Civil authority and the duties of citizens

CHILDREN owe their existence to their parents, and for many years, until they come to maturity, they stand in need of their constant care and direction. It is but right, therefore, that children should love, reverence, and obey the authors of their being and their natural guardians. This is due to parents from their children on account of the special relationship in which they stand towards them, and so, as St Thomas teaches,” there must be a special virtue which regulates the mutual obligations of parent and child. This virtue is called piety in Catholic theology, and it regulates not only the mutual offices of parents and children towards each other, but our duty to other near relatives, and to our country and fellow-countrymen. It is a virtue similar to charity, but it binds more strictly, so that while charity prescribes a general love for all mankind, piety obliges us to a special love for those who are near to us, and for the country in which we were born.¹

If, then, hatred or want of love for our fellow-men is of itself a grave sin, as we saw above, it will be still easier to commit a grave sin by want of proper affection for our parents. To show dislike of them or contempt for them, or to show that we are ashamed of them, will be a grave sin if our unfilial conduct is likely to cause them serious grief. In the same way, serious want of reverence and respect shown in word or action is grievously sinful. To strike a parent, or even to threaten to do so, will usually be mortally sinful.

By the duty of obedience children are bound to obey their parents in all that belongs to their bringing up and to domestic discipline. Sins of disobedience will be grievous if the matter is sufficiently important and the command is given with the serious intention of imposing a strict obligation.

Children are only bound to support their parents when they cannot support themselves, for whatever property a child may have or may acquire belongs exclusively to him. Among the working classes it is usual for elder brothers or sisters who have begun to work to throw their earnings into the common stock for the support of the family until they leave home and get an establishment of their own. This is quite as it should be, for the money which they earn is scarcely sufficient to pay for their own keep; or if it does more, there are little brothers and sisters or aged parents who are dependent on them, and whom they are bound to help to support.

¹ St Thomas, Summa, 2-2, q. 101, a. I.

It has been the constant teaching of the Catholic Church that all public and legitimate authority is of divine right, in the sense that God is the Author of man’s nature by which he is a social animal, formed to live in society, which necessarily implies a distinction of rulers and ruled. The rulers may, indeed, be designated in various ways, their power may be more or less absolute; this power may be in the hands of one or of many, but it is derived from God, the Author of man’s nature and of human society. This is the teaching of St. Paul: “‘ Let every soul be subject to higher powers; for there is no power but from God; and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. And they that resist, purchase to themselves damnation.”¹ As Leo XIII says in his encyclical letter, Diuturnum, June 29, 1881, this doctrine is taught in many passages of Holy Writ, and has been constantly inculcated by the Catholic Church. ² Rom. xiii 1-2.

In English-speaking countries the people have a large share in the election of their rulers, and such an important duty should be faithfully and religiously fulfilled. There may easily be a moral obligation to vote at elections in order to prevent the election of one who would do grave public harm if elected, or in order to secure the election of one whose election would be a great public benefit. If the only choice lies between candidates who are equally good or equally bad, there will be no moral obligation to vote.

Those who hold any civil office are bound to perform its duties faithfully, not only out of charity, but out of justice.

¹ Trent, sess. 23, c. 1, de Ref.

² x Tim. v 17; Heb. xiii 17.

For Catholics it is a matter of religious obligation to love, reverence, and obey those who wield civil power. As Leo XIII teaches: ‘‘ We are bound to love dearly the country whence we have received the means of enjoyment this mortal life affords, but we have a much more urgent obligation to love with ardent love the Church to which we owe the life of the soul, a life that will endure for ever. Moreover, if we would judge aright, the supernatural love for the Church and the natural love of our own country proceed from the same eternal principle, since God himself is their Author and originating Cause. ... Law is of its very essence a mandate of right reason, proclaimed by a properly constituted authority, for the common good. But true and legitimate authority is void of sanction, unless it proceed from God, the supreme Ruler and Lord of all. The Almighty alone can commit power to a man over his fellow-men; nor may that be accounted as right reason which is in disaccord with truth and with divine reason; nor that held to be true good which is repugnant to the supreme and unchangeable good, or that wrests aside and draws away the wills of men from the charity of God. Hallowed, therefore, in the minds of Christians is the very idea of public authority, in which they recognize some likeness and symbol, as it were, of the divine Majesty, even when it is exercised by one unworthy. A just and due reverence to the laws abides in them, not from force and threats, but from a consciousness of duty; for God hath not given us the spirit of fear.”’+ 1 Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter, January 10, 1890.

I. Rulers are bound to promote the public good and therefore especially: 1. to entrust public offices to worthy persons; 2. to provide for the rights and security of citizens; 3. to promote public prosperity by just laws and statutes; 4. to preserve the rights of the Church and to be of assistance to her.¹

¹ Leo XIII, encyclical Immortale Dei, November 1, 1885; Council of Trent, sess. 25, chap. 20, De reformatione.

II. Subjects owe civil superiors reverence,¹ and subjection in those things which are justly established for promoting the common good.²

Corollary I. Rebellion is illicit, both because it is opposed to the right which a ruler enjoys, and because very great evils are everywhere joined to rebellion. Hence Pius IX in the Syllabus condemned proposition 63: "It is lawful to refuse obedience to legitimate rulers, indeed even to rebel."³ And Gregory XVI says: "Both divine and human rights cry out against those who, by most shameful machinations of treason and sedition, strive to fall away from fidelity toward rulers and to hurl them down from authority."⁴

Question 1. Whether it is lawful to eject a usurper.

Resp. It is lawful to eject a usurper in the name of legitimate authority, so long as he has not yet become a legitimate ruler. Now he can become a legitimate ruler either by the just abdication of the legitimate ruler, or by the tacit or express consent of the people to transfer the rights of power to the usurper after the death of the legitimate ruler and of his heirs, or by the public welfare of the commonwealth, if this makes the permanence of the usurper necessary. It is disputed whether long possession of a realm confers a right to authority. It seems it must be denied, especially in the first usurper, and while good faith is lacking and the legitimate ruler still protests, unless that very long possession brings about the necessity that the government of the usurper remain for the public good.⁵ On that supposition, to depose such a ruler already becomes illicit.

Question 2. Whether it is lawful to depose a ruler who is indeed legitimate, but a tyrant.

Resp. 1. It is not lawful to depose a legitimate ruler who is actually abusing power, since an actual injury does not confer the right of dissolving the constituted state.

Resp. 2. If the discussion is about habitual and excessive tyranny, one must distinguish thus:

If the right of electing a ruler belongs to the people, it seems it must per se be affirmed, both because election from the mind of the people seems to be interpreted in this way, and because of the reason to be adduced in the following hypothesis. I said per se, because of the inconveniences often joined to such a manner of acting, about which there will be discussion immediately.

If the principality is hereditary, several more recent authors deny it; but older authors and many more recent ones affirm it, at least per se, because the right of the people to be well governed prevails over the individual good of the ruler that he govern. I said at least per se, because in practice it is difficult to prevent a greater ruin from following from deposition and so forth.

"Tyrannical government," says St. Thomas, "is not just, because it is not ordered to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler, as is clear from the Philosopher in III Politics (chap. 5) and in VIII Ethics (chap. 10); and therefore the disturbance of this government does not have the character of sedition, unless perhaps when the rule of the tyrant is so inordinately disturbed that the subject multitude suffers greater detriment from the consequent disturbance than from the rule of the tyrant" (II-II, q. 42, a. 2, ad 3). And Leo XIII says: "Yet if sometimes it happens that public power is exercised by rulers rashly and beyond measure, the doctrine of the Catholic Church does not allow rising against them on one's own initiative, lest the tranquility of order be disturbed more and more, and lest society receive greater detriment from this. When the matter has come to this, that no other hope of safety shines forth, she teaches that a remedy must be obtained by the merits of Christian patience and by insistent prayers to God."⁶ These words can be understood in such a way that the Supreme Pontiff practically fears that greater evils will arise from rebellion.

Corollary II. Although rebellion is everywhere illicit, nevertheless it is lawful for a nationality, by parliamentary means, as they are called, to tend toward its own commonwealth. It is said by parliamentary means, so that unjust means are excluded, whether with respect to the former commonwealth or with respect to another nationality existing in the same commonwealth. The doctrine stated is drawn from this, that it is lawful, with the rights of others preserved, to tend toward that which is the more suitable means for obtaining human good. But its own commonwealth is per se a more suitable means for a nationality to obtain human good, because citizens of the same morals, culture, and psychological dispositions cooperate more easily toward the common good.

Corollary III. Per se there is no obligation of obeying a usurper who has not yet become a legitimate ruler. The reason is that in reality he lacks authority. Per accidens there can be an obligation, namely lest scandal arise or order be disturbed (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 104, a. 6, ad 3).

Corollary IV. Nor per se is there an obligation of obeying the unjust precepts of a legitimate Ruler. Per accidens there can be an obligation, as was just said about a usurper.

"A man is bound to obey secular rulers," says St. Thomas in the cited place, "insofar as the order of justice requires; and therefore if they do not have a just rule but a usurped one, or if they command unjustly, subjects are not bound to obey them, except perhaps per accidens, on account of avoiding scandal or danger." From these things you may deduce what must be thought about resistance to unjust laws, whether passive or active. Passive resistance, which consists in this, that the law is merely not observed, is per se lawful; per accidens, or because of a greater evil to be avoided, there can be an obligation of fulfilling the law. Yet it is always illicit to observe the law if that which it commands is intrinsically evil. Active resistance, by which someone positively resists observing the law, likewise can per accidens be illicit, and at least as being generally useless is everywhere to be dissuaded.

¹ 1 Pet. 2:17.

² Rom. 13:1, 2, 7.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1763.

⁴ Encyclical Mirari vos, August 15, 1832.

⁵ Aertnys-Damen, I, n. 563.

⁶ Encyclical Quod Apostolici muneris, December 28, 1878.

Definition of Piety.—Piety in the strictest sense is defined as “a moral virtue that inclines one to pay to father and fatherland the duty of respect and assistance that is owed them as the authors and sustainers of our being.”

(a) It is a moral virtue, one pertaining to justice, and hence it differs from the special duty of charity owed to parents and country (see 1158, 1171 sqq.). Charity loves parents and country out of love for God whose creatures they are; piety honors them in recognition of the benefits received from them and the authority vested in them.

(b) Piety is shown to father and fatherland; that is, just as religion gives worship to God in acknowledgment of His excellence and our dependence upon Him, so does piety show due respect to those who hold the place of God in our respect on earth. Filial piety is owed to the mother as well as to the father, and in a less degree to other relatives, inasmuch as they share or continue the blood of one’s parents and may be regarded as representing them (e.g., brothers and sisters, husband or wife). Patriotism belongs to one’s native land or the country, nation, state, city, etc., of which one is a citizen; and it should include, not only fellow-citizens, but also the friends and allies of one’s country. He who is the adopted citizen of a country should love the place of his birth, but loyalty and obedience are owed to the nation to which he has transferred his allegiance.

(c) Piety offers respect and assistance. The first duty is owed to parents on account of their position of progenitors and superiors; the second is owed to their condition when they are infirm or destitute or otherwise in need. It is more probable that filial piety is violated only when the personal goods (e.g., life, health, body, fame, honor) of parents are injured, and that injury to their real goods pertains to fraud, theft or damage, rather than to impiety. Moreover, on account of the community of goods that exists between parents and children, real injuries between them are not rigorously acts of injustice and require more than the ordinary grave matter for serious sin (see 1902).

(d) Piety is owed to parents and country as the authors and sustainers of our being. Thus, it differs from legal justice, which is the duty owed the State or community, precisely as it is the whole of which one is a part. It differs likewise from commutative justice, which is obligatory in agreements with parents or other superiors, for the duty is then owed them as partners to a free contract. On account of this nobility of the formal object, filial piety and patriotism are very like to religion and rank next after it in the catalogue of virtues.

The Duty of Exercising the Electoral Franchise.—(a) There is a grave duty of using the privilege granted to citizens of voting in public elections, and especially primaries; for the welfare of the community and the moral, intellectual and physical good of individuals depend on the kind of men who are nominated or chosen to rule, and on the ticket platforms voted for. Hence, those who neglect to vote cooperate negatively with a serious harm (viz., evil in power), or at least with public unconcern about public matters—for example, those who neglect through laziness or indifference to condemn by their vote. A grave inconvenience (e.g., sickness, ostracism, exile, persecution), but not a slight inconvenience (such as loss of time, trouble, ridicule), excuses from the duty; for an affirmative law has exceptions. Neither is there an obligation to vote when an election is a mere formality, as when there is but one candidate or party.

(b) The duty is not one of commutative justice, as the ballot is either a privilege, or a thing commanded by authority, but not a service to which the citizen has bound himself by contract or office. The obligation is, therefore, one of legal justice, arising from the fact that the common weal is everybody’s business and responsibility, especially in a republic. Hence, representatives of the people who by abstention from voting cause a serious damage which they were bound ex officio to prevent, are guilty of commutative injustice and are held to restitution; but a citizen who stays away from the polls sins, and perhaps gravely, against legal justice, though there is no duty of restitution for the damages that result. Moreover, in a general election the vote of one citizen is usually not of decisive influence, and citizens do not make themselves responsible for all the acts of their representatives.

Manner of Voting.—(a) Object.—It is not necessary to vote for the best candidate, provided one votes for a person who is fitted by character, ability, record, experience, etc. for the office, and gives indications, not merely promises, that he will serve the community well. But in certain ecclesiastical elections the voters must take oath beforehand to vote, not only for a worthy candidate, but also for the person whom they honestly think, all things considered, most worthy. In minor offices (such as constable or town clerk) it suffices that the candidate be known as conscientious; but in major offices (such as President, governor, congressman, legislator, or judge) the party principles for which he stands have to be considered chiefly. Per accidens, it is lawful to vote for an unworthy candidate when this is necessary to prevent a greater evil, as when the opposing candidate is much worse, or a good ticket cannot be elected unless some less worthy candidates are included.

(b) Purpose.—The end which the voter should have in mind is the good of the public, and hence it is not right to vote for candidates solely or chiefly because they are personal friends, members of one’s own race, organization or religion, or because one wishes to gain favor or escape enmity.

(c) Circumstances.—The voter must avoid all that is contrary to natural law (e.g., selling of votes, repeating, stuffing ballot boxes) or positive law (e.g., state laws require not only citizenship and a period of previous residence, but also other conditions such as registration and freedom from bribery and other election crimes). The opinion that politics is necessarily corrupt, and that all is fair that helps to win, is a false and pernicious doctrine. The conditions for ecclesiastical elections are given in Canons 160 sqq.

Obligation to Seek Office.—A worthy man should run for office in the following case: (a) when the public good calls for his candidacy (e.g., when his election or candidacy will avert serious evils, and there is no one else so available); and (b) there is no grave impediment to his candidacy (such as supremely important private affairs or ill-health that makes it impossible to run).

182. Since domestic society is an imperfect society, and does not furnish sufficiency for the necessities of human life, while nature does not make the imperfect except that it may tend to the perfect, it is clear that, by the very connate sociability of human nature, civil society is born from the natural development of families. Consequently, as the family is an immediately natural society, so also the commonwealth obtains its origin immediately from nature itself; and consequently political principate also, considered absolutely and according to itself, is immediately from God, as from the author of nature. Indeed, by nature itself man is ordained both to imperfect society, or the family, and to perfect society, or the commonwealth, which consequently is something flowing from human nature itself. Suarez, de Legib. 3, c. 1, n. 3. But no human society can be or be conceived without authority ruling and governing it. Suarez, de Legib. l. 3, c. 2, n. 4. Whence the Apostle, Rom. 13:1: "Let every soul be subject to higher powers; for there is no power except from God; but those which are, are ordained by God." Whence, there is no power except from God. Whoever have the right of commanding do not receive it from elsewhere... Whatever power there is anywhere, nature itself testifies that it proceeds from God. Leo XIII, encyclical Immortale Dei.

183. "But it is of interest to attend in this place that those who are to preside over the commonwealth can in certain cases be chosen by the will and judgment of the multitude, with Catholic doctrine neither opposing nor resisting. By which choice indeed the prince is designated; the rights of principate are not conferred; nor is command mandated, but it is established by whom it is to be carried." Leo XIII, encyclical Diuturnum illud teterrimumque bellum.

184. Civil society, therefore, is a perfect society of the natural order, which supplies perfect sufficiency of life. Leo XIII, encyclical Immortale Dei; St. Thomas, in 1 Polit., lect. 1. Perfect sufficiency, by supplying the defect of the individual person and of domestic society as regards the perfect cultivation of human life. "For every communication of men is ordered to something necessary for life." St. Thomas, in l. c. Therefore that will be the perfect commonwealth in which are found all things necessary for developing human life; this happens by observance of public order, for the common good of the associates, namely that they live in peace and justice with sufficiency of goods which look to the conservation and convenience of bodily life, and with that probity of morals which is necessary for this external peace and happiness of the commonwealth and the suitable conservation of human nature. Suarez, de Leg., l. 3, c. 11, n. 6. For indeed "a city is not blessed from one source and a man from another, since a city is nothing other than a concordant multitude of men." St. Augustine, Epist. 155. Therefore, just as God is the simply ultimate end of the whole of human life, so God is also the ultimate end of civil society; and consequently the operation of the whole commonwealth ought finally to tend to that end, by ordering the life of men through laws to virtues. St. Thomas, l. c. and 1.2, q. 96, a. 3; Suarez, de Leg., l. 3, c. 12.

185. Now indeed from the very nature of civil society sketched out, it is easily deduced what in it is the obligation of the prince or public power, and of subjects.

Princes are bound to have diligent care of the common good. Consequently they are bound to avert evils, as far as can be done, from society, evils which arise from wars with foreigners and from internal seditions by the work of sects of Freemasons, socialists, and others of that kind.

"Command must be carried for the utility of citizens, because those who are over the rest are over them for this one cause, that they may protect the utility of the commonwealth. Nor must it in any way be committed that civil authority serve for the advantage of one or of a few, since it has been constituted for the common good of all." Leo XIII, encyclical Immortale Dei; encyclical Diuturnum.

Therefore the most grave obligation of princes is that they rightly perform their own office. And the obligation is the graver, the more sublime their dignity is. "Let princes take examples from God, best and greatest, whence authority is theirs; and proposing to themselves his image in administering the commonwealth, let them be over the people with equity and faith, and to that severity which is necessary let them apply paternal charity." Leo XIII, encyclical Diuturnum.

186. Therefore princes are bound to make laws that are just and useful to the common good, to administer justice without respect of persons, and to urge the execution of public decrees and sentences, according to the threefold office of political power, legislative, judicial, executive or coercive; and consequently they are bound to inflict due punishments on malefactors, especially as regards those crimes which directly tend to common damage. But since princes cannot exercise by themselves the three listed offices of authority, they ought to entrust them to distinct and fit magistrates, removing the unworthy and inept from public offices of this kind.

187. Certainly those laws are not just which decline from natural, divine, or human right. The following propositions have been condemned:

"56. The laws of morals have no need of divine sanction, and there is by no means need that human laws be conformed to the natural law, or receive the force of obliging from God." Syllabus.

"57. The science of philosophical matters and morals, and likewise civil laws, can and ought to decline from divine and ecclesiastical authority." Syllabus.

"The will of the people, manifested by what they call public opinion or in another way, constitutes the supreme law, loosed from all divine and human right; and in the political order completed facts, by the very fact that they are completed, have the force of right." Pius IX, encyclical Quanta cura.

188. On the contrary, from the Angelic Doctor, 1.2, q. 96, a. 4, laws will be just which are ordered to the common good, which do not exceed the power of him who bears them, which impose burdens on subjects according to equality of proportion in order to the common good. It is also necessary that laws be imposed on men according to their condition. "Human law is placed upon the multitude of men, in which there is a greater part of men not perfect in virtue. And therefore by human law not all vices are prohibited, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the graver ones, from which it is possible for the greater part of the multitude to abstain, and especially those which are to the harm of others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be conserved; thus by human law homicides, thefts, and things of this kind are prohibited." St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 96, a. 2.

189. But princes ought especially to have care of religion, and consequently to preserve the rights of the Church. For the common good of society is most greatly promoted, the public order of society is preserved undisturbed, and laws are observed holily, if the offices of religion are observed inviolate. Free-thinkers are in error, and in the greatest error; consequently they are opposed to the true good and progress of society. The good and progress of society cannot be in error. Therefore, by right and merit, the following three propositions were proscribed by Pius IX in the encyclical Quanta cura:

"The best arrangement of public society and civil progress altogether requires that human society be constituted and governed with no respect had to religion, as if it did not exist, or at least with no distinction made between true and false religions."

"The best condition of society is that in which the duty of coercing with established penalties violators of the Catholic religion is not recognized by the Government, except insofar as public peace demands."

"Liberty of conscience and of worship is the proper right of each man, which ought to be proclaimed and asserted by law in every rightly constituted society; and the right belongs to citizens to every kind of liberty, to be confined by no ecclesiastical or civil authority, by which they may be able openly and publicly to manifest their own concepts, whatever they may be, whether by voice, by print, or by another manner."

Aptly Leo XIII, encyclical Immortale Dei: "Nature and reason, which command individuals to worship God holily and religiously, because we are in his power and because, having proceeded from him, we ought to return to the same, bind the civil community by the same law. For men joined in common society are no less in the power of God than individuals, nor does society owe less grace to God than individuals do; by him as author it came together, by his nod it is conserved, by his benefit it received the innumerable abundance of goods with which it abounds. Therefore, just as it is lawful for no one to neglect his duties toward God, and the greatest duty is to embrace in mind and morals religion, not what each one may have preferred, but what God has commanded, and what by certain and by no means doubtful indications it has been established is the one true religion out of all; in the same way commonwealths cannot, without crime, bear themselves as if God did not exist at all, or cast aside care of religion as alien and in no way profitable, or take to themselves indifferently out of the many kinds whatever pleases them. Altogether they ought to use, in worshiping the Divinity, that custom and manner by which God himself has shown that he wills himself to be worshiped. Therefore the name of God ought to be holy among princes; and among their chief duties must be placed to embrace religion with favor, to protect it with benevolence, to shield it by the authority and nod of the laws, and to establish or decree nothing which is contrary to its safety. They owe this also to the citizens over whom they preside. For all we men have been born and received unto a certain supreme and ultimate good, to which all plans are to be referred, placed in the heavens, beyond this fragility and brevity of life. But since the fully completed and perfect happiness of men depends on this, therefore it is of such interest to each individual to attain that end which has been mentioned, that nothing can be of greater interest. Therefore civil society, born for the common utility, in guarding the prosperity of the commonwealth, must so consult citizens that in obtaining and attaining that supreme and unchangeable good which they spontaneously seek, it not only never bring any inconvenience, but bring all opportunities whatsoever that it can. The chief of these is that work be given to religion to be preserved holily and inviolate, whose offices join man to God." Leo XIII, encyclical Immortale Dei.

Certainly civil society has God as parent and author. Therefore it is necessary that it revere and worship his power and dominion. Wherefore society cannot be atheistic, nor consequently be affected in an equal way toward various religions, toward the true and the false; it cannot lavish the same rights promiscuously on each.

190. Besides, the prince is bound effectively to protect the rights of citizens and especially of property; otherwise the peace of society is disturbed by dissensions. He is bound to promote agriculture, industries, arts, and commerce of various things, so that citizens not only not lack, but even abound in things necessary for life. And, since the poor are never lacking, he is bound to excite and foster works of public charity and beneficence. Likewise he is bound to advance the sciences, so that perfect material and moral sufficiency of life may truly be found in civil society.

Therefore socialism, which contends that things and advantages are to be divided equally among citizens, "and its proposal concerning reducing possessions into common ownership must be altogether repudiated, because it harms those very persons who are to be helped, is repugnant to the natural rights of individuals, and disturbs the offices of the commonwealth and common tranquillity. Therefore, when relief of the people is sought, this ought to remain and be held first as a kind of foundation, that private possessions are to be preserved inviolate." Leo XIII, encyclical de Conditione opificum.

191. The explored smallness of his powers impels and exhorts man to wish to join to himself another's help. By this natural propensity man is led to public civil society, and to entering other private societies with citizens; for private society looks only to the utility of those associated. The prince ought to protect and assist all these societies, if they are not contrary to the good of civil society; much more if they are very useful to it, as are all religious associations or religious Congregations. But these, since by common rule and manner of living they profess the perfection of the evangelical counsels, and consequently depend on the authority of the Church, if they are prohibited and expelled by civil society, not only the rights of nature, but also the rights of the Catholic Church are violated. Therefore with right and merit proposition 85 was condemned in the Syllabus:

"The laws are to be abrogated which pertain to protecting the state of religious families and their rights and offices; indeed the civil government can furnish aid to all those who wish to defect from an undertaken institute of religious life and to break solemn vows; and likewise it can utterly extinguish the same religious families, as well as collegiate churches and simple benefices, even of right of patronage, and subject and vindicate their goods and revenues to the administration and judgment of the civil power."

But if associations of this kind pursue anything from their own institute which openly disagrees with probity, justice, and the safety of the commonwealth, they must be opposed by fitting laws. "For these causes the public power will by right impede those associations from coming together; by right it will also dissolve them when they have come together." Leo XIII, encyclical letter de Conditione opificum.

192. "Then those most salutary and equally most true things which look to civil society and the interchange of rights and duties between sacred and political power. For just as there are two greatest societies on earth, the one civil, whose proximate end is to obtain for the human race a temporal and worldly good, the other religious, whose office it is to lead men to that true happiness for which we were made, heavenly and eternal, so there is a twofold power. Both obey the eternal and natural law, and in those things which are contained by the order and command of either one, each consults for itself. But whenever something of that kind must be constituted concerning which it is right that each power constitute something, although by diverse causes and in a diverse way, nevertheless each must constitute something, a concord of each is necessary and agreeable to public utility; if this is removed, there will altogether follow a certain doubtful and changeable condition, with which the tranquillity neither of the Church nor of the commonwealth can consist. Therefore when something has been constituted by agreements entered, then surely what belongs to justice, the same belongs to the public matter, that concord remain intact; because just as mutual offices are furnished by one to the other, so a certain fruit of utility is received and rendered on both sides." Leo XIII, encyclical epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, Nobilissima Gallorum gens, Feb. 8, 1884.

193. Now indeed subjects are bound also to exhibit love, reverence, and obedience to secular superiors. For in the civil order they are true superiors, bearing the place of God himself toward us in the temporal order. This is confirmed from Sacred Scripture, Rom. 13:1 seqq.; 1 Pet. 2:13, 17. For this reason the Catechism of the Council of Trent compares and joins an obligation of this kind with that by which we are bound toward paternal and ecclesiastical authority. For, p. 3, on the fourth Commandment, sect. 15, after it taught that parents and ecclesiastical superiors must be honored with due honor, it adds: "The same must be said of Kings, Princes, Magistrates, and the rest to whose power we are subject. For if we give any cult to them, it is referred to God; for the excellent grade of dignity has the veneration of men, because it is after the likeness of divine power; in which also we venerate the providence of God, who has attributed to them the management of public office, and uses them as ministers of his power." Whence it is clear that reverence must be exhibited not only to Princes, but also to their officials according to their office and dignity. - Encyclical letter of Leo XIII Quella lunga, June 29, 1881; St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 5, 6; Quodl. 8, a. 7; Quodl. 10, a. 12.

Therefore it is not fitting to speak rashly of those who perform a public office, nor malignly to carp at their deeds; although it is lawful to scrutinize them and to speak and write publicly about them, insofar as the laws permit this, so that they may be judged rightly and the public utility may be provided for. Therefore they sin against charity and justice who announce in public sheets, or publish in conversations and discussions, the hidden crimes of some persons, which do not harm others, in order that they may drive them from some office. They injure due observance who inflict insults on them, whether by words or by writings, and who deny to them the due signs of honor. - Kenrick, tr. 8, n. 164, 165.

194. "To despise legitimate power," says Leo XIII, "in whatever person it has been established, is no more lawful than to resist the divine will; and if any resist this, they rush into voluntary destruction. He who resists the power resists the ordinance of God; but those who resist acquire damnation for themselves." Encyclical Immortale Dei.

"The order of justice requires that inferiors obey their superiors. For otherwise the state of human things could not be conserved." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 6.

"Just as the actions of natural things proceed from natural powers, so also human operations proceed from the human will. But it was necessary in natural things that higher things move lower things to their actions by the excellence of natural virtue conferred by God. Whence also in human things it is necessary that superiors move inferiors by their will from the force of authority divinely ordained. But to move through reason and will is to command. And therefore, just as from the natural order itself divinely instituted lower things in natural things necessarily are subject to the motion of higher things, so also in human things by the order of natural and divine right inferiors are bound to obey their superiors." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 1.

