§ I. On the Intention Required for a Vow

320. For the validity of a vow there is required a true and deliberate intention of emitting a vow, or a true promise made to God and inducing obligation; for a vow is after the likeness of a certain law, which the one vowing, otherwise capable of weighing the burden which he assumes, imposes upon himself. But the will and deliberation which are required for mortal sin suffice ¹.

¹ These words do not mean that, for the validity of any vow whatsoever, that discretion and maturity of judgment suffice which suffice for sinning mortally. For for grave sin it is enough to know confusedly the gravity of the guilt, just as for merit a general and confused notion of moral good suffices; but for assuming an obligation a general and confused notion of obligation does not suffice; rather, a more perfect knowledge is required of the burden to which one obliges himself. Certainly this knowledge demands that the adjuncts necessary to be known for prudent deliberation be present to the mind of the one deliberating. Thus, then, understand that equal advertence of mind suffices in each case, although for assuming either the obligation of a vow or of betrothal, prudent deliberation and advertence is more difficult, and therefore demands a greater discretion of judgment.

Hence a vow differs essentially from a purpose; because a purpose, however firm, does not produce a bond of obligation, nor is omission of the proposed matter a sin, except perhaps sometimes by accident, for example on account of inconstancy, weariness, or negligence, which per se do not exceed venial sin. - St. Alphonsus, n. 196-199.

321. Questions. Q. 1. Whether a vow made with ignorance of the obligation, or with inadvertence to the obligation already known, is valid?

Resp. To the first. A vow made with every kind of ignorance of the obligation which it induces is not valid; because without the intention of obliging oneself there is no vow.

Resp. To the second. It is valid if the person who emits the vow habitually knows clearly its obligation, although he does not actually attend to it; or also if he who vows, although he does not clearly know the obligation, nevertheless apprehends it confusedly, or wills it implicitly, when, for example, he wishes to vow this or that, just as others are accustomed to vow ². Nevertheless it must generally be held that no greater obligation is induced beyond that which a person wills to impose upon himself and has apprehended. - St. Alphonsus, n. 201.

² An implicit promise can suffice for a vow. Thus certain religious emit vows merely by professing obedience according to the rule. This is more clearly evident in the reception of sacred orders; for although one does not say, "I vow," or, "I promise chastity," nevertheless this vow is made implicitly by this very fact: that, knowing the Church has annexed that vow to those orders, you receive them. But if someone were entirely ignorant of this, St. Alphonsus judges (lib. 6, n. 809) that more probably he is not bound by the vow; and this can scarcely seem doubtful, for the obligation of a vow is wholly from the will which imposes that obligation on itself; but there is no will where there is no knowledge. Nevertheless the Church could compel such a person either to abstain from sacred ministry, or to observe chastity, and indeed by emitting a vow (as St. Alphonsus more probably holds, lib. 3, n. 200, after Laymann), or certainly so that he be guilty of sacrilege unless he observes it, because she commands it from the virtue of religion, as the same St. Alphonsus observes (lib. 6, n. 809).

Q. 2. Whether a vow emitted from error is valid?

Resp. 1. It is denied, if the error concerns the substance of the matter, or substantial circumstances, or those which are chiefly intended, or pertain to the substance, or notably change it ³; because then the promised matter is not sufficiently known and willed. - St. Alphonsus, n. 198, and others.

³ Error concerning a merely impulsive cause does not vitiate a vow; because this is only a secondary cause, and when it is set aside, the act is sufficiently voluntary according to substance. For example, someone vowed a pilgrimage to Rome with zeal for worshiping God, and at the same time also had a secondary impulsive cause, namely to visit his brother, whom he thought to be in Rome. Even if afterward he understands that he is not there, he does not for that reason cease to be bound by the vow. St. Alphonsus, lib. 3, n. 198. Nevertheless Sanchez rightly observes (Decal., lib. 4, c. 2, n. 51) that, because of an error of this sort, an easier cause for dispensing is furnished.

Resp. 2. It is affirmed, if the error concerns accidental circumstances of lesser moment which would not have stood in the way of the vow if they had been known with the error set aside; for he who vows is judged to oblige himself to undergoing merely accidental inconveniences which can occur in fulfilling the vow. - Thus St. Alphonsus ⁴, Elbel.

⁴ Nevertheless St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 198) does not deny that it is probable that error invalidates a vow even in accidental circumstances, if these are of great moment, and if, had they been known, the vow would not have been emitted.

