Question — Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V · from Schola Thomistica
Question XXX: Whether there is order in charity
I ASSERT that the objects to be loved are in a certain order from the will.
Utrum in CHARITATE sit ordo.
ASSERO, obiecta diligenda esse ordine quodam a voluntate.
IT IS PROVED first by the Holy Doctors from 2 Kings, Ordinavit in me charitatem [He ordered charity in me].
PROBATUR a SS. Doctoribus primo ex 2. Cantic. Ordinavit in me charitatem.
Next it is proved by St. Bonaventure from St. Augustine, book I of de doctrina Christiana, cap. 23, where he says: God, who is above us, is to be loved first; yet he did not say this, speaking of being loved first in time; but in the order of excellence and estimation.
Deinde probatur a S. Bonav. ex D. August. lib. I. de doctrina Christiana, cap. 23. ubi ait: Primo diligendus est Deus, qui est supra nos; non dixit autem hoc, loquens, prius tempore diligendum; sed ordine excellentiae, et aestimationis.
THIRDLY from St. Ambrose in the Gloss brought forward on the words of the Canticles: First God is to be loved, second we ourselves, third parents, then children, after them the household, who, if they are good, are to be preferred to wicked children.
TERTIO ex D. Ambrosio in Glossa ad verba Canticorum adducta: Primo Deus diligendus est, secundo nos ipsi, tertio parentes, inde filii, post domestici, qui si boni sunt, malis filiis praeponendi sunt.
IT IS PROVED fourthly by the Holy Doctor. Prior and posterior is according to relation to some principle, from Aristotle 5 Metaph. t. 16. and to an end. Now order includes in itself some mode of prior and posterior; whence it is necessary that, where there is some principle and some end, there also be some order: but Charity tends to rectify the will toward God as toward a principle and supreme end, in the communication of which the friendship of Charity is founded; and therefore it is necessary that in those things which are loved by charity some order be attended to according to relation to the principle, which is God, who is also the supreme good, which is beatitude. St. Thomas also uses this argument. It is proved more fully by St. Bonaventure in 2 dist. 35 art. 2 quest. 1. On this the others rely, with Tanner disput. 2 quest. 3 dub. 2.
PROBATUR quarto a S. Doct. Prius, et posterius est secundum relationem ad aliquid principium, ex Aristotele 5. Metaph. t. 16. et ad finem. Ordo autem includit in se aliquem modum prioris, et posterioris; unde oportet, ut, ubi est aliquod principium, et aliquis finis, sit etiam aliquis ordo: Charitas autem tendit ad rectificandam voluntatem in Deum, ut in principium, finemque supremum, in cuius communicatione amicitia Charitatis fundatur, et ideo oportet, in his, quae charitate diliguntur, attendi aliquem ordinem secundum relationem ad principium, quod est Deus, qui est etiam summum bonum, quod est beatitudo. Hoc argumento utitur etiam D. Thom. Maior probatur a D. Bonav. in 2. dist. 35. art. 2. quaest. 1. His nituntur alii, cum Tannero disput. 2. quaest. 3. dub. 2.
IT IS PROVED fifthly by the Holy Doctor. One habit tends to one principal object, and to other things by order toward it: but Charity is one habit, having for its principal object the divine goodness, from what was said in q. 19. Therefore the other things loved are regarded as ordered toward it; and thus the principal object is God, to be loved first; then the rest. He repeats the same in the body, and ad 2.
PROBATUR quinto a S. Doct. unus habitus tendit in unum obiectum principale, et in alia per ordinem ad illud: Sed Charitas est unus habitus, habens pro obiecto principali divinam bonitatem, ex dictis q. 19. Ergo caetera amata respiciunt, ut ordinata ad illud; atque adeo principalius obiectum est Deus, primo amandus; deinde caetera. Idem repetit in corpore, et ad 2.
IT IS PROVED sixthly by the Holy Doctor. Order is owed more to deliberative love than to natural love; but natural love is ordered with respect to the things lovable: Therefore.
PROBATUR sexto a S. Doctore magis debetur ordo amori deliberativo, quam naturali; sed naturalis est ordinatus respectu diligibilium: Ergo.
IT IS PROVED seventhly. A bond rightly connecting many things to an end ought to bind them in order to the same end: but Charity is the bond of perfection, from 3 ad Colossenses and from St. Dionysius cap. 4 of de Divinis nominibus, and it binds many things together, being a most liberal love, embracing many diverse things to be gathered in the end: Therefore it unites them in order.
