What an oath is

Definition. An oath is an invocation ¹ of the divine Name as testimony of the truth ².

¹ By this chiefly an oath differs from a vow, whose essence consists in the promise alone.

² Others, in order to explain better the twofold end of an oath, say that an oath is an invocation of the divine Name as testimony, either for giving credibility to words, or for confirming a promise.

Division. An oath is distinguished:

Into assertory or promissory, according as the truth ³ alone is asserted, or a promise or agreement is confirmed.

³ Others, in order to include both a true and a false oath, define an assertory oath as that by which present or past things are affirmed or denied; for a promissory oath, as is clear, extends itself only to future things. Although not every oath concerning the future is promissory. For a twofold oath concerning the future is distinguished by the doctors: one bare and simple, which contains no promise toward another, for example if you swear that you will not enter this house or tavern, etc.; another truly promissory, which is confirmatory of a promise either toward God, which is a sworn vow, or toward one's neighbor, which adds to the obligation of justice or fidelity arising from the promise an obligation from the virtue of religion.

Into solemn or simple, according as it is made with the form required by law, or with solemn ceremonies, or with these set aside ⁴.

⁴ Clerics, especially priests, cannot interpose a solemn oath except by permission of the Bishop, which is granted only for a grave cause.

Into explicit or implicit, according as God is expressly invoked as witness, or creatures are employed as testimony, in which the divine attributes shine forth in a special way ⁵.

⁵ The doctors warn that an oath by creatures, by heaven, for example by earth, etc., should be used only by more perfect and spiritual persons, for whom it is easy to apply the due reverence by which we honor God in creatures. Besides, among us that custom is not in force; and if someone, for example, swears by the sun, he is judged to be jesting.

There is added also an imprecatory oath, by which God is invoked at the same time as witness and as avenger of perjury ⁶.

⁶ This distinction of an oath into contestatory and execratory or imprecatory is also common. But it is disputed whether, when someone confirms a falsehood by an imprecatory oath, by which he obliges himself or something pertaining to himself (as St. Thomas says, 2. 2, q. 89, art. 1 ad 3) to punishment, another species of malice is added, namely against charity toward oneself or one's neighbor. The doctors more commonly deny this, because a person is not accustomed to imprecate such an evil upon himself or his own from his heart, but rather thinks that God will not do it. Thus St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 140), who soon after (n. 142) notes that, according to the common opinion, all oaths are of the same species.

An oath clothed with due conditions is honorable and lawful, and if it is promissory, it obliges in conscience, unless a just cause prevents it, or its obligation has lawfully ceased. - Thus all, and it is clear both from the definition of the Council of Constance, sess. 8, against Wyclif, and from the universal practice of the Church and of peoples, and also from various places of Sacred Scripture. Deuteronomy 6. 13: "You shall fear the Lord your God... and by His name you shall swear." - St. Alphonsus, n. 133, 439 and following.

Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 4 passages

Vol. II, Bk. II, Tr. II, Ch. II, Art. I, Division, and Morality of an Oath

n. 190.

Notion and essence. 1. An oath is "the invocation of the divine Name as witness of truth" (c. 1316). It can be explicit, which is expressed in set words, or tacit, as if, as a sign of an oath, you touch the Gospel, or sign a formula. He who of his own accord signs such a formula by which he is judged both to declare certain things and to confirm them by oath, in reality lies or swears feignedly, unless he has the intention of swearing; but he who is compelled by law or by public authority will then lie only if he is lawfully commanded. One who unlawfully commands formal adherence to his intention or order cannot reasonably hope for it for himself, and therefore cannot consider such a subscription as sworn.

The intention alone of swearing suffices that you swear before God; but that you swear before men, suitable signs of the intention are further required. Doubts will of themselves be solved from the common acceptance of the words. The common use of words also begets a certain presumption in the internal forum. Here, however, in doubt one will answer in favor of liberty.

Suitable formulas are: I call God to witness; I invoke God as witness; so may God help me.

The word alone, "I swear," would indeed of itself suffice, but from common usage it does not signify an oath unless it answers to an oath that has been requested. Often also, although by accident, he is not judged to swear who says: by the Catholic faith, by the holy Gospel.

Unsuitable formulas are of themselves: God knows, - God will testify in His own time, - I speak before God, - God knows all things, - God sees my conscience, - God knows that I do not lie; because these are judged to be uttered only narratively, without invocation of God, unless something else is gathered from the circumstances.

More absolutely unsuitable are the formulas: Truly, certainly, in truth, on the faith of a good man, by my faith, on the faith of an honest man, of a good Christian, of a priest, of a king, by my conscience, upon my conscience; by these one merely declares that he speaks from the dictate of conscience and from knowledge of the truth.

From usage, these express only a strong affirmation: I expose my head, let my ears be cut off, unless.... Other sayings in the manner of imprecation will more easily be an oath, at least when the event is designated in which we are accustomed to recognize the hand of God. Therefore an invocation is quite easily had: may I be struck by lightning; may I fall dead unless.... But if an execration or choice of evil were had, a new species would be added.

The same must be said of comparative words: it is as true as the sun shines, as God is, as Christ is in the sacrament, as the Gospel is true; he is as innocent as the Blessed Virgin, etc.; these would be blasphemous if anyone wished to insist upon equality. If at the same time they affirm false things, they contain a lie, and where the name of God is pronounced, a vain usurpation of that Name.

Nor today is he judged to swear who says "by my soul." Although one can swear by the nobler creatures, if He is understood who is peculiarly present in them, for example by heaven, by the angels of God, etc.; today the use of such formulas is rather rare. - Since the Gospels represent Christ, to touch the Gospels is to touch Christ; to swear by the Gospels is to swear by Christ.

The invocation of God, which pertains to the essence of an oath, consists in this: that the one swearing, so far as is in him, desires and wills that God testify or confirm as true that which he swears (if at any time it shall please Him), and at the same time accepts divine punishments or divine vengeance if he lies, as the words prove: So may God help me....

Wherefore the philosophy of an oath is this: he who calls upon God in confirmation of falsity gravely derogates from the reverence of God and exposes himself to divine punishments; a religious man is not judged to will to do these things; wherefore, by such interposition of divine authority, he himself confirms his own statements.

n. 191.

Division. 1. From the exterior form, they distinguish a verbal oath, which is contained in words; a real oath, which is contained in an action, for example of raising the fingers, touching the cross, the Gospels; and a mixed oath, which is composed of both signs.

From the very force of the formula, it is invocatory or contestatory, and execratory or imprecatory. By the former God is simply invoked as witness; by the latter He is expressly at the same time called upon as avenger of falsity, whether one exposes himself or another beloved person, for example a son, to punishments. Since no one is accustomed seriously to imprecate evils from the heart upon himself or a friend, and every oath exposes the one swearing to divine punishments, that false oath does not seem, at least practically, to differ in species from a simple false oath.
From the object, it is distinguished as assertory and promissory. By an assertory oath past or present things are affirmed or denied; by a promissory oath at the same time a present intention is affirmed, and a future deed is promised.

To the promissory oath is referred the comminatory oath, by which someone swears thus, for example: by God, I shall strike you unless....

A promissory oath can be absolute and conditioned.

Finally, from the rite, an oath is distinguished as simple and solemn; the latter is made by a definite rite before a Prelate, judge, notary, etc. - It pertains to the canonical rite that it be made personally: "An oath which the canons require or admit cannot validly be furnished through a procurator" (c. 1316 § 2).

n. 192.

Judges sometimes are ignorant of the proper force of an oath, so that they do not formally swear when they seem to swear; or sometimes they think a certain rite essential, for example really raising the fingers, so that if they do not raise the fingers rightly they think themselves immune from perjury. These things are to be observed by a judge; but by a priest they must be untaught.

n. 193.

Moral judgment. 1. An oath, furnished with due conditions, is honorable and praiseworthy. For it is an act of religion, since it contains a profession of divine truth, authority, and providence. But the words by which the Lord seems to condemn every oath are understood by tradition as concerning the reprobation of the evil custom of mixing oaths into every hour and occasion. That honesty is of defined faith.

The conditions of an honorable oath, moreover, are customarily expressed in the three words which the Code itself used, when c. 1316 § 1 says: "It cannot be furnished except in truth, in judgment, and in justice." a) Truth demands that you utter those things which you think to be true with that certitude which the solemnity of the thing manifests. Wherefore it is not licit to affirm as certain or simply that about which you doubt. Quite commonly, with St. Alphonsus, L. 4, n. 148, they say that moral certitude is enough for you to confirm a matter by oath. But, since moral certitude is not indivisible, that must be accepted cautiously. Let us rather say that such certitude is required as, for the circumstances, with the oath also considered, is reasonably expected by the hearers; or such as is tacitly affirmed with the thing itself, in these circumstances. For an oath is furnished more as a sign of veracity than of the truth of the thing; it properly confirms things as they are said, not as they are (2. 2, q. 89 art. 1). Hence a stricter certitude is required in the judicial forum, because of the gravity of the consequence. Wherefore what you know from another's report must be testified as received from another. Likewise, where you swear in particular that something is true, the thing must truly be established for you. In a prolix discourse, on the contrary, it is less necessary that you be so certain about the individual narrated points, even secondary ones; then by the oath you rather confirm the sincerity of your mind. But certitude of a future deed, in a promise, is of itself less established. It is enough that you think what you promise to be placed in your power.

Insofar as equivocation itself or defensive words are licit, it will be licit, if there is a just cause, to confirm the same by oath. Where they are prohibited under grave sin, one will sin gravely by such an oath.

This condition of truth is required under grave sin in an oath insofar as it is assertory, nor does lightness of matter excuse from grave sin.

b) Judgment requires that an oath be made with discretion, prudence, consideration, and reverence, and with sufficient utility. By every serious cause this condition is fulfilled, and its defect is only venial, like a vain usurpation of the name of God.

c) Justice is understood differently in an assertory oath and in a promissory oath. - In an assertory oath, a narration of a thing which you cannot licitly report, at least under oath, is said to be opposed to justice. Of itself that defect is venial. It would be mortal if you wished thereby to conciliate belief for grave detraction, or, as we may say more generally, to use divine authority as a means of iniquity. - In a promissory oath, where it has its proper seat, the condition of justice forbids you to swear that you will do what is not licit. And when grave sin is in question, there is committed a mortal irreverence of abusing divine authority for evil. This malice seems to remain even if the question is of committing a venial sin. Yet the benign opinion, which is that of several distinguished doctors, Lessius, Sanchez, Suarez, is probable. It will more easily be admitted not to be grave when the matter is opposed merely to evangelical counsel, as if you swear that you will not enter religion, that you will not give alms.