What are the obligations of civil superiors? These are bound to show to subjects love, good example as to morals and religion, the administration of justice, and to provide for public happiness by just and suitable means. This is most plainly clear from the very nature of their office. For the end of civil government is the safety of the commonwealth. The Fathers of the Seventh Council of Toledo, chap. 10, explaining the office of kings, present them as "not looking to the rights of their own advantage, but consulting the fatherland." Hence secular superiors sin gravely by negligence, connivance, and omissions, for example if they do not protect subjects from enemies and unjust vexations, and most of all by positive injuries, oppressions, and excessive exactions, or by persecution of the Christian religion; which injustices God certainly will not leave unavenged. For, as is said in Wis. 6:6, 7, a most severe judgment shall be made upon those who preside: for mercy is granted to the little, but the powerful shall powerfully suffer torments. Struggl 28. They likewise sin if, as far as they can, they do not turn away from society crimes which tend to the common harm, if likewise they do not remove from it the sects of Freemasons, socialists, anarchists, etc., if they put over the commonwealth men ignorant and inexperienced. This grave precept of choosing good men, in due proportion, in a Constitutional and Republican Government, also urges all electors of Deputies, from legal justice, and, other circumstances being excluded, not only do those sin who give a vote to bad men, but also those who by not taking part are the cause that bad men are elected by others; for each one, when he can and no legitimate excuse is present, is bound to turn evil away from the commonwealth. Therefore the obligation per se is both to take part in the election and to choose a suitable deputy. No one is ignorant how many evils come from impious deputies both to religion and to civil society, since the sum of all matters has been entrusted to them, and they not only give counsel, but with others make the laws themselves. Make an exception unless somewhere and at some time, because of special reasons, it is better to act otherwise, and a special prescription is had for acting otherwise. Cf. here, on Particular Obligations of Clerics, n. 195.

Leo XIII, Enc. Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1885; Trid. s. 25, C. 20 de R.; Suarez, de Leg. l. 1, c. 7, n. 5; E. M. Deputies, however, legitimately elected, and truly suitable, by reason of the common good, from legal justice, are bound to accept the office conferred upon them, unless they are excused by a grave and just cause. Likewise Deputies and Senators, since some part of public government has in fact been committed to them, not only must not consent by passing wicked laws to the harm of religion and to the harm of the public good, but they are also bound to impede them by their presence and by their vote. Therefore it is not lawful for them to vote for wicked laws of this sort, nor is it lawful for them to be absent. And if by culpable absence they themselves are the cause why wicked laws are made to public harm, they are guilty both of violated legal justice, by which they are bound, by special reason of their office, to promote the public good, and of violated commutative justice, from a quasi-pact with their electors. As regards the election of Deputies, those things serve the matter which S. Thomas has from S. Augustine, 1. 2, q. 97, a. 1: "If the people is well moderated and serious, and a most diligent guardian of the common utility, a law is rightly made by which it is lawful for such a people to create for itself magistrates through whom the commonwealth is administered. But if little by little the same people, depraved, has a vote for sale, and commits government to disgraceful and wicked men, rightly is taken away from the people such a power of giving honors." Cf. also 1. 2, q. 105, a. 1. "For the work of Catholic men ... to embrace the very highest affairs of the commonwealth is generally useful and honorable... Generally, to be unwilling to touch any part of public affairs would be as much a fault as to contribute no zeal, no work, to the common utility; and all the more because Catholic men are impelled, by the admonition of the doctrine which they profess, to manage the matter honestly and from faith. On the contrary, if they are idle, those will easily receive the reins whose opinions offer, indeed, no great hope of salvation. And this would also be joined with the ruin of the Christian name, for those who would be ill-disposed toward the Church can do very much, and those who are well-disposed, very little. For this reason it is clear that there is a just cause for Catholics to approach public affairs; for they do not approach, nor ought they approach, for this reason, that they approve what at this time in the ordering of public affairs is not honorable, but so that they may turn these very arrangements, as far as can be done, to the public good, having a sincere and true intention to introduce the wisdom and virtue of the Catholic religion, like most wholesome juice and blood, into all the veins of the commonwealth." Leo XIII, Enc. Letter Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1885.

705bis. Note: Ordinary power is that which belongs to someone by force of his dignity or office. Delegated power is that which belongs to someone from the concession of him who has ordinary power. Power of Jurisdiction properly is the power of declaring the law from a public office, and such is the power of ruling subjects and declaring the law in a Society, whether civil or ecclesiastical. One furnished with this power can make laws.

Economic power properly is that which looks to the external order to be preserved in some Community, according to the nature and end of that Community. Such is, for example, the power of a Superiorissa of the Novitiate over Novices. One furnished with this power can make statutes. Power of jurisdiction can be exercised in the internal forum for private utility, and in the external forum for public utility. It is contentious if it is exercised in judgment as regards litigants; voluntary if it is exercised outside judgment concerning affairs in themselves not contentious. Lastly, dominative power properly is that which is exercised over a person as though over something of one's own, as may be seen in a master in relation to a slave, in a father in relation to a son, in a husband in relation to a wife, in a regular Prelate in relation to his subject. Cf. 600; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 57, a. 4; q. 88, aa. 8, 9; q. 189, a. 5.

Is it ever lawful not to obey temporal authority? Is it ever lawful to rebel? Is it ever lawful to kill a Prince? R. To the 1st: As was already said above, n. 171, 4. Laws unjust through contrariety to human good do not oblige in the forum of conscience. Laws unjust through contrariety to divine good are in no way lawful to observe. S. Th. 1. 2, q. 96, a. 4. But in those things which are lawful, and which pertain to civil power, obedience must be given to civil Princes, even to the difficult, and also to those who abuse their authority. From these most pure sources, namely Scripture and Tradition, says Gregory XVI in Br. 9 Jun. 1832, we are most plainly taught that the obedience which men are bound to furnish to powers constituted by God is an absolute precept, which no one can oppose. Pius VI, Br. Pastoralis, 5 Jul. 1796; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 69, a. 4; q. 102, a. 1; q. 104, aa. 5, 6.

R. To the 2nd: It is never altogether lawful to rebel. "In this matter," says St. Liguori, "the principle of John Gerson was exceedingly pernicious, who dared to assert that a monarch can lawfully be judged by the whole nation if he rules the kingdom unjustly... a principle, I say, not only false, but most pernicious." The reason is that subjects, by the very fact that they are subjects, cannot arrogate to themselves power above the Prince, by judging and punishing him. L. H. A. Tr. 8, n. 13; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 42, a. 2; q. 60, a. 6; q. 64, a. 3; q. 69, a. 4. But it is one thing to make rebellion, or to bring violence against a legitimate prince in order to depose him; another thing to resist unjust laws and their execution. Rebellion is a kind of aggression, not defense. But if a force plainly unjust is brought, resistance is then made not to authority, but to unjust force. "And therefore, just as it is lawful to resist robbers, so it is lawful in such a case to resist bad Princes, unless perhaps because of scandal, when from this some grave disturbance would be feared," S. Th. 2. 2, q. 69, a. 4; q. 42, a. 2, or there were no hope of a good outcome, and greater public evils were to be feared. Cf. also the Letters of Leo XIII, Sapientiae christianae, 10 Jan. 1890, who, speaking of laws openly disagreeing with divine right, injurious to the Church and contrary to Religion, then says, "to resist is a duty, to obey a crime." Therefore it is lawful to oppose passive resistance to unjust laws. For one must obey God rather than men, Acts 5:29. "For this reason to cast off obedience, and by the force of the multitude to call the matter to sedition, is the crime of treason, not only against human majesty, but also against divine." Leo XIII, Enc. Letter Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1895, section Non est magni toward the end. For "whoever have the right of commanding do not receive it from elsewhere, but from that supreme Prince of all, God. There is no power except from God, Rom. 13:1... Nature itself testifies that whatever power there is anywhere proceeds from God." When this is known and persuaded, "those things are understood altogether to pertain to justice: to revere the majesty of Princes, to be subject constantly and faithfully to public power, to do nothing seditiously, to preserve the holy discipline of the city."

Leo XIII, l. c., sections Talis, Eiusmodi; Pius X, Ep. Notre charge, 25 Aug. 1910.

R. To the 3rd: It is never lawful for anyone to kill a Prince, neither for a private man nor for the multitude; for the reason is the same for him and for this. The contrary opinion of the ancients is called by St. Alphonsus, l. c., improbable, false, most false. "I ask," says the Holy Doctor, "is he a man like others? And if he is a man, he cannot be deprived of life or goods by those who do not have the right to expel him from life or goods. The doctrine of the holy Fathers is common, that it is never lawful for any private person to kill a man, however private, and however iniquitous he may be, unless he has public authority, or unless this is necessary for protecting his own life." And the very same holds whether the Prince is good or bad; whether legitimate, or an usurper of the kingdom. Prop. condemned by the Council of Constance, Sess. 15, d. 6 Jul. 1414; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 12, a. 2; q. 42, a. 2; q. 64, a. 3; q. 101, aa. 1, 3; q. 102, aa. 1, 2; q. 104, aa. 1, 2, 5; Aertnys 178; E. M.

Are the more worthy to be chosen for civil offices? - R. Affirmatively, if there is a competition; for then there is an implicit contract about choosing the more worthy. But negatively, if there is no competition. For there is no proof of such an obligation. In order that the public good be sufficiently provided for, it suffices that the unworthy be excluded and removed, and that worthy men be chosen. And not only the supreme Prince himself is held by this obligation, but also all those who, by power received from him, can choose. For they do not receive power except for choosing in the mode in which the Prince ought to choose. Therefore also in the election of deputies, no one indeed is bound to choose the more worthy, but he is bound to choose a worthy man, with the unworthy man excluded, from whom grave harm is foreseen. Sometimes, however, it is lawful even to choose an unworthy man in order to exclude another worse man, or if that unworthy man will be more helpful than harmful, or unless otherwise someone would be exposed to undergoing a most grave evil; for his cooperation in evil is only material. Lugo de Iust. et Iur. d. 33; L. 342; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 63.

707bis. Offices: Civil offices strictly are those which look to the necessities and utilities of citizens. Political offices are those which look to protecting the government itself of the whole nation.

1. Vincentius has already rather often detected his male servant with the maidservant, occupied in lascivious intercourse; yet because he adverts that from the dismissal of the male servant, as being especially necessary to the domestic estate, no small detriment threatens him, hence, anxious, he asks whether he can dissimulate with a safe conscience.

Q. 1. What are the obligations of masters? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 693, 694. To the second. Vincentius cannot dissimulate the sins of the servants. For upon him, as superior and father of the family, there rests the obligation from justice of impeding the sins of subjects. And if, correction having been made, they are not amended, he is held under grave obligation to expel them from the house, if from such ejection it is prudently believed that they will return to good conduct. Indeed, even if this is by no means hoped, nevertheless he must altogether eject them, both because, since the servant has the concubine not outside the house but in the very house of the master, and sins with another maidservant, a present and far easier occasion of sinning is had from this; and also because of the grave danger and scandal of the family which is present, as is established by sad experience itself. Parents, retaining depraved servants at home, expose their own children most gravely to corruption. But it is scarcely credible that Vincentius, from the departure of the servant, can fear so great a loss that it would outweigh the most grave obligation of impeding the sins of subjects. And if danger and scandal to the family were present in fact, there certainly is no temporal detriment by which Vincentius could both dissimulate the sins of the servants and retain them at home. Indeed, the sins of subjects can in no way be imputed to a superior when he has tried according to his powers to impede them, by correcting, threatening, etc.; and for that reason only does he dissimulate something, because he cannot impede it without a graver, or certainly rather grave, detriment. But where danger and scandal are present to the family, to retain depraved servants at home is to constitute one's own children in a certain proximate and necessary occasion of sinning; and where servants advert that the masters know and are silent, and fear to expel them, they certainly become more bold for sinning and sin more securely, which is altogether illicit. - Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 2106; Elbel 17, 18, 19; Tambur., in Decal., l. 5, c. 1, § 4, n. 21; G. 374, 375.

2. Mathurinus, a student of Moral Theology, is pressed by grave anguish of conscience. For a disciple, he says, owes love, reverence, and obedience to a master. I have love toward my master; I also have reverence for him; but I cannot have obedience to him. It is impossible for me to admit all the opinions of my master. For there is some opinion on which the master always and much insists, and it seems to me contrary to dogma; but there are also other opinions which seem to me at least equally probable, and even more probable, than those which the master defends as most probable, as uniquely probable, as at least altogether to be held practically.

Q. 1. What are the obligations of disciples toward masters? 2. What is to be held concerning Mathurinus?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 700. - To the second. Mathurinus, before he forms and pronounces judgment against the doctrine of his professor, ought first to understand it well and weigh it with mature consideration, lest perhaps he himself consider and attack as handed down by his professor a doctrine which the professor in no way taught. By acting thus he would both form a rash judgment against his master and, by speaking with others, would harm his reputation. But if, after serious study, and after other learned men have also been consulted, the doctrine of his professor seems erroneous to him, he is certainly not held to follow it. Likewise, if the opinions of others seem to him probable, more probable, or most probable, and are commonly held as such by authors, he is not held to follow the opposed opinions of the master as most probable, or uniquely probable, or altogether to be held. But with due modesty he will be able to think otherwise. Appositely St. Thomas, Quodlibet 3, a. 10: "It must be said that diverse opinions of doctors of Sacred Scripture, if indeed they do not pertain to faith and morals, hearers can follow either opinion without danger; for then what the Apostle says in Rom. 14:5 has place: Let each one abound in his own sense. But in those things which pertain to faith and morals, no one is excused if he follows the erroneous opinion of some master... otherwise those would have been immune from sin who followed the opinions of Arius, Nestorius, and other heresiarchs... Therefore he who assents to the opinion of some master against the manifest testimony of Scripture, or against that which is publicly held according to the authority of the Church, cannot be excused from the vice of error."

Moreover, if the confessor himself cannot impose his probable opinion on the penitent, who wishes to follow another probable opinion, much less will the teacher of moral theology be able to impose his opinion on his hearers when another opinion is truly probable and commonly held by authors as probable. Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 1, d. 26.

But this is directly confirmed from the response of the Sacred Penitentiary, 5 July 1831. For to the question: "Whether a professor of Sacred Theology can safely follow and profess the opinions which Blessed Alphonsus de Liguori professes in his Moral Theology?" it responded: "Affirmatively, without nevertheless judging that those are to be reprehended who follow opinions handed down by other approved authors." Therefore both the teacher of moral theology and his hearers can and are held so to defend their own probable opinions that they do not exclude the contrary truly probable opinions of other Catholic doctors. This certainly, especially in moral theology, would not be to build up, but to destroy.

3. Honoratus, a Catholic, never salutes the Prince, although others commonly salute him in the public streets and halt their step. For he says that the Prince is non-Catholic and by no means virtuous, but honor is owed only to virtue. - What of Honoratus?

R. Honoratus neither reasons rightly nor, of itself, acts rightly. "Honor is a certain testimony concerning the virtue of him who is honored; and therefore virtue alone is the due cause of honor. Nevertheless, it must be known that someone can be honored not only on account of his own virtue, but also on account of the virtue of another, as princes and prelates are honored, even if they are evil, insofar as they bear the person of God and of the community over which they are placed... and by the same reason parents and masters are to be honored on account of participation in the divine dignity, who is the father and master of all. But elders are to be honored on account of the sign of virtue, which is old age, although this sign sometimes fails... But the rich are to be honored on account of this, that they obtain a greater place in communities. But if they are honored with a view to riches, it will be the sin of acceptance of persons." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 63, a. 3; Quodlibet 8, a. 7. "If prelates are evil, they are not honored on account of the excellence of their own virtue, but on account of the excellence of dignity, according to which they are ministers of God; also in them the whole community over which they preside is honored." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 103, a. 3, ad 2; Quodlibet 10, a. 12. Cf. I. M. 701, 704.

4. "An infidel king lays snares for the Christians subject to him, or wishes to destroy them here and now and to blot out the Christian name in his kingdom. While he is meditating and preparing these things, other wicked men, by conspiring and warring against him, try to cast him out from his kingdom.

It is asked: Whether Christians are held positively to defend him, namely the tyrant who wishes here and now to slaughter them; or rather can behave negatively, neither warring against him nor helping him?

R. As it is set forth, negatively to the first part; affirmatively to the second part." S. O., 27 Jan. 1892; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 2099; I. M. 706.

1. To Ferdinandus, a most pious man, prefect of a province, there was committed the execution of the Decree that religious families be expelled from that same province over which he presides. But if he refused to execute it, he himself would have to resign from office, and another prefect, altogether wicked, would be substituted in his place, who certainly will immediately, and more harshly, execute that Decree.

Q. Can Ferdinandus execute the aforesaid Decree, by commanding that even by military force, where there is need, religious be expelled from their own houses?

R. Negatively. For 1. it does not seem that, in circumstances of this sort, the Church yields its right, of the free existence of religious Orders and of ecclesiastical immunity. 2. It indeed does not appear how a most pious man can command the execution of so iniquitous and unjust a Decree without public scandal. 3. If that reason, which is the principal one, of resigning the office, were valid for a prefect on whom the burden of execution of the Decree falls, then it would also have to be said that the supreme minister of the Government himself, issuing such a Decree, would be excused, if otherwise he would have to yield his office. For if that mandate of execution is iniquitous, unjust, and scandalous, much more is the Decree itself iniquitous, unjust, and scandalous. Moreover there is no one who will ever excuse the supreme minister of the Government by that reason, that otherwise he would have to yield his office. Otherwise, now by similar Decrees he could with impunity attack any other right of the Church, which directly yields to public damage of Religion: for any minister who refused to sign Decrees of this sort would certainly be forced to resign his office. But that another is not lacking who would perform this evil and worse cannot render lawful that which is intrinsically illicit, by reason of scandal, by reason of hatred against Religion, by reason of injury against the legitimate liberty of the Church, the Church indeed being reasonably unwilling and contradicting.

2. Festus, a pastor, on account of a grave and urgent cause of death, joined in marriage Caius and Sempronia, concubinaries, although they had not previously contracted civil marriage before the civil magistrate. Festus is accused, as guilty of a violated law, before a judge, an excellent man and fervent Catholic. Hence the judge, very doubtful, approaches his confessor, asking from him whether he ought to resign his office, or whether he can render a condemnatory sentence against the pastor.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. The judge must first take care in every way to absolve the pastor in the case, and declare him innocent. For the pastor acted legitimately per se. Indeed he acted legitimately even with that law of precedence of civil marriage standing. For a law is subject to legitimate epikeia, and in the Case legitimate epikeia appears. If in no way can the judge render a sentence for the pastor, nor can he himself decline the judgment, he does not then seem to be held to yield his office. For although there is question of a law altogether harsh and unjust, nevertheless the matter is not intrinsically evil, and, where it cannot be done otherwise, it is tolerated; and so neither is it intrinsically evil to commit it to execution. Nor likewise is it intrinsically evil to condemn the pastor to some monetary fine, e.g., in the Case, precisely on account of the law not observed, prescinding from the aforesaid epikeia which civil law and the practice of the forum do not admit. For then one altogether innocent is not condemned, at least according to the appearance and form of the judgment, but one guilty of a violated law, namely according to the presumption of the external forum and according to the things brought forward and proved. But the pastor, on account of a greater harm both of the judge and of the community, if another wicked judge would have to be substituted, is reasonably judged to yield his own right as to the aforesaid fine to be paid. Wherefore in the Case the grave harm of the judge, who otherwise would have to resign office, and at the same time the grave harm of the community, which would certainly be present if a wicked judge were substituted, seems to prevail. But the judge must take care in the Case to decree as small a fine as possible, and in the preliminary considerations of the sentence to remove any insinuation injurious against the pastor, so that both every scandal may be removed, and the sentence itself may sufficiently be understood to yield only to the rigor of the law, which does not admit legitimate epikeia from elsewhere. — I. M. 19.

3. Augustinus and Dominicus, confessors, without any scruple absolve all judges who render a sentence of divorce, according to the more recent laws, in matrimonial causes. For they say that here there is no question of a thing intrinsically illicit, but only positively prohibited by the Church; and positive laws do not obligate with great inconvenience. Besides, the judge does nothing else except merely declare the law, which is an act indifferent of itself. Wherefore the cooperation of the judge toward the sin of the parties is merely material, which is lawful for a grave cause. Besides, the judge can well admonish the parties either privately, or even in the Considerations of the sentence, concerning the real indissolubility of marriage. Whence the aforesaid sentence will be nothing except a certain mere permission and denial of civil action; and in truth it regards nothing except the civil effects of marriage; and it in no way touches the sacrament of marriage itself, but only the civil contract of marriage.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Augustinus and Dominicus are deceived. For there is question of a thing intrinsically illicit, by natural and divine right, and not only by ecclesiastical right. For divorce from the bond of matrimony, according to the more recent laws, is opposed to natural and divine right. Besides, the judge rendering sentence does not merely declare the law, but declares authoritatively and practically, so that from that sen- tence civil rights and civil obligations flow, which, speaking per se, have force also in the forum of conscience, namely when that sentence is legitimate and just. Therefore the cooperation of the judge toward the aforesaid divorce in the Case is not merely material, but formal; nor remote, but proximate, since it itself is what gives the parties the faculty of divorce. But that the judge admonishes the parties privately, or even in the Considerations of the following sentence, does not change the intrinsic nature of that sentence, but rather shows its illicitness more. A sentence of this sort is not a mere permission and denial of civil action, since that sentence makes a civil right or civil power, namely according to that iniquitous law of divorce, of contracting other marriages, so that he who is bound by this second marriage must be held by the judge himself, not as an adulterer, but as one legitimately bound by civil marriage. Lastly, it is altogether most false that that sentence regards only the civil effects of marriage, since otherwise the law of divorce would have been altogether useless; for those effects were already governed by the law of civil marriage. Therefore, as that law of divorce regards divorce itself from the bond, so consequently does the sentence of divorce delivered by the judge by force of that law. It is one thing indeed that that sentence regards only civil effects, which is false; another, that the civil effects, where that law now prevails, depend on that sentence, so that unless the sentence of divorce is first obtained, there cannot be had separation of bodies and goods. Lastly, it is plain that, since the aforesaid law and sentence touches divorce from the bond itself, in reality they do not touch only the civil contract of marriage, but most truly the sacrament of marriage itself.

And indeed, if what is asserted were true, namely that that sentence of divorce regards only the civil effects of marriage, then either the Holy Office or the Sacred Penitentiary, from whom it has been sought very often, would have permitted at least spouses to invoke that sentence of civil divorce, in the case of avoiding very grave damage; and, on the contrary, the response has always been: It is not lawful. Cf. Ferraris, Supplementum, v. Divortium, Commentary on the Sentence of Divorce to be rendered by a lay judge as to the bond of matrimony.

4. Armandus and Armanda, spouses, since they could not obtain a sentence of divorce in Italy because of the absence of such a law in Italy, go to France; there they first obtain naturalization, or civil status, and then in court they obtain a sentence of divorce. Having returned to Italy, they ask in court that the judge in Italy confirm the sentence rendered in France. — Can the aforesaid judge in Italy confirm that French sentence?

R. In the negative. In no way can the judge in Italy furnish this, either by natural law or by positive civil law. Concerning natural law, cf. here n. 3.

As regards civil law, it is easily proved, because from C. I. 56, 148, one bound by marriage cannot contract another marriage, and marriage ceases only by the death of the spouse. But one independent State cannot impose upon another State, likewise independent, its own law permitting an act prohibited in that State, when that act regards natural and public honesty, good morals, and public order, as the indissolubility of marriage is. Hence it is that whether Armandus and Armanda are Italians, or are also French, that sentence of divorce pronounced by a French judge cannot be held ratified by an Italian judge. It is added in the Case that there is open fraud against the law, and no one’s own fraud ought to patronize him.

5. The ship William Brown, directed from the port of Liverpool to Philadelphia, suffered shipwreck in the month of June in the year 1841. Many sailors and many travelers were saved in a small boat. But since the sea was stormy, in order to lighten the boat, which otherwise they feared would sink, the sailors cast the travelers into the sea. The matter then having been brought before a judge, the accused were acquitted in court, since otherwise all would certainly have perished.

It is asked: What must be judged concerning the sentence of the judge in the Case?

R. It was certainly in no way lawful for the sailors to cast the travelers into the sea. For this in fact was nothing else than to kill innocent men by private authority. But the fact that all otherwise would have perished does not make their homicide honorable, since the death of all would then have happened only by a natural misfortune, which certainly they could not prevent by the death of some. Therefore the sentence of the judge, wholly absolving the sailors as not guilty of homicide, was not legitimate. In the Case the judge ought indeed to have condemned the sailors as true homicides, but to a punishment milder than the ordinary one, on account of the grave circumstance of the shipwreck of all, which in the case certainly attenuated the offense. It would certainly have been wholly another thing if, in that danger, lest all should perish, some should have cast themselves into the sea, lest the boat be sunk by the multitude. For this “is not directly to kill oneself, but to expose oneself to danger, so as to be overcome by the weight of the body pressed down by the waves.” Thus Lessius writes about one who permits to another the plank occupied by himself, de Iust. et Iur. l. 2, c. 9, d. 6, n. 31: “In a shipwreck,” he says, “you can permit to another a plank not yet occupied by you, indeed even one occupied, and commit yourself to the waves, even if there is no hope of escaping, as Victoria and Peter Navarrus teach; for this is not directly to kill oneself, but to expose oneself to danger, so as to be overcome by the weight of the body pressed down by the waves. Here note that he who first occupied the thing in such an event is not held to admit another, but can hinder him, unless it is sufficient for both; if they occupied it at the same time, it must be decided by lot, unless one wishes voluntarily to yield to the other.” Kenrick, Theol. Mor., Mechlin, 1890, tr. 3, c. 9, nn. 111, 134.

6. Gerulfas, a mayor, assists at the civil marriage of two betrothed persons who both are bound by a previous marriage, but have already been separated from their own spouses by sentence of divorce according to the law in force. Gerulfas contends that he himself can licitly do this, because his assistance is merely a certain civil ceremony.

It is asked: What as to the Case?

R. Gerulfas acts wholly illicitly. For his presence is not a merely civil ceremony; but it is a certain solemnity of law, furnishing civil authority, in the particular Case set forth, to legal adultery, or to adultery contracted according to the norm of civil laws. This is further established from the Responses of the S. C. and of the S. Penitentiary. Cf. Enchir. Mor. 19. And, since the mayor, in the aforesaid Case, not only posits an intrinsically illicit act, but also one unjust against the prior legitimate wife and legitimate children, he is held to compensation for damages if the adulterer refuses to compensate them. For by that unjust act the mayor effectively influences those damages.

Nor indeed does it avail to object that civil marriage in the Case is not intrinsically illicit; whence it could at least be permitted in some very grave and very rare case. For civil marriage, since it is not true marriage, of itself does not hinder a man from fulfilling the obligations of the prior legitimate marriage. This is not true; for in order that in fact a man, for example, may return after a civil marriage to his legitimate wife, the consent of the other party is necessary. Therefore that civil marriage is an act of itself and by its nature legally sanctioning adultery against ecclesiastical and legitimate marriage. — Of a mayor of this sort it cannot be said, as is prescribed by the S. Penitentiary on 20 March 1855, that he does nothing against the sanctity of marriage and the necessity of contracting it before the Church. Of a mayor of this sort it cannot be said, as is held from the same S. Penitentiary, that he removes scandal, since on the contrary he confirms it by his own act.

7. Torquatus, a mayor, a fervent Catholic, assists at the civil marriage of Tullius and Tullia, whom he knows neither to have contracted canonical marriage previously, nor to wish to contract it afterwards. Torquatus cannot deny his assistance; for otherwise he will be liable both to a grave fine and to deposition from office.

It is asked: What as to the Case?

R. Torquatus, in the Case, can assist at the aforesaid marriage. For to the aforesaid case the S. Penitentiary, 20 March 1855, responded: “That it can be tolerated, provided that civil officials in drawing up acts of this sort intend to exercise a merely civil ceremony, and do nothing or advise nothing against the sanctity of marriage and the necessity of contracting it before the Church; rather, that they exhort them to contract it before the Church itself; having before their eyes the most holy laws of our Religion, and the letters of Benedict XIV, Redditae sunt nobis, concerning which, for removing scandal, they should admonish the contracting parties. But as regards cases in which it appears that the faithful, approaching the civil ceremony, are ill-disposed, and will not celebrate before the Church the marriage which regularly ought to have been premised, but will remain in concubinage under the pretext of a civil contract, the officials themselves are to be directed according to the rules handed down by approved authors, and especially by St. Alphonsus, l. 2, tr. 3, c. 2, dub. 5, art. 3, concerning cooperation.” Moreover in the aforesaid letters Benedict XIV teaches that, when Catholics present themselves to the civil magistrate, they exercise a merely civil act, and that marriage must be celebrated before a Catholic minister and two witnesses; otherwise they will never be legitimate spouses, nor ever legitimate offspring.

