Section VII. On the Duties of Civil Rulers and Subjects

I. Rulers are bound to promote the public good and therefore especially: 1. to entrust public offices to worthy persons; 2. to provide for the rights and security of citizens; 3. to promote public prosperity by just laws and statutes; 4. to preserve the rights of the Church and to be of assistance to her.¹

¹ Leo XIII, encyclical Immortale Dei, November 1, 1885; Council of Trent, sess. 25, chap. 20, De reformatione.

II. Subjects owe civil superiors reverence,¹ and subjection in those things which are justly established for promoting the common good.²

Corollary I. Rebellion is illicit, both because it is opposed to the right which a ruler enjoys, and because very great evils are everywhere joined to rebellion. Hence Pius IX in the Syllabus condemned proposition 63: "It is lawful to refuse obedience to legitimate rulers, indeed even to rebel."³ And Gregory XVI says: "Both divine and human rights cry out against those who, by most shameful machinations of treason and sedition, strive to fall away from fidelity toward rulers and to hurl them down from authority."⁴

Question 1. Whether it is lawful to eject a usurper.

Resp. It is lawful to eject a usurper in the name of legitimate authority, so long as he has not yet become a legitimate ruler. Now he can become a legitimate ruler either by the just abdication of the legitimate ruler, or by the tacit or express consent of the people to transfer the rights of power to the usurper after the death of the legitimate ruler and of his heirs, or by the public welfare of the commonwealth, if this makes the permanence of the usurper necessary. It is disputed whether long possession of a realm confers a right to authority. It seems it must be denied, especially in the first usurper, and while good faith is lacking and the legitimate ruler still protests, unless that very long possession brings about the necessity that the government of the usurper remain for the public good.⁵ On that supposition, to depose such a ruler already becomes illicit.

Question 2. Whether it is lawful to depose a ruler who is indeed legitimate, but a tyrant.

Resp. 1. It is not lawful to depose a legitimate ruler who is actually abusing power, since an actual injury does not confer the right of dissolving the constituted state.

Resp. 2. If the discussion is about habitual and excessive tyranny, one must distinguish thus:

If the right of electing a ruler belongs to the people, it seems it must per se be affirmed, both because election from the mind of the people seems to be interpreted in this way, and because of the reason to be adduced in the following hypothesis. I said per se, because of the inconveniences often joined to such a manner of acting, about which there will be discussion immediately.

If the principality is hereditary, several more recent authors deny it; but older authors and many more recent ones affirm it, at least per se, because the right of the people to be well governed prevails over the individual good of the ruler that he govern. I said at least per se, because in practice it is difficult to prevent a greater ruin from following from deposition and so forth.

"Tyrannical government," says St. Thomas, "is not just, because it is not ordered to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler, as is clear from the Philosopher in III Politics (chap. 5) and in VIII Ethics (chap. 10); and therefore the disturbance of this government does not have the character of sedition, unless perhaps when the rule of the tyrant is so inordinately disturbed that the subject multitude suffers greater detriment from the consequent disturbance than from the rule of the tyrant" (II-II, q. 42, a. 2, ad 3). And Leo XIII says: "Yet if sometimes it happens that public power is exercised by rulers rashly and beyond measure, the doctrine of the Catholic Church does not allow rising against them on one's own initiative, lest the tranquility of order be disturbed more and more, and lest society receive greater detriment from this. When the matter has come to this, that no other hope of safety shines forth, she teaches that a remedy must be obtained by the merits of Christian patience and by insistent prayers to God."⁶ These words can be understood in such a way that the Supreme Pontiff practically fears that greater evils will arise from rebellion.

Corollary II. Although rebellion is everywhere illicit, nevertheless it is lawful for a nationality, by parliamentary means, as they are called, to tend toward its own commonwealth. It is said by parliamentary means, so that unjust means are excluded, whether with respect to the former commonwealth or with respect to another nationality existing in the same commonwealth. The doctrine stated is drawn from this, that it is lawful, with the rights of others preserved, to tend toward that which is the more suitable means for obtaining human good. But its own commonwealth is per se a more suitable means for a nationality to obtain human good, because citizens of the same morals, culture, and psychological dispositions cooperate more easily toward the common good.

Corollary III. Per se there is no obligation of obeying a usurper who has not yet become a legitimate ruler. The reason is that in reality he lacks authority. Per accidens there can be an obligation, namely lest scandal arise or order be disturbed (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 104, a. 6, ad 3).

Corollary IV. Nor per se is there an obligation of obeying the unjust precepts of a legitimate Ruler. Per accidens there can be an obligation, as was just said about a usurper.

"A man is bound to obey secular rulers," says St. Thomas in the cited place, "insofar as the order of justice requires; and therefore if they do not have a just rule but a usurped one, or if they command unjustly, subjects are not bound to obey them, except perhaps per accidens, on account of avoiding scandal or danger." From these things you may deduce what must be thought about resistance to unjust laws, whether passive or active. Passive resistance, which consists in this, that the law is merely not observed, is per se lawful; per accidens, or because of a greater evil to be avoided, there can be an obligation of fulfilling the law. Yet it is always illicit to observe the law if that which it commands is intrinsically evil. Active resistance, by which someone positively resists observing the law, likewise can per accidens be illicit, and at least as being generally useless is everywhere to be dissuaded.

¹ 1 Pet. 2:17.

² Rom. 13:1, 2, 7.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1763.

⁴ Encyclical Mirari vos, August 15, 1832.

⁵ Aertnys-Damen, I, n. 563.

⁶ Encyclical Quod Apostolici muneris, December 28, 1878.