Validity of vows

Substantial mistake about the matter of a vow or about the circumstances which are regarded as entering into the substance of the matter invalidates a vow. For substantial mistake hinders consent of the will; consent was given to something which was not there, and so there was no contract. A vow, then, dedicating to God a chalice which is thought to be silver, while in reality it is gold, would be invalid, just as a sale of it would be under the same mistake. Merely accidental mistake about things of little moment which were not really the motive for taking a vow does not invalidate it. However, according to St Alphonsus,¹ it is a probable opinion that a mistake about something connected with a vow, which if it had been known before would have prevented its being taken, is sufficient to invalidate it. This doctrine may be applied to private vows, but it cannot be extended to the vows of religion, which place the religious in a permanent state of life. In order to invalidate these, mistake must be substantial. For just as the perpetuity of the state of marriage, the good of the parties concerned, and the public good, require that only substantial mistake should invalidate marriage, so for the same reasons only substantial mistake invalidates the vows of religion, by which the religious enters into mystical espousals with Christ.

Fear arising from natural causes, provided that it does not take away the use of reason, does not invalidate a vow. If, however, grave fear be unjustly caused with a view to compelling another to take a vow, the vow is null and void (Can. 1307). The same is probably true even if the fear be slight. For God cannot be supposed to accept a promise which has not been freely given, but on the contrary extorted by unjust violence,

¹ Theol. Mor., 3, n. 226.

I. Requisites on the part of the one vowing. There are required a will to bind oneself, sufficient knowledge of the thing promised or of the object of the vow, and perfect liberty.

1. A will to bind oneself, at least implicit; for this belongs to the essence of a vow. When the aforesaid will is lacking, there is a mere proposal (St. Thomas, In IV Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 201).

Corollary I. One who is ignorant of the obligation of a vow vows invalidly, because he lacks the will to bind himself; for the will is not borne toward what is unknown. Except one who wills to vow as others are accustomed to do, even if he merely is ignorant that an obligation arises; for he has an implicit will to bind himself (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

Corollary II. One who wills to vow, but positively excludes the obligation, does not vow; for although the obligation itself is the effect of a vow, nevertheless he who positively excludes the obligation does not have the mind, not even implicitly, of binding himself (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

2. Sufficient knowledge of the thing promised or of the object of the vow; namely, distinct knowledge is not required, but vague knowledge suffices; yet this, if distinct knowledge is lacking, is required per se. I said:

a) Distinct knowledge is not required, but vague knowledge suffices. The reason is that vague knowledge suffices for the one vowing to consent to the object, that is, to those things by which the object is constituted. Hence, for example, a vow of chastity is valid when the one vowing knows that by this vow carnal pleasures are renounced, although he is ignorant of precisely what these pleasures consist in; likewise even if he is ignorant of the "mysteries of life," as they are called.

b) Vague knowledge, if distinct knowledge is lacking, is required per se; for, when this too is lacking, the one vowing does not consent to the object, since it is in no way known. It is said per se, because even vague knowledge does not seem to be required if the one vowing expressly intends to vow what others vow; for then he implicitly consents to the object. Hence one who, for example, in vowing chastity, expressly intends to vow what is vowed by others seems to vow validly, even if he is ignorant, for example, that by a vow of chastity carnal pleasures are renounced. But a defect even of vague knowledge seems almost hypothetical.

Corollary I. Error obstructs validity if it concerns the substantial elements of the thing promised, that is, whether its substance,¹ or the final cause,² or a circumstance which notably changes the substance.³ The reason is that, while error concerning substantial elements remains, consent to the substance is lacking. That a circumstance which notably changes the thing also must be referred to the substantial elements follows from the fact that in this case, according to common estimation, there is a substance or thing morally diverse (St. Alphonsus, III, 198).

Corollary II. Error does not obstruct validity if it concerns either circumstances of lesser moment,⁴ or the impulsive cause.⁵ The reason is that consent to the substance of the thing promised is not lacking. And this holds even if the error gave occasion to the vow;⁶ for the question is not what someone would have done, but what he did. But the fact that, once the error was removed, he would not have consented, does not prevent the fact that he consented (St. Alphonsus, III, 198).

Corollary III. Religious vows, no less than other vows, are void because of error concerning substantial elements, because the reason given above, being drawn from the nature of the thing, must hold here too. Nevertheless, in practice, the said vows will scarcely be void except because of error concerning the very substance of the vows, because, when that error is lacking, error generally will not be such as to constitute a morally diverse object.

3. Perfect liberty, that is, such as is required for sinning gravely; for only an act fully human or fully deliberated suffices for undertaking an obligation (St. Alphonsus, III, 196). Hence vows are invalid when made before the age of discretion, or by one semi-insane, semi-drunk, semi-asleep, or arising from fear which so disturbs the use of reason that full deliberation is impeded. But vows emitted in fervor of devotion are valid, and generally also those which are emitted from sudden passion or levity of mind, because sufficient deliberation generally is present.

Fear which does not impede full deliberation influences a vow in this way:

a) The following do not obstruct validity: 1. grave fear (a fortiori light fear) struck from within, that is, by a cause that is not free; hence a vow emitted in danger of shipwreck is valid; 2. grave fear (a fortiori light fear) justly struck. The reason is that in each case, on the one hand, full deliberation is supposed, and on the other hand no injury has been done to the one vowing, so that no reason exists why the vow would be invalid; 3. grave fear (a fortiori light fear) unjustly struck, but not for extorting a vow, does not obstruct validity; hence a vow emitted so that God may rescue you from the hands of robbers is valid. The reason is that, in relation to the vow, no injury is inflicted on you (St. Alphonsus, III, 197).

b) At least by canon law, grave fear struck from without, unjustly, and for extorting a vow, obstructs validity (can. 1307, § 2). It is disputed whether such fear also by natural law impedes the validity of a vow. Some affirm, and they extend this also to light fear, because God does not accept a vow of this kind, lest He give force to unjust compulsion. Others deny, because, in their opinion, a sufficiently solid reason cannot be alleged why God would not accept a fully deliberated act (cf. St. Alphonsus, cited place).

¹ For example, someone vows a thing of his own which he judges to be glass, when it is a gem.

² Someone vows a Mass for the health of his father, when he is dead.

³ Someone vows a pilgrimage which he judges to be three leagues, when it is six leagues.

⁴ Someone vows a pilgrimage which he judges to be three leagues; but it is three and a half leagues.

⁵ Someone vows alms to be given to poor Peter, whom he judges to be religious, when he is irreligious.

⁶ Suppose that in the cases set forth under 4 and 5, had the error been absent, he would not have vowed the pilgrimage or the alms.

II. Requisites on the part of the thing promised. The thing promised must be possible, morally good, and better than its contradictory.

1. Let it be possible, and indeed physically and morally. For there can be no obligation to physically impossible things; but an obligation of morally impossible things, since it would tend to detriment, is not accepted by God. If the thing promised is partly possible, partly impossible, the vow is valid for the possible part, if the matter both is divisible by its nature, and by the intention of the one vowing has been promised dividedly. If in the matter of a vow one thing is principal and another accessory, the vow is valid as to the possible principal thing, although the accessory is impossible; but not the converse (St. Alphonsus, III, 202).

2. Let it be morally good, because God is offended by an evil thing and is not worshiped by an indifferent thing; hence a promise of things of this kind is not accepted by God. An indifferent thing indeed can be done in an honorable manner; but the thing, not the manner, is supposed to be vowed. Otherwise one must speak if an act indifferent in itself becomes good because of a circumstance; in that case, as clothed with that circumstance, it can be vowed.

3. Let it be better than its contradictory; and this either in itself, or with the circumstances considered, because a promise of abstaining from a thing by which God is worshiped more is not accepted by Him.

Corollary I. A vow of not sinning at all, whether perpetually or for a notable time, is null. For that is impossible without a special privilege of God.¹ But a vow of avoiding all mortal sins is valid; likewise a vow of employing special care to avoid all sins; likewise - but only in a person of solid virtue - a vow of avoiding either all fully deliberated venial sins, or a certain species of venial sins not so difficult to avoid, for example a vow of not stealing. Otherwise one must speak concerning a certain species of venial sins which scarcely can be avoided, as are, for example, idle thoughts (St. Alphonsus, III, 203). A vow of always doing what is held to be more perfect is valid in a person of very great virtue, insofar as it is understood of fully deliberated acts.

Corollary II. A vow of not marrying, or of chastity, is generally valid. I said generally, because it is disputed whether it is valid if it is pronounced in the world by one for whom, because of peculiar frailty, a peculiar danger of incontinence is imminent. Some deny, because marriage seems better, all things considered. More commonly it is affirmed, because, since other means of preserving continence are available, celibacy is better and remains so. A vow of a thing prescribed, since it is morally good, is valid, and effects that a transgression is also opposed to religion (St. Alphonsus, III, 213). A vow emitted against the precept of a superior is valid if the superior only forbade vowing; in that case the act of vowing is evil, but the object which is vowed is good, as is supposed. Otherwise one must speak if a thing forbidden by the superior is vowed.

A vow made concerning a good work, but for an evil end:

a) It is valid if only the act of vowing is elicited for an evil end, for example if someone publicly vows alms in order to gain vainglory (St. Alphonsus, III, n. 206).

b) It is not valid if a good work is vowed as to be directed to an evil end alone, or from a mere affection for an evil thing, for example alms to be given for vain glory alone, or only for seducing someone to sin. The reason is that the thing promised, as it is intended - that is, as a means of attaining an evil end - is evil. If a good work is vowed as also to be directed to a good end, the vow is valid, and the thing promised seems to have to be performed for the good end alone, because the thing promised, as it is intended, is also good (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

A vow made concerning a good work, but for an indifferent end (for example if someone vows fasting in order to save expenses): such a vow is not valid if a good work is vowed as to be directed to an indifferent end alone; if a good work is vowed as also to be directed to a good end, the vow seems to be valid, as was said concerning a good work to be directed to an evil end and to a good end.

A vow emitted from affection for a good thing, even if joined with an evil cause or condition, seems to be valid, because the thing promised, as it is intended - that is, as a means of obtaining a good or licit thing - is good; for example if you vow alms so that you may not be caught in a crime (St. Alphonsus, III, 206).

Corollary III. A vow of marrying is not valid per se, because the opposite is better; it is valid per accidens: 1. if someone is otherwise bound to marriage; 2. one who, because of a particular danger of incontinence, emitted the said vow, more probably is bound by the vow, but only conditionally, namely unless he wishes to use other means; 3. likewise, per se, a vow of marrying a poor girl is valid if one is going to marry someone (St. Alphonsus, III, 207, 209; VI, 75). Likewise, a vow of passing to a laxer Religion is invalid. Likewise, a vow not to vow is invalid, because to vow is better; nevertheless a vow of not vowing without the counsel of the confessor is valid. He who has emitted this vow and nevertheless, without consulting the confessor, vows, acts validly but illicitly; besides, in that case, more probably he would also vow invalidly if the one vowing had intended from the beginning that vows emitted without the counsel of the confessor would be null, and without attending to this intention emitted a vow (St. Alphonsus, III, 210).

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 23.

Knowledge and Deliberation Necessary for Valid Vow.—In the intellect of him who takes a vow there must be such knowledge and deliberation as are required for making an important contract, for he who takes a vow assumes a grave obligation (see 1883). The rule given by many is that the deliberation which suffices for a mortal sin suffices also for a vow, but this does not appear to be exact, since a mortal sin may be committed when there is only a confused perception of the gravity of the sin (see 177).

(a) Thus, a vow is invalidated by substantial ignorance or error (e.g., Titus, thinking his gold watch is brass, vows to give it as an alms; Balbus, thinking that a distant sanctuary is not very far off, vows to make a pilgrimage to it; Claudius, being wrongly informed that his father is sick, makes a vow to go on a pilgrimage for his father’s recovery), but not by ignorance or error that is merely accidental (e.g., Sempronius, thinking that a sanctuary which is four miles away is only three miles distant, vows to go there on pilgrimage, but he would have made the vow, even though he had known the true distance; Caius, intending chiefly to perform an act of religion, and secondarily to visit a friend, vows a pilgrimage to a neighboring town, not being aware that the friend has moved elsewhere). The vows of religion, according to the common opinion, are not invalidated on account of ignorance or error about accidentals, even though the vows would not have been taken had these accidentals been known; for the common good demands that the religious state, like the married state, have stability, and that those who enter it intend to accept all the obligations that go with it.

(b) A vow is invalidated by the absence of full deliberation (e.g., vows made by children who have not the perfect use of reason, by persons who are only half-conscious or who are delirious or laboring under a hysterical delusion or fixed idea, by persons who act on the impulse of the moment without full advertence to the import or force of the vow), but not by the absence of long or studious deliberation (e.g., a vow is valid if one has thought over its meaning and obligation, even though one has done this hurriedly and without reflection on the details and has regretted the vow soon after its pronouncement).

Freedom of Will Necessary for Valid Vow.—In the will of the person who takes a vow there must be freedom of choice, and the absence of such impediments as take away self-determination or consent.

(a) Thus, the natural law itself invalidates a vow made under force or under such fear as takes away the power of giving due deliberation to the vow.

(b) The natural law, according to many, invalidates a vow made under fear that is grave (though not disturbing to the reason), and that is produced unjustly and with a view to coerce one into making the vow. The reason for this opinion is that God cannot accept a promise to Himself caused by injustice, nor can one be held to a promise made under unjust pressure.

(c) The positive law (see Canon 1307, Sec.3) invalidates a vow given under grave and unjust fear. Many canonists interpret this law as meaning that even when the unjust fear is not employed as a means to force one into taking the vow, but does in reality cause one to take the vow, the promise is null in both forums in virtue of Canon Law.

Cases in Which Fear Does Not Invalidate a Vow.—(a) All admit that fear does not invalidate when it proceeds from a natural cause (e.g., vows made during a storm at sea) or an internal cause (e.g., vows made under the influence of fear that one will fall into sin without the protection of the vow); for in these cases one chooses a lesser burden to avoid a greater one, and the thing chosen is involuntary, not simply, but only in a certain respect (see 44).

(b) It is commonly admitted that fear does not invalidate when it proceeds from an external and just cause (e.g., if a guilty person were threatened with the penalties of law unless he vowed not to repeat the offense), since the cause of the vow is then internal rather than external, namely, the guilt of the person who takes the vow and his wish to evade punishment.

Vows of Doubtful Validity.—In the following cases it is disputed whether fear invalidates a vow.

(a) It is disputed whether fear unjustly caused invalidates in the forum of conscience when it is light (e.g., Titia constantly importuned by her parents to enter religion makes a vow to follow their wishes). Some answer in the negative, because a fear that is slight both in itself and in its influence on the vower cannot be considered as the real cause of the vow. Others answer in the affirmative, because light reasons do move persons to take grave steps, and it is not reasonable to think that God will accept a vow brought on by unjust, though light, fear.

(b) It is also disputed whether grave fear unjustly caused invalidates, when the person who causes the fear intends to force the vower, not to the vow, but to something else (e.g., Balbus threatens to kill Caius unless the latter pays a large sum of money, and Caius vows to give the money to religion if he escapes the danger). Some hold for the affirmative and refer to Canon 1307, mentioned above. Others hold for the negative because the vow is taken, not to accommodate the aggressor, but to honor God and benefit self. This is the interpretation given the pre-Code legislation. Still others distinguish, affirming invalidity for the case in which fear is the cause of the vow and denying invalidity for the case when fear is only the occasion of the vow.

The Intention Necessary for a Valid Vow.—As was said in the explanation of the definition, a vow must include a will to bind oneself, that is, the intention to make a vow.

(a) The object of this intention is the obligation itself, not its fulfillment. Hence, he who makes a vow, but intends not to oblige himself, vows invalidly; for he has two contrary intentions and (unless the intention to vow is stronger) the substance of the vow is excluded. On the contrary, he who makes a vow, intending not to fulfill it, vows validly but illicitly, since he really intends to oblige himself, but he sins by his purpose not to keep his vow (see 1883).

(b) The quality of the intention must be such that the character of the vow as a deliberate act and a sincere agreement to obligation will be preserved. Hence, an habitual intention (e.g., Claudius intending to take a vow on the morrow pronounces the words of promise while asleep) does not suffice, because the act made with such an intention is not deliberate or human. Likewise, an external intention (e.g., Balba forced by her parents to enter a convent takes the vows, intending only the external rite) and an indirect intention (e.g., Sempronius, foreseeing that if he drinks certain liquors he will bind himself by vow to a number of things, takes the drinks and makes the vows) are not sufficient, because with them there is no real agreement to obligation. On the other hand, it suffices to have an actual but implicit or tacit intention (e.g., Titus receives subdeaconship intending the obligations annexed to the office, but not knowing that celibacy is a duty vowed by subdeacons), or a virtual intention (e.g., Caius intended to make religious profession, but at the moment of pronouncing the vows he is distracted and gives no attention to the words), for in either case there is a human act and real agreement to obligation (see 2164, 2165).

What sort ought the intention of a vow to be? - For the validity of a vow a true and deliberate intention of emitting a vow is required, or a true promise made to God and inducing obligation from the virtue of fidelity. For a vow is in the likeness of a certain law which the one vowing, otherwise capable of weighing the burden which he assumes, imposes upon himself. But no one is judged, short of sufficient deliberation of mind, to oblige himself. Hence a vow essentially differs from a purpose, because a purpose means a deliberate will of doing or omitting something, without the mind of obliging oneself. Therefore a purpose, however firm, produces no bond of obligation, nor is omission of the thing proposed a sin, unless perhaps sometimes per accidens, for example, on account of inconstancy, weariness, or negligence, which per se do not exceed venial sin. C. Litteraturam 3, de Vot.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 1; L. 196-199; Struggl 3, 16.

You will resolve: For the validity of a vow, not just any will and deliberation suffice which would suffice for mortal sin. For grave sin, it is enough to know confusedly the gravity of guilt and to have the voluntary at least indirectly and in the cause; but a more perfect cognition and willing of the burden to which one obliges oneself is required where the matter concerns a promise and an obligation to be contracted. For good is from an integral cause, evil from any defect. "Since the obligation of a vow is most grave, intention, deliberation, and perfect liberty are required, by which someone freely and directly in himself has willed to promise with the mind of obliging himself." L. 196. Therefore a vow made with half-full advertence or deliberation does not oblige. Likewise vows made in drunkenness, even foreseen beforehand, and thus willed in the cause, are not valid, since they are not willed in themselves and directly.

