§ 3. On the order of charity

Preliminary note. The precept of charity extends not only to both internal and external acts, not only to friends and enemies, but also to the due order to be observed a) as to persons to be loved, b) as to goods to be loved.

That charity is necessarily ordered is established from Sacred Scripture, saying: "He ordered charity in me";²⁷ and is taught by all theologians.²⁸ St. Augustine²⁹ beautifully says: "But he lives justly and holily who is an integral estimator of things: and this is he who has ordered dilection, lest he either love what is not to be loved, or love more what is to be loved less, or love equally what is to be loved either less or more, or love less or more what is to be loved equally." - We treat of the order of charity a) as to persons to be loved, b) as to goods to be loved.

A. On the order of charity as to persons to be loved.

²⁷ Cant. 2, 4.

²⁸ Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 26, a. 1 et 2; q. 44, a. 8.

²⁹ De doctr. christ. l. 1, c. 27 (Migne, Patr. lat. 34, 35).

579. It is clear of itself that God obtains the supreme place in the order of charity; for He is to be loved above all things, and our charity toward God ought to be appretiatively, although not intensively, supreme, as was said above, n. 557. Here the discussion will be only about the order of charity among the diverse men to be loved.

But in establishing this order we must attend to three things: to the person who is loved; to the goods which are loved in him or for him; and, if there is question of effective charity, or of providing help, to the necessity in which the person to be loved is placed.

A threefold necessity is usually distinguished: extreme, grave, light. Extreme necessity is judged to be present when a man is placed in proximate danger of bodily or spiritual death. If such proximate bodily danger is present, it is called extreme bodily necessity, e.g. danger of submersion in water; but if that danger is spiritual, namely, proximate danger of eternal damnation, then it is called extreme spiritual necessity, e.g. an infant about to die but not yet baptized is placed in such necessity. Grave necessity is present when someone cannot avoid grave harm of body or spirit without the help of another. Thus, e.g., an adult sinner near death who cannot confess is placed in grave spiritual necessity. For although he can be saved by perfect contrition alone, nevertheless this is done much more securely by confession. He is placed in grave bodily necessity, e.g., who will lose a great part of his fortune unless he is helped by another. Light or common necessity is judged to exist when someone is indeed placed in difficulties, but can provide for himself: common sinners and beggars are placed in such necessity. These things having been noted beforehand, the following rules are to be attended to:

580. Rule 1. Each person is ordinarily bound, other things being equal, to love himself more than neighbor. I say "other things being equal," i.e. in equal necessity and in an equal order of goods.

It is proved. 1. Christ commanded that neighbor be loved as ourselves. Therefore love of self is the rule, norm, exemplar of love of neighbor. But the exemplar is more powerful than the thing exemplified.³⁰

2. Man is naturally more inclined also to spiritual love of himself than to love of neighbor. But this natural inclination, as implanted by the author of nature, cannot be disordered. Hence the common and true adage says: "Well-ordered charity begins from oneself" (namely, from the one loving), or: "Love of another begins from the ego."

From this rule the following practical conclusions are deduced:

a) Man is bound to put his own necessary spiritual good before all other goods. Therefore he can never sin mortally or lightly, or even expose himself to a certain danger of sinning, on account of any good whatsoever of neighbor, whether spiritual or bodily. But if the danger of sinning is not so proximate, then it is licit to undergo such danger for a great advantage of neighbor, e.g. a confessor or physician can fulfill his office, even if temptations arise from it.

b) Someone can licitly, and indeed sometimes ought, to give up his own non-necessary or less necessary spiritual goods for the salvation of neighbor,

e.g. a priest can and sometimes ought to defer meditation in order to hear the confession of a penitent; a woman knowing that she is shamefully desired by a young man can omit Mass on weekdays in order to avoid the sin of the young man; a son or daughter wishing to enter the religious state can remain in the world for the consolation of parents, provided, however, that proximate danger of sinning mortally is not imminent there; it is laudable to make the so-called "heroic act" of charity, i.e. to offer all one's satisfactions for the souls in purgatory.

