II. On the Order of Charity

What order generally is to be observed in charity toward neighbor?

In the order of charity each one is bound after God to love: 1. himself according to spiritual goods, insofar as he wills God, his end, i.e., the supreme and uniquely necessary good, more to himself than to another; then neighbor as to the same spiritual goods; 2. himself as to intrinsic bodily goods, such as life, health, etc.; then neighbor as to the same bodily goods; 3. himself, and then neighbor, as to external goods, such as reputation, honor, riches. The reason is that love of self is the rule of love of neighbor. But the rule is prior and preferable to what is ruled. Therefore love of self always precedes and is preferred to love of neighbor, where the matter concerns goods of the same order and equal necessity.

Of the same order: Supernatural goods are to be preferred to natural goods. Likewise the common good is to be preferred to private good, because the common good of many is more divine than the private good of one. Intrinsic natural goods, life, health, integrity of members, are to be preferred to extrinsic goods, reputation, honor, riches. But reputation and honor with respect to riches are of a higher order, because they are something spiritual and moral.

Necessity, whether temporal or spiritual, is distinguished as threefold: 1. Extreme, when danger of life, that is, of eternal damnation or death, or of another evil almost equal to death, so presses upon the neighbor that he, morally speaking, cannot escape it without another's help. And it is quasi-extreme if he can free himself, but only with the greatest difficulty; or if there is only probable danger of the aforesaid evil: of life, of integrity of principal members, of liberty, of a most grave disease, of infamy. 2. Grave, when someone suffers great danger to the salvation of the soul, or to the life of the body, or of another grave evil, which he cannot escape without great difficulty. Such is the necessity in which those things necessary for conserving one's state are lacking. 3. Common or middling, in which someone can provide for himself without great difficulty. In this, in the spiritual order, are vulgar sinners who, if they wished to apply some effort, would rise again from a depraved state; but in the temporal order poor beggars are generally in it, for whom life, according to their condition, is not too burdensome and miserable. Tambur., Expl. Dec., l. 5, c. 1, § 1, n. 4 seqq.; § 2, n. 5 seqq.; Suarez, de Carit., d. 9, s. 2, n. 4; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, aa. 4-6; q. 31, a. 3; q. 32, a. 3; q. 44, aa. 7, 8; L. 25, 27, 31; H. A. 18.

Resolves: He sins against charity toward himself, gravely or lightly according to the gravity of the matter, who neglects due care of soul or body. - It is indeed licit, speaking per se, to deprive oneself of spiritual goods not necessary for salvation because of the spiritual or bodily good of neighbor, as it would be to omit entering religion, lest there be lacking one who may devote labor either to a parish, or seminary, or mission, or in order to support his parents or children. Indeed someone can wish for and procure for his neighbor greater spiritual goods, not necessary, than for himself, contempt of them being excluded. But it is not licit to sin lightly or gravely, nor to undergo proximate danger of sinning, in order that you may impede another's sin, when your fall appears in some way certain; otherwise, if that danger can become remote, so that you may rightly trust that you will not fall. L. 26; l. 4, n. 78; l. 5, n. 63; l. 6, n. 453; H. A. 14; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, aa. 3, 4.

In extreme spiritual necessity, neighbor must be helped even with certain danger to life, provided that these four things are established: 1. that there is equally certain hope of helping him; 2. that the neighbor has no one else by whom he may be relieved; 3. that the neighbor is certainly to be damned unless he is helped by you, so that it is established for you that the neighbor cannot free himself from sin through baptism, through the sacrament of penance, or at least through perfect contrition; 4. that a graver evil is not thence imminent, e.g., if, because someone dies for that cause, the salvation of several others is endangered. - 1 John 3:16; L. 27; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 5; Reginald., Prax. For. Poenit., l. 4, c. 25, s. 6, n. 357.

In extreme temporal necessity, neighbor must ordinarily be helped with great inconvenience indeed, but not with the greatest, such as even for a rich man would be a great largess of money. The reason is that on the one hand the life of neighbor is a more excellent good than some good of ours; and on the other hand, since love of self precedes in order, no one is obliged to undergo such great inconvenience for others. L. 31; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66, a. 7.

In grave necessity of either order, no one is bound to help neighbor with his own grave inconvenience, yet title of justice, piety, office, or common harm being excluded. The reason is the same, because namely the good of neighbor can be more excellent than some good of ours; but, since love of self always precedes by force of charity itself, charity does not command procuring the good of neighbor except always with less detriment to ourselves than the harm of neighbor which is urgent. Hence the common saying: Charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience. Excluded, etc.; whence by justice pastors, namely Bishops and parish priests, are bound, with danger to life, to minister to their sheep the necessary sacraments, such as baptism and penance, but not others. Nor can the pastor then renounce his office, although he can substitute others with the just permission of the Ordinary. A pastor is also bound, with great temporal harm to himself, to procure great spiritual utility for a subject. L. 27; l. 6, n. 621; S. Th. l. c.