Yet for this full and perfect deliberation it is not required that someone weigh exactly all the circumstances which can allure toward a vow or deter from it; but it suffices that someone has sufficiently recognized the burden and obligation of the vow as to substance. Likewise virtual intention suffices, which proceeds from a previous actual intention. Hence one who, from a previous intention of religious profession, emits the three vows of religion, although altogether distracted in mind, is truly bound by them. But if someone vows with the positive mind of not promising, nor obliging himself from religion, certainly the vow is null. If someone also wishes to promise, knowing the obligation of a vow, but does not wish to oblige himself to the promise and vow, more commonly and probably he is not held by the vow. But thus to vow without the mind of obliging oneself, Sanchez, etc., say is ordinarily only venial on account of a certain disorder. Ordinarily, because in religious profession and reception of sacred orders it would undoubtedly be mortal, because it would be deception in a most grave matter. L. 196, 201; S. Th. 4, d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, q. 1 ad 2; Struggl 5, 6; Laym., l. 4, t. 4, c. 1, n. 4.

Note: "For a vow an implicit promise suffices, as is clear in the reception of sacred orders, where, although it is not said, I vow, or I promise chastity, nevertheless this vow is made implicitly, by this very fact, that, knowing that the Church has annexed this vow to orders, you receive them. But whether, if someone plainly were ignorant of this, he would still be judged to vow from implicit intention, is doubtful. Some affirm, but others more probably deny, and say that such a person is bound to chastity, not from a vow, but from the precept of the Church." L. 200; Struggl 6.

Is a vow made through error valid? - R. Negatively, if the error concerns the substance of the thing, or substantial circumstances, or those which are principally intended, or pertain to the substance, or notably change it; because then the thing promised is not sufficiently known and willed. Indeed St. Alphonsus, n. 198, adds: "it is certain that error concerning the substance invalidates a vow, even if it was concomitant, that is, not giving cause to the vow, for example, if even when the error was known, you would still have vowed; and even if the error was however crass." For even such ignorance renders the act non-voluntary.

R. Affirmatively, if the error is only concerning an impulsive cause. "The vow is valid, because that is only a secondary cause, and if it is set aside, the act is sufficiently voluntary according to its substance. Nor does such an error vitiate the act in other contracts; for example, someone vowed a pilgrimage to Rome with zeal for worshiping God, and at the same time also had a secondary impulsive cause, that he might visit his brother, whom he thought to be at Rome; even if afterwards he understands that the brother is not there, he does not therefore cease to be obligated by the vow." L. 198.

R. Affirmatively also, if the error concerns accidental circumstances of lesser moment, which would not have stood in the way of the vow if, the error being excluded, they had been known; for one who vows is judged to oblige himself to undergo merely accidental inconveniences which can occur in fulfilling the vow. Thus St. Liguori, who nevertheless in n. 198 does not deny that it is probable that error invalidates a vow in accidental circumstances, if these are of great moment, and if, had they been known, the vow would not have been emitted. Cf. 563, 567, 597, 598.

Yet vows must be excepted which are emitted after the novitiate in any approved order; for these are not void because of any error, except only substantial error, concerning the substance. For by their nature they constitute a stable and irrevocable state; and therefore one dependent upon no other error than substantial error. Moreover, because otherwise it would follow that many Professions would be invalidated, to the grave damage and scandal of the commonwealth. This also holds concerning marriage. L. ib.; Lugo, de Iust. et Iure, d. 22, n. 88; Sanch., de Matr., l. 10, d. 9, n. 20.

Is a vow made through fear valid? - R. Negatively, if the fear is grave, unjust, inflicted from without in order to extort the vow. The reason is that that cannot be acceptable to God which is violently extorted from someone through injury, since the law of nature demands that right be restored entirely. And this indeed proves that vows of this sort are invalid by natural law. It is clear, moreover, from canon law as to solemn vows of religion, and probably also as to other vows. C. Perlatum 1, de His quae, etc.; L. 197.

Unjust; for if the fear is just, the vow is valid, since there is no true coercion in that which one ought to do, nor is the one vowing reasonably unwilling. Inflicted in order to extort the vow; for otherwise the vow is valid, for example, if someone, fearing death which robbers threaten, made a vow to God that he might be delivered. Grave; whether a vow emitted from light unjust fear is invalid, "Busembaum here affirms with Suarez and Filliucci. Likewise Navarrus and many others cited by Sanchez, Decal., l. 4, c. 3, n. 24. The reason, as they say, is that fear therefore annuls a vow because it takes away full liberty of consent; therefore light fear also will annul it, when it takes away the same liberty and is the cause that the vow is made. And Sanchez calls this opinion probable. But the opposite opinion is more probable, which Sanchez holds, n. 24, with Soto, Valentia, Sa, Azor, etc., and the Salmanticenses, ibid., n. 161, who call it common, and prove it from C. Perlatum, de His quae vi, etc. The reason is that light fear, which can easily be cast off, is not judged to be the cause of so grave a thing as a vow, just as we shall likewise say concerning contracts, n. 718." L. 197.

R. Affirmatively, if the fear arises from within or from a necessary cause, unless it takes away the use of reason from the one vowing; the reason is that vows of this sort are simply voluntary.

Is one bound by a vow who doubts whether he emitted the vow; whether he emitted it with sufficient deliberation; whether he has fulfilled the vow emitted? - R. To the first: negatively; and the same must be said if you doubt whether something is comprehended by the vow; you are not bound as to the part about which you doubt. For an obligation is not to be imposed unless it is certainly established.

R. To the second: it is certainly impossible that, while a true and positive doubt remains concerning sufficient use of reason and sufficient deliberation, a certain obligation of a vow should be had from it. For a vow essentially includes perfect deliberation of reason. Therefore if this is doubtful, consequently the vow is doubtful, and its obligation doubtful. Suarez, l. 4, c. 6, n. 10. In a negative doubt, before the seventh year the presumption is for defect of deliberation; after the seventh year, the presumption is for sufficient deliberation.

R. To the third: negatively, for the same reason as to the first, if the doubt is positive. But affirmatively if the doubt is negative, because possession then stands for the vow. L. 196; Elbel, de Actib. human., 156 seqq.

Must the matter of a vow be something morally possible? - R. Affirmatively. The reason is that a vow is a promise made to God with the intention of obliging oneself; but no one can oblige himself to something morally impossible for him. But if the thing is divisible and in part possible, the vow is valid for this part. Except, however, if it were clear that the one vowing wished to oblige himself to both parts by way of one thing, and had both before his eyes indivisibly. The reason is that a vow is a particular law, which is not extended beyond the intention of the one vowing; and therefore if the one vowing collectively promised both parts, and one depending upon the other, if one is impossible, the whole vow remains void. Thus the Salmanticenses, tr. 17, c. 1, n. 74, who soon after, ibid., nn. 75, 76, add several examples of vows which either are to be observed in the part which remains possible, or are judged void because of the impossibility of some part. But a vow is not valid if the thing is morally indivisible. L. 202, 225.

You will resolve: A vow of doing whatever is more perfect is not valid without a special impulse of the Holy Spirit; nor a vow of avoiding all sins, even venial sins, even half-deliberate ones; because this is morally impossible without special grace and privilege. Trent, sess. 6, c. 23. A vow of avoiding all mortal sins is valid, or even all fully deliberate venial sins, because this is morally possible with the ordinary help of divine grace, and does not need a special privilege, provided, however, that the matter concerns persons truly pious. "But a vow," adds St. Alphonsus, n. 303, "of abstaining from venial sins in some determinate matter is commonly valid, especially in persons of great virtue; but in others of moderate virtue it will be impossible matter; indeed in some matters, for example of unchaste thoughts, idle thoughts, etc., since they are unavoidable for all, the vow is null." But the Salmanticenses and others cited by the same St. Alphonsus, l. c., assert on the contrary that a vow of avoiding all venial sins, even if it were concerning fully deliberate sins, is altogether invalid, as concerning a thing morally impossible, from c. 23, sess. 6, Trent. But in this canon the discourse is not only about fully deliberate sins. Sanchez, in Decal., l. 4, cap. 5, n. 17.

Must the matter of a vow be something morally good, indeed concerning a better good? - R. Affirmatively. The reason is that otherwise the promise of a vow would not be pleasing and acceptable to God. "Vows which are concerning vain and useless things are more to be mocked than to be kept." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 2 ad 3; L. 204. Likewise a promise which impedes a greater good, under this respect, detracts from the worship of God, and consequently cannot be pleasing and acceptable to him, so as to beget an obligation in conscience from the motive of religion, or divine worship. But this better good is not to be understood comparatively to any good whatever, but comparatively to its opposite, so that this good is such that its positing is better than its omission. Likewise a better good is understood not only absolutely in itself, but also relatively to the circumstances. Cf. the formula of the oath of certain Colleges of the City. M. E., v. 21, pp. 351 seqq.

You will resolve: A vow of a good thing from an evil end is not valid, if the evil end stands on the side of the vow itself, namely if the vow itself is ordered to an evil end; for example, if you vow alms in order to obtain the successful outcome of theft. The reason is that the giving of alms for such an end is a blasphemous action, as though God would furnish help for sinning. Likewise a vow is not valid from a cause evil in itself, as for example if you make a vow because you have won an unjust lawsuit, or have killed an enemy.

It must be said otherwise, according to the common opinion, if the bad end only accompanies the vow accidentally, and stands entirely on the side of the one vowing; for example, if someone vows on account of the glory of God, but with some vanity, and from vain ostentation more gladly vows externally.

Likewise a vow of a good thing with a bad condition is valid, if the vow is made from affection toward the good thing, as it is good, although joined with a cause or occasion and bad condition; as if someone vows alms because he was not caught, or if he is not caught, in theft. For although theft is evil, nevertheless not being harmed is not evil, but a gift of God; and the vow does not fall upon the evil, but upon the good, insofar as it is good in itself. Much more does this hold if the vow is made from detestation of the bad condition; as if someone vows alms if and as often as he blasphemes.

A vow concerning a thing otherwise prescribed is valid, because a vow of this sort is concerning a thing good in itself, since it is supposed to be prescribed, and is concerning a better good, since it can confer a new bond and greater fidelity and devotion in fulfilling the law. L. 206, 213; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 6; Laymann, l. 4, tr. 4, c. 2, n. 7.

Is a vow invalid concerning a good which impedes a greater good? - These are the words of St. Alphonsus, nn. 207, 209: It is invalid and a venial sin to vow a good which is an impediment of a greater good, as especially are vows against the evangelical counsels, for example, to remain in the world, to take a wife, to go to military service, to engage in trade. Yet if some good, lesser per se and absolutely, should become by accident a greater good, then to vow such things is valid; for example, if someone saw that reception of orders would be harmful to him. Hence a vow of marrying, speaking per se, is null, even if it is concerning marrying a poor woman, a prostitute, or for removing the sins of others, because celibacy is always more pleasing to God. It is otherwise if the vow was emitted in order to repair scandal, or the honor of a girl from obligation, or for the common good; or also, far more probably, because of experience of one's own frailty, supposing that such a person does not wish to use other remedies. For in such a case marriage is a greater good, since it was granted by God for calming concupiscence for him who does not wish to take up other better remedies. 1 Cor. 7:9. Cf. 554, 558.

Does he sin, and how, who vows an evil thing? - These are the words of St. Alphonsus, nn. 204, 205: He who vows a vain, useless, indifferent thing sins venially. He who vows a mortal sin sins mortally. He who vows a venial sin, some say sins venially, others mortally. "It seems more probable to me that it is a grave fault, since of itself it is blasphemy to will that evil should redound to the honor of God; but commonly because of ignorance this is only venial." Cf. 554.

320. For the validity of a vow there is required a true and deliberate intention of emitting a vow, or a true promise made to God and inducing obligation; for a vow is after the likeness of a certain law, which the one vowing, otherwise capable of weighing the burden which he assumes, imposes upon himself. But the will and deliberation which are required for mortal sin suffice ¹.

¹ These words do not mean that, for the validity of any vow whatsoever, that discretion and maturity of judgment suffice which suffice for sinning mortally. For for grave sin it is enough to know confusedly the gravity of the guilt, just as for merit a general and confused notion of moral good suffices; but for assuming an obligation a general and confused notion of obligation does not suffice; rather, a more perfect knowledge is required of the burden to which one obliges himself. Certainly this knowledge demands that the adjuncts necessary to be known for prudent deliberation be present to the mind of the one deliberating. Thus, then, understand that equal advertence of mind suffices in each case, although for assuming either the obligation of a vow or of betrothal, prudent deliberation and advertence is more difficult, and therefore demands a greater discretion of judgment.

Hence a vow differs essentially from a purpose; because a purpose, however firm, does not produce a bond of obligation, nor is omission of the proposed matter a sin, except perhaps sometimes by accident, for example on account of inconstancy, weariness, or negligence, which per se do not exceed venial sin. - St. Alphonsus, n. 196-199.

321. Questions. Q. 1. Whether a vow made with ignorance of the obligation, or with inadvertence to the obligation already known, is valid?

Resp. To the first. A vow made with every kind of ignorance of the obligation which it induces is not valid; because without the intention of obliging oneself there is no vow.

Resp. To the second. It is valid if the person who emits the vow habitually knows clearly its obligation, although he does not actually attend to it; or also if he who vows, although he does not clearly know the obligation, nevertheless apprehends it confusedly, or wills it implicitly, when, for example, he wishes to vow this or that, just as others are accustomed to vow ². Nevertheless it must generally be held that no greater obligation is induced beyond that which a person wills to impose upon himself and has apprehended. - St. Alphonsus, n. 201.

² An implicit promise can suffice for a vow. Thus certain religious emit vows merely by professing obedience according to the rule. This is more clearly evident in the reception of sacred orders; for although one does not say, "I vow," or, "I promise chastity," nevertheless this vow is made implicitly by this very fact: that, knowing the Church has annexed that vow to those orders, you receive them. But if someone were entirely ignorant of this, St. Alphonsus judges (lib. 6, n. 809) that more probably he is not bound by the vow; and this can scarcely seem doubtful, for the obligation of a vow is wholly from the will which imposes that obligation on itself; but there is no will where there is no knowledge. Nevertheless the Church could compel such a person either to abstain from sacred ministry, or to observe chastity, and indeed by emitting a vow (as St. Alphonsus more probably holds, lib. 3, n. 200, after Laymann), or certainly so that he be guilty of sacrilege unless he observes it, because she commands it from the virtue of religion, as the same St. Alphonsus observes (lib. 6, n. 809).

Q. 2. Whether a vow emitted from error is valid?

Resp. 1. It is denied, if the error concerns the substance of the matter, or substantial circumstances, or those which are chiefly intended, or pertain to the substance, or notably change it ³; because then the promised matter is not sufficiently known and willed. - St. Alphonsus, n. 198, and others.

³ Error concerning a merely impulsive cause does not vitiate a vow; because this is only a secondary cause, and when it is set aside, the act is sufficiently voluntary according to substance. For example, someone vowed a pilgrimage to Rome with zeal for worshiping God, and at the same time also had a secondary impulsive cause, namely to visit his brother, whom he thought to be in Rome. Even if afterward he understands that he is not there, he does not for that reason cease to be bound by the vow. St. Alphonsus, lib. 3, n. 198. Nevertheless Sanchez rightly observes (Decal., lib. 4, c. 2, n. 51) that, because of an error of this sort, an easier cause for dispensing is furnished.

Resp. 2. It is affirmed, if the error concerns accidental circumstances of lesser moment which would not have stood in the way of the vow if they had been known with the error set aside; for he who vows is judged to oblige himself to undergoing merely accidental inconveniences which can occur in fulfilling the vow. - Thus St. Alphonsus ⁴, Elbel.

⁴ Nevertheless St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 198) does not deny that it is probable that error invalidates a vow even in accidental circumstances, if these are of great moment, and if, had they been known, the vow would not have been emitted.

Nevertheless vows must be excepted which are emitted after the novitiate in any approved order; for these are not void because of any error, except only a substantial error concerning the substance. St. Alphonsus, l.c. The reason is, as Lugo says (De Iust. et Iur., disp. 22, n. 88), "because in those things which constitute a state firm and irrevocable by its own nature, such as profession and marriage, the will, according to the nature of the thing in question, accommodates itself and consents without restriction or condition, but entirely absolutely and independently of other conditions besides those which are of the substance of the same contract. For from these conditions marriages and professions would remain uncertain, and therefore the state itself, which is not according to the nature of the thing in question." And, as Sanchez adds (De Matr., lib. 10, disp. 9, n. 20), from dependence of this sort it would follow that many professions and most marriages would have to be judged void, which would redound to grave damage and scandal of the commonwealth.

322. Q. 3. Whether a vow made from fear is valid?

Resp. 1. It is denied, if the fear is grave, unjust, and inflicted for extorting the vow. The reason is that that cannot be acceptable to God which is extorted by force from someone through injury, when the law of nature demands that the right be restored in full. And this indeed proves that vows of this sort are invalid by natural law. It is clear, however, from canon law with regard to solemn vows of religion, and more probably also with regard to other vows, according to the more common interpretation of theologians. - St. Alphonsus, n. 197.

Resp. 2. It is affirmed, if the fear arises from within or from a necessary cause, unless it takes away from the one vowing the use of reason; the reason is that vows of this sort are simply voluntary. Likewise if the fear proceeds from a light cause, because light fear is not judged to influence the act efficaciously, and is rather the occasion than the cause of the vow. - Thus commonly with Sanchez ⁵, Azor, the Salamancans; and St. Alphonsus says this is more probable, n. 197.

⁵ Nevertheless Sanchez (In Dec., lib. 4, c. 3, n. 23) judges probable the opinion of those who hold that vows are invalid when fear, even relatively light, yet unjust, was in reality the cause of vowing; which they affirm both of simple vows and of religious profession, at least with regard to the forum of conscience; for in the external forum light fear is not presumed to be the cause of a vow.

Q. 4. Whether he is held by a vow who doubts whether he emitted a vow or a mere purpose, or whether he had sufficient deliberation?

Resp. To the first. No. It is clear from what has been said about probabilism. But if in promising he believed that he would sin if perhaps he did not carry out the proposed matter, it can be judged that he truly vowed ⁶. - St. Alphonsus, n. 201.

⁶ Except, however, the uneducated, who not rarely falsely think that they sin when they break a purpose, especially if the matter concerns certain pious works to be performed at their own time, for example reciting the crown of the Blessed Virgin Mary daily, or fasting on individual Saturdays, etc.

Resp. To the second. No, for the same reason, when he positively and gravely doubts concerning sufficient deliberation. For the most part the matter is to be decided from the circumstances considered. - St. Alphonsus affirms, n. 196 ⁷. - See Cases, n. 305 and following.

