Chapter — 1917 Code of Canon Law
Chapter VII: Of the Oath of the Parties
Superseded as law in 1983 — read why this Code still matters. Each canon links to its 1983 counterpart.
If only semiplenary proof is had and no other aids of proof now remain, and the judge either orders or admits an oath for supplying proofs, this oath is called supplementary.
Si habeatur semiplena tantum probatio nec alia probationis adiumenta iam supersint et iudex aut iubeat aut admittat iusiurandum ad probationes supplendas, hoc iusiurandum dicitur suppletorium.
§ 1. There is especially place for this oath when circumstances which regard the civil or religious status of a person cannot be learned otherwise.
§ 2. But the judge is to abstain from the same both in criminal causes and in contentious causes, if it concerns a right or thing of great price, or a fact of too great moment, or if the right, thing, or fact is not proper to the person to whom the oath would have to be deferred.
§ 3. This oath can be deferred either from office, or at the instance of the other party, or of the promoter of justice, or of the defender of the bond, if they are present in the judgment.
§ 4. Regularly it is to be deferred to the one who has fuller proofs.
§ 5. Nevertheless it belongs to the judge to define by decree whether and when the circumstances concur because of which the supplementary oath must be deferred.
§ 1. Huic iuriiurando vel maxime locus est cum adiuncta, quae civilem vel religiosum personae statum respiciunt, aliter comperiri nequeunt.
§ 2. Sed eodem abstineat iudex tum in causis criminalibus, tum in contentiosis, si de iure vel re magni pretii agatur aut de facto nimii momenti, aut si ius, res, factum non sit proprium personae cui iusiurandum esset deferendum.
§ 3. Deferri autem hoc iusiurandum potest sive ex officio, sive ad instantiam alterius partis, vel promotoris iustitiae, vel defensoris vinculi, si iudicio intersint.
§ 4. Regulariter deferatur ei qui pleniores habet probationes.
§ 5. Iudicis tamen est decreto definire an et quando adiuncta concurrant, cur iusiurandum suppletorium deferri debeat.
§ 1. The party to whom a supplementary oath is deferred in matters which do not pertain to his civil or religious status can, for a just cause, refuse it or refer it back to the adversary.
§ 2. How much this refusal is to be valued, whether it is just or rather to be equated with confession, belongs to the judge to estimate.
§ 3. A supplementary oath rendered by one party can be impugned by the other.
§ 1. Pars cui iusiurandum suppletorium defertur in rebus quae ad eius statum civilem vel religiosum non pertinent, potest ex iusta causa illud recusare vel in adversarium referre.
§ 2. Quanti autem haec recusatio facienda sit, utrum iusta sit, an potius confessioni aequiparanda, iudicis est aestimare.
§ 3. Iusiurandum suppletorium, ab una parte praestitum, potest ab altera impugnari.
If the right to reparation of damage is established, but the quantity of the damage cannot be estimated certainly, the judge can defer to the party who has suffered the damage the oath which is called estimatory.
Si de iure ad damni reparationem constet, sed quantitas damni aestimari certe non possit, iudex potest parti quae damnum passa est, iusiurandum deferre, quod aestimatorium dicitur.
In deferring the estimatory oath these things are to be observed:
1° The judge is to ask from the party who has suffered the damage that, under the sanctity of an oath, he designate the things taken from him or lost by fraud, and express their price and value according to his probable estimation.
2° If the assessment seems excessive to the judge, he is to reduce it to equity, keeping before his eyes all indications and arguments approved by use, also employing experts if there is need, so that truth and justice may be better consulted.
In deferendo iureiurando aestimatorio haec servanda sunt:
1° Iudex a parte, quae damnum passa est, petat ut sub iurisiurandi sanctitate designet res sibi ablatas vel dolo perditas, earumque pretium et valorem secundum probabilem suam aestimationem exprimat;
2° Si taxatio iudici nimia videatur, eam ad aequitatem reducat, prae oculis habens omnia indicia et argumenta usu comprobata, adhibitis etiam, si opus sit, peritis, quo magis veritati et iustitiae consulatur.
§ 1. Not only before a lawsuit has been begun can the parties agree that the controversy be settled by transaction through an oath to be rendered by either one, but also while the lawsuit is pending and at any moment and state of it, one party can, with the judge approving, defer an oath to the other, on this condition: that the question, whether principal or incidental, be considered decided according to the oath.
§ 2. An oath of this kind is called decisory.
§ 1. Non solum ante initam litem partes convenire possunt ut controversia per iusiurandum ab alterutra praestandum transigendo dirimatur, sed pendente quoque lite et in quolibet eius momento et statu, altera pars potest, iudice probante, alteri iusiurandum deferre, ea conditione ut quaestio sive principalis sive incidens, secundum iusiurandum decisa habeatur.
§ 2. Iusiurandum huiusmodi dicitur decisorium.
A decisory oath cannot be deferred unless:
1° It concerns a matter in which cession and transaction are admitted, and which, for the persons of the litigants, is not of too great moment or price.
2° By one who can cede or transact.
3° To one who is able to cede or transact, and who likewise does not have full proof for himself.
4° Concerning mere knowledge of a fact, or concerning a fact which is proper to the one to whom the oath is deferred.
Decisorium iusiurandum deferri nequit, nisi:
1° De re, in qua cessio et transactio admittitur, et quae pro litigantium personis non sit nimii momenti seu pretii;
2° Ab eo qui cedere aut transigere potest;
3° Ei, qui cedere vel transigere valet, quique pariter pro se non habeat plenam probationem;
4° De mera notitia facti aut de facto, quod proprium sit illius, cui iusiurandum defertur.
§ 1. This oath can be revoked by the party by whom it was deferred until it has been rendered, and can be accepted and rendered by the other party, or not, or referred back to the adversary.
§ 2. Once the oath has been rendered, the question is finished according to the sworn formula, just as if a judicial cession or transaction had intervened.
§ 3. If the oath is refused and is not referred back to the adversary, it belongs to the judge to estimate how much the refusal is to be valued, whether it rests on just causes or rather is to be equated with confession.
§ 4. If it is referred back to the adversary, he must render it; otherwise the cause falls.
§ 5. In order that the oath can be referred back to the adversary, it is necessary that the same conditions concur which are required for deferring it, and that the same ministry of the judge intervene.
§ 1. Hoc iusiurandum potest a parte, a qua delatum est, revocari quousque praestitum non fuerit, et ab altera parte acceptari et praestari, vel minus, aut referri in adversarium.
§ 2. Praestito iureiurando, quaestio secundum iuratam formulam finita est, perinde ac si cessio aut transactio iudicialis intercessisset.
§ 3. Si iusiurandum recusetur nec referatur in adversarium, iudicis est aestimare quanti facienda sit recusatio, utrum iustis innitatur causis an potius confessioni sit aequiparanda.
§ 4. Si in adversarium referatur, hic debet illud praestare, secus causa cadit.
§ 5. Ut iusiurandum in adversarium referri possit, eaedem illae concurrant conditiones necesse est, quae ad illud deferendum requiruntur, atque idem intercedat iudicis ministerium.