Chapter I: The Varied Character, Universality, and Order of Love or Friendship

Utility. - It matters very much that we acquire for ourselves a distinct account of the order of charity, and that we understand well the connatural concord between love of ourselves and love of neighbor.

I. Varied Character. — 1. Since every friendship is founded in some communion of life, as many as are the communions, so many will be the genera of friendship. The ineffable communication by which, through supernatural sanctifying grace, we communicate in the divine life, founds a friendship at once most sublime, since it is of charity whose primary object is the divine Goodness itself in itself, and most universal, since it joins even the pure spirits with us and with our neighbor.

Communication in nature begets the universal society and friendship of men whom God has not punished with infernal degradation.

Besides, unequal conjunctions among rational creatures take their beginning from unequal communications in other goods: as in the family and in the state.

Conjunctions which rest upon a communion of lower life can be observed both from charity and from benevolence of a less high honesty.

For since they have been foreseen and willed by the most wise God, charity itself commands their observance. They integrate the order of charity, rather than being repugnant to the law of charity.

And by honestly cultivating the various friendships of the lower order, we exercise virtues which indeed are inferior to charity, but which nevertheless, in a just man, will not lack their own proper merit. Therefore we can observe legitimate conjunctions in a twofold way: insofar as, in the very exercise of charity, we attend to them; and insofar as, from an inferior motive, we show ourselves faithful friends.

2. No true love consists in exterior action alone: we can honestly offer a good and useful action even to brute animals, indeed to plants.

Wherefore, according to varied exercise, we can distinguish love of the heart, or interior love; love of the mouth, or that which is in signification; and love of work, which is in beneficence. This distinction is to be attended to in the very order of charity.

II. Universality of Charity. — It is commanded that neighbor be loved even with affection.

A neighbor is only and every rational creature, with the damned excepted. For these, like irrational creatures, are excluded from the beatitude in whose communication charity rests. - He is to be loved even with affection. For there is no true love which is merely exterior. Besides, from internal benevolence proceeds the beneficent action which we exercise toward ourselves. But from the mouth of Christ we have received the second precept, similar to the first, in these words: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Therefore every neighbor is to be cherished with a general affection of benevolence.

To this point pertain both propositions 10 and 11 condemned by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679, among those condemned and prohibited at least as scandalous and pernicious in practice: "We are not bound to love neighbor by an internal and formal act." - "We can satisfy the precept of loving neighbor by external acts alone" (Denz. 1160, 1161).

2. That office does not demand that we elicit formal acts of universal love. It is enough that, on a given occasion, the good or evil of any neighbor which we know should excite in us some joy of approbation or some compassion, which demonstrate some general disposition of benevolence or sympathy. It is also manifested and exercised by general prayers, for example, Our Father, Hail Mary, from which we exclude no one.

III. Order of Charity. — 1. Things to be noted beforehand. Between right love of ourselves and of neighbor there is no opposition per se, but, on the contrary, a wonderful concord. We cannot love our neighbor better than by right love of ourselves, by which we become more perfect and therefore more powerful for helping our neighbor. Indeed, on account of the community of goods which follows friendship, our good is already the good of our neighbor, at least when there is question of those true goods which are not to be divided in such a way that the more one receives, the less can fall to another. And in turn, by loving neighbor we love ourselves, since right love of neighbor is meritorious. Therefore, while we procure spiritual goods for our neighbor, we in no way per se harm our own spiritual good, and we can expect more helps from a better neighbor. But if, for the utility of neighbor, we neglect our temporal goods, indeed life, that detriment of the inferior order is abundantly redeemed by compensation of the superior good (2, 2, q. 26, art. 4). Hence the friend who gives his life for his friend chooses for himself the greater good, and therefore loves himself more than his friend.

Wherefore the true question concerning practical preference, by which we prefer one to another, arises rather among various neighbors than between ourselves and neighbors. For when there is question of others, those whom our beneficence does not help do not obtain of themselves the merit and compensation of the superior order, which he obtains who "seeketh not her own" (1 Cor. 13, 5).

Therefore, without any appearance of "egoism," we can establish, with St. Thomas, that right order demands that from charity we love ourselves more than neighbor, who nevertheless is to be loved equally, because charity as referred to us is founded in our participation of divine beatitude, while others are loved as associates in that participation (2, 2, q. 25, art. 12; q. 26, art. 1 and 4). Besides, according to Sacred Scripture and Christ Himself: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," love of ourselves is the rule for love of neighbor; but the rule is prior to the thing ruled.

Besides the communication in eternal beatitude, upon which theological charity is founded, there are among men unequal communications in other goods, which beget various conjunctions: for example, in the family, in the state. These conjunctions, since they have been foreseen and willed by the most wise God, are not repugnant to the law of charity, but rather integrate the order of charity, so that according to charity itself they are to be observed.