Now St. Alphonsus teaches this concerning cooperation in the place cited: “It must be said that that cooperation is formal which concurs with the evil will of another and cannot be without sin; but that is material which concurs only with the evil action of another, apart from the intention of the cooperator. And this is licit when the action of itself is good and indifferent, and when there is present a just cause proportionate to the gravity of the sin of the other and to the proximity of the concurrence which is furnished for the execution of the sin.” Cf. I. M. v. 1, 440. Moreover Torquatus the mayor does not cooperate formally in the case with the depraved will of Tullius and Tullia, either by intention, as is supposed, or by action; for the act of the mayor is, in the Case, a merely civil ceremony, furnishing of itself force to a marriage contracted or to be contracted, as to civil effects. For by civil law those things can be ordered and administered which marriages of themselves bring in the civil order, the marriage itself being left untouched, which among Christians is governed by the laws of the Church. But that Tullius and Tullia have neither previously contracted marriage, nor wish afterwards to contract marriage, is only from their depraved will. The cooperation of the mayor is merely material, by an act, as appears, not only indifferent, but of itself honorable and licit, which the aforesaid betrothed persons abuse only from their own malice. Nor indeed is a just and proportionate cause lacking, such as certainly is both the grave fine to which the mayor would otherwise be subjected, and his deposition from office, which would redound to the grave private harm of the mayor himself and to the common harm of society itself; because otherwise honorable and religious public officials would, to the public harm, be replaced by depraved and unjust officials.

386. • From natural law and positive divine law we are bound, under the title of piety, to furnish reverence and obedience to our civil Superiors. For they hold the place of God Himself in the temporal order toward us. For thus the Apostle to the Romans 13. 1 and following: Let every soul be subject to higher powers, FOR THERE IS NO POWER EXCEPT FROM GOD; and those which are, are ordained by God. Therefore he who resists power resists the ordinance of God. But those who resist acquire damnation for themselves... For he (the Prince) is the minister of God, an avenger unto wrath for him who does evil. Therefore be subject by necessity, not only because of wrath, but also because of conscience.

Wherefore the Catechism of the Council of Trent compares and joins an obligation of this sort with that by which we are bound toward paternal and ecclesiastical authority. For in part III, on the fourth commandment, §15, after it taught that parents and ecclesiastical Superiors are to be honored with due honor, it adds: "Likewise the same must be said of Kings, Princes, Magistrates, and the rest to whose power we are subject." But it explains this thus: "For if we render some honor to them, this is referred to God; for the excellent grade of dignity has the veneration of men, because it is in the likeness of divine power: in which also we venerate the providence of God, who attributed to them the administration of public office and uses them as ministers of His power." It is also clear from sacred Scripture, especially 1 Pet. 2. 13, where it is said: Be subject therefore to every human creature on account of God; whether to the King as excelling, or to governors as sent by him... And ibid. 17: Honor the King. - See also St. Justin, Apol. 1. 47. - St. Theophilus of Antioch, ad Autol., lib. 1, c. 11. - St. Clement, Const., c. 12. - Tertullian, ad Scap., c. 2. - St. Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 17. - St. Chrysostom, Hom. 6 ad Ant. - St. Irenaeus, adv. Haeres., l. V. 24. - St. Augustine on Ps. 124, n. 7, and De Civit. Dei, l. V. 10, 11, 14, 15. - Confer also the Encyclical Letters of Gregory XVI and Pius IX.

387. • Q. Whether it is sometimes lawful not to obey temporal authority, and whether it is sometimes lawful to rebel?

Resp. The doctrine of sacred Scripture, of the Fathers, of Councils, of the Supreme Pontiffs, of the Catechism of the Council of Trent, of St. Liguori, Hom. apost., tr. 8, §13, and also of the Encyclical of Gregory XVI, 15 Aug. 1832, which expresses the whole Catholic tradition, can be resumed in a few words concerning this question thus.

To the first. Just as it is evident that human authority is never to be obeyed in those things which are evidently against the law of God, so in those things which are licit per se, Princes are altogether to be obeyed, EVEN THE FROWARD, and also those who abuse their authority. From these most pure sources, namely Scripture and tradition, Gregory XVI says in the Brief of 9 June 1832, we are most plainly taught that the obedience which men are bound to furnish to the powers constituted by God is an absolute precept which no one can oppose.

To the second. It is never altogether lawful to rebel. "Too pernicious in this matter," says St. Liguori, "was the principle of John Gerson, who dared to assert that a monarch can legitimately be judged by the whole nation if he governs the kingdom unjustly...: a principle, I say, not only false, but most pernicious... But what remedy is present if the governance of the Prince were excessively tyrannical? The remedy which is available," says St. Thomas, "is to recur to God, that He may furnish aid." - Hom. apost., tract. 8, n. 13.

But, says St. Thomas, in order that the people may merit obtaining this benefit from God, they must cease from sins, because in vengeance for sin, by divine permission, the impious receive power. De Reg. princ., lib. 1, c. 6. - See especially the Encyclical Letter of Gregory XVI, 15 Aug. 1832 ¹.

¹ These things are confirmed from article LXIII of the Syllabus of the principal errors of our age, proscribed by our Most Holy Lord Pope Pius IX, which reads thus: It is lawful to refuse obedience to legitimate princes, and indeed to rebel.

991. Superiors, or princes, are here called not only those who possess supreme power in civil society, such as a King, Emperor, or President of the Republic, but also those who have a part in the Government, as ministers, or also deputies and senators, in regions where supreme power is divided among several. - But subjects are called those who are subject to civil authority.

But love and worship of the fatherland ought to be common to all, not indeed in the sense that foreign peoples are despised or held in hatred, but in the sense that the region where one was born and educated, in which one's fathers are buried, and which has received its mission from God, is specially loved. And indeed this love ought to be generous, so that we are prepared to act rightly, to suffer patiently, and to die for the common good of the fatherland.¹

¹ Card. Gibbons, Patriotism and Politics, in the periodical North Amer. Review, April 1892, p. 385-400.

I. On The Duties Of Superiors, Or Princes.²

² St. Thom., De regimine principum, Opusc. XVI, among the works published at Parma, t. XVI, p. 225-291; Bellarmine, De officio principis christiani; cf. Leo XIII, Encycl. Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1885; Noldin, n. 304-306.

992. Legitimate superiors, whoever they are and in whatever manner they have been elected, act in the place of God, since every power proceeds from God; therefore they do not enjoy unlimited authority, but ought to exercise rule in dependence on the natural and divine law. Their functions and duties, and also the scope of their power, are defined by the Constitution and civil laws of the various Peoples; here we can briefly touch only the more general matters.

993. 1. Superiors are held, by force of their office, primarily to intend and procure the common good, and only secondarily the particular good, whether their own or that of those who are nearer to them. For since society was instituted to promote the common good, those who preside over society were chosen for this, that they might provide for this common good; wherefore they sin against the duty of their state if, administering care of the republic remissly and negligently, they strive to serve the advantage of the few. Hence: -

(A) First, they ought to know in what the common good consists, whether material or spiritual, and by what means it can and ought to be promoted, not only in itself, but also with all circumstances of times, things, and persons attended to; otherwise they will act imprudently, and will inflict many damages on the republic and on private persons. Wherefore they ought diligently to devote themselves to political, economic, and social science; and if they wish to be of more profit to the fatherland, they will try to know in some measure not only the morals and laws of their own people, but also of foreign nations: for, once a comparison has been made between the laws of diverse peoples, it can be better understood how paternal customs may be amended.

(B) The exercise of rule ought to be just, not tyrannical, "but as it were paternal, because God's most just power over men is also joined with paternal goodness."¹ Wherefore respect of persons must be avoided, by force of which favor is shown to one class of citizens rather than to another, or to some private persons rather than to others, without reasonable cause. This is especially to be observed in the distribution of offices and burdens; when injustice is admitted in this matter has already been explained, On Justice, n. 467-468. But, even with justice uninjured, administrators of the republic sin who knowingly and willingly keep the worthier from offices and call the less worthy; for thus they do not provide for the public good, but for their own or for that of a few friends, with detriment to others.

¹ Leo XIII, Encycl. Immortale Dei.

994. 2. They are held to protect and promote the good morals of citizens, not only by laws and judicial power, but also by examples. For all concede that good morals contribute much even to the temporal utility of the republic. Wherefore, when abuses have already begun to prevail, for example, public drunkenness because of the multitude of taverns, the corruption of the young through obscene books or obscene pictures or exhibitions, it is necessary that the supreme authority strive to restrain them either by just laws, or by more efficacious observance of the laws. - From this it follows that those who preside are held by a stricter obligation to provide good example, since subjects tend to imitate superiors, according to that saying: By the king's example the whole world is fashioned.

995. 3. They ought to defend and protect private associations which contribute to the good of citizens, but to restrain those which are evidently opposed to good morals; for the former furnish aid to the republic, but the latter greatly harm it. This was more fully explained where we treated of the right of association, On Justice, n. 183-194. But concerning relations between the civil power and the Church we have disputed elsewhere, On The True Church, n. 227-250.

996. 4. As to deputies specifically, and all those who enjoy the right of suffrage in Assemblies, these things especially are to be noted: -

(A) Only those can seek and accept this office who can exercise it prudently and usefully; otherwise, they expose themselves to the danger of inflicting grave damage on the republic. - But if suitable persons have been elected, they cannot refuse the office without a grave cause: for the public good demands that wise and upright persons should not decline an office and burden useful to the fatherland.

(B) They are held to fulfill their office faithfully and vigorously, caring for the common rather than the private good. Wherefore they ought to acquire the economic and social science necessary for the exercise of their office, not only speculative but also practical, by studying theories and facts together, and especially those questions which are foreseen as to be treated in the Legislative Assembly.

(C) They ought to be present at sessions, as often as they are not impeded by a grave cause; indeed, when they cannot be present, let them take care that, as often as a question of great moment is to be decided, they be immediately summoned by telephone or telegraph, lest perhaps an unjust or inopportune law be enacted while they are absent. - But they ought to cast their vote according to the dictate of conscience, and, if the matter is doubtful, let them have recourse to those who can provide wise counsel. - If by their vote they concur in an unjust law, they sin and sometimes are held to restitution, according to the principles explained above, On Justice, n. 503-505.

II. On The Duties Of Subjects.¹

¹ Meyer, t. II, n. 497-537; Noldin, n. 307-319; Vermeersch, De Justitia, n. 83-131; Ami du Clerge, Le peche electoral, t. XXV, 1903, p. 979, and t. XXVI, 1904, p. 2.

997. 1. In regions in which deputies and senators are elected, who by their votes concur in administering public affairs, the primary duty of those who have the right of electing is prudently and vigorously to labor for procuring the election of a suitable candidate.

For the matter at issue, especially in our days, is of the greatest moment: for, in Legislative Assemblies, questions are often debated not only commercial and industrial, but also moral and religious, on whose solution depends the good not only temporal but also spiritual of many citizens, indeed of the whole People. But the solution of questions of this sort depends chiefly on elections: if prudent and honest men are chosen, endowed with courage of soul, a Catholic spirit, and, insofar as it can be done, eloquence, religion and the fatherland will flourish together; but if foolish, evil, irreligious men are elected, a way is prepared not only for temporal ruin, but also for corruption of morals and innumerable errors against faith. Wherefore upon all electors there lies a grave duty not only of abstaining from selling their vote, but also of concurring vigorously in the election of a suitable candidate; from which they cannot be excused except on account of a proportionately grave cause. Hence: -

998. (A) Light causes by no means excuse from this duty, insofar as they are loss of time, hunting or honest recreation, or the mockery of malevolent fellow-citizens: for all these things are something light in relation to the public utility. Nor generally does the probable uselessness of casting votes excuse, because, for example, there is scarcely any hope of electing a good candidate; for, even in this case, it is greatly expedient to show by deeds that good citizens do not at all despair, but are prepared to use all licit means until good deputies can at last be elected. - That one may be dispensed from such a duty, an altogether grave cause is required, such as would be the loss of an office necessary for honest support. - Nevertheless, if it is morally certain that one's vote will profit nothing, or that society will suffer no detriment from the election, whichever candidate is elected, because, for example, both are equally good or evil, a lesser cause suffices so that one can abstain from the election. Nonetheless, even in these cases, it is generally expedient to cast a vote for some upright citizen, so that good example may thus be provided; and this indeed more urgently presses those who possess greater authority and can draw others by their example to giving votes.

999. (B) If the choice is given only between two unworthy candidates, of whom nevertheless one is worse than the other, for example, between a socialist and another imbued with liberal errors, a vote can be cast for the less unworthy, and generally it is expedient; for between two evils it is licit to choose the lesser; but, to forestall the scandal of the little ones, it should be declared publicly that this is done only to impede the evils that would follow from the election of the worse one; besides, good citizens who cast their vote for the less unworthy should warn him that they concur in his election only so that he may vigorously oppose the evil principles advocated by the other candidate and repel unjust laws: for thus he will try to act more cautiously.

(C) That upright citizens may more efficaciously concur in administering public affairs honestly and prosperously, it is necessary that they establish permanent associations among themselves, and hold public meetings, by which electors may be instructed concerning their duties, concerning the importance of questions which will be proposed for decision in Assemblies, concerning the necessity of choosing the best deputies; and this ought to be declared not only speculatively but practically, by setting forth facts, how the deputies of such a province cast their vote for such or such a law, what consequences arose from it, etc., so that electors may be able prudently and freely to choose the worthier among the various candidates.

1. As marriage gives rise to the family, so the family is the nursery of the State,¹ which may be defined as a perfect and self-sufficient society, consisting of many families, united together under a common ruler and governed by the same laws, for the attainment of complete life and welfare of all the members. The State owes its existence to the natural needs of men as social beings, which compel them to unite in larger (political) communities. For neither as an individual nor as a family member is a man able to supply even his own urgent needs.

¹ Cicero, De Offic., l. I, c. 17: “Since it is common to living creatures by nature to have the desire to procreate, the first society is in marriage itself, the next in children, then one household, all things in common. And this is the beginning of the city and, as it were, the nursery of the commonwealth. Next come the unions of brothers, afterward those of first cousins and second cousins, who, when they can no longer be contained in one household, go out into other houses as into colonies. Next come marriages and affinities, from which there are yet more relatives. This propagation and offspring will be the origin of commonwealths. Moreover, blood relationship and benevolence bind men by charity.”

Now, as it would be impossible to preserve order in the family without some higher (paternal or parental) authority, so, too, the permanent cohabitation of many families would not be possible without a common leader.² History teaches that in matter of fact there is not and never was a nation or State that wholly lacked political organization, no matter what form of public policy it adopted.

² Prov. XI, 14.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 96, art. 4: “The social life of many could not exist unless someone presided who aimed at the common good. For many of themselves aim at many things, but one at one thing. And therefore the Philosopher says that whenever many things are ordered to one, one is always found as principal and director.”

But the State is not only a spontaneous outgrowth of sheer natural necessity, it is at the same time a free and voluntary product of human intelligence. It furnishes a fruitful soil for countless moral relations which are sustained and regulated by the ideas of social order, right, and justice,—ideas implanted by the Creator Himself in the minds and hearts of men. Accordingly the State or civil society is not a purely human invention, but instituted by God; for, as St. Paul says, “there is no power but from God, and those that are, are ordained of God.”³ “Because no society can hold together unless some one be over all,”—writes Leo XIII in his famous encyclical “Immortale Dei,”—“directing all to strive ear- nestly for the common good, every civilized community must have a ruling authority, and this authority, no less than society itself, has its source in nature, and has, consequently, God for its author. Hence it follows that all public power must proceed from God. For God alone is the true and supreme Lord of the world, to whom everything without exception must be subject, and whom everything must serve: so that whosoever holds the right to govern, holds it from one sole and single source, namely, from God, the Sovereign Ruler of all.”⁴

³ Rom. XIII, 1; cfr. Prov. VIII, 15 sq.

⁴ Encycl. “Immortale Dei,” Nov. 1, 1885: “Since no society can hold together unless someone presides over all, moving each person toward the common purpose with an efficacious and simultaneous impulse, it follows that an authority by which it is ruled is necessary to the civil community of men; this authority, no less than society, arises from nature and therefore from God Himself as author. From this it follows that public power in itself is from none but God. For God alone is the truest and supreme Lord of things, to whom all things whatsoever must be subject and must serve; so that whoever possesses the right of command receives it from no other source than from God, that supreme Prince of all.”—Cfr. J. A. Ryan, The State and the Church, pp. 2 sq., 26 sqq.

Yet, though political power is from God, Divine Revelation has not prescribed any particular form of government,⁵ but leaves men free to choose whichever form they prefer, and civil society is a moral entity precisely by the fact that it is based in part upon a free agreement, that it is sustained by the voluntary co-operation of its members, and that the individual finds within it ample scope for free activity. This liberty, however, like human liberty in general, is not merely legal, derived from positive law, but has its root in the divine will, and, ultimately, in the eternal and imperishable ideas of right and justice as they exist in God.

⁵ Rom. XIII, 1–7; 1 Pet. II, 13–19. Cfr. Linsenmann, Moraltheol., pp. 621 sqq.; G. v. Hertling, Kleine Schriften, pp. 41 sqq., 61 sqq., 91 sqq., 470 sqq.; M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 557 sqq.; J. A. Ryan, op. cit., p. 28 sq.

The influence of Christianity on the development of political life shows itself especially in this that the Church of Christ inculcates a higher conception of justice and goodness. She is the authorized interpreter of the natural law. And since the human race is not intended to work out its destiny exclusively on this earthly planet, but has a truly transcendental aim and purpose,⁶ the State does not contain its ultimate purpose within itself, in other words, it is not absolute, but merely a means to an end. This end is to help humanity reach its temporal and eternal destiny. “Nature did not fashion society with the intent that man should seek in it his last end, but that in it and through it he should find suitable means to attain to his own perfection.”⁷

⁶ Mark VIII, 36 sq.; Luke IX, 25; X, 42.—St. Augustine, Confess., l. I, c. 1: “Thou [Lord] dost stir us, that it may delight us to praise Thee, because Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it rests in Thee.” (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 661).

⁷ Leo XIII, Encycl. “Sapientiae Christianae,” Jan. 10, 1890: “Nature did not beget society for this reason, that man should pursue it as an end, but that in it and through it he should find helps suited to his perfection.”

2. The end or purpose of the State may be briefly described as the promotion of the public welfare (salus sive prosperitas publica). This means that the State must by proper laws and institutions insure the preservation of good morals and the proper government of families, inculcate respect for religion, enforce the demands of justice, secure the prosperity of business, trade, and commerce, etc., because upon the promotion of these things the welfare and happiness of civil society mainly depends.⁸

⁸ Cfr. Rom. XIII, 3 sq.—Cathrein, Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 525 sqq.—Leo XIII, Encycl. “Immortale Dei,” Nov. 1, 1885; IDEM, Encyclical letter “Rerum Novarum,” March 15, 1891.

The object of the State, therefore, is the preservation of civil society on the basis of justice and order. Still law and order are not the last and highest purpose, but means for the attainment of a still higher one, which is contained in the very destiny of man himself, namely, culture and civilization in the fullest and most perfect sense of the term. The State must create such conditions of law and order as are suitable to a nation’s state of culture and apt to lead the people to a still higher plane of morality. Law and order must be directed toward good morals. Hence it belongs to the State not only to protect its citizens against external and internal enemies, and to protect private property, but likewise to prevent and punish all public violations of morality and to promote every form of true culture and civilization,—education, religion, science and art.⁹

⁹ J. A. Ryan, The State and the Church, pp. 195 sqq.; Linsenmann, Moraltheologie, p. 620.

The State has its natural basis in nationality. But History shows that a nation (in the strict sense) can very well comprise several States, and that a State may comprise people of different nationalities. Both the undue suppression of national aspirations and the undue exaltation of the principle of nationality are moral defects and therefore illicit.¹⁰

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 615 sqq.—Cfr. Stöckl, Das Christentum, Vol. II, pp. 389 sqq.; W. Frind, Das sprachliche und sprachlich-nationale Recht in polyglotten Staaten und Ländern, Mayence 1899; W. Haidegger, Der nationale Gedanke im Lichte des Christentums, 2nd ed., Brixen, 1902; A. Vermeersch, S. J., Quaestiones de Iustitia, 2nd ed., pp. 6 sqq.

READINGS.—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 619 sqq.—V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 462 sqq.—IDEM, Die Staatsgewalt und ihre Grenzen, Freiburg i. B. 1882.—G. v. Hertling, Recht, Staat und Gesellschaft, Kempten 1906.—B. Seidel, Die Lehre des hl. Augustinus vom Staate, Breslau 1909.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 461 sqq., 507 sqq.—J. A. Ryan, The State and the Church, N. Y. 1922, pp. 62 sqq., 195 sqq., 221 sqq.—Th. Meyer, S.J., Inst. Iuris Nat., Vol. II, pp. 241 sqq., 266 sqq., 303 sqq.—J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, pp. 395 sqq., 433.—P. Tischleder, Ursprung und Träger der Staatsgewalt nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas und seiner Schule, M. Gladbach 1923.

1. The highest government official in a country, whether his title be emperor, king, or president, is the representative of God, appointed for the purpose of enforcing justice and promoting the common welfare.¹ St. Thomas² describes his duties in a classical passage as threefold: “(1) That he establish a good life among the subject multitude; (2) That he preserve what has been established; (3) That he promote what has been preserved toward better things.” The institutio bonae vitae comprises: (a) that the people live in unity of peace; (b) that, united by the bonds of peace, they be directed in doing good; (c) that by the industry and foresight of their ruler they be provided plentifully with the necessaries of life.³

¹ Rom. XIII, 3 sq.

² De Regimine Principum, l. I, c. 15.

³ Ibid.: “(a) That the multitude be established in the unity of peace; (b) that the multitude, united by the bond of peace, be directed to acting well; (c) that through the ruler’s industry there be a sufficient abundance of the things necessary for living well.”

The conservatio bonae vitae implies: (a) a just administration by, and a proper succession of, officials; (b) proper laws and precepts, re- wards to encourage civic virtue and punishments to deter the people from wrongdoing; (c) safety of the commonwealth against exterior and interior enemies.⁴ The promotio bonae vitae implies: (a) correcting crimes, misdemeanors, and serious faults; (b) supplying the things that are necessary for the welfare of the nation, and (c) introducing indispensable and advisable reforms.⁵ The principal duty of the regent is to dispense justice to all. Hence he must never violate justice, or permit others to violate it; he must render to each what is his due, reward or punish all according to their deserts, combine firmness with paternal kindness and charity, and be ever mindful of the account he will one day have to render to God.⁶

⁴ Ibid.: “(a) Care concerning the succession of men and the substitution of those who preside over the various offices; (b) that by his laws and precepts, punishments and rewards, he restrain the men subject to him from iniquity; (c) that the subject multitude be rendered safe against enemies.”

⁵ Ibid.: “(a) In each of the things set forth above, if anything is disordered, to correct it; (b) if anything is lacking, to supply it; (c) if anything can be done better, to bring it to completion.”—Cfr. Aug. Lehmkuhl, Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., n. 952.

⁶ Ps. II, 10, 12; Wisd. I, 1; VI, 2–4; VI, 7; cfr. Jas. II, 13.

“The right to rule,” says Leo XIII, “is not necessarily bound up with any special mode of government. It may take this or that form, provided only that it be of a nature to insure the general welfare. But whatever be the nature of the government, rulers must always bear in mind that God is the paramount Ruler of the world, and must set Him before themselves as their exemplar and law in the administration of the State.... They, therefore, who rule, should rule with even-handed justice, not as masters, but rather as fathers, for the rule of God over man is most just, and is tempered always with a father’s kindness. Government should, moreover, be administered for the well-being of the citizens, because they who govern others possess authority solely for the welfare of the State. Furthermore, the civil power must not be subservient to the advantage of any one individual or of some few persons, inasmuch as it was established for the common good of all. But if those who are in authority rule unjustly, if they govern overbearingly or arrogantly, and if their measures prove hurtful to the people, they must remember that the Almighty will one day bring them to account, the more strictly in proportion to the sacredness of their office and the pre-eminence of their dignity.”⁷

⁷ Encyclical “Immortale Dei,” Nov. 1, 1885: “The right of command is not of itself necessarily joined to any form of commonwealth: it can rightly assume this form or that, provided it is in fact effective for the common utility and good. But in every kind of commonwealth princes must altogether look to God, the supreme Governor of the world, and set Him before themselves as an exemplar and law in administering the state.... Government, therefore, ought to be just, not masterly, but as it were paternal, because God’s most just power over men is joined with paternal goodness.... But if those who are in authority slip into unjust domination, if they sin through arrogance or pride, if they take bad counsel for the people, let them know that they will someday have to render an account to God, and that the reckoning will be so much stricter, the more sacred the office in which they have been engaged or the higher the degree of dignity they have obtained.”—Cfr. J. A. Ryan, The State and the Church, pp. 3, 26 sqq.

Least of all is a ruler permitted to employ his power against God, i. e., to the detriment of religion;—on the contrary, it is one of his first and most sacred duties to protect and foster religion, inasmuch as fidelity to God and to His holy law is a necessary condition of the temporal no less than of the spiritual welfare and prosperity of nations as well as individuals.⁸

⁸ Ibid., pp. 4 sqq., 29 sqq. Cfr. Ecclus. XIX, 18; 1 Tim. IV, 8.

“All who rule,” says Leo XIII, “should hold in honor the holy name of God, and one of their chief duties must be to favor religion, to protect it, to shield it under the credit and sanction of the laws, and neither to organize nor enact any measure that may compromise its safety. This is the bounden duty of rulers to the people over whom they rule.”⁹

⁹ Encyclical “Immortale Dei”: “The name of God must be holy among princes; and it must be placed among their chief duties to embrace religion with favor, to protect it with benevolence, to cover it with the authority and sanction of the laws, and neither to institute nor decree anything contrary to its safety. They owe this also to the citizens over whom they preside.” (Ryan, op. cit., pp. 4 sq., 29 sqq.)

2. Public officials are the organs of the supreme ruler and entrusted with the duty of promoting the welfare of the people in their respective spheres, whether these be large or small.¹⁰

¹⁰ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 67–71; Lehmkuhl, Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., n. 960–987.

The statement is frequently made in the United States that public officials are merely public servants. This, says Dr. Ryan, is incorrect. “They are, indeed, the servants of the people, but they are also something more. Inasmuch as their function is that of public service, they may properly be regarded as public servants; inasmuch as their position gives them the authority to enact laws which are morally binding on the people, they are not servants, but masters. Their character as public servants does not depend upon the fact that they are elected by the people; for hereditary kings are likewise bound to serve the common welfare. In a republic the members of legislatures may in a special sense be regarded as servants of the people, whenever they are instructed by the electors to carry out certain political policies. Their promise to pursue this course creates a particular responsibility to the people, and renders their position analogous to that of servants or agents. Nevertheless, they are masters and rulers when they enact the legislation necessary to carry out the policies to which they have committed themselves.”¹¹

¹¹ The State and the Church, p. 263.

One of the primary duties of public officials, according to the same writer, is “to possess an adequate knowledge of what constitutes the common welfare and of the means by which it is best promoted. This obligation is disregarded by a large proportion of those who seek public office. Men who are otherwise conscientious assume that good will and right motives are a sufficient equipment for public service. When we consider the enormously extended functions of the modern State, the numerous and profound ways in which its activities affect the welfare of all the people, and the consequent complexity of legislating and governing wisely, we see that this notion is utterly mistaken. Only in local governments and subordinate official positions is it true that common honesty plus common sense suffice for those who are charged with the duty of caring for the public welfare. In all the more important legislative and executive officers a considerable amount of special and specific knowledge is essential to an adequate discharge of official obligations.”¹²

¹² Ryan, op. cit., p. 262.

Other important duties of public officials are: fidelity and conscientiousness in fulfilling the particular obligations of their state and impartiality in the administration of justice.¹³ They should also strive to be models of all other Christian virtues, especially of prudence, mildness, and benevolence. Here, too, what St. Paul says is true, that “love is the fulfilling of the law.”¹⁴ If public officials intentionally or out of culpable ignorance violate the rights of the people, or cause them material damage, they are guilty of sin and must make restitution. Thus, for example, a judge who, in a gravely culpable way, either because of ignorance or carelessness, has pronounced an unjust judgment, must repair the damage that results therefrom, because he is in duty bound to administer his office fairly and justly. If he has erred without grave fault, he is bound to correct his mistake as far as lies within his power.

¹³ Ex. XXIII, 2 sq., 6 sqq.; Lev. XIX, 15, 35; XXIV, 22; Deut. I, 17; XVI, 18 sq.; XXIV, 17; XXV, 1 sq.; Ps. LXXXI, 3 sq.; Is. I, 17; XXXII, 1; LVI, 1; Jer. XXII, 3; Zach. VIII, 16; Wisd. I, 1; Ecclus. XX, 31; Rom. XIII, 3 sq.; Jas. II, 1–9.—St. Augustine, De Civit. Dei, l. IV, c. 4: “Justice removed, what are kingdoms but great robberies? For what are robberies themselves but little kingdoms?” (Migne, P. L., XLI, 115).—Cicero, De Offic., l. II, c. 11: “Such is the power of [justice] that not even those who feed upon wrongdoing and crime can live without some particle of justice.”

