Censures and Ecclesiastical Penalties

I have thought that the treatise on ecclesiastical penalties, which pertain to the proper object of canon law, should be added to moral theology, because in some schools the professor of moral theology also treats ecclesiastical penalties.

1. a. The power which Christ conferred upon His Church, that through it the faithful might be directed to the supernatural end of eternal life, is twofold: the power of order, which is an aptitude acquired by sacramental ordination for performing certain sacred actions, but especially the offering of the eucharistic sacrifice and the administration of the sacraments and sacramentals; and the power of jurisdiction, which is the power of ruling the faithful in order to eternal salvation.

The power of jurisdiction is again twofold: the power of teaching, or the power of ruling the faithful with respect to the intellect through precepts of faith; and the power of government, which is the power of ruling the faithful with respect to the will through precepts of morals.

b. That Christ instituted His Church as a true, visible, and perfect society, to which He conferred every power which is necessary for directing the faithful to the end of eternal salvation, is shown both by dogmatic theologians in fundamental theology and by canonists in public law. But in particular the same authors show that the power of jurisdiction with which Christ willed the Church to be furnished is not only the power of making laws, but also of exercising coercive force and of restraining transgressors of both divine and ecclesiastical laws by penalties. Now, therefore, after laws have been treated, the sanction of laws, or ecclesiastical penalties, must also be treated.

c. Namely, law needs a sanction, by which a reward is decreed for those observing it, but a penalty for those violating it. The sanction of the Christian law is twofold: one of the future life, another of the present life. The sanction of this life consists chiefly in ecclesiastical penalties, by which the Church strives to deter the faithful at least from violation of the graver laws and to compel them to fulfill their duties.

¹ Thesaurus-Giraldi, De poenis ecclesiasticis. J. Hollweck, Die kirchlichen Strafgesetze (Mainz: Kirchheim, 1899). Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theol. morale^3 (Prati: Giachetti, 1901) VII, De poenis ecclesiasticis. Lehmkuhl, Theologia moralis^10 (Freiburg: Herder, 1902) II, 860-1030.

2. Definition. A penalty is an evil inflicted by legitimate authority because of transgression of law.

a. The evil inflicted by the Church as penalty consists in the privation of a good, either the possession or the use of which depends upon the Church, and of which therefore she herself can deprive the delinquent. Goods of this kind are only external goods; but they are not only spiritual goods, but also temporal goods, such as goods of fortune, reputation, liberty, etc.

b. Although the Church can also inflict temporal penalties, nevertheless ordinarily, especially with respect to lay persons, she does not employ for obtaining her ends except spiritual penalties, which consist in the privation of a spiritual good either already received or afterward to be received; wherefore ecclesiastical penalties are accustomed to be called spiritual penalties.

c. A penalty by its nature supposes fault, because it is inflicted because of a committed fault; wherefore there is no penalty where there is no fault.

3. End of ecclesiastical penalties. The threat of a penalty must be distinguished from the infliction and execution of the penalty.

a. The end of the threat is that subjects be deterred from violation of the law and be compelled by fear of the penalty to its observance.

b. The end of infliction and execution is fourfold: a. that the order which has been injured may be restored and confirmed; b. that the guilty person may be amended; c. that both the delinquent himself and others may be deterred from crime and restrained; d. that by the example of the penalty the scandal given by the crime may be repaired.

In all penalties, indeed, this fourfold end is more or less intended; nevertheless in diverse genera of penalties one end is chiefly regarded before the others. The primary and essential end is restoration of the injured order. For the injury of order, which was made by this, that the delinquent, having despised the good of order, indulged his own concupiscences, demands a certain kind of expiation and satisfaction, because the same delinquent is compelled to yield something from his own goods and to undergo an evil.¹

¹ Cf. St. Thomas I-II, q. 87, a. 1.

4. The cause of ecclesiastical penalty is a crime or delict. Although the names of crime and delict are for the most part used indiscriminately, nevertheless in law those actions are called crimes which are punished by graver penalties, and those actions delicts which are punished by lighter penalties.

A crime or delict is understood to be an external action or omission which disturbs the social order of the Church. And since ecclesiastical penalties are established against actions which disturb the public order, a crime or delict can also be defined: an action against which an ecclesiastical penalty has been established. But the social order of the Church is preserved by both divine and ecclesiastical laws; therefore a crime or delict is the transgression of a penal law, or of a law in whose transgression a penalty has been sanctioned.

5. Division of penalties. Ecclesiastical penalties are divided in manifold ways.

a. By reason of the subject, into personal penalty, which affects the person only, such as suspension from hearing confessions, fasting; real penalty, which punishes a person in his goods, such as privation of a benefice; and mixed penalty, which embraces both, such as excommunication, suspension from celebration.

b. By reason of quantity, into ordinary penalty, which does not exceed the measure customarily observed in this matter; and extraordinary penalty, which is imposed beyond the measure on account of special circumstances, and therefore cannot be foreseen even confusedly.

c. By reason of the mode by which the guilty person is deprived of the good, into negative penalty, by which he is barred from acquiring a good, such as the impediment of crime, irregularity from delict; privative penalty, by which he is deprived of an acquired good (a right, the exercise of a right), such as privation of active and passive voice, suspension from order; positive penalty, by which an evil is inflicted, such as a monetary fine, beating. The execution of this requires some positive action either of the delinquent himself or of another.

d. By reason of the object, into spiritual penalty, which deprives the delinquent of a spiritual good; and temporal penalty, which deprives the delinquent of a temporal good or affects him in a temporal mode, as by prison or blows.

It cannot be doubted that the Church can also inflict temporal penalties; for since she has the power of applying all means which are necessary for the end, and temporal penalties are sometimes altogether necessary so that external order can be preserved, it is certain that the Church can apply temporal penalties. Nevertheless, concerning the penalty of death and mutilation, almost all teach that the Church herself cannot inflict it; indeed, according to the opinion of many, the Church cannot even demand that it be inflicted by the secular arm: for the axiom is solemn, the Church does not thirst for blood. But according to the discipline now in force, temporal penalties are accustomed to be applied by the Church only to clerics, not to lay persons.

e. By reason of form, into a penalty of a sentence already passed, which is incurred by the very fact, i.e. by perpetration of the crime or transgression of the law; and of a sentence to be passed, which is not incurred unless it is inflicted by the sentence of a judge.

a. Only the Church inflicts penalties of a sentence already passed; the civil penal code contains no penalties of sentence already passed, but only of sentence to be passed.

b. The sentence of a judge is either condemnatory or only declaratory of the crime committed; the former falls upon the penalty which is inflicted by the judge, the latter falls upon the fault against which the penalty has been laid by law.

c. Some penalties of sentence already passed are incurred before, others only after, a declaratory sentence of the crime committed.

Before sentence there are incurred: a. censures of a sentence already passed; b. penalties which only prevent a right from being acquired, and have more the character of an inability than of penalty properly so called, as if non-resident clerics are prohibited from making the fruits their own; c. conditional penalties, which properly are a condition under which something is given; therefore if someone does not fulfill the condition, before sentence he must give up what he received under it; thus one elected bishop, if he is not consecrated within six months, must give up the episcopate.

After sentence there are incurred penalties by which the guilty person is deprived of a right already acquired, as if someone is deprived of a benefice, active and passive voice, etc.¹

f. By reason of the internal end which is chiefly intended, into vindicative or punitive penalty, which chiefly tends to the punishment of the crime; and medicinal penalty, which chiefly tends to the amendment of the delinquent.

The distinctions between each must be noted: a. by a vindicative penalty the guilty person can be punished for a past delict, even after he has returned to his senses; but by a medicinal penalty the guilty person cannot be punished if he has already returned to his senses; b. a medicinal penalty is removed by absolution, which remits the penalty to one rightly disposed; but a vindicative penalty does not need absolution, but either ceases of itself when the time has elapsed or is removed by dispensation, which exempts from the penal law.

¹ Genicot, Theologiae mor. institut.^2 (Louvain: Polleunis et Ceuterick, 1905), I, n. 140.

6. What ecclesiastical penalties are. All penalties which the Church inflicts can be reduced to three genera:

a. to censures;

b. to vindicative penalties;

c. to penances.

1. Censures, which chiefly tend to the restoration of external order and to the amendment of the delinquent, are divided into three species:

a. Excommunication;

b. Suspension;

c. Interdict.

2. Vindicative penalties, which chiefly tend to the restoration of external order and to the punishment of the crime, are some inflicted upon all, others upon clerics alone.

a. Vindicative penalties which are inflicted, or can be inflicted, upon all, both clerics and lay persons:

a. Irregularity from delict;

b. Ecclesiastical infamy;

c. Privation of ecclesiastical burial;

d. Privation of particular rights or privileges;

e. Temporal penalties, such as monetary penalty, public correction, canonical admonition.

b. Vindicative penalties which are inflicted upon clerics alone:

a. Penalties of prison;

b. Privation of the fruits of a benefice;

c. Translation to a worse benefice or complete privation of a benefice;

d. Deposition;

e. Degradation.

3. Penances are public works of penance enjoined by the Church chiefly for this end, that public scandal may be repaired.¹

Exercises of several days are now customarily enjoined upon clerics; but upon lay persons, either revocation before witnesses or use of the sacraments or a pious pilgrimage with reception of the sacraments.

Note. We shall treat here only censures and irregularities, since these are what it is chiefly necessary for the confessor to know, and we shall interpret more accurately only those censures which occur more frequently in the internal forum of penance.

¹ Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 24, c. 8, De reform.

7. On the forum of the Church. 1. By the name forum there is signified: a. both the place in which saleable things are exposed, and the place in which controversies and lawsuits are conducted; b. the territory in which a judge can exercise his jurisdiction.

2. Forum is chiefly divided into external, in which public causes pertaining to the government of the Church are treated, and internal, or of conscience, in which matters pertaining to the spiritual salvation of individuals are conducted.

A faculty (of absolving, dispensing) conceded for each forum signifies: a. that a faculty which someone can or must use for the external forum also avails for the internal forum; b. that the faculty can be applied both for the external forum and for the internal forum, according as the subject matter demands it, i.e. according as the matter is public or occult.

8. Notion of censure. A censure is a medicinal penalty by which the use of certain spiritual goods is taken away by the Church from a delinquent and contumacious Christian. Therefore two things are needed for incurring a censure: a delict and the contumacy of the delinquent.

a. Among the ancient Romans the name censure signified both the dignity and office of the censor, and also the sentence of the same, by which he either branded with a mark or inflicted a penalty upon citizens. In ecclesiastical usage censure signifies both a judgment by which it is noted whether something is worthy of praise or of blame, and a penalty inflicted for crime.

b. Medicinal: for in inflicting censure the Church chiefly intends the restraint of crime and the amendment of the delinquent; wherefore, once amendment has been posited, censure by its own nature demands that it be taken away; and if sometimes it is carried against those whose amendment is despaired of, this is done for striking terror into others. For the same reason censure is to be inflicted simply, not perpetually nor to a certain day, so that when the guilty person has amended himself, he can be absolved.

c. Censure can also have the character of a vindicative penalty, but only secondarily; but if it is inflicted chiefly for punishing a delict, it cannot be a censure properly so called.

d. Contumacious: censure is inflicted for breaking contumacy (virtual contempt of authority and of censure, disobedience), whose nature is described below. Therefore contumacy as a condition for incurring censure is always required; and as soon as contumacy ceases through the amendment or satisfaction of the delinquent, the censure is to be taken away, just as once health is recovered the use of medicine ceases.

e. Of spiritual goods, namely those which are subject to the power of the Church. Indeed, besides the goods which inhere habitually in each person, goods of a threefold kind exist in the Church: goods which proceed from the Head, or from Christ; goods which proceed from the members taken privately; goods which proceed from the body, or from the Church. Now, one censured cannot be deprived of goods habitually inhering in himself, such as the sacramental character, the power of order, faith, hope, and charity, etc.; nor of goods which proceed from Christ, the Head of the Church, such as manifold graces, because these goods do not depend upon the Church; nor can he be deprived of goods which proceed from the members of the Church taken individually, such as the prayers and good works of the faithful, because the Church cannot impede the communion of saints; but only of goods which are administered and conferred by the Church, such as the use of the sacraments, the sacrifice, indulgences, common suffrages, jurisdiction, ecclesiastical benefices. And if sometimes the Church deprives someone of temporal goods, as of civil commerce with the faithful, this is done secondarily and indirectly, insofar as it conduces to the spiritual good both of him who is bound by censure and of others.

¹ Suarez, De censuris. Covarruvias, Operum t. I, p. 315. Dicastillo, De censuris. Tamburini, De censuris et irregularitate. St. Alphonsus l. VII, De censuris eccles. Bucceroni, De censuris etc.^4 (Rome: Typographia S. C. de Prop. Fide, 1896). Hilarius a Sexten, Tractatus de censuris ecclesiasticis (Mainz: Kirchheim, 1898). Hollweck l. c., Die Zensuren, p. 86 ff. Heiner, Die kirchlichen Zensuren (Paderborn: Bonifatius-Druckerei, 1884). I. Kock, Die kirchlichen Zensuren latae sententiae (Graz: Styria, 1902). Paschalis de Siena, Commentarius in Const. Ap. sedis^3 (Pustet: Rome, 1902).

9. Division of censures. a. By reason of essence they are divided into three species, into excommunication, suspension, and interdict: for each of these penalties has the common character of censure and deprives the guilty person of other and diverse spiritual goods; but other ecclesiastical penalties, by whatever name they are called, are not censures.¹

b. By reason of the efficient cause, into a censure which is from law, if it is inflicted by stable law against future sins; and which is from man, if it is inflicted by a superior through judicial sentence against future or past sins.

A censure carried by man is carried either by way of precept or particular sentence, as if a bishop suspends a contumacious cleric from office, or if he prohibits a cleric from the game of dice under penalty of suspension, or by way of law or general statute, as if a bishop decrees that all who are about to commit some crime be bound by excommunication.

c. By reason of the power of absolving, into reserved censures, which cannot be taken away except by the one imposing them, his successor, or his superior; and non-reserved censures, which by the disposition of the legislator can also be taken away by inferior ministers.

d. By reason of publicity, into notorious censures, when either by sentence of a judge or by perpetration of the delict in a public place it is so known that someone has incurred censure that it can no longer be hidden; and occult censures, when this is not known.

e. By reason of the mode by which they are incurred, into censures of a sentence already passed, which are incurred by delinquents by this very fact, that they have committed the delict; and of a sentence to be passed, which, once the delict has been posited, are to be imposed by sentence of a judge.

f. By reason of the mode by which they are reserved:

a. into censures reserved to the Roman pontiff in a special mode;

b. into censures reserved to the Roman pontiff in the ordinary mode, or simply reserved;

c. into censures reserved to bishops;

d. into censures reserved to no one, which are indeed true censures insofar as they produce the effects of others, but from which the censured person, provided he is truly sorry for the sin, can be absolved by any confessor.

a. Several censures are called reserved in a special mode: a. because for them a general faculty of absolving from censures reserved to the Roman pontiff does not suffice, but an altogether special faculty is required; b. because they are not contained in the faculty conceded to bishops by c. Liceat, namely of absolving from all occult censures even those reserved to the pope; c. because those presuming to absolve from these without due faculty incur a special excommunication reserved to the Roman pontiff; d. because those absolved from these in the article of death by one not having power, if they recover, are held by a special obligation of presenting themselves to the superior and standing by his mandates.

b. From the declaration of the Holy Office of April 4, 1871, in the special faculty of absolving from censures reserved to the Roman pontiff in a special mode, there is not contained the faculty of absolving from cases reserved in the bull Sacramentum poenitentiae, which need a most special faculty and therefore are called reserved to the supreme pontiff in a most special mode. The cases reserved in the aforesaid bull are: a. absolution of an accomplice; b. malicious denunciation of a priest concerning the crime of solicitation.

¹ C. Quaerenti 20. De verborum sign. (V. 40).

10. Since censures in the specific sense, namely insofar as they pertain to the external forum, are called public or notorious, it is useful to indicate what is required for a censure to be notorious. But a censure is notorious if the delict prohibited under censure is notorious. A delict can be notorious either by law or by fact.

a. A delict is notorious by law when it is established: a. by the declaratory sentence of a judge, whether because the guilty person himself confessed the delict, or because he has been convicted of it; b. from public acts or from authentic protocols.

Thus if a cleric constituted in sacred orders contracts civil marriage; if a Catholic enters marriage before a heretical minister; if someone is punished by a civil judge because of a duel, these delicts are notorious by law, because they are established from public acts.

b. A delict is notorious by fact when it was perpetrated in a public place before several persons who can testify concerning it.

a. Since both elements must concur at the same time, a delict is not notorious which was perpetrated in a private or hidden place, although before many, nor a delict which was perpetrated in a public place before few persons, or indeed before many who nevertheless cannot testify about it, because they did not attend to it, e.g. to the heresy uttered. How many persons must know the delict so that it can be called notorious is indicated elsewhere.¹

b. A delict public by law is public everywhere, nor can it ever become occult; but a delict public by fact in one place can be occult in another, and if it consists in a transitory fact (the striking of a cleric), through oblivion it can become occult; not likewise if it consists in a permanent fact (illicit possession of ecclesiastical goods).

