§ 2. On the Subject of a Vow

392. Since a vow is an act of the virtue of religion, in the first place those things said above in n. 326 concerning the subject of religion apply to the subject of a vow. Since, however, a vow is customarily made in order to confirm the will in a good resolution, those persons whose will is perfectly confirmed in good no longer need a vow.

Hence the saints in heaven, the good angels, and Christ did not make vows. St. Thomas³⁴⁷ writes: "It was not fitting for Christ in Himself to vow, both because He was God and because, insofar as He was man, He had His will confirmed in good, as one existing in the state of comprehension." That the damned are not the subject of a vow is evident of itself, since they are not capable of any act of religion.

With these excepted, therefore, all men are the subject of a vow, or capable of vowing, provided that 1. they are endowed with the perfect use of reason; 2. they have the intention of vowing; 3. they have sufficient deliberation and 4. liberty; 5. they are not prohibited by positive law from making vows.

All men can make vows.

The reason is that all men can worship God. Therefore not only Catholics but also Protestants, indeed even unbelievers, can make valid vows. Therefore the Sacred Penitentiary declared on 29 Nov. 1842 that a Protestant who made the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience before an Anglican minister is bound to the observance of these vows if he had a true intention of vowing.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 4 ad 3.

³⁴⁸ Collect. de Prop. Fide n. 959.

393. 1. Perfect use of reason is required on the part of the person vowing for the validity of a vow.

For a vow is a certain particular law. But just as no one who does not have the perfect use of reason can establish an obliging law, so no one can impose upon himself the obliging law of a vow unless he has the perfect use of reason. Hence infants under seven years of age (unless, however, they have already attained the perfect use of reason) cannot make vows. For infants the rule is valid: If they can devote themselves to the devil through mortal sin, they can also oblige themselves to God through a true vow. Likewise invalid are the vows of a man who is completely drunk, insane, or hypnotized. Since the vows of religious institutes are so gravely obligatory, the Church has established that no one can make these vows before a more perfect use of reason, namely, before completion of the sixteenth year of age.³⁴⁹

³⁴⁹ Code of Canon Law, c. 573.

394. 2. The intention or will of vowing is required for the validity of a vow.

Hence a fictitious vow, i.e., one made only externally without the internal intention of vowing, is null. A threefold quality of this deficient intention is subtly distinguished:

a) Someone promises and vows in words alone, but internally has absolutely no intention of vowing. In this case there is certainly no true vow before God. Hence St. Thomas says briefly: "A promise is sometimes made with the mouth and not with the heart, and such a promise, as regards God, is not a vow."³⁵⁰ A fictitious vow of this sort can occur, e.g., if someone is compelled by other men to vow in some religious institute. But if someone were to make a fictitious religious vow without external compulsion, he would sin gravely; for he would mock the religious institute; sometimes he would also cause material harm, and he would be bound to repair all injuries committed.

b) Someone indeed intends internally to vow and to oblige himself, but at the same time determines not to execute the promise made. In this case theologians commonly teach that a vow truly exists, because fulfillment is not of the essence of a vow, but only the deliberate mind of obliging oneself. Nevertheless, as is evident of itself, such a person vowing sins mortally, because it is a grave irreverence inflicted upon God to promise something in honor of God and at the same time to will to derogate from this promise.

c) Someone indeed wills to promise in a vow and also to execute the promise, but by no means wills internally to oblige himself. In this case it is not so certain whether a vow is truly present. The negative opinion seems to be truer, because the internal resolution to oblige oneself is of the essence of a vow.³⁵¹ Moreover, in this case, whether a vow is present or not, the obligation of fulfilling the promise remains.

If defects of intention of this kind occur in a religious profession which someone made for merely earthly motives, or in the reception of the subdiaconate, then the confessor must insist that the penitent make a true vow as soon as possible, or refer the matter to the competent ecclesiastical authority. Since, however, some authors teach that a subdeacon is obliged to perpetual chastity not by force of a vow properly so called but by force of ecclesiastical law, such a subdeacon can receive sacramental absolution, provided he has promised that he will preserve perfect chastity.

As regards the quality of intention necessary for a vow, an actual or explicit intention is not required, but a virtual or implicit intention suffices. For an actual intention is not necessarily required, because in no human act is an actual intention required for its validity, but a virtual or implicit intention suffices. Hence, e.g., one who has the will to receive the subdiaconate, knowing that the vow of chastity is joined to this order, has a sufficient virtual or implicit intention of making the vow of chastity. An indirect or interpretative intention does not suffice; and therefore, e.g., if one who knows that he is prone to vowing when drunk voluntarily makes himself drunk and, while drunk, vows, his vow does not seem to be valid.

