Article I: On the Essence of Vow

S. Th. II-II, q. 88, a. 1, 4, 5, 6.

710. A vow (voeu; gelofte) is a promise made to God.1 - In this definition there is indicated:

1. The genus: promise, that is, a deliberate and spontaneous obligation of faith or fidelity toward another, undertaken for doing or omitting something; and thus it is distinguished from a simple purpose, even one made before God and firmly established, which per se induces no obligation, although by not fulfilling it one can sin by negligence or inconstancy toward oneself. A purpose, namely, is the mere will of doing or omitting something, but a vow is the will of furnishing it as a debt, so that from it there arises an obligation toward God, and as it were a special title is acquired by God for exacting for Himself the thing promised. The reason is that a vow, like a contract, is a certain private law which the one vowing of his own accord imposes upon himself and by it obliges himself to God.

Moreover, for a promise, on the part of the one promising, three acts are required: a) deliberation of the intellect; b) a spontaneous purpose of the will, that is, the intention of obliging oneself or giving faith; c) the signification or manifestation and expression of this will, which is essentially the promise itself. This is an act of practical reason, to which it pertains to order: for just as by commanding or entreating a man orders what is to be done for him by others, so by promising he orders what he himself ought to do for others. To these, on the other side, is added a) acceptance of the faith given. But since every heart lies open to God, the will and interior thought suffice for a vow; and if the due conditions are present, it is accepted by God, because it is pleasing to Him (Deut. XXIII, 21; Num. XXX, 3; Eccl. V, 3).

2. The specific difference: made to God, so that it may be indicated that a vow is an act of religion: for a promise is made to another for his advantage and utility, or service and honor; but from our promises no advantage can arise for God, but only honor and glory; hence by vow we order good works to be performed in honor of God, and therefore by its nature it is an elicited act of religion.

Hence promises which are made directly to the saints are not vows strictly so called, but acts of dulia, as if someone promises something to the Blessed Virgin, not thinking of God and without any relation to God. Nevertheless a) a promise made to God of fulfilling or executing what was promised to the saints (a. 5, ad 3), b) likewise a promise made to God before the saints as patrons or witnesses, under their invocation or protection (IV Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 4), c) or made principally to God but secondarily in honor or memory of the saints, in the way in which churches and altars are erected to the saints and sacrifices are celebrated, so that they may be more honored and God may be honored by the worship of the saints, are vows: this last mode the faithful generally intend when they say that they vow to the saints.

1. Canon 1307: "A vow, that is, a deliberate and free promise made to God concerning a possible and better good, must be fulfilled from the virtue of religion."

711. The conditions on the part of the act required for the validity of a vow are three: for the intention of obliging oneself must be true and sincere, deliberate and free.

1. A true and internal intention of obliging oneself is required; hence:

a) There is no vow if someone, even in serious circumstances, does not wish to promise, but only externally expresses the words of a vow; hence in doubt whether someone has emitted a true vow, the intention of the one vowing is to be considered rather than the words.

b) Likewise, if someone, wishing to promise, positively intends not to oblige himself.1

In these cases there is a fictitious vow, which is a sin because it includes a certain irreverence toward God, but only venial, unless contempt, grave scandal or injustice, or deception in a matter of great importance is present, as in religious profession or the reception of sacred order.

c) But for the validity of a vow the intention of executing the vow is not required.

1. Unless perhaps the will of vowing were altogether predominant and more efficacious than the will of not obliging oneself, which is not presumed.

2. Deliberation is required, and indeed full and perfect, such as is required for an act simply and absolutely human and perfectly moral: for no one is judged to will to impose an obligation upon himself except from perfect deliberation.

Hence there is no vow if the promise is made by one drunk, half-asleep, deprived of the senses, or if it proceeds from a motion which is called primo-primus or secundo-primus; likewise vows emitted by hysterical persons, or by children even after the use of reason, are often invalid. - Yet he who, knowing that a vow induces obligation, here and now does not explicitly think about it, is judged to make a valid vow; similarly, knowledge of all the circumstances of the thing promised is not required, but knowledge as to the substance suffices.

3. Liberty is required, and indeed perfect liberty, such as is in an act directly and in itself voluntary: for this is required for a good act.

Hence the indirectly voluntary or voluntary in the cause does not suffice, as if someone, foreseeing that he will promise when drunk, nevertheless makes himself drunk and promises; besides, such an act is not apt for signifying the undertaking of an obligation. - Yet an actual and explicit will is not required, but a virtual and implicit will suffices, as if someone freely receives the subdiaconate, to which he knows a vow is annexed.