¹ Cf. De praeceptis n. 649.

11. Who can impose censures. He can impose censures who has either ordinary or delegated power for this.

1. Ordinary power is had by all and only ecclesiastical superiors having jurisdiction in the external forum.

a. The supreme pontiff has it over all the faithful, both taken collectively (diocese, province) and taken individually; he indeed receives this power immediately from Christ; all others participate in it from the supreme pontiff.

b. Apostolic legates have it in the territory assigned to them.

c. Bishops, archbishops, patriarchs have it over their subjects; however, archbishops and patriarchs cannot bind the subjects of their suffragans by censures; an episcopal vicar, who constitutes one tribunal with the bishop; when the see is vacant, the vicar of the chapter, who succeeds the bishop in jurisdiction, and a fortiori the chapter itself before the vicar has yet been elected.

d. Cardinals have it in the churches of their title.

e. A general council has it over the whole Church, and a provincial council over its province.

f. Abbots having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction have it.

g. Superiors of regulars (generals, provincials, locals) have it over their subjects from a privilege of the pontiff attached to their office,¹ yet according to the statutes of their order.

Parish priests do not have the power of imposing censures, because jurisdiction in the external forum does not belong to them.

2. Delegated power is had by all and only clerics to whom this has been committed by those having ordinary power.

Clerics: because all and only clerics are capable of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which is required for imposing censures, unless by positive law they have been declared incapable of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, as married clerics have been declared.² Wherefore all lay persons and women, even abbesses, are excluded from the power, both ordinary and delegated, of imposing censures.

¹ C. Quum in ecclesiis 10. De maioritate et oboedientia (I. 33).

² C. Clerici un. De clericis coniugatis (III. 2) in 6°.

12. Conditions required on the part of the author. In order that an ecclesiastical superior can validly impose censures, there is required:

a. That he be in possession of reason and have the will of binding him against whom he imposes the censure: for to impose censure is an act of jurisdiction, which has its whole force from an act of the will. Wherefore a censure imposed by a drunken man would be null.

b. That he act freely, not by compulsion.

A censure carried from grave fear must of itself be called valid, because an act done from grave fear is of itself valid, unless it is annulled by special positive law; but a censure carried from fear is not annulled by positive law. Nevertheless the case must be excepted in which the one imposing the censure would have pronounced it only externally, without internal intention.

c. That he exercise power within the limits of his jurisdiction: for contentious jurisdiction cannot be exercised outside one's own territory.

Therefore a bishop existing outside his own diocese cannot impose censure, not even upon his own subject, unless he has obtained the consent of the bishop of the place in which he is found.

Nevertheless several cases must be excepted, in which a bishop, even existing outside the diocese, can impose censure:

a. If the censure is imposed not by way of a particular sentence, but by way of statute for guarding against future crimes.

b. If the censure is indeed imposed by way of sentence, which nevertheless does not need cognition of the cause, either because the contumacy is manifest, or because the cause has already been known in one's own territory.

c. If the bishop has been unjustly expelled from his own territory.¹

d. That he admonish the delinquent concerning the censure to be inflicted: for censure is imposed upon a contumacious person; but that contumacy may be established, a prior correction is required.

According to the diversity of censures, a diverse admonition is required.

a. In censures of a sentence already passed for future delicts, likewise in censures which are attached to some delict as of a sentence to be passed, legal admonition suffices, which consists in the law promulgated with the censure added: for a known law which threatens censure is judged continually to admonish subjects concerning their obligation and concerning the penalty to be incurred by transgressors.

b. In a censure which no law threatens, and which therefore is inflicted by man for a past or present delict, a canonical or express admonition is required, and indeed a threefold one with some interval of time (at least two days) between the individual admonitions. Nevertheless a single admonition suffices, provided it is expressed that it is peremptory, or that it avails for three. But in this case six days must intervene between the admonition and the infliction of the censure, unless the necessity of the fact advises otherwise.²

Note. A censure unjustly inflicted does not oblige in conscience, whether it is unjust because of defect of fault or because of defect of proof. Wherefore one unjustly censured is not bound to observe the censure in secret; but publicly, because otherwise it cannot be done without scandal, he is bound so to conduct himself as if he were bound by censure.

¹ Regular superiors can bind their subjects by censure by way of particular sentence wherever they are staying, because their jurisdiction is chiefly personal.

² C. Constitutionem 9. De sententia excommunicat. (V. 11) in 6°.

The subject capable of censure is only a baptized man, a wayfarer, capable of reason and subject to him who imposes the censure.

13. A baptized man, both because the Church has no jurisdiction over those who are not baptized, and because only the baptized enjoy the spiritual goods of which they are deprived by censures.

Therefore the Church can impose censures neither upon infidels and Jews nor upon catechumens, but indeed upon heretics and schismatics, who by reason of baptism are subject to her jurisdiction.

14. A wayfarer: for the Church does not have jurisdiction over the dead.

But if sometimes the dead are excommunicated, they are not properly condemned by judicial sentence; rather, for striking terror into the faithful, the Church only declares that in life they incurred censure because of their delicts and must be treated as censured, i.e. that they must be deprived of the suffrages of the Church and of ecclesiastical burial, and, if already buried in a blessed place, must be exhumed. In like manner, if the dead are absolved from censure, the Church only removes the prohibition by which they could not participate in the common suffrages of the faithful nor be given ecclesiastical burial.¹

¹ The rite of absolving an excommunicated dead person is had in the Roman Ritual, tit. III, c. 4.

15. Capable of reason: for since censure supposes sin, indeed also contumacy, it cannot be imposed upon those who cannot yet sin.

The question is whether those who indeed have the use of reason, but are still impubescent, can be bound by censure. Although the impubescent are of themselves capable of censure, nevertheless from the common opinion of doctors these things must be held:

a. The impubescent, by the will of the Church, do not incur censures of a sentence already passed unless this is expressed in law.¹ Wherefore the impubescent incur only one censure also, because this is expressly established in law, namely because of entrance into a monastery of nuns.²

b. With respect to censures of a sentence to be passed, by positive law indeed it is not prohibited that the impubescent be bound by them; nevertheless the age of the impubescent does not seem sufficient for them suitably to be censured: for the impubescent, as the Salmanticenses well observe (n. 168), are more suitably corrected with rods than with censures.

¹ C. Pueris 1 and C. Referente 2. De delictis puerorum (V. 23).

² Council of Trent, sess. 25, c. 5, De reg. In the old law there is another excommunication which even the impubescent incurred, namely that carried against those violently laying hands upon clerics (C. Super 1. C. Mulieres 6. C. Pueris 60. De sententia excommunicationis [V. 39]). But several doubt whether in the recent law this same thing avails (cf. n. 70).

16. A subject: for there is no jurisdiction over one who is not a subject. Therefore:

a. The supreme pontiff alone cannot be bound by censure, because he has no superior on earth, and he cannot bind himself. But all the faithful can be bound by censures by the supreme pontiff, and all diocesans by the bishop.

a. Although all the faithful can incur pontifical censures, nevertheless bishops and cardinals from a privilege of law do not incur suspension and interdict to be incurred by the very fact, unless special mention is made of them;¹ but bishops and cardinals are also subject to papal excommunication, unless they are specially excepted.

b. Although all subject to the bishop incur episcopal censures, nevertheless kings and queens by a privilege introduced through custom cannot be struck by censures by bishops, even if in other respects they are subject to the bishop's power, both legislative and judicial.

b. Strangers, or subjects of another, do not incur episcopal censures to be incurred by the very fact, unless the matter concerns censures attached to those laws which even strangers are bound to observe;² nevertheless strangers, or subjects of another, can be punished by a bishop with censures carried by a particular precept if they have committed a delict in his territory: for by reason of the delict they become his subjects.

a. Therefore a stranger who commits a delict to which an episcopal censure is attached does not incur the censure, because a bishop cannot bind another's subject, even one delinquent in his diocese, by censures carried by way of general sentence and therefore before the delict, and to be incurred by the very fact. The same must be said of one who commits in a place exempt from the diocese, e.g. in a monastery, a delict to which an episcopal censure is attached. Nevertheless, one who has once been bound by censure remains bound by it, even if he goes into other regions: for censure follows him as the shadow the body and leprosy the leper.

b. Since a stranger by the statute of law obtains the forum of the delict, both because there where the delict was perpetrated the author and quantity of the crime are more easily known, and because restoration of the injured order is better obtained there where the violation was made, by reason of the delict a stranger becomes the subject of the bishop of the place in which he committed the delict.

c. Exempt regulars do not incur episcopal censures, nor can they be bound by censure by bishops except in those matters in which jurisdiction over regulars has been conceded to bishops by law. In this case bishops act as delegates of the apostolic see.

d. One delinquent outside the diocese does not incur a censure carried by general statute, because this statute affects only the territory; but he incurs a censure carried by special precept for guarding against some crime, as if a bishop, under penalty of suspension of a sentence already passed, prohibits a cleric from entrance into a tavern, but the cleric enters a tavern outside the diocese.

Several authors indeed deny that a cleric in this case incurs censure, whose opinion St. Alphonsus (n. 23) calls probable; but, as Ballerini after Laymann notes, a particular precept, as clinging to the bones, obliges even outside the diocese; wherefore the opinion denying it seems to lack true probability.³

e. One delinquent within, but existing outside, the diocese can be bound by censure by the bishop; thus a bishop can suspend a parish priest who flees after a delict has been committed.

Citation indeed, since it imports judicial noise, cannot be made in another diocese; nevertheless one absent can be cited by letters and, having been cited, must appear; but if he does not appear, he can be excommunicated.

¹ C. Quia periculosum 4. De sentent. excommun. (V. 11) in 6°.

² Cf. De principiis n. 149.

³ Ballerini-Palmieri VII, n. 71.

17. Whether the subject of censure can be an entire community, e.g. a university, monastery, chapter, city.

a. Interdict can be imposed upon a whole community, although there are several innocent persons in it; for by interdict the innocent are not properly punished, but the Church for just causes withdraws her benefits from both the guilty and the innocent.

b. Suspension can be imposed upon a whole community, although there are several innocent persons in it, because suspension does not affect the innocent except with respect to acts which belong to the whole community as such, such as the election of superiors.

c. Excommunication cannot be imposed upon a whole community, but only upon those who are found culpable: for since in a community several persons are accustomed to be either altogether innocent or less guilty than others, it would be too harsh if all were affected by the same penalty.¹

¹ C. Romana ecclesia 5. De sententia excommun. (V. 11) in 6°.

18. Nothing prevents someone from being bound at the same time by several censures of the same species, and likewise from being loosed from one while he remains bound by another.

a. No one doubts that someone can be bound by several censures of diverse species, e.g. excommunication and suspension; but they have doubted whether someone can be bound by several censures of the same species. For since censure consists in the privation of spiritual goods, if someone by force of one censure has already been deprived of goods, he cannot by another censure again or more greatly be deprived of the same goods. But formally censure is not so much privation as the cause inducing privation; but nothing prevents the same privation from existing from several titles and causes, just as several mortal sins deprive of the same sanctifying grace.¹

b. There is an axiom in law: as many transgressions, so many penalties.² Therefore one who commits two crimes distinct in species, to each of which a distinct excommunication is attached, as, for example, one who commits heresy and reads a book prohibited under censure, incurs a twofold excommunication. One who commits two crimes distinct in number, e.g. commits a duel twice, incurs the same censure twice. One who commits a crime by which two penal laws diverse in species are violated at the same time incurs a twofold censure; for example, one who kills a priest in a church incurs the censure laid upon personal sacrilege and upon local sacrilege. One who commits several and diverse crimes prohibited by the same penal law incurs the censure several times; thus one who reads, retains, prints, and defends a book prohibited under excommunication is excommunicated from a fourfold head, because all four actions are prohibited by the same penal law.

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri VII, n. 78.

² C. Ea, quae 1. De poenis (V. 37).

The cause of censure is crime: for censure is brought upon the delinquent; but the crime because of which censure is inflicted must be grave, external, consummated, and committed with contumacy, in order that censure be incurred.

19. Grave with respect to the internal and external act. a. For penalty supposes fault, and grave penalty supposes grave fault; but censures (at least excommunication, suspension from order, and general interdict) are grave penalties. Nevertheless light censures, such as suspension and interdict which are inflicted for a short time and prohibit only one or another act, can be inflicted even because of light fault.

a. Therefore a censure would be invalid by which restitution of a slight thing was commanded under excommunication. Nevertheless if a thing light in itself becomes grave by reason of scandal, danger, or end, it can be commanded or prohibited under grave obligation and under censure. Thus one incurs excommunication who violates enclosure only for a very little while.

b. Therefore whatever excuses a delinquent from grave sin, such as smallness of matter, imperfection of the act, material cooperation offered from a grave cause, also excuses him from incurring censure, at least before God and in conscience.

b. For censures are immediately inflicted because of an external sin; wherefore excommunication is not incurred because of a light striking of a cleric, even if he is struck with the intention of gravely injuring him.

One who commits an action prohibited under excommunication in such a way that it is a grave sin only because of a gravely evil intention or from an erroneous conscience does not incur censure, as one who reads a book which he falsely thinks is prohibited under excommunication.

20. External. For a merely internal sin cannot be punished by a censure of a sentence to be passed, because it cannot be proved in judgment; it could indeed be punished by a censure to be incurred by the very fact, but the usage is not in force in the Church of punishing internal sins with censures of a sentence already passed: no one suffers penalty for thought.¹

An internal sin is one thing, an occult sin, of which only the delinquent has knowledge, is another. The Church can punish occult sins and in fact does punish them, as when, for example, she strikes occult heresy with excommunication; but one who commits merely internal heresy does not fall into excommunication.

¹ C. Cogitationis 14, d. 1, De poenit.

21. Consummated, i.e. an attempted act (der Versuch) does not suffice, but the act prohibited under penalty must be truly posited and completed in its own genus by the effect following: for penal laws are of strict interpretation; wherefore they are restricted to consummated acts, unless the law itself decrees otherwise.

a. Hence where the violent laying on of hands upon a cleric is prohibited under excommunication, he does not incur the censure who shoots at a cleric without hitting him, because the action prohibited under censure is not posited. Where incest is prohibited under censure, the penalty is not incurred except because of perfect intercourse with a blood-relative or relative by affinity, because by the name incest is signified carnal intercourse with a blood-relative or relative by affinity. Where homicide is prohibited under penalty, he does not incur the censure who inflicts a lethal wound unless death follows, whatever be the cause which prevents death, whether a natural remedy or a miracle, because properly only he commits homicide who brings about death itself.

b. Thus the law itself prohibits under censure not only a duel, but also acts preparatory for a duel, namely provocation and acceptance. These acts, however, must be completed in their own genus in order to induce censure; therefore censure is not incurred if, for example, the provocation from any cause whatever does not reach the offender.

c. One who, after a culpable action has been posited, repents of it before the effect follows, incurs censure and irregularity, because repentance does not prevent the effect which afterward follows from being voluntary. Nor should it be said with St. Alphonsus (n. 40) that he is not punished unless contumacious, and that one is not contumacious who has retracted his evil will through repentance: for the delict which is punished by the Church was truly committed with contumacy, even if it was afterward retracted. Indeed, he is called contumacious who, knowing the penal law of the Church, voluntarily transgresses it; nevertheless he does not incur the censure in fact before the effect has followed. Therefore it can happen that someone through contrition or confession is already immune from the sin because of which he is punished by the Church, when he in fact incurs the penalty itself or censure.¹

d. Whether the effect which is intended to be prohibited under censure must be completed, if the censure is carried against those mandating or counseling, e.g. homicide or abortion, must be gathered from the very words of the law: for if the words of the law chiefly prohibit the effect (homicide, abortion) and only accessorily the mandate or counsel, those mandating or counseling do not incur censure when the effect has not followed; but if the words of the law chiefly prohibit also the mandate itself and counsel, they incur censure even when the effect has not followed, because by the very mandate or counsel the action prohibited under penalty is already posited.

Note. One who doubts whether he has contracted censure can regard himself as immune from it, and the confessor can absolve him. If, for example, someone has given an efficacious remedy for procuring abortion and afterward does not know whether the effect followed or not, he is burdened by censure or immune from it according as the effect in fact followed or did not. Nevertheless the confessor can absolve a penitent of this kind from the sin and from the censure, if it were present in fact, without enjoining the obligation of declaring this sin again if he learns that the effect followed, because in doubt, even of fact, concerning the existence of censure, the Church supplies power.

