Article — Konings, Theologia Moralis
ARTICLE I: ON THE CONDITIONS OF AN OATH
I. On the requisites for the essence of an oath. - 366. - Two things are required for an oath, namely: 1° The intention of swearing, at least virtual; because without such intention there cannot exist a formal oath. 2° An oath-formula, either by God explicitly, or implicitly by creatures, or an oath-sign; because, since God is invoked as witness, it is necessary that this be expressed in the oath.4
- You will resolve. - 1° A fictitious promissory oath, or one merely external, is not valid, because of defect of will or intention. Yet he who thus swears sins; but more probably, speaking of itself, only venially, because it is nothing but a lie with vain usurpation of the name of God.5 - Nevertheless it is mortal in contracts, or before a judge (because of grave deception against justice), or if the one swearing fictitiously does not have the mind of fulfilling the promises.6
2° An oath made with the mind indeed of swearing, but not of obligating oneself from religion, more probably is not valid, because this is nugatory. But an oath made with the mind indeed of swearing, but not of obligating oneself from justice or from fidelity, is valid.
3° It is an oath to say: I swear by God, by the Saints, the temple, the cross, the altar, the Gospel, the Catholic Faith, the Church, heaven, earth. - Likewise to say: I call God to witness.... Let God be witness to me.... I invoke God as witness. Otherwise, if someone swore by creatures in which the divine goodness or power does not shine forth, for example by a beard, etc.1
4° It is not an oath to say: God knows.... I speak before God, etc.... if these are uttered narratively; but otherwise, if invocatively, which is discerned from the circumstances or the intention of the speaker. Nor is it an oath to say: This is as true as God exists,... as I exist,... as I am in this place,... on the faith of an honest man (upon my word and honor), by my faith,... by my conscience,... by priestly faith,... may I die, or may the devil destroy me, unless it be so.... Except when these last two are uttered by way of execration, and not rather, as is customary, by way of pledge. Indeed it is not even an oath to say: I swear or I swear that it is so, unless a question about giving an oath has preceded. - St. Alphonsus,2 and many others.
II. On the requisites for the liceity of an oath.
Notes to n. 367 - note sequence 1. (4) L. IV. 134. (5) H. A. Tr. V. 17. (6) Ib. and L. IV. 172. Notes to n. 367 - note sequence 2. (1) L. IV. 144. (2) L. IV. 134-138.
- A threefold condition is required for the liceity of an oath according to that saying of Jeremiah:1 Thou shalt swear: The Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice.
I. Therefore Truth is required, that is: conformity of the assertion with intention and not with the fact. For an oath excludes only lying, not every error. In an assertory oath truth regards the existence of the fact; in a promissory oath the existence of the intention.
II. Judgment, that is, that it be done with discretion, prudence, consideration, and reverence, and not without necessity or a just cause.
III. Justice, that is, that the oath be about a just, licit, and honorable thing. Thus he would swear against justice who by oath would obligate himself to inflict damage unjustly on his neighbor, or to furnish something else prohibited.
Notes to n. 368. (1) Jerem. 4. 2.
- Questions. - Quaer. 1° What is a sufficient cause for swearing?
Resp. Any honorable cause of some weight, for example peace to be confirmed in families, greater security in contracts, etc.1
Quaer. 2° Is it licit to swear with probability of truth?
Resp. Negatively, because God cannot be invoked except in testimony of a certain thing; nevertheless a certain moral certainty, or sole probability, suffices.2
Quaer. 3° Is it licit to swear with mental restriction?
Resp. Negatively, if it is purely mental; but otherwise, if it is broadly mental, and a just cause is present, which nevertheless ought to be greater than that which is required for an unsworn restriction, and greater in proportion as the words furnish greater occasion of erring.4 See what is to be said n. 513-515.
Quaer. 4° Is it licit to swear, touching and kissing Protestant Bibles, when they have been presented to us by magistrates?
Resp. Negatively, of itself, as is plain; hence one about to swear is accustomed to bring Catholic Bibles or a prayerbook in which some part of Sacred Scripture is contained. For the rest, solemn affirmation among us suffices. I said: Negatively, of itself, because ignorance often excuses. Collect. p. 630 n. 1180.
Quaer. 5° Is it licit to give an oath in public disturbances of the commonwealth?
Resp. This generally depends on the circumstances. Weigh what justice or the common good postulates, and what the obligations required by the oath are, whether positive or negative. - But especially it is expedient to consult ecclesiastical Superiors, to whom it belongs to define what, according to the various circumstances, is to be done.
- Quaer. 6° What kind of sin is it to swear without truth, judgment, and justice?