¹⁴ Rom. XIII, 10; cfr. Zach. VIII, 19; Eph. IV, 15; Col. III, 14.—Sallust, Iugurth., 10: “By concord small things grow; by discord the greatest things fall apart.”

“The man who regards public office as an opportunity for private gain, except incidentally and as a necessary consequence of faithful public service, is false to his trust and violates legal justice. To accept a bribe for aid in the enactment of a bad law, for negligent or oppressive administration of the law, or for unjust judicial conduct, is an evident moral wrong. To obtain some advantage on the occasion of proper official actions, for example, through some form of ‘graft,’ is likewise a violation of legal justice. Such conduct is generally forbidden by the civil law; at any rate, it renders right judgment and adequate performance of official duties extremely difficult. Public officials are not justified in exposing themselves to such a grave temptation. What is true of their own private advantage, applies also to that of their friends. In their enactment or administration of the law they may not extend favors of any sort to any individual or class of individuals. The common good must be preferred to the good of individuals, and all individuals must be treated with exact justice.”¹⁵

¹⁵ J. A. Ryan, The State and the Church, pp. 260 sq.

What would become of a State without justice? It would fall to pieces, for injustice breeds anarchy, and anarchy causes the disruption of all social bonds. When a State departs from the laws of justice, therefore, it courts destruction.

Every public official ought to be a vessel and an organ for the manifestation of justice within the sphere of his jurisdiction. He must be incorruptible, because justice cannot coexist with bribery. He must be impartial, for without impartiality his judgments would be unjust. He must be unselfish, for selfishness would render him susceptible to bribery. He must be discreet, for without discretion he cannot acquire and hold the confidence either of his superior or of the public. He must be diligent and punctual in the performance of his duties, else he cannot be a model to others. He must be chaste and temperate in all things, for he who is guilty of immoderate indulgence in the pleasures of the flesh can be neither assiduous nor impartial. Where would a slave of lust find the courage to sacrifice himself for the welfare of his country?¹⁶ He must be a man of superior culture, for without true culture there can be no wisdom, without wisdom no religion, without religion neither justice nor true benevolence.

¹⁶ J. M. Sailer, Handbuch der christl. Moral, Vol. III, p. 51, note 1: “History and philosophy both admit the influence of the current immorality on the conduct of public business.”—Tacitus says: “Nothing honorable resides in a mind corrupted by lust.”—Aristotle asks: “What difference does it make whether women govern, or whether those who govern are governed by women?”—Cfr. Polit., l. II, c. 9 (Op., II, 1269; III, 629).

The most indispensable qualities of a true statesman are: justice, wisdom, incorruptibility, and discretion; and the higher his office, the greater is his responsibility, and the more assiduously should he cultivate these virtues.

As justice is the very life and foundation of the State, and its administration is formally entrusted to the judges, their duties demand a special treatment.

a) A judge can pronounce official judgment only in matters over which the law gives him jurisdiction.

b) He must be familiar with the law so that he can apply it correctly to the concrete cases submitted for his decision.

c) He must be guided by a firm purpose of administering justice and, therefore, love justice above all things, as the embodiment of the divine will.

d) He must render his decisions according to the letter of the law, but never against its spirit, for this would be to disregard its very essence.

e) He must examine every case without prejudice, and preserve this impartial attitude until he has rendered judgment.

f) He must hear and examine all witnesses who are able and willing to tell the truth, and discount the testi- mony of those who are incompetent or addicted to falsehood.

g) He must adhere to the prescribed formalities in pronouncing judgment, for they are of the essence of the law.

h) He must protect right and justice against the prejudice and selfishness of minor officials; against interference by unauthorized outsiders; against prevarications on the part of lawyers, and, if necessary, also against usurpation by the rich and by the mob.

All this demands courage, wisdom, and fortitude of an altogether exceptional kind.¹⁷

¹⁷ F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. II, pp. 432 sqq.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, De Regimine Principum, l. I, c. 15 sqq.—IDEM, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 67 sqq.—Leo XIII, Encyclical “Immortale Dei,” of Nov. 1, 1885; English translation in The Pope and the People, London 1912, pp. 71 sqq. and in J. A. Ryan, The State and the Church, pp. 1 sqq.—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. IV, n. 192 sqq. (ed. Gaudé, II, 625 sqq.).—J. Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, pp. 177 sqq.—J. M. Sailer, Handbuch der christl. Moral, Vol. III, pp. 21 sqq., 50 sqq.—J. P. Gury, S.J., Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. II, n. 1 sqq.—J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, pp. 415 sq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 325 sqq.—Th. Meyer, S.J., Inst. Iuris Nat., Vol. II, pp. 536 sqq., 584 sqq.

1. The first duty of a citizen is obedience to legitimate authority and to the laws passed by that authority. For, as St. Paul says, he that resists legitimate authority, resists the ordinance of God and purchases for himself eternal damnation.¹

¹ Rom. XIII, 2; cfr. 1 Pet. II, 13–15; Tit. III, 1.—J. P. Gury, S. J., Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. II, n. 1–18.

“The Catholic Church, as well as natural reason, teaches that civil law obliges in conscience. The ultimate basis of this obligation is the natural law; the immediate basis is the authority of the State. Civil laws of importance are gravely obligatory, unless the legislator formally intends their binding force to be slight. The general teaching of moral theologians is that a law is not binding without at least the implicit intention of the legislator. Some civil laws may be purely penal, but their number is probably small.”²

² Ryan, The State and the Church, Ch. XII, “Moral Obligation of Civil Law,” pp. 244–259.—Cfr. Matth. XVII, 23–26; XXII, 21; Rom. XIII, 6 sq.; 1 Pet. II, 17.

Obedience to the law should be inspired by a sincere respect and reverence, which, of course, presupposes confidence in the lawgiver and faith in the sanctity of the law itself—a confidence and a faith which, unfortunately, modern lawgivers themselves too often undermine.

The individual citizen has the duty to employ the rights and liberties he enjoys under the law in a manner conducive to the public welfare. This means that he must choose for himself a useful profession or occupation, conscientiously perform his duties as a member of his family and of the profession and political community to which he belongs, and take part in public affairs according to the measure of his talent, his professional duties, his physical strength, and his material means.

a) The extent to which a citizen is obliged to participate in politics depends on the constitution of the particular State to which he belongs and on the answer to the question whether it is necessary for him to make his influence felt in public life in order to safeguard liberty, civilization, and religion. Sometimes the interests of religion require that all good citizens should throw their influence into the political balance, and occasionally the individual citizen is compelled to defend himself against unjust aggression on the part of the State. In that case, as St. Peter says, “we ought to obey God rather than men.”³

³ Acts V, 29.

b) Fidelity to one’s country attains its climax in the virtue of patriotism, which is one of the noblest forms of charity.

In the natural order, says St. Thomas, “we observe that the part naturally exposes itself to safeguard the whole; as, for instance, the hand is without deliberation exposed to the blow for the whole body’s safety. And since reason copies nature, we find the same inclination among the social virtues; for it behooves the virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of death for the conservation of the whole State.” And again: “Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways, according to their various excellences and the various benefits received from them. On both counts God holds first place, for He is supremely excellent and is for us the first principle of being and government. In the second place, the principles of our being and government are our parents and our country, that have given us birth and nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country, after God.... The worship given to our country includes homage to all our fellow-citizens and to all the friends of our country.”⁴

⁴ Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 60, art. 5: “We see that the part naturally exposes itself for the preservation of the whole, just as the hand is exposed to a blow without deliberation for the preservation of the whole body. And because reason imitates nature, we find an imitation of this kind in the political virtues. For it belongs to the virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of death for the preservation of the whole commonwealth.”—Ibid., qu. 101, art. 1: “A man becomes a debtor to others in different ways according to their diverse excellence and the diverse benefits received from them. In both respects God holds the highest place, who both is most excellent and is for us the first principle of being and government; secondarily, however, the principles of our being and government are our parents and our country, by whom and in which we were born and nourished. And therefore after God a man is most indeb- ted to his parents and country. Hence, just as it pertains to religion to offer worship to God, so in the second degree it pertains to piety to offer homage to parents and country.... In the homage paid to one’s country is understood homage to all fellow-citizens and all friends of the country. And therefore piety principally extends to this.”

2283. • Those who are over others, these Divine Wisdom itself gravely admonishes in this manner: "Give ear, you who contain multitudes, and please yourselves in the crowds of nations: because power has been given to you by the Lord, and strength by the Most High, who will interrogate your works, and search out your thoughts: because when you were ministers of his kingdom, you did not judge rightly, nor keep the law of justice, nor walk according to the will of God. Horribly and quickly he will appear to you: because a most hard judgment will be made for those who are over others. For mercy is conceded to the little one: but the powerful shall powerfully suffer torments" (Wis. 6:3-7).

This most grave admonition having been premised, behold what things seem to have to be said summarily both concerning the offices of PRINCES and of those who possess supreme power; and concerning the offices of LEGISLATORS and of those who are over some multitude.¹⁰

2284. • A PRINCE and anyone marked with supreme power, according to the doctrine of the Apostle, "is the minister of God unto good." But since the good of human society is DOUBLE, namely spiritual or moral, and temporal, the following things must be established.

Principles. I. A PRINCE, and anyone ruling, is held TO FOSTER in those subject to him the sense of religion, and good morals. The reason is because, religion and fidelity toward God having been taken away, fidelity itself toward the prince collapses, and supreme power, without which no order in society can subsist, is necessarily brought into contempt. For civil life is defended by religion alone, and no force or human law can efficaciously impel an irreligious multitude to an honorable and truly upright tenor of life.¹¹

Therefore the Prince and whoever acts in his PLACE ought:

1. To furnish a good example in all those things which regard religion and honesty of morals; and since "the whole world is formed according to the example of the King," the leader of the people would stain himself with the enormous crime of prevarication if by his own evil example he induced those subject to him into contempt of religion and corruption of morals.

2. He ought to choose suitable counselors and ministers, whom doctrine and goodness of life make truly commendable, and first of all (if he possesses the right of election from the Holy See) good Bishops, and upright instructors of studious youth (cf. n. 2244 and 712).

3. He ought to use his power for the protection of religion and of the Church, not because he boldly arrogates ecclesiastical authority to himself, or decrees those things which regard faith and religion; but because he strives to be a help to the sacred Ministers to whom the care of the Church has been committed by Christ: by taking care that reverence be exhibited to the divine precepts and to men enrolled in the sacred militia, that public violations of divine law be prevented, that sowers of new religions be warded off, as also those evil books and journals by which damage is brought upon holy Faith and good morals. "For evil books," says St. Alphonsus, "plot ruin for kingdoms."¹² (cf. n. 451).

2285. • II. A PRINCE and anyone ruling is held TO PROVIDE for public felicity and security by just and opportune means. The reason is because public felicity or prosperity is the end of government, not indeed the primary end, but the secondary, according to that of Matthew: "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added to you." - Whence, a prince would sin if he placed over the republic ignorant and unskilled ministers, if he burdened subjects more than is equitable, if he did not protect them from enemies or unjust vexations¹³ (Recall what was said nn. 138, 147-150, 653, 729, 749, 873, 922, 965, 978, 983, 1188).

Note. Since St. Alphonsus depicts in few words the form of a good prince, it is helpful to transcribe his words here, especially because ALL who PRESIDE over a multitude or community to be ruled can take from it an example for imitating. - Behold the salutary words of the holy Doctor:¹⁴

1. A good Prince, for the exercise of good government, has God always present to himself, and he sets those things which regard the divine glory before all political reasons.

2. He abhors flatterers, and loves truthful men, and desires that this horror and love of his become known to all.

3. He uses equity toward all, every passion and party-zeal being removed.

4. He does not decree matters of greater moment except after a prior and serious inquiry.

5. In doubtful matters, he has recourse to the counsel of the prudent.

6. He is most cautious in selecting for himself wise and upright counselors.

7. Once counsel has been accepted which he judges to be good, he is wholly intent on this, that he execute the matter strongly, unless clear reasons supervene which persuade the contrary; for to change counsel with a just reason is not weakness of mind, but laudable prudence.

8. If he hears someone praised or accused, he is slow to believe, and weighs whether the reporter, moved by some advantage of his own, is incited to speak thus.

2286. • Besides supreme governors, there concur for making laws or Decrees both Senators and Deputies (or Counselors) elected by the Prince or by the people in a representative Government, and the electors themselves. Wherefore we establish the following:

Principles. I. Those ELECTED to the office of MAKING LAWS are held to attend, not to what here and now pleases the prince or the multitude, but to what is just, and congruous with the common good of all. For civil law is not just because it is a fugitive decree of the will of the prince or of the people (as pleased certain innovators); but because it is a stable prescription, by which the supreme Power reasonably commands, prohibits, or establishes something, for the common temporal good of the citizens without detriment to spiritual good. - And what we say here concerning laws is valid, by a like reason, for Decrees and any Statutes whatsoever. (Recall what was said n. 153 sqq.) - Sometimes, however, Senators, Deputies, and Counselors can admit certain things less right (which are not intrinsically evil) and strengthen them by their vote, that worse things may be excluded; provided that they do this with a protestation of their right intention¹ (cf. n. 202).

Hence: - 1. Participants in legislative power SIN (for the most part gravely), if they do not bring due knowledge and diligence to so great an office; and most gravely indeed, if knowingly they lend their effort or assent to unjust laws or decrees. - Whence, it can happen that they are held to the reparation of damages. Indeed, theological fault and effective influence being supposed, whoever abstains from casting a vote is liable to restitution, when he ought to cast it by reason of the office which he freely accepted by quasi-contract, and by which he bound himself to protecting the public or private good. - Recall what was said n. 983 sqq. - Concerning excommunication, see n. 1320 sqq.

2. Those elected, or to be elected, if they are suitable for so great an office, and no other suitable persons are found, are held to subject themselves to election. And indeed, if someone is sometimes held to consult the good of private persons, how much more the good and safety of the whole community.²

2287. • II. Upon ELECTORS, in a legitimate government, there lies the grave office of ELECTING UPRIGHT Deputies, whether communal, or provincial, or political. - Whence, other circumstances being set aside, not only do positive cooperators sin, namely those who vote for evil men; but also negative cooperators, who by not concurring knowingly are the cause why evil men are elected; for from legal justice each one is held, insofar as he can, to avert evil from the republic, if any hope of averting it shines forth. But no one is ignorant how many and how great evils are brought into both religious and civil society by wicked Deputies, especially by those who are enrolled in the Masonic sect³ (cf. n. 989).

We have said in a legitimate government; for, if it is asked whether it is lawful, in a usurped kingdom, to vote in elections and to sit in an assembly of legislators, authors disagree. Some indeed affirm, especially if society is in extremities, and ruin threatens religion. - But others deny that it is right, because such concurrence cannot be furnished without scandal, nor without injustice, since to elect DEPUTIES and to exercise PUBLIC OFFICES is the same as to sustain the person of the usurper, to make laws with him, and to share the government. And hence it was that PIUS IX wholly disapproved a concurrence of this kind, especially for the Pontifical Dominion, in a Brief issued 29 January 1877, and already before in a Declaration made on 18 June 1874... Otherwise, however, if the question is only of electing municipal and provincial COUNSELORS; for these protect only the affairs of the Community, or the good of the Province, nor do they make laws, but they undergo them, not otherwise than the other citizens. - Finally others proceed by a middle way and teach more truly that account must be taken of places, persons, times, and circumstances, which, since they can be diverse, can also lead to diverse conclusions. Therefore with these we say: If, with the right of the legitimate prince preserved, grave damages can be averted from society, citizens have the right and the office of electing upright men, who may keep watch over the common good; if probable hope of promoting a greater good is lacking, it will be better to abstain from political concurrence; especially if the right of the legitimate prince would thereby be injured. But to define the matter belongs to the prince himself⁴ (cf. n. 150, q. 2).

2288. • IT IS ASKED. Whether it is lawful to elect an UNWORTHY man in order to exclude a MOST UNWORTHY man?

Resp. Some with Hurtado deny; for it is evil to will and to choose evil; and if evils are not to be done that goods may come about, a fortiori evils are not to be done that lesser evils may come about; for that is intrinsically evil, and prohibited by the law of nature. To this belongs that saying: "Let the world perish, but let justice be done." - Others with Lugo affirm; for it is lawful to take counsel for a lesser evil, that a greater may be avoided. And then an evil man is not properly chosen because he is evil or for evil; but he is chosen for this, that he may impede greater damages, which is good. And this cannot be said to be evil intrinsically and per se, since in the present case it has the character of good; for it is a diminution of evil. - Finally, others readily concede this, if not only is evil diminished by such an election, but some good is intended and hoped from the one to be elected, as if through him Catholics are able to obtain that liberty by which the evil enjoy themselves.⁵

2289. • To the present order chiefly pertain: 1. Ministers of princes, and Prefects of provinces; 2. Leaders of the military; 3. Syndics or rectors of communities. - Concerning each, a few things.

I. Concerning Ministers. - Standing between the prince and the people, MINISTERS owe to the prince truth and service in all things which look to good government; but to the people they owe the faithful and equitable execution of the common law. Whence they make themselves guilty of infidelity: 1) if they conceal from the prince, whose eyes and hands they are, those things the knowledge of which right administration requires for itself; 2) if they bring contempt or hatred of the government upon the people by vicious administration, whether by too great negligence or severity, or by injury to distributive justice in the application of the law, or in the distribution of burdens or favors; 3) if they execute commands certainly unjust. For where the injustice of the command is certain and grave, execution ought to be deferred, until the prince or Superior, having been reverently admonished, corrects the error. But if, admonished, he refuses to correct it, or if admonition is impossible, surely God must be obeyed, and not men.

And these same things, proportion being preserved, are valid concerning Prefects of provinces, concerning delegates to foreign princes, and concerning all other ministers of the executive Power.

2290. • II. Concerning leaders of the military. Leaders of the military, besides suitable KNOWLEDGE and SKILL, which they are held to acquire and to have, are bound by several other obligations, both toward the prince and toward the soldiers.⁶

1. Toward the Prince (and the nation), they ought to preserve inviolate FIDELITY and JUSTICE. - Whence, they cannot desert military service, especially in time of war, except by the consent of the prince. They are held to fight strongly; they would be perjured if they fled over to the enemies, or entered clandestine counsels with them. - They would sin against justice by pretending absent soldiers to be present, or by retaining the pay of dead soldiers.

2. Toward soldiers, as good fathers of families they ought to keep watch that nothing be lacking to them, whether as to soul, or as to body: let them impede, as far as it can be done, single combats, drunkennesses, quarrels, impurities, thefts. They sin gravely if, without necessity, they prescribe military exercises on Sundays and feast days, especially at the hour of Mass; for they impede the soldiers from performing the principal duty of religion. - Likewise, they sin gravely if they rashly enter battle, or expose the life of soldiers without a just cause. Recall what was said concerning Duel and War (n. 745 sqq.).

2291. • III. Concerning Syndics. "The Syndics of Communities, and their assistants, have their obligations, and indeed most grave ones; since they have been deputed by law as rectors and guardians of Communities, namely that they may protect their goods and rights and the observance of laws, if these are just. - Therefore, they sin gravely and are held concerning damages, if, acceptors of persons, they choose unsuitable men for public offices; if they do not restrain the wicked; if, when able, they do not impede scandals; if they squander the goods of the Community; if they hold the things which belong to religion as almost nothing; and coerce its free exercise, pervert rights, or furnish assistance to those who usurp them.

Concerning these things, sometimes, though prudently, public administrators are to be questioned by the confessor; for not rarely such men confess, as it is said, the sins of Charles, and are silent about the sins of Caesar: that is, they confess the things which they committed as private persons, not those which they perpetrated as deputed to public offices.⁷ - This the Most Holy Lord, Our Lord Pope LEO XIII specifically reproves, solemnly declaring:⁸ "it is not lawful to follow one form of duty privately, another publicly, namely so that the authority of the Church is observed in private life, and rejected in public. For this would be to join honorable and base things, and to make a man fight with himself, whereas, on the contrary, he ought always to be consistent with himself, and in no matter nor in any kind of life to fall away from Christian virtue."

But here the more general question, and one especially useful for practice, comes to be treated:

2292. • QUESTION. WHETHER A PRAETOR, or another PREFECT of the republic, can sometimes commit an UNJUST LAW to execution?

Resp. By reason of obtaining a greater good, or avoiding a greater evil, the execution of an unjust law sometimes becomes lawful. But for this it is required: 1) that the object of the law not be intrinsically evil; 2) that the one injured in his own right, because an unjust law is observed, can and wishes to assent to the injury of his right, or at least that, with the order of charity so commanding, he is not reasonably unwilling.

Wherefore: 1. It is not lawful for the praetor or judge to urge the application of an unjust law, if its execution has been committed to their discretion.

2. If any law is opposed to the rights and liberty of the Church, its execution, when the Church contradicts in the particular case, can in no way whatever be urged, not even under the pretext of obtaining a greater good, or avoiding a greater evil, since the Church alone is judge of those things which are more fitting for herself.

3. If the execution of an unjust law becomes a little harmful to some third party, but its neglected application very harmful to the praetor or judge, the law can be urged: especially if the damage to the third party cannot be avoided, because, one praetor failing, another will not be lacking who will furnish his effort (cf. n. 526).

270. The limits within which intervention is to be made in all these matters are determined by the end itself or the cause of intervening: "the same cause," says Leo XIII, "which asks the help of laws, determines the limits." Therefore:

1. "It is not right, as we have said, for the citizen or the family to be absorbed by the republic; it is equitable that the faculty of acting with liberty be permitted to each, as much as can be done with the common good unharmed and without injury to anyone."

Pius XI has most recently applied this to the various groups and associations of orders: "Just as those things which can be accomplished by individual men by their own initiative and their own industry must not be taken away from them and handed over to the community, so also those things which can be effected and furnished by lesser and inferior communities, to call these away to a greater and higher society is at once an injury, a grave damage, and a disturbance of right order; since every social work by its force and nature ought to bring aid to the members of the social body, but never to destroy and absorb them.

"Therefore the supreme authority of the republic ought to permit affairs and concerns of lesser moment, by which otherwise it would be especially detained, to be dispatched by inferior groups; by which it will happen that it may execute more freely, strongly, and efficaciously all those things which pertain to it alone, as things which it alone can furnish: by directing, watching over, urging, restraining, according as the case bears and necessity demands."

2. The common good is to be promoted of the whole society and of the individual parts, as Leo XIII shows: "Those who command must see to it that they protect the community and its parts. The community indeed, since nature has entrusted it to the supreme power to be preserved, to such a degree that the guarding of public safety is not only the supreme law but the whole cause and reason of rulership; the parts, moreover, because both philosophy and the Christian faith equally agree that the administration of the republic by nature pertains not to the utility of those to whom it has been entrusted, but to those who have been entrusted. And since the faculty of commanding proceeds from God, and is a certain communication of His supreme principate, it must be carried on according to the example of divine power, which consults with paternal care no less for singular things than for universal things.⁷ If, therefore, any detriment has been brought or threatens either to common affairs or to the interests of individual orders, which cannot be healed or prevented in another way, it is necessary that it be met by public authority."

⁷ St. Thomas already has the same thing, De Reg. princ., I, c. 12 at the end: "Let the king know that he has taken up this office, that he be in the kingdom as the soul in the body and as God in the world"; and c. 15 at the beginning: "The king, just as he ought to be subject to the dominion and governance which is administered through the office of the priesthood, so also ought to preside over all human offices and order them by the command of his rule."

3. In warding off evil, "not more things must be undertaken by laws, nor must progress be made farther, than the healing of inconveniences or the repulsion of danger requires."

Thus in governing society, the middle way must be held between socialism, which takes away the liberty of individuals and contends that all things be defined by the State, and individualism or liberalism, which thinks that the State is composed of individuals alone, with intermediate associations removed, in such a way that, says Pius XI, "almost only individual men and the republic remained, to no small detriment of the republic itself, which, having lost the form of social governance and having taken up all the burdens which those destroyed associations formerly bore, has been overwhelmed and oppressed by affairs and offices almost infinite."

271. Notice. — The civil State by which intervention is to be made in the aforesaid matters and limits is any State whatever, and not the State insofar as it exists under a special form in this or that people: for the motive of intervention is by no means the quality or particular form of the State, but the natural requirement itself of things. Hence Leo XIII: "By republic in this place we understand not the republic such as one or another people uses, but such as right reason, congruent with nature, both wills, and the documents of divine wisdom approve."

This text of the holy Pontiff could not be understood in that sense in which some would wish, that the ideal State alone intervenes, and one which is already perfect. Such an interpretation is contrary to the obvious sense itself, and to the very nature of the matter; for a) the intervention of which it has been spoken is an office derived from the nature of things, and on that account imprescriptible; — b) if the interpretation which we reject were true, there would have been no need for the Pontiff to demand this part of the remedy from the State, since the perfect State already furnishes all those things which the holy Pontiff recalls as to be furnished; — c) he would also have spoken in vain, since now nowhere in the world does such a perfect State exist in fact. It is added that such an interpretation is opposed to the common doctrine of the scholastics.

From natural law and positive divine law we are held by the title of piety to render reverence and obedience to our civil superiors. For they bear the place of God himself in the temporal order toward us. Thus indeed the Apostle to the Romans xiii, 1 and following: "Let every soul be subject to higher powers. For there is no power except from God, and those which are, have been ordained by God. Therefore he who resists the power, resists the ordinance of God. But those who resist acquire damnation for themselves. For he (the Prince) is the minister of God, an avenger unto wrath to him who does evil. Therefore be subject of necessity, not only on account of wrath, but also on account of conscience."

For this reason the Catechism of the Council of Trent compares and joins this obligation with that by which we are bound toward paternal and ecclesiastical authority. For in part III, on the fourth commandment, § 15, after it has taught that parents and ecclesiastical superiors are to be honored, it adds: "Likewise concerning Kings, Princes, Magistrates, and the rest to whose power we are subject. For if we attribute any honor to them, it is referred to God; for an excellent degree of dignity has the veneration of men, because it is like divine power: in which also we venerate the providence of God, who attributed to them the administration of public office, and uses them as ministers of his power." - I Pet. ii, 15. - St. Justin, Apol. I, 17. - St. Augustine, on Ps. 124, n. 7; de Civitate Dei, lib. V, 10, 11, 14, 15.

"But now a society can neither exist nor be understood in which someone does not moderate the wills of individuals, so that one thing may be made, as it were, out of many, and impel them rightly and in order toward the common good; therefore God willed that in civil society there should be those who would command the multitude. And that also has great force, that those by whose authority the republic is administered ought to be able to compel citizens to obey in such a way that it is plainly a sin for them not to obey. But no man has in himself or from himself that by which he can constrain the free will of others with bonds of this kind of command. That power belongs only to God, creator and legislator of all things: those who exercise it must necessarily exercise it as communicated to them by God. ... From which it will be necessary for citizens to be subject and obedient to princes as to God, not so much from fear of punishments as from reverence for majesty, nor for the sake of flattery, but from conscience of duty." - Leo XIII, Diuturnum illud.

Hence the response is also clear to the question: Can there ever be for citizens a cause for not obeying? "That one cause exists for men not to obey, if something is demanded by them which openly conflicts with natural or divine right: for in all things in which the law of nature or the will of God is violated, it is equally wicked to command and to do. Therefore if it should happen to someone that he is compelled to choose one of the two, namely either to neglect the commands of God or those of princes, Jesus Christ must be obeyed, who commands rendering the things that are Caesar's to Caesar, and the things that are God's to God." - Nor are citizens therefore to be accused of having cast off authority: "for if the will of princes fights with the will of God and his laws, they exceed the measure of their power, and pervert justice, nor then can their authority have force, since, where justice is not present, it is null." Diuturnum illud.

Legislation is the work of men who are clothed with power and who in fact govern the state. Whence it follows in practice that the character of laws depends on the character of these men more than on the virtue of that power. Laws, namely, will be either good or evil according as the legislators themselves are imbued with good or evil principles, and allow themselves to be led by prudence or passion. Therefore one must resist by any legal and honorable means the abuse of legislation: laws hostile to God and religion are in no way to be approved; indeed they are to be disapproved by all prudent men.

Generally citizens enjoying the right of suffrage are held to use that right duly. The reason is that each one according to his strength is held to impede evils and to promote good things. The Sacred Penitentiary, December 1, 1866, responded that nothing stands in the way of Bishops and Ordinaries, on the occasion of elections, whenever they shall have been required for this, recalling to the mind of the people that each one of the faithful according to his strength is held to impede evils and to promote good things. "Is it not the duty of each Catholic to use the political arms which are in his hand for defending [the Church], for containing political systems within their own dominion and compelling them, after they have rendered to the Church what is owed to her, for the rest to leave her quiet?" - Pius X, Encycl. Letter Notre Charge Apostolique - cf. Scavini. The precept of electing upright deputies, whether municipal or political, presses upon all electors in every legitimate government and, other circumstances being excluded, not only do those sin who give suffrage to bad men, but also those who by not taking part are the cause that bad men are elected by others: each one is held to avert evil from the republic, if there is hope.