¹ Cf. Lugo, who with Suarez defends this opinion (De poenit., disp. 16, n. 445); likewise Ballerini-Palmieri III, n. 350; VII, n. 95.

22. Committed with contumacy: for censures have been instituted for breaking contumacy against the power of the Church threatening the penalty. But he is judged to be contumacious who knows that something is prohibited by the Church under penalty and nevertheless dares to act against the prohibition.

A twofold contumacy against the Church, or contempt of the Church, is distinguished: special, which is committed by a proper and formal act of contempt against the power of the Church and constitutes a special sin; and general, which is implicitly contained in the transgression of ecclesiastical law committed by one who knew that the matter was commanded or prohibited by the Church under penalty. General contumacy suffices for incurring censure, nor is it required that the delinquent in the act of sin, e.g. while he commits a duel, think about the censure, provided he knows it habitually.

Note. These conditions are required in order that censure be present in the internal forum; in order that it also be incurred in the external forum, it is further required that the delict be notorious, and that not only with respect to the fact in itself, but also with respect to the conditions which are necessary for incurring censure. But since the conditions which by their nature are internal, such as knowledge and consent required for grave sin, are rarely notorious by fact, in the external forum someone would rarely have to be considered as bound by censure without a declaratory sentence of the judge, unless the conditions were presumed. But where the delict itself prohibited under censure is notorious, the required conditions, especially knowledge and contumacy, are presumed in the external forum until it is juridically established that the delinquent did not incur the censure, unless only those acting knowingly and rashly are bound by censure by the law: for in this case knowledge of the law and contumacy must be proved even for the external forum.

Hence it can happen that a censure is incurred in the external forum, but is not present in the internal forum. Thus Catholics who, ignorant of the censure, entered marriage before a heretical minister need absolution for the external forum,¹ because knowledge of the censure is presumed in this forum until ignorance is proved before the judge; but in the internal forum they are immune from the censure because of ignorance of it.

¹ Holy Office, May 18, 1892.

For incurring censure contumacy is required; therefore whatever either notably diminishes or completely removes contumacy excuses from incurring censure. Now there are chiefly two causes numbered which for this reason excuse from incurring censure: grave fear and ignorance.

23. Fear. a. Grave fear excuses from censure whenever it excuses from observing an ecclesiastical law: for an act which proceeds from grave fear is not committed from contumacy, but rather from the weakness of nature. Moreover, fear of grave harm of itself excuses from the very precept of the Church; but where no sin is committed against the precept of the Church, censure is not incurred, which of itself and primarily is established against injury of an ecclesiastical precept.

a. Namely, an act prohibited under censure is prohibited either by ecclesiastical law alone or at the same time by divine law (natural or positive). If the first, an act posited from fear is not a sin; if the other, an act posited from fear can be a sin against divine law, but is not a sin against the law of the Church, which does not oblige with grave inconvenience.

b. There are a few certain cases in which fear, however grave, does not excuse from observation of ecclesiastical law, especially where violation of the law causes common harm. In these cases, therefore, grave fear, just as it does not excuse from observing ecclesiastical law, so also does not excuse from incurring censure.¹

c. Just as grave fear excuses from incurring censure, so it also excuses from observing it: for ecclesiastical laws do not oblige with grave inconvenience. Therefore when observation of censure, e.g. of occult excommunication, is joined with fear of grave harm or with grave inconvenience, the excommunicated person can conduct himself as immune from censure.

b. Even light fear excuses from incurring censure, provided the fear is the cause of the prohibited action, if the censure is imposed on those doing it rashly, with rash daring, spontaneously: for in these cases it is required that the prohibited action be posited altogether by one's own movement, not for escaping any evil whatever.

¹ Cf. De principiis n. 176, where it is explained when grave fear, or grave inconvenience, excuses from the obligation of an affirmative law.

24. Ignorance. a. Ignorance which is not crass always excuses from incurring censure, whether the ignorance is of fact or of law, not only when it is not known that the act is prohibited, but also when only this is not known, that it is prohibited under censure.¹ The reason for the first is that censure supposes fault; but this ignorance (whether antecedent or concomitant) excuses from fault, therefore also from incurring censure. The reason for the second is that one ignorant that a censure is attached to a sinful act is not contumacious against the coercive power of the Church; but censure is inflicted for breaking the contumacy of the delinquent.²

a. Several authors (Sanchez, Pirhing, Reuter, Mazzotta, Ballerini) do not call every gravely culpable ignorance crass, but admit gravely culpable ignorance which is not crass: for crass ignorance, so they say, arises not simply from gravely culpable negligence, but from negligence with grave excess. This opinion is probable and therefore licit in practice. But since it is very difficult to distinguish between culpable ignorance from grave negligence and culpable ignorance from grave negligence with excess, practically it can be established that only ignorance which is not gravely culpable always excuses from incurring censure.

b. Therefore ignorance both of law and of fact excuses from incurring censure, and it also excuses when the delinquent indeed knows that the action is prohibited by divine law, whether natural or positive, but does not know that the same is prohibited under ecclesiastical censure.

c. Ignorance is gravely culpable in him who does not know what he ought to know by reason of office; therefore lay persons are always excused from incurring censures which they do not know; not likewise clerics, who ought to know them by reason of office, unless it can be affirmed that their negligence in learning censures was not grave, or at least was not grave with excess.

b. Sometimes even crass ignorance excuses from incurring censure, namely if the law imposing censure does not speak absolutely and simply (whoever shall have committed this, let him be excommunicated), but if the censure is carried against those who have sinned rashly, with rash daring, by presumption, knowingly, deliberately.

c. Indeed if the law for incurring censure requires that the sin have been committed knowingly or deliberately, even affected ignorance excuses from incurring censure: for one who acts with any ignorance whatever certainly does not act knowingly. Therefore, although one who acts with such ignorance sins gravely against the precept, nevertheless he does not incur censure, since the law itself requires certain and formal knowledge for incurring censure.

But if someone knows the law and the penalty imposed, but does not know that the penalty is reserved, there are a few certain doctors who think that the reservation of the censure ceases because of this ignorance: for reservation is added to censure in the manner of a penalty; but ignorance excuses from incurring a penalty and therefore from incurring a reservation. But authors commonly teach that this ignorance does not bring it about that the censure is not reserved. For ignorance would excuse because the Church does not wish to subject the ignorant to an extraordinary penalty; but reservation, once the censure has been contracted, is not something extraordinary which is added to the censure, but rather that which naturally follows it, unless the legislator from kindness has made absolution easier.³

Note. a. Forgetfulness and inadvertence of the censure are equivalent to ignorance, because one who in no way adverts to the law cannot be called contumacious against it.

b. Censures, especially by the more unlearned, are rarely incurred because of ignorance until they have been admonished about the matter.

¹ C. Ut animarum 2. De constit. (I. 2) in 6°. Although in this chapter there is speech only about censures of ordinaries, nevertheless by right and deservedly the principle established in it is extended also to papal censures.

² In the external forum knowledge of the censure is presumed; therefore, in order that ignorance excuse from incurring censure in the external forum, it must be proved.

³ Lehmkuhl II, n. 866.

25. Whether ignorance excuses from incurring a vindicative penalty. A vindicative penalty, since it is not inflicted for correcting the contumacy of the guilty person, but for punishing his crime, is incurred even by those ignorant, not indeed of the law, but of the annexed penalty, unless this penalty is extraordinary.

For incurring a vindicative penalty knowledge of the penalty is not required if this is ordinary: for natural reason understands that a delict by its nature is to be punished. But if the penalty is extraordinary and exorbitant, knowledge of the penalty is required in order that it be incurred. Namely, for incurring a penalty there is not indeed required consent to the penalty, but nevertheless consent to the cause of the penalty is required; now, one committing a delict by this very fact implicitly consents to the cause of the ordinary penalty, but does not consent even implicitly to the cause of an extraordinary penalty, since he in no way knows it. Now all vindicative penalties of a sentence already passed are judged extraordinary and exorbitant.

26. On absolution itself. 1. A censure once contracted cannot be taken away except through absolution conceded by a legitimate superior.¹

a. Censure is not taken away through the amendment of the guilty person, nor through the death or removal of the one imposing the censure, nor through the death of the censured person, who, even if he has died contrite, is deprived of the suffrages of the Church and ecclesiastical burial unless he has been absolved; for censure once inflicted remains until it is taken away through absolution.

b. Hence an excommunicated person who elicits an act of contrition is in the state of grace, but nevertheless remains excommunicated and deprived of the communion of the Church. Therefore, although fault is required for incurring censure, the penalty can nevertheless remain after the fault has been remitted.

2. Absolution of censure is remission of the penalty made by a legitimate superior.

It differs from dispensation, because absolution is an act of justice, which is owed to him who has laid aside contumacy and has offered satisfaction, if any was needed; but dispensation, by which someone is exempted from a common law, is an act of grace, which can be denied even to one disposed. Moreover, for granting absolution validly and licitly, besides the disposition of the guilty person, no other cause is required; for granting dispensation validly or at least licitly, a just cause is required. Medicinal penalties are taken away by absolution, vindicative penalties by dispensation.

¹ C. Quum desideres 15. C. A nobis 28. De sentent. excom. (V. 39).

27. Absolution from censures can be conceded in manifold ways:

a. In the internal forum, which of itself takes away the effects of censure for the internal forum alone.

b. In the external forum, which takes away the effects of censure also for the internal forum.

c. Absolution to re-incidence, or under penalty of re-incidence, is absolution conceded under a determined condition, so that if this is not fulfilled the same censure is again incurred by the very fact.

The censure into which the absolved person falls back is of the same species, but new and distinct in number; wherefore one cannot add the penalty of re-incidence to absolution unless he has the power of imposing censures. For re-incidence there is required new fault and contumacy, and for its removal a new absolution.

d. Absolution for caution is given when it is unknown or doubted whether someone is in fact bound by censure. Of this kind is the absolution which is given in the sacrament of penance before absolution from sins.

e. Absolution for an effect is sometimes conceded in pontifical rescripts, and tends to this, that censure not impede the effect of obtaining the grace conceded, while with respect to other effects the censure remains. Thus spouses in rescripts of dispensation are absolved from censures, that they may certainly become participants in the dispensation.¹

f. Absolution can be given absolutely or conditionally, and indeed under a condition concerning the past, concerning the present, and concerning the future. Generally it is not licit to use a condition concerning the past or concerning the present; but a condition concerning the future (e.g. I absolve you if within a month you shall have restored) is licit from a grave cause.

¹ The form of this absolution, which is accustomed to be appended to pontifical rescripts, is this: "We therefore, absolving the same N. N. from any excommunications ... if he in any way exists bound by them, for the sole effect of obtaining the present things, and judging him to be absolved."

28. Who can absolve. 1. From reserved censures only he can absolve who imposed them, his superior, his successor in office, and the delegate of these; for to absolve belongs to the same one to whom it belongs to bind.

It must be noted that censures carried by man by way of precept, or through particular sentence, are reckoned among reserved censures; on the contrary, censures carried by man by way of statute, or through general sentence, are reckoned among non-reserved censures.

2. From non-reserved censures any confessor can absolve, both for the internal forum and for the external forum.¹ The confessor can grant this absolution both within and outside confession. Nevertheless, in order that one notoriously censured may publicly use the absolution, for preventing scandal it is required that the granted absolution be publicly established.

Concerning absolution from censures, whether reserved or non-reserved, which is granted to strangers, the same must be said as is established concerning absolution from sins in the treatise on the sacrament of penance.²

3. In the article of death any priest, even one not approved, indeed even when an approved or privileged one is present, can absolve from all censures, even reserved ones.³

One who in the article of death is absolved from censures reserved to the Roman pontiff is not bound to present himself to the superior if he recovers, if he was absolved from censures simply reserved.⁴ But if he was absolved from censures reserved in a special mode, under grave sin and under penalty of re-incidence he must present himself to the superior, i.e. either by himself or through the confessor he must have recourse to the holy see and stand by its mandates, or seek a new absolution from one having the power of absolving.⁵

4. In more urgent cases any confessor can give absolution from censures reserved to the pope, yet under this condition, that the absolved person, under penalty of re-incidence into the same censures, within a month by letter or through the confessor have recourse to the holy see.⁶

¹ C. Nuper 29. De sentent. excom. (V. 39).

² Cf. De sacramentis^3 n. 349, 378.

³ Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 7.

⁴ Holy Office, June 17, 1891.

⁵ Holy Office, August 19, 1891.

⁶ Holy Office, June 23, 1886. Cf. De sacramentis^3 n. 381.

29. On absolution in occult cases. Bishops have the faculty of absolving in the internal forum, even outside the sacrament, any delinquents subject to themselves from censures contracted from an occult delict and reserved to the Roman pontiff simply, but not in a special mode.

a. The terms occult and public have a different sense in diverse matters. Where matrimonial impediments are concerned, they are understood more strictly;¹ where crimes are concerned, a little more broadly.²

b. A crime can be occult in two ways: materially, namely when the fact itself is unknown, e.g. entrance into enclosure; or formally, if the fact is known, but either is thought to have been done rightly, e.g. entrance from permission (error of fact), or the attached censure is unknown (error of law). Now a bishop can absolve not only if the crime is materially occult, but also if it is only formally occult; and indeed if there is error of fact, all concede this; if there is error of law, it is commonly admitted.

1. This faculty is conceded to bishops by the Council of Trent in the celebrated chapter Liceat,³ and the same is confirmed and restricted to simply reserved cases by the Pian constitution Apostolicae sedis.⁴

But besides this faculty conceded in law, bishops are accustomed to receive from the holy see, for a time, the faculty of absolving either by themselves or through others even from cases reserved in a special mode, whether they are occult or public. In practice, therefore, the faculty of absolving from papal cases will almost always be able to be obtained from the bishop.

2. Regular prelates, by the constitution Apostolicae sedis, lack a perpetual faculty of absolving from papal cases not only seculars but also their own subjects;⁵ nevertheless this power is accustomed to be conceded to them for a time.

Regular prelates can absolve their own subjects from censures which by pontifical law are reserved to bishops.

3. Although Trent does not concede to bishops the power of absolving except with respect to their own subjects, nevertheless from universal custom they can absolve even subjects of others, or strangers, by power conceded by the tacit consent of the bishop of the strangers.⁶

4. From c. Liceat, bishops can absolve their own subjects from occult cases in the forum of conscience. Now these words do not signify that this must be done in sacramental confession, but that the absolution of itself avails only for the internal forum.

¹ Cf. De sacramentis^3 n. 619.

² Cf. above n. 10 and De praeceptis^3 n. 649.

³ Sess. 24, c. 6, De reform.

⁴ "Nevertheless we will that the faculty of absolving conceded to bishops by the Tridentine synod remain firm in any censures reserved to the apostolic see by this our constitution, excepting only those which we have declared reserved to the same apostolic see in a special mode."

⁵ Sacred Penitentiary, December 5, 1873.

⁶ Cf. De sacramentis^3 n. 378.

30. On the conditions required for absolving. 1. Someone can be absolved from censure even absent and unwilling; nevertheless it is fitting that absolution be given only to one present and asking.

Just as one absent can be struck by censures through letters, so also he can be absolved from censures; nevertheless the presence of the censured person conduces more both to reverence for censures and to the humiliation of the censured person himself; therefore it is conceded to one absent only from a reasonable cause.

2. The conditions to be fulfilled by the censured person are generally accustomed to be expressed by these words: those things having been enjoined which must be enjoined by law; but in particular there must be enjoined:

a. That he satisfy the injured party, if he injured any (by revocation, restitution, petition for pardon), or if he cannot satisfy, that he at least promise that he will satisfy as soon as he can, unless the injured party has remitted the injury or the guilty person is unable to satisfy.

b. That he repair scandal, if any was given, which is necessary by divine law. But scandal must be repaired in the better way in which it can be done, according to the prudent judgment of the ordinary or confessor.

c. That a salutary penance be imposed besides the sacramental penance.

3. For validly absolving from censure a determined formula of words is not required, but the will of the superior manifested by a sensible sign suffices, whether this is done by words or in writing or by another sign.

For licitly absolving in the internal forum, whether sacramental or extra-sacramental, from the prescription of the Roman Ritual the formula which is had in the very form of sacramental absolution is to be used;¹ but in the external forum, from the prescription of law, the form which is had in the Roman Ritual or Pontifical is to be used.²

¹ Roman Ritual, tit. III, c. 3, n. 8.

² C. A nobis 28. De sentent. excom. (V. 39).

31. On whether absolution from censure is to be given in the internal or external forum. In practice a difficulty not rarely arises whether absolution must be conceded for the external forum or whether it suffices for the internal forum. A censure carried by man through condemnatory sentence certainly needs absolution for the external forum; concerning a censure of a sentence already passed, these things must be held:

1. If a censure of a sentence already passed was contracted in the internal forum alone, absolution for the internal forum suffices.