⁷ Suarez, after he has reviewed various causes on account of which there can be doubt concerning defect of sufficient deliberation, namely either because of weak age, or because of a state of drunkenness or madness, or because of a vehement affection either of anger or of fear, rightly concludes that the disagreement, if there is any among the doctors, does not concern principles, namely whether a vow is valid where sufficiency of deliberation is uncertain, but when that defect ought to be supposed or not supposed. Thus he says (De Relig., tr. 6, lib. 4, c. 6, n. 10): "I observe... that it is one thing to ask whether, with a true doubt standing concerning actual use of reason and sufficient for free consent, an obligation arises; but it is another thing to ask when there is, or is not, such doubt. In the former question it is always true, with the hypothesis standing that such doubt is true, that the vow does not oblige, because it is doubtful whether it is a vow, and thus all the things said above proceed. Therefore the said authors properly treat the second question, and in that sense say that a vow made from the heat of anger, if it is not positively and by an almost certain judgment clear that it took away the use of reason, obliges; because the heat of anger alone by itself does not suffice to constitute moral doubt about sufficient use of reason, unless other circumstances accede."

** The Salamancans (tr. 17, c. 1, n. 11) rightly affirm with others that it is not a sufficient indication of defect of liberty and deliberation that someone immediately repents of his vow. For this can arise from levity and inconstancy of mind. But they themselves (ibid.) give another reason, namely that it often happens that acts fully deliberate are immediately retracted by us because of a new difficulty, consideration, or circumstance. St. Alphonsus seems to be looking to these things (lib. 3, n. 196), where, alleging this place of the Salamancans, he says that it must be seen whether other joined circumstances are present.

But these things need some suitable explanation, so that they can be reconciled with another doctrine which the Salamancans have (ibid., n. 152), and which after them St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 226) thus presents: "The Salamancans themselves, c. 1, n. 152, judge that that is a notable change which, if it had been known from the beginning, a person would not have obligated himself. This opinion," namely that in the case there is no obligation of the vow, "seems to me no less probable, indeed perhaps more probable, than the first... Because when a circumstance not foreseen supervenes, by which the vow is rendered more burdensome, the matter of the vow becomes different from that promised."

324. Questions. Q. 1. Whether a vow concerning matter already prescribed from another source is valid?

Resp. It is affirmed, first because it is not repugnant for a debtor to be obligated by diverse titles; then because a vow of this sort concerns a thing good in itself, since it is supposed to be prescribed, and it concerns a better good, since a new bond can confer greater fidelity and devotion in fulfilling the law ². - Thus commonly. - St. Alphonsus, n. 213. - Salamancans.

² Moreover, to actions placed from a vow of this sort there accedes the nobility which flows from the virtue of religion and the notion of richer merit.

Q. 2. Whether a vow of a good thing with an evil end, or an evil condition, is valid?

Resp. To the first. No, if the evil end holds itself on the part of the thing vowed, for example if you vow alms in order to obtain a successful outcome to theft, or in thanksgiving for robbery. The reason is that the giving of alms for such an end is a blasphemous action, as though God were bringing aid for sinning. It must be said otherwise, according to the common opinion, if the evil intention only accompanies the vow accidentally, and the wicked end, as St. Alphonsus says, holds itself entirely on the part of the one vowing; for example if someone, vowing for the glory of God, then more willingly vows externally from vain ostentation. - St. Alphonsus, n. 206 ³.

³ At this place St. Alphonsus also intimates the opinion of the Salamancans (tr. 17, c. 1, n. 66-68), namely that a vow is invalid even if the wicked end is only impulsive, yet such that without it the vow would not have occurred; and these things indeed can seem contradictory. For when the cause of an act is of such a kind that without it the act would not happen, it is called not only impulsive, but motive, principal, and primary. Besides, if the end is merely impulsive, it is therefore an end joined to another principal end. Therefore this end is not the total nor principal cause of the thing vowed or of vowing. But an end of this sort, thus added to the principal end, does not wholly corrupt an act formally good from its object, but can be held as something coming accidentally and extrinsic to the act. Therefore it does not take away the validity of the vow.

** The VV. rebuke us (p. 919) because in the Note it is said that he speaks contradictory things who calls that cause impulsive without which the matter would not occur; and they wish to prove this by the example of a man who from a desire for eternal salvation wishes to embrace the religious state, and from a desire for fish chooses the Carthusian order. Resp. Since otherwise this man would have chosen not the Carthusian order but another religious order, the desire for fish will be called the motive cause of choosing that order, no differently than the desire for eternal salvation will be called the motive cause of choosing the religious state in general; and only abusively will either desire be called merely impulsive.

Resp. To the second. It is affirmed, if the vow is made from affection toward a good thing, as good, although joined with an evil cause or condition, as if someone vows alms if he is not caught in theft. For although theft is evil, nevertheless not to be harmed is not evil, but a gift of God; and the vow does not fall upon the evil, but upon the good, insofar as it is good in itself. Much more, however, does this hold if the vow is made from detestation of the evil condition; as if someone vows alms if and whenever he blasphemes. - Laymann, lib. 4, tr. 4, c. 2, n. 7.

Q. 3. Whether a vow of not sinning is valid?

Resp. 1. A vow of avoiding all sins, even the very slightest, is not valid, because this is impossible. - Trent, sess. 6.

Resp. 2. But a vow of avoiding all mortal sins, or all fully deliberate venial sins, is valid, because this is possible with divine grace and without a special privilege, if, however, the matter concerns pious persons ⁴. Likewise a vow of not committing venial sins of a certain kind is valid, for example of never lying, although because of the excessive difficulty of execution, vows of this sort are not expedient for most people. - Bouvier, and not a few others.

⁴ Understand persons not professing piety in just any way, but, as St. Alphonsus has it (lib. 3, n. 203), striving intensely for Christian perfection. Say the same of a vow of avoiding venial sins of a certain kind; for it will be valid, as St. Alphonsus says (ibid.), "in persons of great virtue," that is, in those long exercised in solid virtue; "but in others of moderate virtue it will be impossible matter; indeed," St. Alphonsus goes on, "in some matters, such as dishonorable thoughts" (understand as to any subreption whatever or even the slightest, not as to plainly deliberate fault), "idle thoughts, etc., since they are unavoidable for all, the vow is null." And to this pertains a vow of avoiding acts of impatience or anger. For since the passion of anger is indifferent to good and evil, to be angry at times is not only in accord with reason, but plainly necessary; but otherwise to hold the mean in such a way that one sins neither by excess nor by defect is most difficult, not to say morally impossible.

Others add (in Suarez, De Relig., tr. 6, lib. 2, c. 3, n. 2) that a vow of avoiding all mortal sins, or mortal sins of a certain kind, is not valid if the matter concerns a fragile person. Although Suarez himself does not adhere to this opinion, he nevertheless approves what Navarrus says, that vows of this sort are neither useful nor expedient, and that sufficient cause for dispensation or commutation is present. On this matter, what some object is childish: that a dispensation of this sort is equated with a license to sin, which therefore must be denied. For this dispensation is neither sought nor granted so that one may sin more freely, but so that the bond may be taken away which, considering the fragility of the one vowing, does not hold him back from sinning, and thus redounds solely, rather than to his spiritual utility and the glory of God, indeed to him as a snare and to God as a graver offense.

392. Since a vow is an act of the virtue of religion, in the first place those things said above in n. 326 concerning the subject of religion apply to the subject of a vow. Since, however, a vow is customarily made in order to confirm the will in a good resolution, those persons whose will is perfectly confirmed in good no longer need a vow.

Hence the saints in heaven, the good angels, and Christ did not make vows. St. Thomas³⁴⁷ writes: "It was not fitting for Christ in Himself to vow, both because He was God and because, insofar as He was man, He had His will confirmed in good, as one existing in the state of comprehension." That the damned are not the subject of a vow is evident of itself, since they are not capable of any act of religion.

With these excepted, therefore, all men are the subject of a vow, or capable of vowing, provided that 1. they are endowed with the perfect use of reason; 2. they have the intention of vowing; 3. they have sufficient deliberation and 4. liberty; 5. they are not prohibited by positive law from making vows.

All men can make vows.

The reason is that all men can worship God. Therefore not only Catholics but also Protestants, indeed even unbelievers, can make valid vows. Therefore the Sacred Penitentiary declared on 29 Nov. 1842 that a Protestant who made the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience before an Anglican minister is bound to the observance of these vows if he had a true intention of vowing.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 4 ad 3.

³⁴⁸ Collect. de Prop. Fide n. 959.

393. 1. Perfect use of reason is required on the part of the person vowing for the validity of a vow.

For a vow is a certain particular law. But just as no one who does not have the perfect use of reason can establish an obliging law, so no one can impose upon himself the obliging law of a vow unless he has the perfect use of reason. Hence infants under seven years of age (unless, however, they have already attained the perfect use of reason) cannot make vows. For infants the rule is valid: If they can devote themselves to the devil through mortal sin, they can also oblige themselves to God through a true vow. Likewise invalid are the vows of a man who is completely drunk, insane, or hypnotized. Since the vows of religious institutes are so gravely obligatory, the Church has established that no one can make these vows before a more perfect use of reason, namely, before completion of the sixteenth year of age.³⁴⁹

³⁴⁹ Code of Canon Law, c. 573.

394. 2. The intention or will of vowing is required for the validity of a vow.

Hence a fictitious vow, i.e., one made only externally without the internal intention of vowing, is null. A threefold quality of this deficient intention is subtly distinguished:

a) Someone promises and vows in words alone, but internally has absolutely no intention of vowing. In this case there is certainly no true vow before God. Hence St. Thomas says briefly: "A promise is sometimes made with the mouth and not with the heart, and such a promise, as regards God, is not a vow."³⁵⁰ A fictitious vow of this sort can occur, e.g., if someone is compelled by other men to vow in some religious institute. But if someone were to make a fictitious religious vow without external compulsion, he would sin gravely; for he would mock the religious institute; sometimes he would also cause material harm, and he would be bound to repair all injuries committed.

b) Someone indeed intends internally to vow and to oblige himself, but at the same time determines not to execute the promise made. In this case theologians commonly teach that a vow truly exists, because fulfillment is not of the essence of a vow, but only the deliberate mind of obliging oneself. Nevertheless, as is evident of itself, such a person vowing sins mortally, because it is a grave irreverence inflicted upon God to promise something in honor of God and at the same time to will to derogate from this promise.

c) Someone indeed wills to promise in a vow and also to execute the promise, but by no means wills internally to oblige himself. In this case it is not so certain whether a vow is truly present. The negative opinion seems to be truer, because the internal resolution to oblige oneself is of the essence of a vow.³⁵¹ Moreover, in this case, whether a vow is present or not, the obligation of fulfilling the promise remains.

If defects of intention of this kind occur in a religious profession which someone made for merely earthly motives, or in the reception of the subdiaconate, then the confessor must insist that the penitent make a true vow as soon as possible, or refer the matter to the competent ecclesiastical authority. Since, however, some authors teach that a subdeacon is obliged to perpetual chastity not by force of a vow properly so called but by force of ecclesiastical law, such a subdeacon can receive sacramental absolution, provided he has promised that he will preserve perfect chastity.

As regards the quality of intention necessary for a vow, an actual or explicit intention is not required, but a virtual or implicit intention suffices. For an actual intention is not necessarily required, because in no human act is an actual intention required for its validity, but a virtual or implicit intention suffices. Hence, e.g., one who has the will to receive the subdiaconate, knowing that the vow of chastity is joined to this order, has a sufficient virtual or implicit intention of making the vow of chastity. An indirect or interpretative intention does not suffice; and therefore, e.g., if one who knows that he is prone to vowing when drunk voluntarily makes himself drunk and, while drunk, vows, his vow does not seem to be valid.

³⁵⁰ IV, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 1, solut. 1 ad 2.

³⁵¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 201.

395. 3. Sufficient deliberation is required for the validity of a vow.

The reason is that no one is considered to impose upon himself a grave obligation, such as the obligation of a vow is, without sufficient deliberation. But the question immediately arises: What deliberation is truly sufficient for the validity of a vow? Full or perfect deliberation is customarily distinguished from imperfect or semiplena deliberation. The most common opinion is that full and perfect deliberation is required for the validity of a vow. This consists in the person vowing a) being fully master of himself; b) attending to and truly knowing that which he imposes upon himself to fulfill through the vow. Hence theologians commonly teach that for the validity of a vow there is required as much deliberation and knowledge as is necessary for completing an onerous contract or another grave business; or even as much as is necessary for constituting a grave sin from a perfect and direct voluntary act. Hence a confused notion of the obligation does not suffice for a vow, but a confused notion of the gravity of the guilt suffices for mortal sin. The reason for this opinion is that every vow, even in light matter, imposes a serious obligation of religion before God. But no one either ought or is considered to impose such an obligation upon himself without full deliberation. Nevertheless, not every disturbance or emotion of the mind destroys the validity of a vow; otherwise all those vows which are made either in a vehement spirit of devotion, in a very great desire to obtain some benefit, or at the instigation of fear would be invalid, which assuredly no one will say. Therefore only that disturbance impedes the validity of a vow which clouds the mind or at least removes the perfect use of reason.

Because of a lack of sufficient deliberation, invalid are the vows of a child not yet in perfect possession of reason, of a half-drunken man, or of a man so gravely ill that because of fever he cannot think seriously. Often invalid also are the vows of those who suffer from hysterical disease or from so-called "fixed ideas." Nevertheless, a long and prolonged discussion of all circumstances is not absolutely necessary for making a vow, although it is commonly to be counseled, provided, however, that the vow is not made precipitately. In practice a serious doubt can sometimes arise whether some vow was made with sufficient deliberation. Then, for greater security, it is expedient to obtain a dispensation or commutation of the vow so made, which indeed will easily be obtained. The faithful are diligently to be admonished not to make vows from a sudden emotion; indeed, praiseworthy is the custom of several confessors who strictly prohibit their penitents from making any vow of greater moment, e.g., a vow of chastity, without the previous consent of the confessor.

396. Sufficient deliberation is also absent if a vow was made from a notable error. But an error which invalidates a vow is twofold:

a) A substantial error, i.e., either concerning the very substance of the thing promised or concerning a substantial condition.

An error concerning the very substance of the thing promised is present if the person vowing intends an altogether different thing, e.g., if someone were to vow to give away his possession which he thinks to be made from base material but which in fact has a very great value. An error concerning a substantial circumstance or condition is considered present if some circumstance or condition inheres in the object of the vow which, had it been known, would most certainly have prevented the vow, e.g., if you vowed a pilgrimage to some sanctuary, thinking the expenses of the journey to be a few francs, when in fact they are one hundred francs.

b) Error concerning the final cause of the vow.

E.g., if someone vowed a pilgrimage for the recovery of the health of his father, whom he thought to be sick but who in fact had always enjoyed excellent health, such a vow is invalid because the principal end of the vow is absent.

But if an error concerns accidental conditions or merely impulsive causes, the vow is not indeed invalid of itself, but nevertheless it can easily be commuted or even dispensed.

E.g., if someone vowed a pilgrimage to the thresholds of the Apostles but did not know all the difficulties connected with such a pilgrimage, he is not by that very fact excused from fulfillment of the vow, but a commutation or dispensation will rather easily be conceded.

Note. The essential vows in religious institutes cannot be impugned because of unforeseen inconveniences which someone afterwards experiences in observing them, e.g., in chastity or obedience. For these inconveniences could and ought to have been foreseen. Nevertheless, according to the present discipline of the Roman Curia, a dispensation from religious vows also is rather easily conceded if someone proves that he was led into error concerning even the accidental obligations of the religious state which he professed.

397. 4. Liberty likewise is required for a vow, since a promise which was given not freely but under compulsion cannot be pleasing to God. Opposed to liberty are not only force and violence, which destroy the voluntary act and consequently every vow, but also fear.

Concerning a vow made from fear, the following things seem to have to be said:

A twofold grave fear invalidates; likewise a twofold fear does not invalidate a vow:

a) If the fear under whose influence the vow was made was so grave that the use of reason was disturbed, such a vow is certainly invalid. Thus all teach, and the reason is obvious, for such fear removes everything voluntary and all deliberation.

b) Grave fear, although it does not disturb the use of reason, nevertheless invalidates all vows if it was unjustly inflicted in order to extort the vow. Thus from positive ecclesiastical law.³⁵² The reason for this law seems to be that God does not accept a vow of this sort, since otherwise He would seem to approve the grave injury inflicted upon the person vowing.

c) Grave natural fear, or even grave fear justly inflicted by a free cause, does not of itself invalidate any vows whatsoever.³⁵³ Hence, e.g., if someone in the greatest danger of shipwreck or death vows perpetual chastity; or if an ecclesiastical judge were justly to condemn a cleric to deposition unless he entered a strict monastery and made vows there, then such vows, according to the more probable and more common opinion, are valid.³⁵⁴ The reason is that no injury is done to such a person vowing, and his act, notwithstanding the fear, remains free and deliberate. The same things hold concerning the validity of a vow made under the influence of grave fear which was indeed inflicted unjustly, but not in order to extort the vow. For such fear, in its relation to the vow, is not distinguished from natural fear. Hence, e.g., the vow is valid which someone made in order to escape a danger of death arising from an attack by robbers.

d) Light fear does not invalidate vows. Although some authors cited by St. Alphonsus,³⁵⁵ e.g., Busembaum, Navarrus, and, among the moderns, Schindler and Noldin, think that even light fear invalidates a vow because such light fear also removes at least full liberty of consent, nevertheless the far more common and more probable opinion asserts that a matter as grave as a vow is not invalidated by light fear.³⁵⁶

³⁵² Code of Canon Law, c. 1307, § 3.

³⁵³ Cf. Billuart, l.c., and Ernest Müller, Theol. mor. II, § 52.

³⁵⁴ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 197.

³⁵⁵ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 197.

³⁵⁶ Dominic Soto discusses this matter excellently, De iure et iust. l. 7, q. 2, a. 1.

398. 5. On ecclesiastical law prohibiting certain vows. By natural and divine positive law, no one capable of reason is prohibited from making vows concerning suitable matter. But it is asked whether by positive ecclesiastical law certain persons are forbidden to vow. The answer is:

a) The Church renders several men incapable of making public vows, whether simple or solemn; and therefore it has attached certain conditions without which vows made in religious institutes are altogether invalid from the beginning. Canonists treat of these conditions essentially required for religious profession, whether simple or solemn.³⁵⁷

b) Since, according to a probable opinion, the Church can prescribe even internal acts, nothing prevents the Church from also attaching certain conditions to private vows to be made, without which vows of this sort are invalid. Nevertheless, it is not certainly established that the Church has in fact attached conditions of this sort to any private vow.

c) Religious bound by the vow of obedience cannot make any private vow which is contrary to the will of their superiors or to the rule professed. The reason is that such a vow would concern a thing evil and prohibited.

d) Religious can make a vow of entering a stricter order, as has been established by several Supreme Pontiffs.³⁵⁸ But the transfer itself can no longer be made without the authority of the Apostolic See.³⁵⁹

e) Professed religious cannot make other private vows which are firm and not subject to invalidation by the superior. Therefore St. Thomas says simply: "No vow of a religious is firm except with the consent of his prelate."³⁶⁰

f) Generally, it is not expedient for religious to make private vows, at least without the express permission of the superior. For first, it is not certain whether these vows are valid, and secondly, a religious already bound by the three essential vows and the observance of the rule, if he wishes faithfully to observe all these things, is already sufficiently bound without needing a new obligation from some private vow.

g) Private vows made by a professed religious seem to be valid unless the superior has invalidated them or vows of this kind are expressly prohibited by the rule. Thus the more common opinion, which Cajetan,³⁶¹ John of St. Thomas,³⁶² Suarez,³⁶³ the Salmanticenses,³⁶⁴ and many others hold. The reason is that such vows inflict no detriment upon the jurisdiction of superiors and their right administration. For when the superior judges them inopportune, he can invalidate them. Therefore, if, e.g., some religious gravely obliged himself under vow to recite the Rosary daily, this vow is valid and its transgression is a grave sin; or if a religious bound himself by a private vow to the observance of some rule otherwise obliging under no fault, he sins by transgressing this vow which he made.