2. A twofold principle of order. After St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 26, art. 6, we acknowledge a twofold principle of order: one on the part of the object, which is God; the other on the part of the subject, which is the very one who loves; and according to unequal nearness to one or the other principle the very character of love from charity varies. Thus, according to the Holy Doctor, the intensity of affection is taken from the one loving; wherefore with a more intense affection we will more strongly the good which we can wish for and procure for those nearer to us (l. c., art. 7). But always the one loving himself is the principle and, as it were, the rule of loving one near to him.

— 3. The order of charity. a) As to interior acts. If there is question of simple complacency and approbation, we ought to will to each neighbor the good which he has. "It pertains to charity that it wish the justice of God to be preserved, according to which the better participate more perfectly in beatitude" (2, 2, q. 26, art. 7). Wherefore in this love, which is mixed with estimation and brings with it honor, worship, and reverence, the better, the holier, are to be placed before the less holy, although the latter are more joined with us. For a similar reason, even in the order of lower communion, parents are to be loved more than children or wife, benefactors more than those to whom we have done good ¹ (2, 2, q. 26, art. 9-12).

But if there is question of benevolence and desire, by which we wish for another a good not yet possessed, just as the solicitude of providing is increased by subjective nearness, so it will be consonant with order that we desire more the good of those who are bound to us by a closer bond. Wherefore, in this order, the wife who is one flesh with the husband, children who are something of the parents, are preferred to the parents themselves.

b) As to signification. Charity ought also to be manifested by exterior signs. These vary according to the quality of the person and the very conjunction. Observances are owed to superiors, affability to equals, benignity to inferiors. There exist common signs, which are to be denied to no one per se, and special signs, among those who are nearer.

c) As to beneficent action. Finally, true charity ought to be beneficent. In estimating the laudable acts and offices of charity, the order of charity must here be composed with the various necessities.

¹ Nevertheless by natural inclination we love more those to whom we have done good, because something of our own has been placed in them, and thus we love ourselves in them. Hence he testifies humble friendship who accepts a benefit: he consents that he belong in some way to another.

— Moreover necessity is distinguished by a twofold genus: spiritual, which is considered with respect to eternal life (not simply with respect to the life of grace); temporal, which is estimated with respect to temporal life.

Extreme spiritual necessity is that of him who without the help of another undergoes a certain and proximate danger of eternal damnation, so that this ruin is morally certain, for example, a child about to die without baptism. An uninstructed unbeliever is also in a similar necessity, or an uninstructed faithful person who has lived very badly; but not every uninstructed faithful person: for he can help himself by an act of contrition.

Grave spiritual necessity is that which is overcome with difficulty: as when someone is in a sufficiently proximate danger of losing the faith or good morals. - Common spiritual necessity presses sinners or those who are about to sin unless they are taught or corrected.

Extreme temporal necessity is that from which death or an equivalent evil in moral estimation threatens one in need: perpetual servitude, infamy, violation, ruin of health. An evil is said to threaten insofar as it will follow certainly and shortly, for example, within a few months. Cf. Busenbaum, Dubium de eleemosyna; St. Alphonsus, l. 2, 31; Lugo, De Iustitia, d. 16, n. 135; Genicot-Salsmans, I, 222. To this necessity is almost equated that which is called quasi-extreme, when the danger of an extreme evil is less threatening, yet probable, or when an evil threatens which is almost equivalent to death: perpetual weakness, grave positive infamy. - Grave necessity is constituted by a grave evil threatening, by which, however, those goods are not taken away which nature willed per se to belong to all: for example, loss of riches, of office, being cast down from one's state, captivity that is not most grave. - Common necessity is defined by that remote danger of life in which those who have no goods are habitually placed. It is the common lot of beggars; wherefore it is said to be theirs.

In the material description of necessities not all strictly agree. Lugo, d. 16, n. 154, proposes a sufficiently useful rule of formal distinction, so that you call necessity extreme, quasi-extreme, grave, according as privation with moral certitude affects goods which nature willed simply to be present to all, or per se to be available to all, or, on the contrary, granted to some and denied to others. Another formal account is taken from the relation which the good has with the temporal good which is the greatest and fundamental, that is, with life.

The Order of Charity Composed with Various Necessities. — 1. Between ourselves and neighbors, as to beneficent action, these general principles or norms are shown by the very order of charity.

1. It is lawful for us to postpone necessary spiritual good to no utility of neighbor: wherefore, with certain prevision of mortal sin, no works can be offered to neighbor. - Spiritual good which is not necessary, but certain, we must postpone to office, but to no utility of neighbor whose care has not been imposed upon us. Wherefore neither can a son desert his needy mother, nor can a religious violate obedience, in order to preach the Gospel to barbarians. But it is not to be advised that we redeem the utility of neighbor by the loss of spiritual good. - It is lawful to prefer uncertain spiritual good to the utility of neighbor. What is to be counseled must be gathered from the circumstances. Wherefore, for a probably more perfect life, it is lawful to renounce a very good action among the people, although it is not always more expedient.

But see that you observe that that opposition between our spiritual good and the utility of neighbor is only accidental. Thus, in the classic example of the son who is impeded by the office of piety toward poor parents from entering religion, or from going to foreign missions, the son per se can become no less holy among his parents than in the midst of barbarians. But human frailty brings it about that we yield to the difficulty of the circumstances.