If the delict is occult, the censure pertains to the internal forum and it is treated in the internal forum alone. Both a delict which became public neither by law nor by fact, and a delict which in the place where the guilty person is now staying neither is nor will be known, even if in another place it is known by fact, are judged occult.

2. If a censure of a sentence already passed was contracted in the external forum, absolution for the external forum is required.

Only if the censure is not reserved does absolution for the internal forum suffice, even if the censure is notorious, provided the absolution conceded is publicly established.

3. Absolution conceded for the external forum avails also for the internal forum; but absolution for the internal forum of itself does not avail for the external forum. Nevertheless an ecclesiastical judge can recognize it also for the external forum if the absolution conceded is publicly established.

That the absolution conceded is publicly established is judged if it is publicly known that the censured person has confessed and has offered due satisfaction, if any was necessary.

32. Censures now in force. 1. At every time the Church has used the power of inflicting censures because of certain graver crimes, but especially because of the crime of heresy.¹ The mode by which she imposed censures was diverse in diverse times; nevertheless she more frequently used excommunications, of which the first, by common law and reserved to the Roman pontiff, was established by the Second Lateran Council (1139), to which in the course of time several others were added. All these, collected in the form of a bull by the will of the Roman pontiffs, were promulgated every year at Rome in the churches on certain days, especially on Maundy Thursday. Their collection is therefore called the Bull In Coena Domini, which in the passage of time, by the care of the Roman pontiffs, was increased up to twenty censures. Besides the censures which were contained in the Bull In Coena, several others were in force, both those carried by pontifical constitutions and those carried by the Council of Trent. Since the number of censures was growing too much, and some of them, with morals and times changed, seemed less useful, by Pius IX, through the constitution Apostolicae sedis of October 12, 1869, very many censures of a sentence already passed having been abrogated, the most recent law was established with respect to ecclesiastical censures. Wherefore today by common law only those censures of a sentence already passed are in force which are directly or indirectly contained in this constitution, and those which were added to them after its promulgation. But all censures which are contained clearly and certainly in this constitution receive full force of obliging through it, even if before its promulgation they perhaps had fallen into desuetude.

The Pian constitution, which treats only censures, and those of a sentence already passed, changed nothing with respect to censures of a sentence to be passed, nor with respect to censures carried by private law, such as censures carried by bishops or by prelates of regulars against their own subjects, nor with respect to irregularities or other ecclesiastical penalties, nor with respect to ecclesiastical laws. Therefore if by this constitution the censure has been removed from some law, the law itself retains the force of obliging.

2. The censures now in force are:

a. Censures inflicted in express words in the bull itself.

b. Censures inflicted by the Council of Trent and confirmed by this constitution.

It is the common opinion of interpreters that from this constitution only those Tridentine censures have force which the Council of Trent then first inflicted, but not those which Trent only renewed and confirmed from the old law. For the words which the supreme pontiff uses in this constitution designate those censures alone.

c. Censures previously in force and not changed by this constitution from the constitutions: a. for the election of the Roman pontiff; b. for the internal governance of any orders and regular institutes.

d. Censures which were carried after the constitution Apostolicae sedis.

¹ Cf. 1 Cor. 5, 1-5. Kober, Der Kirchenbann, p. 15 ff. Hausmann, Geschichte der papstlichen Reservatfalle (Regensburg: Pustet, 1868), p. 21 ff.

33. Notion. Excommunication is a censure by which a Christian man is deprived of communion with the faithful.

a. There is a threefold communication of the faithful: a. merely internal, consisting in faith and charity, by which the faithful are mystically united among themselves and with Christ; b. merely external (in civil matters), which consists in external profane actions, namely in the common life, conversation, commerce, etc., of the faithful; c. mixed (in divine matters), consisting in external religious actions which by their institution produce internal spiritual fruit, such as the administration and reception of the sacraments, the suffrages of the Church, which in the sacrifice of the Mass and in other public offices are founded for all the faithful, indulgences. Now the Church deprives no one of the communion of merely internal goods, nor can she deprive anyone of it; but she can deprive a disobedient and contumacious man of external and mixed communion, and in fact deprives him of it through excommunication.

b. Excommunication is the gravest of all ecclesiastical penalties, than which there is none greater in the Church: for since it deprives one of all the goods of the Church, it virtually contains in itself the other censures, which deprive one of the same goods only partially. Therefore the Council of Trent admonishes ecclesiastical judges not to use this penalty unless when no other remedy remains.¹

c. By the name anathema there is designated either excommunication itself, or excommunication inflicted because of heresy or suspicion of it, or excommunication which is denounced against the excommunicated person with a certain extraordinary solemnity.²

¹ Sess. 25, c. 3, De reform.

² Cf. C. Debent 106, c. 11, q. 3, where the mode and form of solemn excommunication is described.

34. Division of excommunication. Excommunication was previously divided, from its effect, into greater and lesser; the former deprived one of all common goods, the latter only of part, namely reception of the sacraments and passive election to dignities and benefices. But now, lesser excommunication having been removed by the constitution Apostolicae sedis, only greater excommunication is in force.¹

Lesser excommunication was formerly incurred by those who, against the prohibition of the Church, communicated with an excommunicated person to be avoided. Those communicating with an excommunicated person to be avoided today fall into greater excommunication, but only in those cases which are expressly indicated in the constitution Apostolicae sedis.

¹ Holy Office, December 5, 1883. Cf. Acta sanctae sedis XVII, p. 555.

35. Distinction among excommunicated persons. Some excommunicated persons are to be avoided, whom the faithful are bound to avoid; others are tolerated, whom the faithful are not bound to avoid. This distinction, taken from the chief effect of greater excommunication, must still be attended to today.

a. In antiquity all persons excommunicated by greater excommunication were to be avoided. In the Council of Constance the constitution Ad evitanda was issued, confirmed by Martin V and afterward by Leo X, which a. removes the prohibition of communicating with excommunicated persons, with three cases excepted, yet b. does not intend to relieve the excommunicated persons themselves in anything or in any way to favor them, but to avoid scandals and many dangers and to aid the consciences of the faithful.

b. Therefore not only is it prohibited to excommunicated persons to be avoided to communicate with the rest of the faithful, but there also lies upon the faithful an obligation in conscience of omitting commerce with excommunicated persons to be avoided. But with respect to tolerated persons, they indeed are bound to abstain from commerce with the rest of the faithful in divine matters; however, the faithful can licitly communicate with them both in divine and in human matters. But if the excommunicated persons have been anticipated by the faithful, they too can licitly communicate even in divine matters.

c. Therefore by reason of excommunication, sacraments can licitly be asked from an excommunicated person (tolerated) even without necessity; but from another reason it can happen that sacraments cannot be asked from him without necessity, namely if he is in sin.

36. Who are to be avoided. Therefore, from the new law introduced through the Council of Constance, excommunicated persons to be avoided are:

1. Those excommunicated by name and publicly, whether by the Roman pontiff or by a bishop.

2. Those who by name and publicly have been denounced as excommunicated by the pope or by a bishop, namely where it concerns a censure of a sentence already passed.

a. By name, i.e. by an expressed name or by another title which certainly designates the person and therefore is equivalent to a name, e.g. we excommunicate the dean of this place.

b. Publicly, i.e. in the mode by which promulgation of law is made, either by affixing the name in a public place or by reading it in church at the time of Mass or sermon, etc.

c. Therefore we licitly communicate with heretics and schismatics who, because of their heresy, have been excommunicated and denounced publicly as such, because they have not been excommunicated and denounced by name.

3. Notorious strikers of clerics, even if they have not been denounced as excommunicated.

But in order that a striking inducing censure be notorious, notoriety of fact does not suffice; rather, notoriety of law is also required, i.e. that the crime be known by sentence of a judge or by confession of the guilty person in judgment (n. 10).¹

¹ Holy Office, January 9, 1884. Cf. St. Alphonsus n. 144.

WE here understand by a censure a spiritual and remedial penalty by which a baptized and contumacious delinquent is deprived by ecclesiastical authority of the use of certain spiritual advantages. It differs from other penalties, such as degradation, which are also spiritual and inflicted by the Church, in that a censure has in view the correction and amendment of the delinquent, while other penalties have chiefly in view the common good to be procured by the punishment and repression of crime. The Church has jurisdiction only over those who are baptized, and she punishes by censures only those of her children who have done wrong with their eyes open, with knowledge of the wrongfulness of their action and of the spiritual censure by which the Church punishes it.

A censure does not and cannot deprive a man of all the spiritual advantages which he may possess. There are some spiritual gifts in man’s possession which depend only on his personal relations with God, such as sanctifying grace, and the supernatural virtues and gifts which accompany it. These may adorn the soul of one who is not baptized, and they are not possessed by all members of the Church. There are, however, other spiritual privileges which a Christian enjoys through membership with the Church of God. Among these theologians distinguish those that are internal, external, and mixed. Internal comprise the special providence and helps which God grants to the members of his Church because they belong to his Spouse who is continually interceding for them. External are the society and special charity which binds the members of the Church to each other. Mixed are the participation in the same sacraments and sacrifice, the common suffrages, satisfactions, indulgences, children of the Church in communion with her enjoy. According to the common opinion, excommunication deprives the delinquent of all these privileges, it puts him outside the communion of the faithful, and consequently leaves him without the benefits of union.. The other two censures, suspension and interdict, deprive him at least of some of those benefits, as of their nature they are limited in their effect. There are, however, some theologians who with Suarez deny that a censure deprives a man of the merely internal advantages which membership with the Church confers.

With reference to the effects produced by them, censures are of three kinds: excommunication, suspension, and interdict. With reference to the manner in which they are inflicted, they are said to be a jure, or ab homine. The former are imposed by a stable and permanent law, the latter by way of particular precept or sentence. Sometimes a censure is incurred by the very fact of committing a crime, without any declaratory sentence of a judge; it is then said to be latae sententiae. Sometimes it needs the intervention of a judge, and is said to be ferendae sententiae.

Certain conditions must be fulfilled in order that a censure may be incurred:

(a) As it is a serious penalty, and a serious penalty can only be inflicted for a grave fault, a censure can only be incurred by one who has committed a mortal sin.

(b) ‘The Church does not judge of what is merely internal, and so the fault which is punished by censure must be grave externally as well as internally. A slight blow given to a cleric, which does not constitute a serious injury, does not involve excommunication incurred by those who violate the privilege of the canon, even though the act were accompanied with mortal hatred.

(c) Penalties must be interpreted strictly, and therefore the crime which is punished by censures must be completed, not merely attempted.

(d) Inasmuch as a censure is remedial and inflicted on the delinquent for his correction and amendment, it cannot be incurred for a crime which is altogether past, and which has left no traces behind it. Sometimes suspension or interdict may be inflicted in punishment of such crimes, but then they are inflicted for a definite period, or for ever, and become pure penalties, not censures, (e) ‘There must be contumacy in order that a censure may be incurred, or, in other words, the delinquent must be conscious at the time that he is committing a crime which is punished by the Church by censure. It follows from this: that a censure cannot be inflicted ab homine by a particular sentence without previous admonition, and this should ordinarily be in writing so as to be capable of proof. In censures inflicted a jure or ab homine by a general precept which is of the nature of a law, no special admonition is required, as the law itself is a sufficient admonition. Nor is an admonition necessary when suspension or interdict are inflicted by way of mere penalty (Can. 2242).

It is of faith that the Church has the power of inflicting censures. It is contained in the general power of binding and loosing granted to the Church by her divine Founder. This power is exercised by all ecclesiastical prelates who have jurisdiction in the external forum, unless their authority has been restricted. The Pope and a general council have jurisdiction over the whole Church, and they can bind all the faithful by their laws and censures. A bishop can inflict censures on his subjects, as can regular prelates on theirs.

A parish priest has no jurisdiction in the external forum, and cannot as such impose censures, nor can laymen, nor women.

A bishop cannot lawfully exercise contentious jurisdiction outside his diocese, and consequently he cannot inflict censures outside his diocese when the case requires a judicial process. If the case does not require any judicial process, he may impose a censure on a guilty subject even when he is outside his diocese.

A bishop within his diocese may punish with censure a subject who is now outside the diocese on account of a crime which was committed within the diocese, and even on account of a crime which has been committed outside if it had reference to the diocese. And so a parish priest who is absent from the diocese and refuses to come to synod, or who is taking too long a holiday, may be punished by censure. The more probable opinion holds that a subject who violates a precept imposed under censure while he is outside the diocese incurs the censure, though St Alphonsus admits that the opposite is probable. The jurisdiction of superiors over regulars is personal, and these certainly incur censures imposed on them wherever they may be at the time when it is imposed. Regulars belonging to mendicant orders and members of the Society of Jesus have a special privilege granted by the Holy See, by which they cannot be put under censure by any bishop, even when they do wrong in matters in which their general exemption is of no avail, and in which they are subject to the bishop. In three cases, however, these religious may be punished by episcopal censure, notwithstanding their special privilege. Gregory XV permitted this in case they preach in churches not their own without the bishop’s licence, or in their own without asking for his blessing, or against his command; Innocent X added to this the case of disobedience with reference to hearing confessions; and Urban VIII added the case of hanging sacred pictures painted in an unusual or scandalous manner.

In order to incur a censure, the delinquent must be subject to the authority which imposes it. Strangers, therefore, do not incur the particular censures which bind in the place where they are staying for a short time. If strangers, however, violate some provision of the common law which for such violation imposes a censure ferendae sententiae, the bishop of the place may inflict this on them, Even when they offend in other matters, the local ordinary may punish them by other penalties, and if they prove contumacious, they may be put under censure by him.

A censure latae sententiae is multiplied: (1) If different crimes of which each is punished by censure are committed by the same or distinct actions.

(2) If the same crime punished by censure is often repeated so that there are several distinct crimes.

(3) If a crime punished by different censures by distinct superiors is committed once or several times (Can. 2244).

Grave fear and ignorance prevent contumacy, and therefore hinder one who commits a crime under their influence from incurring any censure by which such crime is punished. Grave fear, however, does not excuse from censures inflicted for crimes which produce contempt for the faith, or for ecclesiastical authority, or public harm to souls (Can. 2229, sec. 3, iii). If, however, the ignorance be crass or supine, it will not excuse from grave sin or contumacy, and so the censure will be incurred. But if the censure is inflicted on those who knowingly, rashly, with rash daring, or presumption, commit a crime, full knowledge is required in order to incur the censure, but merely affected ignorance will not prevent its being incurred (Can. 2229).

WHEN a censure has been incurred, it does not cease as a rule merely by lapse of time or on the correction and amendment of the delinquent. The delinquent must obtain absolution of the censure from one who is competent to give it. In some cases, however, a censure is imposed as long as certain conditions last, and then on the termination of those conditions the censure lapses without absolution.

Any confessor in the tribunal of Penance may absolve from censures inflicted by law and not reserved to the Holy See or to the bishop. Censures, too, which are imposed ab homine but by a general precept or ordinance are in the same category, and may be absolved by any confessor unless they are reserved (Can. 2253, i).

Absolution for a reserved censure must be sought from him to whom it is reserved, or from his delegate. Similarly, absolution from a censure inflicted ab homine by a particular precept must be obtained from him who inflicted it, or from his superior, or successor in office, or from some one delegated by one of these to grant absolution (Can. 2253, ii).

If a confessor in ignorance of the reservation absolves a penitent from a censure and from sin, the absolution of the censure is valid provided that it is not a censure ab homine or a censure most specially reserved to the Holy See (Can. 2247, sec. 3).

If there is question of a censure which does not prevent the reception of the sacraments if he who is under censure is rightly disposed and has ceased to be contumacious, he can be absolved from his sins, while the censure remains unabsolved.

But if there is question of a censure which prevents the reception of the sacraments he who is under censure cannot be absolved from his sins unless he has previously been absolved from the censure.

The absolution of a censure in the sacramental forum is contained in the usual form of absolution for sins prescribed in the Ritual; in the non-sacramental forum it may be given in any way, but for the absolution of excommunication it is ordinarily advisable to use the form given in the Ritual (Can. 2250).

If absolution for a censure is given in the external forum it avails also for the internal forum; if it is given in the internal forum he who is absolved if there is no scandal can act as absolved also in the external forum; but unless the grant of absolution is proved or at least can be lawfully presumed in the external forum, the censure can be urged by the superiors of the external forum and the guilty party should obey them until absolution is obtained in the same forum (Can. 2251).

When treating of the sacrament of Penance in the chapter on reserved cases we saw that any priest has unrestricted faculties to absolve any penitent in danger of death, and that a simple confessor has very large powers in more urgent cases by Canon 2254.