But how great evils and how great good things come to the state when laws are made by enemies of the Church, or by her friends, history testifies. Besides, the present condition of things, to be lamented in many regions, is derived from the fact that Catholics remained idle in political action. Now this obligation of using one's right in many cases can be grave, namely if on one side the danger of grave harm is imminent and on the other side suffrage seems likely to be efficacious. It must be noted that political leaders greatly fear votes; and they desire that these be given for themselves. And although it is not of itself a grave sin not to vote, if the bad party undoubtedly has the greater number, certainly one must not therefore abstain from voting: for the action and voting of good men gradually takes away the security of bad men, and instills anxiety in them; and thus they will not always perpetrate the same graver evils by making iniquitous laws. Yet if it is certain that the evil to come from the influence of this candidate is grave, and it is doubtful whether even my action and voting can decide the matter, it seems that in such a case it must be said that I sin gravely by omitting suffrage. Namely individual good men in this hypothesis are held to bring help and procure the election of good men. "An obligation," says Palmieri, "is present: but unless it affects individuals, in reality there will be none." - Op. Th. Mor., tract. IX, n. 640, v. 4, ed. III.

Therefore, whenever citizens give their votes in public assemblies: "favor is to be given to men of proved virtue, who will merit well of the Christian name." - Leo XIII, Sapientiae Christianae.

But if someone gives votes to an unworthy man about to act against the Church or good morals, precisely for this end, that an iniquitous law may be made, he sins gravely. In general, when my cooperation directly and certainly has influence upon such evils so that without it these things would not occur, my cooperation is formal. Yet this case will be rare, but must not be called impossible.

But if an election is to be made between a notable enemy of the Church and another who is at least less unworthy, suffrage must be given to this one, since he is going to do less evil, and so by your action you avoid the greater evil; indeed you can also act publicly to obtain his election.

It must especially be taken care that the leaders themselves of the district, of the city, as they are called, are ruled by true principles. For these exercise the greatest influence and not rarely by their work decide the election. Therefore just as these can much more easily sin gravely than ordinary electors, so also they can more easily promote the good.

The law concerning not buying or selling votes seems to be penal, for there is no proportion between penalty and fault. This notwithstanding, he who sells his vote not rarely incurs a sufficiently great danger of infamy, which renders him and his own people wretched. Voluntarily to undergo such a danger appears to us to be a grave fault. But if one political party simply and obstinately buys votes, certainly those introducing this abuse sin gravely; nor is it remarkable if the other party, as if compelled, does the same, otherwise one and the same worse party will always occupy the highest magistracies. It matters much that the electorate be pure, and all things are to be done for obtaining this end; nevertheless it is wicked to say that justice is gravely violated by the fact that here and there an elector holds his vote for sale. Therefore he would not be compelled to restore the price.

The certain rule is that these rites are not to be permitted by Christians to subject infidels without a most grave cause.

The most grave causes, however, are twofold: to avoid greater evils, or lest a greater good be impeded. So the Theologians commonly with St. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 10. art. 11. et St. Bonau. locis allegandis. So Tanner. disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 2.; Card. Lugo disp. 19. sect. 2. §. 4.; Bassaeus v. Fides, 2. num. 9.

I assert first, that for the causes adduced, subject infidels can be tolerated by Christian Princes.

It is proved from the Saintly Doctor, opusc. de sex alis Seraphim, cap. 7., from that word of Matth. 13., where the Father of the family, expostulated with about eradicating the Zizanias, answered: Non: ne forte eradicetis et triticum. Sinite utraque crescere, etc. — No: lest perhaps you root up the wheat also. Suffer both to grow, etc. For this is the general rule, observed at that time by Pontiffs and Kings, lest seditions and confusions boil up in the Church. For thus God also tolerates certain evils for these causes, as Tanner. notes after St. Bonau. in 1. dist. 47. quaest. 3., where he infers our conclusion, certainly for this reason, because our goods ought to have their exemplars in God.

I assert second, that for this cause also the Jews are tolerated, both because as it were shadows they confirm the truth of our faith, and they exhibit the sacred Books to us for convincing the Pagans. So it is had in can. Qui sincera, dist. 45. et St. August. l 8. de ciuit. cap. 46. The legitimate Books of the old testament are indeed to be received from them, but the truly Talmudic, Cabalistic, and similar ones, vomiting forth insults against Christ, are to be given to the flames, as was long ago decreed by Gregory IX, Innocent IV, Julius III, Paul IV, and recently by Clement VIII.

I assert third, that outside these cases subject infidels are not to be tolerated. So it is defined in the Fourth Council of Carthage, can. 15. Elibertino; cap. 44. et Clem. un. de Iudaeis, et Saracenis, et leg. Nemo, C. de Paganis.

It is proved from Suarez disp. 18 sect. 4.; Tannero disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 2.; Lugo disp. 19 sect. 2. §. 4.; by the argument of St. Bonau ad Psal. 118. cap. 2. vers. 11., expounding that word of Matthaei 20: Principes gentium dominantur eorum — The princes of the nations lord it over them; because they are bound to remove their subjects from the perdition of souls, from scandals, and to promote them to good. For this reason Constantine burned the Temples of the Pagans and forbade the sacrifices; and he is praised by the Saints, Ambr. epist. 30. August. epist. 48. 50. et 104., and Nicephorus lib. 8. cap. 33. et de Iouiniano lib. 10. cap. 39. et Theodosio lib. 12. c. 25. relates it; thus Josias, Ezechias, Iosaphat are praised, who took away the high places, 3. et 4. Reg., and others are blamed who did not take them away, as St. August. epist. 50. notes.

Here they ask: whether a Prince can grant a safe-conduct to infidels without a faculty of the Pontiff.

Hurtadus answers, disp. 79. sect. 5., that it can be granted to unbaptized infidels; not to heretics, who are subjects of the Church.

Therefore, notwithstanding any safe-conduct of the Kings, the Church can punish heretics, as the Council of Constance defines, sess. 19.; yet if she herself has given the safe-conduct, she is bound to keep it: as the Master Joannes Marq., the Augustinian, teaches, lib. 2. de gubernatore Christiano. cap. 24., who on pagina 301. says that faith is to be kept with them, especially when confirmed by oath.

This is a most weighty question, and necessary in our times.

I assert first: it is not lawful for a Christian Prince to make compacts on this matter without most grave causes. The Catholics agree with D. Bonav. in the places to be cited. So D. Thom. quaest. 10. art. 11. Molanus lib 1. de fide haereticis servanda, cap. 20. Lenaeus de unica religione servanda. Becanus lib. de fide haereticis servanda, cap. 10. Iacobus Simanc. lib. Cathol. Instit. cap. 46. Conradus Brunus de haeret. lib. 3. cap. 15. Petrus Ribadeniera lib. 1. de Inst. Principis, cap. 17. and others cited by Tannerus disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 3. num. 66.

It is proved first by D. Bonav. on 12. Wisdom, in these words: Those ancient inhabitants of thy holy land, whom thou didst abhor, because they did hateful works to thee by charms, and unjust sacrifices, etc. thou didst will to destroy from the midst of thy Sacrament by the hands of our forefathers.

It is proved secondly by S. Doct. there from Deuter. 7. You shall not make a covenant with them, nor show mercy to them; nor shall you join with them in marriage. You shall not give your daughter to his son, nor take his daughter for your son: for she will lead your son astray, lest he follow me, so that he may serve strange gods rather: and the wrath of the Lord will be kindled, and he will quickly destroy you. The same is commanded Exodus 34. Hence Solomon is reproved for transgressing, 3. Reg. 11. and Josaphat, otherwise pious, 2. Paral. 19. and 20. for that he had imprudently made a covenant with the infidel Kings of Israël.

It is proved thirdly by S. Doct. opusc. de sex alis Seraphim, cap. 7. from cap. 5. ad Galat. A little leaven corrupts the whole mass, etc. But he that troubles you shall bear judgment, etc. would that they were cut off who trouble you. And 1 Corinth. 5. Put away the evil from among yourselves. And Luke 13. Cut it down. Similar things are found 2. Timot. 2. Tit. 3. Ioan. epist. 2. Apocal. 2.

It is proved fourthly by S. Doct. serm. 6. Hexaemer. from the practice of the Church, especially of the supreme Pontiffs, and of Councils, condemning and separating heretics. Likewise of Emperors, especially Constantine, Charlemagne, and Theodosius. For there exists a famous Constitution of Theodosius, Gratian, and Valentinian, and it is found l. Cod. de summa Trinitate, where it is defined: We will that all peoples, whom the clemency of our empire rules, dwell in such a Religion as the divine Peter handed on to the Romans, which the Religion hitherto revealed to us by himself declares, which it is clear the Roman Pontiff follows. Similar is the rescript of the Emperors Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius, who impose perpetual silence on all heretics l. 2. C. de haeret. similar things are found l. 3. C. de haeret. and in Eusebius on the life of Constantine lib. 3. cap. 6. et 62.

It is also proved by the reasons brought forward quaest. 6. for these pacts bring grave harm and scandal, and are extorted by force and fraud, as is evident from the compacts with the sectaries of these times, which brought most grave wars and ruins, as Davila relates in the history of Gallia, and Tannerus disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 3. Bassaeus verb. Infidelitas, 10.

I add, however, that for most grave causes it is lawful to make compacts and to tolerate. The reason is that of Tannerus num. 99. for it is lawful to pact concerning those things which it is lawful to tolerate.

I assert secondly. If at any time such pacts are entered into by Kings for grave causes, they are not to be violated. So Molanus lib. 1. cap. 25. et sequent. Becanus disp. de fide haereticis servanda, cap. 7. Letmatius de fide haereticis servanda, and others cited by Tanner. disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 4. This is the opinion of S. Bonav. in the places to be alleged.

It is proved first by S. Doct. in 3. dist. 39. art. 2. quaest. 3. where from the fact, that it is lawful to enter into treaties with infidels, S. Doct. gathers that oaths may be received from them according to their sects, as from Mahometans upon the Alcoran, as I shall show tract. de Relig. disp. de iuramento, quaest. 2.

But he proves that treaties are to be kept, and that they were at times legitimately entered into; first by the example of Iacob Genesis 31. where he made a treaty with Laban the Pagan.

Next he proves it by the example of Iudas, the holy Leader of the Machabees, who made treaties with the Romans 1. Machab. cap. 8. and is not reproved.

It is proved next by S. Doct. in the same dist. art. 3. quaest. 3. by the example of Iosuë, the most holy Leader, who kept the treaty, though imprudently made, with the Gabaonites, and in this he is praised by D. Ambr. lib. de officiis. Abulensis disputes ad 9. Iosue, from quaest. 17. to 27. Whether an oath bound to it: for he asserts that it was not obligatory, Lyranus striving for the opposite. With Tostatus is Tannerus also disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 4. num. 119.

S. Bonau. indeed supposes that foundation by which Tostatus chiefly strives: that the Hebrews were obliged simply to kill the Gabaonites, who were Chananaeans; concerning whose killing without mercy the command of God was at hand. Deuter. 20. Num. 33. Nor is any revelation of God dispensing found. From which the whole argumentation of Lyranus collapses.

He brings forward one reason, which is that of D. Ambrosii loc. cit. who says, Iosue judged that the peace which he had given was not to be recalled, because it had been confirmed by the religion of a Sacrament, lest, while he reprehended the perfidy of another, he should dissolve his own faith. Therefore by reason of scandal he seems to intimate that the oath is to be kept.

Abulensis quaest. 22. answers however that no scandal was given, because the Gabaonites, as deceivers, had extorted this oath, feigning that they were not Chananaeans.

The reason by which D. Bonau. asserts that the oath was rightly kept is, that the precept concerning the killing of the Chananaeans was laid down insofar as they were incorrigible: Therefore Iosue 11. it is said: For the sentence of the Lord was, that their hearts should be hardened, and that they should fight against Israël, and fall, and not merit any clemency, and so perish, as the Lord had commanded Moses. Therefore since the Gabaonites were not hardened, but gave themselves to the Hebrews, there was no precept to kill them.

Tostatus quaest. 21. answers first, that the sentence of the Lord was against all the Chananaeans, nor was any exception declared, except afterwards cap. 11. Iosue, which was not then known to the Israelites.

I say that clear evidence is had that this precept was so declared to Iosuë, and to the princes, because two chapters later it is described, not as laid down then only, but as manifest for the just preservation of the Gabaonites. And therefore it is said: As the Lord had commanded Moses, so Moses commanded Iosue, and he accomplished all things: there did not pass from all the mandata, not even one word, which the Lord had commanded Moses: But then he immediately subjoins the exception in the law of killing the Chananaeans: Since therefore Moses at the beginning declared it to Iosuë, and he fulfilled it to the finest point; it follows, that the precept was laid down in this form, in which it is thus related: then it is from Iosue. That certain Chananaeans were afterwards killed, is nothing against me; for they were obstinate, rebellious, just like the rest before the killing. S. Doct. adds that they were punished civilly with perpetual servitude, in which the Princes judged they acted better than by killing them, since they voluntarily subjected themselves to servitude. S. Doct. nevertheless does not accept this reason, because if the oath was valid, they ought not to be punished with the other penalty of perpetual servitude, as Tostatus argues quaest. 24. who excuses their ignorance. And in this alone he adheres to S. Doctor, that it did not tend to an evil outcome, so to receive them unto salvation.

Truly for our purpose it suffices that the holy man Iosue, of whom it is said that he kept the law of the Lord adamussim, entered into treaties with these men, whom he knew to be Pagans, even though from far off.

The reason of D. Bonav. from D. Ambrosio loc. cit. which Tannerus uses num. 104. is, that it is of Divine and Natural Law to keep pacts; otherwise the whole bond of human society will be broken.

The heretics object to us, as holding that no pacts are to be kept.

First the Council of Constance, which did not keep faith with Ioanni Hus, and the Pragensi.

It is answered, that the Council only declared that the safe-conduct of Kings does not avail to the prejudice of the power of the Church over Heretics. But those two were justly condemned. And indeed Hieronymus a Praga had from the Council a safe-conduct, but with the addition, salva semper iustitia. Hus however from the Emperor. Add that heretics have often been perfidious, as the Hugonotti toward Carolus IX. as Davila relates.

They object many Councils, Romanum IV. and Later. III.

These however only absolve subjects from the oath of fidelity to Kings excommunicated, and deprived of their jurisdiction by the Pontiff.

I assert thirdly, these pacts are to be kept, even if imprudently made. So D. Bonav. 3. dist. 39. art. 3. quaest. 3. whom the others commonly follow, cited by Tannerus num. 112.

It is proved by D. Bonav. with the argument of D. Ambrosii loc. cit. because it is a greater evil to break faith than to keep such pacts; for thereby the common good of human society is harmed.

It is certain that such infidel Princes, or even private persons, are capable of dominion. And indeed to have dominion over goods is defined by Paulus III. in a certain Bull cited by Coninch. disput. 1. dub. 10. num. 160. Of dominion also over persons as over slaves, it is certain that it can be with them if they hold slaves by a just title, say a just war, etc.

From many Scriptures S. Doct. shows that jurisdiction can be in infidels over the faithful. First from 1. a Petri 2. Subiecti estote omni humanae creaturae propter Deum: sive Regi, tanquam praecellenti. Be subject to every human creature for God's sake: whether to the King, as preeminent.

1. Thomas Hobbes, than whom never was greater genius for riding an idea, right or wrong, to the full length that it will go, was born in 1588: and notwithstanding his twelve pipes of tobacco daily, his vigorous constitution endured to his ninety-second year. The first half of his life fell in with the age of the greatest predominance of Calvinism. In religion he was scarcely a Calvinist, indeed he laboured under a suspicion of atheism: but his philosophy is accurately cast in the mould of the grim theology of Geneva. We may call it the philosophy of Calvinism. It has for its central tenet, that human nature either was from the first, or is become, bad, "desperately wicked," depraved, corrupt, and utterly abominable, so that whatever is natural to man, in so far forth as it is natural, is simply evil. The remedy for our evil nature Hobbes finds in no imputed merits of a Redeemer, no irresistible victorious grace, but in the masterful coercion of a despotic civil power. But, lest any one should suspect that there was at least this good in man, a propensity to civil society and obedience to the rulers of cities, Hobbes insists that man is by nature wholly averse to society with his kind: that the type of the race is an Ishmael, "a wild man, his hand against all men, and all men's hands against him:" in fact that the state of nature is a state of war all round. He writes (Leviathan, c. xiii.): "Men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping company where there is no power able to overawe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him at the same rate he sets on himself; and upon all signs of contempt or undervaluing naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which among them that have no common power to keep them quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his contemners by damage, and from others by the example…. Hereby it is manifest, that during the time that men live without a power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war, and such a war as is of every man against every man…. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently no culture of the earth: no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea: no commodious building: no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force: no knowledge of the face of the earth: no account of time: no arts, no letters, no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short…. To this war of every man against every man this also is consequent, that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power there is no law: where no law, no injustice…. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct, but only that to be every man's that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it."

2. Such is what Hobbes is pleased to call "the natural condition of mankind," a condition which man would have every natural reason for getting out of with all speed, were he ever so unhappy as to fall into it. It is true that, apart from civil government, violence would reign on earth. But it is not true that to live apart from civil government is the natural condition of mankind. It is not true that the only motive which draws men into civil society is the fear of violence, as though there were no such facts and exigencies of human nature as sympathy, friendship, intellectual curiosity, art, religion. It is not true that the one reason for the existence of the civil power consists in this, that without the restraining hand of the magistrate men would bite and devour one another. Lastly, it is not true that all rights, notably rights of property, are the creation of the State. A man is a man first and a citizen afterwards. As a man, he has certain rights actual and potential (c. v., s. i., p. 244): these the State exists, not to create, for they are prior to it in the order of nature, but to determine them, where indeterminate, to sanction and to safeguard them.

Natural rights go before legal rights, and are presupposed to them, as the law of nature before that law which is civil and positive. It is an "idol of the tribe" of lawyers to ignore all law but that upon which their own professional action takes its stand.

3. "In considering man as he must have come from the hands of nature," writes Jean Jacques Rousseau, "I behold an animal less strong than some, less active than others, but upon the whole in organism having the advantage of them all. I behold him appeasing his hunger under an oak, slaking his thirst in the first brook, finding a bed at the foot of the same tree that furnished his repast, and there you have all his cravings satisfied." (Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité.) This noble savage—quite a contrast to Hobbes's ruffian primeval, "nasty, brutish," and short-lived—observes and imitates the industry, and gradually raises himself to the instinct, of the beasts among whom he lives. His constitution is robust, and almost inaccessible to malady. He attains to old age, free from gout and rheumatism. He surpasses the fiercest wild beasts in address as much as they surpass him in strength, and so arrives to dwell among them without fear. Yet withal he is distinguished from brutes by freewill and perfectibility, qualities which gradually draw him out of his primeval condition of tranquil innocence, lead him through a long course of splendours and errors, of vices and virtues, and end by making him a tyrant at once over nature and over himself.

4. Rousseau's life, 1715-1778, was a continual protest against the formalism, affectation, pedantry and despotism of the age of the Bourbons. His ideal of man was the unconventional, unconstrained, solitary, but harmless and easy-going savage. Hobbes was the growth of a sterner and more serious age. The only reality to him in heaven and on earth was force: his one idea in philosophy was coercion. Human nature to him was an embodiment of brute violence ever in need of violent restraint. Rousseau, an optimist, saw nothing but good in man's original nature: to the pessimist mind of Hobbes all was evil there. Neither of them saw any natural adaptation to social life in the human constitution. To live in society was, in both their views, an artificial arrangement, an arbitrary convention. But Hobbes found in the intolerable evils of a state of nature an excellent reason why men should quit it for the unnatural condition of citizens. Rousseau found no reason except, as he says, quelque funeste hasard. The problem for Hobbes stood thus: how men, entering society, might be "cribbed, cabined, and confined" to the utmost in order to keep down their native badness. Rousseau's concern was, how one might so become a citizen as yet to retain to the full the delightful liberty of a tropical savage. Hobbes's solution is the Leviathan, Rousseau's the Social Contract. The prize, we think, rests with the Englishman: but the reader shall judge.

5. And first of the Social Contract. Rousseau proposes "to find a form of association which shall defend and protect with all the strength of the community the person and the goods of each associate, and whereby each one, uniting himself to all, may nevertheless obey none but himself and remain as free as before." (Contrat Social, i. 6.) This proposal is hopeless, it is a contradiction in terms. No man can contract and remain as free as before, but he binds himself either under a wider obligation to do or abstain, where he was not bound before, or under a stronger obligation where he was bound already. Nevertheless Rousseau finds a means of accomplishing the impossible and the self-contradictory. "Each of us puts into a common stock his person and all his power under the supreme direction of the general will; and we receive in our turn the offering of the rest, each member as an inseparable part of the whole. Instantly, instead of the private person of each contracting party, this act of association produces a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly has voices, which body receives by this same act its unity, its common Ego, its life and its will." (ib.) This awful signing away of all your rights, so that your very personality is merged in that of the community—a self-renunciation going far beyond that of profession in any religious order—ought certainly, as Rousseau says, to be "the most voluntary act in the world;" and he adds the characteristic reason: "every man being born free and master of himself, none can, under any pretence whatsoever, subject him without his own consent." (Contrat Social, iv. 2.) Then you ask: When have I made this large contract by the most voluntary act in the world? Rousseau replies: "When the State is instituted, consent is in residing." (ib.) But, you reply, my residence is anything but the most voluntary act in the world: it would be awkward for me to emigrate; and if I did emigrate, it would only be to some other State: I cannot possibly camp out and be independent in the woods, nor appease my hunger under an oak. To this plea Rousseau quite gives in, remarking that "family, goods, the want of an asylum, necessity, violence, may keep an inhabitant in the country in spite of himself; and in that case his mere sojourn no longer supposes his consent to the contract." (ib.) Then none of us have made the contract, for we have never had the option of living anywhere except in some State.

6. Hobbes, after laying down the necessity of men combining for protection against mutual injustice, observes that a mere promise or agreement not to injure any one will not suffice: "for the agreement of men is by covenant only, which is artificial; and therefore no wonder if there be something else required besides covenant to make their agreement constant and lasting, which is a common power to keep them in awe and to direct their actions to the common benefit." He continues: "The only way to erect such a common power … is to confer all their power and strength upon one man or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices unto one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man or assembly of men to bear their person; and every one to own, and to acknowledge himself to be the author of, whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act or cause to be acted in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills every one to his will, and their judgments to his judgment. This is more than consent or concord,—it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man: I authorise, and give up my right of governing myself to this man or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a commonwealth, in Latin civitas. This is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god, to whom we owe under the immortal God our peace and defence." (Leviathan, c. xvii.) This idea of all the rights and personalities of the individuals who contract to live socially being fused and welded together into the one resultant personality and power of the State, has evidently been borrowed by Rousseau from Hobbes. We shall deal with the idea presently. Meanwhile several points claim our notice.

7. The hideous piece of cynicism whereby Rousseau (Contrat Social, iv. 2), after promising you that, if you join his commonwealth, you shall obey none but yourself, then goes on to tell you that you obey yourself in obeying the will of the majority, even when it puts you in irons or leads you to death—because as a citizen you have once for all renounced your own will, and can only wish what the majority wishes,—has its root in the position of Hobbes, that "every subject is author of every act the sovereign doth." (Leviathan, c. xxi.)

8. A real and important difference between the Leviathan and the Social Contract, is that Hobbes (c. xix.) allows various distributions of sovereign power, but prefers monarchy: Rousseau (l. ii., c. i.) will have it that sovereignty is vested inalienably in the people: of which doctrine more to follow.

9. Men are by nature equal, say Rousseau and Hobbes and many more respectable authors. Yes, in their specific nature, that is, they are all equally men. Similarly you have it that all triangles are equal, if that is a proposition of any value. But men as individuals are not all equal. One is stronger in body, another more able in mind: one predisposed to virtue, another to vice: one born in affluence and honour, another in squalor. Not men in the abstract, but living men, start at different points of vantage, and the distance between them widens as they run the race of life. We may lay it down as an axiom, in diametric opposition to Rousseau, that inequalities are natural, equalities artificial.

10. Man is born free: so opens the first chapter of the Contrat Social. If free of all duties, then void of all rights (c. v., s. i., nn. 5, 7, pp. 246, 247): let him then be promptly knocked on the head as a sacrifice to Malthas; and with the misformed children born in Plato's Republic, "they will bury him in a secret and unseen spot, as is befitting."

11. Hobbes and Rousseau go upon this maxim, which has overrun the modern world, that no man can be bound to obedience to another without his own consent. The maxim would be an excellent one, were men framed like the categories of Aristotle—substance, quantity, quality, relation, and the rest—each peering out of his own pigeon-hole, an independent, self-sufficient entity. But men are dependent, naturally dependent whether they will or no, every human being on certain definite others,—the child on the parent, the citizen on the State whose protection he enjoys, and all alike on God. These natural dependences carry with them natural uncovenanted obediences,—to parents, filial duty—to country, loyalty—to God, piety: all which are embraced in the Latin term pietas. (See St. Thomas, 2a 2æ, q. 101, art. 1, in corp.) The fatal maxim before us is the annihilation of pietas. In lieu of loyal submission we get a contract, a transaction of reasoned commercial selfishness between equal and equal. This perverse substitution has called forth Leo XIII.'s remark on the men of our time, "Nothing comes so amiss to them as subjection and obedience," Nihil tam moleste ferunt quam subesse et parere. (Encyclical on Christian Marriage.)

12. The common extravagance of the Leviathan and the Social Contract is the suppression of the individual, with his rights and his very personality, which is all blended in the State. (See Rousseau's words above quoted, n. 5, and those of Hobbes, n. 6.) The reservations in favour of the individual made by Hobbes, Leviathan, c. xxi., and by Rousseau, Contrat Social, l. ii., c. iv., are either trifles or self-contradictions. But it is not in man's power by any contract thus to change his nature, so as to become from autocentric heterocentric (c. ii., s. i., n. 2, p. 203; c. v., s. i., n. 1, p. 244), from a person a thing, from a man a chattel, void of rights and consequently of duties, and bound to serve this Collective Monster, this Aggregated Idol, with the absolute devotedness that is due to God alone. The worship of the new Moloch goes well with the dark misanthropism of Hobbes: but in Rousseau, the believer in the perfect goodness of unrestrained humanity, it is about the most glaring of his many inconsistencies. It is of course eagerly taken up by the Socialists, as carrying all their conclusions. It is the political aspect of Socialism.

Reading.—Burke, Warren Hastings, Fourth Day, the passage beginning, "He have arbitrary power!"

1. The Greeks had a name [Greek: eranos], which meant a feast where the viands were supplied by each guest contributing in kind. If, in a party of four, one man brought a ham, another a rabbit, a third a dish of truffles, and a fourth a salmon, no one would expect that, when the cover was raised, there should appear a pigeon-pie. That would not be in the nature of an [Greek: eranos]. Now not only Hobbes and Rousseau, but Locke and a great multitude of modern Englishmen with him, hold that the power of the State is an aggregate, the algebraic sum of the powers whereof the component members would have stood possessed, had they lived in what is called, by a misleading phrase, "the state of nature," that is, the condition of men not subject to civil authority. These powers,—either, as Hobbes and Rousseau virtually say, all of them, or, as Locke and the common opinion has it, only some of them, —men are supposed to resign as they enter into the State. If therefore there appears in the City, Nation, State, or Commonwealth, a certain new and peculiar power, which belongs to no individual in the "state of nature," or, as I prefer to call it, the extra-civil state, then what we may designate as the Aggregation Theory breaks down, and another origin must be sought of civil principality. But there is such a power in the State, new and peculiar, and not found in any of the component individuals: it is the power and authority to punish on civil grounds. It is the right of the rods and axes, that were borne before the Roman magistrate. It is, in its most crucial form, the right to punish with death.

2. We are not here concerned with proving the existence of this right. It is generally admitted: we assume it accordingly, and shall prove it later on. Nor are we concerned with domestic punishment, inflicted by the head of a family within his own household, for the good of that household, stopping short of any irreparable harm to the sufferer. (St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 65, art. 2, ad. 2.) Leaving this aside, we say, and have proved already, that one private individual has no right to punish another, neither medicinally for the amendment of the delinquent, nor by way of deterrent for the good of the community, nor in the way of retribution for his own satisfaction. He has the right of self-defence, but not of punishment: the two things are quite different. He may also exact restitution, where restitution is due: but that again is not punishing. If he is in the extra-civil state, he may use force, where prudence allows it, to recover what he has lost. This right of private war really is surrendered by the individual, when the State is established: but war and punishment are two totally different ideas. Subjects are punished: war is levied on independent powers. (Ethics, c. ix., s. iii., nn. 4-6, pp. 171-174; Natural Law, c. ii., s. ii., n. 6, p. 212.)