³⁵⁷ Cf. our Manuale iur. can. q. 213.

³⁵⁸ Cf. Innocent III, c. 18, X 3, 31.

³⁵⁹ Code of Canon Law, c. 632.

³⁶⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 8 ad 3.

³⁶¹ Comm. in 2, 2, q. 88, a. 8.

³⁶² In 2, 2, q. 88, disp. 29, a. 16.

³⁶³ De relig. l. 3, c. 5, n. 3.

³⁶⁴ Curs. theol. mor. tr. 17, c. 1, punct. 8, n. 185.

399. The object of a vow is that which is promised in the vow, e.g., alms to be given, a prayer to be said, chastity to be preserved, etc. It is also customarily called the matter of the vow. But for the validity of a vow, suitable matter is required, having three conditions, namely: 1. that it be possible for the person vowing; 2. that it be morally good; 3. that it concern a better good.

1. The thing promised must be possible for the person vowing.

For an impossible thing, whether physically or even morally, i.e., to be performed with extraordinary difficulty not foreseen, cannot be promised in a vow, since no one can seriously oblige himself to such impossible things. Hence a vow of working a miracle is invalid; likewise a vow by a poor man of distributing great alms.

It is customary to ask here: a) Is a vow of avoiding all sins valid? The answer is given with a distinction: α) If someone vowed that he would commit no sin, not even the lightest, throughout his whole life, such a vow is invalid; for it concerns a morally impossible thing, since no one can, without a special grace, avoid all even the lightest sins. β) If someone vowed that he wished to avoid all mortal sins, or even all fully deliberate venial sins, such a vow is indeed valid in itself, because this is possible with the ordinary help of God; but nevertheless, for a man not proved by long exercise of the virtues, such a vow is imprudent, because it is not expedient to promise under vow that which will more probably not be observed faithfully.

b) Is a vow concerning a thing partly possible and partly impossible valid? It is necessary to ascertain whether the matter of the vow is indivisible and whether the nature of a vow is still at least partially contained also in the possible part.³⁶⁵ If the matter is indivisible, the vow becomes invalid if the whole is not possible, even though a part is possible. Thus, e.g., if someone promised by vow a pilgrimage to Lourdes and the whole journey has become impossible for him to make because of lack of strength or money, he is not bound to the part of the journey possible for him. But if the matter of the vow is divisible, and in the possible part of this matter the nature and end of the vow are still preserved at least in some manner, this possible part is to be performed; e.g., if someone promised to make a pilgrimage fasting and cannot observe the fast but can make the pilgrimage in another manner, he is not totally freed from the obligation of the vow, but is bound to make the pilgrimage, although not fasting. Moreover, in these and similar cases inquiry must first be made concerning the precise intention of the person vowing, and from this it is necessary to judge whether the obligation of the vow persists or ceases.

³⁶⁵ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 202.

400. 2. The matter of a vow must be morally good and pleasing to God.

For a vow is an act of worshiping God. But God is not worshiped by dishonorable acts or by acts altogether indifferent and vain.³⁶⁶

a) To vow a dishonorable thing or to make a vow in order to obtain an illicit thing is a grave sin unless an erroneous conscience excuses. Hence St. Alphonsus³⁶⁷ writes: "It is also more probable to me that to vow an evil, even a venial evil, is of itself a grave fault; since of itself it is blasphemy to will that evil redound to the honor of God. But commonly, because of ignorance, this is only venial." When the end of the person vowing is evil, although the matter promised by vow is good in itself, then the vow is invalid and gravely sinful if this was the principal end; but if it is only a secondary end, the vow is valid. Hence, e.g., a vow of giving alms in order to obtain good success in theft, causing harm, adultery, etc., is invalid and constitutes a grave sin; but a vow of giving alms indeed in honor of God, but also in order to have some vain glory of one's own, is valid, although to seek vain glory is evil in itself.³⁶⁸

b) To vow a vain and indifferent thing, both in itself and in its circumstances, is a venial sin; but the vow itself is null. The reason is that a foolish promise of this kind displeases God. Hence a vow no longer to pass through a certain street would be invalid and lightly sinful. Almost always, however, things indifferent in themselves become good or evil because of annexed circumstances or because of the end of the agent. Therefore the vow of some girl no longer to pass through a certain street because there she experiences dangerous delights upon seeing a certain young man would be valid and lawful.

³⁶⁶ St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 2.

³⁶⁷ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 205.

³⁶⁸ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 206.

401. 3. A vow must concern a better good, i.e., it ought not to impede a greater good in the subject vowing.

a) Thus this quality of the object of a vow is more commonly and more correctly explained. For something can be called a greater or better good in two ways: first, comparatively to another good, e.g., it is better to render obedience than to perform bodily mortifications, but each is good. In a second manner, comparatively to the contrary omission of the same good, e.g., it is better to give alms than not to give, it is better to preserve chastity than not to preserve it. For suitable matter of a vow, it suffices that it be a better good in this second manner. For if it were necessary that the good promised by vow be better comparatively to another good, it would follow that no vow would be valid unless it concerned the most perfect work of all, since only the most perfect work has no other work more perfect than itself.³⁶⁹

b) From these things it is inferred that not only works called supererogatory, or falling under counsel, but even works already prescribed from another source can be the matter of a vow. Certainly works of counsel or supererogatory works most properly fall under vow, as the Angelic Doctor says,³⁷⁰ but prescribed works are still sufficient matter of vows, or vows can also be made concerning them. The reason is that a work imposed under a precept, whether natural, divine, or ecclesiastical, nevertheless remains free and induces only a moral obligation. Nothing, therefore, prevents someone from binding himself by a new bond of religion to perform that work already prescribed from another source. Hence, e.g., a vow never again to become drunk can be excellent when made by one who has a depraved habit of intemperance. This doctrine can also be confirmed from a promissory oath, which induces an obligation of religion similar to a vow. But a promissory oath is very often employed not only by Catholics but also by non-Catholics to confirm treaties, pacts, contracts, etc., to the observance of which natural and divine law already oblige. Why cannot vows be employed in the same manner?

c) Moreover, it is to be noted that for sufficient matter of a vow it is not required that the work promised be absolutely and objectively better than its omission, but it suffices that this work be better than its omission subjectively, or relatively to the person vowing. Therefore a vow contrary to the evangelical counsels can sometimes be lawful, e.g., of entering marriage with virginity abandoned. For although the state of virginity considered objectively is more perfect than the state of marriage, nevertheless for some men marriage is better than virginity. For St. Paul says: "It is better to marry than to burn."³⁷¹ Besides the danger of incontinence avoided, other special goods can also arise from a determined marriage, e.g., the cessation of scandal, the cessation of concubinage, the legitimation of offspring, etc. Hence St. Alphonsus calls certain and far more probable the opinion which teaches that in these cases a vow of marrying is valid and lawful.³⁷² Nevertheless, several grave authors contradict this, such as Dominic Soto,³⁷³ John of St. Thomas,³⁷⁴ John of the Cross,³⁷⁵ Concina,³⁷⁶ etc., because marriage is not the only remedy for concupiscence and other equally efficacious means are also at hand. In practice a vow of marrying does not seem to be counseled, both because perhaps it is invalid and because its utility is customarily very small. Hence, if someone agitated by the impulses of the flesh does not wish to use other remedies for preserving chastity, let him contract marriage, but let him not make a vow of marrying.

d) St. Alphonsus³⁷⁷ here appends the question: "Whether, if someone too prone to vowing vows no longer to vow except with the permission of his confessor, but afterwards nevertheless vows, that vow is valid?" The answer is: 1. A vow absolutely made not to vow is indeed invalid, because it is better to vow than not to vow; but a vow not to vow except with the permission of the confessor is certainly valid for one who is too prone and inconsiderate in vowing, since it impedes imprudent vows. 2. By making the second vow without consulting the confessor, the person vowing sinned. 3. Nevertheless, this second vow is valid, provided all the other essential conditions of a vow were present.

e) Here another question is also appended which today is indeed antiquated, but which in former times occurred not rarely: Can parents devote their children to some monastery or to the ecclesiastical state in such a way that the children by force of that vow are bound to enter the monastery or embrace the clerical state? The answer is negative, for such a vow would be equally unjust and impossible. For children are altogether free in the choice of a state, and therefore parents injure justice if they compel their children to embrace a determined state. Then, if the children refuse to embrace the state designated for them by the parents, execution of the vow becomes at least morally impossible. But if in ancient times some parents nevertheless devoted their infant children to some monastery or to the clerical state, the Church either did not approve such vows or, after the children so devoted had arrived at the years of discretion, conceded that they could freely leave the monastery and choose another state.

f) Finally it is asked: Is the vow made in baptism of renouncing Satan, the world, and its pomps a true vow? It is not a vow in the strict sense, but in a broad sense, so that a baptized person sinning against the promises given indeed commits a graver sin than an unbaptized man, but nevertheless does not commit true sacrilege because of violation of the baptismal vow. Thus the common opinion.³⁷⁸ The reason is that he who gives such promises in baptism does not intend to oblige himself under a special sin against religion, but only promises faithful observance of all the commandments of God.

³⁶⁹ Cf. Concina, In Decal. l. 4, diss. 1, c. 5, n. 5.

³⁷⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 2.

³⁷¹ 1 Cor. 7:9.

³⁷² Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 209.

³⁷³ De iure et iust. l. 7, q. 1, a. 3.

³⁷⁴ In 2, 2, q. 88, disp. 29, a. 7, concl. 4.

³⁷⁵ De voto dub. 2, concl. 4.

³⁷⁶ L.c., n. 7.

³⁷⁷ L.c., n. 210.

³⁷⁸ Cf. St. Raymond, Summa l. 1, De transgress. voti; St. Thomas, IV, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 2; St. Antoninus, S. theol. P. 2, tit. 2, c. 2.

711. The conditions on the part of the act required for the validity of a vow are three: for the intention of obliging oneself must be true and sincere, deliberate and free.

1. A true and internal intention of obliging oneself is required; hence:

a) There is no vow if someone, even in serious circumstances, does not wish to promise, but only externally expresses the words of a vow; hence in doubt whether someone has emitted a true vow, the intention of the one vowing is to be considered rather than the words.

b) Likewise, if someone, wishing to promise, positively intends not to oblige himself.1

In these cases there is a fictitious vow, which is a sin because it includes a certain irreverence toward God, but only venial, unless contempt, grave scandal or injustice, or deception in a matter of great importance is present, as in religious profession or the reception of sacred order.

c) But for the validity of a vow the intention of executing the vow is not required.

1. Unless perhaps the will of vowing were altogether predominant and more efficacious than the will of not obliging oneself, which is not presumed.

2. Deliberation is required, and indeed full and perfect, such as is required for an act simply and absolutely human and perfectly moral: for no one is judged to will to impose an obligation upon himself except from perfect deliberation.

Hence there is no vow if the promise is made by one drunk, half-asleep, deprived of the senses, or if it proceeds from a motion which is called primo-primus or secundo-primus; likewise vows emitted by hysterical persons, or by children even after the use of reason, are often invalid. - Yet he who, knowing that a vow induces obligation, here and now does not explicitly think about it, is judged to make a valid vow; similarly, knowledge of all the circumstances of the thing promised is not required, but knowledge as to the substance suffices.

3. Liberty is required, and indeed perfect liberty, such as is in an act directly and in itself voluntary: for this is required for a good act.

Hence the indirectly voluntary or voluntary in the cause does not suffice, as if someone, foreseeing that he will promise when drunk, nevertheless makes himself drunk and promises; besides, such an act is not apt for signifying the undertaking of an obligation. - Yet an actual and explicit will is not required, but a virtual and implicit will suffices, as if someone freely receives the subdiaconate, to which he knows a vow is annexed.

Hence on the part of the one vowing, one vow is expressed or formal, another tacit, implicit, and virtual.

712. Ignorance or error is opposed to deliberation, even if only concomitant or crass:

1. when it is concerned with the essence of a vow; hence he does not vow who is ignorant that a vow is a promise, or induces obligation, or is made to God: exception is made if he altogether wishes to vow in the mode in which others are accustomed to vow, because then he has the implicit will of obliging himself;

2. or when it is concerned with the substance of the thing promised, for example, if someone vowed entrance into religion, being ignorant that it includes chastity, poverty, and obedience;

3. or concerning a substantial condition of the thing, which, if known, would impede the vow, for example, if a Belgian vowed a Roman pilgrimage, thinking Rome to be in the vicinity, or the journey to be undertaken for 100 francs;

4. or concerning the final cause of the vow, for example, if someone vowed for the health of his father, thinking him to be dying.

The reason is that in those cases the intention of obliging oneself is lacking.

But the following do not impede the validity of a vow:

a) ignorance concerning an accidental circumstance, for example, error concerning the pleasantness of the journey for a Roman pilgrimage;

b) nor error concerning an impulsive cause, for example, if someone vowed to give alms to poor Peter, whom he erroneously thought honest.

1. For vows of religious profession, however, only substantial error invalidates, not error of condition or circumstance, even if it gives cause to the profession; because this participates in the nature of an onerous contract.

713. Fear is opposed to liberty:

1. when it so disturbs the mind that it takes away deliberation;

2. also when it is grave and unjustly inflicted for extorting a vow, in which case the vow is null at least from ecclesiastical law, as is clear from tradition and the perpetual practice of the Church, as can. 1307, § 3 also testifies,¹ and also probably from natural law, because God does not accept a promise extorted by injury;

¹ "A vow emitted from grave and unjust fear is null by the law itself."

3. indeed probably, on account of the same reason, when a vow is extorted by slight fear unjustly inflicted, provided it was the sole cause of vowing; but in the external forum slight fear is not judged to have been the cause of a matter as grave as a vow.

Any other fear whatever, whether it is from a necessary cause, or is justly inflicted, or unjustly but not for extorting a vow, does not render a vow invalid. Examples are vows emitted from fear of shipwreck or illness, - of just imprisonment from the sentence of a judge, - of robbers.

I Say 1st. For the validity of a vow there is required a true and deliberate intention of emitting a vow, or a true promise of itself suitable to inducing an obligation; for a vow is like a certain law, which the one vowing, otherwise capable of weighing the burden which he assumes, imposes upon himself. Hence a vow essentially differs from a proposal, because a proposal, however firm, does not produce a bond of obligation, nor is omission of the thing proposed a sin, except perhaps sometimes by accident, for example, on account of inconstancy, weariness, or negligence, which of themselves do not exceed venial sin. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 196 and following.

I Say 2nd. The matter of a vow ought to be not only morally possible, but also morally good, indeed better than its opposite. The reason of the first is that no one can oblige himself to something morally impossible to him; and the reason of the second is that God is not worshiped by an action whose placing is not better than omission. But a better good is here understood not only absolutely in itself, but also relatively to circumstances. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 202.

I Say 3rd. § 1. A vow, that is, a deliberate and free promise made to God concerning a possible and better good, must be fulfilled from the virtue of religion.

§ 2. Unless they are prohibited by law, all possessing suitable use of reason are capable of a vow (Can. 1307).

Question 1. How great ought deliberation to be in emitting a vow?

Response. It is commonly taught by theologians that the deliberation which suffices for mortal sin suffices for a vow. But this is indeed so if in each case the relation of the deliberating mind to the object is considered; but if attention is given to the fact that it is more difficult to deliberate about some obligation to be assumed than about the violation of some law, it must be said that greater discretion of judgment or deliberation is required for emitting a vow than for perpetrating mortal sin. - Cf. Baller., note (c), p. 313.

Question 2. Is a vow valid which has been made with inadvertence to an obligation already known?

Response. Affirmatively, if he who emits the vow habitually knows clearly its obligation, although actually he does not attend to it; or also if he who vows, even if he does not know the obligation clearly, nevertheless apprehends it confusedly and wills it implicitly, while, for example, he wills to vow this or that, as others are accustomed to vow. - Nevertheless it must generally be held that no greater obligation is induced beyond that which someone wills to impose upon himself and has apprehended. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 201.

Question 3. Is a vow emitted from error valid?

Response. Affirmatively, if the error regards accidental circumstances of lesser moment; for he who vows is judged to oblige himself to undergoing merely accidental inconveniences which can occur in fulfilling the vow. But one must answer otherwise if the error concerns the substance of the thing, or accidental circumstances indeed, but which are principally intended, or notably change the substance itself, or are of such a nature that, if they had been known, the vow would not have been emitted; for then the promised thing could not be said to be sufficiently known and willed. - Nevertheless vows emitted after the novitiate in any approved order must always be excepted; for these are not invalid except by error properly and strictly substantial. The reason is that otherwise they would not be sufficiently accommodated to the firmness which is essential to the religious state. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 198. - Lugo, de jure et just., disp. 22, n. 88. - Baller., note (b), p. 314, and note (a), p. 315.

Question 4. Is a vow made through fear valid?

Response. Affirmatively, if the fear, however grave, provided it does not remove the use of reason, arises from within, or from a necessary extrinsic cause; for those things which are done from fear are simply voluntary. But can. 1307, § 3, says that a vow emitted from grave and unjust fear is null by the law itself. The reason is that the law of nature, which demands that an injured right be restored in its entirety, dictates that what is extorted from someone through injury cannot be acceptable to God. It is also clear from canon law as regards solemn vows of Religion, and more probably also as regards other vows, according to the more common interpretation of theologians. - I said if it is grave; for light fear never invalidates a vow, at least for the external forum. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 197. - Baller., note (b), p. 315.

Question 5. Is he who doubts whether he emitted a vow or a mere proposal held by the vow?

