Article — Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis
Article I: The Notion, Division, and Morality of an Oath
Notion and essence. 1. An oath is "the invocation of the divine Name as witness of truth" (c. 1316). It can be explicit, which is expressed in set words, or tacit, as if, as a sign of an oath, you touch the Gospel, or sign a formula. He who of his own accord signs such a formula by which he is judged both to declare certain things and to confirm them by oath, in reality lies or swears feignedly, unless he has the intention of swearing; but he who is compelled by law or by public authority will then lie only if he is lawfully commanded. One who unlawfully commands formal adherence to his intention or order cannot reasonably hope for it for himself, and therefore cannot consider such a subscription as sworn.
The intention alone of swearing suffices that you swear before God; but that you swear before men, suitable signs of the intention are further required. Doubts will of themselves be solved from the common acceptance of the words. The common use of words also begets a certain presumption in the internal forum. Here, however, in doubt one will answer in favor of liberty.
- Suitable formulas are: I call God to witness; I invoke God as witness; so may God help me.
The word alone, "I swear," would indeed of itself suffice, but from common usage it does not signify an oath unless it answers to an oath that has been requested. Often also, although by accident, he is not judged to swear who says: by the Catholic faith, by the holy Gospel.
- Unsuitable formulas are of themselves: God knows, - God will testify in His own time, - I speak before God, - God knows all things, - God sees my conscience, - God knows that I do not lie; because these are judged to be uttered only narratively, without invocation of God, unless something else is gathered from the circumstances.
More absolutely unsuitable are the formulas: Truly, certainly, in truth, on the faith of a good man, by my faith, on the faith of an honest man, of a good Christian, of a priest, of a king, by my conscience, upon my conscience; by these one merely declares that he speaks from the dictate of conscience and from knowledge of the truth.
From usage, these express only a strong affirmation: I expose my head, let my ears be cut off, unless.... Other sayings in the manner of imprecation will more easily be an oath, at least when the event is designated in which we are accustomed to recognize the hand of God. Therefore an invocation is quite easily had: may I be struck by lightning; may I fall dead unless.... But if an execration or choice of evil were had, a new species would be added.
The same must be said of comparative words: it is as true as the sun shines, as God is, as Christ is in the sacrament, as the Gospel is true; he is as innocent as the Blessed Virgin, etc.; these would be blasphemous if anyone wished to insist upon equality. If at the same time they affirm false things, they contain a lie, and where the name of God is pronounced, a vain usurpation of that Name.
Nor today is he judged to swear who says "by my soul." Although one can swear by the nobler creatures, if He is understood who is peculiarly present in them, for example by heaven, by the angels of God, etc.; today the use of such formulas is rather rare. - Since the Gospels represent Christ, to touch the Gospels is to touch Christ; to swear by the Gospels is to swear by Christ.
- The invocation of God, which pertains to the essence of an oath, consists in this: that the one swearing, so far as is in him, desires and wills that God testify or confirm as true that which he swears (if at any time it shall please Him), and at the same time accepts divine punishments or divine vengeance if he lies, as the words prove: So may God help me....
Wherefore the philosophy of an oath is this: he who calls upon God in confirmation of falsity gravely derogates from the reverence of God and exposes himself to divine punishments; a religious man is not judged to will to do these things; wherefore, by such interposition of divine authority, he himself confirms his own statements.
Division. 1. From the exterior form, they distinguish a verbal oath, which is contained in words; a real oath, which is contained in an action, for example of raising the fingers, touching the cross, the Gospels; and a mixed oath, which is composed of both signs.
From the very force of the formula, it is invocatory or contestatory, and execratory or imprecatory. By the former God is simply invoked as witness; by the latter He is expressly at the same time called upon as avenger of falsity, whether one exposes himself or another beloved person, for example a son, to punishments. Since no one is accustomed seriously to imprecate evils from the heart upon himself or a friend, and every oath exposes the one swearing to divine punishments, that false oath does not seem, at least practically, to differ in species from a simple false oath.