Hence on the part of the one vowing, one vow is expressed or formal, another tacit, implicit, and virtual.

712. Ignorance or error is opposed to deliberation, even if only concomitant or crass:

1. when it is concerned with the essence of a vow; hence he does not vow who is ignorant that a vow is a promise, or induces obligation, or is made to God: exception is made if he altogether wishes to vow in the mode in which others are accustomed to vow, because then he has the implicit will of obliging himself;

2. or when it is concerned with the substance of the thing promised, for example, if someone vowed entrance into religion, being ignorant that it includes chastity, poverty, and obedience;

3. or concerning a substantial condition of the thing, which, if known, would impede the vow, for example, if a Belgian vowed a Roman pilgrimage, thinking Rome to be in the vicinity, or the journey to be undertaken for 100 francs;

4. or concerning the final cause of the vow, for example, if someone vowed for the health of his father, thinking him to be dying.

The reason is that in those cases the intention of obliging oneself is lacking.

But the following do not impede the validity of a vow:

a) ignorance concerning an accidental circumstance, for example, error concerning the pleasantness of the journey for a Roman pilgrimage;

b) nor error concerning an impulsive cause, for example, if someone vowed to give alms to poor Peter, whom he erroneously thought honest.

1. For vows of religious profession, however, only substantial error invalidates, not error of condition or circumstance, even if it gives cause to the profession; because this participates in the nature of an onerous contract.

713. Fear is opposed to liberty:

1. when it so disturbs the mind that it takes away deliberation;

2. also when it is grave and unjustly inflicted for extorting a vow, in which case the vow is null at least from ecclesiastical law, as is clear from tradition and the perpetual practice of the Church, as can. 1307, § 3 also testifies,¹ and also probably from natural law, because God does not accept a promise extorted by injury;

¹ "A vow emitted from grave and unjust fear is null by the law itself."

3. indeed probably, on account of the same reason, when a vow is extorted by slight fear unjustly inflicted, provided it was the sole cause of vowing; but in the external forum slight fear is not judged to have been the cause of a matter as grave as a vow.

Any other fear whatever, whether it is from a necessary cause, or is justly inflicted, or unjustly but not for extorting a vow, does not render a vow invalid. Examples are vows emitted from fear of shipwreck or illness, - of just imprisonment from the sentence of a judge, - of robbers.

714. To vow is useful and of counsel, not indeed for those who are in the state of perfection or of the term, as Christ or the angels, but for those who are in the state of the way and of imperfection, so that their will can be strengthened in good. And indeed:

1. on the part of the act of vowing, because by vowing we immovably strengthen our will in the good of virtue (a. 4);

2. on the part of the promised work, because it is better and more meritorious to do something from a vow than without a vow: a) because to vow is an act of religion, which is nobler among the moral virtues; b) one who does something by vow subjects himself to God not only as to the act but also as to the power of acting, because henceforth he cannot licitly do otherwise; c) because it is more perfect to do something from a will more firmly established in good (a. 6). Cf. Ps. LXXV, 12; CXXXI, 1-2; Is. XIX, 21.

Yet per accidens, on account of special circumstances, a vow is often not expedient; hence it should not be emitted except according to the rules of prudence.

715. It is objected: A vow removes liberty, since by it the moral power of choosing between contraries is removed; and this is especially true of the vows of religious profession, by which the whole life is bound, so that it is perpetual servitude.

Resp. 1. Liberty is not removed by moral obligation, but this is a help to it for tending toward the end and pursuing good better, more easily, and for a longer time, so that liberty is perfected and freed from the passions which impede it; - otherwise it would have to be said that the power of choosing evil is a perfection essential to liberty, although it is an imperfection, because it does not exist in God and in the blessed. Hence St. Thomas, a. 4, ad 1: "Just as not being able to sin does not diminish liberty, so also the necessity of a will strengthened in good does not diminish liberty, as is plain in God and in the blessed; and such is the necessity of a vow, having a certain likeness with the confirmation of the blessed. Hence Augustine...: happy is the necessity which compels to better things."

2. This holds a fortiori if the moral obligation was freely undertaken, as happens in a vow; otherwise it would have to be said that liberty is destroyed by all human promises and contracts; which however no one affirms. Namely, a work freely undertaken is not against liberty.

3. Obligation does not impede us from fulfilling an obligatory work in a fully free and meritorious mode, but just as we contracted the obligation altogether freely, so we can fulfill it from full liberty: for this it is enough that we be so disposed that we would do the work even if we were not bound. And thus it is understood that religious perfectly faithful to their vows are the freest men.