OF all the penalties which the Church can inflict, excommunication is the most severe, and it virtually contains the others. It deprives the delinquent of all the advantages which he possessed as a member of the Church, and puts him outside the communion of the faithful. According to the ancient discipline of the Church, no excommunicated person could hold any intercourse with the faithful, nor could the faithful hold intercourse with him, but at the close of the Middle Ages, when heresy became more common, it grew to be impossible to maintain the ancient rigour, and Martin V introduced an important mitigation in the law. By the decree Ad evitanda, he distinguished between those under censure who were still to be avoided and those who were to be tolerated. All who were excommunicated by name, and at the same time specially denounced by name, together with all who notoriously violated the privilege of the canon by striking clerics, were still to be avoided; all others were to be tolerated. By this concession Catholics might without scruple, as far as concerned the censure, henceforth have intercourse with persons under censure who were tolerated. The concession was not, indeed, made directly in favour of those under censure, but these could not fail to benefit indirectly by the relaxation in the law that had been granted to the faithful. The tolerated as well as those to be avoided were still theoretically subject to the former disabilities, but custom made a distinction between them in several important respects.

The Code retains the distinction between excommunicates who are to be avoided and those who are tolerated; no one is to be avoided as excommunicated unless he has been excommunicated by name by the Holy See, publicly denounced as such, and in the sentence it is expressly said that he is to be avoided (Can. 2258).

By the ancient discipline one of the faithful who held unlawful intercourse with one who was under excommunication himself incurred the minor excommunication, but this penalty has ceased to exist since the promulgation of the constitution of Pius IX, Apostolicae Sedis, where no mention is made of it.

The effects of excommunication, according to the Code, may be enumerated as follows:

(a) An excommunicated person has no right to assist at divine offices—that is, functions of the power of order which are ordained to the worship of God by the institution of Christ or of the Church, and which can be exercised by clerics alone.

(b) An excommunicated person cannot receive the sacraments, and after a declaratory or condemnatory sentence, not even the sacramentals.

(c) As a general rule the lawful administration of the sacraments and sacramentals is forbidden to excommunicated persons. However, especially if other ministers are not to be had, the faithful may ask for the sacraments and sacramentals from an excommunicated priest, and then the latter can administer the same without asking the reason for the request.

But from one who is to be avoided and from others after a condemnatory or declaratory sentence, only in danger of - death can the faithful ask for sacramental absolution, and then also the other sacraments and sacramentals if other ministers are not to be had.

(d) An excommunicated person does not share in the indulgences, suffrages, and public prayers of the Church.

The faithful, however, are not forbidden to pray for him privately. Priests are not forbidden privately and with the avoidance of scandal to offer Mass for him, but only for his conversion, if he is to be avoided.

(e) An excommunicated person is removed from the exercise of ecclesiastical offices in law within the limits laid down under the proper heads.

(f) An act of jurisdiction, both of the external and internal forum, when exercised by an excommunicated person is unlawful, and also invalid after a condemnatory or declaratory sentence, with the exceptions mentioned above.

(g) An excommunicated person is debarred from the right of electing, presenting, nominating, he cannot acquire dignities, offices, benefices, ecclesiastical pensions, or other posts in the Church; nor can he be promoted to orders.

(h) After a condemnatory or declaratory sentence of excommunication he is deprived of the emoluments of office if he had one in the Church, and if he is to be avoided, of the office itself.

(k) The faithful ought to avoid communicating in secular matters with one who is to be avoided, unless there is question of a spouse, of parents, children, servants, subjects, and generally unless a reasonable cause excuses it (Can. 2259-2267).

Beside the foregoing effects immediately produced by excommunication, there are others more remote. If the person under excommunication violates the censure by unlawfully and solemnly exercising sacred Orders, he incurs irregularity, and if after due admonitions he takes no steps to be released from the censure but remains in it for a whole year, he becomes suspect of heresy (Can. 985, vii; 2340).

SUSPENSION is a censure by which a cleric is deprived of the use of some ecclesiastical power which he has by reason of his orders, office, or benefice, or, in the words of the Code, it is a censure by which a cleric is debarred from office, or benefice, or both.

This censure, then, differs from the rest in that it is inflicted only on clerics, whom it deprives of the lawful exercise of some portion or of the whole of the ecclesiastical power which they possess. A suspended priest may hear Mass and receive the sacraments, and he retains the order or office from which he is suspended, but he cannot lawfully exercise that order or office as long as he is under censure.

Suspension may be partial, as when it deprives the delinquent of the exercise of some sacred order, or office, or of the administration and fruits of his benefice; or it may be total and embrace all those ecclesiastical powers. When a cleric is simply suspended without any special limitation he is understood to be totally suspended from all sacred orders, the exercise of his office, and the fruits of his benefice.

Suspension ab homine, inflicted for the perpetration of a crime, should ordinarily be imposed after the crime has been proved judicially. However, the Council of Trent¹ permitted prelates to suspend their clerics on account of a secret crime and without judicial process, If they use this right, they are said to suspend the delinquent ex informata conscientia; if it is inflicted as a censure they are bound to make known the grounds of their action to the delinquent himself, and they should be prepared to submit them to the Sacred Congregation if he have recourse to Rome, as he has a right to do, though he has no right to a strict appeal.²

Suspension inflicted for life, or for a crime which is altogether past and done with, or at the will and good pleasure of the superior, is not a censure in the strict sense, but a mere penalty inflicted in punishment for crime.

¹ Sess. xiv, c. 1, de Ref.; can. 2186 ff.

² Instruct. S.C. de P.F., October 20, 1884.

A suspended person who exercises an act prohibited him by the censure commits grave sin, and if he solemnly exercises sacred orders after being suspended from them he incurs the penalty of irregularity in addition (Can. 985). An act of jurisdiction on the part of one who is publicly suspended after a condemnatory or declaratory sentence, or if the jurisdiction were expressly revoked by the superior, would be invalid; otherwise it would always be valid, and even lawful if it were exercised at the request of the faithful who have the right to ask it of him.

INTERDICT is a censure which prohibits the use of liturgical offices, some sacraments, and ecclesiastical burial. It differs from excommunication and suspension, even when the effects are similar, in that excommunication deprives the delinquent of the use of the sacraments, for example, inasmuch as that use is a communication with the faithful, and suspension deprives the delinquent of the exercise of ecclesiastical power in the administration of the sacraments, while interdict forbids their use inasmuch as they are sacred actions and objects of which for just reasons the delinquent is deprived.

An interdict is local, personal, or mixed, as the prohibition immediately affects the place, certain persons, or both.

It is general or special as it affects the whole of some country or body; or only some particular place or person, physical or moral.

A local interdict, whether general or special, does not forbid the administration of the sacraments and sacramentals to the dying under proper conditions, but it forbids in the place any divine office or sacred rite with the following exceptions: On the feasts of Christmas, Easter, Whit Sunday, Corpus Christi and the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin, a local interdict is suspended, and the conferring of orders and the solemn nuptial blessing are alone forbidden.

If the interdict was local and general and the decree of interdict did not expressly state otherwise:

(r) Provided that they are not personally interdicted, clerics are allowed in private to exercise all divine offices and sacred rites in any church or oratory, with closed doors, in a low voice and without the ringing of bells.

(2) Moreover, in the cathedral, in parish churches, and in the only church in the place, and in these places alone, the celebration of one Mass, the reservation of the Blessed Sacrament, the administration of Baptism, the Eucharist, Penance, assisting at marriage, with the exclusion of the nuptial blessing, funerals excluding all pomp, the blessing of baptismal water, and of the holy oils, and preaching the word of God are permitted.

Moreover, in these sacred functions singing is forbidden and pomp in the sacred furniture, the ringing of bells, the playing of the organ and of other musical instruments; and Holy Viaticum should be carried to the sick privately.

Even if a cemetery is specially interdicted the bodies of the faithful may be buried there, but without any ecclesiastical rite (Can. 2270-2272).

The violation of an interdict by doing what it forbids is a grave sin, and a cleric who violates a personal interdict by the exercise of an action belonging to sacred orders or who performs such an action in a place which is interdicted by name incurs irregularity (Can. 985, vii).

CERTAIN ecclesiastical penalties resemble censures in some respects, and it will be convenient to say a word about them here. Deposition is an ecclesiastical penalty by which a cleric as a punishment for grave crime is for ever suspended from his office and rendered incapable of holding any office, dignity, benefice, pension, or post in the Church, and deprived of those which he has, even though he was ordained on their title (Can. 2303). It differs from a censure in that it is vindictive, not remedial, and it does not endure merely until correction, amendment, and absolution; but of itself it is perpetual. The deposed cleric retains the privileges of the forum and of the canon,

Degradation is a more severe penalty than deposition, inasmuch as it reduces the cleric to the state of a layman as far as it is in the power of the Church so to do, and deprives him of all clerical offices, rights, and privileges. Degradation is inflicted by the bishop in punishment of grave crimes committed by clerics who are incorrigible, by depriving them solemnly of their vestments and insignia of office, and handing them over to be dealt with by the secular arm,

By ecclesiastical burial is meant interment in consecrated ground with the rites of the Church. All Catholics who die in communion with the faithful have a right to ecclesiastical burial. If there is no consecrated ground in which they can be buried, the grave in which they are placed is blessed at the time of interment. As far as possible Catholics should have a special cemetery of their own or a portion at least of the common cemetery assigned to them exclusively. In this a part should be left unblessed for the reception of the bodies of unbaptized infants and of those to whom Christian burial is to be denied. These are either such as are deprived of ecclesiastical burial because they died out of communion with the faithful, or those to whom it is denied in punishment of crime.

To the first category belong all who are not baptized, open and public heretics, schismatics, apostates, and those under excommunication, for “‘ with those with whom we have not communicated when alive we do not communicate when dead.¹’”4 To the second class belong suicides, unless they killed themselves while out of their mind, and this the Church readily presumes, those who have been killed in a duel, those who did not make their Easter duties, and open and public sinners. No Catholic, however, should be refused ecclesiastical burial without the sentence of the bishop.

Those also, who of their own free will chose to be cremated and persevered in this choice till death, are denied ecclesiastical burial. The Church’s rites may be performed at the house and in the Church in favour of those who are to be cremated by the wish of another, but no sacred rites are permitted at the crematorium.²

Although cremation in itself is not intrinsically wrong, yet the Church for good reasons forbids it, and it is gravely sinful for a Catholic to take a formal part in the cremation of the body of a Catholic.

¹ C. 12, de Sepulturis.

² S.0., December 15, 1886; can. 1203, 1240, 2339.

THE special censures which are now in force in the Western Church are contained in Book V, Part III, of the Code—On the Penalties of Particular Crimes. Of the excommunications some are reserved to the Holy See in a very special manner, others in a special manner, and others simply reserved; others are reserved to bishops, and others are not reserved but may be absolved on proper conditions by any confessor. Special faculties are required in order to absolve from cases reserved to the Holy See, except in certain circumstances described in the chapter on reserved cases. Faculties for cases simply reserved will not avail for cases specially reserved, and faculties for cases specially reserved will not avail for cases very specially reserved. ensures very specially reserved to the Holy See have other characteristics besides requiring very special faculties for their absolution. Canon 2247, sec. 3, provides that where a confessor in ignorance of the reservation absolves a penitent from a censure and from a sin, the absolution is valid except in the case of a censure ab homine, or of a censure very specially reserved to the Holy See. Canon 2237, sec. 2, grants power to bishops to remit penalties latae sententiae of the common law in occult cases, but censures very specially and those specially reserved are excepted. Canon 2252 provides that when a penitent has been absolved when in danger of death by a simple confessor from a censure ab homine or one very specially reserved to the Holy See, if he recovers he is bound to present himself to the person who censured him or to the Sacred Penitentiary, and submit to their requirements. This is not necessary in the case of one who has been absolved in danger of death from other censures.

We shall give a list of the censures contained in the Code with brief comments where they seem to be called for.

Canon 2320 I. Qui species consecratas abjecerit vel ad malum finem abduxerit aut retinuerit, est suspectus de haeresi, incurrit in excommunicationem latae sententiae specialissimo modo Sedi Apostolicae reservatam, est ipso facto infamis, et clericus praeterea est deponendus. (Whoever throws away the consecrated species, or carries them off or keeps them for an evil purpose, is suspect of heresy, incurs an excommunication latae sententiae reserved to the Apostolic See in a most special manner, is ipso facto infamous, and a cleric is besides to be deposed.) Abjecerit—Spit them out, throw them away.

Abduxerit—Take them away for superstitious purposes, to treat them irreverently.

Retinuerit—Keep them for show, out of curiosity to see what would happen to them. Canon 2343 II. Qui violentas manus in personam Romani Pontificis injecerit excommunicationem contrahit latae sententiae Sedi Apostolicae specialissimo modo reservatam, et est ipso facto vitandus; est ipso jure infamis; (Whoever lays violent hands on the person of the Roman Pontiff contracts an excommunication latae sententiae reserved to the Apostolic See in a most special manner, and is ipso facto to be shunned; he is infamous by the law itself.) clericus est degradandus, It is a censure which safeguards the personal immunity of the Roman Pontiff by a special form of the privilege of the canon. Canon 2367 III. Absolvens sive fingens absolvere complicem in peccato turpi incurrit ipso facto in excommunicationem specialissimo modo Sedi Apostolicae reservatam; idque etiam in mortis articulo si alius sacerdos, licet non approbatus ad confessiones, sine gravi aliqua exoritura infamia et scandalo, possit excipere morientis confessionem, excepto casu quo moribundus recuset alii confiteri.

Eamdem excommunicationem non effugit absolvens vel fingens absolvere complicem qui peccatum quidem complicitatis a quo nondum est absolutus non confitetur, sed ideo ita se gerit, quia ad id a complice confessario sive directe sive indirecte inductus est. (One who absolves, or pretends to absolve, an accomplice in a sin of impurity incurs ipso facto an excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See in a most special manner; and this even at the point of death, if another priest, even though not approved for hearing confessions, is available.)

See the comments on this censure above, Penance, Chapter XI.

Canon 2369 IV. Confessarium qui sigillum sacramentale directe violare praesumpserit, manet excommunicatio specialissimo modo Sedi Apostolicae reservata; qui vero indirecte tantum, obnoxius est poenis [suspensionis a celebratione Missae, et ab audiendis sacramentalibus confessionibus vel etiam pro delicti gravitate inhabilis ad ipsas excipiendas declaretur, privetur omnibus beneficiis, dignitatibus, voce activa et passiva, et inhabilis ad ea omnia declaretur, et in casibus gravioribus degradationi quoque subjiciatur. (A confessor who presumes to violate the sacramental seal directly lies under an excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See in a most special manner; but one who violates it only indirectly is liable to the penalties of suspension from celebrating Mass and from hearing sacramental confessions, or may even, according to the gravity of the offence, be declared unfit to hear them; he is to be deprived of all benefices, dignities, and of active and passive voice, and declared unfit for them all, and in graver cases he is to be subjected to degradation as well.)] Only a confessor who with full knowledge of the crime which he is committing, and of its penalty, directly violates the seal of confession and incurs ipso facto excommunication very specially reserved to the Holy See. The penalties assigned by the Code in punishment of others besides confessors, and of confessors who presume to violate the seal indirectly, are ferendae sententiae.

Canon 2314 I, Omnes a Christiana fide apostatae et omnes et singuli haeretici aut schismatici incurrunt ipso facto excommunicationem; nisi moniti resipuerint priventur beneficio, etc. (All apostates from the Christian faith, and each and every heretic or schismatic, incur excommunication ipso facto; if, after being warned, they do not repent, they are to be deprived of any benefice, and so forth.)

The absolution from the above excommunication to be given in the forum of conscience is specially reserved to the Holy See. If, however, the crime of apostasy, heresy, or schism has been brought before the external tribunal of the local Ordinary in any way, even by voluntary confession, the same Ordinary, but not the Vicar-General without a special mandate, can absolve the penitent by his ordinary authority in the external forum, when abjuration has previously been made, according to law and other conditions to be complied with have been fulfilled; but one so absolved can afterwards be absolved from his sin in the forum of conscience by any confessor. But the abjuration is held to have been lawfully made when it is made before the local Ordinary or his delegate and two witnesses at least (Can. 2314, sec. 2).

Canon 1325, sec, 2, defines the terms used in this censure, "If anyone, after having received baptism, while retaining the name of Christian pertinaciously denies of any the doctrines which are to be believed by divine and Catholic faith or doubts about it, he is a heretic; if he wholly abandons the Christian faith, he is an apostate; finally, if he refuses to be subject to the Roman Pontiff or to communicate with the members of the Church subject to him, he is a schismatic." Canon 2318 II. In excommunicationem Sedi Apostolicae speciali modo reservatam ipso facto incurrunt, opere publici juris facto, editores librorum apostatarum, haereticorum et schismaticorum, qui apostasiam, haeresim, schisma propugnant, itemque eosdem libros aliosve per apostolicas litteras nominatim prohibitos defendentes aut scienter sine debita licentia legentes vel retinentes, Editores. (There incur ipso facto an excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See in a special manner, once the work has been made public, the publishers of books by apostates, heretics and schismatics which defend apostasy, heresy or schism; and likewise those who defend such books, or others prohibited by name in apostolic letters, or who knowingly read or keep them without the required permission.)—The publishers of books defending apostasy, heresy, and schism, written by apostates, heretics, and schismatics, incur this censure when the book is published.