From the object, it is distinguished as assertory and promissory. By an assertory oath past or present things are affirmed or denied; by a promissory oath at the same time a present intention is affirmed, and a future deed is promised.
To the promissory oath is referred the comminatory oath, by which someone swears thus, for example: by God, I shall strike you unless....
A promissory oath can be absolute and conditioned.
- Finally, from the rite, an oath is distinguished as simple and solemn; the latter is made by a definite rite before a Prelate, judge, notary, etc. - It pertains to the canonical rite that it be made personally: "An oath which the canons require or admit cannot validly be furnished through a procurator" (c. 1316 § 2).
Judges sometimes are ignorant of the proper force of an oath, so that they do not formally swear when they seem to swear; or sometimes they think a certain rite essential, for example really raising the fingers, so that if they do not raise the fingers rightly they think themselves immune from perjury. These things are to be observed by a judge; but by a priest they must be untaught.
Moral judgment. 1. An oath, furnished with due conditions, is honorable and praiseworthy. For it is an act of religion, since it contains a profession of divine truth, authority, and providence. But the words by which the Lord seems to condemn every oath are understood by tradition as concerning the reprobation of the evil custom of mixing oaths into every hour and occasion. That honesty is of defined faith.
- The conditions of an honorable oath, moreover, are customarily expressed in the three words which the Code itself used, when c. 1316 § 1 says: "It cannot be furnished except in truth, in judgment, and in justice." a) Truth demands that you utter those things which you think to be true with that certitude which the solemnity of the thing manifests. Wherefore it is not licit to affirm as certain or simply that about which you doubt. Quite commonly, with St. Alphonsus, L. 4, n. 148, they say that moral certitude is enough for you to confirm a matter by oath. But, since moral certitude is not indivisible, that must be accepted cautiously. Let us rather say that such certitude is required as, for the circumstances, with the oath also considered, is reasonably expected by the hearers; or such as is tacitly affirmed with the thing itself, in these circumstances. For an oath is furnished more as a sign of veracity than of the truth of the thing; it properly confirms things as they are said, not as they are (2. 2, q. 89 art. 1). Hence a stricter certitude is required in the judicial forum, because of the gravity of the consequence. Wherefore what you know from another's report must be testified as received from another. Likewise, where you swear in particular that something is true, the thing must truly be established for you. In a prolix discourse, on the contrary, it is less necessary that you be so certain about the individual narrated points, even secondary ones; then by the oath you rather confirm the sincerity of your mind. But certitude of a future deed, in a promise, is of itself less established. It is enough that you think what you promise to be placed in your power.
Insofar as equivocation itself or defensive words are licit, it will be licit, if there is a just cause, to confirm the same by oath. Where they are prohibited under grave sin, one will sin gravely by such an oath.
This condition of truth is required under grave sin in an oath insofar as it is assertory, nor does lightness of matter excuse from grave sin.
b) Judgment requires that an oath be made with discretion, prudence, consideration, and reverence, and with sufficient utility. By every serious cause this condition is fulfilled, and its defect is only venial, like a vain usurpation of the name of God.
c) Justice is understood differently in an assertory oath and in a promissory oath. - In an assertory oath, a narration of a thing which you cannot licitly report, at least under oath, is said to be opposed to justice. Of itself that defect is venial. It would be mortal if you wished thereby to conciliate belief for grave detraction, or, as we may say more generally, to use divine authority as a means of iniquity. - In a promissory oath, where it has its proper seat, the condition of justice forbids you to swear that you will do what is not licit. And when grave sin is in question, there is committed a mortal irreverence of abusing divine authority for evil. This malice seems to remain even if the question is of committing a venial sin. Yet the benign opinion, which is that of several distinguished doctors, Lessius, Sanchez, Suarez, is probable. It will more easily be admitted not to be grave when the matter is opposed merely to evangelical counsel, as if you swear that you will not enter religion, that you will not give alms.
N. B. Concerning an oath requested from one who is going to perjure himself, cf. what was said at n. 124, 2; concerning a feigned oath, cf. here immediately, where we treat of a promissory oath.