2. We must postpone our bodily good to the extreme spiritual necessity of an individual neighbor; we can per se, but are not bound to, postpone it to the bodily good of neighbor.

3. As to external goods, we can per se, but are not bound to, prefer an individual neighbor to ourselves; and therefore, by the same reason by which it is lawful to neglect physical care of the body on account of another temporal utility of our own, by the same reason it will be right to neglect the body on account of the utility of neighbor.

4. Our spiritual good excepted, when there is question of other goods, common utility ¹ is to be placed before one's own.

These principles are easily shown if you consider: a) that it is fitting that we love ourselves more than neighbor with the love of charity; b) that spiritual detriment is compensated for us by no good, while bodily and temporal detriment admits compensation by a better good; c) that through the body and exterior goods, but not through spiritual goods, we are members or parts of a community; but parts exist for the whole, and therefore their good must yield to the good of the community.

¹ By the name of utility is meant what in Italian or French we would call interesse. Wherefore this word comprises not only useful goods but even especially necessary goods.

— 2. Among neighbors themselves, the same order of charity orders that we first succor private persons more joined to us, and indeed by attending first to those to whom we must bring help per se. Wherefore neighbors come in this order: wife or husband, children, parents, collateral blood-relatives and relatives by affinity, household members and familiars. One exception to that order is admitted: in extreme necessity, parents, because they have given life, are said to be preferred even to wife and children. Cf. Laymann, L. 2, t. 3, c. 3, n. 5.6.

Necessary public good is to be placed before private good; non-necessary public good cannot be preferred to necessary (or obligatory) private good; it can be preferred to non-necessary private good, and this per se is laudable.

— 1. Various communications in goods beget various conjunctions which can be observed from the supreme friendship of charity; and they also give place to various honest friendships, but of inferior dignity. And, according to varied exercise, interior charity is distinguished, its exterior signification, and its exterior operation.

2. We are ordered to love neighbor not by exterior action alone but also with affection, since we must love him as ourselves, and no true love can be merely exterior. But the interior affection calls for its connatural manifestation.

Moreover neighbor is only and every rational creature, with the damned excepted. Hence the universality commanded of love, which, besides formal acts which are contained in general prayer (Our Father), requires no other expressly universal acts: it is enough that, when the occasion is given, general benevolence be exercised.

3. Between right love of ourselves and of neighbor, there is no opposition per se, so that without any appearance of "egoism" we can establish the principle: from charity we must love ourselves before neighbor, who nevertheless is to be loved equally. This is gathered clearly from the words of Christ: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," and from the foundation of charity. But the question concerning practical preference arises rather among various neighbors than between ourselves and neighbors. Moreover the principle of order is twofold: on the part of the object, which is God, and on the part of the subject, which is ourselves, as loving.

4. The order as to interior acts. By simple complacency and approbation, the better are to be preferred in our estimation to the less holy; but by benevolence of desire, those more joined to us are rightly preferred.

5. As to signification, signs are to be accommodated to the quality of the person and to the conjunction.

6. As to beneficent action, the order of charity must be composed with various necessities. There is distinguished, with respect to eternal life, spiritual necessity, and temporal necessity with respect to the present life. He is pressed by extreme spiritual necessity whose eternal ruin, without another's help, would be morally certain; by grave spiritual necessity, he who will overcome ruin with difficulty; by common spiritual necessity, he who, unless he is helped, is about to sin or not morally at once about to recover grace. Extreme temporal necessity is that of him who, without another's help, will not escape the danger of imminent death or of an equivalent evil; grave temporal necessity is constituted by an evil absolutely or relatively grave threatening; but a grave evil is one by which the quality of the present life is notably affected, although it leaves intact those goods which nature willed to be common to all. Common necessity is defined by removing that danger in which those who have no goods are commonly placed. Between extreme and grave necessity there lies quasi-extreme, when the danger of an extreme evil is less imminent, or an evil threatens which is almost compared with death.

These things having been posited, these are the norms of effective charity. a) Between ourselves and neighbors: it is lawful to prefer our spiritual good to the utility of neighbor; it is not always expedient; sometimes we must; but we must postpone it to office: nor then can there be question of our necessary good. - We must postpone our bodily good to the spiritual extreme necessity of neighbor; to bodily necessity, per se, we can, but are not bound. In external goods we can prefer an individual neighbor to ourselves but are not bound. Our spiritual good excepted, public or general necessity or utility is to be placed before our own.

For we must love ourselves before neighbor; but, contrary to spiritual detriment, bodily and temporal detriment admits the compensation of a better good. Moreover, through exterior goods and the body, but not through spiritual goods, we are parts of the community; but parts exist for the whole.

b) The norms among neighbors themselves return to this: that we first succor private persons more joined to us, and, among these, those to whom we must bring help per se. In extreme necessity, however, parents, since they have given life to us, are to be preferred to all others.