Defendentes——Also those who defend those same books or others prohibited by name by apostolic letters, such as Fénelon’s Explication des Maximes des Saints.

Legentes.—Those who read them without leave knowing that they are forbidden under censure.

Retinentes.—Retaining for any purpose whatever without leave. Canon 2322 III. Ad ordinem sacerdotalem non promotus si Missae celebrationem simulaverit aut sacramentalem confessionem exceperit, excommunicationem ipso facto contrahit, speciali modo Sedi Apostolicae reservatam; et insuper laicus quidem privetur pensione aut munere, si quod habeat in Ecclesia, aliisque poenis pro gravitate culpae puniatur; clericus vero deponatur. (One not promoted to the priestly order who simulates the celebration of Mass or hears a sacramental confession contracts ipso facto an excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See in a special manner; and further, if a layman, let him be deprived of any pension or office he may hold in the Church, and punished with other penalties according to the gravity of his fault; but a cleric is to be deposed.)

Simulaverit—So that onlookers think he is saying Mass.

Confessionem—So that the penitent makes his confession with a view to absolution. Canon 2332 IV. Omnes et singuli cujuscumque status, gradus seu conditionis etiam regalis, episcopalis vel cardinalitiae fuerint, a legibus, decretis, mandatis Romani Pontificis pro tempore existentis ad Universale Concilium appellantes, sunt suspecti de haeresi et ipso facto contrahunt excommunicationem Sedi Apostolicae speciali modo reservatam.

Appellantes—Physical persons who appeal from the Pope to an Oecumenical Council, not to a future Pope or to the reigning Pope better informed. Canon 2333 V. Recurrentes ad laicam potestatem ad impediendas litteras vel acta quaelibet a Sede Apostolica vel ab ejusdem Legatis profecta, eorumve promulgationem vel executionem directe vel indirecte prohibentes, aut eorum causa sive eos ad quos pertinent litterae vel acta sive alios laedentes vel perterrefacientes, ipso facto subjaceant excommunicationi Sedi Apostolicae speciali modo reservatae. (Those who have recourse to the lay power in order to impede any letters or acts whatsoever issuing from the Apostolic See or from its Legates, or who directly or indirectly forbid their promulgation or execution, or who on that account injure or terrify either those to whom the letters or acts pertain or any others, are ipso facto subject to an excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See in a special manner.)

Recurrentes——Those incur this censure who with effect have recourse to the civil authority to impede any letters or acts of any kind issued by the Holy See, the Roman Congregations, Offices, Legates, Nuncios, Apostolic Delegates.

Prohibentes—Preventing in any way their promulgation and execution.

Laedentes—Injuring and frightening with effect those to whom the letters belong or others concerned in their promulgation and execution. Canon 2334.

VI. Excommunicatione latae sententiae speciali modo Sedi Apostolicae reservata plectuntur: (1) Qui leges, mandata, vel decreta contra libertatem aut jura Ecclesiae edunt.

(2) Qui impediunt directe vel indirecte exercitium jurisdictionis ecclesiasticae sive interni sive externi fori, ad hoc recurrentes ad quamlibet laicalem potestatem. (There are punished with an excommunication latae sententiae reserved to the Apostolic See in a special manner: (1) those who issue laws, mandates or decrees against the liberty or the rights of the Church; (2) those who directly or indirectly impede the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, whether of the internal or of the external forum, having recourse for this purpose to any lay power whatsoever.)

Edunt.—Public authorities who make laws, issue mandates and decrees against the liberty and rights of the Church, incur this censure.

Impediunt.—As also do those who hinder with effect in any way the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction by having recourse to any sort of lay authority. Canon 2341 VII. Si quis contra praescriptum [privilegii fori] ausus fuerit ad judicem laicum trahere aliquem ex S. *(If anyone, against the prescription of the privilege of the forum, shall have dared to drag before a lay judge any one of the Most Holy)*R.E. Cardinalibus, vel Legatis Sedis Apostolicae, vel officialibus majoribus Romanae Curiae, ob negotia ad eorum munus pertinentia, (Cardinals, or Legates of the Apostolic See, or the major officials of the Roman Curia, on account of business pertaining to their office,) vel Ordinarium proprium, contrahit ipso facto excommunicationem Sedi Apostolicae speciali modo reservatam. (or his own Ordinary, contracts ipso facto an excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See in a special manner.)

(St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, book VII, nn. 1-340; Homo Apostolicus, tract 19, nn. 1-71).¹

After in special moral theology we have treated of the due cultivation of virtues and of the principal means of obtaining the graces necessary for exercising this cultivation, there remains to be explained in what way the Church strives to sanction the observance of virtues and of means, or to coerce transgressions of precepts by established penalties. First and by way of preliminary, however, we will speak of those things which the Church punishes, or of delicts; then of the penalties by which she punishes delicts.

¹ Wernz, Ius Decretalium, VI; Hollweck, Die kirchlichen Strafgesetze; Chelodi, Ius poenale; Sole, De delictis et poenis; Lega, De delictis et poenis; Noldin-Schoenegger, De poenis ecclesiasticis; Vermeersch-Creusen, Epitome Iuris Canonici, III, n. 382 sq.

We will treat first of penalties in general; then of penalties in species; then of penalties established for individual delicts.

According to the norm of the Code, here there will be discussion both of penalties taken in the proper sense, medicinal as well as vindicative, and of disciplinary means, or penal remedies and penances.

I. Notion. Vindicative penalties are those which tend directly to the expiation of the delict, so that their remission does not depend on the cessation of the delinquent's contumacy (canon 2286).

II. Division. A vindicative penalty is distinguished:

1. By reason of the privation, into spiritual or mixed, or even merely temporal, because sometimes it deprives one of merely temporal goods; otherwise than a censure (n. 862).

2. By reason of the subject, into one common to all the faithful or special to clerics.

3. Finally, just as censure, so also a vindicative penalty is latae or ferendae sententiae, a iure or ab homine, determinate or indeterminate.

Note 1. From inflicted vindicative penalties there is given appeal or recourse in suspensive effect, unless something else is expressly provided in law (canon 2287).

Note 2. In canon law the so-called conditional condemnation is assumed; for canon 2288 establishes: if the guilty person is such that for the first time after a life laudably passed he has offended, it is remitted to the prudence of the judge to suspend the execution of the ordinary penalty inflicted by condemnatory sentence; yet on this condition, that if the guilty person within the next three years commits another delict of the same or another kind, he undergo the penalty due to each delict (canon 2288). With the three years having passed without crime, the guilty person is free from the effect of the condemnation. Nevertheless this conditional condemnation is not admitted: 1° in penalties of degradation, deposition, deprivation of office or benefice; 2° if the necessity of repairing scandal presses (cited canon).

III. Cessation. A vindicative penalty is ended:

1. By its expiation (canon 2289), and this mode corresponds to its nature.

2. By dispensation (cited canon); for this there is required a cause proportionate to the gravity of the penal law, because dispensation in a vindicative penalty is against the intention of the law; it is certainly also required that the guilty person be amended and that he have repaired damages and scandal according to his powers. Nor, when the dispensation sought has been denied, can the guilty person appeal, but only for a grave cause have extrajudicial recourse to the Superior.

Dispensation can be granted by: 1° him who issued the penal law or penalty; 2° his competent Superior or successor; 3° the person to whom the power of dispensing from the penalty or from the penal law has been committed (canons 2236; 2237; 2290). Moreover, this power has been committed as follows:

a) The Ordinary, by force of canon 2237, can by ordinary power: 1° in public cases remit vindicative penalties latae sententiae established by common law, except cases brought to the contentious forum, and penalties of incapacity for benefices, offices, dignities, functions in the Church, active and passive voice, or deprivation of these, perpetual suspension, infamy of law, deprivation of the right of patronage and of a privilege or grace granted by the Apostolic See; 2° in occult cases remit vindicative penalties latae sententiae established by common law and reserved in any manner whatever.

b) Any confessor can in the sacramental forum, in more urgent occult cases, namely, if from observance of a vindicative penalty latae sententiae the guilty person would betray himself with infamy and scandal: 1° suspend the obligation of observing the penalty, with the burden imposed of having recourse at least within a month by letter and through the confessor, if this can be done without grave inconvenience, the name withheld, to the Sacred Penitentiary or to the Bishop endowed with the faculty, and of standing by his commands; 2° dispense, if in some extraordinary case the aforesaid recourse is impossible, nevertheless imposing those things which by law must be imposed and imposing congruous penance and satisfaction for the penalty, so that the penitent, unless within a congruous time to be fixed beforehand by the confessor he has done penance and given satisfaction, falls back into the penalty (canon 2290, § 2, compared with canon 2254, § 3); that is, reincidence, although by its own nature it regards censures, nevertheless of itself does not prevent a Prelate from dispensing from a penalty under the condition that the dispensed person, if he does not perform something, is again bound by the bond of the same penalty.¹

¹ Lega, op. cit., n. 135.

From canon 2298, the vindicative penalties which are applied to clerics alone are:

I. Prohibition of exercising the sacred ministry except in a certain church.

II. Suspension in perpetuity, or for a predefined time, or at the good pleasure of the Superior.

III. Penal transfer from an office or benefice obtained to a lower one; concerning this note: if a cleric obtains an irremovable benefice, he can be deprived of it as a penalty only in cases expressed by law; if it is removable, also for other reasonable causes (canon 2299, § 1).

IV. Deprivation of some right joined with a benefice or office; concerning this canon 2299, § 2, establishes: clerics obtaining benefices, offices, and dignities can also be prohibited for a certain time only from some ministry joined with them, for example the ministry of preaching, hearing confessions, etc.

V. Incapacity for all or for some dignities, offices, benefices, or other functions proper to clerics (cf. canon 2296).

VI. Penal deprivation of a benefice or office with or without pension; concerning this observe canon 2299, § 1, cited under III.

Note. Regarding numbers III, IV, and VI, note canon 2299, § 3: A cleric cannot be deprived of a benefice or pension by title of which he was ordained, unless provision is made from elsewhere for his honorable sustenance, saving the prescription of canons 2303, 2304.

VII. Prohibition of dwelling in a certain place or territory. The Ordinary can command as a penalty that a subject cleric remain outside a certain place or territory and dwell in a certain place or territory of his diocese; but he cannot prescribe that a cleric dwell in a certain place outside the boundaries of his diocese, unless the consent of the Ordinary of that place is added, or there is question of a house of penance or correction destined not only for diocesan clerics but also for outsiders, or of an exempt religious house, with the consent of its Superior (canon 2301). Nevertheless, both prescription and prohibition of dwelling in a certain place and placement in a house of penance or in a religious house, especially if they are going to endure for a long time, are to be imposed only in grave cases in which, in the prudent judgment of the Ordinary, these penalties are necessary for the amendment of the cleric or the repair of scandal (canon 2302).

VIII. Prescription of dwelling in a certain place or territory. See the things said under VII.

IX. Deprivation for a time of ecclesiastical habit. If a cleric gives grave scandals and, having been warned with threat of penalty, does not come to his senses, nor can the scandal be removed otherwise, he can meanwhile be deprived of the right of wearing ecclesiastical habit; this deprivation, while it endures, carries with it the prohibition of exercising any ecclesiastical ministries and deprivation of clerical privileges (canon 2300).

X. Deposition; concerning this we note:

1. Deposition, the obligations arising from the order received and clerical privileges remaining firm, carries with it both suspension from office and incapacity for any offices, dignities, benefices, pensions, functions in the Church, and also deprivation of those things which the guilty person has,¹ although he was ordained by title of them (canon 2303, § 1). But in this last case, if the cleric truly needs it, the Ordinary, according to his charity, should take care to provide for him in the better way possible, lest he be forced to beg with dishonor to the clerical state (canon 2303, § 2).

2. The penalty of deposition cannot be inflicted except in cases expressed by law (canon 2303, § 3); moreover, it must be inflicted before a tribunal of five judges (canon 1576, § 1, 2°).

The penalty of deposition is always ferendae sententiae; therefore a deposed person is subjected to the effects of suspension after sentence as regards the validity of acts of office.

XI. Perpetual deprivation of ecclesiastical habit is a special penalty of a deposed cleric; for if a deposed cleric does not give signs of amendment, and especially if he continues to give scandal and, having been warned, does not come to his senses, the Ordinary can perpetually deprive him of the right of wearing ecclesiastical habit (canon 2304, § 1); but only before a tribunal of five judges (canon 1576, § 1, 2°). This deprivation (canon 2304, § 2) carries with it deprivation of clerical privileges and cessation of the prescription by which the Ordinary according to his charity should take care to provide for him, if the cleric truly needs it. Nevertheless he is bound by the obligation of observing celibacy and the canonical hours.

XII. Degradation; concerning this the Code establishes:

1. Degradation contains in itself deposition, perpetual deprivation of ecclesiastical habit, and reduction of the cleric to the lay state (canon 2305, § 1). A degraded cleric in major orders is not bound to recite the canonical hours, but he is bound to observe celibacy (canons 135; 213, § 2); every degraded cleric besides is prohibited from wearing the tonsure (canon 213, § 1).

2. This penalty can be issued only because of a delict expressed in law, or if a cleric, already deposed and deprived of clerical habit, still continues to give grave scandal for a year (canon 2305, § 2). But there is not an obligation of proceeding in this way immediately after a year.² Besides, it must be inflicted in the same way as deposition and perpetual deprivation of ecclesiastical habit.

3. Degradation is either verbal or edictal, which is imposed by sentence alone, yet in such a way that it immediately has all its juridic effects without any execution; or real, if the solemnities prescribed in the Roman Pontifical are observed (canon 2305, § 3). But this real degradation adds no juridic effect to the penalty already inflicted.

4. Dispensation from the penalty of degradation inflicted on a cleric in major orders is reserved to the Holy See (canon 212, § 2); as regards dispensation from the penalty of deposition, the same is not established.

¹ Wherever, for it is a penalty of common law (cited canon, § 3).

² Against clerics in minor orders the Ordinary can proceed in an easier way, namely by decree; cf. canon 211, § 2, where the penalty of degradation is not even mentioned (cf. § 1). A cleric in minor orders dismissed in this way can be admitted again by the Ordinary according to canon 212, § 1, otherwise than a cleric in major orders (canon 212, § 2).

The objects, therefore, which formally or reductively pertain to the virtue of faith, are as follows:

(a) Divine faith has for its object all the truths revealed by God as contained in the Canonical scriptures approved by the Church, and in the teachings received by the Apostles from Christ or the Holy Spirit and handed down to the Church as Tradition. Private revelations in exceptional cases may also be the object of divine faith.

(b) Catholic faith has for its object all the truths formally revealed in scripture and Tradition that have been defined as such by the Church. The definitions of the Church are either solemn (e.g., those given in the Creeds, ex cathedra definitions of the Popes, decisions of Ecumenical Councils) or ordinary (e.g., those contained in the universal preaching, practice or belief of the Church, encyclical letters [see Humani Generis, n.20]). Equivalent to definitions are the condemnations of error opposed to revealed truths.

(c) According to some theologians ecclesiastical faith has for its object all infallible decisions of the Church about matters not revealed, but connected with revelation, or necessary for the exercise of the teaching office of the Church. Such are: (i) definitions, that is, definitive declarations of theological conclusions or of dogmatic facts, disciplinary laws made for the entire Church, canonization of the saints, solemn approbation of religious Orders, express or special recognition of Doctors of the Church, declaration of the relation of private revelations to the public revelation; and (ii) censures, that is, condemnations of teachings, on account of falsity, as heretical, near to heresy, savoring of heresy, erroneous, rash, etc.; on account of their expression, as equivocal, ambiguous, presumptuous, captious, suspected, ill-sounding, offensive to pious ears, etc.; on account of their tendency, as scandalous, schismatical, seditious, unsafe, etc. Examples: The definitions concerning the sense of the book Augustinus, the suitability of the terms “consubstantial” and “transubstantiation,” the agreement of the Vulgate with the original scriptures, the lawfulness of the insertion of the Filioque.

(d) Religious assent has for its object all doctrinal pronouncements of the Church that are not infallible, but are yet official and authoritative. Examples are ordinary instructions and condemnations given by Pontifical Congregations and Commissions. The Syllabus of Modern Errors issued by Pius IX was most likely not an infallible or definitive document, although many of the errors it rejects are contrary to dogma, and hence, even apart from the Syllabus, they are to be rejected as opposed to Catholic faith. Likewise, many of its tenets are drawn from encyclical letters. Papal allocutions, radio addresses, and the doctrinal parts of Apostolic Constitutions, in themselves, are in this class.