N. B. Concerning an oath requested from one who is going to perjure himself, cf. what was said at n. 124, 2; concerning a feigned oath, cf. here immediately, where we treat of a promissory oath.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 2 passages

Vol. II, Tr. XI, Sect. II, Q. I, Ch. II, Art. V, § 1. On the Notion and Division of an Oath

n. 437.

437. Definition. An oath (which is sometimes also called a swearing and a sacrament) can be defined: an invocation of the divine Name as witness to veracity. Hence St. Thomas⁵⁰⁸ says: "To take God as witness is called swearing."

The definition given is explained. It is said, first: an invocation of the divine name, insofar as man, inwardly conscious of the defect of his own veracity and knowledge, invokes as an aid God, the first truth in knowing and speaking. Hence every true oath is a true worship of God, and presupposes faith in the existence of a personal, omniscient, and omnipotent God, who knows every lie and punishes it. Therefore the oaths of atheists, pantheists, monists, materialists, etc., and generally of all who deny the existence of a personal God, are not true oaths. Therefore not even a judge can demand an oath from them; he can, however, certainly compel them under grave penalties to tell the truth. Certain jurists call this obligation of telling the truth imposed by a judge a civil oath, in opposition to a religious oath; but this distinction is to be rejected, since every true oath is essentially an act of religion. Since today so many men openly profess crude atheism, it has more than once already been proposed that the oath be abolished in civil tribunals. The invocation of the divine name in an oath can be either express or tacit through signs, e.g., through touching the Gospel, through raising the fingers, etc.

It is said, second: as witness to veracity. For the end of every oath is the confirmation of the truth spoken. But since the truth of contingent facts cannot be proved from intrinsic causes, it must be sought elsewhere, namely, through the testimony of men. This testimony of men, however, is often insufficient and fallacious because of a defect both of knowledge and of veracity. Therefore it is necessary to have recourse to the testimony of God, who can neither be deceived nor deceive.⁵⁰⁹ Nevertheless, the one swearing neither intends nor asks that God here and now testify to the truth by an actual and clear sign, for this would be a tempting of God, but that the omniscient, just, and omnipotent God testify to the truth how and when it shall please Him, and punish the one swearing falsely most gravely.⁵¹⁰

⁵⁰⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 89, a. 1. Aristotle (Pseudo-Aristotle) defines an oath: "Ὅρκος δ' ἐστὶ μετὰ θείας παραλήψεως φάσις ἀναπόδεικτος" -- "An oath is an assertion with an invocation of the gods, admitting of no proof" (Rhet. ad Alexand. c. 17). Also excellent is the definition given by the distinguished Göpfert: "The oath is the express or tacit invocation of God as witness of the truth, either for the confirmation of a statement or for the strengthening of a promise" (Der Eid [1883], 152), or in Latin: An oath is the invocation of the divine name in testimony, to establish faith in a statement or to confirm a promise.

⁵⁰⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 89, a. 1.

⁵¹⁰ Cf. ib., n. 2 ad 3.

n. 438.

438. Divisions of an oath. Among the several divisions of an oath, let it suffice to enumerate the following, which are necessary for a confessor to know:

By reason of the object or matter, an oath is distinguished into assertory and promissory.⁵¹¹ In an assertory oath God is invoked as witness to a past or present truth; e.g., I swear that I did not commit that crime; or I swear that I am incapable of paying.⁵¹² In a promissory oath God is invoked as witness both to a future event and to the present sincere intention of doing or omitting something; e.g., I swear that I shall fulfill all the duties of my new state.⁵¹³ A promissory oath, therefore, confirms the present sincere will and binds it lest it be changed in the future. The Angelic Doctor⁵¹⁴ explains both oaths in this way: "Divine testimony is sometimes introduced to assert present or past things, and this is called an assertory oath. But sometimes divine testimony is introduced to confirm something future, and this is called a promissory oath." If anyone considers a promissory oath accurately, he will find that it always includes an assertory oath; for one who swears that he will do something invokes God as witness to a certain present truth, namely, that he now has the intention of effecting that which he promises. Then he invokes God as guarantor of the future truth, namely, that he will fulfill the thing promised. Nevertheless, the division of an oath into assertory and promissory is not therefore superfluous; for although a promissory oath includes an assertory oath, the converse does not hold.

A promissory oath is customarily subdivided into a sworn resolution, a sworn promise or sworn pact, a sworn vow, and a vow with a sworn pact. a) A sworn resolution (which is also called a simple promissory oath) is a resolution, confirmed by an oath, of doing or omitting something; e.g., I swear that I shall no longer play cards. b) A sworn promise is a promise made to a man and confirmed by an oath; e.g., I promise you marriage and swear that I shall fulfill the betrothal thus contracted. Since this promise is a contract or pact, such an oath is also called a sworn pact. c) A sworn vow exists if a promise is made not to a man but to God and is confirmed by an oath. d) Finally, a vow can be made for the benefit of some third person and accepted by him. If an oath is added to such a vow, there is then a vow with a sworn pact.

By reason of form, an oath is distinguished into invocatory and execratory (imprecatory).⁵¹⁵ The first simply invokes God as witness to the truth, and therefore is also customarily called a contestatory oath; e.g., I swear by God that the matter is so. The other invokes God not only as witness to the truth, but also as avenger of falsehood. The one swearing can imprecate vengeance for falsehood upon himself in three ways: a) directly from God Himself; e.g., May God destroy me, may He punish me, if I have not spoken the truth. In Sacred Scripture the words, "May God do these things to me and add these things," are often used as the formula of an oath of this kind.⁵¹⁶ In canon law the formula now in force is: "So may God help me and these holy Gospels of God"; its meaning is: May God no longer help me if I pronounce what is false. b) Through creatures, God so permitting; e.g., May lightning kill me, may the devil seize me, may the earth swallow me, etc., if I do not speak the truth. David uttered an oath of this kind, saying: "If I have rendered evil to those who repaid me, let me deservedly fall empty before my enemies."⁵¹⁷ c) Through persons intimately joined to him, who are to suffer harm; e.g., a father swears by the head of his son; its meaning is: Let my dearest son be punished capitally if I lie.
By reason of manner, an oath is distinguished into solemn, which is made with a certain solemnity, e.g., with candles lit, before a crucifix, with the Gospels touched, etc., and simple, which is pronounced privately, without these solemnities, in whatever words are preferred. A solemn oath can be made not only by words but also by gestures, e.g., by touching the Gospel, kissing the Bible, etc. Since a solemn oath is always employed in trials, it is also called a judicial oath. But an extrajudicial oath is every other oath, whether it is in solemn form or in simple form. A judicial oath has very many subdivisions, e.g., an oath against calumny, an oath against malice, a supplementary oath, an oath tendered, etc., which we omit here because knowledge of them pertains not to Moral Theology but to either ecclesiastical or civil law. For all oaths are of the same moral species because they all agree in the invocation of the divine name, although they differ accidentally.
By reason of invocation, an oath is distinguished into explicit and implicit. The first is that by which God Himself is explicitly and immediately invoked as witness, e.g., God is my witness. The other is that by which a creature is indeed immediately invoked, but God Himself mediately, because in such a creature a special relation to God shines forth. Thus Moses swore implicitly, saying: "I call heaven and earth as witnesses today that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing."⁵¹⁸

⁵¹¹ In German: Aussage- and Zusageeid [assertory oath and promissory oath].

⁵¹² Offenbarungseid [oath of disclosure].

⁵¹³ Amts- or Diensteid [oath of office or service].

⁵¹⁴ S. theol., l.c., a. 1.

⁵¹⁵ Zeugnis- and Verwünschungseid [testimonial oath and imprecatory oath]. Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 89, a. 1 ad 3.

⁵¹⁶ Cf. 1 Kings 14:44; 2 Kings 3:35.

⁵¹⁷ Ps. 7:5.

⁵¹⁸ Deut. 30:19.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 30 passages

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Fifth Part: On the Virtues…, Section B: On the Acts of …, Ch. IV, Question One: On Oath, Article I: On the Essence and Object of an Oath

n. ¶1.

S. Th. II-II, q. 89, a. 1, 4, 6.

n. 742.

742. Oath (serment; eed) is said from right, because it was introduced for right or law, among all nations, so that what is said under invocation of divine testimony may be held as true; therefore to swear (eed doen of zweren) is to appeal to God as witness of some matter, or, as St. Thomas says, a. 1, "to assume God as witness." Whence oath is defined: Invocation of divine testimony, or with the Code (can. 1316): "the invocation of the divine Name as witness of truth."

n. 742.

Therefore the end of an oath is the confirmation of truth. Confirmation in the sciences is made through reason, which proceeds from evident things to conclusions; there witnesses and oath are not employed: for one would seem ridiculous if, in the disputation of some science, he wished to prove what was proposed by an oath. But the particular and contingent facts of men cannot be confirmed through reason (from intrinsic causes), and therefore they are accustomed to be confirmed through witnesses. Human testimony, however, is not always sufficient for confirming these things, on account of defect of veracity or knowledge, and therefore it was necessary to have recourse to divine testimony, because God can neither lie nor be ignorant of anything (a. 1).

n. 742.

But one swearing does not ask that God here and now testify to the truth of the statement by an actual sign (for that would commonly be tempting God), but when and how it pleases Him, at least in the future judgment (a. 2, ad 3), or that He punish most gravely one swearing falsely (a. 1, ad 3). And yet the invocation serves to produce faith immediately among men, because someone is not easily judged to be of such impiety and boldness that he would make God a witness of falsehood and subject himself to divine vengeance.

743. An oath is an invocation; therefore it is an act of reason: an interior speech, which nevertheless presupposes an act of the will, namely, at least the implicit intention of swearing and of calling God as witness.

Hence an oath is not:

a) An invocation pronounced indeliberately by him who does not know what an oath is, or by him who is ignorant of the sense of the words or does not advert sufficiently: an unconscious oath.

b) Nor an invocation pronounced merely materially in circumstances which exclude every intention of invocation, for example, if it is made in school or in a theater for the sake of teaching or representing, or by way of interjection as in common speech, by God (for example, par Dieu, c'est vrai): a narrated oath.

c) Nor a deliberate but merely external invocation without intention: a fictitious oath, for example, by him who does not admit the existence of God.

For a human act does not operate beyond the intention of the agent. But an oath must be a human act, not only insofar as it is speech, but also insofar as it is an invocation of God as witness: for invocation can be made for a diverse end. Therefore, in order that it be made for a witness, the intention of uttering words and expressing an invocation of divine testimony does not suffice, but the will of invoking God as witness is required. A fictitious oath is an irreligious lie, of itself venial, sometimes mortal because of grave public or private harm, as in judgments and contracts.¹

¹ Hence condemned by Innocent XI is proposition 25: "With cause it is licit to swear without the mind of swearing, whether the matter is light or grave."