In common necessity of either order, neighbor must be helped with some inconvenience indeed, because love of neighbor requires this, but only a light one; for there can only be a light obligation of charity when the neighbor can fairly easily rescue himself from that necessity, or it is not too burdensome to him. But we are not bound to help all persons placed in common necessity. For this is impossible, and if it could be done, it would no longer be a light inconvenience. L. 32; S. Th. l. c.

Is it against charity to wish death for oneself because of misfortunes of life? - R. Negatively, if it is done from desire of a better life or eternal happiness, as is clear of itself; or when life is so troublesome that it is judged harsher than death itself. Phil. 1:21-23; Ecclus. 30:17; 1 Mach. 3:50-60.

R. Affirmatively, if this is done from weariness of life and dejection of soul; yet this does not exceed venial sin, if that desire is inefficacious, and does not wish contrary to the order of divine Providence. For it is a certain pusillanimity and timidity, which fears all things, even light things, and per se is light. Very often also defect of advertence and deliberation excuses. Cf. 373; Struggl, q. 5, n. 12; Viva, in prop. 13-15 Innoc. XI, n. 3; L. 30; l. 5, n. 22; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 64, a. 5 ad 3.

In those things which are necessary for life, is it licit to prefer another to oneself? - Some probably deny it, because the order of charity demands that someone, other things being equal, love himself more than neighbor. Yet except if the public good required saving the life of the other. Others probably affirm it, for in these things one does not in reality love neighbor more than oneself, but loves the good of heroic virtue more than life; Tob. 2:3-8; 12:12. But except if he who exposes himself is necessary to the republic or to his own family. Hence it is licit to yield to another the plank from a shipwreck; to give oneself up to enemies for preserving the fatherland unharmed; to defend a prince by interposing one's body against the weapon of an assassin. For this is not to inflict death on oneself, but to permit it. But from a most grave cause it is licit not to withdraw oneself from danger of death, indeed to expose oneself to it voluntarily. And thus it is licit also for a Carthusian gravely ill to meet death rather than eat flesh-meat, from love of virtue, and of faith given to God, or of keeping a vow. - L. l. 3, n. 366; H. A. tr. 8, n. 1; S. Th. 3, D. 29, a. 5 ad 3; Struggl 20, tr. 7, q. 3, n. 8.

What order especially is to be observed among neighbors? The order to be observed in charity regards both the love itself, and the goods, and the persons. - As to love, one must attend whether it is a love merely appreciative and of simple complacency and joy concerning goods possessed, which is followed by worship, honor, reverence; or a love of efficacious benevolence and mercy by exterior work, by which we will and procure for another goods not yet possessed. - As to persons, there must be attended both the comparison to God, according to which some are more excellent and better than others, and the comparison to us, according to which some are more joined to us than others; but with ourselves we do not have conjunction, but unity and identity. As to goods, some are more excellent than others and more necessary, as was already declared in n. 389. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, aa. 7, 9, 11, 12.

First, by the love of simple complacency, the better are to be loved more. - "Among neighbors, we ought to love more the better and those more closely related." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 44, a. 8 ad 2. For since "the principle of love is God and the one loving himself, it is necessary that according to greater nearness to either of these principles, the affection of love be greater." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 6. - Hence by appreciative love of simple complacency and joy, parents are to be loved more than children or wife, benefactors more than those benefited; for the former have a greater likeness with God, the common parent and benefactor of all, and are more closely joined with God, the chief object of charity. By the other love of beneficence and mercy, those more closely joined are to be loved more. "It must be said that from this very fact that it is said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, it is consequently given to be understood that those who are more near are to be loved more." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 44, a. 8 ad 3. If the intensity of love is considered, "those who are more near to himself a man loves with more intense affection toward that good to which he loves them, than better persons toward a greater good." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7. For every movement has intensity of speed from the disposition of the movable thing and the power of the mover. S. Th. ibid.

If conjunction with God and conjunction with us are considered at the same time, "some neighbors are near to us according to natural origin, from which they cannot depart, because according to it they are what they are. But the goodness of virtue, according to which some approach God, can come and recede, increase and diminish; and therefore from charity I can will that this person, who is joined to me, be better than another, and thus be able to arrive at a greater degree of blessedness." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7. "But there is also another mode by which we love more from charity those more joined to us, because we love them in more ways. For toward those who are not joined to us we have only the friendship of charity; but toward those who are joined to us we have certain other friendships, according to the mode of their conjunction to us. But since the good upon which any other honorable friendship is founded is ordered as to an end to the good upon which charity is founded, it follows that charity commands the act of any other friendship." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7.