3. Opposite is the opinion of Locke, who writes:

"The execution of the law of nature is in that state [of nature] put into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation: for the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world, be in vain, if there were nobody that in the state of nature had a power to execute that law." We observe that the punishment of offenders against the law of nature, as such, belongs to the Legislator, who is God alone. Certainly it is well, nay necessary, that there should be human law to bear out the law of nature: but human law is the creation of human society in its perfection, which is the State. Man is punished by man for breaking the laws of man, not—except remotely—for breaking the laws of God. Nor would it be any inconvenience, if the law of nature were in vain in a state wherein nature never intended men to live, wherein no multitude of men ever for any notable time have lived, a state which is neither actual fact nor ideal perfection, but a mere property of the philosophic stage, a broken article, an outworn speculation. Such is "the state of nature," as identified with the extra-civil state by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau.

1. The State is deemed by Aristotle (Politics, III., ix., 14): "the union of septs and villages in a complete and self-sufficient life." The first and most elementary community is the family, [Greek: oikia]. A knot of families associating together, claiming blood-relationship and descent, real or fictitious, from a common ancestor, whose name they bear, constitute a [Greek: genos], called in Ireland a sept, in Scotland a clan, nameless in England. When the sept come to cluster their habitations, or encampments, in one or more spots, and to admit strangers in blood to dwell among them, these hamlets, or camps, gradually reach the magnitude of a village. When a number of these villages, belonging to different septs, come to be contiguous to one another, this mere juxtaposition does not make of them a State. Nor does interchange of commodities, nor intermarriage, nor an offensive and defensive alliance: these are the mutual relations of a confederacy, [Greek: xymmaxia], but all these and more are needed for a State, [Greek: polis]. To be a State, it is requisite that these septs and villages should agree to regulate the conduct of their individual members by a common standard of social virtue, sufficient for their well-being as one community. This common standard is fixed by common consent, or by the decision of some power competent to act for all and to punish delinquents. The name of this common standard is law. (Ethics, c. vii., n. 1, p. 126.) The community thus formed leads a life complete and self-sufficient, not being a member of another, but a body by itself,—not part of any ulterior community, but complete in the fulness of social good and social authority.

2. Among the ancient Greeks and Italians, and to some extent also in mediæval Italy and Germany, the city or municipality, with the small country district attached, was the State. With us the nation is the State; and accordingly we say my country where the Greek said my city. Bearing this difference in mind, as also the fact that the sept is not known amongst us except to antiquarians, and likewise that the village with us coincides with the parish, and that there are town as well as country parishes,—upon these modern data we may amend Aristotle's definition thus: The State is the union of parishes and municipalities in a perfect and self-sufficient community.

3. The City State is well illustrated in the following narrative of Thucydides (ii., 15):

"In the time of Cecrops and the early kings as far as Theseus, Attica was always divided among several independent cities, with their own town-halls and magistrates; and when there was no alarm of an enemy, the inhabitants did not resort for common deliberation to the King, but severally managed their own affairs and took their own counsel, and some of them even went to war. But when Theseus came to the throne, he abolished the council-chambers and magistracies of the other cities, and centralised all the people in what is now the city [of Athens], where he appointed their one council-chamber and town-hall; and while they continued to occupy their own properties as before, he forced them to recognise this as their one city and State." Attica before Theseus was a confederacy, [Greek: xymmaxia], not a State, [Greek: polis].

4. A citizen is defined: "one who has access to a share in deliberative and judicial functions." (Ar., Pol. III., i., 12.) It is not necessary that he actually should share these functions, but the way to them should lie open to him: he should be a person qualified to share in them. There are various degrees of citizenship. Under a parliamentary government, we distinguish the member of parliament, the elector, and him who will be an elector as soon as he gets a house of his own; and again, the judge, and him who is liable to serve on juries. In an absolute monarchy there are no citizens, only subjects.

5. "The distribution of power in the State, and especially of the sovereign power, is called the polity" ([Greek: politeia], Ar., Pol., III., vi., 1),—a word immortalised by the judicious Hooker, and happily recovered recently to the English language. The polity then is the distribution of the sovereignty. The person, singular or collective, in whose hands the full sovereignty rests, is called the ruler. Be it observed that what we call the ruler is never one man, except in absolute monarchy. By the theory of the British Constitution, the ruler is King, Lords, and Commons, together.

6. Nature requires that men generally live in society, domestic and civil, so that the individual be of the family, and families form associations, which again conspire to form one perfect community, which is the State. The requirement of nature may be gathered from the universal practice of mankind. "If it (the word savage) means people without a settled form of government, without laws and without a religion, then, go where you like, you will not find such a race." (Max Müller, in Nineteenth Century, Jan. 1885, p. 114.) The same may be gathered from a consideration of what the State is, and of the ends which it serves. The State, as we have seen (n. 2), is a union of septs and villages, or of parishes and municipalities. The individual is born and nurtured in the family, and ordinarily becomes in time the parent of a new family. Families must combine to form septs by blood, or villages (or parishes) by locality. Municipalities we may leave aside, for a municipality is a potential State. But we must consider the sept, village, or parish, which is the community intermediate between family and State. Among the cogent reasons which require families to enter into this association, we may mention friendship, intermarriage, the interchange of services and commodities, the cultivation of the arts, the preservation of traditions and inventions.

7. But it is further necessary that these septs, villages, or parishes, should band together and combine to form a higher community, self-sufficient and perfect,—for the determining of rights which Natural Law leaves undetermined,—for the punishing of disturbers of the peace, if need be, even with death,—for defence against a common enemy,—for a union of counsels and resources to the execution of magnificent works. This self-sufficient and perfect community, which is not part of any higher community, is the State.

8. We may observe that the whole reason for the being of the State is not mutual need, nor the repression of violence. Main reasons these are, no doubt, but not the whole main reason. Even if men had no need of one another for the supply of their animal wants, they would still desire to converse for the satisfaction of their intellectual curiosity and their social affections. And even if we had all remained as void of guile, and as full of light and love, as our first parents were at their creation, we should still have needed the erection of States. In a State there are not only criminal but civil courts, where it is not wicked men alone who come to be litigants. From sundry passages of Scripture it would appear that even angels may disagree as to what is best and proper: angelic men certainly may and do. It is a mistake to look upon civil government, with its apparatus of laws and judgments, simply as a necessary evil, and remedy of the perverseness of mankind. On the contrary, were all men virtuous, States would still be formed, towering in magnificence above the States known to history, as the cedars of Lebanon above the scanty growths of a fell-side in our north country.

9. There can be no State without a power to guide and govern it. It has indeed become the fashion to repeat, as the latest discovery in politics, that what a State needs is not government but administration. This saying comes of a theory, to be examined presently, that sovereign power abides permanently with the people at large, and that the sole function of princes, cabinets, and parliaments, is to provide means of giving effect to the popular will. This however is not quite a repudiation of government, but a peculiar view as to the seat and centre of government. Those who hold it, vigorously maintain the right of the Many to govern, control, and command the Few. The need of some governing authority in a State can be denied by none but an Anarchist, a gentleman who lives two doors beyond Rousseau on the side of unreason.

10. Every State is autonomous, self-governing, independent. Either the whole people taken collectively must rule the same whole taken distributively, or a part must rule the rest. The ruler is either the whole commonwealth, or more frequently a part of the commonwealth. An autocrat is part of the State which he governs. Sovereignty whole and entire is intrinsic to the State. A community that is to any extent governed from without, like British India or London, is not a State, but part of a State, for it is not a perfect community.

11. We have it therefore that man is a social animal. Naturally he is a member of a family. Nature requires that families should coalesce into higher communities, which again naturally converge and culminate in the State. Nature further requires that in every State there should be an authority to govern. But authority to govern and duty to obey are correlatives. Nature therefore requires submission to the governing authority in the State. In other words, Nature abhors anarchy as being the destruction of civil society, and as cutting the ground from under the feet of civilised man. The genuine state of nature, that state and condition, which nature allows and approves as proper for the evolution of the human faculties, is the state of man in civil society. That is lost where there is no judge in the land.

12. There are men full of a sentimental deference to authority and professions of obedience, who yet will not obey any of the authorities that actually are over them. These are disobedient men. He is an anarchist in practice, who meditates treason and rebellion against the "powers that be" actually over him in the State wherein he lives. To obey no actual power is to obey no power, as to wear no actual clothes is to go naked. To keep up the comparison,—as a man may change his clothes upon occasion, and thus go through a brief interval of unclothedness without injury to health or violation of decency, notwithstanding the requirement of nature to wear clothes: so it may be or it may not be consonant with the exigency of our nature at times to subvert by insurrection the existing government in order to the substitution of a new authority; that does not concern us here. We are stating the general rule under ordinary circumstances. The submission to civil authority, which nature requires of us, must be paid in the coin of obedience to the actual established "powers that be."

13. Any one who understands how morality comes from God (Ethics, c. vi., s. ii. nn. 6-9, 13, pp. 119-125), can have no difficulty in seeing how civil power is of God also. The one point covers the other. We need no mention of God to show that disobedience, lying, and the seven deadly sins, are bad things for human nature, things to be avoided even if they were not forbidden. All the things that God forbids are against the good of man. Their being evil is distinguishable from their being prohibited, and antecedent to it. Now as drunkenness and unchastity are evil for man, so too is anarchy. The one remedy for anarchy is civil government. Even if there were no God, it would be still imperatively necessary, as we have seen, for mankind to erect political institutions, and to abide by the laws and ordinances of constitutional power. But there would be no formal obligation of submission to these laws and ordinances; and resistance to this power would be no more than philosophic sin. (Ethics, c. vi., s. ii., n. 6, p. 119.) What makes anarchy truly sinful and wrong is the prohibition of it contained in the Eternal Law, that law whereby God commands every creature, and particularly every man, to act in accordance with his own proper being and nature taken as a whole, and to avoid what is repugnant to the same. (Ethics, c. vi., s. ii., n. 9, p. 120.)

Therefore, as man is naturally social, and anarchy is the dissolution of society, God forbids anarchy, and enjoins obedience to the civil power, under pain of sin and damnation. "They that resist, purchase to themselves damnation" (Rom. xiii. 2): where the theological student, having the Greek text before him, will observe that the same phrase is used as in 1 Cor. xi. 29 of the unworthy communicant, as though it were the like sin to rend our Lord's mystical Body by civil discord as to profane His natural Body by sacrilege. But to enjoin obedience and to bestow authority are the obverse and reverse of one and the same act. God therefore gives the civil ruler power and authority to command. This is the meaning of St. Paul's teaching that there is no power but from God, and that the powers that be are ordained of God. (Rom. xiii. 1.)

14. The argument is summed up in these seven consequent propositions:

(a) Civil society is necessary to human nature. (b) Civil power is necessary to civil society. (c) Civil power is naught without civil obedience. (d) Civil obedience is necessary to human nature. (e) God commands whatever is necessary to human nature. (f) God commands obedience to the civil power. (g) God commissions the civil power to rule.

15. If any one asks how the State and the civil power is of God any otherwise than the railway company with its power, or even the fever with its virulence, a moment's reflection will reveal the answer in the facts, that railway communication, however convenient, is not an essential feature of human life, as the State is: while diseases are not requirements in order to good, but incidental defects and evils of nature, permitted by God. Why God leaves man to cope with such evils, is not the question here.

Readings.—Ar., Pol., I., ii.; III., i.; III., ix.: nn. 5-15.

1. One polity alone is against the natural law; that is every polity which proves itself unworkable and inefficient: for the rest, various States exhibit various polities workable and lawful, partly from the circumstances, partly from the choice, of the citizens: but the sum total of civil power is a constant quantity, the same for all States. We proceed to establish the clauses of this statement in succession.

2. If a watch be necessary to a railway guard, and he is bound to have one accordingly, it is also necessary, and he is bound to procure it, that the watch shall go and keep time. A watch that will not keep time is an unlawful article for him to depend upon, being tantamount to no watch, whereas he is bound to have a watch. Otherwise, be his watch large or small, gold, silver, or pinchbeck, all this is indifferent, so long as it be a reliable timekeeper. In like manner, we must have a State, we must have a government, and we must have a government that can govern. Monarchy, aristocracy, parliaments, wide or narrow franchise, centralisation, decentralisation, any one of these and countless other forms—apart from the means whereby it is set up—is a lawful government, where it is a workable one; unlawful, and forbidden by God and nature, where it cannot work. A form of government that from its own intrinsic defects could nowhere work, would be everywhere and always unlawful.

3. You cannot argue from the accomplished fact the lawfulness of the means whereby it was accomplished. Nor do we say that every form of government, which succeeds in governing, was originally set up in justice; nor again that the success of its rule is necessarily due to the use of just means. The Committee of Public Safety in Paris in 1794 did manage to govern, but it was erected in blood, and it governed by an unscrupulous disregard of everybody's rights. All that we say is, that no distribution of civil power as a distribution, or no polity as a polity (s. iii., n. 5, p. 312), is unlawful, if by it the government can be carried on. And the reason is plain. For all that nature requires is that there should be an efficient civil authority, not that this man should have it, or that one man or other should have it all, or that a certain class in council assembled should engross it, or that all the inhabitants of the country should participate in it. Any one of these arrangements that will work, satisfies the exigency of nature for civil rule, and is therefore in itself a lawful polity.

4. Working, and therefore, as explained, lawful polities are as multitudinous as the species of animals. Besides those that actually are, there is a variety without end, as of animals, so of polities, that might be and are not. We can classify only the main types. We ground our classification upon Ar., Pol., III., vii., modernising it so as to take in forms of representative government, whereof Aristotle had no conception.

(1) Monarchy, or the rule of the Single Person, in whose hands the whole power of the State is concentrated, e.g., Constantine the Great.

(2) Aristocracy, or the rule of the Few, which will be either direct or representative, according as either they themselves by their own votes at first hand, or representatives whom they elect, make the laws.

(3) Democracy, or the rule of the Many, that is, of the whole community. Democracy, again, is either direct (commonly called pure) or representative. The most famous approach in history to pure democracy is the government of Athens, B.C. 438-338.

(4) Limited Monarchy.

(a) Monarchy with Aristocracy, the government of England from 1688 to 1830.

(b) Monarchy with Democracy.

5. All civil government is for the governed, that is, for the community at large. The perversion of a polity is the losing sight of this principle, and the conducting of the polity in the interest of the governing body alone. By such perversion monarchy passes into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy, and democracy into ochlocracy or mob-rule. It might appear strange that, where the power rests with the whole people collectively, government should ever be carried on otherwise than in the interest of the entire community, did we not remember that the majority, with whom the power rests in a democracy, may employ it to trample on and crush the minority. Thus the Many may worry and harass the Few, the mean and poor the wealthy and noble: though commonly perhaps the worrying has been the other way about. Anyhow it is important to observe that there is no polity which of itself, and apart from the spirit in which it is worked, is an adequate safeguard and rock of defence against oppression.

6. The wide range of polities that history presents is not drawn out by the caprice of nations. The very fact of a certain nation choosing a certain polity, where they are free to choose, is an indication of the bent of the national character, and character is not a caprice. No North American population are ever likely to elect an absolute monarch to govern them. That polity which thrives on the shores of the Caspian, can strike no root on the banks of the Potomac. The choice of a polity is limited by the character of the electors and by the circumstances in which the election is made. Not every generation in a nation is free to choose its polity: but the choice and institution of the fathers binds the children. Up to a certain point ancestral settlements must be respected, or instability ensues, and anarchy is not far off. Thus the spirit of freedom should always act as Burke says, "as if in the presence of canonized forefathers."

7. The smallest State in the world is the little republic of Andorra in the Pyrenees. Though it be a paradox to say it, there is as much political power in Andorra as in Russia,—one and the same measure of it in every State. In every State there is power for civil good to the full height of the emergencies that may arise. The same emergencies may arise everywhere, and everywhere there is full power to see that the commonwealth take no harm by them. What a great empire can do for this purpose, e.g., proclaim martial law, search houses, lay an embargo on the means of transport, impress soldiers, the same can the tiniest commonwealth do in the like need. And the ordinary functions of government are the same in both.

8. This seems at variance with the theory of some constitutions, according to which there are certain so-called fundamental laws, which the legislature cannot call in question, nor deal with in any way, but must take them in all its deliberations for positions established and uncontrovertible. The British Constitution recognizes no fundamental laws. There is no reform that may not legally be broached in Parliament and enacted there. Parliament is said to be "omnipotent," "able to do everything, except to make a man a woman." But in many legislatures it is not so. At Athens of old there were certain measures which no one could introduce for discussion in the Sovereign Assembly without rendering himself liable to a prosecution [Greek: graphae paranomon]. And there have been many monarchs termed absolute, who yet were bound by their coronation-oath, or by some other agreement with their people, to preserve inviolate certain institutions and to maintain certain laws. It may be contended that such a government as we have in England, which is theoretically competent to pass any law within the limits of the natural law, has a greater range of power than a government whose operation is limited by a barrier of fundamental positive law. But this contention vanishes when we observe that there must remain in the State, which has fundamental laws, a power somewhere to reverse them. They can be reversed at least by the consent of the whole people. Thus at Athens the [Greek: graphae paranomon] could be suspended by a vote of the Assembly. A people can release their monarch from his coronation-oath in such portions of it as are not binding absolutely by divine law. Where fundamental law obtains, a portion of the civil power becomes latent, and only a diminished remainder is left free in the hands of the person or persons who are there said to rule. Such person or persons are not the adequate ruler of the State, as they have not the full power, but the people, with whom rests the latent authority to cancel certain laws, are to that extent partakers in the sovereignty. Where there is agreement of the whole people, great and small, no part of the power remains latent, but all is set free. With us, it may be observed, the omnipotence of parliament has become a mere lawyer's theory. On every great issue, other than that on which the sitting parliament has been elected, it is the practice of ministers to "go to the country" by a new General Election. Thus only a certain measure of available authority is free at the disposal of parliament: the rest remaining latent in the general body of the electorate. Such is our constitution in practice.

9. If in any State the whole power were free in the hands of one man, there we might look to see made good the dictum of the judicious Hooker (Ecclesiastical Polity, bk. i., s. x., n. 5): "To live by one man's will became the cause of all men's misery." In a monarchy untrammelled by senate or popular assembly, it were well that some of the sovereign power should remain latent, and that His Majesty should rule in accordance with certain laws, not within his royal pleasure to revoke.

10. The State and the power of the State, apart from the polity, is of God. (s. iii., n. 14, p. 318.) The State under this or that polity and this or that ruler, is also of God. But, apart from the polity, the State is of God antecedently to any determination of any human will: because, willy nilly, man must live in civil society and God commands him so to do. But the State under this polity and this ruler is of God consequently to some determination of human volition. In this consequent sense we write Victoria Dei gratia.

Summary : I.—Nominal description of civil tolerance.— In what sense we make it the exclusive work of the State.—What complete civil tolerance would imply.— There are not two schools, to be called, the one the school of tolerance, the other of intolerance. II.—General views of the subject : its complexity.— Plan and arrangement of this section.

THE effect of religious beliefs and philosophical opinions on the status, the rights, and liberties of citizens, gives rise to the problem of civil tolerance.

Whatever opinion we form on the duties of the State, and the corresponding rights of the Church, it is materially within the discretion of the temporal government to grant or deny to the Church its visible help and support. For this reason, putting aside for the present the question of responsibility, we consider this tolerance as the special work of the civil power.

Civil tolerance may be looked at from many points of view, and lends itself to many divisions.

In regard to its supreme principle or its reasons, civil tolerance asserts itself as a permanent, sacred, inviolable institution, which is dogmatic tolerance ; or it is content to be a concession, a rule of the nature of a compromise, founded on circumstances, which is practical tolerance.

The extension of civil tolerance may be considered as it is shown to the religions permitted in the State, and to the citizens and their liberties.

With reference to religions, civil tolerance may extend to all, or may be restricted to some only—as, for example, to Christian bodies, or religions already established.

It may permit them to make converts, or may simply authorize their existence.

It may grant them public and social life, either in their temples or outside, with liberty to form a hierarchical organization or to possess property ; or it may put certain limitations on that public life by decrees on the subject of associations, processions, and the public exhibition of religious symbols ; or it may even recognize only the individual liberty of conscience of their members.

With reference to citizens, tolerance may leave them free choice to continue in their own religion, or pass from one religion to another, or to no religion at all.

It may place all citizens on a footing of perfect equality, or content itself with punishing no one for his religion, while making certain civil rights depend on the profession of faith.

It grants or refuses them the free manifestation and propagation of their opinions and beliefs. In regard to its practice, tolerance of opinions and creeds may be combined with the recognition of a State religion, with favours reserved to the true religion, or to religion in general ; or it may observe strict neutrality, giving no preference to one religion over another, or to religion over unbelief. Experience tells us that there are two kinds of neutrality—the one sympathetic and trusting, like that of the United States of America ; the other contemptuous and suspicious, like that of the present French Republic or its younger sister, the new Republic of Portugal.

In the opinion of many modern political writers, the complete scheme of civil tolerance implies— The dogma of tolerance.

Perfect equality, civil and political, among believers in any religion whatever, and unbelievers. The free manifestation and diffusion of all opinions and all systems.

The perfect neutrality of the State, and its indifference to religion and irreligion. This description seems to us to err both by excess and by defect.

On the one hand, as we shall see better by-and-by, it is not necessary for the existence of tolerance that it should be raised to a dogma ; and the most liberal tolerance does not require official indifference in religious matters. Moreover, the State, by dissociating itself from religion and from God, does not remain neutral ; it professes practical atheism, and by its very abstention preaches religious indifference, and so, as Sarcey said, men are accustomed to do without religion, and are slowly and gradually drawn away from the faith.

On the other hand, simple individual liberty does not give liberty to religious bodies ; it gives no security to the social form and organization which are essential to all religions. The programme of tolerance, therefore, is not complete, unless it contains some provision guaranteeing the freedom of religious society.

It may be said that complete civil tolerance does not yet exist except as a dream. In many countries the head of the State must belong to some particular religious body. The rulers abandon the position of unstable equilibrium in which they would be placed by abstract neutrality, in order to show themselves either timidly friendly to religion or, more frequently, boldly hostile to it ; and the Church nowhere enjoys perfect freedom. Even in Belgium, where civil tolerance exists to a greater extent than in any other country in Europe, the priority of civil marriage, which is obligatory under the Constitution, is derogatory to the liberty of worship.

In spite of the variety of opinions and systems, neither complete intolerance nor complete tolerance finds any defenders, as we shall proceed to prove. We cannot allow any class of persons to arrogate to themselves the exclusive right to be called tolerant, and to fix the reproach of intolerance on all their opponents ; and this is the less permissible because the specious banner of tolerance often covers the most insidious designs against religion. M. Briand, addressing the extreme Left in the French Parliament, repeated, almost word for word, the statement of Sieyès in the Constituent Assembly of 1791, when he said : “ You have so little idea of liberty that you cannot tolerate it.”¹

¹ Session of October 25, 1910.

Now that we have arrived at civil tolerance, we have reached the heart of our subject, but we are still faced with this difficulty : In the minds of many, if not of most persons, the problem of tolerance is reduced entirely to civil tolerance ; and no one can remain indifferent to a matter in which every practice supposes a theory, in which every speculation leads straight to practical conclusions, in which religion and its rights, the State and its mission, the private individual and the guarantees of his liberty, are all vitally concerned. But this universal interest is mixed up with too many different passions to facilitate clearness of views and harmony of conclusions. Philosophers do not agree upon the principles, nor historians upon the facts, nor politicians in their appreciation of the facts or the lessons they teach.

Moreover, the problem of tolerance varies in its aspect with the centuries ; its Protean form changes with the various doctrines which bear upon tolerance and its fundamental principles, with the political factions which use it as a weapon of party strife, and with the circumstances which increase or diminish the necessity for it. It originated in the day when, thanks principally to the influence of Christianity, men rose in conscientious resistance to a tyrannical law. It was then harmoniously solved in Europe by universal acceptance of the same faith, and was again raised at the time of the disastrous schism which destroyed the religious unity of the civilized world. It spread till the beginning of the nineteenth century, when it was radically modified, as discussions extended to the existence and personality of God, and soon after to morality and social order. An intolerance of an unforeseen character arose at the same time, so violent in its first outbursts that its very exaggeration put an end to it, apparently for ever. But by degrees it reappears, preparing and already renewing its attacks on religion.

The problem of tolerance does not present itself, either theoretically or practically, in the same form to-day as yesterday ; nor was it yesterday the same as it was the day before.

Our task therefore is somewhat complicated, and the order to be followed creates a new difficulty ; we have to state and discuss principles, and to come to a conclusion on controverted facts, and therefore cannot adopt a purely logical or a purely historical method. Considering the unequal manner in which the facts agree with the theories, and also the diversity of the principles appealed to, we have thought it best, for the sake of clearness, to divide the subject into three periods, ending respectively with the Reformation of the sixteenth century, the French Revolution, and the present day.

The first period, in which a great Empire fell and gave place first to barbarous kingdoms and then to the Christian republic of the Middle Ages, is more full of events than theoretical discussions. All interest is concentrated on the explanation of facts, and is finally absorbed in a judicial institution—the Inquisition. This is what, in spite of the multitude and diversity of facts, gives to this period a sufficient unity. The principles are, then, in the acts, and we have only to consider the policy followed and form our judgment upon it. In the course of the second period tolerance is discussed among Christians, or at least among theists ; acts are distinguished from opinions, and are influenced by them. We shall principally occupy ourselves with a rapid review of systems, and with criticisms upon them, without refusing to the facts the consideration they demand. In the third period the ground of the discussion is changed ; it is no longer religious, but legal. The adversaries of religion flatter themselves that they have secured a lasting victory for tolerance. We shall have to test the truth of their assertion. Finally, we shall elect for a theory of tolerance which is in accordance with Catholic principles, and is the only one that can be justified by sound reason.

I. Successive Policies in the Matter of

Heresy.

Summary : Intolerance of the Christian Emperors.—This is real, as are their encroachments on the domain of religion.—But these Princes are excusable, and their acts must not be exaggerated.—Sketch of the imperial policy in the matter of heresy.—Attitude of the Popes. —Successive phases of under the barbarian Kings, and under Charlemagne.—Intervention of the people.— The principle of repression introduced into legislation in the thirteenth century.—Obstinate and relapsed heretics incur capital punishment, even death by burning.—Organization of the Inquisition.—This law governs Europe until the sixteenth century.

As heirs of an unrestrained despotism, the Roman Emperors did not at their baptism lay aside the traditions of absolutism to which the world had become accustomed. Without a miracle such as God is not in the habit of working, they could not at once solve with any certainty a question which their predecessors had never even put to themselves —that of the limits by which their power was bounded. For the first time two autonomous societies, religious and political society, had to exist on the same territory. Many encroachments on the domain of religion must have been committed unconsciously, and the complete powerlessness of the victim made even the thought of protest impossible. It is true that dogmatic definitions and the sacred functions of the Church were left to the Bishops ; but for everything else, for all that concerns the exterior discipline of the Church, all right was arrogated by the Christian Emperor : the right of banishing Arian or Catholic Bishops according to his own will,¹ the right of assembling Councils, of legislating for priests and monks, of imposing religious uniformity ; and such acts as these surprised no one.

¹ “ Naturally,” writes Mommsen, " the divergence of religious opinions among the different Sovereigns and the good pleasure of the monarch gave rise to much that was arbitrary, and to numerous variations in fixing the line of demarcation between true and false Catholics ” (Roman Penal Law, translated by Duquesne, t. 2, p. 312).

Unless we make allowance for the circumstances and customs of the time, we shall be unjust to the Princes, who thought they were acting within their rights, and also to the Church, which permitted their acts ; and we shall not be able rightly to apportion the responsibility. The objections thus made will have only the value of anachronisms. But when we deal with excesses and encroachments, we must not exaggerate or darken the reality. The pagan Emperors had hunted down sorcerers and magicians with the utmost severity.² This policy was not inspired by any zeal for orthodoxy, nor can the baptized Emperors who continued it be charged with religious fanaticism. Diocletian had already condemned the Manichaeans to the flames ; and if still later they were under various names the objects of special enactments,¹ these exceptional laws were directed less against heresy than against the antisocial tendencies of the sect. And we should be reluctant to transform into martyrs of free thought the Priscillianists and Donatists who fell under the sword of justice.² Neither Leo the Great, who mentioned with approval certain condemnations of the Priscillianists, nor those Bishops³ who, wearied of the Donatist excesses, brought them up before the magistrates, can be charged with intolerance, even in the most modern sense of the word. And Charles Lea is not justified in writing in this connection that the Church by their act was definitely committed to the extirpation of heresy by all means whatsoever.⁴ Even at the present day it is well to remember this : disturbers of the public peace and common criminals must not be allowed to find an assurance of impunity in heresy or irreligion.