A merely internal oath, although it is valid before God, as if someone invokes Him internally as witness that he wishes firmly to avoid sin, nevertheless does not obtain its effect of confirming assertions and promises before men, whence it is incomplete; likewise if someone, intending to swear, uses a formula wholly unfit for this. Therefore, in order that an oath be complete, it must be expressed by some oath formula; and therefore on the part of the mode by which the invocation is expressed, it is divided into verbal, real, and mixed, according as it is expressed either by words or by signs (the raising of fingers, the touching of a scepter, cross, or gospels), or by both.

744. An oath is the invocation of testimony or an appeal as witness of truth.

Hence a) it is not the invocation of the merciful and omnipotent God by way of prayer and supplication for obtaining some good, favor, or help, even, for example, for showing truth or conciliating faith for ourselves; but it is the invocation of the infinitely true God for obtaining testimony for confirmation, by which, insofar as it is in us, we constitute Him witness, that is, we cite Him and consent that He be witness, if He wills.

b) Nor is it the invocation of Sacred Scripture to confirm doctrine: for it is one thing to use testimony already given, another to invoke the testimony of God as to be exhibited (a. 1, ad 1).

c) Nor is it a simple assertion of divine omniscience, as in the expressions: I speak before God; God hears me; He knows that I speak the truth; God is witness; God will testify in His own time; God is truth; the Lord lives; the Lord sees my conscience, etc.; unless they are pronounced not only narratively and enunciatively, but invocatively, as the Apostle, Gal. I, 20: Behold before God, that I do not lie...

d) Nor is it a simple comparison of the asserted truth with an evident truth, for example, it is as true as God exists, as the sun shines, as I sit here (as in Dutch waarachtig Gods), or with a truth of faith, for example, it is true as the Gospel, after the likeness of faith, as infallible as the Church: in which case nevertheless ordinarily some irreverence toward God or sacred things will not be lacking.

e) Nor is it a simple vehement affirmation as in the expressions: in truth, by my faith (that is, human faith), in conscience, by my conscience, by the conscience of my soul (for example, ma foi, ma parole d'honneur; op mijn woord).

f) Nor is it a simple wager or obligation of a penalty, for example, if it is false, I pledge my head; I wish to be a thief; let me be a heretic; let my ears be taken off; let me be killed, hanged, die; let the devil take me; ... by damnation, come here, etc.; unless God is invoked as witness of truth and at the same time avenger of falsehood.

On the part of the testimony which is sought, an oath is merely contestatory or directly invocatory (getuigeniseed) if God is invoked only as witness for manifesting truth; or indirectly, namely, execratory or imprecatory (vervloekings- of verwenschingseed) if He is also invoked as avenger for punishing falsehood. This often happens if He is expressly named, for example, if I lie, may God punish me, destroy me, damn me..., or if the evil is commonly regarded as proceeding specially from divine providence, for example, if I lie, may lightning from heaven strike me, may I descend into hell (a. 1, ad 3).

745. An oath is the invocation of divine testimony or of the divine name. Hence he does not swear 1. who does not say whom he invokes, for example, I swear that it is so, unless from the circumstances it is clear that he intends God, for example, if the demand for an oath preceded; nor 2. he who invokes false gods; nor 3. he who appeals to men as witnesses; or 4. even to the saints, stopping at their testimony: for this is nothing but an act of dulia.

Yet a) if a creature is invoked insofar as it belongs and is referred to its Author, and represents His supreme truth and majesty, the Creator who shines forth in creatures is implicitly and mediately invoked, for example, if someone swears by heaven, by the holy faith, by the cross, by the Gospels, by the sacraments, by the temple, by the saints, by relics, or by other nobler creatures which commonly are regarded insofar as they have a special relation to God; but by baser creatures no one is judged to swear, nor would that be licit because of irreverence.

Similarly b) if someone obliges himself or something pertaining to himself to a penalty and offers it to God as avenger of falsehood, there is an execratory oath in which God is implicitly invoked as witness and avenger, for example, I swear by my head, by my son, by my salvation... Such an oath is the expression by my soul (II Cor. I, 23), unless nevertheless, as often happens, the faithful do not advert to the special relation of the soul to God.

Vol. I, Tr. VI, On the Second Precept of t…, Chapter II. On Oath · Vol. I, Tr. VI, On the Second Precept of t…, Ch. II, Article I. On the Conditions of an Oath

On the part of Him by whom one swears, an oath is explicit or immediate, or implicit or mediate (a. 6).

n. 746.

746. Famous is the division of oath into assertory and promissory, which is taken on the part of the object or matter, according as an oath turns upon the assertion or affirmation of the one swearing concerning the present, for example, I think it is so, I am incapable of paying, or concerning the past, for example, I did this, or upon an action or omission to be executed by the one swearing in the future. In the first case it is assertory (bevestigende of bloote eed), in the other promissory (belovende of verbindende eed).

n. 746.

In a promissory oath 1. God is invoked to testify to the present intention of the one swearing to do what he proposes; whence it includes an assertion concerning the present and adds a purpose concerning the future, and therefore when we distinguish an assertory oath from a promissory one, we understand it as merely assertory. 2. Nevertheless God is not invoked as witness of the future execution, for testimony is not given about a thing not yet done;² nevertheless 3. God is as it were the patron,³ who gives special authority and force to the promise and urges its execution by a special obligation of religion: for just as men promise or enter betrothals before a king, judge, or other man of great authority, who lends authority to the contract, so that they understand that they would do injury to him if they do not fulfill the promises, so also they promise with God invoked; but if they do not fulfill, they inflict injury upon Him. Whence by such an oath God is invoked that He may confirm the present sincere will and bind it lest it be changed in the future.

² Although future things are present before God, nevertheless by oath there is not asked from God testimony concerning a future thing as it is present to Him, but as it is in the word of the one promising. But in this way testimony does not fall upon the word except insofar as it is capable of truth when it is spoken; therefore with respect to a future deed God is not invoked as witness. Suarez, De Religione, l. I, c. 9, n. 25.

³ Others say surety, but "this word... we cannot take in the strict sense, in which he is called a surety who answers for another so as to take upon himself the burden of paying the promise in defect of another." Dignant, De Virtute religionis, n. 221.

n. 746.

A promissory oath is a) strictly promissory or accessory when the action which is sworn is truly promised, whether to God by vow (a sworn vow), or to man (a sworn deed), or to both (a sworn vow in favor of a third party); or b) broadly promissory or standing of itself when the action is not promised but only proposed, whether for another's honor or favor (an oath confirmatory of a purpose or a sworn purpose), or for penalty or vengeance (a comminatory oath; bedreigingseed).

n. 747.

747. An oath is an act of religion. For nothing is confirmed except by something which is more certain and more excellent; therefore he who invokes divine testimony to confirm what he says, by this very fact professes God to be more excellent, as one whose truth is indefectible and whose knowledge is universal, and thus he exhibits reverence to God. But to reverence God belongs to religion; therefore. Cf. Deut. VI, 13; Ps. LXII, 12; Hebr. VI, 13-16.

n. 747.

All oaths in the account of oath are of the same species, because since the account of oath consists essentially in the invocation of God, all the differences brought forward above, or diverse modes of invocation, are related materially and per accidens to God's testification, and consequently do not change its essence and species.⁴ - Nevertheless other species can accede, for example, of fidelity, justice, dulia, and if the oath is sinful, of blasphemy, injustice, scandal, etc.

⁴ Nor is a promissory oath distinguished in species because one thing is to invoke God as witness of present truth, and another as patron of future execution. For in an oath the testimony of God and His authority are not invoked distinctly and separately, but God is invoked as testifying to the present intention and consequently He urges the future execution, because the matter concerns a future thing promised; which returns to a material difference. Dignant, o. c., n. 246.

n. 748.

748. Practical observations. - 1. In doubt concerning the intention of the one swearing, judgment is to be made from the circumstances, for example, whether the demand for an oath preceded, whether the one swearing is accustomed to swear, etc., but especially from the words employed: if the formula from its proper sense and common usage is oath-like, and was pronounced advertently, an oath is presumed; if it is doubtfully oath-like, it is not presumed but must be proved; but if it is ambiguous and the intention is not established, an oath is not judged to be present.

n. 748.

By the prescription of the Church, "an oath which the canons require or admit cannot validly be furnished through a proxy" (can. 1316, § 2).

Marc, Institutiones Morales

Clement Marc, C.SS.R. — 2 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, Ch. II, Art. I, § 1. On the Validity of an Oath

n. ¶603.

PRINCIPLE. For a valid oath there are required: the intention of swearing and a swear-formula. These two are essential; nevertheless the first parts are held by intention, so that, although God is invoked as witness only internally, an oath is present.

I. The INTENTION OF SWEARING is required, at least virtual; because without such an intention an oath, as an invocation of God, is not a human act (III, 134).

Hence: 1. If the mind of swearing is lacking, whether from inadvertence, as in him who does not know or does not notice that the words which he uses are sworn words, or who does not intend to usurp them as sworn words but only wishes to affirm more expressly the things which he says; or from malice, as in him who swears fictitiously, by positively excluding the intention of invoking God as witness, there is no oath. 2. The same must more probably be said concerning a promissory oath, if the mind of obliging oneself from oath, or from religion, is lacking; because it is contradictory to will to promise by swearing and to be unwilling to contract an obligation of religion. 3. If only the mind of fulfilling the promise is lacking, the oath is valid, since the intention of truly swearing is present; but perjury is committed, on account of defect of truth, as will be said n. 606. Cf. St. Alph., III, 172.

II. A SWEAR-FORMULA is required, by which it is expressly or tacitly manifested that God is invoked as witness. Otherwise how could God be employed in a sensible way as witness before others? (III, 134).

Moreover: 1. The invocation is EXPRESS whenever God or his attributes are brought into the midst for making faith. Of this sort are the following formulas: I attest God, I call God to witness; let God be witness to me; I swear by God, by Christ, by the truth of God, by the faith of God, by his mercy, justice; may God destroy me, if, etc. (III, 140-143).

The invocation of God is TACIT when it is done through nobler creatures, insofar as divine perfections shine forth in them, for example: I swear by the Blessed Virgin, by the Saints, by heaven, etc.; likewise when signs alone are employed, for example hands are raised, the Gospel is touched, if from a preceding determination those signs are held as a swear-formula (III, 135-138). Indeed, this determination being presupposed, the contact of hands alone suffices, which officials of the State, priests, or even those who are enrolled in the sect of Mennonites, use in some regions, so that they assert the truth of the matter before a judge.

n. ¶604.