Resp. to the first. It is mortal, because to bring God forward in testimony of falsity is to will to destroy His veracity. It is established also from Proposition 24 condemned by Innocent XI (see p. XV). L. IV. 147.
Resp. to the second. It is venial of itself, that is, with the danger of perjury excluded;5 because it is only vain usurpation of the name of God. - Thus almost all, even the stricter authors.
Resp. to the third. An assertory oath must be distinguished from a promissory one. In the former, for instance if someone boasts with an oath about some sin, more probably there is only a venial sin against religion, because it is not done to confirm complacency in sin, but only to make others more certain about it, which is only a certain venial levity of soul. Except, however, an oath for confirming detraction; for it is employed as a means for making another's infamy more certain. In the latter oath it is certainly mortal, if there is question of a grave matter, as is plain; if of a light matter, St. Alphonsus1 is more pleased by the opinion which affirms that even in this case one sins mortally, because it seems to be a grave irreverence to invoke God as witness and surety of sin, even light sin.
You will resolve. - 1° Among prohibited oaths are listed those which are customarily emitted in secret societies, and by which members obligate themselves to obey those things which perhaps will be ordered by certain superiors, or to keep secrecy even against legitimate power.2 See n. 1721. 1°. d).
Yet there are certain societies of workers in which an oath is emitted, or is judged to be emitted, with a restriction, that it is licit to reveal its object to the Ordinary or to a priest; and these, indeed, if the oath contains nothing else which is opposed to justice, and the society is not illicit from elsewhere, are not to be disturbed. See n. 1721. 1).
2° The oath of preserving the Constitution of the United States is to be understood in the popular sense, which, namely, is received among all; for each person is not judged to embrace with judgment of mind whatever is contained in it, nor does the Constitution obligate to this.3 Nor is a law to be called evil, but good, which permits a lesser evil that it may prevent a greater one. Moulart, L'Eglise et L'Etat.
3° The oath of foreigners seeking the right of citizenship here is licit, even for him who shall have given an oath of fidelity to the prince from whom he departed. For that oath of fidelity was exacted for confirming the natural obligation of citizens, rather than for inducing a new one, and therefore it must be explained according to the nature of that obligation, by which no one, unless a public and grave cause presses, is bound to remain in his fatherland, and which he satisfies who obeys the prince while he dwells in his domain. But as regards the oath which is given here by foreigners seeking the right of citizenship, and by which every foreign prince is abjured, and consequently also that one from whom someone departed, it is understood of that natural obligation being abjured which, by departing from his domain, has already ceased; and therefore it cannot be called illicit.
4° He who, while war is raging among some nations, brings goods under a neutral flag and documents either fictitious or purposely made into a neutral port, so that thence they may be carried to one or the other of the nations which wage war between themselves, is sometimes compelled to swear that the documents are true. Such an oath cannot be given in the case. (o) p. 473.
Notes to n. 370 - note sequence 1. (1) L. IV. 144. (2) H. A. Tr. V. 14 and L. IV. 148. (4) L. IV. 151 sq. (5) Ib. 145 sub 3. Notes to n. 370 - note sequence 2. (1) L. IV. 146. Cf. Vind. P. III, q. IX. (2) Conc. Pl. Balt. II. n. 519. (3) Kenr. Tr. III. 68. Appendix annotation (ι), to n. 370. 4°. p. 168. col. 2. I add also this resolution of St. Alphonsus (L. IV. 150). "Certain simple persons seem sometimes able to be excused from mortal perjury by reason of lack of consideration, when they use certain oath-formulas, such as: By my soul, may God punish me. For although they know this to be called an oath, nevertheless they do not apprehend that to swear is something grave and is to call God as witness, but they apprehend only some confused notion of evil, not of so great moment. See Bon. loc. cit. Laym. c. 14." Thus Busembaum. St. Alphonsus adds: "Indeed it must be noted that commonly country people do not apprehend the gravity of perjury, when, confessing themselves concerning oaths, they distinguish little or not at all true oaths from false; and I have long since understood this from practice in missions. Therefore for those who have the custom of perjuring in such a way, I judge confessors should rather abstain from instructing such persons concerning the grave sin which truly is in perjury, lest material sins in them, on account of the evil habit they have, become formal, according to the general rule, as Busembaum teaches concerning the Sacrament of Penance with Lugo, Sanchez, and Laymann, etc. See book 6. n. 610. Yet such customary sinners are indeed to be strongly warned that henceforth they cease to swear falsely. Moreover, it is not always expedient to warn a rude penitent of this kind concerning the gravity of perjury, if the warning is foreseen not easily to be profitable."