Nevertheless vows must be excepted which are emitted after the novitiate in any approved order; for these are not void because of any error, except only a substantial error concerning the substance. St. Alphonsus, l.c. The reason is, as Lugo says (De Iust. et Iur., disp. 22, n. 88), "because in those things which constitute a state firm and irrevocable by its own nature, such as profession and marriage, the will, according to the nature of the thing in question, accommodates itself and consents without restriction or condition, but entirely absolutely and independently of other conditions besides those which are of the substance of the same contract. For from these conditions marriages and professions would remain uncertain, and therefore the state itself, which is not according to the nature of the thing in question." And, as Sanchez adds (De Matr., lib. 10, disp. 9, n. 20), from dependence of this sort it would follow that many professions and most marriages would have to be judged void, which would redound to grave damage and scandal of the commonwealth.

322. Q. 3. Whether a vow made from fear is valid?

Resp. 1. It is denied, if the fear is grave, unjust, and inflicted for extorting the vow. The reason is that that cannot be acceptable to God which is extorted by force from someone through injury, when the law of nature demands that the right be restored in full. And this indeed proves that vows of this sort are invalid by natural law. It is clear, however, from canon law with regard to solemn vows of religion, and more probably also with regard to other vows, according to the more common interpretation of theologians. - St. Alphonsus, n. 197.

Resp. 2. It is affirmed, if the fear arises from within or from a necessary cause, unless it takes away from the one vowing the use of reason; the reason is that vows of this sort are simply voluntary. Likewise if the fear proceeds from a light cause, because light fear is not judged to influence the act efficaciously, and is rather the occasion than the cause of the vow. - Thus commonly with Sanchez ⁵, Azor, the Salamancans; and St. Alphonsus says this is more probable, n. 197.

⁵ Nevertheless Sanchez (In Dec., lib. 4, c. 3, n. 23) judges probable the opinion of those who hold that vows are invalid when fear, even relatively light, yet unjust, was in reality the cause of vowing; which they affirm both of simple vows and of religious profession, at least with regard to the forum of conscience; for in the external forum light fear is not presumed to be the cause of a vow.

Q. 4. Whether he is held by a vow who doubts whether he emitted a vow or a mere purpose, or whether he had sufficient deliberation?

Resp. To the first. No. It is clear from what has been said about probabilism. But if in promising he believed that he would sin if perhaps he did not carry out the proposed matter, it can be judged that he truly vowed ⁶. - St. Alphonsus, n. 201.

⁶ Except, however, the uneducated, who not rarely falsely think that they sin when they break a purpose, especially if the matter concerns certain pious works to be performed at their own time, for example reciting the crown of the Blessed Virgin Mary daily, or fasting on individual Saturdays, etc.

Resp. To the second. No, for the same reason, when he positively and gravely doubts concerning sufficient deliberation. For the most part the matter is to be decided from the circumstances considered. - St. Alphonsus affirms, n. 196 ⁷. - See Cases, n. 305 and following.

⁷ Suarez, after he has reviewed various causes on account of which there can be doubt concerning defect of sufficient deliberation, namely either because of weak age, or because of a state of drunkenness or madness, or because of a vehement affection either of anger or of fear, rightly concludes that the disagreement, if there is any among the doctors, does not concern principles, namely whether a vow is valid where sufficiency of deliberation is uncertain, but when that defect ought to be supposed or not supposed. Thus he says (De Relig., tr. 6, lib. 4, c. 6, n. 10): "I observe... that it is one thing to ask whether, with a true doubt standing concerning actual use of reason and sufficient for free consent, an obligation arises; but it is another thing to ask when there is, or is not, such doubt. In the former question it is always true, with the hypothesis standing that such doubt is true, that the vow does not oblige, because it is doubtful whether it is a vow, and thus all the things said above proceed. Therefore the said authors properly treat the second question, and in that sense say that a vow made from the heat of anger, if it is not positively and by an almost certain judgment clear that it took away the use of reason, obliges; because the heat of anger alone by itself does not suffice to constitute moral doubt about sufficient use of reason, unless other circumstances accede."

** The Salamancans (tr. 17, c. 1, n. 11) rightly affirm with others that it is not a sufficient indication of defect of liberty and deliberation that someone immediately repents of his vow. For this can arise from levity and inconstancy of mind. But they themselves (ibid.) give another reason, namely that it often happens that acts fully deliberate are immediately retracted by us because of a new difficulty, consideration, or circumstance. St. Alphonsus seems to be looking to these things (lib. 3, n. 196), where, alleging this place of the Salamancans, he says that it must be seen whether other joined circumstances are present.

But these things need some suitable explanation, so that they can be reconciled with another doctrine which the Salamancans have (ibid., n. 152), and which after them St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 226) thus presents: "The Salamancans themselves, c. 1, n. 152, judge that that is a notable change which, if it had been known from the beginning, a person would not have obligated himself. This opinion," namely that in the case there is no obligation of the vow, "seems to me no less probable, indeed perhaps more probable, than the first... Because when a circumstance not foreseen supervenes, by which the vow is rendered more burdensome, the matter of the vow becomes different from that promised."