Response. Negatively, as is clear from what has been said concerning probabilism. Nevertheless it must be noted that if he who thus doubts believed, in promising, that he would sin if perhaps he did not carry out the proposed thing, it can be judged that he truly vowed. I say can, and not ought, because simple people who propose before a priest to recite some pious prayers at their proper time, or never to drink a certain kind of liquor, surely think that they would sin if afterward they violated that promise, and yet it is certain that they emit no vow. - Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 316.

Question 6. Is a vow not to sin valid?

Response. Affirmatively, if the vow regards all mortal sins or fully deliberate venial sins, or sins of a certain kind, for example, a vow never to lie. But a vow of avoiding all sins, even the very lightest, would not be valid, because without a special privilege this is impossible. Cf. Mazzella, de Gratia, disp. 2, art. 5.

Question 7. Is a vow concerning matter already commanded from elsewhere valid?

Response. Affirmatively, both because it is not repugnant for a debtor to be obliged by different titles, and because a vow of this kind concerns a thing good in itself, otherwise it could not have been commanded; it is also concerning a better good, since the new bond can contribute to greater fidelity and devotion in fulfilling the law. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 203.

Question 8. Is a vow of a good thing with an evil end or an evil condition valid?

Response to the 1st. Negatively, if the evil end holds itself on the side of the thing vowed, for example, if you vow alms in order to obtain the successful outcome of a theft, or in thanksgiving for robbery. The reason is that the giving of alms for such an end is a blasphemous action, as if God were bringing help for sinning. - But one must answer otherwise, according to the common opinion, if the evil intention only accidentally accompanies the vow, and the evil end, as St. Alphonsus says, holds itself entirely on the side of the one vowing, for example, if someone, vowing for the glory of God, afterward from vain ostentation more willingly vows externally. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 206.

Response to the 2nd. Affirmatively, if the vow is made from affection toward the good thing, as it is good, even if joined with an evil cause or condition, as if someone vows alms if he is not caught in theft. For although theft is evil, nevertheless not to be harmed is not evil, but a gift of God; and the vow does not fall upon the evil, but upon the good, insofar as it is good in itself. Much more, however, is this valid if the vow is made from detestation of the evil condition; as if someone vows alms, if and as often as he blasphemes. - Cf. Laymann, lib. 4, tract. 5, chap. 2, n. 7.

III. "Is a vow of chastity, of the religious life, or of not marrying, made by one for whom marriage would be more salutary on account of incontinence, valid, and does it prevent marriage from being lawfully contracted? The negative opinion — namely, that such a vow is not valid, nor an impediment to marriage — can be argued for on these grounds... because a vow of chastity, or of the religious life, made by one whom the troubles of the flesh, and the frequent danger of ruin precede, is not concerning sufficiently suitable and just matter; indeed it is rather made contrary to St. Paul's counsel... The authors of this opinion would perhaps teach the same in the case where, having made the aforesaid three vows, or one of them, it would be more advisable, on account of frequent temptations of the flesh, and subsequent lapses into venereal matters, for someone to contract marriage... because what, prior to the vow being made, renders the promised matter unsuited matter for a vow, if it supervenes after the vow has been made, removes the obligation of the vow... Therefore these same lapses will invalidate the preceding vows... This opinion is probable speculatively... But I answer, probably, that the aforesaid opinion is also probable in practice... Here and now, such an opinion can also be embraced practically, in some sense, and safely by one who now finds it speculatively probable, speaking somewhat probably. The reason is that it is probable (whatever Diana may unjustifiably doubt) that what is here probable will also be practically probable. Therefore it can safely be held that marriage will also be, for him for whom it would be more salutary on account of his incontinence than remaining in religion or chastity, etc. Therefore he can, without dispensation, enter marriage." So expressly held the aforesaid John Sanchez. Leander a Santissimo Sacramento (tract. 9, on Marriage, disp. 23, q. 2 and 3, pp. 324 and 325). See below, ch. 5, n. 17.

V. "A vow to perform an act of thanksgiving for a shameful deed already done is valid." Leander (tract. 2, on vows, disp. 4, q. 31, p. 341), from Filliucci (tract. 26, on vows, ch. 2, q. 6, n. 54).

I. Before I present the notion, or definition, of a vow, I set forth first the various meanings of this word. The name "votum" derives from the verb vovere, "to vow." Now to vow is the same as to promise — not to anyone, but to God or to the Saints. "To promise," "to pledge," "to engage" are words by which we disclose to men, or to God, the desires of our mind, and bind ourselves. "To vow," however, properly signifies to promise something to God, since a vow is an act of religion, by which we worship God. The word "votum" is also often taken for "desire" ["wish"]. Hence those who obtain their desires are called "compotes voti" ["having attained their wish"]. "To make vows" (vota facere) not infrequently means the same as to pray, or to wish; and pious desires are called "vota," and are sometimes even used for the very resolve of the will. From these various meanings, we must now establish the genuine notion of the vow, which shall be the subject of the disputation to follow.

II. St. Raymond (in his Summa, Bk. I, on vows) gives this definition of a vow: "A vow is a deliberate promise made to God concerning a better good." This definition differs little from that which theologians commonly give, following St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88), which is as follows: "A vow is a deliberate and spontaneous promise made to God concerning a better good." Five conditions are commonly assigned to a vow. The first is deliberation, whereby the intellect weighs and considers the burden to be undertaken. The second is the resolve, or the will to promise, to bind oneself, and to carry out the promise. The third is the promise itself, which is customarily called a certain practical utterance of the intellect. The fourth, that this promise be made to God, to whom alone, as will be said below, vows properly so called are made. The fifth, that it be a promise concerning a better good — that is, concerning a matter pleasing to God, or a good of supererogation, which is not commanded — if a vow is taken strictly and properly. Although, as will be said below, a vow can also be made concerning a commanded thing, insofar as the commanded thing is constituted, by the one vowing, as matter of religion; and under this title, it can be called a better good, or a work of supererogation. But, as I said, when we come below to discuss the matter of a vow, this condition will be more fully explained from St. Thomas.

III. The conditions indicated must be explained. And first it must be noted that no words or signs at all are required for a vow to be complete, as the Angelic Doctor teaches (loc. cit.), and St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2). "It is not necessary," he says, "for the promise to be expressed in words; but it suffices to have promised in the heart." For that reason, words, signs, or nods, by which the internal feelings of the mind are made known, are necessary for a promise made to a man — because man does not see what is in the heart, as God does. Wherefore a human promise, to be accepted, needs words or signs; a vow made to God does not. This, however, is said so that we may explain the nature of a vow. In practice, however, it will always be advisable, both for firmer memory and for a clearer declaration of the vow, to express the vow in words — as David is read to have done (Ps. 65): "I will pay thee my vows, which my lips have uttered."

IV. Theologians dispute, not without difficulty, in which act — of the intellect, or of the will — the essence of the vow consists. We will free ourselves from this difficulty briefly. All agree that several acts, both of the will and of the intellect, are required beforehand for a vow. If you look to the essence of the vow, it consists in a practical act of the intellect. For a vow is a private law, whereby someone binds himself to God to do something; and orders and directs what he imposes on himself to be done, to God's honor and glory. Now to direct, and to order, is an act of the commanding intellect; yet it carries with it the resolve of the will. How the resolve of the will, which moves, precedes the very acts of the intellect, will be discussed elsewhere, when the internal acts come to be outlined.

V. Question I. How much deliberation is required for a vow? Response: All, to a man, affirm that deliberation is necessary for making a vow. But since deliberation, or freedom of action, can be imperfect and only half-complete, or, on the other hand, perfect and full, the question here is which of these is required for a vow. The most common opinion is that full and perfect deliberation is required. This perfect deliberation consists in the one vowing being fully master of himself — that is, that he advert to, and know, what he is promising. For this perfect and full deliberation, a long and lengthy discussion of all the surrounding circumstances is by no means necessary. Nor does this perfect deliberation suffer from any disturbance or agitation of mind whatsoever — only from that which clouds the mind, and removes the light of reason. Otherwise, if any agitation of mind at all removed the necessary deliberation, very few vows would be found valid — since very many vows are made either in a spirit of devotion, or under the vehement impulse of some desire, or of anger, or of fear — all of which, though occasions, are nonetheless not the cause of the vow's invalidity. That freedom, then, which suffices for committing a sin, or for completing a contract, or some other grave business, is not doubted to suffice also for making a vow. Deliberation, then, can be considered in two ways: as it is opposed to a sudden impulse — which they call the "first movement" — and as it implies a serious discussion of all the means which might either advance or delay the deliberated matter. Deliberation taken in the first sense is necessary for a vow; not so in the second.

VI. Question II. Must sudden, hasty vows be fulfilled? Response: Vows, even if made suddenly, are valid, since, as has been said, they flow from a deliberate will. Such vows, however, are marked by imprudence. But if they are valid, they undoubtedly induce an obligation. Such a sudden making of a vow, moreover, gives just cause to seek either a dispensation, or a commutation. That someone, having made a vow, immediately repents of it, does not thereby prove the vow invalid — since it is not uncommon for many things to displease us as soon as they are done, even though conceived and carried out with full deliberation. If, however, the vow proceeded from some vehement disturbance, whether of anger or of fear, and the one vowing immediately repented of it, this would be no slight argument that the vow was invalid. No precise rule, however, can be assigned. For deliberation is an internal act, and can only be gathered from external signs. From various conjectures and circumstances, then, such vows are to be declared valid, or invalid. One rule alone is certain: that vows should be made only with great weighing and discussion. For they are private laws, which, before being enacted, ought to be brought to a severe examination of all the circumstances. Wherefore we say, with the most common opinion of theologians, that those who make vows of great import with only slight consideration sin, at least venially. For the greater the burden to be undertaken, the more mature the consideration, the more serious the discussion, and the more prudent the deliberation required. Hence it is said (Ecclesiasticus 5): "It displeaseth God, and a foolish promise." A promise is called foolish which lacks prudence and deliberation.

VII. Question III. Does one who rashly makes a vow of great import sometimes commit a mortal sin? And is a vow made with such a sin valid? Response: The gravity of any inconsideration is taken from the greater or lesser importance of the matter to be undertaken. A vow, by its very kind, is a grave matter entered into with God. It can become light on account of the lightness of the matter. But if the matter is grave, it will always be most grave. It will therefore be culpable to omit, more or less, the due consideration, according as the vow made will have been of greater or lesser importance. That a mortal sin should ever occur here, however, I would say, in my own opinion, is never the case. Sánchez, Suárez, and Lessius maintain that a mortal sin does occur, when the one vowing, taught by experience, foresees that he will transgress the vow he is making without due consideration. This opinion is rejected by the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 1, §2, n. 13), on the grounds that the danger of transgressing a vow arises equally when a vow is made with perfect deliberation. For one who vows precipitately exposes himself, on account of his own frailty, to the danger of promising impossible or unlawful things. For to promise such things to God is a grave sin. It will therefore likewise be a grave sin to expose oneself to the danger of promising similar things. They add, however, that a mortal sin can occur when one exposes himself to this danger by vowing without consultation and precipitately, foreseeing such a danger.

VIII. I judge both the first and the second opinion to be false. Do not all agree that perfect and full deliberation is required for a vow? One who vows precipitately, with only half-complete deliberation, vows nothing. If the lack of full deliberation excuses from the vow, it will, with even greater reason, excuse from the aforesaid danger. What then? Will deliberation be imperfect with respect to the vow, but full with respect to the danger? These are paradoxical claims. For one who, with full light and deliberate will, foresees the danger, also sees what he is vowing. But if the inconsideration is such as to impede freedom and full deliberation, the one vowing vows nothing at all. How, then, can it be true, as the theologians of Salamanca say, that the one vowing exposes himself to the danger of promising unlawful or impossible things — if, indeed, he vows nothing, and promises nothing, on account of the lack of the necessary and full deliberation? He sins, then, only venially, on account of the lack of due consideration and reflection — a crime of mere imprudence, which does not exceed the bounds of venial malice. Men are, therefore, to be dissuaded from such vows, and instructed that, before making vows, they should give more serious thought to their own strength, inclinations, circumstances, and state in life. As for the second point — that one who, after experience of a violated vow, vows the same thing again, even with full deliberation, sins mortally, even though nothing prevents him from fulfilling the vow to God — this is likewise clear to be false. For such a vower always makes his vow with the intention of showing God worship, in order to restrain himself from vice. It is, therefore, solely a crime of imprudence and inconsideration, which does not exceed the bounds of venial malice.

IX. Question IV. When a vow is valid, and the one vowing is bound to fulfill it, does nothing prevent that vow from proceeding from some fit of anger, fear, or other passion, as if from an occasion, and consequently occurring with some accompanying half-deliberate fault? Response: This is affirmed, since such a fault neither removes the deliberation necessary for the vow, nor infects the vow itself.

X. Question V. Does full deliberation suffice for any vow, even one concerning a slight matter, or is virtual deliberation sufficient? Response: Some affirm, among whom the theologians of Salamanca are counted (loc. cit., n. 15), citing St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, notab. 6), that a sudden vow does not oblige to a perfect sin, nor to a perfect good. This, however, is false: for regardless of how the matter stands, I answer that full deliberation is required for any vow, however slight the matter, and that half-complete deliberation does not suffice. For any vow whatsoever is a private law, whose nature the magnitude or smallness of the matter in no way alters. Such a vow, by its very nature, obliges gravely. Even granting (the opposite of which we shall show below) that, by reason of a slight matter, it induces only a light obligation, this in no way prevents it from being a true law — and a private law, by its very nature, requires perfect deliberation. A venial sin (as the previous argument runs) can be committed by only half-complete deliberation, because the act is, by its own kind, imperfect in the moral order; but any vow whatsoever, whatever its matter, whether great or small, demands, in the order of religion, perfect deliberation, or actual freedom — this consideration removed, whatever else is perfect [would not matter]. But this author establishes no reason from this at all. In another part of his little work, he shows little regard for authority.

XI. Question VI. Does a firm resolve, or any kind of simple willing, constitute a vow? Response: Some canonists teach that a resolve alone suffices for a vow. The common opinion of theologians and canonists is the contrary — since a resolve is nothing other than the will to do something; a resolve is indeed a prerequisite for a vow, but the nature of the vow does not consist in it. Concerning the second part of the question, there is not a single unanimous opinion among theologians. What all agree on is that the violation of no resolve, however efficacious and firm, is a mortal sin. There is dispute about venial fault. Not a few — Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 41, dub. 4), Angles (s.v. Votum, n. 1), Prado, Raphael de la Torre (II-II, q. 88, art. 1, disp. 7) — hold that no fault at all is committed in the violation of a resolve, since the very nature of a resolve indicates that it obliges no one, and it remains free for anyone to alter their plan at will. For in those things which men impose on themselves, their freedom always remains, so that they can, according to their own choice, change their resolve. This teaching follows St. Thomas here, art. 1, ad 1: "Those who propose to do something have not yet begun to do it, but only intend to do it in the future; whereas one who promises has already begun, in a certain way, to show that he will fulfill what he promises — just as one who puts his hand to the plough has already begun to plough, even though he has not yet finished the ploughing." This opinion of St. Thomas's is very frequently invoked by the Fathers in support of a vow's resolve. Whenever Augustine indicates the violation of a vow, he calls it a falling away from resolve — a "transgression," as he says. In the same way Bernard and Gregory speak. That the breaking of a resolve is not free of venial fault is held by other Fathers, who cite that saying of St. Bernard (Epistle 9): "Whoever has made a good resolve to do something has made it unlawful for himself not to do what he could have done." This opinion of St. Thomas's is used to argue for an inconstancy, a levity, and, so to speak, an unfaithfulness. That it is false is denied, however. Nay, I myself judge that some fault does occur, if someone, without any cause, departs from a good resolve — not indeed on the ground that he thereby violates the obligation, which we have said does not exist, of the resolve; but on account of that general principle: that not to advance in the way of the Lord is to fall behind. Everyone, then, ought to take care to carry out what he has resolved, unless reasons arise that suggest the contrary. And although this is not a binding law, nor does it bind the debt of fidelity, such a change can with great difficulty be cleared of the taint of inconstancy and fickleness on the part of the one changing. And to this extent, perhaps, we can in no way condemn the first opinion; and in this sense we by no means reject it.

XII. Question VII. Does the essence of a vow consist in the use of the word "promise" — and does what has been promised differ from a resolve carried out? Response: The most common opinion of theologians holds that a vow consists precisely in the falling due of a promise made to God. The reason is drawn from Scripture itself, which describes a vow through the term "promise." For it is said (Deut. 23): "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it... thou shalt do according as thou hast promised." Likewise (Ecclesiastes 5): "If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it: for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him" — and further on: "it is much better not to vow, than after a vow not to perform the things promised." A vow, then, is explained by Scripture through the term "promise." All alike affirm this. For this distinction to become clearer, however, the notions of both must be set forth. A promise is customarily defined thus: "An act by which someone intends to do something, his own obligation having been undertaken toward another." This definition explains the common meaning, or nature, of a promise. For the promise of a vow is a particular act by which someone binds himself to render something to the worship of God; a resolve, however, as is commonly said, proceeds from a deliberation to do something; or, as this common definition explains, a resolve proceeds from the deliberation of the thing to be done; a promise, from the deliberation of accepting an obligation, and imposing it upon oneself. Theologians dispute to which power of the soul a promise pertains. Fr. Suárez (Bk. I, ch. 13) treats this question at great length, which we judge it best to pass over, since it appears to us of no great importance. We say only, following St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88, art. 1), that a promise pertains to the intellect — for it is a practical utterance, or command, by which a man directs himself toward God, or by which he binds himself to him. For through a vow, which consists in a promise, a man raises himself up toward God. Now to direct and to order pertains to the intellect, not to the will — whatever Suárez may assert to the contrary, following Scotus, whose objections I now pass over in silence, since they are not of such weight that I ought to spend more time examining them.

XIII. Question VIII. What resolve is required for a vow to be valid? Response: All, to a man, admit the necessity of a resolve for the validity of a vow. The disagreement concerns only the quality of the resolve, or of the intention and deliberation. For the resolve of the one vowing can be considered in different ways. First, if he has a deliberate resolve to promise, and to bind himself (in other words, to promise and to vow), and has a deliberate mind not to vow. Second, if someone has the resolve to vow, and to bind himself, but at the same time has a deliberate will not to carry out the promise. In a third way, the one vowing can be considered insofar as he has the intention, or resolve, to promise and to fulfill the promise, but without the intention of binding himself.