(e) Respect is due to the judgment of the Church even in non-doctrinal matters and where no obligation is imposed by her, on account of her position and the careful examination given before decision. Example: It would be disrespectful to reject without good reason a pious belief which the Church after mature deliberation has permitted to be held.

The Code (Canon 684) mentions the following kinds of societies as banned for Catholics:

(a) secret societies, that is, those which demand of members that certain things which the society considers secrets be told absolutely to no one outside the society, or certain degrees of the society, not even to those who may legitimately inquire about them, such as the bishop or civil superior in the external forum, parents with regard to their children not emancipated, pastors and confessors in the internal forum. Those societies are also secret which demand blind and absolute obedience to unknown leaders;

(b) condemned societies, that is, such as have been censured by the Church, or simply forbidden. Canon 2335 decrees ipso facto excommunication reserved to the Holy See against all those who join Masonic or similar associations which plot against the Church or lawful civil authority. Among the societies forbidden without censure are: various Biblical societies, societies for the promotion of cremation, the Knights of Pythias, the Odd Fellows, the Sons of Temperance, the Independent Order of Good Templars, Theosophical societies, the Y.M.C.A. Female societies affiliated with these are also condemned, since they are branches of the main society—for example, the Rebeccas, the Eastern Star, the Pythian Sisters.

Worthy of detailed consideration is the condemnation of the Communist Party and the penalties attached to membership in, or defense, or propagation of the Party. The following questions were asked of the Holy Office:

1. Whether it is licit to join the Communist Party or to favor it.

Reply: In the negative; for Communism is materialistic and anti-Christian; and the leaders of the Communists, although they sometimes verbally profess that they are not attacking religion, in fact, nevertheless, by doctrine and action show themselves to be enemies of God and of the true religion and the Church of Christ.

2. Whether it is licit to publish, propagate, or read books, periodicals, daily papers, or sheets which promote the doctrine or action of Communists, or to write in them.

Reply: In the negative: for they are forbidden ipso iure (see Canon 1399).

3. Whether the faithful who knowingly and freely do the acts mentioned in 1 and 2 can be admitted to the sacraments.

Reply: In the negative, according to the ordinary principles governing the refusal of the sacraments to those who are not properly disposed.

4. Whether the faithful who profess the materialistic and anti-Christian doctrine of Communists, and especially those who defend or propagate it, incur ipso facto as apostates from the Catholic faith the excommunication specially reserved to the Holy See.

Reply: In the affirmative (Decree of the Holy Office, July 1, 1949).

The sanction of excommunication specially reserved to the Holy See was imposed also upon those who teach boys and girls in associations set up by the Communists to imbue youth with principles and training which are materialistic and contrary to Christian morality and faith. The associations themselves are subject to the sanctions of the decree of July 1, 1949. Moreover parents or guardians who send their children to such associations, and the children themselves, as long as they have part in these associations, cannot be admitted to the reception of the sacraments (Monitum of the Holy Office, July 28, 1950).

(c) seditious societies, that is, those organizations, even though not secret, which aim at the overthrow of family and property rights;

(d) suspect societies, that is, those whose principles or methods have the appearance of being unsound. On January 11, 1951 the Holy Office in response to the question: “Whether Catholics may join the ‘Rotary Club’?” issued the following decree: “It is not licit for clerics to join the Association ‘Rotary Club’ or to be present at its meetings; the laypeople are to be urged to preserve the prescript of Canon 684.” The decree seems to have taken many English-speaking people by surprise, one paper describing it as “a bewildering document.” The surprise flowed from personal experience of Rotary Clubs as social clubs dedicated to bonhomie and community improvement. Nevertheless, the decree was in accord with the general trend of Church policy in regard to undenominational societies. They are not approved; they are not condemned as Masonry has been condemned. What is their position? The response that layfolk are to be exhorted to observe Canon 684 is indicative of the attitude of the Church in regard to such societies. The canon instructs them to “beware of secret, condemned, seditious and suspect societies.” Since Rotary Clubs are seldom considered to be secret and never as condemned nor as seditious, the implication is that they are suspect. Such was the interpretation of the decree given in the Osservatore Romano of Jan. 27, 1951.

In regard to clerics, the effect of the decree was to make illicit what was formerly simply inexpedient; for the Sacred Consistory had replied on February 4th, 1929, that it was not expedient for Ordinaries to permit clerics to join Rotary Clubs, or to take part in their meetings. Moreover, as the Osservatore article indicates, the prohibition is limited to meetings of members only and does not extend to meetings at which non-members may be present, provided the purpose of such meetings befits priestly activity.

The exhortation to layfolk in regard to “Rotary” simply reaffirms the Church’s general attitude to all secular associations. As early as November 5, 1920 the Holy Office, referring specifically to Y.M.C.A., warned the Ordinaries that the note of “suspicion” attaches to all secular societies. Their efforts to promote good works and good moral standards independent of religious authority tend to foster the spirit of religious indifferentism and moral naturalism. Both the Spanish hierarchy (1929) and the Dutch hierarchy (1930) have so judged Rotary. However, the degree of suspicion to be attached to each Rotary Club is a question of fact to be determined in specific instances by the proper local Ordinary. Where evidence of suspicion is available, exhortatious not to join the clubs must be made; in the lack of such evidence, the ordinaries may maintain discreet silence.

(e) societies that aim to elude the lawful vigilance of religious authority.

Meaning of the Expression “Infamous in a Certain Place.”—(a) The place referred to is either a closed community (e.g., a monastery, a college, a family) or an open community (e.g., a village, a neighborhood, a parish, a town, a city); (b) the notoriety referred to is either universal (i.e. known to all the community), or general (i.e., known to the greater part of the community), or sufficient (i.e., known to so many and such talkative persons that the whole community will shortly be made to share in it). A crime known only to one or two, or to a small circle of Christian-living persons, is not notorious.

Penalties for Immorality Decreed in Canons 2357-2359.—(a) Laymen who are guilty of certain offenses against the sixth commandment become infamous on conviction and are excluded from legitimate ecclesiastical acts. In case of adultery, the injured spouse may obtain a separation, temporary or perpetual, from the offending spouse (Canon 1129). (b) Clerics in minor orders are subject to special punishments, and may even be dismissed from the clerical state. (c) Clerics in major orders are subject to penalties named in law (e.g., suspension, infamy, deposition) for graver crimes such as concubinage, adultery, and to penalties decreed by the lawful superior for other delinquencies.

Two Other Important General Laws of the Church.—(a) The prohibition of wicked and dangerous writings (Canons 1384 sqq.) is based on the natural law, which requires one to avoid what is proximately dangerous to faith or morals. This subject is treated above in 1456, 849 sqq., 1529.

(b) The prohibition of the cremation of corpses (Canon 1203) is not based on natural law or on any dogma, as though the burning of dead bodies were intrinsically evil or repugnant to our faith in immortality and resurrection. On the contrary, in exceptional cases (e.g., in time of war or epidemic) cremation is permitted, if a real public necessity requires it. The reasons for the anti-cremation law are: the tradition of the Old and New Testaments (Gen., iii, 19; I Cor., xv. 42), and especially the example of Christ whose body was consigned to the tomb; the association of burial throughout the history of the Church with sacred rites and the doctrine of the future life, and the contrary association of cremation both in times past and today with paganism and despair; the sacred dignity of the human body (Gen., i. 25; I Cor., iii. 16, vi. 5), and the feeling of affection for parents, relatives, friends, which is outraged when their bodies are consigned to the furnace. The practical arguments offered for cremation are chiefly hygienic and economic; but it is certain that proper burial at sea or in the grave is no menace to public health, and is not more expensive or difficult than cremation. A most serious objection to cremation is that it makes exhumation impossible, and is therefore a means of concealing murder by poison. It is not lawful for a Catholic to cooperate (except materially in case of necessity) with cremation, or to belong to any society that promotes the incineration of corpses; it is not lawful for a priest to give the last Sacraments or funeral rites to those who ordered the cremation of their bodies.

Audifax, a regular missionary, after he had spoken many things against the Apostolic Delegate, was suspended by him from order and from office. Audifax, sent by his Superior to another mission, is absolved from the suspension laid upon him by the Apostolic Delegate of this mission.

It is asked: What to the Case?

R. Since Audifax was suspended through a censure laid down ab homine, he surely could not be absolved from this censure by the Apostolic Delegate of another mission, although the latter was strong with the same authority as the other Apostolic Delegate. Although Audifax changed domicile and no longer depends on the former Apostolic Delegate, nevertheless, as regards absolution from the censure laid upon him, he is still dependent on him. "As regards censures," says St. Alphonsus, l. 7, n. 72, "laid down ab homine, if the censure is borne by way of a particular sentence against a determinate person, that person cannot be absolved except by the one bearing it, or by his superior, or by his successor or delegate. It is certain and common." And Suarez, d. 7, s. 2, n. 26: "One must distinguish," he says, "concerning one excommunicated by his bishop either through a general sentence or through a special one. For, if it is in the former mode, he can be absolved by another bishop to whose diocese he has transferred his domicile... But if he has been excommunicated through a particular sentence, he cannot be absolved by another judge, even if he has transferred domicile elsewhere, because the case was already begun before another judge, who consequently acquired as it were a permanent jurisdiction in such a case, and in those things which pertain to it, among which are the censure and absolution from it. But jurisdiction thus confirmed is not taken away because of transfer of domicile, as is clear from C. Proposuisti de Foro comp." And Schmalzgr., l. 5, t. 39, n. 85, 87, 93: "It is doubted who can absolve from censures specially laid down ab homine? Resp. From these only he who laid it down can absolve, and his successor, superior, or delegate, and no one else... even if the guilty party changes domicile. For he is still to be absolved by him who bore the sentence, arg. C. Proposuisti 19, de Foro comp.... The reason is that by change of domicile he cannot elude the jurisdiction of the author of the censure... And no one else; for besides those thus far enumerated, the power of absolving from a censure specially laid down belongs to no other. The reason is manifest; for to no other is found granted the dissolution of this bond; and rightly, lest the jurisdiction of judges be disturbed, or their authority be contemned. Exception is made if the guilty party is prepared to offer satisfaction, but on account of infirmity or some other impediment cannot approach the author of the censure in order to be absolved; for then he can be absolved by an equal or inferior judge, an oath having been offered that as soon as he can he will present himself to him to whom by law the absolution belongs, according to C. Ea noscitur 13, Quod de his 26, Quamvis 58, de Sent. exc. The reason is that, since a censure is a medicinal penalty, depriving one of many spiritual advantages, it was expedient that, correction being placed, it be removed."

Moreover, the doctrine and prescription of C. Proposuisti 19, de Foro comp., is very clear, and is of the following tenor: "You have proposed to us that a certain subject of yours, legitimately cited by you to a case at the petition of a certain adversary of his, because afterward he began to be of another jurisdiction, intends to decline your judgment. Now we do not believe it to be doubtful to your prudence that he, in the aforesaid case, does not have the right of recalling the forum, as one already anticipated by that forum."

Therefore Audifax cannot be absolved except either by that Apostolic Delegate by whom the censure was laid upon him, or by the Supreme Pontiff, who is the Superior of the author of the censure. Namely, if Audifax offers to the Apostolic Delegate whom he offended by his manner of speaking a fitting satisfaction, the latter is bound to absolve him. But if without reasonable cause he denies absolution to him, then he will be able to have recourse to the S. Congregation de Prop. Fid., and he will certainly obtain absolution from it if he himself is truly penitent.

1. "When a wife has predeceased within the limits of a certain parish, no burial having been chosen, and the husband declaring that she is to be buried in the ancestral sepulcher of the husband himself, which is in the Church of another parish, supplication was made that it be defined: whether the husband could licitly do this for the predeceased wife?

R. That if the husband has his own burial place, the wife also is to be entombed in it; but if not, in the parish church within whose limits she died." S. R. C., Jan. 15, 1633, n. 601; I. M. 1150.

2. "The chaplain of a confraternity contended against the parish priest of the place that to himself, and not to the parish priest, belonged the right of performing the funeral office over corpses which, unless public cemeteries existed, would have to be buried in the public church of that confraternity.

R. The aforesaid right belongs to the parish priest when the one to be entombed is subject to the parish priest and to the parish within whose boundaries the aforesaid church of the confraternity is." S. R. C., Dec. 10, 1703, ad 20, n. 2123; Nov. 20, 1885, ad 4, n. 3645.

3. Primatius, advocate and parish priest, for the funeral rites of the Marquis de Fugatiis, his parishioner, yet to be entombed in another parish according to the latter's testament, contended against the rest of the clergy present, against the other parish priest of the entombing church, and against the chapter also of the cathedral church, invited with the others, that all ought to proceed under the cross of his parish, that he alone, vested with stole, ought to lead the funeral, and that he should fulfill all the functions of the obsequies. For it is a question, he says, of his own parishioner. - Is this rightly said?

R. Negatively. For 1.º "The corpses of the dead are to be accompanied with one cross only, which ought to be that of the church to which the body of the deceased is borne, provided that the chapter of the cathedral church does not intervene, under which all who accompany the funeral ought to proceed.

2.º The right and burden always belongs, even when the chapter of the cathedral church is present, yet outside this cathedral church, to the parish priest, of putting on the stole and performing all offices over the corpse of the deceased belonging to his church, until from the place of death it has entered the entombing church.

3.º The same parish priest has precedence over all the clergy, except if the chapter of the cathedral church has been present, which in the accompaniment will proceed after the parish priest himself. In this Case the more worthy member of the cathedral chapter proceeds with stole and cope, which the parish priest does not wear.

4.º If the deceased is to be entombed in another parish church, to the rector of that one church alone, likewise vested with stole, belongs the right and burden of performing the remaining offices there over the corpse, and of preceding all others, not even the parish priest of the deceased excepted, who, when the corpse has been brought to the threshold of the church, should withdraw." S. R. C., Apr. 23, 1895, n. 3854, Decr. sup. exequiis.

1. Frigerius, for the sake of curiosity, frequents the temples of heretics and assists at their assemblies and offices, together with other Protestants. He himself, however, is internally altogether Catholic.

It is asked: Whether Frigerius incurs excommunication?

R. First, Frigerius does not act rightly and sins. For although to go to the temples of Protestants, for the mere sake of curiosity, without any communication in sacred things, is an act indifferent in itself, and Frigerius does not internally adhere to heresy, nevertheless frequently to go to the temples of Protestants is not without scandal, nor is it without some favor toward heresy and heretics. Besides, since, by frequently going even to the temples of heretics, he is present at their assemblies and offices, there can practically be no doubt that communication in sacred things is had, nor without scandal, since Frigerius is a Catholic and is certainly regarded as such, and wishes to be regarded as such, by the very fact that internally he does not adhere to the errors of heresy. Hence certainly he cannot be excused from excommunication because of favor. This is openly confirmed from the Instruction of the Eminent Cardinal Vicar for parish priests and confessors of Rome. Cf. Enchir. Moral. 365, 367, and Commentar. in Const. Apostolicae Sedis, ed. 5, n. 9 seqq.

2. Petrus possesses an old and spacious house in Rome in the square called Navona. The Methodist Protestants would like to buy it, so that there they may open a public school and boarding house for boys and girls. Moreover that sale would be altogether useful to Petrus; nevertheless he does not wish at all to complete it before he is certain of its liceity.

It is asked: 1.º What is cooperation in sin, and is it licit? - 2.º Whether Petrus licitly sells the house in the Case? - 3.º Insofar as the response to the second is negative, whether he also incurs excommunication?

R. To the 1st. Cooperation in sin is to concur by some work in the sin of another. As it is illicit to sin, so also it is illicit to cooperate by direct will in sin; and then the cooperation is called formal. But if the cooperation is not toward the sin, but toward some other work which is ordered by the sinner to the sin, the cooperation is material, and consequently in itself is not illicit. But from the circumstances its liceity or illiceity in the concrete is to be defined.

To the 2nd. Negatively. For there is a sufficiently proximate cooperation, the circumstances considered, toward public harm, through the instruction of boys and girls in Protestantism, especially since the place is very favorable for a school and boarding house of this sort for attracting several families and for gathering boys and girls in no small number. Besides, public scandal is present, namely if it becomes known that a Roman and a Catholic sold a house in Rome to Protestants in the most principal square of the City, so that there a school and boarding house of Protestants might be established.

To the 3rd. Affirmatively. For there seems no doubt that such a deed, by itself, would greatly favor heresy and its propagation in the City.

3. Cornelius, a Catholic, receives several heretical newspapers to which he is subscribed, and reads them only occasionally.

It is asked: Whether Cornelius incurs excommunication?

R. There is no doubt, speaking in itself, that it is a grave sin to read newspapers of this sort by natural law itself, on account of the grave danger of falling away from the faith. Moreover, the reading of them is positively prohibited by the General Decree of the Constitution Officiorum of Leo XIII, VIII Kal. Febr. 1896, Cap. VIII, n. 21. But as regards excommunication, the following Decision is had of the Holy Office, Apr. 21, 1880: "Whether those knowingly reading newspapers which champion heresy incur the excommunication of the second article of the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, reserved in a special mode to the Supreme Pontiff? R. Negatively." But although Cornelius, because of the reading and because of the retention of these newspapers, does not incur the aforesaid excommunication, he does indeed incur it because of favor, by reason of the subscription.

