Question III: Whether one who promises something to God, knowing the obligation yet intending not to bind himself, is bound by the vow

The intention, which is placed in the definition of a vow, I shall set out briefly here.

It must be noted, with D. Bonav. in 3. dist. 39. art. 3. quaest. 1. in resol., that the same question arises concerning marriage, Oath, and Vow. So Sanchez l. 1. de matrim. disput. 9., and in the place cited in the summa, walking with D. Bonav., resolved the difficulty completely. He first sets out certain cases in which one vowing without intention is not bound, which are easy: for instance, if he believes a vow does not bind, etc., or if he vows without the intention of promising.

Concerning this question, some have held that it is a true vow and binds. So Soto l. 7. de Iust. quaest. 1. art. 2. versic. 3.; Penna p. p. Instruct. cap. 42. et 43.; Manuel, 2nd Tomo of the summa, cap. 92. num. 4.; Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 1. fol. 969.; Gutierrez l. 1. quaest. Canon. cap. 22. num. 32.

The second opinion is that it is not a vow, nor does it bind the conscience under the aspect of a vow. So D. Bonav. in 3. dist. 39. art. 3. quaest. 1. and in 4. dist. 38. quaest. 1., whom Richard. follows there, art. 3. quaest. 2. ad 2.; D. Anton. 2. p. tit. 11. cap. 2.; Angel. v. pactum, num. 4. and v. votum 1. num. 7.; Sylvester verb. metus, quaest. 8. and verb. pactum, quaest. 4.; Armilla there, num. 2. and verb. Iuramentum, num. 14.; Tabienna verb. pactum, quaest. 1.; Medina C. de restit. quaest. 23.; Nauar. summa, cap. 12. et 13. conf. 4.; Viguer. l. Iustit. cap. 5. §. 5. versic. 14.; Palacios in 4. dist. 29. disp. 1. fol. 665.; whom Tanner disp. 5. quaest. 4. dub. 1. cites and follows, Sanchez loc. cit. and in summa, l. 4. cap. 1. num. 27., where he adds Valentia 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 6. p. 1.; Azor. l. 11. cap. 4. quaestio 2. and cap. 13. quaestio 9.; I add Faustus Thesaur. lib. 1. quaest. 26.; Less. lib. 2. cap. 40. dub. 3. and Bassaeus num. 7.

I assert, with this opinion, that one who vows without intending to be bound is not bound by reason of a vow.

It is proved by Sanchez from the final chapter, where a condition contrary to the substance of marriage annuls it, even though the words and the intention of contracting it were present: therefore, since it belongs to the nature of a promise to have the mind of binding oneself, where that mind is absent the promise will be nothing. The same is held by others with Fagundez in 2. praecepto Decal. d. 2. s. 9.

Yet this reason seems to beg the principle, as S. Bonav. hinted in 4. loc. cit. with the last argument; for this is the very thing in dispute: whether intention is necessary when the will of promising is present, in which, it seems, the vow, or the other promise, consists.

It is proved, then, by D. Bonav., because a vow looks immediately and substantially to God: therefore such a promise will be as is judged in the judgment of God; but there it is judged according to what is internal, as is said in 1 Reg. 16, For man seeth those things that appear; but the Lord beholdeth the heart; and D. Gregory: Words serve the intention, and God judges such words as are brought forth from within.

PROVED secondly by D. Bonau. with the argument which Sanchez took up loc. cit., Henriquez l. 11. de matrim. cap. 13. num. 1. for marriage, and the others cited for a vow. Every obligation which is not from law arises from the private will of a man. Thus in l. obligationum, ff. de obligationibus it is said that no one binds himself to another unless willing: but a vow is not from any law: therefore it arises from the free will of man: therefore it rises there from a private law which the promiser imposes upon himself; yet no law binds unless the lawgiver intends to bind.

You object first: Obligation is a natural effect of a promise, just as fire is to heat: therefore, just as fire being applied, heating follows; so a promise being posited, obligation follows.

It is answered from D. Bonau. in 4. loc. cit. ad 2.: when the promise is true, it has the effect of obligation; but not when it is fictitious, such as one with the mind not of binding, for then the natural condition of the promise is lacking. And so, just as heat does not follow from painted fire, so here. So Suarez also answers.

From this there also falls that which they object secondly: Whoever wills the antecedent necessarily wills the consequent, l. 1. §. 1. ff. si ususfruct. petat.; but obligation follows a promise: therefore. It is answered that it follows a true promise, not indeed a fictitious one, such as we here suppose.

It also falls, that other objection: He who gives the form gives also the consequences of the form: therefore he who offers a promise offers also the obligation.

It is answered that this is true of one giving a true form, such as one is not who promises fictitiously.

I ASSERT thirdly, that this fictitious promiser, if he fictitiously goes forth with solemn vows, is bound in the sight of the Church to fulfill them.

It is proved by D. Bonau. in 4. loc. cit. in the body, because the Church judges according to what is external.

It is proved secondly by D. Bonan. there ad ult. and in 3. loc. cit. with the second argument: Fraud and deceit ought to patronize no one, as all the Jurists cry out.

It is proved thirdly by D. Bonan. loc. cit. with argument 3.: Human society consists in contracts; but if one were to stand on intention, no one would ever be secure: for words are that in which a contract consists.

By THIS distinction the arguments on both sides are resolved.