³⁵⁰ IV, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 1, solut. 1 ad 2.

³⁵¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 201.

395. 3. Sufficient deliberation is required for the validity of a vow.

The reason is that no one is considered to impose upon himself a grave obligation, such as the obligation of a vow is, without sufficient deliberation. But the question immediately arises: What deliberation is truly sufficient for the validity of a vow? Full or perfect deliberation is customarily distinguished from imperfect or semiplena deliberation. The most common opinion is that full and perfect deliberation is required for the validity of a vow. This consists in the person vowing a) being fully master of himself; b) attending to and truly knowing that which he imposes upon himself to fulfill through the vow. Hence theologians commonly teach that for the validity of a vow there is required as much deliberation and knowledge as is necessary for completing an onerous contract or another grave business; or even as much as is necessary for constituting a grave sin from a perfect and direct voluntary act. Hence a confused notion of the obligation does not suffice for a vow, but a confused notion of the gravity of the guilt suffices for mortal sin. The reason for this opinion is that every vow, even in light matter, imposes a serious obligation of religion before God. But no one either ought or is considered to impose such an obligation upon himself without full deliberation. Nevertheless, not every disturbance or emotion of the mind destroys the validity of a vow; otherwise all those vows which are made either in a vehement spirit of devotion, in a very great desire to obtain some benefit, or at the instigation of fear would be invalid, which assuredly no one will say. Therefore only that disturbance impedes the validity of a vow which clouds the mind or at least removes the perfect use of reason.

Because of a lack of sufficient deliberation, invalid are the vows of a child not yet in perfect possession of reason, of a half-drunken man, or of a man so gravely ill that because of fever he cannot think seriously. Often invalid also are the vows of those who suffer from hysterical disease or from so-called "fixed ideas." Nevertheless, a long and prolonged discussion of all circumstances is not absolutely necessary for making a vow, although it is commonly to be counseled, provided, however, that the vow is not made precipitately. In practice a serious doubt can sometimes arise whether some vow was made with sufficient deliberation. Then, for greater security, it is expedient to obtain a dispensation or commutation of the vow so made, which indeed will easily be obtained. The faithful are diligently to be admonished not to make vows from a sudden emotion; indeed, praiseworthy is the custom of several confessors who strictly prohibit their penitents from making any vow of greater moment, e.g., a vow of chastity, without the previous consent of the confessor.

396. Sufficient deliberation is also absent if a vow was made from a notable error. But an error which invalidates a vow is twofold:

a) A substantial error, i.e., either concerning the very substance of the thing promised or concerning a substantial condition.

An error concerning the very substance of the thing promised is present if the person vowing intends an altogether different thing, e.g., if someone were to vow to give away his possession which he thinks to be made from base material but which in fact has a very great value. An error concerning a substantial circumstance or condition is considered present if some circumstance or condition inheres in the object of the vow which, had it been known, would most certainly have prevented the vow, e.g., if you vowed a pilgrimage to some sanctuary, thinking the expenses of the journey to be a few francs, when in fact they are one hundred francs.

b) Error concerning the final cause of the vow.

E.g., if someone vowed a pilgrimage for the recovery of the health of his father, whom he thought to be sick but who in fact had always enjoyed excellent health, such a vow is invalid because the principal end of the vow is absent.

But if an error concerns accidental conditions or merely impulsive causes, the vow is not indeed invalid of itself, but nevertheless it can easily be commuted or even dispensed.

E.g., if someone vowed a pilgrimage to the thresholds of the Apostles but did not know all the difficulties connected with such a pilgrimage, he is not by that very fact excused from fulfillment of the vow, but a commutation or dispensation will rather easily be conceded.

Note. The essential vows in religious institutes cannot be impugned because of unforeseen inconveniences which someone afterwards experiences in observing them, e.g., in chastity or obedience. For these inconveniences could and ought to have been foreseen. Nevertheless, according to the present discipline of the Roman Curia, a dispensation from religious vows also is rather easily conceded if someone proves that he was led into error concerning even the accidental obligations of the religious state which he professed.

397. 4. Liberty likewise is required for a vow, since a promise which was given not freely but under compulsion cannot be pleasing to God. Opposed to liberty are not only force and violence, which destroy the voluntary act and consequently every vow, but also fear.

