§ 3. On the Object of a Vow

399. The object of a vow is that which is promised in the vow, e.g., alms to be given, a prayer to be said, chastity to be preserved, etc. It is also customarily called the matter of the vow. But for the validity of a vow, suitable matter is required, having three conditions, namely: 1. that it be possible for the person vowing; 2. that it be morally good; 3. that it concern a better good.

1. The thing promised must be possible for the person vowing.

For an impossible thing, whether physically or even morally, i.e., to be performed with extraordinary difficulty not foreseen, cannot be promised in a vow, since no one can seriously oblige himself to such impossible things. Hence a vow of working a miracle is invalid; likewise a vow by a poor man of distributing great alms.

It is customary to ask here: a) Is a vow of avoiding all sins valid? The answer is given with a distinction: α) If someone vowed that he would commit no sin, not even the lightest, throughout his whole life, such a vow is invalid; for it concerns a morally impossible thing, since no one can, without a special grace, avoid all even the lightest sins. β) If someone vowed that he wished to avoid all mortal sins, or even all fully deliberate venial sins, such a vow is indeed valid in itself, because this is possible with the ordinary help of God; but nevertheless, for a man not proved by long exercise of the virtues, such a vow is imprudent, because it is not expedient to promise under vow that which will more probably not be observed faithfully.

b) Is a vow concerning a thing partly possible and partly impossible valid? It is necessary to ascertain whether the matter of the vow is indivisible and whether the nature of a vow is still at least partially contained also in the possible part.³⁶⁵ If the matter is indivisible, the vow becomes invalid if the whole is not possible, even though a part is possible. Thus, e.g., if someone promised by vow a pilgrimage to Lourdes and the whole journey has become impossible for him to make because of lack of strength or money, he is not bound to the part of the journey possible for him. But if the matter of the vow is divisible, and in the possible part of this matter the nature and end of the vow are still preserved at least in some manner, this possible part is to be performed; e.g., if someone promised to make a pilgrimage fasting and cannot observe the fast but can make the pilgrimage in another manner, he is not totally freed from the obligation of the vow, but is bound to make the pilgrimage, although not fasting. Moreover, in these and similar cases inquiry must first be made concerning the precise intention of the person vowing, and from this it is necessary to judge whether the obligation of the vow persists or ceases.

³⁶⁵ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 202.

400. 2. The matter of a vow must be morally good and pleasing to God.

For a vow is an act of worshiping God. But God is not worshiped by dishonorable acts or by acts altogether indifferent and vain.³⁶⁶

a) To vow a dishonorable thing or to make a vow in order to obtain an illicit thing is a grave sin unless an erroneous conscience excuses. Hence St. Alphonsus³⁶⁷ writes: "It is also more probable to me that to vow an evil, even a venial evil, is of itself a grave fault; since of itself it is blasphemy to will that evil redound to the honor of God. But commonly, because of ignorance, this is only venial." When the end of the person vowing is evil, although the matter promised by vow is good in itself, then the vow is invalid and gravely sinful if this was the principal end; but if it is only a secondary end, the vow is valid. Hence, e.g., a vow of giving alms in order to obtain good success in theft, causing harm, adultery, etc., is invalid and constitutes a grave sin; but a vow of giving alms indeed in honor of God, but also in order to have some vain glory of one's own, is valid, although to seek vain glory is evil in itself.³⁶⁸

b) To vow a vain and indifferent thing, both in itself and in its circumstances, is a venial sin; but the vow itself is null. The reason is that a foolish promise of this kind displeases God. Hence a vow no longer to pass through a certain street would be invalid and lightly sinful. Almost always, however, things indifferent in themselves become good or evil because of annexed circumstances or because of the end of the agent. Therefore the vow of some girl no longer to pass through a certain street because there she experiences dangerous delights upon seeing a certain young man would be valid and lawful.

³⁶⁶ St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 2.

³⁶⁷ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 205.

³⁶⁸ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 206.

401. 3. A vow must concern a better good, i.e., it ought not to impede a greater good in the subject vowing.

a) Thus this quality of the object of a vow is more commonly and more correctly explained. For something can be called a greater or better good in two ways: first, comparatively to another good, e.g., it is better to render obedience than to perform bodily mortifications, but each is good. In a second manner, comparatively to the contrary omission of the same good, e.g., it is better to give alms than not to give, it is better to preserve chastity than not to preserve it. For suitable matter of a vow, it suffices that it be a better good in this second manner. For if it were necessary that the good promised by vow be better comparatively to another good, it would follow that no vow would be valid unless it concerned the most perfect work of all, since only the most perfect work has no other work more perfect than itself.³⁶⁹