Hence it is inferred: a) If the divine persons or perfections, or the aforesaid creatures, are simply remembered for the sake of affirming and merely by way of narration or similitude, formulas of this sort are not reputed sworn formulas, unless something else is established or argued from the circumstances. Thus he is not considered to swear who says: "I speak before God, the angels, the blessed; God knows; God knows all things; God sees my conscience; hold me as innocent of this evil as the angels of God; it is as true as God exists; God lives before whom I stand, etc." (III, 134-138).

b) Execratory formulas, as for example, "may I be killed if this is not so," are commonly not considered a true oath, unless God is expressly named, for example: May God destroy me, if I lie. Otherwise they contain only a certain sponsoring or obligation of penalty (III, 143; l. El. qq. ref., n. 19).

c) Of itself, the invocation of one's own conscience, faith, life, body, one's own affairs, or a common creature does not suffice for an oath: for example, "I swear from conscience, by conscience, by my faith, probity, by priestly honor, military honor, by my head, by honor, by house, by children, etc." But otherwise, if one swears by the faith of Christ or the Catholic faith (III, 134-135). Nevertheless a promise made by invoking priestly honor is altogether serious and obliges.

d) Similarly, he does not swear who says: "I swear that it is so; I swear that I am going to do this"; unless from the previous declaration of the one swearing or of the one asking, the intention of furnishing a true oath is manifest (III, 136).

e) A lay oath, as they call it, is not an oath, since invocation of God is lacking (Ami du Cl., 1908, p. 870).

PRACTICAL RULES. 1. In the INTERNAL forum, the matter is to be judged from intention. He who has the mind of swearing truly swears, whatever words or signs he uses. Indeed he truly swears, even if he uses words which do not import an oath, if he believes it to be an oath. In doubt concerning the intention of the one swearing, one is accustomed to judge according to the common acceptance of the words which he used (III, 134; Lehmkuhl, I, 554).

In the EXTERNAL forum, one must stand by the formula which the one swearing usurped. For, although perhaps the oath is null before God because of defect of intention, nevertheless, in the external forum he is judged to have sworn who usurped such a word or such a sign which either of itself or because of circumstances attests a true oath.

Note. Concerning the oath in the declaration of revenues, see n. 967.

Konings, Theologia Moralis

Anthony Konings, C.SS.R. — 5 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. II, ARTICLE I: ON THE CONDITIONS OF AN OATH

n. ¶366.

I. On the requisites for the essence of an oath. - 366. - Two things are required for an oath, namely: 1° The intention of swearing, at least virtual; because without such intention there cannot exist a formal oath. 2° An oath-formula, either by God explicitly, or implicitly by creatures, or an oath-sign; because, since God is invoked as witness, it is necessary that this be expressed in the oath.⁴

n. ¶367.

You will resolve. - 1° A fictitious promissory oath, or one merely external, is not valid, because of defect of will or intention. Yet he who thus swears sins; but more probably, speaking of itself, only venially, because it is nothing but a lie with vain usurpation of the name of God.⁵ - Nevertheless it is mortal in contracts, or before a judge (because of grave deception against justice), or if the one swearing fictitiously does not have the mind of fulfilling the promises.⁶

2° An oath made with the mind indeed of swearing, but not of obligating oneself from religion, more probably is not valid, because this is nugatory. But an oath made with the mind indeed of swearing, but not of obligating oneself from justice or from fidelity, is valid.

3° It is an oath to say: I swear by God, by the Saints, the temple, the cross, the altar, the Gospel, the Catholic Faith, the Church, heaven, earth. - Likewise to say: I call God to witness.... Let God be witness to me.... I invoke God as witness. Otherwise, if someone swore by creatures in which the divine goodness or power does not shine forth, for example by a beard, etc.¹

4° It is not an oath to say: God knows.... I speak before God, etc.... if these are uttered narratively; but otherwise, if invocatively, which is discerned from the circumstances or the intention of the speaker. Nor is it an oath to say: This is as true as God exists,... as I exist,... as I am in this place,... on the faith of an honest man (upon my word and honor), by my faith,... by my conscience,... by priestly faith,... may I die, or may the devil destroy me, unless it be so.... Except when these last two are uttered by way of execration, and not rather, as is customary, by way of pledge. Indeed it is not even an oath to say: I swear or I swear that it is so, unless a question about giving an oath has preceded. - St. Alphonsus,² and many others.

II. On the requisites for the liceity of an oath.

n. ¶368.

- A threefold condition is required for the liceity of an oath according to that saying of Jeremiah:¹ Thou shalt swear: The Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice.

I. Therefore Truth is required, that is: conformity of the assertion with intention and not with the fact. For an oath excludes only lying, not every error. In an assertory oath truth regards the existence of the fact; in a promissory oath the existence of the intention.

II. Judgment, that is, that it be done with discretion, prudence, consideration, and reverence, and not without necessity or a just cause.

III. Justice, that is, that the oath be about a just, licit, and honorable thing. Thus he would swear against justice who by oath would obligate himself to inflict damage unjustly on his neighbor, or to furnish something else prohibited.

n. ¶369.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° What is a sufficient cause for swearing?

Resp. Any honorable cause of some weight, for example peace to be confirmed in families, greater security in contracts, etc.¹

Quaer. 2° Is it licit to swear with probability of truth?

Resp. Negatively, because God cannot be invoked except in testimony of a certain thing; nevertheless a certain moral certainty, or sole probability, suffices.²

Quaer. 3° Is it licit to swear with mental restriction?

Resp. Negatively, if it is purely mental; but otherwise, if it is broadly mental, and a just cause is present, which nevertheless ought to be greater than that which is required for an unsworn restriction, and greater in proportion as the words furnish greater occasion of erring.⁴ See what is to be said n. 513-515.

Quaer. 4° Is it licit to swear, touching and kissing Protestant Bibles, when they have been presented to us by magistrates?

Resp. Negatively, of itself, as is plain; hence one about to swear is accustomed to bring Catholic Bibles or a prayerbook in which some part of Sacred Scripture is contained. For the rest, solemn affirmation among us suffices. I said: Negatively, of itself, because ignorance often excuses. Collect. p. 630 n. 1180.

Quaer. 5° Is it licit to give an oath in public disturbances of the commonwealth?

Resp. This generally depends on the circumstances. Weigh what justice or the common good postulates, and what the obligations required by the oath are, whether positive or negative. - But especially it is expedient to consult ecclesiastical Superiors, to whom it belongs to define what, according to the various circumstances, is to be done.

n. ¶370.

- Quaer. 6° What kind of sin is it to swear without truth, judgment, and justice?

Resp. to the first. It is mortal, because to bring God forward in testimony of falsity is to will to destroy His veracity. It is established also from Proposition 24 condemned by Innocent XI (see p. XV). L. IV. 147.

Resp. to the second. It is venial of itself, that is, with the danger of perjury excluded;⁵ because it is only vain usurpation of the name of God. - Thus almost all, even the stricter authors.

Resp. to the third. An assertory oath must be distinguished from a promissory one. In the former, for instance if someone boasts with an oath about some sin, more probably there is only a venial sin against religion, because it is not done to confirm complacency in sin, but only to make others more certain about it, which is only a certain venial levity of soul. Except, however, an oath for confirming detraction; for it is employed as a means for making another's infamy more certain. In the latter oath it is certainly mortal, if there is question of a grave matter, as is plain; if of a light matter, St. Alphonsus¹ is more pleased by the opinion which affirms that even in this case one sins mortally, because it seems to be a grave irreverence to invoke God as witness and surety of sin, even light sin.

You will resolve. - 1° Among prohibited oaths are listed those which are customarily emitted in secret societies, and by which members obligate themselves to obey those things which perhaps will be ordered by certain superiors, or to keep secrecy even against legitimate power.² See n. 1721. 1°. d).

Yet there are certain societies of workers in which an oath is emitted, or is judged to be emitted, with a restriction, that it is licit to reveal its object to the Ordinary or to a priest; and these, indeed, if the oath contains nothing else which is opposed to justice, and the society is not illicit from elsewhere, are not to be disturbed. See n. 1721. 1).

2° The oath of preserving the Constitution of the United States is to be understood in the popular sense, which, namely, is received among all; for each person is not judged to embrace with judgment of mind whatever is contained in it, nor does the Constitution obligate to this.³ Nor is a law to be called evil, but good, which permits a lesser evil that it may prevent a greater one. Moulart, L'Eglise et L'Etat.

3° The oath of foreigners seeking the right of citizenship here is licit, even for him who shall have given an oath of fidelity to the prince from whom he departed. For that oath of fidelity was exacted for confirming the natural obligation of citizens, rather than for inducing a new one, and therefore it must be explained according to the nature of that obligation, by which no one, unless a public and grave cause presses, is bound to remain in his fatherland, and which he satisfies who obeys the prince while he dwells in his domain. But as regards the oath which is given here by foreigners seeking the right of citizenship, and by which every foreign prince is abjured, and consequently also that one from whom someone departed, it is understood of that natural obligation being abjured which, by departing from his domain, has already ceased; and therefore it cannot be called illicit.

4° He who, while war is raging among some nations, brings goods under a neutral flag and documents either fictitious or purposely made into a neutral port, so that thence they may be carried to one or the other of the nations which wage war between themselves, is sometimes compelled to swear that the documents are true. Such an oath cannot be given in the case. (o) p. 473.

Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology

Aloysius Sabetti, S.J., and Timothy Barrett, S.J. — 2 passages

Vol. I, Tr. VI, On the Second Precept of t…, Chapter II. On Oath

n. 222.

An oath is the invocation of the divine Name as witness of truth; and it is distinguished in many ways, namely:

1st. Assertory or promissory, according as it is assumed for asserting things present or past, or for confirming something future. But this is called promissory, not because every oath concerning the future contains a promise, but either because more often it is ordered to confirming that, or because, even with any pact excluded, it is equivalent to a promise, insofar as it induces the obligation of carrying out the sworn proposal.

2nd. Solemn or simple, according as it is made in the form required by law, and with solemn ceremonies, or with these excluded.

3rd. Explicit or implicit, according as God is expressly invoked as witness, or creatures are employed in testimony in which divine attributes specially shine forth.

4th. Attestatory or execratory or imprecatory, according as the one swearing invokes God only as witness, or also as avenger of perjury.

Vol. I, Tr. VI, On the Second Precept of t…, Ch. II, Article I. On the Conditions of an Oath

n. 223.

I Say 1st. For the essence of an oath two things are required, as is clear from its definition, namely, the intention of swearing, at least virtual, and some formula or sign by which it is sufficiently expressed that God is invoked as witness, either explicitly or implicitly through creatures, unless, however, the oath is directed to God alone. - I said 1st, unless, etc., because when an oath is directed to God alone, it can be wholly completed in the mind of the one swearing by interior words. - I said 2nd, some formula or sign, because an oath uttered among men must be considered both with regard to the law of nature alone and with regard also to positive law; in the first case any external sign suffices, in the other a certain formula of words or a certain rite can be required under pain of nullity. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 134. Hence:

1st. A fictitious or merely external oath is not valid because of defect of intention; nevertheless one swearing thus sins, as is clear from proposition 25 proscribed by Innocent XI, which has itself thus: "With cause it is licit to swear without the intention of swearing, whether the matter is light, or whether it is grave." But according to the more probable opinion, speaking of itself, only a venial sin is then committed, because nothing is uttered except a lie with vain usurpation of the name of God. Yet often this is mortal by reason of common or particular damage. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., n. 17.