XIV. The common opinion is that one who vows in the first manner makes no vow at all, since he only wishes to trifle with words. In confirmation of this opinion, the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 1, §3, n. 14) adduce this authority of St. Thomas, from Bk. IV of the Sentences, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1, qc. 1, ad 1: "A promise made only in words, and in the heart, to God, is not a vow." This authority of St. Thomas is, however, cited only in part, and does not express the Doctor's true mind; for the Angelic Doctor immediately adds: "Yet man can be sufficiently compelled to promise by a certain interpretive coercion... although he can be compelled simply to an exterior promise, as also to other exterior acts of the will, he cannot, however, be compelled to an interior promise." The opinion of St. Thomas, then, is that if someone, under compulsion, uttered the exterior words that express a vow, he would make no vow at all — since a compelled exterior promise, if the one vowing lacks the positive will to promise, is a mockery, and a mere shadow of a promise. But if someone had a positive, deliberate mind to promise, and, with this deliberate will, spontaneously and freely uttered the words of a vow — even though, with another intention, he did not wish to bind himself — it seems to us probable that such a person does make a vow; because that internal, efficacious intention, or resolve, contains a vow, and necessarily carries with it the will to bind oneself. For whoever, seriously and with a deliberate mind, with no one compelling him, utters the words of a vow, freely wills and deliberately promises — or deliberately makes a vow. As for the intention which would elicit the opposite — namely, that by which the one vowing refuses to bind himself — whether it can prevail against that former, efficacious intention, I leave to be disputed by others, since this is more a discussion for the author's own scrutiny; I abstain from it here. This much I will add for practical purposes: that one who, with a deliberate mind, without any interior resolve, would utter the words of a vow, could not, in the opinion of all, I think, be excused from any fault whatsoever. For if a mocking and deceitful promise made to men is not free of fault, how much more vicious will a promise full of deceit and guile, made to God, be?

XV. Those who vow in the second manner — namely, with the intention of promising, and of binding themselves, but with the will not to fulfill the promise — although Valentia (Vol. III, II-II, disp. 6, q. 6, punct. 1) says that such vowers do not make a vow, the most common opinion is that they do elicit a true vow; since the essence of a vow is completed by a voluntary promise, made with both the intention to promise and the intention to bind oneself. A vow is a private law, which is enacted by the legislator with the will to bind, without the will to carry out [immediately]. It can, quite well, be asked. But the latter — the resolve not to fulfill — is not efficacious, and cannot nullify the first two elements — of promising and of binding oneself, that is, the very practical command by which the vow is commanded, and directed toward the worship of God. Wherefore one who promises marriage, or who receives holy orders, with the will to act against them, validly contracts marriage, and validly receives holy orders... receives holy orders — even though he did not have the will to fulfill what he promised; nevertheless he is bound to fulfill his promises. But such cases scarcely arise in practice.

XVI. You will object: St. Thomas says that a promise proceeds from a resolve, and the will to fulfill the promise constitutes the essence of the promise. If, then, the resolve to act is lacking, the promise itself is lacking. What more is there to say? If someone promised a man something, and immediately added that he had no intention of fulfilling it, would he not be held a mocker, not a true promiser?

XVII. Response: St. Thomas, when he says that a promise proceeds from the resolve to make the promise, is speaking of a perfect promise; and when he says that three things are required for a vow — deliberation, resolve, and promise — he is speaking of a vow according to the regular and common norm of vowing. But when some condition is lacking which pertains neither to the essence of the vow, nor of the promise, the vow is not destroyed, but remains merely imperfect. Now the condition of fulfilling what is promised, or vowed, in no way pertains to the nature of either the promise or the vow; it is external and incidental to it, and therefore cannot destroy the vow. What is added, then, is beside the point. To be sure, if someone promised, and immediately added that he refused to fulfill the promise, he would not be a true promiser, but a mocker. But if he promised sincerely and deliberately, as we are now discussing, he would be compelled to hold to his promises, and to fulfill them.

XVIII. One who vows in the third manner is bound by the vow. For one who vows and promises with a sincere and deliberate mind really wills all those things which are necessarily included in the vow and promise itself. Now in a true vow and promise is included the obligation of carrying out the thing promised. In the same way that someone deliberately wills some cause, by that same will he necessarily wills to attain that cause's effect. Can one who deliberately commits a rape reject vengeance? This opinion is upheld by Sotus (Bk. 7, q. 1, art. 1), Suárez (Bk. I, ch. 3, n. 7), Azor (Part I, Bk. XI, ch. 13, q. 9), Sánchez (II-II, q. 88, art. 1), Aragón, Prado (Vol. II, ch. 31, q. 1), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 1, n. 27), Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 41, n. 12), Trullench (dub. 1, n. 6), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 1, §6, n. 24), and many others. Sotus (q. ult.) and Valentia (disp. 1, punct. 1) argue the contrary, on the grounds that whoever attaches a condition contrary to the substance of a contract renders that contract void. Moreover, a vow is a private law, which does not oblige beyond the legislator's intention.

This question is much ado about nothing, and to be dismissed among trifles: for either the hypothesis is chimerical, or it is true. For, granting the premise that someone really wishes to vow and promise — indeed, that he really does vow and promise, admitting, I say, this true and sincere will, which has already broken forth into the act of vowing and promising — the later will is a mere velleity, which cannot override the former, efficacious will. Since, moreover, it can scarcely, if at all, be conceived that a man, master of himself, should sincerely and with deliberate mind wish to vow and promise, while simultaneously wishing not to bind himself, we pass over this question as an empty one.

I. All agree that the matter of a vow must be something honorable, possible, free, not indifferent, and not an impediment to a greater good. For in any vow, two actions occur: one material, which constitutes the vow — such as fasting, sacrificing, and the like; the other formal, which is the promise to carry out the material action; and this promise made to God is an act of religion. All this will be explained in the following little questions.

II. Question I. Can things prescribed by human or divine law be the matter of a vow? Response: For the negative opinion, the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 2, n. 30) cite St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, §1), Sylvester (s.v. Votum, q. 4). But it must be affirmed that these authors are not correctly cited by the theologians of Salamanca, since they teach the entirely opposite view: they merely distinguish, with St. Thomas, a commanded or necessary thing from free matter, and establish that a necessary work is not the matter of a vow, but a free one is. But whatever is commanded, whether by human or divine law, though it may be necessary for salvation insofar as salvation cannot be obtained without it, is nevertheless free — both because man can refuse it, and because he can bind himself, under a new title, to its observance. Or, more briefly: they distinguish a twofold necessity — one absolute, which is incompatible with a vow; and another, the necessity of the end, which necessity is imposed on an absolutely free work, and is necessary only in the sense of being required for the attainment of some end. This is the teaching of St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88, art. 2): "Because a vow implies a voluntary promise, and necessity excludes voluntariness, that which is absolutely necessary — namely, to be, or not to be — in no way falls under a vow; for it would be foolish for someone to vow that he would die, or that he would not fly. But that which does not have absolute necessity, but the necessity of the end — as, for instance, because without it one cannot be saved — does indeed fall under a vow, insofar as it is done voluntarily, but not insofar as it is a matter of necessity." This teaching is defended by St. Antoninus, Sylvester, Angles (s.v. Votum, n. 1), and Trovamala (s.v. Votum, n. 2).

III. The most common opinion teaches that all things prescribed by divine, civil, or ecclesiastical law can be the matter of a vow. This opinion is clearly drawn from Sacred Scripture, for it is said (Psalm 118): "I have sworn, and am determined to keep the judgments of thy justice." It is likewise drawn from canon law — from the chapter Ego, on oaths, and the chapter Cum Ecclesiis, and the chapter Significasti, on elections. This is also established by the consent of all nations. For not only Christians, but pagans too, commonly confirm with oaths the covenants, pacts, and contracts to whose observance men are bound by natural and divine law. Why, then, should they not be confirmed by both vows and oaths together? For when confirmed by vows and by oaths, an additional bond of religion is superadded. Whence the barbarians themselves, if they break sworn covenants, believe they commit two crimes, specifically distinct — one against religion, the other against justice. The reason for this is, in the end, evident. A work imposed under precept is absolutely free, and is called necessary only by the necessity of the end, or of the obligation — a necessity which Trovamala himself calls a conditional, or suppositional, necessity, which does not exclude freedom. Nothing, then, prevents us from binding ourselves by a new bond of religion to perform a work already imposed under precept. For precept in no way removes freedom from the will; rather, it presupposes it. Why, then, could this same commanded work not become the matter of a vow — such that what is owed under the title of law, divine or human, should also be owed under another title, namely, that of religion? Citation of authors is superfluous here, since this is the most common opinion.

IV. Question II. Is the promise made at the reception of baptism, to renounce the devil and his pomps, a vow? Response: St. Raymond (title on transgression, p. 34) says: "Of vows, some are of necessity, others of will. Vows of necessity are those which every man is necessarily bound to fulfill, whether he vows them or not — as to renounce the devil, and all his pomps... to this everyone binds himself at baptism: and hence, whoever afterward sins mortally is a transgressor of this kind of vow: and therefore is bound to do penance for that sin, and additionally for the transgression [of the vow]. But say that a penance is not to be imposed on him as for different mortal sins, but as for one, aggravated by the circumstance of the transgression of a vow." Having the baptismal promise as a vow, in this broad sense, its transgression does not constitute a distinct mortal sin, but only a sin graver within its own kind. St. Thomas teaches the same (Bk. IV, dist. 38, art. 2, q. 1, ad 3): "The transgression of a common vow does not make a special sin, but adds a special deformity to the sin." For a baptized person sins more gravely by committing the same kind of sin. The same is taught by Antoninus (Part II, tit. 12, ch. 15, §1), Cajetan (II-II, q. 88, art. 2, dub. 2), and theologians commonly. The promise made at baptism can, then, be called a vow, though in a broad sense — a vow whose transgression, as a law, is stained with the taint of a peculiar deformity.

V. Question III. How is that phrase, "of a better good," to be understood? Response: Something can be called a "greater," or "better," good in two ways. First, comparatively to another good — as it is better to give alms to a poor person than to fast; better to help a girl in peril than not to help another poor person exposed to no danger to her soul. Second, comparatively to the contrary omission of the same good — as it is better to give alms than not to give it; better to fast than not to fast; better to preserve chastity than not to preserve it. For something to be suitable matter for a vow, it suffices that the good in question be a "better good" in this second sense. For if it were required to be a better good comparatively to another good, it would follow that no vow would be valid unless it concerned the most perfect of all works. Authors do not speak on this matter with sufficient clarity. The theologians of Salamanca report two opinions as though contrary: one teaches that a better good must, absolutely, and in whatever way considered, be a work of supererogation; the other maintains that this is not required, but that it suffices that it be a work of supererogation, or of precept, provided it is not the contradictory opposite of it. There is, however, no real disagreement between these opinions, if the authors' true meaning is sincerely explained. For St. Thomas, and others, when they assert that the matter of a vow is a work of supererogation, are speaking of the matter of a vow taken precisely and strictly, as he clearly explains himself (Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1, qc. 2): "If a vow is taken according to its proper nature, it properly concerns those goods to which not all are bound, which are of supererogation; and therefore they are called 'better goods,' because they are added to those goods without which there is no salvation; and therefore a vow properly taken is said to concern a better good." Nor does the Angelic Doctor thereby exclude commanded works from the matter of a vow; rather, he openly includes them (II-II, q. 88, art. 2): "That which does not have absolute necessity, but the necessity of the end — as, for instance, because without it one cannot be saved — does indeed fall under a vow. But that which is in no way necessary falls most properly under a vow," the Angelic Doctor concludes in the same place. In brief: works of counsel, or of supererogation, are, as the Angelic Doctor says, most properly the matter of a vow; and indeed men commonly make vows about matters of counsel. But commanded works are sufficient matter for vows as well — that is, vows can also be made concerning them. No one has any right to depart from this teaching of St. Thomas; and, so far as I have been able to gather, no one does depart from it. For St. Thomas grants that the commandments themselves become, under a new title, the matter of a vow; while the evangelical counsels, or those reduced to them, are more properly — indeed, as he himself says, "most properly" — the works subject to a vow. Who would dare call this into controversy?

VI. Question IV. Is a vow concerning matter opposed to the counsels valid? Response: It is certain, and agreed among all, that all those things absolutely opposed to the evangelical counsels are not subject to vows, being no fit matter for them; and consequently there are no valid vows not to fast, not to lend, not to give alms, not to enter religious life, and the like of this kind. For such things cannot please God, since they are an impediment to greater perfection — and this St. Thomas expressly teaches (q. 88, art. 5, ad 2). Circumstances can nonetheless arise such that a work which is absolutely opposed to the counsels is not, in that particular case, opposed to them. For instance, not lending to one's neighbor is absolutely opposed to the evangelical counsel; but not lending on such-and-such an occasion can be a work not contrary, but rather consonant, with the evangelical counsel — as will be more fully explained below. If someone stubbornly and obstinately vowed to omit works of counsel, he would sin mortally, since he would be showing contempt for the evangelical counsels. It should be added that certain counsels frequently become precepts on account of some circumstance. One who, however, out of levity or ignorance, made two or three such vows, would not exceed the bounds of venial fault. This is common doctrine among authors.

VII. Question V. Is a vow to contract marriage valid? Response: It is invalid, according to the most common opinion of theologians — since it is opposed to the evangelical counsel. You will say: If someone swore to some girl that he would take her as his wife, would he not then, in justice, be bound to fulfill his oath? Why, then, would such a vow not likewise bind? The difference is self-evident. A betrothal, sworn and accepted by the girl, must indeed be fulfilled by the promiser in fulfillment of that oath. But a vow dedicated to God concerning the contracting of marriage is not accepted by God. What if someone promised to take as his wife a poor girl, or a prostitute? Not even in this case would the vow be valid — since the girl's poverty does not outweigh the greater good of celibacy, nor is marriage a means, in itself ordained, or altogether sufficient, for securing the spiritual salvation of a prostitute. It must be judged otherwise, however, if someone vowed to take as his wife a girl he had deflowered; or if he vowed to marry a prostitute, on the condition that he intends at some point to contract marriage anyway — for in that case, either vow would be valid. A vow to contract marriage would likewise be valid whenever, as very rarely happens, marriage would be necessary for the common good of the commonwealth, or of a principality, to secure peace between princes, for the conversion of heretics, or for the enlargement of the Catholic Church. For in these cases, it is not so much the marriage as the common good that would be the matter of the vow. All this is common doctrine.

VIII. Question VI. Does one who, tormented by the stings of concupiscence, vows to contract marriage, in order to avoid fornication and other acts of lust, vow validly? Response: There are two extreme opinions. The first affirms that such a vow is valid, given the supposition that the one vowing is unwilling, or unable, to use other remedies to check the impulses of the flesh. Since, say the authors of this opinion, marriage was granted as a remedy for concupiscence, the Apostle saying: "It is better to marry than to burn." It will, therefore, be better to use this remedy; and consequently a vow to contract such a marriage will be a vow concerning a better good. This can be confirmed by the fact that if someone, having a concubine, vowed either to enter religious life, or to marry his concubine, he would, in the opinion of all, be bound to enter religious life within the year, if he did not marry her. Finally, a frail man, frequently succumbing to lust, is bound, by natural law, to contract marriage as a remedy for concupiscence, unless he has some impediment, so as to avoid further sins — given the supposition that he is unwilling, or unable, to use other remedies.

This opinion is defended by the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 2, §2, n. 40), citing in its favor Bellarmine (Bk. II, On Monks, ch. 14). But wrongly: for Bellarmine only asserts that it can sometimes be better for a certain person to marry, and consequently that the vow can be valid — as if he marries for the common good of the commonwealth, and the other reasons indicated above. He says not a word there about a vow to marry as a remedy for concupiscence. They also cite Navarrus, in his Manual, ch. 11 — but this is an error, for that reference is ch. 12, n. 43, verse 15; and even there this author, at least in the place cited, says nothing on this matter. They further cite Villalobos, Bonacina, López, Trullench, and Cajetan (II-II, q. 88, art. 2, concl. 6), who does indeed really defend this opinion, along with several others, among whom is Sylvius.

IX. The contrary opinion seems to me more probable — namely, that the aforesaid vow is invalid. And first, this is clearly established from St. Thomas's teaching. For the Angelic Doctor teaches that marriage was instituted for the office of nature, and for the procreation of offspring; but that it was permitted, by way of indulgence, for restraining concupiscence (Bk. IV, dist. 31, q. 2, art. 2, ad 2): "If someone, through the marital act, intends to avoid fornication in his spouse, this is no sin at all, since this is a kind of rendering of the debt, which pertains to the good of fidelity; but if he intends to avoid fornication in himself, thus, according to this, there is a venial sin, nor is there any superfluity in it; for it is not for this that marriage was instituted, except by way of an indulgence which concerns venial sins." And indeed the Apostle says: "They that have not continency, let them marry: for it is better to marry than to be burnt" — that is, than to burn with lust, or to fornicate, as the Fathers explain. But if marriage, as a remedy for concupiscence, is only permitted by way of indulgence, no one would dare deny that a vow is invalid which has for its object not a better good, but a good so imperfect that a venial sin is attached to it. But, setting aside this opinion for the present — which we shall discuss more fully in the treatise on marriage — we establish our own opinion by a most cogent argument.

X. All theologians maintain that a vow to contract marriage, made absolutely, is invalid; and this all the authors of the contrary opinion admit, to a man. With even greater reason, then, will a vow to contract marriage as a remedy for concupiscence be invalid. I prove the consequence: marriage contracted as a remedy for concupiscence, even granting it to be good, no one would deny is a good far inferior to the good of marriage contracted for the office of nature. Therefore, if the vow of this latter kind is invalid, with greater reason will the vow of the former kind be invalid. Why does a vow to enter marriage for the propagation of nature — which is a great sacrament in the Church, and is often, and very frequently, advisable — impede a greater good, namely, the celibate life, to which the one vowing might be called by the inspiration of the divine Spirit? Is not that greater good equally impeded by contracting marriage to extinguish the ardor of concupiscence? Either, then, it must be conceded that a vow to contract marriage absolutely, and for the office of nature, is valid; or, if this is denied, as indeed all deny, it must likewise be denied that a vow to enter marriage as a remedy for concupiscence is valid. Finally, even after such a vow has been made — indeed, even after a marriage ratified but not consummated — one who vowed may still enter religious life. That vow, then, is in every respect null.