From these Sanchez deduces (l. 4. Decal. cap. 1. num. 29.) that one who is initiated and consents to the Sacred Orders, to which the vow of chastity is joined, yet does not wish to subject himself to this vow, but only wishes the Sacred Orders, is not bound by force of a vow to preserve chastity, but is bound by force of the Ecclesiastical constitution; and if he were to enter marriage, it would be invalid.

The SAME he holds in lib. 7. de matrim. disp. 27. num. 12., where he brings along with him Paludanus 4. dist. 37. quaest. 1. art. 2. num. 14.; Sylv. Gabriel 4. dist. 38. quaest. unica, art. 2. and dist. 37. quaest. unica, art. 2. after the second conclusion; D. Anton. 3. p. tit. 11. cap. 8.; Sylvest. V. Matrim. 8. quaest. 12. dicto 2.; Durandus 4. dist. 37. quaest. 1.; Arboteus l. 5. Theosophiae, cap. 7.; Bassolis in 4. dist. 47. quaest. unica, art. 1.; Nicolaus de Nissia super 4. sent. tract. 6. p. 22. de matrim. quaest. 7.; Antonius Cuccus l. 5. Instit. maiorum, tit. 12. num. 220.; Palac. in 4. dist. 37. disp. un.; Anglem. fleribus p. 1., where concerning marriage quaest. 11. art. 1. diffic. 4.; so also Henriq. l. 10. cap. 14.; Valent. p. 1.; Azor. p. 1. l. 11. c. 13.; Bassaeus v. Votum, n. 6.

They are OBJECTED by Rich. 4. dist. 37. art. 1. quaest. 1.; Palud. dist. 38. quaest. 2. art. en.; Nauar. sum. cap. 22. n. 52.; Palac. 4. dist. 37. disp. un.; Dominicus c. Diaconi, dist. 38.; Tol. l. 1. cap. 8.: namely, because one who approaches sacred order efficaciously wills it; and so he is held to lay down that volition of the vow of chastity. D. Bonau. seems to have thought this in 4. loc. cit. ad 2.

I FOR MY PART do not think Sanchez rightly deduces from the fact that one vowing fictitiously is not bound, that the same must be said of our case; concerning which I thus argue ad hominem.

WHOEVER wills the antecedent wills also that which necessarily follows it, if he will the antecedent efficaciously, according to Sanchez l. 1. de matrimonio, disput. 9. num. 8. (for so he answers the argument above). But one who is initiated into the Sacred Orders is, of himself, supposed to will the Sacred Orders, from which the obligation of the vow of chastity follows conjointly, as is found in l. 7. de matrimonio, num. 11.; therefore one willing the Sacred Orders wills also to vow chastity.

Yet the disparity is great: for there he wills fictitiously, whence the obligation, which is the effect of the promise, does not fall upon the promiser; but here, one who is initiated wills really and efficaciously that from which the burden of the vow of chastity follows, whence he is bound even to that; just as also (S. Bonau. says) one who intends to promise the rule of the monks intends to vow also chastity and obedience, which, I confess, are vows more closely joined to the Monastic profession than the vow of chastity is to the Sacred Order; yet the same reason runs, because on either side the one follows from the other necessarily.

You will still URGENTLY object: If that ordained man is bound, not by reason of a vow, but by reason of the Ecclesiastical constitution; it would follow that two precepts exist in this business, imposing chastity: one Divine from a vow, the other human from the Church: but this is false, against all, and against Sanchez himself l. 7. de matrimonio, disp. 27. num. 11. et 12. Therefore.

HENCE it follows also, that one initiated into the Orders, by fornicating, sins with a twofold sin beyond the ordinary fault of fornication.

Sanchez answers, num. 14., that the precept of the Church is not immediately about continence to be imposed upon priests, but about the vow of chastity being imposed. Therefore this argument does not prevail against Sanchez.

He ADDS in lib. 3. de matrim. disp. 16., with S. Bonau. in the cited places, and with Hostiensis cap. veniens, qui clerici, and Ioan. Andrea there; Anchartan, and as to an oath forced by fear, the same assert Anton. c. si vero, de iure iur. n. 5., and there Abbas num. 10.; Imola fine, Naeuo n. 38.; Sylvest. iuram. 4. quaest. 7. dicto 1. after D. Bonau. in 3. loc. cit.: that one who confesses that he vowed, and says he vowed fictitiously, is not to be believed, and therefore is to be compelled to fulfill the vow; although in the forum of conscience we are bound to believe him, and to declare him immune from the obligation of the vow.

The REASON indeed is that of D. Bonau. ad 2., which is also found in cap. per tuas, de probat. there: Since it is altogether unworthy that what each one has clearly protested with his own voice should be weakened in the same case by his own testimony; and in l. Labeo 7. versiculo, the same Tubero, ff. suppellect. legat. there: I do not think anyone ought to say what he does not feel. This holds, with many citations, in Tiraquel. l. si unquam, verb. liberis, num. 17. C. de revocat. donat.; Menoch. lib. 6. de praesumpt. 35. and l. 1. quaest. 12. and l. 3. praesumpt. 1. num. 57. et 39.

Sanchez ADDS, num. 10., that if from his confession alone it is held that he truly vowed, yet did not wish to bind himself, he is to be believed; because if he wished to deceive, he would keep silence about both, or would deny. From these the question is almost resolved.