c) Man is regularly bound to prefer his own bodily life to the life of another. Yet there are exceptions if either the common good or the good of one's own virtue intervenes. Thus a man can and sometimes ought to give his life for the common good; e.g. a soldier ought to give his life for a commander of the army necessary for the fatherland;³¹ those who serve the sick laboring under an infectious disease can expose their life to grave danger on account of the good of virtue, e.g. on account of heroic charity. Concerning this matter the Angelic Doctor writes: "To hand oneself over to death on account of a friend is the most perfect act of virtue; hence the virtuous man desires this act more than his own bodily life. Hence that someone lays down his own bodily life on account of a friend does not happen from this, that someone loves the friend more than himself; but because in himself he loves the good of virtue more than bodily good."³²

³⁰ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 26, a. 4, where another reason for this rule is also assigned.

³¹ Quaest. de carit. a. 9 ad 15.

³² 3, dist. 29, a. 5 ad 3.

581. Rule 2. Neighbors are not to be loved equally by us, but more or less, according as they are nearer either to God or to us. Thus St. Thomas.³³

The reason is that in charity there is a twofold principle, namely, God and we ourselves. But that which is nearer to either principle is to be loved more. Hence better and more perfect men, as more similar and nearer to God, are to be loved more than others less perfect.^33a In this way a holy man is to be loved more than a wicked father. But this is to be understood only of reverence and appretiation, not of the affection of doing good and willing good; for a son can rightly desire that his father, now indeed wicked, later be converted and obtain greater glory than another man who now is holy. Hence as a rule it can be held: those who are nearer to us are to be loved more with the affection of desire and by external work. For, other things being equal, we ought to desire and procure temporal and spiritual goods for them more than for others. But among those joined and near to us, the following order is to be observed, if there is question of common necessity: 1. spouse,³⁴ 2. children,³⁵ 3. parents, 4. brothers and sisters, 5. other relatives, 6. friends, benefactors. But in extreme necessity, namely, if there is question of danger of life, parents are to be preferred to all others; therefore even to spouse and children. Thus St. Thomas³⁶ and, with him, almost all theologians.

³³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 26, a. 6.

^33a Ib. a. 7.

³⁴ Ib. a. 11.

³⁵ Ib. a. 9 ad 1.

³⁶ Ib.

582. Scholion. On limiting these rules. Concerning the rules given, two things are to be noted: 1. If there is question of the common good, these rules are not to be applied strictly; for before the rest we ought to save those men who are necessary for the common good. 2. The rules given indeed oblige in conscience; yet if there is question of light necessity, some inversion of the order does not exceed the guilt of venial sin. Hence, e.g., if someone, his father and mother existing in the same necessity, would assist his mother before his father, this would not be a great sin. Likewise if someone loved a cousin more than a sister, etc.

B. On the order of charity as to goods to be loved.

Among diverse goods such an order exists: 1. spiritual goods, and those supernatural, e.g. grace, eternal salvation; 2. goods of the body, e.g. life, health, integrity of the members; 3. external goods, e.g. honor, reputation, riches. But the following rules are to be observed:

583. Rule 1. We ought to assist a neighbor constituted in extreme spiritual necessity even with danger to our bodily life, if nevertheless a) there is founded hope of saving the neighbor, and b) the common good does not stand in the way. Thus St. Thomas³⁷ with the common opinion.

For Christ says: "This is My precept, that you love one another, as I have loved you."³⁸ But Christ gave His bodily life for the salvation of souls. Hence St. John also expressly says: "We ought to lay down our lives for the brethren."³⁹ This precept obliges at least in the extreme spiritual necessity of neighbor. But the intrinsic reason of this precept is that the eternal life of neighbor is a far more excellent good than our bodily life. It is added that a man, by positing such an act of perfect, and indeed heroic, charity, most certainly merits eternal life. - The reason for each limitation is easily understood: a) because without founded hope of a happy outcome no one is bound to undertake an arduous work; b) because the common good prevails over private good.