² This severity had its influence on the argument of the apologetical treatises, and partly explains the silence maintained on the argument of miracles at that time ; it was necessary to guard against any suspicion of magic.

¹ The legislation seems to have been milder under Arcadius, Honorius, and Theodosius. The law 4 De Hæreticis (i. 5) of these Emperors omits the extreme penalty ; but the law 2. eodem, thus sums up a Constitution of Justinian : “ [Wherever Manichaeans are found, they are to be condemned to death].”

² These heresies have a clearly marked antisocial character. “ [We persecute Manichaean men or Manichaean women or Donatists with most deserved severity] ” (1. 4, Princ. De Hæreticis, i. 5).

³ The Bishops, indeed, did not desire any sanguinary measures of repression.

⁴ History of the Inquisition in the Middle Ages, vol. i., p. 215. This book imposes upon many persons by its confused mass of apparent erudition, but it is as deficient in synthesis as in impartiality and accuracy. See the criticism of M. Paul Fournier in the Revue d’Histoire Eccl., t. 3 (1901), pp. 708-719. M. Kurth also does not hesitate to condemn it as unfair and prejudiced. For instance, p. 215 and the following pages of the first volume, full of references as they are, so entirely misrepresent the opinions of various Fathers, the action of the Emperors, and the influence exercised by the Church on the sanguinary repression of heresy, as to render them unrecognizable. See Maillet-Hanquet, op. cit., pp. 20-26, and the authors quoted below.

If we compare the texts of laws with what history tells us of their application, we shall draw these conclusions as to the official repression of heresy by the Christian Emperors of Rome and Byzantium : (1) The Christian Emperors like Constantine desired to unite the Empire and religion ; they saw in religious unity a guarantee of political unity ; orthodoxy was expected to strengthen patriotism.¹ (2) Yet they had no desire to obtain conversions to the faith by force.² (3) They were more severe against proselytism and outward manifestation than against the heresy itself ;³ the proscription was specially directed against certain sects which had become a real danger to the public peace.⁴ (4) Their laws were more terrible in their texts than in their effects.¹ (5) These laws being enacted motu proprio by the prince, no responsibility attaches to the Church.

¹ “ Die Grundsätze auf denen sie (die Strafgesetzgebung) beruht, sind klar ; sie sind gegeben . . . durch die herr- schende Ueberzeugung dass in der Einheit des Glaubens eine Schutzwehr des Reichs liege ” (Loening, Geschichte des deutschen Kirchenrechts, i. 96). See also Diehl, Justinien, L’Œuvre Religieuse).

² “ The Roman State constantly refrained from the use of coercion to make converts, on the ground that conversions obtained by such means would be merely superficial ” (Mommsen, Roman Public Law, translated by Duquesne, vol. ii., pp. 313, 314).

³ Cf. 1. 8, § 5, C. i. 5 ; Theodosian Code, xvi. 5, c. 34, 36, 51, 56, 58, 63, 66. Cf. Loening, op. cit., t. i., p. 99. The threat against proselytism dates from Theodosius (Theodosian Code, xvi. 5, c. 3). It was afterwards extended to the holding of public assemblies (cc. 51 and 66, ibid.).

⁴ “ Einzelne Sekten waren in der That eine Gefahr für den öffentlichen Frieden geworden ” (Loening, t. i., p. 68).

¹ Cf. Loening, i. 99. Mommsen similarly recognizes that Imperial Rome confined itself to restricting the patrimonial rights of the heretic—his free choice of a residence, and his capacity to hold public office. “ In general,” he says (op. cit., t. 2, p. 315), “ legislation took no other measures against heretics, though there have frequently been penalties prescribed against particular sects.” He mentions in a note heavy pecuniary fines, confiscations, banishment, and even the penalty of death. But for this last he refers to the Theodosian Code, xvi. 5. 7. 1., in which this penalty is not mentioned. No doubt he meant to quote xvi. 5. 9. 1., in which this penalty is directed, not against heretics in general, but against certain Manichæans who called themselves Encratitæ (continent). MM. Maillet-Hanquet are wrong in speaking of this as a general law renewed by Arcadius. He only ratified the previously existing laws, without specifically mentioning any ; and, according to the testimony of Sozomenus, Theodosius intended not to punish, but to terrify. So Socrates does not even mention those laws of Theodosius of which Sozomenus says that they contained heavy penalties (χαλεπὰς τιμωρίας) against heresy. See C. Theod., xvi. 5. 25; Sozomen., Hist. Eccl., 7, 12 (M.P.G., t. 67, cols. 1445, 1446) ; Socrates, 5, 10 (M.P.G., t. 67, cols. 593, 594). The picture of the Roman legislation against heresy is much less dark in the learned works of Hinschius, Mommsen, Loening, than in certain French authors—e.g., Tanon, Histoire des Tribunaux de l’Inquisition en France ; Paris, 1893.

It is true that the Popes, from the beginning, approved of the protection which the Christian Emperors offered to the Church for the maintenance of its unity ; the letters which they wrote to obtain the removal of Bishops or Abbots who favoured schism or heresy² can neither surprise nor scandalize anyone ; they prove simply the care of the pastor for the peace of the Church and the safety of his flock, but they did not demand the infliction of torture in the name of religion. M. de Cauzons¹ considers it a plausible conjecture that “ if the sentence of death was so rarely passed for religious offences, the fact is due to the influence of the ecclesiastical members of the Imperial Council.”

² E.g., St. Celestine, Ep. 22 (M.P.L., t. 50, cols. 540, 541). He acted in the interest of peace and for the preservation of others. See also Ep. 19 (M., ibid., cols. 511, 512). So also St. Leo the Great, Ep. 84 (M.P.L., t. 54, col. 922). But see Ep. 45 (M., ibid., col. 833) on the violent acts of the heretics.

¹ Alias the Abbé Thomas, Histoire de l’Inquisition en France, t. 1, p. 186.

MM. Maillet-Hanquet, though they exaggerate to some extent the severity of the Roman laws, describe in these terms the attitude of the religious authorities : “ If they thought it necessary to excommunicate heretics and expel them from the pale of the Church, if they called in certain cases for the interference of the civil power, they do not appear to have acted for the purpose of procuring the enactment of laws condemning heretics to death ; they seem rather to have been entirely opposed to such legislation. Nevertheless, when the laws had been finally passed against the Manichæans, they did not think it necessary to raise their voices publicly against them. As they considered the Manichæans as constituting a fundamental danger to society, they could not refuse to society the right to protect itself.”²

² Op. cit., p. 25.

If the Roman Empire classified heresy among offences against the State, [among public crimes], as was made clear by Frederic II., the Merovingians cared much less for religious unity,³ and the Roman law of the Visigoths⁴ reproduces only the penalties prescribed against certain sects—the Manichæans, Eunomeans, and Montanists. Charlemagne was actuated by political motives when he promulgated the celebrated capitulary, which, as we have already seen, was condemned by Alcuin, because it required baptism under pain of death.¹ With scarcely any other exception, the Carlovingian legislation was opposed to the penalty of death, which was not even inflicted for murder, " and this was entirely owing to the influence of the Church, thus showing how she preserved to the beginning of the Middle Ages that spirit of clemency by which she was distinguished in the first days of Christianity.”²

³ Loening, op. cit., ii., pp. 46, 48, 53.

⁴ Ibid., ii. 43.

¹ Capitul. reg. Franc., i., p. 69, n. 26, c. 8 (Mon. Germ. Hist., t. 1, pp. 48-50).

² Maillet-Hanquet, op. cit., pp. 28, 29. Relying on a text of the celebrated Hincmar of Rheims, these authors remark that there were already declared opponents of capital punishment, who disputed the right even of the Prince to draw the sword.

Antisocial sects, which remind us in some respects³ of the Manichæans⁴ and the Donatists,⁵ were the scourge of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. That of the Catharists⁶ especially astonished men, equally by its absurdity, its zeal, and its success. Lea says :¹ “ Had Catharism become dominant, or even had it been allowed to exist on equal terms, its influence could not have failed to become disastrous. . . . The conscientious belief in such a creed could only lead man back in time to his original condition of savagism.”² A contemporary author compares the number of such sectarians to the number of grains of sand on the seashore.³ The danger which they caused to society rekindled the fires lighted against the Manichæans and persons who practised witchcraft. Sometimes the repression was regularly ordered by the public authorities ; sometimes, and more frequently, it was the act of the enraged populace, who demanded the execution of the disturbers of their peace, and who, afraid of the clemency of the priests, invaded the prisons in the same fashion as a lynching crowd in modern America, and thus drew down upon themselves the thunders of the Church.¹

³ We do not wish to exaggerate the resemblance, or to settle the delicate question of the relation between the sects, or whether one was the descendant of the other.

⁴ By their dualism, their syncretism, and their effort to obtain universal domination.

⁵ By their rigorist and revolutionary schismatic fanaticism. They made the efficacy of the sacraments dependent upon the personal holiness of the minister.

⁶ Catharists, or pure persons. In the Middle Ages, “ heretics ” meant the Catharists ; and this name, sometimes corrupted into Pathari or Gazari, has produced the Dutch word Ketter, and the German Ketzer. The Catharist Church, the only pure Church, (as they professed) and the only one opposed to the wicked and decadent Church of Rome, included (1) the perfect ones, who practised an antisocial asceticism, which obliged them to break family ties and live a life of rigorous poverty and solitude ; and (2) simple believers, who were allowed to marry and possess property. The latter, if they wished to be saved, were bound, at least at the hour of death, to receive from one of the perfect the consolamentum, or absolution, which effaced their sins ; but in case of recovery they were constrained to a rigorous observance of the rules. By this ceremony they were admitted into the Church, of which, until that time, they had been merely catechumens.

¹ Op. cit., t. 1, p. 106.

² This judgment is independent of any opinion which may be formed on their mode of life, and is justified by their asceticism alone, which M. Charles Molinier admits to have been opposed to the happiness and development of the human race (Ch. Molinier, L’Église et la Société Cathares, in the Revue Historique, 1907, t. 94 and 95, p. 290).

³ William of Newburgh, quoted by Maillet-Hanquet, p. 29. Almost all the documents relating to the Catharist heresy come from Catholic sources. M. Jean Guiraud very forcibly rebukes those authors who refuse on this ground to accept the information so given (Cartulaire de N. D. de Prouille, Preface, pp. xx-xxii). M. Molinier considers this language exaggerated. However, his own calculations lead him to the conclusion that there were 3,000,000 to 6,000,000 believers, of whom 2,000,000 to 4,000,000 were in Italy, 200,000 to 400,000 in France, 700,000 or 800,000 in the East, and about 3,100 perfect ones (see the articles quoted, t. 95, pp. 278, 279).

¹ Some inhabitants of Cambrai had burnt a heretic. Gregory VII., by his letter of March 25, 1077, ordered Godefroi, Bishop of Paris, to hold an inquiry, and excommunicate the authors and accomplices of the crime. “ [If you shall have ascertained that they have stretched forth impious hands to such great impiety] ” (Mon. Germ. Hist. Script., 7, p. 540, n. 31).

Lea himself, whose testimony on this point is very valuable, gives this example : In 1114 the Bishop of Rheims, who had convicted some heretics by the ordeal of water, consulted the Council of Beauvais as to the punishment to be inflicted ; in his absence, the people, fearing the lenience of the Bishops, broke open the prison, and burned the prisoners.² “ These struggles,” observes M. Julien Havet, “ between an over-zealous people and a more tolerant clergy were not uncommon at that period.”³ It is well known how energetically Wazon, the Bishop of Liège, whose voice was listened to even at Rome, pleaded with the Episcopate the cause of mercy.

² Op. cit., vol. i., p. 351. For “ Rheims ” we must read “ Soissons.” The passage is borrowed from Guiberti Abbatis de Novigente Monodiarum, 1. 3, c. 17.

³ L’hérésie et le Bras Séculier au Moyen Age jusqu’au XIIIe Siècle ; from Bibliothèque de l’Ecole de Chartes, 1880, or Œuvres, t. 2, 117.

This resistance to exterior severity, however, slackened by degrees, and ceased altogether at the end of the twelfth century. The Bishops yielded to the current of public opinion, which was that of the people and the Prince, and which was explained by the antisocial character of the prevailing errors. Moreover, the least scrupulous and least pious monarchs, the declared enemies of the Popes, made themselves conspicuous by an animosity which may have been inspired by various motives—by genuine zeal for religion and social order, by political duplicity, or even by cupidity, for certain confiscations came in very conveniently to fill the coffers of the State.

In short, in the thirteenth century the policy of repression prevailed everywhere ; but it must be remembered, as we shall have occasion to point out later on, that the heresy so repressed was that of obstinate or relapsed persons.

Princes and people, united in their desire to repress heretical apostasy, agreed in inflicting on obstinate or relapsed heretics the penalty of death ; and the Emperor who first made it a rule of common law, Frederic II. (Constitution of 1224), laid down that this should be death by burning.¹ But custom permitted a relapsed person who repented to escape this punishment, and in many countries heresiarchs were practically the only persons to be delivered alive to the flames (see Pirhing in 1. 5, t. 7, n. 92 ; he quotes Farinacius).

¹ This form of execution had passed from the Roman law into the barbarian codes. In the summary executions of the twelfth century the people more than once had recourse to it. The Chronicon Universale Anonymi Laudu- nensis (edition Cartellieri-Stecheli, p. 29) records that in 1204 several persons, convicted of heresy in presence of the Archbishop of Rheims at Braine-sur-Nesle (Aisne), were condemned to the stake by Count Robert, Countess Yolande, and numerous assessors. The heretics of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were connected with the Manichaean sects whose leaders had been burnt under Diocletian. Naturally, the punishment of death by burning commended itself to the German Emperor, who professed to follow the traditions of the great Roman Empire. " [By our authority],” said Frederic II., “ [to be condemned by the judgment of fire] ” (March, 1224, Mon. Germ. Hist. Legum., t. 2, p. 252). The old Canonists, yielding to the necessity of proving everything by Scripture as well as reason, found their warrant in St. John xv. 6 : “If any one abide not in Me, he shall be cast forth as a branch, and shall wither, and they shall gather him up and cast him into the fire, and he shall be burned.”

Such is the law which governed Europe until the time of the Reformation, and even after that time was retained on the statute books of various countries, either in its original form or as amended by later edicts of partial toleration, and it did not disappear entirely until the end of the eighteenth century. It must not, however, be concluded from this that there was a relentless or uninterrupted persecution of heresy, real or pretended, during six hundred years. Even those books which profess to give a dramatic representation of the war against heresy show us clearly, if we read with attention, that the treatment of heretics varied according to time and place. The severity shown in Spain, especially after the time of Ferdinand and Isabella— that is to say, from the last quarter of the fifteenth century—was never known in Portugal. In France the Inquisition was most energetic in the thirteenth century, and then only for the purpose of getting rid of the Catharists and the Albigenses. Before Charles V. and Philip II. the struggle against religious error occupies but little place in the national history of Belgium. The repression was more moderate in Italy, principally in Central Italy and the Papal States, and everywhere short outbursts of violence were succeeded by long periods of tranquillity.

The measures adopted against heresy by the Emperors of Rome and Byzantium, and the appeals made by the Church to the secular arm during their time, call for no special remark, and the encroachments of the secular authorities on the spiritual domain are explained by a confusion of powers very natural at that period. The Church asked only for a twofold protection—protection for her ministers and the faithful against those who were criminals under the common law ; protection for her doctrine against those who threatened the unity of Christian society. That protection, which the Church desired to have free from bloodshed, cannot in principle be denied her, without refusing to acknowledge her right to teach or her social constitution, without repudiating even the defence of morality. In short, she justifies herself by the reasons which refute the theory of absolute tolerance of which we shall speak in the following chapters. It is unnecessary to say more at present on the subject.

The severe laws enacted in the Middle Ages against heretics, the capital sentences passed upon them, and the procedure by which they were condemned, raise questions which we cannot pass over in silence. It is of special interest to know what heretics were prosecuted to the death, and on what grounds they became liable to the extreme penalty of the law. In spite of all that has been already written on the subject, the reader will still look forward to the explanation we have to offer of the institution whose name is always connected with the sanguinary repression of heresy in the Middle Ages—namely, the Inquisition. We will endeavour to satisfy him, first disposing of the question of form and procedure.

221. Civil society may be defined as a union of many such persons as are their own masters, sui juris, joined together for the purpose of protecting their rights and securing their temporal happiness. In the present chapter we shall consider the nature and the origin of civil society, and the exercise of civil functions.

222. The nature of civil society can be best understood from a detailed examination into its constituent notes, namely: 1. Its end or purpose, 2. The units composing it, 3. The authority governing it, 4. The means employed to obtain its end.

§ 1. The End of Civil Society.

223. 1. We have seen in a preceding chapter (No. 199) that society, or association of some kind, is natural to man, and, consequently, that it is an institution of God. The society first in the order of nature is the family, or domestic society, and next in order comes civil society, or the State.

The necessity of civil society is obvious: when many families live in proximity, they are forced to have intercourse of some sort with one another. In the course of time it will come to pass, as each family has chiefly its own interests at heart, that many of these families will not be moderate in their aspirations, their claims, and their efforts at aggrandizement. Hence, unless they be united for the purpose of securing public peace and the protection of personal rights, they will be frequently at variance, and even in deadly strife with one another.

224. The preservation of peace among its members is the primary end of civil society. United by a common bond, men can render great assistance to one another in securing, with comparative ease, the comfort and happiness of all; and opportunities for the development and exercise of the human faculties are thus afforded which would be impossible without such an association. The complex end of civil society is clearly stated in the preamble to the Constitution of the United States, which reads thus: "We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

225. Civil society, we repeat, is natural to man, and, consequently, owes its institution to the Creator. It is natural, because it is the outcome of man's natural tendencies and is necessary for the development and application of his highest powers. Without civil society, men could not lead lives worthy of their rational nature and their ultimate destiny. The theory of Hobbes and of Rousseau, that man is naturally a savage, perpetually at war with his fellow-men, and that society is an afterthought, something artificial superadded to his nature, is as opposed to historical facts as it is degrading to the human race.

§ 2. The units of which civil society is composed.

226. When certain families have entered into association for mutual aid and protection, the domestic relations in each family are manifestly not altered thereby: the family continues to be a natural society; each family is a moral person, the father acting for all the members. Hence the units composing civil society are not individual men, women, and children, but the families, or the heads of families. The wives and children are indeed members of the State, though not directly; they are members of the families that make up the State, and they are represented in the State by the heads of the families to which they severally belong. It is neither necessary nor desirable for the common good that the State should deal directly with them, ignoring the natural organization of the domestic society. Unmarried men, who are properly qualified by age and civil condition, i. e., who have attained their majority and are their own masters, sui juris, share with heads of families in the enjoyment of civil rights.

238. To fulfill its purposes, civil government must exercise three functions, namely: the legislative, in the making of laws; the judiciary, in the application of the laws to particular cases; the executive, in carrying laws and judgments into effect. All three functions may be exercised by one person or body of men; but in this country they are intrusted to three distinct departments: the legislative to Congress, the judiciary to the law courts, the executive to the President.

§ 3. The Executive.

251. In addition to the legislative and judicial departments, a country requires for its government executive officers, an armed force, and a treasury for the remuneration of public services. Those officials whose duty it is to carry the laws into effect form the executive department, which is in some respects dependent upon the two other departments. The President of the United States is the chief executive officer of the nation; at the same time he is at the head of the legislative department, holding the power of veto and giving validity to the enactments of Congress by affixing his signature thereto. The President is also the official embodiment of the majesty and authority of the nation.

252. The public officers ought to be chosen or appointed from those who, by their knowledge, ability, fidelity, and integrity, are well qualified to procure the common good. The practice of distributing offices as the spoils of party victory among the unworthy and incompetent, is a gross violation of distributive justice and a serious injury to the State.

253. The treasury is supplied either by direct taxation, i. e., by taxes imposed on the property of the individual citizens, or by indirect taxation, i. e., revenues and duties paid for manufactured and imported goods. The right of taxation is based upon the need of the government to defray public expenses incurred for the common good; hence, the taxes levied should not exceed these expenses. The assessment of taxes for each class of the citizens ought, as far as is practicable, to be proportioned to the benefits received therefrom. Thus, each citizen receives from the State an equivalent for the taxes he pays, and no one is forced to labor for another without just compensation. This rule does not prevent the taxation of the rich to supply assistance to the needy poor. The honest poor have a right, as human beings, to live in decent comfort, and, if they cannot succeed in doing so by their own exertions, they must be aided by the wealthy members of the community. It is even necessary for the common good that no class of the people should be driven by want to discontent and desperation.

254. The armed force required by civil society consists usually of:

1. The police, a body of men who exercise a constant guardianship over public tranquillity and the rights of individuals.

2. The militia, or civic troops, intended chiefly for the protection of the State against the insubordination of its own subjects.

3. The regular army, whose main purpose is defense against foreign foes.

As personal danger naturally accompanies the work of armed men, these are bound, when the occasion requies it, to expose themselves even to death in the performance of their duty. In the use of armed force, nations approach nearest to ideal perfection when this use is brought within the narrowest limits, while at the same time the public peace is vigorously maintained. Accordingly, the people of the United States have reason to congratulate themselves that public order reigns so extensively, though the army is comparatively diminutive, the militia seldom needed, and the police rarely compelled to make use of deadly weapons.

WE say, and say truly, that we are fighting for the liberties of Europe. The brave Belgian people chose rather to see their country overrun and its fairest cities destroyed than be deprived of their freedom. But the enemy also asserts that he is fighting for freedom. He wants room to expand, to grow to the full stature that nature intended him to reach. He asserts that he is fighting for the freedom of the seas which are held in bondage by the naval predominance of England. The country seems to have made up its mind to abandon its long-cherished idol of free trade. Even freedom may be bought at too dear a rate. If we are determined to conquer and to crush militarism we see the necessity of greater organisation. But organisation means restraint of individual initiative, it means some curtailment of freedom. Everybody, except the anarchist, sees that some sort of government is absolutely necessary, that people cannot be allowed to act and to speak just as they like, that some restriction of liberty is necessary to prevent society from lapsing into barbarism. On the other hand the philosophers who are most in vogue tell us that freedom is a dream, a shadow without substance. According to them, everything that happens in the universe is the necessary outcome of antecedent necessary causes. It is almost beyond dispute, says Mr. Bertrand Russell, that Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms. In action, in desire, we must submit perpetually to a tyranny of outside forces. It is only in imagination that we can indulge in dreams of freedom. In thought, in aspiration, we are free, free from our fellow-men, free from the petty planet on which our bodies impotently crawl, free even while we live from the tyranny of death.* Some time ago I attended a lecture given by a man of science on a subject connected with eugenics. After the lecture I remarked to him that he seemed to me to have treated the matter from too mechanical a point of view and had not allowed for free will. He answered that the question of free will was undoubtedly at the root of the whole subject, that at one time he had studied the question and had tried to write something about it. But he honestly confessed that as he thought and wrote free will seemed to vanish into thin air, there was simply no room for it in his materialistic conception of the universe. It will be worth while to try to make two or three points as clear as possible in so important and intricate a question. And first of all we must recognise that the freedom of the individual will is ultimately the question at issue. Poets may indulge their fancy and write beautiful things about political and civil liberty, but if man's individual will is not free political and civil liberty is a mere pretence. Political and civil action whether called free or unfree is simply what it must be given the antecedent circumstances. Patriots who thought they were dying for their country's freedom simply could not do otherwise. It is as far from the truth to call their actions heroic and celebrate them in song as it would be to talk of the heroism of the moon and her bold flights through the realms of space. If the individual human will is not free then there is no such thing as freedom in the visible universe. Every slightest event is the necessary result of blind and necessary antecedent conditions. Mr. Bertrand Russell seems to claim exemption of thought from this iron law of necessity. Thought is indeed, as he says, free from our fellow-men, in the sense that our fellow-men cannot put fetters on our thoughts. They can fetter our limbs, they can cast the whole body into prison, but the mind can still wander unfettered abroad. Our minds are free from the petty planet on which our bodies impotently crawl, in the sense that we can in thought travel to Mars and bear its inhabitants company. But if the individual will is not free it is clear that thought is not free either. Like everything else it is but the resultant of antecedent and necessary conditions. It is but the flash which accompanies some change in the substance of the brain, and we might as well talk of the liberty of the flame that rises from heated coal, as of the freedom of thought. In discussing questions of freedom we must focus our attention on the freedom of the human will, which lies at the root of all other liberties. In the question of free will every person of sound mind has within himself the main factors required for a solution of the problem. What a man of sound mind is directly conscious of must be true if the human mind is really capable of attaining to truth. Let us then examine the working of our own minds. At the very outset we are struck with a phenomenon which is quite different from the phenomena exhibited by the world of matter and force. Material forces may be reduced to those of attraction and repulsion. Water falling under the action of gravitation is an instance of the one, steam expanding under the application of heat is an instance of the other. In both cases one particle of matter acts on another, it influences something outside itself, either drawing it towards itself or repelling it from itself. The action of mind is altogether different. Thought turns back upon itself, the mind reflects upon itself, and becomes self-conscious. Mind, then, is not made up of material particles which mutually attract or repel each other. It is not extended in space. It is a simple, unextended substance, a spiritual substance, which is indeed intimately connected and united with matter, but which for all that is quite different from it. My thought can represent to me something which I apprehend as good and desirable. I have a friend who lives twenty miles off and I always derive pleasure and advantage from visiting him. The thought of paying him a visit comes into my mind this morning. The presence of the thought at once calls into action that other faculty of my spiritual nature which I call my will. The will is a faculty which is always more or less attracted by what is presented to it as something good. It cannot initiate an action of itself. Thought must always go before, and the thought must be of something apprehended as good if the will is to be attracted by it. The will shrinks from what is apprehended as evil. But as the sense of sight is necessarily attracted by what is pleasant to look upon, as the sense of taste is necessarily gratified by what is agreeable to it, so the will is necessarily attracted more or less by what is apprehended in thought as good. If the object is represented as so exceedingly good that there is no admixture of evil in it, and its possession would give unlimited and unadulterated happiness, the will is necessarily and overwhelmingly attracted by it. The human will is not free when such an object is presented to it. The human will necessarily desires complete happiness. But out of Heaven there is no object whose possession can render man completely and perfectly happy. All created goods are limited, they all have some imperfection or evil mixed with them, and when they are presented to the mind in thought, the mind can turn away from the contemplation of the good which they contain to the contemplation of the evil which is mingled with them. That power is the rational foundation of the freedom of the will. Man is endowed with the power of stopping and deliberating about the pursuit of a finite good which has been presented to the will by thought. Although probably there is always some indeliberate movement of the will towards an object which thought presents to it as good and desirable, yet when that object is finite and mingled with imperfection, thought can step in and keep the will in suspense by presenting to it the disadvantages which its pursuit and possession would entail. And so when the thought of visiting my friend who lives twenty miles off occurs to me, although at first I feel my will attracted by the prospect I do not necessarily set off on my visit. If my will was a material force the whole mechanism of my being would at once be set in motion towards my friend when the attraction was felt. But being a spiritual substance I can say to my will—Stay, let us consider the proposal. If I visit my friend to-day, I shall lose a day's work; I shall not be able to keep the appointment I made with another friend who is coming to visit me this afternoon. No, I cannot go to-day, and so the first movement of the will is checked, it does not put the rest of the machinery, which I call myself, in motion. If, on the contrary, on deliberation, I find no great obstacle in the way of paying a visit to my friend, I have nothing to do but to allow the movement of the will, which was started by the thought of my friend, free play. I simply allow it free scope for execution. Mind and will work in harmony, together they quickly settle to go by motor not by train, and to take my child Mary with me, because my friend always likes to see his godchild. And in all this I feel and know that I could have determined otherwise if I had chosen to do so. Not all the learned treatises of all the mechanical philosophers who ever lived could ever persuade me to the contrary. I am convinced that I chose freely to visit my friend, nothing without or within constrained me to it. I am certain that I chose freely to go by car, and that I could have taken the train by preference if I had chosen. I am certain, too, that I was not under compulsion when I elected to take little Mary with me. If I acted freely here, my will is free in large spheres of human life. Nor am I acquainted with anything in the theory of causation, or in that of the conservation of energy, which gainsays my brief exposition of an important doctrine of the Church.

* Philosophical Essays, p. 63.