2nd. It is an oath to say: I swear by God, by the Saints, by the temple, the cross, the altar, the Gospel, the Catholic faith, the Church, heaven, earth. - Likewise to say: I call God to witness. ... Let God be witness to me. ... I invoke God as witness. It is otherwise if someone should swear by creatures in which divine goodness or power does not specially shine forth, for example, by the beard, etc. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 134 and following.

3rd. It is not an oath to say: God knows. ... I speak before God, etc., if these are uttered narratively; but otherwise, if invocatively, which is discerned from the circumstances or the intention of the speaker. Nor is it an oath to say: This is as true as God exists ... as I exist ... as I am in this place ... on the faith of a good man ... by my faith ... by conscience ... may I die ... or may the devil destroy me, if it is not so. Indeed, according to St. Alphonsus, it is not an oath to say: I swear, or I swear that it is so, unless a question about taking an oath has preceded. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

I Say 2nd. For the liceity of an oath, however, three conditions are required according to that saying of Jeremiah, iv, 2: "Thou shalt swear: The Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice." - And so there is required, 1st, truth, namely conformity of the assertion with the intention and knowledge of the one swearing, and therefore a lie is excluded, but not error. In an assertory oath truth regards the existence of the fact; in a promissory oath, the existence of the intention. There is required, 2nd, judgment, that is, that it be made with discretion, prudence, and reverence, and not without grave cause, of which sort would be peace to be confirmed in families, or greater security in contracts, etc. There is required, 3rd, justice, that is, that the oath be concerning a thing or promise, proposal, or assertion that is licit and honorable. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 144; and Hom. Ap., n. 14.

§ 2. An oath which the canons require or admit cannot validly be taken through a procurator (Can. 1316).

Concina, Theologia Christiana III

Daniele Concina, O.P. — 52 passages

Diss. I, Chapter IV — Lax, or improbable, propositions are reviewed, which not a few Casuists teach · Diss. I, Chapter V — What an oath is; various formulas of swearing are explained · Diss. I, Chapter VI — Some further little questions concerning oath formulas are resolved. Rules too are assigned for distinguishing what counts, or does not count, as an oath, especially concerning this formula: "By God" · Diss. I, Chapter VII — The divisions of oaths are given, and whether all oaths are of the same species is explained

Diss. I, Chapter IV — Lax, or improbable, propositions are reviewed, which not a few Casuists teach

II. "By whatever words, even those clearly and unambiguously containing an oath, it is uttered — much more so, then, must attention always be paid in the forum of conscience to the intention of the swearer, if we wish to discover whether it is truly an oath. For either, whatever words are finally uttered, one intends, first, positively to invoke God, or, second, positively not to invoke him, or, third (whether because he does not advert to it, or because he does not know), he abstracts from such invocation — that is, he neither intends, nor does not intend, to invoke. This division seems adequate; for it contains contradictories, and precision itself. Now if the first, it will certainly be an oath, as is clear of itself. If the second, it will certainly not be an oath, as the Doctors commonly admit... For although I say, 'I swear by God,' if I do not wish, by these words, to implore God as witness of what I say, I certainly will not implore him, except materially, just as a parrot taught by its master would utter the same words. Certainly in Sicily common men swear 'Per Dio' at every other word. Who would say that these common men truly swear, since they themselves sometimes do not know what 'Per Dio' signifies? It seems, however, from its own notion, to signify 'by God.' Finally, if the third, likewise it will certainly not be an oath, since he does not invoke God. For since here he abstracts from invocation, it clearly appears that he does not exhibit invocation." — Thomas Tamburini, Bk. III, on the Decalogue, ch. 1, §3, n. 6, p. 78. Felix Potestas, Vol. I, Part II, on the 2nd precept of the Decalogue, ch. 2, n. 1555, p. 111 in my copy; see below, ch. 6.

Diss. I, Chapter V — What an oath is; various formulas of swearing are explained

n. I.

I. An oath is defined by St. Thomas (II-II, q. 89, art. 1) as being "an invocation of the divine name to make faith, or to confirm a promise." St. Augustine, cited by St. Thomas himself in the place cited, defines the oath in these words (Sermon 28, On the Words of the Apostle): "What is it to swear by God, but that God is witness?" It differs from prayer, since by the latter divine aid is sought; by the former, however, it is asked that the truth be manifested. Wherefore Franz Buddeus, the Lutheran, wretchedly errs, who, in his Moral Theology Institutions, Vol. II, ch. 3, §5, n. 10, blurts out that God is not here regarded as witness, as though an oath were a testimony of God, or as though God himself testified concerning the truth of the swearer. This error of that Lutheran collapses of itself, says the same Angelic Doctor, as though pertaining to a "right"; for an oath is called "introduced from right" — that is, in order that what is asserted under the invocation of divine testimony may be held as true. For there are certain deeds, either hidden, or contingent, which cannot be proved by human testimony; and therefore it has been established, and decreed, by law, that they be confirmed by divine testimony, necessity compelling it, and that faith be given to facts confirmed by divine testimony.

II. Iuramentum, iusiurandum, and sacramentum are synonyms. From Scripture it is established that iuramentum and iusiurandum are used for the same thing, according to that of Luke 1: "The oath, which he swore to Abraham our father, that he would grant to us." It is also called sacramentum, both in Scripture and in law, as is established from the chapter "Qui sacramentum," 22, q. 4. And although the word sacramentum has other, more proper significations, it is nonetheless also used for an oath — since this too is a sign of a sacred thing, namely, of infallible truth.

n. III.

III. For a clearer understanding of the given definition, St. Thomas, in the place cited, in his reply to the first objection, notes that we can use divine testimony in two ways. First, by that testimony which God has already given in his Scriptures — namely, when we allege that very text, or authority, of Scripture to prove some truth: while we do this, we swear in no way. Second, when we implore his testimony to be given — namely, that God may manifest the truth of that fact in confirmation of which we invoke his testimony. And in this manner we swear. Moreover, when we invoke God as witness in this way, so that he may confirm our assertions, we do not intend that God should immediately, by some evident prodigy or miracle, confirm our assertions by his own authority, and manifest them — for whoever did this would tempt God; but we ask only that God add his testimony to our words, and reveal the truth, whenever it shall please him, in life or in death, in this age or in the future one.

n. IV.

IV. Divine testimony can be invoked in two ways. First, expressly, when God himself is brought forward as witness; second, tacitly, when the testimony of creatures is invoked with a peculiar respect to God — which we shall explain more clearly below. In both ways, however, one swears, since in both ways divine testimony is implored.

n. V.

V. This invocation of divine testimony can be made by word, as if you utter aloud, "I swear by God"; by nod, as if, to one asking whether you swear by God, you nod your assent with your eyes, or head, or by some gesture; by touch, as if, when an oath is offered to you upon a book of the Gospels, and you touch the book itself, even if you utter nothing, you are reckoned to swear; by mind, as if within your own soul you swear that you will do something, you bind yourself, by the virtue of religion, to carry it out in the internal forum; but in order to be obliged in the external forum, it is necessary that the oath uttered be manifested externally by one of the three signs described.

n. VI.

VI. If someone swore, touching the Book of the Gospels, and afterward discovered that this book was entirely a profane one, it would nonetheless be a true oath, and he ought to observe it — because there would be only a material diversity, since the swearer intended to swear by the sacred Gospel, whichever it was. On the contrary, one who swears by false gods does not make an oath at all — since only the true God deserves to have faith paid to him by men.

n. VII.

Various Formulas of Swearing

VII. Since the words by which an oath is uttered are not fixed, it follows that there are very many formulas of oaths. We can reduce all of them to a threefold kind. Of the first kind are those which, according to common sense and understanding, contain an oath, or an invocation of divine testimony; and these are held, in every forum, to be oaths, unless it clearly appears that the one uttering them had a contrary intention. Of the second kind are those which, in common understanding, do not contain the assumption of divine testimony; and these are not held to be an oath, unless one who utters them declares that he wished, by those words, to elicit an oath. Of the third kind, finally, are those which are ambiguous, and which sometimes contain an oath, sometimes not, according to the various manner in which they are uttered. The matter will appear clearer by examples.

n. VIII.

VIII. Of the first kind are: "I swear by God," "God is my witness," "God lives," "I invoke the living God as witness." Nor, however, is it necessary that the word "witness" be used; but it suffices to confirm one's own assertions by "by God," "by the faith of God," "by the faith of Christ." To this class too may be reduced oaths made by creatures, as when one says, "by heaven," "by the earth," "by my soul," "by my health," "by the Angels," "by the Blessed Virgin," "by the Saints," etc. Here, however, I would have you note that the testimony of creatures can be invoked in several ways. First, as an infallible argument of truth — and this invocation would be blasphemous, since God alone is infallible. Second, rational creatures can be invoked, as persons endowed with a certain peculiar authority, so that they may lend credence to our words, without respect to God — and this invocation does not constitute an oath, just as we do not swear when we call living men as witnesses. Third, creatures are called to witness the truth, insofar as the divine majesty especially shines forth in them, and they have a peculiar relation to God, and their invocation singularly excites in us the memory of God — as when we swear by the Gospels, by temples, by altars, by heaven, by the earth, by the elements. It must be judged otherwise, when one swears by the lowest and vilest creatures — as if someone swore by his own beard, by his own hair, by his own dog, etc. — this would not be a true oath. For although all these are creatures of God, in them, according to common understanding, the divine majesty does not shine forth in any peculiar manner. If, however, someone, invoking these creatures, at the same time named God obliquely, it would be an oath — as if someone said, "By this bread of God," "by the fire of God," "by the air of God," "by this stone of God," "by this creature of God." For whenever God, whether in the direct or the oblique case, is called to witness, an oath is uttered. To this class are likewise reduced the Italian formulas "Se Dio m'aiuti" ["so help me God"], and similar ones: "So may God help me," "may the demon seize me," "may I die," "may I perish, if it is not so." These oaths are execratory, and yield this sense: "I offer myself to death, may the demon deliver me over," etc.

n. IX.