XI. The arguments of the contrary opinion collapse of their own accord. We grant that marriage, for the sole remedy of concupiscence, is a good, especially for a man troubled by the stings of the flesh. We grant that for this frail man marriage is a suitable and good remedy. What follows from this? If we said the vow was invalid because marriage as a remedy for concupiscence is not a good, our argument would prove something. But we say that although it is good, marriage nonetheless impedes a greater good — which is enough to invalidate the vow. Otherwise, if a vow concerning a good thing were valid, with even greater reason a vow to contract marriage for the office of nature ought to be valid — which is certainly a greater good than entering marriage for the extinguishing of concupiscence. What the theologians of Salamanca oppose in the second place is altogether inept. If someone made a vow to steal, the vow would be null, because theft is unsuitable matter for a vow — not merely because it is a lesser good, but because it is an evil thing; but to take a concubine in marriage is, in its own kind, a good thing, although it impedes a greater good. The difference, then, is evident. What they add in the last place — and it is astonishing that such things should be foisted on us by theologians — is of no greater weight: that someone may be bound, by natural law, to contract marriage, so as to avoid the sin of lust, by no means implies that he can place himself, by a vow, in a state of resisting the Holy Spirit, whereby he would be prevented from assenting to a call to a higher state. Let them note, then, the sophistical reasoning here. Someone can contract marriage to avoid the sin of lust. Let us even grant that he is sometimes bound to this — though I do not know whether such an obligation can actually arise, since very many other remedies for lust are available. But no one can, by a vow, render himself unfit to embrace a more perfect state, to which he may be called by God. The examples which the aforesaid theologians of Salamanca adduce (n. 45) we shall examine elsewhere. This, our own opinion, is defended by Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 1, art. 3), Prado (Vol. II, ch. 31, q. 3, n. 50), John of St. Thomas (II-II, disp. 29, art. 7, concl. 4), Aragón (II-II... ..., q. 88, art. 1), John of St. Thomas (II-II, on the 2nd precept of the Decalogue, ch. 2, sect. 1), Sporer (Bk. IV, tract. 4, ch. 2, n. 12) — although these last three, Palao, Layman, and Sporer, rather concede the contrary opinion: for they say that, under the virtual hypothesis that a frail man is unwilling to employ other remedies, the vow is binding. But they produce nothing that is not already resolved by what has been said. Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 18, n. 14), Sporer (tract. 3, on vows, dub. 1, concl. 6, n. 61), Layman.

XII. Question VII. Can a married person, hindered from requesting the debt by a vow, an oath, or spiritual kinship, request it whenever he is agitated by vehement stirrings of the flesh, lest he be exposed to the danger of falling into grave sins of lust? Response: Fr. Patritius Sporer, who proposes this very case (tract. 3, on the 2nd precept, ch. 2, sect. 2, §3, n. 65), says: "I follow the affirmative." And he attempts to prove his conclusion in this manner, which it is worth quoting in his own words, lest we seem to misrepresent him: "It is proved (he says) in the case of one who, after marriage, or before it, has vowed chastity. For just as a vow, according to the common opinion of the Doctors, following St. Thomas, must concern a better good, so too must its observance. But the vow, and its observance in the aforesaid circumstances, do not concern a better good. Therefore they do not oblige. The major premise is certain. The minor is certain too: for when, from the observance of the vow, someone is exposed to the proximate danger of falling into some sins of lust that are intrinsically evil, then non-observance of the vow (namely, requesting the debt from one's own spouse) is not intrinsically evil; it is manifest, therefore, that neither the vow, nor the observance of the vow, concerns a better good, etc." He adds: "This and much more on this subject, the most learned Fr. Quintanadueñas... to which the most experienced casuist Gobat subscribes."

XIII. This opinion, in my own judgment, is not merely lax, but improbable — and, with all due respect to such great, most learned, and most experienced casuists, opens far too wide a path toward doing away with all vows whatsoever. For the patrons of this opinion teach, in express words, that a vow does not bind one who, through the rebellion of the senses, is so drawn to commit sins against the observance of the vow, that he feels himself placed in proximate danger of violating it. All vows of chastity, then, would be null, whenever men who have made them are provoked by lustful itching to fornicate and commit adultery. Married persons bound by a vow, or by some other bond, from requesting the debt, would then be able to request it, so as to avoid the crimes of lust. Why? Because the non-observance of the vow is not intrinsically evil, since requesting the debt, when non-observance of the vow, is a good thing. Why, then, would monks, and secular clergy alike, burning with the ardor of concupiscence, not be able to contract marriage — since entering marriage even as a remedy for concupiscence is no less good than requesting the debt to soothe that same concupiscence? Why, I ask, would a vow be invalid for a married person prone to lust? Why, in this man's case, would the observance of the vow not concern a better good? Because this observance is joined with the proximate danger of falling into lust. Then it will not concern a better good for a monk either — for the observance of a vow of chastity is likewise attached to a proximate danger of falling into lust. That vow, then, will not be valid either.

XIV. What can be said to this? Perhaps that the vow of chastity of monks and clerics is solemn, while that of married persons is simple. But that distinction is altogether irrelevant, and unsuited to our present purpose. For both a solemn and a simple vow must, as all admit, concern a better good. But, according to the most learned Quintanadueñas, Gobat, and Sporer, when a married man bound by a vow is urged by the sharpest stirrings of the flesh, and is in proximate danger of violating it, the vow then does not concern a better good. If, then, it does not concern a better good in a married man, neither will it, in a priest or a monk in the same proximate danger, concern a better good. But if this vow does not prevent a married person from being able to request the debt, or a priest or monk from being able to contract marriage — since requesting the debt is good, just as entering marriage is good — but let us set aside the solemn vows of Religious, and turn our discussion to simple vows: will all the vows of chastity which so many Catholics make be null, whenever they find themselves in proximate danger of lust? Null, they say. Hear the following case.

XV. Parthenius, a young man, is vehemently tormented by lustful temptations, and frequently succumbs to them — although he realizes that the married state would be far more beneficial for him than the unmarried — yet he makes a vow of chastity, and gravely violates it, so that he now wishes it had never been made. The question is asked, whether this vow is valid. Response: It is probable that this vow is not valid, since, all things considered, it does not concern a better good. So Fr. Adam Burghaber holds, in his 66th selected case; so too Fr. Patritius Sporer, loc. cit., n. 69.

XVI. The opinion just reviewed is lax, and in no way probable. Let us grant that the aforesaid vow was imprudent; this imprudence nonetheless does not prevent chastity, vowed, from being suitable matter for a vow, nor does it remove the deliberate choice of the one vowing. The one vowing experiences frequent lapses into lust; nonetheless, he deliberately wishes to vow chastity. On what basis, then, is it to be concluded that this vow is null? From the repeated violation of the vow? If that were so, few vows would be valid. Martín Bonacina also teaches the aforesaid opinion (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 1, n. 26). He adds, however, that a dispensation must be sought. What could be more absurd! The vow is null; yet a dispensation must be obtained! What effect would this dispensation produce, if the vow is null? From what bond must the one vowing be absolved, if he is bound by no bond at all? But greater absurdities are to come.

XVII. Question VIII. Is a vow of chastity, of the religious life, or of not marrying, made by one for whom marriage would be more salutary on account of his incontinence, valid, and does it prevent marriage from being lawfully contracted? Likewise, do such vows, once validly made, become null on account of subsequent temptations to lust? Response: Leander (tract. 9, on Marriage, disp. 23, q. 12 and 13) teaches the following: "The negative opinion — namely, that such a vow is not valid, nor does it prevent marriage — can be argued for on these grounds. First, a vow to enter marriage is valid for those for whom it is judged more salutary that they enter marriage on account of incontinence, since this concerns a better good relative to the one vowing: therefore the aforesaid vows contrary to this concern a lesser good relative to that same person vowing: therefore they are void. This is clear: for two contradictory things cannot be legitimate matter for the same person and at the same time." Sharp indeed, and robustly argued dialectically! But let us hear the second argument. "A vow (he adds) of chastity or of the religious life, made by one whom bodily troubles and frequent falls precede, is not concerning sufficiently suitable and just matter; indeed it is rather made contrary to the counsel of St. Paul (1 Cor. 7), who says: 'But if they do not contain, let them marry: for it is better to marry than to burn.'"

XVIII. Whether such principles favor Luther and Calvin, who rail against Catholic vows on the grounds that they are unbearable for human frailty, and contrary to the ardors of the loins, let others judge. As for the first argument Leander makes, we have already shown above that it is false. The law of non-contradiction he cites against us is wrongly applied. For from it only this much can be drawn: that the same person cannot make both a vow to marry and a vow not to marry, or a vow to marry and a vow of chastity, at one and the same time, concerning contradictory or contrary objects. One who makes a vow of chastity, even though entangled in the allurements of the flesh, chooses that vow as an instrument for restraining the flesh's rebellion. The matter, by its own nature, is regarded as something better; and the one vowing regards it as the more advisable remedy. If he were to form the opposite judgment, he would make a vow to marry instead. Wherefore, since the matter — namely, chastity — is by its own nature suited to a vow, as being a better good, by that very fact it cannot become unsuitable matter for a vow even in a man exposed to the danger of lust — even granting that, had he formed the contrary judgment, he could have made a vow to marry instead. This much is said against the sophistical reasoning. But, so that the laxity of this opinion may be more fully apparent, before I proceed further to refute it, it is worth setting before our eyes the still laxer things that this same Leander, along with a few others, teaches.

XIX. Leander continues, saying that not only are vows invalid which are made at the very time when someone burns with the heat of lust, but also those which, though made in a time of tranquility and concord of the flesh with reason, nonetheless become, on account of subsequent temptations and rebellion of the senses, unsuitable matter for a vow: "...what, before the vow was made, renders the promised matter unsuited matter for a vow, if it supervenes after the vow is made, removes the obligation of the vow. But it is so that, in the opinion of these Doctors, frequent lapses into lust invalidate vows of religion, of chastity, etc. Therefore these same lapses will invalidate the preceding vows as well." This opinion he afterward calls "more probable speculatively." But what does that matter to practice? "I answer, probably (he says there, q. 13, p. 320), that the aforesaid opinion, speaking practically too, is somewhat probable, and can safely be embraced. Therefore, without dispensation, he can enter marriage."

XX. Did you hear that? The aforesaid opinion is "somewhat probable": therefore it "can safely be embraced." The Probabilists proceed by stages. First they devise some most subtle reasonings, by which they claim a veil of speculative probability for their own opinion. Then, this most subtle veil they wrap in further reflections, which they make so thick and solid that it becomes, in the end, a safe rule of conduct. It could be objected in favor of this opinion that, according to weighty authors, a vow to marry is valid whenever it is judged to avoid fornication — therefore a vow of chastity, or of celibacy, is invalid whenever such celibacy reaches the point of being less advisable than marriage for that same person. Sylvius denies this consequence (II-II, q. 88, art. 2, concl. 2), since a vow, when free, and when no vow at all binds one, will nonetheless become obligatory if one wishes to bind oneself by a vow to a frail man, provided celibacy will then be more useful for him than marriage. John Marín (Vol. II, tract. 9, disp. 12, sect. 6, n. 77) answers that a vow to marry, taken conditionally, is valid — that is, provided the one vowing is unwilling to choose other means. But none of this reasoning pertains to us, who have taught the opposite. Setting this aside, then,

III. "Whether a vow of chastity, or of Religion, or of not marrying, hidden from the one to whom marriage was promised, on account of incontinence, is valid, and impedes marriage from being licitly entered upon? The denying opinion — namely that such a vow is neither valid, nor impedes marriage — can be urged by these arguments... Because a vow of chastity or of Religion made by one whom frequent troubles of the flesh and ruinous falls precede is not concerning sufficiently suitable and just matter; nay rather it is against the counsel of St. Paul.

"The authors of this opinion would perhaps teach the same thing in the case where, the three said vows having been made, or one of them, it would be wiser for someone, on account of frequent temptations of the flesh and supervening lapses into venereal matters, to contract marriage ... Because what, before the vow was made, causes the promised thing to be an unfit matter for a vow, if it supervenes after the vow has been made, removes the obligation of the vow ... Therefore these same lapses will invalidate the antecedent vows ... This opinion is more probable speculatively ... But I answer that the aforesaid opinion, speaking even practically, is probable to some degree, and can be safely embraced. The reason is that it is probable (whatever Diana doubts undeservedly) that what is here and now speculatively probable is also practically so ... Therefore here and now such an opinion will also be practically probable. Therefore it can be safely embraced by one for whom marriage is more wholesome than the vows of Religion or of chastity are on account of his incontinence, etc. Therefore he will be able to enter marriage without dispensation. So expressly held the aforesaid Juan Sánchez." Leander of the Most Holy Sacrament, treatise 9 on marriage, disputation 24, question 2, page 324, § 3, page 325.

V. "A vow made in thanksgiving for a shameful act already done is valid." Leander, treatise 2 on the vow, disputation 4, question 31, page 341, from Filliucci, treatise 26 on the vow, chapter 2, question 6, number 54.

I. Question I. What is a vow, and what its conditions? Answer. It is a deliberate and spontaneous promise made to God concerning a better thing. Five conditions are assigned: 1. deliberation; 2. the will of promising and of executing the promise; 3. the promise itself; 4. that this promise be made to God; 5. that it be concerning a better thing, or one pleasing to God. Each condition must be explained.

II. For a vow, full deliberation is required, which consists in this: that the one vowing be master of himself, and advert to and know what he promises. Not to say more: that liberty which suffices for committing a sin, for perfecting a contract, suffices for a vow. Wherefore vows, even sudden ones, can be valid, when they proceed from a deliberate will. Vows of this kind, however, suffer from imprudence, which, on account of such a precipitate emission, according to the variety of circumstances, can be dispensed with or commuted. A virtual deliberation suffices, however, as in all other actions, contained in other preceding actions, provided the one vowing be master of himself. A mere purpose does not suffice for a vow, since a purpose is nothing other than a will of doing something. A promise, then, is necessary. Often the unlearned confuse a purpose with a promise, and conversely. Wherefore a prudent director of souls will gather from the circumstances whether a vow has been made or not. If someone should vow with the mind of promising and binding himself, but with the will of not fulfilling the promise, he would elicit and constitute the vow: because the latter purpose of not fulfilling is inefficacious and inept.

III. The other clause, promise made to God, indicates that vows are made to God alone. When someone pledges that he will do some work in honor of some Saint, this is not a vow properly so called, but the matter of a vow. Wherefore vows which are made in honor of some Saint are called vows in a broader signification, which nevertheless have the force of binding. These vows are not acts of latria, owed to God alone, but of dulia, or hyperdulia. Catholics, then, vowing to the Blessed Virgin, to SS. Augustine, Benedict, Dominic, etc., vow to God before these Saints as witnesses, patrons, and helpers.

IV. Question II. What does the other clause, "concerning a better good," signify? Answer. The matter of a vow must be honorable, possible, free, not indifferent, and not impeding a greater good. Things which are commanded by divine or ecclesiastical law can be the matter of a vow, as the common opinion teaches. The clause "concerning a better good" has a twofold sense: first, compared to another good — as it is better to succor an endangered girl than another poor person exposed to no danger of soul. Secondly, with respect to the omission of that same good — as it is better to give alms than not to give. For fitting matter of a vow it suffices that it be a better good in this second way. Matter opposed to the evangelical counsels is in no way fit for a vow. Hence a vow of contracting marriage is invalid, because it is opposed to the evangelical counsel. If marriage were necessary for preserving the Commonwealth, for confirming peace between Princes — which scarcely, or not even scarcely, happens — they say that then the vow would be valid: because the matter of the vow is not so much the marriage, as the common good of the Commonwealth and of the Church. A vow of marrying, in order to bridle and restrain concupiscence, is null.

V. If a married person, impeded by a vow made from asking the debt, is troubled by stimuli of concupiscence, can he ask the debt? Fr. Sporer affirms it, citing Fr. Gobat. But this opinion is lax and false. Even laxer is the other opinion of Leander, denying that a vow of chastity, of religion, or of not marrying is valid when made by one for whom marriage is more wholesome, and who suffers grave rebellions of concupiscence. Nay, the same most benign Leander adds that supervening temptations and anxieties of the flesh render a vow of not marrying null. Read Tome 3 on the Decalogue, book 4, dissertation 1, chapter 4, number 12 and following. A vow of not vowing is invalid. That a vow of not seeking a dispensation is valid, if it is more useful to the soul not to seek a dispensation; on the contrary, that it is null, if it is more wholesome to the soul to request a dispensation, St. Antoninus and Richard teach.

VI. Question III. Are indifferent, useless, or vicious things the matter of a vow? Answer. All deny it. Yet if a thing which is by its own nature indifferent should, on account of some circumstance, put on honesty, it is fit matter for a vow. A vow whose execution is a sin is null. Wherefore Jephthah sinned in killing his daughter. Similarly, a vow made concerning a good thing for a depraved end is null: since then the vow is taken as an instrument for procuring a depraved end. Invalid too are vows of offering God gifts, of celebrating Masses, of laying out alms, which certain Christians are wont to make, this condition being added: if they come off victors in a duel, or in an unjust war. Likewise a vow made in thanksgiving to God for a shameful act already committed is invalid, and unbefitting God — as for a gain procured from unjust gambling. But valid is a vow made to obtain the safety of a son begotten of a concubine: because the health of the son is a good, although sin has preceded it. Equally valid are vows of punishing one's own crimes. Vows of a good thing for an indifferent end are null. A vow concerning an impossible thing is null.

VII. Question IV. If one who cannot fulfill the whole vow is bound to fulfill a part? Answer. You vowed to build a Church: unable to build the whole, are you bound to a part? That this one vowing is bound to nothing, Tamburini, Leander, Castropalao, and others teach. But a distinction must be made. If the separated part redounds to the honor of God, then the one vowing must execute it; but not if the separated part would be useless. But in this case the one vowing should build a Chapel in another Church, or something else in some temple, which would redound to God's honor. When the matter of a vow is mixed, partly good and partly evil, or vain, the good part must be fulfilled, the other neglected. Hence a vow of coming to Rome with a naked body is valid as regards the making of the journey; only the manner of nakedness must be omitted.

VIII. Question V. Is a vow of not gaming valid? Answer. The true and common opinion affirms it, because it concerns a better good. For gaming is something fortuitous in order to gain, or loss, and a source of evils. Therefore abstinence from gaming concerns a better good.

IX. Fr. Claude La-Croix teaches lax opinions on this argument, book 3, part 1, number 453 and following. An error crept into my Tome 3 on the Decalogue, page 117, number 8, where, in editing the lax opinion of this author, in place of "you wished" [voluisti], by an error certainly of the printers, "you vowed" [vovisti] was printed. This material error, although trivial and of no moment, I now correct, that I may satisfy my censors, and give thanks, since by objecting such very light blemishes to me they make plain to the whole World that Christian Theology is free both from Rigorism and from Laxism.

X. "If you vowed to this end" ("vowed" here, not "wished," says Fr. La-Croix, place cited, number 454) "that you would avoid quarrels, blasphemies, oaths ... it will be licit to play through another, even though these inconveniences are feared, because in very deed you are not playing." You are not playing, indeed, under your own name, but under another's; so neither do you blaspheme, quarrel, or swear with your own mouth, but with another's mouth. How lax these things are, and others which La-Croix teaches in the same place, let others judge.