AFTER more than a century of struggle and revolution the principle of Nationalism has prevailed—at least, to a great extent. Oppressed nationalities have succeeded to a great extent in securing the freedom and the home rule which they demanded. And yet peace and contentment do not seem to have come together with the realization of the nations’ hopes. Far-seeing men are beginning to fear that a new element of discord and war has been introduced into Europe. Some nations find themselves cooped up within the limits of the lands of their ancestors with frontiers that have no pretension to be scientific. On the other side of their frontiers are hostile and aggressive peoples who seriously threaten their security. In pure self-defence they must make their security more certain. Others find themselves cut off from easy access to the sea, and their commerce with the outside world controlled by jealous neighbours. The more powerful nations are fully conscious of their own superiority. They show little disposition to adopt a self-denying ordinance, and refrain from using their economic and political advantages for their own benefit. On the contrary, they seem determined to take advantage of their opportunities to the full. The watchword of “Germany above all” has not been silenced even though it is uttered in less boisterous tone than was usual before the Great War. National pride and ambition is one of the strongest passions of human nature, and it has not been exorcised by any means as yet.

On the contrary, the old spirit of imperial Rome seems to be as strong as ever in some modern peoples. According to the national poet it was the proud mission of Rome to rule the subject nations with imperial sway, to spare those who submitted, and to war down those who obstinately resisted. This, of course, was for the benefit of less cultured nations. Roman culture and Roman peace were blessings which the outer barbarian should be compelled to accept for his own good.

The fervour and the absolute character of pagan patriotism added strength to this imperial temper. In his work on Duties, Cicero tells us what pagan patriotism was. “When we have gone over,” he says, “all the relations that are in the world, and thoroughly considered the nature of each, we shall find that there is no one of greater obligation, no one that is dearer and nearer to us than that which all of us bear to the commonwealth. We have a tender regard and concern for our parents, for our children, our kindred and acquaintance, but the love which we have for our native country swallows up all other loves whatsoever.” The ancients deified and worshipped their country, and the ancient state domineered with absolute power over both soul and body. There is not much tendency nowadays to pay religious worship to the state, but in other respects in many quarters a recrudescence of the pagan doctrine of patriotism may be observed.

This recrudescence of pagan patriotism is all the more dangerous because it is untrammelled by any laws of morality. The ancient state professed to be scrupulously observant of the laws of justice and fidelity. The modern state adopts the principles of Machiavelli; it acknowledges only one law, the law of success. The watchword, ‘ Germany over all,” is not confined to Germany; some in England change it to “England over all,” and they add another to it, “England, right or wrong.” A powerful state, fettered by no laws, human or divine, treating its pledged word as only a scrap of paper, commanding the blind obedience of its subjects, becomes a menace to the world.

While some exaggerate the duty of patriotism, there are others who minimize or deny it altogether. They profess to be cosmopolitans, citizens of the world, or they are Internationals. The Red International of Communism fosters loyalty to class rather than to country. The yellow International of high finance pursues its object of gain irrespective of country; it is prepared to assist the fatherland in difficulties, but on strictly business principles. Many people who belong neither to the red nor to the yellow International deny that patriotism is a virtue. In their opinion it is a mere prejudice, a provincialism, a sort of extended selfishness. The true attitude according to them is to cultivate esteem and friendship for all mankind, and to recognize the good points in all men. Some Catholics even regard patriotism as rather a pagan virtue. The true Catholic, they think, considers heaven as his true fatherland, and looks upon his home on earth as a place of exile and a vale of tears. Are we not exhorted to conduct ourselves here below as strangers and pilgrims? Is not human life a journey through the desert of this world towards the promised land? All this suggests that patriotism is a matter of practical importance, and that it is not without its ambiguities and difficulties. It will be worth while to try to state the Catholic doctrine on the subject as clearly and concisely as possible. We shall find that patriotism is recognized as a virtue by Catholic theology, and that, like all moral virtues, it occupies a mean position between two vicious extremes.

Although it may be said that patriotism is nowhere explicitly inculcated as a virtue in Holy Scripture, yet there are many passages and incidents where it is implied. The book of Esther and the books of the Machabees abound in such passages. One of the tenderest and most touching of the Psalms is the hundred and thirty-sixth: “How shall we sing the song of the Lord in a strange land? If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand be forgotten. Let my tongue cleave to my jaws if I do not remember thee.” One of the most pathetic incidents in the Gospels is our Lord’s weeping over Jerusalem. So that if we are taught that heaven is our true spiritual country, and are bidden to conduct ourselves on earth as exiles, this does not mean that we have no duties to our earthly country while we live here.

St Ambrose, St Augustine, and St Thomas, in the name of the Church, expressly teach that patriotism is a virtue implanted in us by Nature herself and inculcated by the religion of Christ. It is a part of the two fundamental virtues of justice and charity. Justice requires that we should give everyone his due, that we should pay to all what we owe them. There is no one to whom we owe more than to God, our Creator and Lord. To him we owe all that we have, all that we are, and all that we hope to be. We depend upon him every moment of our existence. We cannot repay him the immense debt that we owe him, but justice compels us to do what we can. We strive to do this by practising the virtue of religion, by giving God the love, honour, and worship which pleases him and which is his due.

Under God we owe most to our parents. They brought us into the world, and gave us the first and most important part of our education. We inherited from our parents a certain habit of body, certain tendencies, and certain dispositions, and those dispositions were developed and stereotyped during our early years, when we were under the more immediate control of our parents. Our characters for good or evil were moulded to a great extent before we began to think, and they were moulded largely by our parents and by the home which they provided for us. To our parents we owe the education which was intended to fit us for the battle of life. It is our duty to strive to repay all the debt which we owe to our parents by honouring them, by loving, reverencing, and obeying them as long as we are not emancipated from their control. Our duty towards them of love and reverence lasts as long as life.

Under God and our parents we owe most to the country in which we were born and bred. Our country gave us the food, drink, clothing, air, and exercise which our bodies required. Our characters, ideas, feelings, sentiments, aims, and ambitions are to a great extent inherited from the race to which we belong, and are the product of its character, its history, and its traditions. The very hills and valleys, the woods and the rivers of our native land, have left their mark upon us. We should have been quite different beings if we had been born and brought up in Spain or in India.

That immense debt which we owe to our country we pay by practising the virtue of patriotism. We are bound to esteem and love our country and to serve it to the best of our ability in its needs. This does not mean that we are to hate other countries. Just as the love of our parents does not imply that we should hate the parents of other people, so the duty of loving our country does not imply that we should hate other countries. We fully recognize that other people have their obligations towards their parents; we prefer our own. In the same way we recognize the duty and the right of other people to love their country; we prefer our own.

In the second place, patriotism is based on the great virtue of charity. Our Lord was only announcing what the natural law prescribes when he said that all morality hangs on the two fundamental precepts of the love of God and the love of our neighbour as ourselves. The duty of loving our neighbour as ourselves, of doing as we would be done by, does not mean that we are to entertain the same evenly balanced affection for all men. We must love other men inasmuch as they are our neighbours. We must wish well to the Chinese and the Japanese whom we do not know and shall never see. Our fellow-countrymen are much nearer to us than the Chinese and Japanese; they are our neighbours in a stricter sense, and well-ordered charity takes note of the fact. Their interests and welfare are intimately bound up with ours. We need their help, protection, and good will in a thousand different ways. We are members of the same organized body politic, of the same community, and St Paul tells us that one member cannot say to another: “I need you not.”

There is, then, an obligation made known to us by right reason, and enforced by Christian charity, of loving our fellow-countrymen and fellow-citizens with a special degree of affection. The instructed Catholic will not be exposed to the danger of exaggerating this obligation and making it supreme and absolute over all other duties. He knows that he is a member of a still greater communion of saints, to whom also he is bound by special ties in this life and in life everlasting. He must do nothing to imperil his claim to life everlasting, even under the excuse of patriotism. Such a maxim as ‘ England, right or wrong ” is self-condemned in his eyes. And so the true Catholic’s patriotism is real and genuine, but it is not exaggerated. It occupies the golden mean between two vicious extremes. The country which, as true patriots, we are bound to esteem, love, and serve is in general our native land, the country in which we were born and bred. That is clear from what has just been said about justice and charity, the foundations of patriotism.

But in these days of emigration the case frequently arises of a man leaving his native land and making a home for himself and his children elsewhere. An Englishman, for example, emigrates to America, with a view to settling there. He will preserve a warm affection for the old country, he may visit it occasionally, but he has made his home in America, and henceforth he will regard America with a true patriot’s esteem and love. That, too, is a conclusion drawn from justice and charity.

It is certain and undeniable that two orders of things actually exist in this world, the natural order and the supernatural—nature and grace. These two orders have the same ultimate end, though, in themselves, they are distinct. Nature is, and must be, always subordinate to grace; the natural must be always subservient to the supernatural. This is God's immutable decree. Hence religion must always hold the first place in everything. A system of education that places the natural and the supernatural on the same level is absurd, and must be condemned; but a system of education that ignores the supernatural altogether, is, if possible, even more wicked and detestable. Yet this wicked, detestable, irreligious system, diabolical in its origin, and subversive of all political, social, and religious order, is imposed by the State upon all Christian denominations, whether they approve of it or not. Now the State has no right whatever to force such a godless system upon its subjects.

For the right understanding of this most important point, I attach great importance to a clear understanding of what is commonly called the State.

People in general have a vague and confused conception of this matter. You will hear the people talk of the "sovereignty of the State," "the life of the State," "the power of the State," "the absolute authority of the State," "the paramount allegiance due to the State," etc., etc. Not only the Public at large, but even those who assume to lead and direct public opinion, are constantly blundering on this subject.

There is nothing so fertile as an idea; it will, like every other germ or seed, bring forth in time according to its kind. If it be a good one, it will bring forth good fruit; if it be a false or bad one, it will spread its evil fruits over society. Be it one or the other, it is never barren; sooner or later, the idea or maxim takes form and substance in an Institution; then it operates, in a material manner, for good or evil.

To illustrate: a false conception of the nature and authority, of the legitimate functions, rights and duties of what is called the "State," has led, and will, if not corrected, ever lead to the most deplorable political, social, and religious disorder and oppression. As diverging lines in mathematics can never approximate, but must continue to widen as they are extended, so a false departure from a political "standpoint" can never be rectified unless by a return to correct first principles. This is what is meant by the democratic maxim, "that a frequent return to first principles is necessary to secure the ends of public liberty."

Indeed, this error, this diverging point in constitutional interpretation, has been the real cause—the "causa causarum"—of the late war; and not the "negro," or "cotton," or the "spirit of domination," or "difference of race," or what not, might serve as the "proximate cause," but the real cause lay far back of them. I am willing to admit that political events do not always proceed on a strictly logical order, but nevertheless there is a sequence, indeed an inevitable chain of cause and effect in the progress of public affairs, such as we see in individual conduct, but only on a broader scale.

Now what is the civil power, or State; what its origin, its authority, its legitimate functions, its rights and duties? Here I must, of necessity, be very brief. The State originated from the natural desire which men experience to obtain certain goods, such as peace, security of life and property, of personal rights and privileges, etc., etc. These are goods which neither individuals, nor families, nor private corporations can procure for themselves satisfactorily. People therefore unite to establish a State, in order to attain, through the State, what they cannot do by their own private exertions. The State, then, is made by the people and for the people. In our form of government it is a mere corporate agency. Its duty is to see that justice is administered, and personal rights and property protected. It holds the sword of justice not for itself, but for others; it is the servant, and not the master. The people were not made for the State, or given to the State, but the State is posterior to the people; it was, as I said before, established by the people and for the people. In them, under God, resides the sovereignty and ultimate permanent authority. The right of the State is to discharge the duties assigned it within the sphere of its delegated authority—that is all.

That sphere of action of the State in this country is clearly defined in the written Constitution. The State, then, must scrupulously abstain from violating any of the rights it was organized to protect.

There never has been, and never will be, but two forms of government—one seeking to restrain, the other to enlarge, the liberties of the people. To the former belong the centralized and despotic governments of the past and present; to the latter, the limited and representative ones.

Russia, without doubt, is the highest type of that despotism so common among Pagan nations. The Czar is the successor of the Gentile Cæsar; he unites in himself the civil and spiritual power; the inevitable result is social oppression, denial of the rights of conscience, of the family, and of the political society. Our government has already made gigantic steps in the same direction. Many of the political minds of this country have been drawn within the circle of monarchial ideas. They are unconsciously, as it were, adopting their forms of thought, and applying their forms of expression to our government, and claiming for it the prerogatives and supremacy appertaining to the feudal institutions of Asia and Europe. Our simple democratic form of government seems to be getting ashamed of its plebeian origin, and ambitious to ape the language and pretensions of its former masters. This decadence was made apparent not long ago, in the discussions "for the removal of the United States Capitol." In a two-hours' discussion, the word "Republic," or "Federal Government," or "United States," was not once mentioned!! It was "Nation," "Empire," etc., etc., usque ad nauseam, from beginning to end. To a reflecting mind, this language has an ominous significance. It smacks strongly of monarchy.

But some one will perhaps say, "Sir, what has all this dissertation to do with your subject? You commence by disclaiming against the Public School System, and here you are giving a grave lecture on the nation relapsing into imperialism or monarchy."

It has a great deal to do; it is an attempt to trace effects to their causes. This government of ours, both in its Federal and State capacity, is growing ambitious to play the King. It is setting itself up as master. It is using the language of all tyrants: "Sic volo, sic jubeo," etc., etc. It claims, after the example of Prussia or Russia, or some other despotism, to direct the education of the children of the people. It even claims them as belonging to itself. It is the great feudal master. It takes upon itself the old duty of providing instruction for the sons and daughters of its dependents. It takes upon itself the discharge of duties imposed on parents by Divine Law, just as if fathers and mothers had lost their natural instincts as well as sense of duty; just as if the State had all the intelligence, virtue, and forethought of the public in her keeping. It dispenses parents from a duty from which God will never dispense them. It has usurped the office of teacher; it will, if not checked, set itself up as preacher. It makes Sunday laws, temperance laws; it places marriage on the footing of simple contracts, facilitates divorce; it is constantly, in all these things and many others, repeating the "mot" ascribed to a King of France: "L'état c'est moi." In fine, it makes, as it has been aptly, but not very reverently, said, God a little man, and itself and the State a little god, not in love and charity, indeed, but in power and authority.

Here is where the danger comes from, and it is against this that the people must provide. The people must see to it that the State, or those who are charged with its authority, keep within their proper place. The people can never be too vigilant or jealous of their constituted authority, never permit themselves to be the victims of misplaced confidence. The State is not seldom the usurper—the rebel that should be watched. The allegiance is not to it, but from it to the people—its master. "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty."

The people have been greatly deceived and wronged by the State on the establishment of the Public School system. The better to understand this, let us see again, in a few words, what are the principles on which the establishment of public schools is based. How did men arrive at the idea that the State should be a school-master? If we consult history, we shall find that this idea rests upon most objectionable grounds. In Europe—in Protestant countries—the education of youth was held to belong to the church. But as the Protestant prince was also the chief bishop of his church, he had the care of schools, as well as the administration of other religious matters. According to this principle of the State-church, all the schools were State-schools. At the present day, Protestant princes and princesses are not looked upon as chief bishops, but the consequence of this objectionable system does still remain, and has gained a foothold even in this free country.

The French Revolution, among other things, diffused communistic and socialistic theories. Nay, communism and socialism seemed to have, for a moment, the fullest sway in those revolutionary proceedings. It is from such socialistic revolutionists that came the idea, or rather principle, which was made a law, that the State should educate the children of its subjects. Accordingly the school-system was arranged, which Napoleon I. highly welcomed and retained, as he saw in it a welcome instrument of his despotism. In fact, nothing pleases State-absolutism or despotism so much as the complete control of education through the system of State-schools. As the result of impartial history, then, we see that the foundation of the State-school system is nothing else than the objectionable Protestant State-church, and especially revolutionary socialism.

But most absurd did the State-school system appear after it had been transplanted into free America. Here this "State system of education" was at first applied to the poor, and other unprovided-for "waifs of society." But not long after, the State claimed to have a paramount interest in the children of all classes; it made no distinction, it knew not the rich from the poor, but opened its scholastic treasures alike, and it was thought to be all right.

What an absurdity! The State, as I have remarked, must scrupulously abstain from violating any of those rights which it was organized to protect. It must not paralyze or take away the industry of the individual, family, or private institutions by substituting for it its own industry. The State should rather protect and promote the industry of its subjects, as well as other rights and liberties. Let me speak more plainly: the State, for instance, should protect trade, but it should not be itself a tradesman; the State should encourage agriculture, but it should not be itself a farmer; the State should sustain honest handicraft, but it should not work at shoe-making or tailoring, and bread-baking. So, in the same manner, the State should promote and protect education, but it should not be itself a school-master, and give instruction.

What a cry would be raised if the State erected State workshops, and thereby ruined all other similar trades! Now the State does the same thing, as far as possible, in regard to education. What an absurdity! In our free country, State education has no more foundation in good sense than the old sumptuary laws, that regulated the length of a boot or the dimensions of a skirt.

If the State claims the right to educate our children, why does it not just as well claim the right to nurse, feed, clothe, doctor, and lodge them? Indeed these necessities are more indispensable, and must be supplied to a considerable extent before education can be given at all. Why should the State throw all these burdens on the parents, and assume that of instruction? It cannot claim to know more of grammar than of the art of nursing and cooking. It is even said that the tailor and barber have more to do in fashioning the man than the school-master.

Again, how absurd is it not for the State to undertake to teach all alike, without regard to their circumstances or prospects in life, the same business. This scholastic equality soon ends, if it ever had a reality. They cannot all expect to be Newtons, Humboldts, or La Places. They cannot be all, nay, not one in ten thousand, "professors," or "editors," or what not. We cannot, if we would, escape the sentence imposed on our forefather in the garden: "Thou shalt eat thy bread in the sweat of thy face." As well might the State claim that all the children from seven to seventeen years of age should sit at the same table, provided at public expense, and be served with the same food and the same number of dishes. If the State (in order to prepare the rising generation to make citizens, which must be its reason, if any) thinks it necessary to prescribe a State education, it is equally important that their food, and even their clothing, should be of the approved State quality and pattern!!! All know that this was the old Lacædemonian plan, and how it ended history tells;—in ferocity, avarice, dishonesty and disruption. All admit the folly and wickedness of forcing a people into uniformity in matter of religion. Now it is just as unreasonable, just as absurd, just as wicked to force the people into uniformity in the matter of education. One species of tyranny as well as the other disregards the just claims of conscience, tramples on the most vital rights of individuals, and usurps the most sacred right of the family.

The State may, indeed, require that the children should be educated, in order that they may one day become worthy members of society, and fit subjects for the State; but claim, and give, and control their education, the State cannot. There is in all this matter a feature not always clearly represented. It is this: any provision made by the "State" for education, must refer to the poor and otherwise unprovided, and be justified on the grounds of the State standing to these classes in loco parentis; beyond this, though the State, as to "charitable uses," may be defined parens patria, yet, as to the people at large, it has nothing to do with their education whatever. If this simple though undeniable fact were properly understood, it would save a world of trouble and confusion.

I am speaking of a "Christian State," and the State in America is Christian. The very graves, if necessary, would open and give up their dead to bear testimony to its Christian origin. Its civilization is Christian, and is the product of the principles of the "New Law" as taught and promulgated by the Church. The distinguishing feature of this civilization is, that it has asserted the dignity of freedom of the individual man, while the ancient, or Gentile, civilization, sunk the individual man in the composite society called the State. In that case it was but reasonable that the State should, as owner, take upon itself the burden of providing, not only for his government, but also for the education of his offspring. These, too, belonged to it, on the maxim of Roman or Pagan law, that partus sequitur ventrem, or the offspring follows the parent. This is the origin of the Pagan doctrine, "the children of the State"—a miserable relic of barbarism. It is important to keep this fact in mind, when we deny the supremacy of the State in the matter of education.

Our children, then, are not the children of the State. The State has no children, and never had, nor will. The State does not own them, nor their fathers nor mothers, nor anybody else in this country, thank God! We have not got that far yet on the road to civil slavery, and I hope we never shall. We are not Pagans, nor Mahometans, nor Russians. We have not sold out, and don't intend to! We are free, for with a great price our forefathers have bought this freedom; and better still, we are made, through the mercy of our Divine Author, Christians, and heirs to a heavenly kingdom. Our children, too, are free; they belong by the order of nature to their parents, and by the order of grace to our Lord Jesus Christ. They are children of God and heirs to His heavenly kingdom. It is not on the State, but on parents, that God imposed the duty to educate their children, a duty from which no State can dispense, nor can fathers and mothers relieve themselves of this duty by the vicarious assumption of the State. They have to give a severe account of their children on the Day of Judgment, and they cannot allow any power to disturb them in insisting upon their rights and making free use of them. The State has no more authority or control rightfully over our children, than over a man's wife. The right to educate our children is a right of conscience, and a right of the family. Now these rights do not belong to the temporal order at all; and outside of this the State has no claim, no right, no authority. When the State has children, it will be time enough to teach them. How long will it take our enlightened age to learn this simple but important truth?

Nothing shows better the absurdity of the State in claiming the right of education, than its incompetency for the task. The State is forbidden any interference with religion.

I have shown that the whole system is infidel in principle. The State says we want no religion taught in the Public Schools, because, as we cannot teach you religion without inculcating some form or other professed by some sect or other, and as we do not wish to give offence, we will teach you none. Let the child believe anything or nothing, so as it is not some form of "sectarianism." I worship in the "Pantheon;" all are alike to me, of course. In all this the State is perfectly consistent, and cannot do otherwise. It has undertaken a part it is not competent to perform. The State, as State, professes no form of belief. Its gods, its worships, its altars, its victims, its rewards, its punishments, its heaven, its hell—are here. It teaches no religion, because it don't profess any. It was not born, it will not die, it has no soul, it was not created, it will not be judged in the world to come, like men.

But let me not be misunderstood as concluding that states, nations, or kingdoms are not moral persons, and are not responsible for their acts and conduct to Almighty God. They have no right to do wrong more than an individual. "States" have their lives, their mission, their destiny; they have their sphere here below. They represent the temporal, or the things which belong to Cæsar.

The State, then, is a moral person, and a fortiori, a religious person, for there can be no morality without religion. But though religion, in a general sense, be recognized by the State, it has no authority to control or direct it. It must respect the conscience of an individual. This is his birthright, and cannot be voted away, whether to support Public Schools or Public Churches.

If there be amongst us any number, great or small, who deny the common faith, it is the duty of the State to tolerate them. A greater power—God—does this. But the State itself cannot profess or play infidel, or, under pretence of avoiding sectarian partiality, strike at the root of all Christianity. I admit the State is of the "temporal order," and cannot discriminate between the various modes of belief; but not for that can it place itself outside of them. It is distinguishable, but not separable, from the spiritual order. It is simply a means to a greater end. It is a mischievous error to say that the State has nothing to do with religion, and may act outside of its obligations. If by this it is meant that the State cannot establish or maintain any special form of religion, or interfere with its profession, or even denial by others, I admit the proposition; but if, on the other hand, it is meant that it regards Christianity and infidelity, God or no God, truth and error, either as equal or unimportant, then I utterly deny and condemn it. To bear with and tolerate error is its duty; to foster or provide for its support or propagation, or place it on the same footing with revealed truth, is another and very different thing.

The constitutions of the State guarantee to every citizen the right to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience; but this is not guaranteeing to every one the liberty of not worshipping God at all, to deny His existence, His revelation, or to worship a false god. The freedom guaranteed is the freedom of religion, not the freedom of infidelity. The American Constitution grants to the infidel the right of protection in his civil and political equality, but it grants him no right to protection and support in his infidelity; for infidelity is not a religion, but the denial of all religion. The American State is Christian, and under the Christian law, and is based upon Christian principles. It is bound to protect and enforce Christian morals and its laws, whether assailed by Mormonism, Spiritism, Freelovism, Pantheism, or Atheism. But the State does the contrary. For, I ask, is not the State indirectly prohibiting the profession of Christianity by establishing a system of education which prohibits all religious instruction? The State forbids the teacher to speak a word on the subject of religion.

The State says that "it is an admitted axiom that our form of government, more than all others, depends on the virtue and intelligence of the people. The State proposes to furnish this virtue and intelligence through the Public Schools." That is, the safety of the State depends on the virtue and intelligence of the people, and the latter is derived from the virtue and intelligence of the "State." But where does the virtue and intelligence of the State come from? The only answer on this theory is, from the people. So the "State" enlightens and purifies the people, and the people enlighten and purify the "State." The people support the State, the State supports the Public Schools, and they support the State. If this is not what logicians call a "vicious circle," it looks very much like it. It puts me in mind of the Brahmin's theory of the support of the earth. The Hindoo says, "The world rests on the back of an elephant—the elephant rests on the back of a turtle." But what does the turtle rest on? So it is with our "Public School Brahmins." They will tell you, with all the coolness of Hindoo hypocrisy and pretension, that the "State depends on the schools—the schools on the State or people," but they do not say what the turtle stands on. This is the dilemma that all who rest society on the State, or on an atheistical basis, get into. They would cut the world loose from its assigned order of dependence on Divine Law, and "set it a-going on its own hook." But the trouble is, they have no support for this turtle; they have an earth without axis. The Public School savans would have a self-supporting, a self-adjusting, and a self-created State, balanced on nothing, resting on nothing, responsible to nothing, and believing in nothing but in its own perfection and immortality. They pretend, "through godless schools," to give virtue without morality, morality without religion, and religion without God; thereby sinking below the level of the poor Indian, whose untutored mind sees God in the clouds, and hears Him in the wind.

The nameless abominations of the Communists, Fourrierists, and other such vile and degraded fraternities; the cold-blooded murders and frightful suicides that fill so many domestic hearths with grief and shame; the scarcely-concealed corruption of public and professional men; the adroit peculation and wilful embezzlement of the public money; those monopolizing speculations and voluntary insolvencies so ruinous to the community at large; and, above all, those shocking atrocities so common in our country of unbelief—the legal dissolution of the matrimonial tie, and the wanton tampering with life in its very bud; all these are humiliating facts sufficient to convince any impartial mind that there can be no social virtue, no morality, no true and lasting greatness, without religion.

"Religion," says Lord Derby, "is not a thing apart from education, but is interwoven with its whole system; it is a principle which controls and regulates the whole mind and happiness of the people." And, "Popular education," says Guizot, "to be truly good and socially useful, must be fundamentally religious."

The essential element of education—its pith and marrow, so to speak—is the religious element. By excluding it from the school-room the State has committed a crying injustice to the rising generation, and one of the worst—if not the very worst—of crimes against society. It is not one portion of the "triple man," but the whole—the physical, intellectual, and moral being—the body, the mind, the head, as stated in a previous chapter—that must be cultivated and "brought up." Neglect any one part of man's nature, and you at once disturb the equilibrium of the whole, and produce disorder; educate the body at the expense of the mind and soul, and you will have only animated clay; educate the intelligence at the expense of the moral and religious feelings, and you but fearfully increase a man's power to effect evil. You store the arsenal of his mind with weapons to sap alike the altar and the throne, to carry on a war of extermination against every holy principle, against the welfare and the very existence of society.

Science, without religion, is more destructive than the sword in the hands of unprincipled men; it will prove more of a demon than a god. It is these upholders of the present Public School system that arrest the progress of true happiness in our country, and prepare terrible catastrophes, which may deluge the land with blood.

Who were the leaders in the work of destruction and wholesale butchery in the Reign of Terror? The nurslings of lyceums in which the chaotic principles of the "philosophers" were proclaimed as oracles of truth.

Who are those turbulent revolutionists who now long to erect the guillotine by the Tuilleries? And who are those secret conspirators and their myrmidon partisans who have sworn to unify Italy or lay it in ruins? Men who were taught to scout the idea of a God and rail at religion, to consider Christianity as a thing of the past; men who revel in wild chimeras by night, and seek to realize their mad dreams by day.

Let us, then, dear American fellow-citizens, rest assured that intellectual discipline, without the coöperation of any religious element, will not, and cannot, produce the greatness of a nation, nor can it maintain its life and splendor and prevent its decay; let us, on the contrary, be persuaded that the only safety for a commonwealth, the only source of greatness and prosperity for a nation, as well as of tranquillity and happiness for the individual, is the true religion of Jesus Christ; it is this religion alone that is the safeguard of morality, and morality is the best security of law, as well as the surest pledge of freedom.

We have seen, so far, that the irreligious, godless system of the Public Schools tends directly to turn the youth of both sexes into the worst kind of infidels; to make them disregard good principles, and hold iniquity in veneration; to do away, not only with all revealed religion, but even with the law of nature; to make them practise fraud, theft, and robbery almost as a common trade; to make them regardless of their parents and of all divinely constituted authority; we have seen that this godless system of education is the most powerful means to create confusion, not only in religion, but also in government and in the family circle; to increase the number of apostates, and make of these apostates members of such secret societies as aim at the overthrow of governments and all good order, and Christian religion itself.

Truly, this godless system of education, if carried out to its logical consequences, will disrupt society, destroy the right of the Christian family entirely, bring back on the world the barbarism, tyranny and brutality of Pagan antiquity, and make slaves and victims of its children and their posterity forever!

Who does not feel most indignant at the State for having introduced such a godless system of education? And for the support of this system of education—of this prolific mother of children of anti-Christ—we are enormously tithed and taxed! Horrible!