b) From these things it is inferred that not only works called supererogatory, or falling under counsel, but even works already prescribed from another source can be the matter of a vow. Certainly works of counsel or supererogatory works most properly fall under vow, as the Angelic Doctor says,³⁷⁰ but prescribed works are still sufficient matter of vows, or vows can also be made concerning them. The reason is that a work imposed under a precept, whether natural, divine, or ecclesiastical, nevertheless remains free and induces only a moral obligation. Nothing, therefore, prevents someone from binding himself by a new bond of religion to perform that work already prescribed from another source. Hence, e.g., a vow never again to become drunk can be excellent when made by one who has a depraved habit of intemperance. This doctrine can also be confirmed from a promissory oath, which induces an obligation of religion similar to a vow. But a promissory oath is very often employed not only by Catholics but also by non-Catholics to confirm treaties, pacts, contracts, etc., to the observance of which natural and divine law already oblige. Why cannot vows be employed in the same manner?

c) Moreover, it is to be noted that for sufficient matter of a vow it is not required that the work promised be absolutely and objectively better than its omission, but it suffices that this work be better than its omission subjectively, or relatively to the person vowing. Therefore a vow contrary to the evangelical counsels can sometimes be lawful, e.g., of entering marriage with virginity abandoned. For although the state of virginity considered objectively is more perfect than the state of marriage, nevertheless for some men marriage is better than virginity. For St. Paul says: "It is better to marry than to burn."³⁷¹ Besides the danger of incontinence avoided, other special goods can also arise from a determined marriage, e.g., the cessation of scandal, the cessation of concubinage, the legitimation of offspring, etc. Hence St. Alphonsus calls certain and far more probable the opinion which teaches that in these cases a vow of marrying is valid and lawful.³⁷² Nevertheless, several grave authors contradict this, such as Dominic Soto,³⁷³ John of St. Thomas,³⁷⁴ John of the Cross,³⁷⁵ Concina,³⁷⁶ etc., because marriage is not the only remedy for concupiscence and other equally efficacious means are also at hand. In practice a vow of marrying does not seem to be counseled, both because perhaps it is invalid and because its utility is customarily very small. Hence, if someone agitated by the impulses of the flesh does not wish to use other remedies for preserving chastity, let him contract marriage, but let him not make a vow of marrying.

d) St. Alphonsus³⁷⁷ here appends the question: "Whether, if someone too prone to vowing vows no longer to vow except with the permission of his confessor, but afterwards nevertheless vows, that vow is valid?" The answer is: 1. A vow absolutely made not to vow is indeed invalid, because it is better to vow than not to vow; but a vow not to vow except with the permission of the confessor is certainly valid for one who is too prone and inconsiderate in vowing, since it impedes imprudent vows. 2. By making the second vow without consulting the confessor, the person vowing sinned. 3. Nevertheless, this second vow is valid, provided all the other essential conditions of a vow were present.

e) Here another question is also appended which today is indeed antiquated, but which in former times occurred not rarely: Can parents devote their children to some monastery or to the ecclesiastical state in such a way that the children by force of that vow are bound to enter the monastery or embrace the clerical state? The answer is negative, for such a vow would be equally unjust and impossible. For children are altogether free in the choice of a state, and therefore parents injure justice if they compel their children to embrace a determined state. Then, if the children refuse to embrace the state designated for them by the parents, execution of the vow becomes at least morally impossible. But if in ancient times some parents nevertheless devoted their infant children to some monastery or to the clerical state, the Church either did not approve such vows or, after the children so devoted had arrived at the years of discretion, conceded that they could freely leave the monastery and choose another state.

f) Finally it is asked: Is the vow made in baptism of renouncing Satan, the world, and its pomps a true vow? It is not a vow in the strict sense, but in a broad sense, so that a baptized person sinning against the promises given indeed commits a graver sin than an unbaptized man, but nevertheless does not commit true sacrilege because of violation of the baptismal vow. Thus the common opinion.³⁷⁸ The reason is that he who gives such promises in baptism does not intend to oblige himself under a special sin against religion, but only promises faithful observance of all the commandments of God.

³⁶⁹ Cf. Concina, In Decal. l. 4, diss. 1, c. 5, n. 5.

³⁷⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 2.

³⁷¹ 1 Cor. 7:9.

³⁷² Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 209.

³⁷³ De iure et iust. l. 7, q. 1, a. 3.

³⁷⁴ In 2, 2, q. 88, disp. 29, a. 7, concl. 4.

³⁷⁵ De voto dub. 2, concl. 4.

³⁷⁶ L.c., n. 7.

³⁷⁷ L.c., n. 210.

³⁷⁸ Cf. St. Raymond, Summa l. 1, De transgress. voti; St. Thomas, IV, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 2; St. Antoninus, S. theol. P. 2, tit. 2, c. 2.