PROBATUR septimo. Vinculum, multa recte connectens ad finem, debet ea ordinate colligare ad eundem finem: Sed Charitas est vinculum perfectionis ex 3. ad Coloss. et ex D. Dion. cap. 4. de Divin. nominibus, eaque multa colligans, cum sit amor maxime liberalis, complectens multa diversa in fine colliganda: Ergo ea unit ordinate.
IT IS PROVED eighthly by the Holy Doctor. What weight is in bodies, love is in spirits, from St. Augustine book 13 of Confessions cap. 9, and book 21 of de civitate Dei cap. 28, and 6 of de Trinitate cap. 10. But weight ought to be well balanced: Therefore also love.
PROBATUR octavo a S. Doct. Quod est pondus in corporibus, est amor in spiritibus, ex D. August. lib. 13. confess. cap. 9. et lib. 21. de civit. cap. 28. et 6. de Trinitate, cap. 10. Sed pondus debet esse bene libratum: Ergo et amor.
You will OBJECT first. Where there is order, there is distinction; but charity with respect to diverse things is one: Therefore it is not ordered.
OBIICIES primo. Ubi ordo, ibi distinctio; sed charitas respectu diversorum est una: Ergo non ordinata.
St. Doctor RESPONDS that order in a habit is attended to in relation to the object; and although charity is not multiple in itself, it nevertheless has many material objects and many acts, by reason of which there are many precepts.
RESPONDEt S. Doct. ordinem in habitu attendi in ordine ad obiectum; quamvis autem charitas non sit multiplex in se, habet tamen multa obiecta materialia, et multos actus, ratione quorum sunt multa praecepta.
You will OBJECT secondly. Where there is order, there is proportion; but among things lovable there is no proportion; for between the created and the uncreated there is none: Therefore.
OBIICIES secundo. Ubi est ordo, ibi proportio; sed inter diligibilia non est proportio; creati enim ad increatum nulla est proportio: Ergo.
St. Doctor RESPONDS that proportion is twofold. One is proportion properly so called, which is the commensuration of things of the same genus, and in this sense the major is false. Secondly, proportion is said broadly, and is any relation which is attended to according to the convenience of analogy; and in this way there is a proportion of created good to the uncreated, and also an order according to the ratio of primitiveness and causality; for the end is more worthy than those things which are toward the end, and in this respect order is attended to in Charity.
RESPONDEt S. Doctor, quod proportio est duplex. Alia proprie dicta, quae est commensuratio rerum eiusdem generis, et hoc sensu falsa est maior. Secundo, proportio dicitur large, et est quaecumque habitudo, quae attenditur secundum convenientiam analogiae; et hoc modo datur proportio boni creati ad increatum, et etiam ordo secundum rationem primitatis, et causalitatis; finis enim dignior est his, quae ad finem, et quantum ad hoc, attenditur ordo in Charitate.
You will OBJECT thirdly. Order pertains to cognition, because it belongs to the wise to order: Therefore if order is not placed in cognition with respect to things to be known, much less ought it to be placed in Charity with respect to things to be loved. If you say that order is in the sciences. Against this: for charity follows the cognition of faith; but in its objects there is no order: Therefore.
OBIICIES tertio. Ordo spectat ad cognitionem, quia sapientis est ordinare: Ergo si non ponitur ordo in cognitione respectu cognoscendorum, multo minus debet poni in Charitate respectu diligendorum. Si dicas, quod ordo est in scientiis. Contra: nam charitas sequitur cognitionem fidei; sed in huius obiectis non est ordo: Ergo.
St. Doctor RESPONDS that there are two kinds of order. The first is of parts in a whole, and of things in the universe: and indeed to order belongs to the intellect. The other is the order of things toward an end, and this is from the will, which tends toward the good, and thus toward the end; and such is the order of Charity.
RESPONDEt S. Doct. duplicem esse ordinem: Primus est partium in toto, et rerum in universo: Et quidem ordinare est intellectus. Alter est ordo rerum in finem, et hic est a voluntate, quae tendit in bonum, atque adeo in finem, et talis est ordo Charitatis.
He RESPONDS secondly that order in habits is attended to in relation to the objects; and because the Supreme Goodness by essence, with respect to the other things lovable, which are participative, is deservedly to be esteemed of more worth; and among those things lovable some participate more or less of goodness, as body less than spirit: hence it is that the love of charity ought to be ordered according to these. For thus also among things knowable there is order: first are the first principles, in which there is the greater evidence of truth; then the knowledge of conclusions follows; and so the assumption can be denied. Nor is it the same with faith; for all the articles are compared equally to the First Truth, from whose revelation all are believed uniformly.