IX. "May God not help me, if it is not true"; "God help me not, if it is not so." To the second class are reduced the following formulas: "In truth," "in the truth of the matter," "I profess," "by my faith," "on my faith," "on the faith of a good man," "by the faith of an honest man," "by my honor," "on my conscience." Such formulas, according to common estimation, do not have the force of an oath. Unless, then, one who utters them has the express intention of swearing, they are not oaths. If, however, someone, uttering the aforesaid words, intended to call God to witness, they would be oaths. Authors commonly, whom I follow, likewise assert that these are not oaths: "by the faith of a good Christian," "on the faith of a Christian," "on the faith of a Religious," "by the faith of the Priesthood" — commonly, "Da Cristiano," "alla fè di Cristiano," "da Religioso," "da Sacerdote," "in fede di Sacerdote." For, they say, in these expressions, divine faith is not invoked, but human faith; and they hold this sense: "I speak as a good Christian, a good Priest, ought to speak." So the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 2, punct. 3, n. 23).

Authors, and indeed the common view among Casuists in practice, must be candidly admitted here. But, since I do not have a reason available to me by which I could free the aforesaid formulas from the force of an oath, I judge that such expressions should in no way be permitted to Christians in common speech. Theologians commonly assert that to swear by sacred things, say, by temples, by altars, by the relics of the Saints, is a true oath. Why, then, will it not be an oath to say, "by the faith of a Christian," "of a Religious," or of a "Priest"? Is not the priesthood sacred, is not the religious state sacred, is not the Christian condition, or Christianity, sacred, and the priestly profession? If someone should say, "by this habit," or "this garment, of St. Peter, of St. Francis, of St. Dominic," all authors, and consequently the cited ones too, hold that he truly swears. Why, then, will he not swear, if he says, "on the habit," or "by the faith of a Priest"?

I fear, then, that these authors interpret the aforesaid formulas so as not to hold that an oath is contained in them, because men everywhere use it; and, lest they should condemn very many as guilty of perjury, they teach that they do not truly swear at all. Nor indeed does it rarely happen that horror is withdrawn from vices, when men cannot be withdrawn from vices. I do not deny that oaths depend greatly on the intention of the swearer. But when locutions betray the force of an oath, even though the lack either of intention or of consideration may excuse, or diminish, the past malice, a Confessor is not excused, however, from obliging penitents to guard their tongue, nor a penitent, if he does not strive to abstain from the aforesaid formulas. It should be added that men commonly take such expressions — "by the faith of a Priest," "of a Religious," commonly "da Sacerdote," "da Religioso" — as an oath.

Nevertheless, what we have said concerning these three last formulas — namely, "by the faith of a Christian, of a Religious, of a Priest" — is not so manifest to us that we should condemn the contrary and common opinion. For only moral certainty sometimes compels us to depart from the common opinion of more recent authors. This certainty being lacking, we too accede to the common opinion. And because we confess that such certainty is not now present to us on this matter, we therefore proclaim the contrary opinion probable. In practice, however, I would bid all whose confessions I might hear to abstain from such expressions. Sotus, too (Bk. VIII, on justice and law, art. 5, q. 1, concl. 3), speaks doubtfully of these manners of swearing.

n. X.

X. The following formulas — "I vow to God," "I swear to God," "I promise to God"; commonly, "voto a Dio," "giuro a Dio," "prometto a Dio" — contain a true oath, since God is really called to witness. And although such expressions may seem to have the character of a vow and of a promise, nonetheless, since those who utter them employ them in confirmation of their assertions, they constitute an oath. The following formula, however — "I swear that I will do this," or "that this is so," with no word added — is, by the force of the words themselves, and by its own nature, an oath. The theologians of Salamanca teach the contrary (tract. 17, ch. 2, punct. 3, n. 34), Bonacina (disp. 4, punct. 1, near the end). The theologians of Salamanca, and Bonacina too, allege Suárez in their favor, but falsely; indeed, he teaches the opposite, saying (Bk. IV, ch. 13, n. 4): "'By oneself,' and by force of the word, in its rigorous signification, without doubt suffices for swearing. In use, however, the circumstances must be considered." We too teach the same thing. The aforesaid words absolutely betray an oath; the intention, however, of the one uttering them, and other circumstances, must be attended to. Wherefore, if something is added which withdraws those words from the invocation of divine testimony, it will not be an oath — as, for instance, if someone were to swear in this manner, "I swear by my beard," "I swear by ten," "I swear by myself" — none of these would be an oath. Authors commonly hold, too, that no oath at all is present in these formulas, if one who says, "I swear by this cross," designates no cross — since one who abstains from forming the sign of the cross is presumed to have had no intention of swearing. But if he formed a cross, he would utter an oath. The circumstances, however, must be observed. Similarly, if someone, asked to affirm something under oath, responded, "I swear that it is so," he would truly swear.

n. XI.

XI. To the third class are reduced the formulas which sometimes contain an oath, and sometimes do not — of which kind are: "God knows," "I speak in the sight of God," "God sees that it is so." These, if uttered enunciatively, are not oaths; on the contrary, they are just as much oaths, if pronounced invocatively — as is established from the Apostle Paul, swearing to the Galatians (ch. 1) in these words: "Now the things which I write to you, behold, before God, I lie not." I would have you note, however, that, to discern whether they are uttered enunciatively or invocatively, not only the intention of the one speaking, but also the manner of speaking, must be examined. For if it is said, "God hears what I speak," "God sees what I do," unless the contrary intention is established, an oath is not presumed. On the contrary, however, if it is said, "God knows that I speak the truth," Navarrus, in his Manual, ch. 12, n. 2, Leander, tract. 1, disp. 12, q. 4, maintain that such a formula contains a true oath — an opinion which indeed seems to me probable enough. For the rest, since the aforesaid formula includes some ambiguity, the circumstances are therefore to be attended to, and especially the intention of the speaker.

n. XII.

XII. Several authors also reduce to this class the following formulas: "God is my witness that I speak the truth," "God lives," "the Lord lives," "God is truth." But the more common opinion, and the one that alone seems true to me, teaches the opposite. Since, to begin with the first formula, St. Thomas (II-II, q. 89, art. 1, ad 3) absolutely asserts that it contains an oath. St. Augustine teaches the same (Sermon 28, on the words of the Apostle, ch. 6): "Not without reason do those who, wishing to distinguish oaths, I know not how, or rather not understanding, say that it is not an oath, when a man says, 'God knows,' 'God is witness,' 'God sees.' He invoked God: he made God his witness. What else do they wish, but, God being invoked as witness, to lie? Are you not swearing, of a perverse heart, if you say, 'By God'? Are you not swearing, if you say, 'God is witness'? For what is it to swear, but to render right to God? Whoever you are, of a wicked heart, do you render right to God, when you swear falsely by him? For what is 'by God,' but 'God is witness'? Or what is 'God is witness,' but 'I invoke God upon my soul, that I speak the truth' — does he not swear? Those who say these things do so only when you swear by God; to render right to your health, when you swear by your health; to render right to your children, when you swear by your children. But what right do we owe to our health, to our children, to our God, except of charity, of truth, not of falsehood? But it is chiefly by God that the true oath is made, since, when one says, 'by my health,' he binds his health over to God; when he says, 'by my children,' he pledges his children to God, so that it may come upon their head, that which comes forth from his own mouth: if true, it is true; if false, it is false." Wherefore Sporer, Felix Potestas, La Croix, and many other Casuists wrongly place that formula among the ambiguous formulas of swearing. Of the other formulas the matter is clearer, since Scripture uses them as a true oath. Jeremiah 4: "They will swear: 'The Lord liveth.'" Elijah used the same formula (3 Kings 17): "As the Lord liveth, the God of Israel, in whose sight I stand." In no way, then, are the aforesaid formulas to be reckoned among equivocal expressions, whatever many recent writers assert.

n. XIII.

XIII. The following sayings do not contain an oath: "May I be wicked," "a liar," "faithless," "a heretic," "may I perish," "may my nose, or ears, be cut off, if it is not so." For such locutions, according to common understanding, contain only a certain... wish, not an oath. The following formulas, however — "May I be slain," "may I die," "may I perish" — if uttered by way of execration, contain an oath, as has been said above. For they yield this sense: "May God, whom I call to witness, kill me, if what I assert is not true." It must be judged otherwise, if they are pronounced only enunciatively — for commonly, in this manner, they do not render more than a certain pledge. It likewise seems to me not probable that "I swear by myself," "by him who I am"; commonly, "giuro da quel che sono," is an oath. For although man is, according to the common view, a singular creature of God, nonetheless, according to the common opinion, nothing else is understood by this than an interposition of human faith and authority.

Diss. I, Chapter VI — Some further little questions concerning oath formulas are resolved. Rules too are assigned for distinguishing what counts, or does not count, as an oath, especially concerning this formula: "By God"

n. I.

I. The custom of swearing has become so familiar to men that not a few authors, since they cannot abolish the aforesaid custom, assert that what is absolutely an oath is not an oath — as will be plain from the following.

II. Question I. Do men who everywhere say, "Par Dios que sí," as the Spanish do; "Per Dio," as the Italians; "Par Dio," as the Sicilians; "Par Diu," as the people of Foligno — do these swear the same as if they had said, "By God"? Response: Patritius Sporer, tract. 3, on the 2nd precept of the Decalogue, ch. 1, sect. 1, n. 9, teaches that men, invoking God thus, if, when they utter the aforesaid words, they are negatively disposed (which is the same as if they had neither the intention of swearing, nor of not swearing), in no way swear — since God is not thereby invoked as witness. Here are his own words: "Again, it is not an oath, since God is not thereby invoked as witness — otherwise those who blurt out, at almost every word, their 'By God,' 'By the sacrament,' would always be swearing, and would very often be perjuring themselves. Whence a Confessor, hearing a penitent accuse himself of having sworn falsely, ought not immediately to judge that he has perjured himself, but should ask whether he intended to invoke God as witness, and indeed of a falsehood. And he will very frequently discover that these were not perjuries, but only lies, to be judged according to their matter — sometimes officious, sometimes jesting, and thus venial."

I would have you turn your mind to the reasoning which this author produces, to establish that those who swear by God do not swear — namely, that otherwise they would always be swearing, and would very often be perjuring themselves. Wherefore, so that we may not admit to this consequence, it must be said that they do not swear. This is a most familiar principle of many recent Casuists. Since men everywhere accept the interest that comes from money lent, they do not commit usury. Why? Because otherwise almost all would be stained with the taint of usury. They employ this reasoning most frequently. But the deduction and inference which this author draws is worthy of consideration. For he adds that, although the penitent accuses himself of a false oath, his own conscience thus dictating, the Confessor should not, for that reason, give him credence. Whence a Confessor, hearing a penitent accuse himself of having sworn falsely, ought not immediately to judge that he has perjured himself. That this was uttered by a theologian would scarcely be credible, were it not read in print. He concludes, finally, that, although swearers pronounce a falsehood, they commit, under the invocation of divine testimony, only a jesting, or officious, lie, according to the diversity of matter, and consequently sin only venially.

n. III.