XI. Question VI. Is a vow of never sinning valid? Answer. If the vow is of abstaining from every mortal sin, it is most valid. But if the vow is of avoiding all faults, even venial ones, taken collectively, the vow is null, inasmuch as it concerns a matter humanly...

impossible to human weakness. Valid, however, is a vow of avoiding this or that determinate deliberate venial sin — for instance, of not lying. But there is no need to dwell on unraveling these vows, since Christians must be persuaded to abstain in very deed from sins, not to burden themselves with a load of vows.

XIII. Question VIII. Does an error concerning the substance of the vow render it invalid? Answer. The common opinion affirms it: because error takes away the voluntary; for nothing is willed that is not first known. But error concerning adventitious matters and the circumstances of a vow does not render the vow null. But whence is it to be gathered whether circumstances redound to the substance of the vow, or not? Those redound to the substance of the vow which regard the end of the vow; but those are occasions of vowing, which excite one to vow. You vow alms to be conferred upon an honest poor man. The relief of poverty is the end of the vow...

the vow. The honesty of the poor man is the occasion which excites and impels you to the vow. In doubt whether some circumstances have the character of the end of the vow, or of the occasion, one must examine whether, these being removed, the end of the vow would still stand: for if it stands, all the other things have merely the character of occasion. But if, on the contrary, these being absent, the end of the vow would collapse, then they would have the character of the end.

XIV. Question IX. Is a vow extorted by fear valid? Answer. One fear is grave, falling upon a constant man; another is light. A grave fear can arise intrinsically, as from infirmity, a storm, or an imminent shipwreck. A vow made by force of intrinsic fear is valid both by natural law and by positive law: because then the one vowing is compelled by no one but himself. Valid, then, are vows made to avoid death, shipwreck, or another misfortune. A vow is also valid on account of fear justly inflicted from outside: because when fear is justly inflicted in order to extort a vow, the one vowing is unreasonably unwilling. Light fear does not invalidate a vow, because it lightly injures free consent.

II. Question II. Are vows made by Religious, without the Prelate's license, concerning an honorable matter which disturbs neither jurisdiction nor discipline, valid? Answer. Several deny it; but the more probable opinion affirms it, since they bring no detriment either to the jurisdiction of the Prelates, or to the discipline of the Order, and concern an honorable matter. Prelates can indeed invalidate these vows, once they have come to know of them. But subjects are not bound to manifest them; and so, as long as they remain hidden, they are valid, and those vowing are bound to execute them. But vows of Religious opposed either to the Rule or to the jurisdiction of Superiors are null. Similarly, vows made by Religious to give away in alms anything of the goods granted for their own use, without the license of the Prelates, are altogether null.

As regards the first condition, deliberation, and its necessity for a vow, the question is: whether every deliberation sufficient to avoid mortal sin suffices, or whether there is required such deliberation as has weighed all the circumstances of the matter.

Some think that the prior deliberation which proceeds from the heat of passion, anger, or love does not suffice, but that a perfect one is required, which can be proved from c. si quis iratus, 2. quaest. 4, and the rule Quidquid calore, 48. ff. de regulis iuris and l. 3. ff. de divortiis: whence is also drawn what kind of pledge ought to be in marriage. So the Gloss on c. dudum, verb. calore, and there Hostiensis on the same word; Antoninus, c. sicut ex litteris de iureiurando, n. 9; Panormitanus on d. c. dudum, num. 8, and c. sicut ex litteris, num. 2, and c. si vero, num. 7 de iureiurando; Romanus, singulari 508; Tiraquellus, de poenis temperandis, causa 1, num. 26; and among the Theologians, Richard in 4, dist. 38, art. 2, quaest. 2.

The opposite opinion, however, is that deliberation suffices which suffices even for committing a mortal sin. So Navarrus, summa Latina, cap. 18, num. 7; Molina, T. 1, de iustitia, tract. 2, disp. 267, where they teach this generally in every promise made to a man; but concerning a vow and an oath, John Andreas teaches it, c. dudum, n. 10, de consecr., d. 5, ubi Antoninus n. 25, Cardinalis n. 2, oppositione 5; Ancharanus n. 10; Alexander de Nevo, c. sicut ex litt. de iureiurando, n. 18, where Imola at the end, Faelinus num. 3 and 4.

Among the Theologians: Paludanus in 4, dist. 38, quaest. 1; D. Antoninus, 2nd part, tit. 11, cap. 2; Cajetan, 2. 1. quaest. 88, art. 1, and in the summa, v. votum; Soto, book 7, de iustitia, quaest. 1, art. 2; Viguerius, book Instit. cap. 5, §. 1; Alcoyer, I. de Ludo, cap. 13; Medina, book 1 of the summa, cap. 14, § 6; Palacios, 4, dist. 38, disp. 1; Manuel, 2nd tome of the summa, cap. 92; Tanner, disp. 5, quaest. 4, dub. 1; Aragon, 2. 2. quaest. 88, art. 1, fol. 995; Angles, floribus 2. p. quaest. 1, de voto, art. cit. diff. 3; Bassaeus, num. 2; Lopez, first part of the Instruct., cap. 45. Sanchez adduces and follows these, book 1, de matrim., disp. 8, num. 5, and in the summa, book 4, cap. 1. This is the opinion of D. Bonaventure in the place cited.

I assert, with this opinion, that deliberation which intervenes with mortal sin suffices for a vow: it is proved from D. Bonaventure in 4, dist. 38, quaest. 3, by the arguments in the first place, with the replies added. Such deliberation suffices for handing oneself over to the devil, and to a vow, as is had in c. sunt, qui opes, 17. quaest. 4, and c. veniens de voto: but to hand oneself over to the devil, deliberation arising even from passion suffices, with all the circumstances not considered: Therefore. On this argument Sanchez and the others rely in the places adduced.

Sanchez notes, first, num. 6, that in betrothals a period of seven years is required.

He notes, second, num. 7, that it is so gathered that the deliberation required be sufficient, the one vowing ought thus to premeditate the moving cause and the end, which Cajetan explains, saying that one ought to compare what one deliberates with its opposite; yet he observes that this does not require a delay of time.

But what consideration, and what consent, is required for mortal sin, has been sufficiently elucidated in Tractate 3, which is on Sin, disput. 2, quaest. 11 and 12.

But if a doubt should arise whether there was sufficient deliberation, we may judge that there was not, according to the foundations handed down in Tract. 1, disp. 17, quaest. 22. Tanner, however, disp. 5, quaest. 4, dub. 1, says the counsel would be to seek a dispensation. On this see Sanchez in the summa, l. 1. cap. 10, from num. 16, where, in doubt whether a vow has been emitted, he judges it not to be believed emitted, because the condition of the possessor is better, and the whole possession stands for the will, not for the vow. Add Soto, l. 7. de Iust. quaest. 3. art. 2. dub. secundo, Medina, l. 1. summae, cap. 14. §. 7. fol. 90, Suarez, de Censuris, disp. 40. sect. 5. n. 15, Sà in summa, v. debitum, Lopez, 1. p. Instruct. consc. 145, Henriquez, l. 8. de Eucharist. cap. 45, Manuel, 2. Tomo summae, cap. 99. num. 5, Graff, p. 1. decis. l. 2. cap. 26. num. 7, Rebellus, de Iust. p. 2. l. 1. quaest. 3. sect. 2, whom Sanchez adduces loc. cit., where he also retracts what he had taught in T. 1. de matrim. l. 2. disp. 41. num. 34, namely that one who is more inclined to affirm that he has vowed is bound to that part of the thing promised which the quantity of the doubt requires. In which case he here judges that one must judge altogether in favor of the one doubting, with Sala, p. 1. quaest. 10. Tract. 4. disp. unica sect. 25. num. 254, with whom Fernandez proceeds in exam. Theol. Moral. p. 1. cap. 6. §. 2, Bonacina, Tract. de legibus, disp. 2. quaest. 4. p. 2. num. 18, Diana, p. 1. tract. 15. resol. 9, against Bassaeus. The same Sanchez, l. 4. decal. cap. 1. num. 12, says one must see whence the doubt arises, since this matter is still undecided; because possession does not stand for liberty in whatever doubt there is from a defect of deliberation. For if it arises from perturbation of mind through fear or anger, he says one must then judge for the vow. But if it is doubted, on account of tender age, whether he has completed 7 years, one must judge for liberty; if from the madness of the one vowing, one must see what the law presumes about what was then done. And thus he decides variously.

Truly, however, he does not expound this rightly. For since the doubt stands in this, that it renders the mind equally undecided on both sides, as is taught in l. 2. de matr. disp. 41. num. 1, and liberty stands in the possession of the one doubting, as he himself asserts, LL. CC., and from each of these causes one can be made doubtful, and the possession of liberty can arise from the doubt, as he himself teaches, certainly he will be in possession, from wherever the doubt arises. Moreover, the cases adduced by him do not leave the matter undecided. Wherefore he labors equivocally. On these things see p. 2. T. 1. disp. 17. q. 20.

The intention, which is placed in the definition of a vow, I shall set out briefly here.

It must be noted, with D. Bonav. in 3. dist. 39. art. 3. quaest. 1. in resol., that the same question arises concerning marriage, Oath, and Vow. So Sanchez l. 1. de matrim. disput. 9., and in the place cited in the summa, walking with D. Bonav., resolved the difficulty completely. He first sets out certain cases in which one vowing without intention is not bound, which are easy: for instance, if he believes a vow does not bind, etc., or if he vows without the intention of promising.

Concerning this question, some have held that it is a true vow and binds. So Soto l. 7. de Iust. quaest. 1. art. 2. versic. 3.; Penna p. p. Instruct. cap. 42. et 43.; Manuel, 2nd Tomo of the summa, cap. 92. num. 4.; Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 1. fol. 969.; Gutierrez l. 1. quaest. Canon. cap. 22. num. 32.

The second opinion is that it is not a vow, nor does it bind the conscience under the aspect of a vow. So D. Bonav. in 3. dist. 39. art. 3. quaest. 1. and in 4. dist. 38. quaest. 1., whom Richard. follows there, art. 3. quaest. 2. ad 2.; D. Anton. 2. p. tit. 11. cap. 2.; Angel. v. pactum, num. 4. and v. votum 1. num. 7.; Sylvester verb. metus, quaest. 8. and verb. pactum, quaest. 4.; Armilla there, num. 2. and verb. Iuramentum, num. 14.; Tabienna verb. pactum, quaest. 1.; Medina C. de restit. quaest. 23.; Nauar. summa, cap. 12. et 13. conf. 4.; Viguer. l. Iustit. cap. 5. §. 5. versic. 14.; Palacios in 4. dist. 29. disp. 1. fol. 665.; whom Tanner disp. 5. quaest. 4. dub. 1. cites and follows, Sanchez loc. cit. and in summa, l. 4. cap. 1. num. 27., where he adds Valentia 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 6. p. 1.; Azor. l. 11. cap. 4. quaestio 2. and cap. 13. quaestio 9.; I add Faustus Thesaur. lib. 1. quaest. 26.; Less. lib. 2. cap. 40. dub. 3. and Bassaeus num. 7.

I assert, with this opinion, that one who vows without intending to be bound is not bound by reason of a vow.

It is proved by Sanchez from the final chapter, where a condition contrary to the substance of marriage annuls it, even though the words and the intention of contracting it were present: therefore, since it belongs to the nature of a promise to have the mind of binding oneself, where that mind is absent the promise will be nothing. The same is held by others with Fagundez in 2. praecepto Decal. d. 2. s. 9.

Yet this reason seems to beg the principle, as S. Bonav. hinted in 4. loc. cit. with the last argument; for this is the very thing in dispute: whether intention is necessary when the will of promising is present, in which, it seems, the vow, or the other promise, consists.

It is proved, then, by D. Bonav., because a vow looks immediately and substantially to God: therefore such a promise will be as is judged in the judgment of God; but there it is judged according to what is internal, as is said in 1 Reg. 16, For man seeth those things that appear; but the Lord beholdeth the heart; and D. Gregory: Words serve the intention, and God judges such words as are brought forth from within.

PROVED secondly by D. Bonau. with the argument which Sanchez took up loc. cit., Henriquez l. 11. de matrim. cap. 13. num. 1. for marriage, and the others cited for a vow. Every obligation which is not from law arises from the private will of a man. Thus in l. obligationum, ff. de obligationibus it is said that no one binds himself to another unless willing: but a vow is not from any law: therefore it arises from the free will of man: therefore it rises there from a private law which the promiser imposes upon himself; yet no law binds unless the lawgiver intends to bind.

You object first: Obligation is a natural effect of a promise, just as fire is to heat: therefore, just as fire being applied, heating follows; so a promise being posited, obligation follows.

It is answered from D. Bonau. in 4. loc. cit. ad 2.: when the promise is true, it has the effect of obligation; but not when it is fictitious, such as one with the mind not of binding, for then the natural condition of the promise is lacking. And so, just as heat does not follow from painted fire, so here. So Suarez also answers.

From this there also falls that which they object secondly: Whoever wills the antecedent necessarily wills the consequent, l. 1. §. 1. ff. si ususfruct. petat.; but obligation follows a promise: therefore. It is answered that it follows a true promise, not indeed a fictitious one, such as we here suppose.

It also falls, that other objection: He who gives the form gives also the consequences of the form: therefore he who offers a promise offers also the obligation.

It is answered that this is true of one giving a true form, such as one is not who promises fictitiously.

I ASSERT thirdly, that this fictitious promiser, if he fictitiously goes forth with solemn vows, is bound in the sight of the Church to fulfill them.

It is proved by D. Bonau. in 4. loc. cit. in the body, because the Church judges according to what is external.

It is proved secondly by D. Bonan. there ad ult. and in 3. loc. cit. with the second argument: Fraud and deceit ought to patronize no one, as all the Jurists cry out.

It is proved thirdly by D. Bonan. loc. cit. with argument 3.: Human society consists in contracts; but if one were to stand on intention, no one would ever be secure: for words are that in which a contract consists.

By THIS distinction the arguments on both sides are resolved.

From these Sanchez deduces (l. 4. Decal. cap. 1. num. 29.) that one who is initiated and consents to the Sacred Orders, to which the vow of chastity is joined, yet does not wish to subject himself to this vow, but only wishes the Sacred Orders, is not bound by force of a vow to preserve chastity, but is bound by force of the Ecclesiastical constitution; and if he were to enter marriage, it would be invalid.

The SAME he holds in lib. 7. de matrim. disp. 27. num. 12., where he brings along with him Paludanus 4. dist. 37. quaest. 1. art. 2. num. 14.; Sylv. Gabriel 4. dist. 38. quaest. unica, art. 2. and dist. 37. quaest. unica, art. 2. after the second conclusion; D. Anton. 3. p. tit. 11. cap. 8.; Sylvest. V. Matrim. 8. quaest. 12. dicto 2.; Durandus 4. dist. 37. quaest. 1.; Arboteus l. 5. Theosophiae, cap. 7.; Bassolis in 4. dist. 47. quaest. unica, art. 1.; Nicolaus de Nissia super 4. sent. tract. 6. p. 22. de matrim. quaest. 7.; Antonius Cuccus l. 5. Instit. maiorum, tit. 12. num. 220.; Palac. in 4. dist. 37. disp. un.; Anglem. fleribus p. 1., where concerning marriage quaest. 11. art. 1. diffic. 4.; so also Henriq. l. 10. cap. 14.; Valent. p. 1.; Azor. p. 1. l. 11. c. 13.; Bassaeus v. Votum, n. 6.

They are OBJECTED by Rich. 4. dist. 37. art. 1. quaest. 1.; Palud. dist. 38. quaest. 2. art. en.; Nauar. sum. cap. 22. n. 52.; Palac. 4. dist. 37. disp. un.; Dominicus c. Diaconi, dist. 38.; Tol. l. 1. cap. 8.: namely, because one who approaches sacred order efficaciously wills it; and so he is held to lay down that volition of the vow of chastity. D. Bonau. seems to have thought this in 4. loc. cit. ad 2.

I FOR MY PART do not think Sanchez rightly deduces from the fact that one vowing fictitiously is not bound, that the same must be said of our case; concerning which I thus argue ad hominem.

WHOEVER wills the antecedent wills also that which necessarily follows it, if he will the antecedent efficaciously, according to Sanchez l. 1. de matrimonio, disput. 9. num. 8. (for so he answers the argument above). But one who is initiated into the Sacred Orders is, of himself, supposed to will the Sacred Orders, from which the obligation of the vow of chastity follows conjointly, as is found in l. 7. de matrimonio, num. 11.; therefore one willing the Sacred Orders wills also to vow chastity.

Yet the disparity is great: for there he wills fictitiously, whence the obligation, which is the effect of the promise, does not fall upon the promiser; but here, one who is initiated wills really and efficaciously that from which the burden of the vow of chastity follows, whence he is bound even to that; just as also (S. Bonau. says) one who intends to promise the rule of the monks intends to vow also chastity and obedience, which, I confess, are vows more closely joined to the Monastic profession than the vow of chastity is to the Sacred Order; yet the same reason runs, because on either side the one follows from the other necessarily.

You will still URGENTLY object: If that ordained man is bound, not by reason of a vow, but by reason of the Ecclesiastical constitution; it would follow that two precepts exist in this business, imposing chastity: one Divine from a vow, the other human from the Church: but this is false, against all, and against Sanchez himself l. 7. de matrimonio, disp. 27. num. 11. et 12. Therefore.

HENCE it follows also, that one initiated into the Orders, by fornicating, sins with a twofold sin beyond the ordinary fault of fornication.

Sanchez answers, num. 14., that the precept of the Church is not immediately about continence to be imposed upon priests, but about the vow of chastity being imposed. Therefore this argument does not prevail against Sanchez.

He ADDS in lib. 3. de matrim. disp. 16., with S. Bonau. in the cited places, and with Hostiensis cap. veniens, qui clerici, and Ioan. Andrea there; Anchartan, and as to an oath forced by fear, the same assert Anton. c. si vero, de iure iur. n. 5., and there Abbas num. 10.; Imola fine, Naeuo n. 38.; Sylvest. iuram. 4. quaest. 7. dicto 1. after D. Bonau. in 3. loc. cit.: that one who confesses that he vowed, and says he vowed fictitiously, is not to be believed, and therefore is to be compelled to fulfill the vow; although in the forum of conscience we are bound to believe him, and to declare him immune from the obligation of the vow.

The REASON indeed is that of D. Bonau. ad 2., which is also found in cap. per tuas, de probat. there: Since it is altogether unworthy that what each one has clearly protested with his own voice should be weakened in the same case by his own testimony; and in l. Labeo 7. versiculo, the same Tubero, ff. suppellect. legat. there: I do not think anyone ought to say what he does not feel. This holds, with many citations, in Tiraquel. l. si unquam, verb. liberis, num. 17. C. de revocat. donat.; Menoch. lib. 6. de praesumpt. 35. and l. 1. quaest. 12. and l. 3. praesumpt. 1. num. 57. et 39.