Article — Marc, Institutiones Morales

Article II: On The Offices Of Those In Whose Hands Is Legislative Power

¶2286.
    • Besides supreme governors, there concur for making laws or Decrees both Senators and Deputies (or Counselors) elected by the Prince or by the people in a representative Government, and the electors themselves. Wherefore we establish the following:

Principles. I. Those ELECTED to the office of MAKING LAWS are held to attend, not to what here and now pleases the prince or the multitude, but to what is just, and congruous with the common good of all. For civil law is not just because it is a fugitive decree of the will of the prince or of the people (as pleased certain innovators); but because it is a stable prescription, by which the supreme Power reasonably commands, prohibits, or establishes something, for the common temporal good of the citizens without detriment to spiritual good. - And what we say here concerning laws is valid, by a like reason, for Decrees and any Statutes whatsoever. (Recall what was said n. 153 sqq.) - Sometimes, however, Senators, Deputies, and Counselors can admit certain things less right (which are not intrinsically evil) and strengthen them by their vote, that worse things may be excluded; provided that they do this with a protestation of their right intention1 (cf. n. 202).

Hence: - 1. Participants in legislative power SIN (for the most part gravely), if they do not bring due knowledge and diligence to so great an office; and most gravely indeed, if knowingly they lend their effort or assent to unjust laws or decrees. - Whence, it can happen that they are held to the reparation of damages. Indeed, theological fault and effective influence being supposed, whoever abstains from casting a vote is liable to restitution, when he ought to cast it by reason of the office which he freely accepted by quasi-contract, and by which he bound himself to protecting the public or private good. - Recall what was said n. 983 sqq. - Concerning excommunication, see n. 1320 sqq.

  1. Those elected, or to be elected, if they are suitable for so great an office, and no other suitable persons are found, are held to subject themselves to election. And indeed, if someone is sometimes held to consult the good of private persons, how much more the good and safety of the whole community.2

(1) Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 800. (2) Scavini, I, 676.

¶2287.
    • II. Upon ELECTORS, in a legitimate government, there lies the grave office of ELECTING UPRIGHT Deputies, whether communal, or provincial, or political. - Whence, other circumstances being set aside, not only do positive cooperators sin, namely those who vote for evil men; but also negative cooperators, who by not concurring knowingly are the cause why evil men are elected; for from legal justice each one is held, insofar as he can, to avert evil from the republic, if any hope of averting it shines forth. But no one is ignorant how many and how great evils are brought into both religious and civil society by wicked Deputies, especially by those who are enrolled in the Masonic sect3 (cf. n. 989).

We have said in a legitimate government; for, if it is asked whether it is lawful, in a usurped kingdom, to vote in elections and to sit in an assembly of legislators, authors disagree. Some indeed affirm, especially if society is in extremities, and ruin threatens religion. - But others deny that it is right, because such concurrence cannot be furnished without scandal, nor without injustice, since to elect DEPUTIES and to exercise PUBLIC OFFICES is the same as to sustain the person of the usurper, to make laws with him, and to share the government. And hence it was that PIUS IX wholly disapproved a concurrence of this kind, especially for the Pontifical Dominion, in a Brief issued 29 January 1877, and already before in a Declaration made on 18 June 1874... Otherwise, however, if the question is only of electing municipal and provincial COUNSELORS; for these protect only the affairs of the Community, or the good of the Province, nor do they make laws, but they undergo them, not otherwise than the other citizens. - Finally others proceed by a middle way and teach more truly that account must be taken of places, persons, times, and circumstances, which, since they can be diverse, can also lead to diverse conclusions. Therefore with these we say: If, with the right of the legitimate prince preserved, grave damages can be averted from society, citizens have the right and the office of electing upright men, who may keep watch over the common good; if probable hope of promoting a greater good is lacking, it will be better to abstain from political concurrence; especially if the right of the legitimate prince would thereby be injured. But to define the matter belongs to the prince himself4 (cf. n. 150, q. 2).

(3) Scavini, loc. cit.; Gousset, tom. I, n. 627. (4) Cf. Del Vecchio, I, n. 332; cf. Berardi, Prax. conf., n. 66.

¶2288.
    • IT IS ASKED. Whether it is lawful to elect an UNWORTHY man in order to exclude a MOST UNWORTHY man?

Resp. Some with Hurtado deny; for it is evil to will and to choose evil; and if evils are not to be done that goods may come about, a fortiori evils are not to be done that lesser evils may come about; for that is intrinsically evil, and prohibited by the law of nature. To this belongs that saying: "Let the world perish, but let justice be done." - Others with Lugo affirm; for it is lawful to take counsel for a lesser evil, that a greater may be avoided. And then an evil man is not properly chosen because he is evil or for evil; but he is chosen for this, that he may impede greater damages, which is good. And this cannot be said to be evil intrinsically and per se, since in the present case it has the character of good; for it is a diminution of evil. - Finally, others readily concede this, if not only is evil diminished by such an election, but some good is intended and hoped from the one to be elected, as if through him Catholics are able to obtain that liberty by which the evil enjoy themselves.5

(5) Del Vecchio, ibid. I, 332.