Question II: What deliberation is required for a vow

As regards the first condition, deliberation, and its necessity for a vow, the question is: whether every deliberation sufficient to avoid mortal sin suffices, or whether there is required such deliberation as has weighed all the circumstances of the matter.

Some think that the prior deliberation which proceeds from the heat of passion, anger, or love does not suffice, but that a perfect one is required, which can be proved from c. si quis iratus, 2. quaest. 4, and the rule Quidquid calore, 48. ff. de regulis iuris and l. 3. ff. de divortiis: whence is also drawn what kind of pledge ought to be in marriage. So the Gloss on c. dudum, verb. calore, and there Hostiensis on the same word; Antoninus, c. sicut ex litteris de iureiurando, n. 9; Panormitanus on d. c. dudum, num. 8, and c. sicut ex litteris, num. 2, and c. si vero, num. 7 de iureiurando; Romanus, singulari 508; Tiraquellus, de poenis temperandis, causa 1, num. 26; and among the Theologians, Richard in 4, dist. 38, art. 2, quaest. 2.

The opposite opinion, however, is that deliberation suffices which suffices even for committing a mortal sin. So Navarrus, summa Latina, cap. 18, num. 7; Molina, T. 1, de iustitia, tract. 2, disp. 267, where they teach this generally in every promise made to a man; but concerning a vow and an oath, John Andreas teaches it, c. dudum, n. 10, de consecr., d. 5, ubi Antoninus n. 25, Cardinalis n. 2, oppositione 5; Ancharanus n. 10; Alexander de Nevo, c. sicut ex litt. de iureiurando, n. 18, where Imola at the end, Faelinus num. 3 and 4.

Among the Theologians: Paludanus in 4, dist. 38, quaest. 1; D. Antoninus, 2nd part, tit. 11, cap. 2; Cajetan, 2. 1. quaest. 88, art. 1, and in the summa, v. votum; Soto, book 7, de iustitia, quaest. 1, art. 2; Viguerius, book Instit. cap. 5, §. 1; Alcoyer, I. de Ludo, cap. 13; Medina, book 1 of the summa, cap. 14, § 6; Palacios, 4, dist. 38, disp. 1; Manuel, 2nd tome of the summa, cap. 92; Tanner, disp. 5, quaest. 4, dub. 1; Aragon, 2. 2. quaest. 88, art. 1, fol. 995; Angles, floribus 2. p. quaest. 1, de voto, art. cit. diff. 3; Bassaeus, num. 2; Lopez, first part of the Instruct., cap. 45. Sanchez adduces and follows these, book 1, de matrim., disp. 8, num. 5, and in the summa, book 4, cap. 1. This is the opinion of D. Bonaventure in the place cited.

I assert, with this opinion, that deliberation which intervenes with mortal sin suffices for a vow: it is proved from D. Bonaventure in 4, dist. 38, quaest. 3, by the arguments in the first place, with the replies added. Such deliberation suffices for handing oneself over to the devil, and to a vow, as is had in c. sunt, qui opes, 17. quaest. 4, and c. veniens de voto: but to hand oneself over to the devil, deliberation arising even from passion suffices, with all the circumstances not considered: Therefore. On this argument Sanchez and the others rely in the places adduced.

Sanchez notes, first, num. 6, that in betrothals a period of seven years is required.

He notes, second, num. 7, that it is so gathered that the deliberation required be sufficient, the one vowing ought thus to premeditate the moving cause and the end, which Cajetan explains, saying that one ought to compare what one deliberates with its opposite; yet he observes that this does not require a delay of time.

But what consideration, and what consent, is required for mortal sin, has been sufficiently elucidated in Tractate 3, which is on Sin, disput. 2, quaest. 11 and 12.

But if a doubt should arise whether there was sufficient deliberation, we may judge that there was not, according to the foundations handed down in Tract. 1, disp. 17, quaest. 22. Tanner, however, disp. 5, quaest. 4, dub. 1, says the counsel would be to seek a dispensation. On this see Sanchez in the summa, l. 1. cap. 10, from num. 16, where, in doubt whether a vow has been emitted, he judges it not to be believed emitted, because the condition of the possessor is better, and the whole possession stands for the will, not for the vow. Add Soto, l. 7. de Iust. quaest. 3. art. 2. dub. secundo, Medina, l. 1. summae, cap. 14. §. 7. fol. 90, Suarez, de Censuris, disp. 40. sect. 5. n. 15, Sà in summa, v. debitum, Lopez, 1. p. Instruct. consc. 145, Henriquez, l. 8. de Eucharist. cap. 45, Manuel, 2. Tomo summae, cap. 99. num. 5, Graff, p. 1. decis. l. 2. cap. 26. num. 7, Rebellus, de Iust. p. 2. l. 1. quaest. 3. sect. 2, whom Sanchez adduces loc. cit., where he also retracts what he had taught in T. 1. de matrim. l. 2. disp. 41. num. 34, namely that one who is more inclined to affirm that he has vowed is bound to that part of the thing promised which the quantity of the doubt requires. In which case he here judges that one must judge altogether in favor of the one doubting, with Sala, p. 1. quaest. 10. Tract. 4. disp. unica sect. 25. num. 254, with whom Fernandez proceeds in exam. Theol. Moral. p. 1. cap. 6. §. 2, Bonacina, Tract. de legibus, disp. 2. quaest. 4. p. 2. num. 18, Diana, p. 1. tract. 15. resol. 9, against Bassaeus. The same Sanchez, l. 4. decal. cap. 1. num. 12, says one must see whence the doubt arises, since this matter is still undecided; because possession does not stand for liberty in whatever doubt there is from a defect of deliberation. For if it arises from perturbation of mind through fear or anger, he says one must then judge for the vow. But if it is doubted, on account of tender age, whether he has completed 7 years, one must judge for liberty; if from the madness of the one vowing, one must see what the law presumes about what was then done. And thus he decides variously.

Truly, however, he does not expound this rightly. For since the doubt stands in this, that it renders the mind equally undecided on both sides, as is taught in l. 2. de matr. disp. 41. num. 1, and liberty stands in the possession of the one doubting, as he himself asserts, LL. CC., and from each of these causes one can be made doubtful, and the possession of liberty can arise from the doubt, as he himself teaches, certainly he will be in possession, from wherever the doubt arises. Moreover, the cases adduced by him do not leave the matter undecided. Wherefore he labors equivocally. On these things see p. 2. T. 1. disp. 17. q. 20.