Article — Marc, Institutiones Morales
Article I: On The Offices Of Those In Whose Hands Is Supreme Power
- A PRINCE and anyone marked with supreme power, according to the doctrine of the Apostle, "is the minister of God unto good." But since the good of human society is DOUBLE, namely spiritual or moral, and temporal, the following things must be established.
Principles. I. A PRINCE, and anyone ruling, is held TO FOSTER in those subject to him the sense of religion, and good morals. The reason is because, religion and fidelity toward God having been taken away, fidelity itself toward the prince collapses, and supreme power, without which no order in society can subsist, is necessarily brought into contempt. For civil life is defended by religion alone, and no force or human law can efficaciously impel an irreligious multitude to an honorable and truly upright tenor of life.11
Therefore the Prince and whoever acts in his PLACE ought:
To furnish a good example in all those things which regard religion and honesty of morals; and since "the whole world is formed according to the example of the King," the leader of the people would stain himself with the enormous crime of prevarication if by his own evil example he induced those subject to him into contempt of religion and corruption of morals.
He ought to choose suitable counselors and ministers, whom doctrine and goodness of life make truly commendable, and first of all (if he possesses the right of election from the Holy See) good Bishops, and upright instructors of studious youth (cf. n. 2244 and 712).
He ought to use his power for the protection of religion and of the Church, not because he boldly arrogates ecclesiastical authority to himself, or decrees those things which regard faith and religion; but because he strives to be a help to the sacred Ministers to whom the care of the Church has been committed by Christ: by taking care that reverence be exhibited to the divine precepts and to men enrolled in the sacred militia, that public violations of divine law be prevented, that sowers of new religions be warded off, as also those evil books and journals by which damage is brought upon holy Faith and good morals. "For evil books," says St. Alphonsus, "plot ruin for kingdoms."12 (cf. n. 451).
(11) Cf. LEO XIII, Encycl. Diuturnum, 29 June 1881, and Encycl. Immortale Dei, 1 November 1885. (12) Fedelta dei Vassalli, c. 1, n. 9; cf. J. B. Jaugey, Accord de l'Eglise et de l'Etat, Letter 4 and following.
- II. A PRINCE and anyone ruling is held TO PROVIDE for public felicity and security by just and opportune means. The reason is because public felicity or prosperity is the end of government, not indeed the primary end, but the secondary, according to that of Matthew: "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added to you." - Whence, a prince would sin if he placed over the republic ignorant and unskilled ministers, if he burdened subjects more than is equitable, if he did not protect them from enemies or unjust vexations13 (Recall what was said nn. 138, 147-150, 653, 729, 749, 873, 922, 965, 978, 983, 1188).
Note. Since St. Alphonsus depicts in few words the form of a good prince, it is helpful to transcribe his words here, especially because ALL who PRESIDE over a multitude or community to be ruled can take from it an example for imitating. - Behold the salutary words of the holy Doctor:14
A good Prince, for the exercise of good government, has God always present to himself, and he sets those things which regard the divine glory before all political reasons.
He abhors flatterers, and loves truthful men, and desires that this horror and love of his become known to all.
He uses equity toward all, every passion and party-zeal being removed.
He does not decree matters of greater moment except after a prior and serious inquiry.
In doubtful matters, he has recourse to the counsel of the prudent.
He is most cautious in selecting for himself wise and upright counselors.
Once counsel has been accepted which he judges to be good, he is wholly intent on this, that he execute the matter strongly, unless clear reasons supervene which persuade the contrary; for to change counsel with a just reason is not weakness of mind, but laudable prudence.
If he hears someone praised or accused, he is slow to believe, and weighs whether the reporter, moved by some advantage of his own, is incited to speak thus.
(13) Cf. Tarquini, Instit. jur. eccl. publ., L. 1, c. 2. (14) Fed. de' Vassalli, cap. 2 (Opp. ascet., t. II, p. 506).