For there are various friendships of men: the supernatural friendship of charity is founded upon communication of supernatural goods; other friendships are founded upon communication of particular goods. All these friendships can be subordinated to the first. Hence the same Angelic Doctor, 2. 2. q. 103, a. 3 ad 2, says: "The reason of loving neighbor is God. And therefore the charity by which God and neighbor are loved is the same. Nevertheless there are other friendships different from charity, according to other accounts by which men are loved." Therefore, other things being equal, by love of benevolence and desire, by which we will and wish for another a good not yet possessed, which beneficence follows by doing good, those who are more joined to us are to be loved more as to those goods which are owed to such conjunction. The reason is that communication of goods is the foundation of friendship and charity. And thus in those things which pertain to nature we ought to love blood relatives more; in matters pertaining to civil communication, our fellow citizens; in military matters, fellow soldiers ought to be preferred to others. But in spiritual helps greater account is to be had of those who are judged our sons, fathers, or brothers according to the spirit. Nevertheless not improbably carnal parents, even in spiritual matters, are to be preferred, partly because their conjunction with us is founded also in these things; partly because carnal conjunction, the foundation and basis of other conjunctions, is by its own nature prior and more stable, while other conjunctions supervene upon it and can be removed, as S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 8, warns. But the grace of charity does not destroy the inclination of nature, but perfects it and directs it to a supernatural end. S. Th. l. c., a. 7. And what has been said of parents ought by the same reason to be said of children and carnal brothers, in comparison with spiritual sons or brothers.

Finally in goods pertaining to nature and to conserving bodily life, help must be given, other things being equal: 1. to one's wife, because she is one flesh with the husband; 2. to children, for whom by natural right parents are more obliged to provide than conversely; for children ought not lay up treasure for parents, but parents for children, says the Apostle, 2 Cor. 12:14, and teaches S. Th., a. 9; 3. to parents, but more to the father than the mother, because he obtains the more excellent account of principle, S. Th., a. 10; indeed, in a case of extreme necessity, S. Th., a. 9, 11 ad 3; q. 31, a. 3 ad 4, thinks that parents must be helped before all others, even wife and one's own children, since they were the cause and principle of our existing; therefore equity demands that in extreme necessity, by freeing them from destruction, we repay as much; 4. to brothers, sisters; 5. to other blood relatives; 6. to benefactors, friends. Other things being equal; for to a distinguished benefactor or friend, for example, help must be given by the law of charity rather than to a blood relative not very near or not well deserving of us. Similarly it seems that spiritual brothers must be helped more, even in temporal goods, than relatives not very near, since spiritual conjunction excels carnal conjunction.

There is indeed no order on the part of the good which we wish for the neighbor through supernatural charity, if generally such good is considered according to itself. "As to this we love all men equally from charity, because we wish for all the same good in genus, namely eternal blessedness." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 6 ad 1. Yet if the aforesaid good is considered according to the diverse participations of blessedness, we ought from charity to will a greater good to those who are nearer to God. "And this pertains to charity, that it wills the justice of God to be preserved, according to which the better participate more perfectly in blessedness." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7.

But if necessary good is attended to, other things being equal, those are to be loved more, and indeed with efficacious love, who are in greater necessity. For since the obligation of this efficacious charity is not except by reason of necessity, it is clear that generally the greater necessity obliges more. But since a greater or lesser obligation also depends on greater or lesser conjunction, and there are diverse degrees both of need and of nearness, no universal rule can be determined for all cases as to whom help should be given more. Therefore this requires the judgment of a prudent person. And thus, generally, a stranger in grave spiritual necessity must be helped rather than a blood relative in grave temporal necessity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26; q. 31, a. 3; q. 32, a. 9; q. 44, aa. 7, 8; q. 64, a. 6 ad 2; L. 27.

Is it against charity to desire a temporal evil for neighbor, or to rejoice over it, because of a good end? - R. Negatively, if the due order of charity is preserved, i.e., if it is done because of a greater good, or because of a lesser evil. R. Affirmatively, if the order of charity is perverted. Confirmation from propositions 13, 14, 15 condemned by Innocent XI. - To desire; with an inefficacious desire; for it is not licit to inflict evil on neighbor, and therefore neither to desire it efficaciously.

Therefore it is licit to wish temporal evil for neighbor, or to rejoice over it: 1. because of the spiritual good of the neighbor himself; 2. because of the common good, whether spiritual or temporal; 3. because also of the good of many persons, of much greater moment, e.g., of the family, community, etc. - But it is illicit for a wife to desire the death of her husband because she is unjustly treated badly by him, or of her daughter in order to avoid her own trouble, because, on account of deformity or poverty, she cannot marry. - Hence, if it is against charity to wish evil for neighbor, it is also against charity to imprecate evil upon neighbor; and each per se is grave. For if charity commands loving neighbor, it consequently forbids hating him, which is to will evil. - L. 30; l. 5, nn. 21, 22; S. Th. de Carit., q. un., a. 8 ad 10; 3, D. 30, q. 1, a. 1 ad 4; 2. 2. q. 76, a. 1; Viva, in prop. cit., n. 20; Struggl, q. 5, n. 9; E. M. 389.