Concerning a vow made from fear, the following things seem to have to be said:

A twofold grave fear invalidates; likewise a twofold fear does not invalidate a vow:

a) If the fear under whose influence the vow was made was so grave that the use of reason was disturbed, such a vow is certainly invalid. Thus all teach, and the reason is obvious, for such fear removes everything voluntary and all deliberation.

b) Grave fear, although it does not disturb the use of reason, nevertheless invalidates all vows if it was unjustly inflicted in order to extort the vow. Thus from positive ecclesiastical law.³⁵² The reason for this law seems to be that God does not accept a vow of this sort, since otherwise He would seem to approve the grave injury inflicted upon the person vowing.

c) Grave natural fear, or even grave fear justly inflicted by a free cause, does not of itself invalidate any vows whatsoever.³⁵³ Hence, e.g., if someone in the greatest danger of shipwreck or death vows perpetual chastity; or if an ecclesiastical judge were justly to condemn a cleric to deposition unless he entered a strict monastery and made vows there, then such vows, according to the more probable and more common opinion, are valid.³⁵⁴ The reason is that no injury is done to such a person vowing, and his act, notwithstanding the fear, remains free and deliberate. The same things hold concerning the validity of a vow made under the influence of grave fear which was indeed inflicted unjustly, but not in order to extort the vow. For such fear, in its relation to the vow, is not distinguished from natural fear. Hence, e.g., the vow is valid which someone made in order to escape a danger of death arising from an attack by robbers.

d) Light fear does not invalidate vows. Although some authors cited by St. Alphonsus,³⁵⁵ e.g., Busembaum, Navarrus, and, among the moderns, Schindler and Noldin, think that even light fear invalidates a vow because such light fear also removes at least full liberty of consent, nevertheless the far more common and more probable opinion asserts that a matter as grave as a vow is not invalidated by light fear.³⁵⁶

³⁵² Code of Canon Law, c. 1307, § 3.

³⁵³ Cf. Billuart, l.c., and Ernest Müller, Theol. mor. II, § 52.

³⁵⁴ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 197.

³⁵⁵ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 197.

³⁵⁶ Dominic Soto discusses this matter excellently, De iure et iust. l. 7, q. 2, a. 1.

398. 5. On ecclesiastical law prohibiting certain vows. By natural and divine positive law, no one capable of reason is prohibited from making vows concerning suitable matter. But it is asked whether by positive ecclesiastical law certain persons are forbidden to vow. The answer is:

a) The Church renders several men incapable of making public vows, whether simple or solemn; and therefore it has attached certain conditions without which vows made in religious institutes are altogether invalid from the beginning. Canonists treat of these conditions essentially required for religious profession, whether simple or solemn.³⁵⁷

b) Since, according to a probable opinion, the Church can prescribe even internal acts, nothing prevents the Church from also attaching certain conditions to private vows to be made, without which vows of this sort are invalid. Nevertheless, it is not certainly established that the Church has in fact attached conditions of this sort to any private vow.

c) Religious bound by the vow of obedience cannot make any private vow which is contrary to the will of their superiors or to the rule professed. The reason is that such a vow would concern a thing evil and prohibited.

d) Religious can make a vow of entering a stricter order, as has been established by several Supreme Pontiffs.³⁵⁸ But the transfer itself can no longer be made without the authority of the Apostolic See.³⁵⁹

e) Professed religious cannot make other private vows which are firm and not subject to invalidation by the superior. Therefore St. Thomas says simply: "No vow of a religious is firm except with the consent of his prelate."³⁶⁰

f) Generally, it is not expedient for religious to make private vows, at least without the express permission of the superior. For first, it is not certain whether these vows are valid, and secondly, a religious already bound by the three essential vows and the observance of the rule, if he wishes faithfully to observe all these things, is already sufficiently bound without needing a new obligation from some private vow.

g) Private vows made by a professed religious seem to be valid unless the superior has invalidated them or vows of this kind are expressly prohibited by the rule. Thus the more common opinion, which Cajetan,³⁶¹ John of St. Thomas,³⁶² Suarez,³⁶³ the Salmanticenses,³⁶⁴ and many others hold. The reason is that such vows inflict no detriment upon the jurisdiction of superiors and their right administration. For when the superior judges them inopportune, he can invalidate them. Therefore, if, e.g., some religious gravely obliged himself under vow to recite the Rosary daily, this vow is valid and its transgression is a grave sin; or if a religious bound himself by a private vow to the observance of some rule otherwise obliging under no fault, he sins by transgressing this vow which he made.

³⁵⁷ Cf. our Manuale iur. can. q. 213.

³⁵⁸ Cf. Innocent III, c. 18, X 3, 31.

³⁵⁹ Code of Canon Law, c. 632.

³⁶⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 8 ad 3.

³⁶¹ Comm. in 2, 2, q. 88, a. 8.

³⁶² In 2, 2, q. 88, disp. 29, a. 16.

³⁶³ De relig. l. 3, c. 5, n. 3.

³⁶⁴ Curs. theol. mor. tr. 17, c. 1, punct. 8, n. 185.