Resolves: a) A Catholic maidservant caring for a gravely sick Jewish infant is bound, even with the greatest inconvenience to herself, to baptize such an infant, unless persecutions of the Church are truly feared from this.

b) A pregnant mother would be bound, even with danger to life, to undergo a Caesarean operation, if otherwise the infant would have to die without baptism. Yet in practice the mother is sometimes indeed to be admonished to permit this operation, but almost never is a strict obligation to be imposed on her. For 1. it is not certainly established that the infant will still be alive after the operation; 2. valid baptism can be administered with moral certitude to an infant existing in the mother's womb by means of some instrument.

c) A parish priest ought, with danger to life, to administer the necessary sacraments wherever an infectious disease rages. For although a man can be saved through an act of contrition, nevertheless not all the sick are capable of eliciting an act of perfect contrition, and the necessity is truly extreme for a dying man who has lived in a habit of sinning and is so untaught that he does not know how to elicit an act of contrition. A similar obligation falls upon another priest if the parish priest and his assistant are lacking. On the contrary, extreme necessity does not seem to be present if someone throws himself into a river with the intention of suicide; for he can elicit an act of contrition and by his own fault has brought himself into that danger. Therefore in that case there does not seem to be present a strict obligation of saving such a suicide with imminent danger to one's own life.

³⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 26, a. 5.

³⁸ Jo. 15, 12.

³⁹ 1 Jo. 3, 16.

584. Rule 2. Outside the case of the extreme spiritual necessity of neighbor, the obligation of assisting him does not press either with imminent danger of life or even with another very great harm to oneself. Exceptions, however, are the cases in which the common good or a special office requires help even with very great bodily harm.

The reason is that in these cases there is question either of the extreme bodily necessity of neighbor, namely, of imminent danger of bodily death, or of other grave necessities but not extreme ones. In the first case no one is bound to assist neighbor with grave harm, because he is not even bound to preserve his own bodily life with great harm, as was said above. Therefore, a fortiori, he is not bound in these circumstances to preserve the bodily life of neighbor. Thus, e.g., a rich man is not bound to give a great sum of money to save a sick neighbor from certain death. But if there is question of other grave necessities of neighbor, then he rather than I is bound to undergo the same necessity. Only a) the necessity of the community is excepted, since the common good prevails over private good, and b) a special office undertaken. Hence pastors of souls are bound, even with danger to life, to administer the sacraments to their subjects; a physician appointed for some hospital is bound to care for the sick laboring under a contagious disease. The reason is that in these cases neighbor is to be assisted not only from charity, but also from justice.

585. Rule 3. A neighbor constituted in grave necessity, whether spiritual or bodily, is to be assisted with only moderate inconvenience, unless nevertheless other titles, such as justice, piety, or an office undertaken, impose a wider obligation.

The reason is that charity toward oneself precedes charity toward neighbor. Wherefore in the grave necessity of neighbor no one is bound to assist him with his own grave inconvenience, but only with moderate inconvenience.

Resolves: a) You are bound, even with some but not with great inconvenience, to lend money to a man constituted in such necessity that without your money he is compelled to make a surrender of all his goods (commonly, to make Bankrott, faillite). If, however, there is no or little hope of recovering the money to be lent, you are not now bound, because the probable loss of a rather great quantity of money is a notable inconvenience.

b) A rich man is not bound to give a great sum of money for this, that a sick poor man may be able by extraordinary means, e.g. by taking baths in a distant place, to recover health. The reason is the same.

Concerning a wider obligation from the added titles of justice, piety, and office, enough has already been said above.

586. Rule 4. Neighbor living in common or light necessity is to be assisted with only light inconvenience.

The reason is that charity indeed demands that we assist neighbor living in some necessity; but if this necessity is only light, there also exists only a light obligation of assisting, because the neighbor can help himself. In a light or common necessity of this kind there live, e.g., ordinary beggars. Wherefore we are bound to give them alms only with light inconvenience, as will be explained more fully below, n. 594.

By combining all the rules stated, the following order results: in the order of charity a man is bound after God to love 1. himself according to spiritual goods; 2. neighbor as to the same goods; 3. himself as to bodily goods; 4. neighbor as to the same goods; 5. finally himself and then neighbor as to external goods.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 25.