III. What would Chrysostom, what would Augustine, what would all the Fathers say, who inveigh so sharply against the custom of swearing? For those who swear from habit do not have an express intention of swearing, and think nothing at all of the oath. Sporer drank in this doctrine from Tamburini, and copies it out from him, one of his own masters. I do not think it beside the purpose to transcribe here Tamburini's own words too, so as to render readers more cautious of authors of this kind. Tamburini, then (Bk. III, on the Decalogue, ch. 1, §3, n. 6), writes this: "By whatever words, even those clearly and plainly containing God — much more, then, if uttered doubtfully — an oath is offered; it will always, and ever, in the forum of conscience, be necessary to attend to the intention of the swearer, if we wish to discover whether it is truly an oath. For either, whatever words are finally uttered, one intends, first, positively to invoke God, or, second, positively not to invoke, or, third (whether because he does not advert to it, or because he does not know it), he abstracts from such invocation — that is, he neither intends, nor does not intend, to invoke. This division seems adequate; for it contains contradictories, and precision itself. Now if the first, it will certainly be an oath, as is clear of itself. If the second, it will certainly not be an oath, as the Doctors commonly admit... For although I say, 'I swear by God,' if I do not wish, by these words, to implore God as witness of my saying, I certainly will not implore him, except quite materially — just as if a parrot, taught by its master, uttered the same words. Certainly in Sicily common men swear 'Par Dio' at every other word. Who would say that these common men truly swear, since they themselves sometimes do not know what 'Par Dio' signifies? It seems, however, from its own notion, to signify 'by God.' Finally, if the third, likewise it will certainly not be an oath, since he does not invoke God. For since here he abstracts from invocation, it clearly appears that he does not exhibit invocation."

Tamburini teaches two things here, of which one is most certainly false — namely, that a swearer, without the intention of swearing, does not swear; which proposition has been condemned by the Church, as we shall see below. The other — that a swearer, if he does not advert to the fact that he is swearing, or if he abstracts from the invocation of divine testimony, does not swear — is likewise altogether false, and full of scandal, in my judgment. But what we ought greatly to note is that Tamburini testifies that these propositions of his are commonly taught by the Doctors. For he praises Layman, who indeed, Bk. IV, tract. 3, ch. 1, n. 3, teaches them. He then cites also Suárez in his own favor (Bk. I, on oaths, ch. 1, n. 4), but falsely: for that distinguished theologian has nothing there that favors these opinions. As for the reason which Tamburini further alleges to confirm his propositions, it is the same as that which we just now produced from Sporer. "For the Sicilians swear," he says, "at every other word, 'Par Dio,' which sounds the same as 'By God.' Who, then, would say that they swear?" Is this not a valid reason! But he adds this: "For they are ignorant, or do not advert to, what 'Par Dio' means." Who are these who are ignorant of this? Christians, Catholics! Christian peoples, then, are ignorant of the knowledge of God concerning the second commandment of the Decalogue! But, while they pronounce the most holy name of God, as if parrots taught by a master, they utter it merely materially. The ignoble Sicilians, then, are parrots, in this matter! What, I ask, do their parish priests, and their teachers, teach them concerning this commandment: "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain"? Has this commandment become obsolete in Sicily?

This teaching of Tamburini's ill suits that nation of his, whose people excel in sharpness of wit; and, besides, it is far too shameful and defiled a doctrine for the Christian profession. And indeed, if, when we confirm our assertions by God, we do not utter an oath, for this sole reason — that we do not advert to the fact that we are swearing — by the same reasoning it will be permissible to excuse blasphemies, insults, curses, and every kind of crime. This doctrine of Tamburini's is taught, besides Sporer and Layman cited, by Felix Potestas (Vol. I, Part II, on the 2nd precept of the Decalogue, ch. 2, n. 1553), Lorenzo Pisani, in his Clodius Gideon, prop. 25, near the end, Leander (tract. 1, disp. 12, q. 11), and several others.

I reject, then, the doctrine and opinion which I have described from the cited authors, as false and improbable. For a fuller understanding of the question and its response, I say that those who confirm their assertions with these formulas, "Par Dio que sí," "Par Diu sì," "Par Deu no," "Per Dio," which is the same as saying "by God," truly swear; and, if they frequently use such formulas, they are engaged in the habit of swearing. If, however, someone, moved by sudden anger, or affected by weariness, uttered that "By God" — he would in no way be swearing, since he would be asserting or denying nothing; but he would nonetheless be taking the name of God in vain. Others, too, take it in vain who say "Di Dio," "To far Dio," asserting or denying nothing.

n. IV.

IV. Question II. Do those who everywhere take the name of God in vain, even though they assert or deny nothing, sin mortally? Response: One who, on the occasion of any anger, weariness, joy, or other disturbance, uses the name of God, exposes himself to the proximate danger of swearing, and of committing perjury. For it can scarcely happen that he does not pronounce that name in almost all the movements of his mind, and, an occasion of asserting or denying something being given, does not invoke that name. I hold, then, that those who continually name God gravely sin, not so much on account of the vain, continual, and scandal-laden invocation of God, as on account of the most grave and voluntary danger of perjury to which they expose themselves. Wherefore a prudent and pious Confessor should absolve none of those who everywhere use the name of God, unless they promise, and, the danger having been made known to them, really restrain their tongue from such vain and continual assumption of the divine name. And although, at the beginning, the Confessor may not detect a grave sin in the pronunciation of the divine name, he ought not, for that reason, to absolve the penitent, when he refuses to abstain from the continual pronunciation of the divine name, according to certain authors. From the negligence, indeed, of very many Confessors, and from the too-lax doctrine of certain authors, the sacrilegious custom of swearing not infrequently arises.

n. V.

V. Question III. Do these formulas — "by my soul," "on my soul," "on my conscience" — have greater force than this formula, "on my conscience"? Response: I find no distinction at all between the aforesaid formulas, as regards the force of confirming assertions; and authors commonly hold the same. One swears, then, who says either "by my soul," or "on my soul" — since the soul is an excellent and illustrious work of God, in which, as in an image, the divine majesty shines forth by a special covenant. But one does not swear, as seems to me more probable, who says either "on my conscience," or "in my conscience" — since this formula of speaking, according to common understanding, yields this sense: "This is what my conscience feels, and dictates," "what I sense in my conscience," "what is suggested to me." So Suárez teaches, and the more common authors, Sotus, Ledesma, Fagundez, Lessius, Sánchez, and almost all more recent authors. Sylvester, Azor, Aragón, and others teach the opposite. For this reason, one ought to abstain from a similar manner of speaking. The most sacred formula, then, of swearing, will be more strictly guarded, and one's tongue watched more carefully for this reason.

n. VI.

VI. Question IV. Does one swear who says, "I swear on my conscience," or "in my conscience"? Response: Sánchez, Ledesma, Leander, and others deny this. I, however, with Sotus, Sylvester, Azor, Navarrus, and others, maintain that a man speaking thus swears. For that word "swear," by its own proper signification, suffices for an oath, unless drawn away from its meaning by some added word — as if someone said, "Swear by my nose," "by ten," etc. And, when someone swears by his own conscience, he betrays something most grave, and worthy of consideration. For when someone absolutely affirms something in his own conscience, he adds great force to his assertion. For one's own conscience, in common usage, is held to be a matter of very great weight. False, then, is what the adversaries allege — namely, that the word "conscience" draws that oath away from its native signification: rather, on the contrary, it more confirms this word in its own proper signification. And indeed, what seems to establish the matter is that the adversaries themselves admit that one who pronounces these words, "Swear by my own conscience," really swears, if he wished to swear expressly. For when someone says, "Swear by my conscience," he uses the word "swear" expressly, and, for this reason, wishes to say that he intends to swear, and to invoke as witness his own conscience: therefore he swears. Well then — can he, or that very person who uses the word, deny that he swears? If, then, one who merely affirms something on his own conscience is deemed not to swear, while, however, one who says "Swear by my conscience" similarly affirms something, in like manner one ought to hold that he swears — with the most weighty theologians cited. If, when one affirms something on his own faith, one does not swear, yet when one says, "Swear by my faith," it must be asserted that he swears, for the reason already assigned — the theologians of Salamanca themselves concede this, with others (tract. 17, ch. 2, punct. 3, n. 28).

n. VII.

VII. Question V. Would one swear who said, "by the life of my horse," "by the preservation of this tree," or of some other inanimate thing? Response: Leander proposes this same question under the same terms (tract. 1, disp. 3, q. 3): "By force of the words, this is an oath, unless it appears from the circumstances that they are said to avoid a true oath." Suárez teaches the same thing (ch. 13, n. 27), and Sánchez (n. 36). This I too do not deny; I only add that, by a stronger right, it must be said that one who swears by his own faith, when he says, "By my faith" [gives an oath]; only I add that, by a stronger right, one must say that one who swears "by the life of this horse," "of this tree, or stone, or other inanimate thing," utters an oath.

n. VIII.

VIII. Question VI. If someone questioned in this manner: "Do you swear to me by God that the matter is so?" and the one questioned responded, "The matter is so" — would he utter an oath by so responding? Response: Sánchez (Bk. III, ch. 2, n. 23) teaches that he does not swear if he responded, "Yes," or merely nodded with his head; but he affirms that he does swear, if he responded, "The matter is so." This distinction seems to me fabricated and empty. For whether he responds to one questioning under oath, "The matter is so," or simply "yes," it comes to the same thing — since the response ought to correspond to the question, which seeks a response under oath. Wherefore, when he responds to such a question, he truly swears, all circumlocution being removed, unless it is gathered from the circumstances that the one responding wishes to decline the oath.

n. IX.

IX. Question VII. Does one swear who uses these expressions: "I wish my saying to be my oath," "let my saying and promise be as certain as if it were an oath"? Response: Layman proposes this formula of swearing, familiar to the Germans, and asserts and resolves thus: one speaking thus swears, if he has the intention of swearing, and as often as he utters these words before a judge exacting an oath, and finally when he pronounces the words deliberately and seriously — since, according to common estimation, they are taken for an oath. He adds, however, that the oath is not lacking, even should the intention of swearing be lacking: to this Patritius Sporer subscribes, n. 8. And, when the aforesaid words, according to the common understanding of the people, are taken for an oath, and the speaker utters them seriously and deliberately, the internal intention does not have the force of taking away from those words the meaning which they have according to common acceptance, as has been said above.

n. X.