RESPONDEt secundo, ordinem in habitibus attendi per ordinem ad obiecta, quia vero Summa Bonitas per essentiam respectu aliorum diligibilium, quae sunt participantia, pluris merito aestimanda est, et ex eis diligibilibus aliqua plus, vel minus participat de bonitate, ut corpus minus, quam spiritus: hinc est, ut charitatis amor secundum haec sit ordinandus. Sic enim etiam in cognoscibilibus est ordo, ut prius sint prima principia, in quibus est maior veritatis evidentia; deinde scientia conclusionum subsequatur; et ita potest negari assumptum. Nec est simile de fide; omnes enim articuli ad primam veritatem aeque comparantur, ex cuius revelatione omnes uniformiter creduntur.
You will OBJECT fourthly. Just as in faith there is one ratio of believing, namely the supreme truth; so in Charity there is one ratio of loving, which is the supreme goodness: but from the fact that the Truth, which is the ratio of believing, is one, Faith is one, assenting equally to all the articles: therefore from the fact that there is one ratio of loving, charity is one, having itself in the same way toward all things lovable.
OBIICIES quarto. Sicuti in fide est una ratio credendi, scilicet summa veritas; ita in Charitate una ratio diligendi, quae est summa bonitas: Sed ex eo, quod una est Veritas, quae est ratio credendi, una est Fides omnibus articulis aequaliter affentiens: ergo ex eo, quod est una ratio diligendi, una est charitas, eodem modo se habens ad omnia diligibilia.
St. Doctor RESPONDS that the ratio is dissimilar, for in Charity the objects terminating the affection are unequal, even if all are reduced to one.
RESPONDEt S. Doct. disparem esse rationem, nam in Charitate inaequalia sunt obiecta terminantia affectum, esto omnia ad unum reducantur.
You will OBJECT fifthly. Charity is one habit, naturally inclining to the good: therefore equally; for the same thing, always remaining the same, does the same.
OBIICIES quinto. Charitas est habitus unus, naturaliter inclinans ad bonum: ergo aequaliter; nam idem, semper manens idem, facit idem.
St. Doctor RESPONDS that one thing always does the same given an equal disposition in natural objects; otherwise it acts diversely. Thus the sun illumines crystal more than stone; but the will is a potency acting by election, which is ruled by charity, and is itself also moved; it does not, however, remain always the same. Moreover it regards objects lovable in a diverse manner and degree.
RESPONDEt S. Doct. unum semper facere idem, data pari dispositione in obiectis naturalibus; alioqui diverse operatur. Sic Sol magis illuminat chrystallum, quam lapidem; at voluntas est potentia operans ex electione, quae regitur a charitate, quaeque et ipsa movetur; non autem manet eadem semper. Praeterea respicit obiecta, diverso modo, et gradu amabilia.
You will OBJECT sixthly. If order is attended to in Charity, it is attended to either with respect to the habit or with respect to the act; not with respect to the habit, which is altogether one: if with respect to the act: then it is not ordered in a baptized infant, or in one sleeping, who have no act. Therefore I ask, what is attended to in the order of charity? and why is order attended to in it more than in the other virtues, since every virtue is ordered love, as St. Augustine says in de moribus Ecclesiae? And again, since about every good there are mode, species, and order, why is charity rather said to be ordered than moderated?
OBIICIES sexto. Si ordo attenditur in Charitate, aut attenditur penes habitum, aut penes actum; non quoad habitum, qui est omnino unus: Si quoad actum: Ergo non est ordinata in infante baptizato, vel in dormiente, qui non habent actum. Igitur quaero, quid attenditur in ordine charitatis? et cur attenditur magis in ipsa, quam in alia virtute ordo, cum omnis virtus sit amor ordinatus, ut ait D. August. de moribus Ecclesiae? Et rursus, cum circa omne bonum sit modus, species, et ordo, cur potius charitas dicitur ordinata, quam modificata?
St. Doctor RESPONDS that order is attended to in the habit, in relation to the objects. Charity is therefore chiefly said to be ordered, because it is the weight whose it is to balance, and the bond of perfection, whose it is to gather all things in order.
Respondet S. Doct. attendi ordinem in habitu, in ordine ad obiecta. Praecipue igitur dicitur charitas ordinata, quia est pondus, cuius est librare; et vinculum perfectionis, cuius est omnia ordinate colligere.