X. Question VIII. Do such formulas as the people of Friuli commonly use — "Al seugnuli si," or "Seugneli no"; "Al seugnuli sagri," which they prefer to their own dialect — present the true character of an oath? Response: Whatever author has treated the peculiar manner of asseveration, and the custom of oaths, among our own countrymen, I have thought it fitting to propose these formulas of the Friulians too. This much, however, I have been able to gather: that this formula, among such a people, presents a certain species of oath; for it seems that it could mean, by no one's leave [i.e., is uncertain in precise etymology], according to their dialect, "Al seugneli," or "segnuli," or "seugnuli," that it signifies the same as "by the Gospel"; and that it contains a certain reference to the Gospel, and to God himself, is established from the attributes in the last formula, "Al seugnuli sagri" [reading uncertain: possibly "sacred"], "e potenti," which seems to mean "by the sacred and just Gospel, and mighty, or 'potenti,'" or "by God the mighty" — which formula, that it contains a true oath, no one fails to see. The bare word "seugneli," however, does not contain an oath — for it does not, absolutely, by its own nature, signify "Gospel," even in that idiom, since this is properly called "Vangeli," or "Vagnek." But because that word "seugnuli" was, at the beginning, used for "Gospel" (for that idiom is indeed exotic to me), I have heard many of that region pronounce it, without, however, absolutely... using it in place of "Gospel." Perhaps some words, in the course of years, lose their ancestral signification — which is perhaps the case with the aforesaid word, which is a certain conglomeration formed from the Latin, Spanish, French, Lombard, and other tongues over an interval of time. It must be said, then, that this word, as pronounced, is ambiguous (so far as I, brought up in that language, can determine). The intention, then, of the one uttering it must be attended to. For I hold it established that very many pronounce that word without perceiving what it signifies. Only then, therefore, does this formula, "Al seugnuli," or "segnuli sì," contain an oath, when the one who uses it seriously intends to swear by it; not so, when those who pronounce it neither know how to swear in this manner, nor have this in mind, nor know that this word contains an oath: for really such a word, from itself, does not contain an oath. Let the Confessor, however, take care that the faithful, so far as they can, avoid this word, and restrain their tongue.

n. XI.

XI. Question IX. Does an oath made by Christians by swearing by false gods bind them? Response: It is already established, from what has been said, that one invoking any creatures whatsoever as an infallible testimony of truth utters a blasphemy. Whoever, then, would swear by false gods, invoking their testimony as a manifest argument of truth, would commit the sin of idolatry — since he would attribute to idols and creatures what he seeks from God alone. Hence God forbade the Jews to swear by false gods (Exodus 23): "Thou shalt not swear by the name of strange gods, neither shall it be heard out of thy mouth" — just as Christ, too, forbade swearing thus in the Gospel (Matthew 5): "Neither by heaven, for it is the throne of God; nor by the earth, for it is his footstool; nor by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King" — since the Jews were inclined toward the worship of heaven, and had fallen into idolatry. In no way, then, is it lawful to swear seriously by false gods. And when, sometimes, in jest, it is said, "by Jove," "by Mercury," "by the stone of Hercules," it is not an oath, but a certain jesting phrase, which, in common acceptance, asserts or denies nothing; and those who use it strive to avoid both assertion and negation. From this the second part of the question is clear. For, if there is no oath, no obligation whatsoever can follow from it. Only from erroneous conscience could there arise an obligation to fulfill the promise. Thus pagans, swearing by idols while worshipping them as true deities, were bound, by force of erroneous conscience, to fulfill oaths made. Similarly, if some Christians thought that an oath made by false gods was a true oath, they ought to observe it, until they laid aside their erring conscience, or error. In error, however, they would be excused; a promise confirmed by oath ought to be observed by Christians, not by force of the oath, but by force of human fidelity — all of which is most common ground.

n. XII.

XII. Question X. What is to be said of the following formulas: "May God do this to me," "may he add this," "may God never spare me, nor save me, nor defend me," "may I die an evil death," "may I not live until tomorrow," "may an evil Easter come upon me," "may the devil carry me off to hell, if it is not so"? Response: In the first formulas, in which the name of God is invoked, an oath is, without doubt, extracted, as an execratory one — just as it is contained among all the other truth-confirming formulas, when they are employed in confirmation. Indeed, whether the aforesaid formulas contain an execratory oath among themselves too...

n. XIII.

XIII. Question XI. Do these other formulas — "may my ears be cut off, may my nose, head, or arm be severed, if it is not so" — have the force of an execratory oath? Response: Absolutely, and the rigor of the speech considered, such phrases can have the force of an execratory oath — for which reason God forbade this (Matthew 5): "Neither shalt thou swear by thy head." Nonetheless, as they are commonly uttered, they do not contain an oath. For men understand nothing less than swearing, when they commonly say — "Mi sian tagliate le orecchie, il naso, la testa, il braccio, se non è così" ["may my ears, my nose, my head, my arm be cut off, if it is not so"]. These formulas are also often uttered in another manner, namely: "Ci metto, scommetto la testa, le orecchie, il naso, il braccio, se non è così" ["I stake, I bet my head, my ears, my nose, my arm, if it is not so"]. Where it appears that God is in no way invoked as avenger, or as judge, to exact vengeance; but that these and similar expressions present a mere and bare pledge.

n. XIV.

Certain Rules for Practice

XIV. Although anyone can gather, from the resolutions of the many questions on which we have hitherto dwelt, when assertions are confirmed by oath, and how they are to be distinguished from simple assertions, so that a matter treated at greater length may be seen — it is nonetheless worth presenting a few general rules, by which the reader may be able to discern, in a single glance, as it were, which are oaths and which are not.

n. XV.

XV. First Rule. Doctors commonly teach, first of all, that in an oath, by whatever words it is conceived, the mind and the intention of the swearer must be attended to — since, they say, although someone invokes God, if he nonetheless does not have an express intention of swearing, he does not really swear. This rule, which Sánchez, Sporer, Tamburini, and many others impress above all others, is partly true, and partly false. It is indeed true that the mind, intention, and will of the swearer must be attended to; but not in the sense that the swearer is bound to conform his intention, or mind, and will to the words which he utters. Hence it is false, unless I am mistaken, the rule given by many more recent authors, insofar as they teach that an oath is lacking, on account of the defect of invocation of God, when they pronounce it, "by God," that the matter is so, and advert to it. For, when they pronounce that expression, and affirm through God that the matter is so, considering it with full deliberation, they are bound to conform their intention, or mind, and soul, to the words which they utter. For, since we are forbidden to take the name of God in vain, we are, at the same time, commanded to use and employ it with the greatest consideration, and to make our intention conform to those who invoke divine testimony. Wherefore the very defect of intention which more recent theologians press to excuse Christians who everywhere confirm their assertions through God, is itself a sin. When, then, a formula of words, by its own nature, expresses an oath — of which kind is that which expressly invokes divine testimony, "By God it is so," commonly "Per Dio sì," or "Par diu no," "God is my witness," and similar ones — it is an oath, even though the swearer does not have an express intention of swearing; which has already been demonstrated above, and will be shown more fully below, when we speak of the habit of swearing. Whether one who expressly invoked divine testimony, and at the same time did not wish expressly to swear, would really swear, I shall resolve below. The intention of swearing, however, is chiefly necessary when the words have an ambiguous and varying sense — of which kind are these: "in truth," "truly," "by my faith" — which can be understood of truth and human faith, or of divine faith, according to the swearer's diverse intention.

n. XVI.

XVI. Second Rule. For an oath, an express invocation of divine testimony is not required, such that the word "swear" must be pronounced; but it suffices to say, "By God," "by the Virgin Mary." This word "swear," however, absolutely uttered with no other word added, is taken strictly, and is held as constituting an oath; commonly, however, those who swear are accustomed to add what they swear. If a word is added indicating that divine testimony is not invoked, that word "swear" does not draw an oath from its own signification. If something is added, however, denoting that God is called to witness, an oath is effected. Sometimes, although nothing is added, the word "swear" alone suffices for a true oath... . This, however, must be gathered from the circumstances — as, if one exacting an oath says, "Do you swear to me by the Gospel?" "Do you swear to me in due form?" and the other responds, "I swear."

n. XVII.

XVII. Third Rule. Words which can be used in a twofold sense — such as these: "God sees what I do," "what I relate is Gospel," and other similar ones, which can be uttered either enunciatively or invocatively — we ought to interpret with respect to those who pronounce them. For if a man be of good character, and not at all accustomed to swearing, we ought to interpret that he uttered them enunciatively (unless the opposite is plainly evident). It must be judged otherwise of men habitually accustomed to swear.

n. XVIII.

XVIII. Fourth Rule. In ambiguous words, especially in those in which the divine majesty does not shine forth in any peculiar manner, the intention of the speaker must be attended to, along with the custom of the homeland, and other circumstances; and especially the character of the one uttering those words.

n. XIX.

XIX. Final Rule. The rule which Christ himself handed down (Matthew 5) is always to be kept before one's eyes: "But let your speech be: yea, yea; no, no: and that which is over and above these, is of evil." This is to be fixed in memory: that whatever exceeds a simple affirmation or negation can proceed from evil, whether on the part of the speaker, or of the hearer — namely, from the evil disposition of mind, when nothing is added beyond a simple affirmation or negation. Wherefore we ought not only to abstain from ambiguous and equivocal words, which may or may not be taken for oaths, but also from certain corrupted words, such as "per Christa," "per Dia," "per Diana," "per Diobacco," and others of this kind, which, although they draw the word "swear" away from its genuine signification, nonetheless bear a certain affinity with an oath, and present a certain species of oath.

One must abstain, I say, from such things, both on account of the ease, or danger, of using true formulas of oaths for themselves, or of similar corrupted words, and on account of the scandal which is sometimes cast upon simple folk; and because Christ the Lord forbade adding anything beyond a "yes, yes; no, no," adding that whatever is added beyond this is of evil. Let this rule of Christ the Lord, then, always be before your eyes: for that which is more than this is of evil. Long before this, Ecclesiasticus (ch. 23) had handed down this to men: "Let not thy mouth be accustomed to swearing; for in it there is the word of sin." From all this it is gathered that those who, exclaiming, everywhere blurt out, "To far Dio," "Potenza di Dio," "Servo di Dio" ["by the power of God," "servant of God"], continually violate the second commandment of the Decalogue, taking the name of God in vain; and although they do not swear, but exclaim, moved either by weariness, or by admiration, or by some other disturbance of mind, they nonetheless sin, as has been said, both on account of the scandal, and on account of the vain naming of God, and on account of the ease, or danger, of slipping from the continual vain naming of God into a habit of swearing, and of perjuring oneself. Wherefore I never impart absolution to such persons, unless they promise, and, so far as they are able, strive to amend.

Diss. I, Chapter VII — The divisions of oaths are given, and whether all oaths are of the same species is explained

n. I.

I. The definition of the oath having been set forth, and the various formulas of swearing exhibited, it remains now that we present several divisions of oaths as well. St. Thomas, in the place cited (II-II, q. 89, art. 1), draws a twofold division of the oath: namely, from the side of the thing sworn, and from the manner of swearing.