1. Antoninus, a bishop, hearing that heretical books are being spread in his diocese, without delay orders them to be brought to himself, so that he may read them, examine them, and, insofar as there is need, proscribe them. Can Antoninus read the aforesaid books of heretics in the Case?

R. Affirmatively. For bishops, according to necessity or time, can well read the books of heretics, C. 1, Dist. 37. And the contrary opinion of certain persons was seen in the Holy Office as too rigorous, Albitius, de Inconst. in fide, c. 30, n. 204. Namely, bishops are the born judges of the faith, and to their office it belongs to defend the faith, and therefore to ward off from the sheep committed to them the harmful pastures of faith. Whence it is of their office to prohibit the reading of depraved books, and also, if it is necessary, to denounce them to the Holy See. Leo XIII, C. Officiorum; I. M. 1301. Now how could they ever execute such an office unless they read the aforesaid books? Commentar. in C. Apostolicae Sedis n. 13, ed. 5; D'Annib., Comment. in C. Apost. Sed., ed. 4, n. 41.

2. Alphonsus, owner of a typographical workshop, and Alfredus, corrector in the same workshop, in which books of heretics have until now been printed, doubt whether they have incurred excommunication, and their confessor himself also doubts.

It is asked: Whether Alphonsus and Alfredus have incurred, in the Case, excommunication reserved in a special mode to the Supreme Pontiff, art. 2 of the first series of C. Apost. Sed.?

R. Affirmatively. For first as regards Alphonsus, he cannot indeed be counted among readers, nor among defenders, nor even among printers from the fact that he is owner of the workshop, himself provides the expenses, and by his will and mandate the books are printed. Nevertheless he must be counted among retainers, since he very truly retains them in his own workshop. But Alfredus, because he is corrector, is reckoned among readers. Wherefore both incur the aforesaid excommunication. Comment. in C. Apost. Sed. n. 13.

3. Seius, having lapsed into heresy, wrote several heretical books, which he himself was continually reading and correcting in order to prepare new editions. He was converted to the faith, and his uncertain confessor asks whether, besides the excommunication because of heresy, he also incurred excommunication because of the reading of heretical books.

R. The more common opinion affirms. And by the rigor of law and of the law it must be affirmed, because Seius in reality was retaining and reading books of a heretic championing heresy. Yet D'Annib., Comm. in Const. Apost. Sed., n. 41, note 44, says: "I fear lest this be true; for who, in the proper and common meaning, would say that a heretic reading his own books reads books of heretics?"

4. Guido, an editor of books, gratuitously furnishes the expenses of the edition of a heretical book of Vincentius, his friend. Does he incur excommunication reserved in a special mode to the Supreme Pontiff, art. 2, first series, C. Apost. Sed.?

R. Negatively, as is clear from the preceding case; because he does not read, does not print, does not retain. Nevertheless he incurs excommunication art. 1, as a favorer of heretics. Comm. in C. Apost. Sed. n. 9 seqq.

Lambertus, a priest, owed Iovinus, a priest, 1000 lire, and always deferred their payment. Iovinus cited Lambertus before the bishop, but profited nothing. For Lambertus confessed the debt, promised payment, but did not stand by his promises. Hence Iovinus cites Lambertus before the lay judge. Two priests, associates, are called as witnesses. And thus Iovinus finally obtained payment of the debt. But Lambertus was saying everywhere that Iovinus and the other two priests were excommunicated.

It is asked: What to the Case?

R. A priest can be cited, whether as defendant or as witness, both in a civil cause and in a criminal cause, before a lay judge, yet with permission first obtained from the bishop, who must permit that he be examined in the secular forum, on account of the good of public and private justice. S. C. EE. et RR., Apr. 14, 1616; July 19, 1619. Wherefore Iovinus, since he already cited Lambertus in vain before the ecclesiastical judge, is not to be disturbed if he now cites him before the lay judge, permission first having been obtained from the bishop. Likewise those two priests, witnesses in the lay judgment, are not to be disturbed if they have first obtained the bishop's permission. Moreover, although Iovinus omitted to seek permission from the bishop, he would not therefore have incurred excommunication; and the same is to be said concerning the two priests who were witnesses. Nor indeed does that excommunication fall upon the judge himself, who pronounced sentence against Lambertus. That indeed is clear from the tenor of art. VII of the first series of excommunications in C. Apostolicae Sedis, and from various Declarations of the Holy Office. Cf. Commentar. in cit. Const., ed. 5, n. 20 seq.; I. M. 1170.

1. Fabia approaches Caius, with whom she recently sinned, for the sake of making sacramental confession before him. Caius does not dare to repel her from the Sacred Tribunal, nor does he dare to absolve. "I cannot," he says, "absolve you from this sin; I do not have jurisdiction; it is necessary that you go to another." Nevertheless, greatly disturbed, he absolves her from the other sins. Caius, sincerely penitent, manifests this to his confessor, who, anxious, doubts whether Caius has incurred excommunication; and suspending resolution, before he absolves Caius or does anything else, he determines to seek counsel concerning this matter from a pious and learned friend.

It is asked: What to the Case?

R. Here first one must note what Cardinal De Lugo has, de Poenit., d. 20, n. 77. Concerning sacramental absolution it must be said that "it cannot be divided or halved, just as neither can confession itself without necessity and urgent cause, since the integrity of confession is of divine law. Whence Suarez adds that even if the superior wished, after the whole confession had been heard, to absolve directly from only the reserved sins, he could not validly do this; but either he must absolve from all sins heard, or from none, because Christ did not give such a power. Yet this does not lack difficulty, nor will it easily be proved that a priest cannot validly, although not licitly, will to absolve from these and not apply the absolution directly to the others, but to hold himself as if he had not heard them." But whatever may be of this, there is no doubt that in the Case Caius could not absolve from the sins of complicity, since in that whole matter he lacked jurisdiction. As regards the other sins, Caius did not lack jurisdiction, but it does not seem that, in the Case, Fabia was truly absolved from the other sins. For since Caius told her that he did not have jurisdiction for absolving her, Fabia in fact received absolution in bad faith, and therefore sacrilegiously. But as regards excommunication, there is no doubt that Caius incurred it in the Case. For first, although he was greatly disturbed, nevertheless since he absolved, and absolved from other sins, therefore he well adverted to what he was doing, and so well that by acting thus he surely wished to avoid excommunication. But he did not avoid excommunication, for he truly absolved an accomplice. And if that man incurs excommunication who even feigns and simulates absolving, how much more he who simply absolves an accomplice.

Censures are to be considered both in general and in particular.

993. Definition. - Suspension is a censure by which a Cleric is deprived for a time, in part or in whole, of the use of the power which he has by reason of Order, office, or benefice.

Suspension is a censure because of itself it is imposed medicinally by way of admonition, so that the delinquent may cease from contumacy. Thus: 1. it differs from deposition and degradation, which are mere and perpetual penalties for the vindication of a crime; 2. it differs from irregularity, which is not of itself a penalty, but a mere impediment or inability preventing not only the exercise of ecclesiastical power but also its reception.

Nevertheless, suspension is not necessarily and essentially a censure; for sometimes it is imposed either for a definite time or perpetually to punish fault which is merely past, and therefore it is then not medicinal. This is established from the practice of the Church, from book 2 of the Decretals, title 20, chapter 33.

Division. A twofold suspension is distinguished:

1. Total, by which a Cleric is barred from every ecclesiastical function or right.

2. Partial, by which he is deprived only of some function or right.

But partial suspension is threefold: 1. from Order, which deprives one of the exercise of the functions of Order, for example, the celebration of Mass, the solemn chanting of the Gospel or Epistle, etc.; 2. from office, which deprives one of the use both of Order and of jurisdiction, whether in the external forum or even in the internal forum; 3. from benefice, which deprives one of the revenues and administration of the benefice. But each of these can again be subdivided into total or partial suspension, whether from Order, office, or benefice. See St. Alphonsus, no. 315 and following.

994. General Rules. - I. Rule. A suspended Cleric sins gravely if he solemnly exercises a forbidden act of sacred Order, unless he is excused by invincible ignorance or another legitimate cause, for example, necessity. The reason is that in a grave matter he resists the Church. Nevertheless, he can do all those things which are customarily done by laics, for example, sing in choir in the manner of laics, etc. But one suspended from Order, if he exercises it, not only sins gravely but also incurs irregularity, as we shall say in its place.

II. Rule. Suspension absolutely and simply, without any determination to this or that, is always considered total and therefore deprives one of every use of Order, jurisdiction, and benefice. But partial suspension deprives one only of that part of this power which is expressed in the law, statute, mandate, or sentence.

III. Rule. Suspension from Order absolutely and simply deprives one of the exercise and use of every Order, whether major or minor. Suspension from jurisdiction imports deprivation of all jurisdiction.

IV. Rule. Suspension from office simply and without limitation deprives one of the use both of jurisdiction and of Order, or of every ecclesiastical ministry. Hence a Pastor suspended from Office can neither celebrate Mass, nor preach, nor preside over offices, nor administer the Sacraments.

995. Resolutions. - 1. One simply suspended from Order is not understood to be suspended from jurisdiction, and vice versa. One suspended from a higher Order is not thereby suspended from a lower one. Likewise, one suspended from a benefice is not considered suspended from office, nor vice versa.

2. Irregularity is not incurred by violation of a suspension imposed on account of an offense which is merely past, or imposed perpetually. St. Alphonsus, no. 314 and following. The reason is that such a suspension has the character of a mere penalty and not of a censure, as was said above, no. 941; therefore, there is not then a violation of censure. A fortiori, this is so if the suspension was imposed on account of an inculpable defect of mind or body. Nor is irregularity incurred through the exercise of any act from which someone was suspended, except the solemn exercise of sacred Order. Thus commonly.

3. A Bishop suspended from pontificals, if he celebrated Mass, even with pontificals, would not incur irregularity, because he would not exercise a substantial act of episcopal Order. St. Alphonsus, no. 314, etc.

4. Acts of Order of a suspended Cleric which do not depend upon jurisdiction are valid, because the Church cannot take away the power of Order, but can only prohibit its exercise. But acts of jurisdiction are invalid if the suspended person has been denounced by name, because he is deprived of actual jurisdiction; they are valid, however, unless he has been denounced, because the Church, by the very fact that it tolerates the suspended person, does not take away his jurisdiction, for the good of the faithful. St. Alphonsus, no. 314, etc.

996. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Can a suspended Priest be absolved from sins by a simple Confessor before he is released from the censure by the Superior?

Reply. Affirmatively. The reason is that the effect of suspension is not to deprive one of the reception of the Sacraments. It suffices, therefore, if he is disposed for the Sacrament of Penance, namely, if he is at least attrite concerning his sins and promises that as soon as possible, insofar as it lies in him, he will procure absolution from the censure, and that in the meantime he will not use the prohibited power or rights.

QUESTION 2. Can a partial suspension be imposed for only a venial fault?

Reply. Affirmatively, according to the common opinion, provided it is for a brief time ¹, and therefore imposed ab homine. The reason is that it does not then introduce a great burden, and therefore proportion between fault and penalty is not lacking. It is otherwise, however, if it were for a long time or imposed by law so that it is incurred without a previous admonition; for such a censure is not incurred except on account of mortal sin. St. Alphonsus, no. 320, etc.

¹ But the Author himself has already admonished several times that suspension for a definite time, whether long or brief, is not a censure properly so called. Concerning these things the Rieti Commentary speaks briefly and clearly thus (section 13): Suspension and interdict are sometimes imposed by way of punishment alone or of a certain deprivation. By way of punishment, when contumacy is not restrained, but they are imposed upon individuals for offenses altogether past, that is, which have no successive course, as they say; or are established perpetually, or until a certain day, or for as long as it shall seem good to the Ordinary. But by way of a certain deprivation, when they are imposed upon some College or University. Between censures and penalties or deprivations this especially differs: one who violates a censure by exercising Order incurs irregularity; but violation of a penalty or deprivation makes no one irregular unless something else is provided in law, as in chapter Cum aeterni 1, On Sentences and Matters Adjudged, in the Sext, where a judge is declared irregular if he damnably intrudes himself into divine things during the suspension otherwise imposed upon him for a year.

997. • QUESTION 3. How is suspension removed?

Reply 1. If the suspension has the character of a censure, it is removed like excommunication, namely, by absolution alone, and indeed that of the Superior if it is reserved. Nevertheless, if it was imposed for a definite determined time or under a condition, it ceases of itself when the time has elapsed or the established condition has been fulfilled.

Reply 2. But if it was imposed perpetually on account of fault altogether past, it is removed as a mere penalty by dispensation alone of the Prelate or his delegate, because it is not then a censure. Thus commonly.

QUESTION 4. What form must be employed for removing suspension?

Reply 1. If the suspension is occult, it is removed by absolution under the general form: I absolve you from every bond, etc.

Reply 2. If it is public, it is removed in the internal forum by the same form; but in the external forum the solemn form determined in the Ritual must be employed. But no one can solemnly absolve from suspension except the Superior himself or another specially delegated for this.

QUESTION 5. Can a Priest simply approved absolve a person suspended by censure at the point of death if the Superior or delegate is lacking?

Reply. Not a few deny this, being led by the reason that no cause appears why the Church should confer such power upon him; for suspension does not deprive one of the faculty of receiving the Sacraments, if you except promotion to a higher Order. It therefore suffices for eternal salvation that one suspended and constituted in such danger be absolved from sins. Others, however, probably judge that a Priest in this case can absolve the dying person. The reason is that the Council of Trent says generally and without distinction, from any censures; and thus, since it excepts no censure, it is not ours to distinguish where the law of the Council distinguishes nothing. See Diana, tome V, treatise 1, resolution 205.

998. • I. Those who, already marked with the episcopal character, having been nominated and presented or elected to vacant churches, see above, no. 973, dare to undertake their care, governance, and administration before the exhibition of the Apostolic Letters incur the penalty of suspension from the exercise of Pontificals ², reserved in a special manner to the Roman Pontiff. From the Constitution Romanus Pontifex of Pius IX, 28 August 1873.

² By the name of Pontificals is understood the authoritative use of Pontifical insignia, such as the miter, pastoral staff, and pallium. Therefore, one suspended from Pontificals is barred from acts of episcopal Order which are customarily performed with the aforesaid insignia. Therefore, without dispensation he cannot confer the sacrament of Confirmation or Orders, nor consecrate virgins, Churches, etc., because these are numbered among Pontificals. Nevertheless, he can celebrate Mass in the manner of other priests, hear confessions, baptize, and even impose censures, confer benefices, and exercise other acts of jurisdiction, for these do not pertain to Pontificals.

From the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis.

999. • II. Chapters and Convents of Churches and monasteries, and all others, who receive for the governance and administration of those Churches or monasteries Bishops or other Prelates provided in any manner by the same Holy See for the aforesaid Churches or Monasteries before they have exhibited the Apostolic Letters concerning their promotion, incur by the act itself a simply reserved suspension from the receipt of revenues from their Benefices at the good pleasure of the Holy See ³.

³ This suspension strikes moral persons or communities, see above, no. 950, question 7, such as chapters and monasteries, if they have received Bishops or Prelates provided by the Holy See for their respective Churches or Monasteries, but who have not yet exhibited the Apostolic Letters concerning their promotion, and accordingly have shown obedience and subjection to them as endowed with legitimate authority.

But since suspension can be imposed either upon a Chapter as a moral person, or upon the individual Clerics of that Chapter, or simultaneously upon the Chapter and the individuals, the question is whether Chapters and monasteries here incur suspension only from the benefices which they possess in common, as Suarez judged (On Censures, disputation 31, section 5, no. 23, and disputation 28, section 3, no. 5), or also from those which individuals obtain, as Bonacina thought (tome 3, disputation 3, question 4, point 10, no. 4)? The opinion of Suarez, says the Rieti Commentary, agrees better both with the words of our Constitution and with the rules of Canon Law; and in doubt, since we are dealing with penal matters, it is to be preferred.

Bonacina was moved (loc. cit.) by the fact that in the Extravagant Iniunctae, On Election, chapter 1, from which this censure is taken, it is said and any others, just as in our Constitution it is said and all others. But since all those others do not belong to the Chapter or monastery, let it be granted that they are punished with deprivation of those things which the individuals obtain, since they undergo no other deprivation; but if the members of the Chapter or monastery were punished thus in addition, they would now undergo a double penalty in comparison with those others.

But here take care to observe that both in the Constitution Iniunctae and in the text of our Constitution, under the name of benefices come also goods which pertain to monasteries. Hence that which we indicated above, in the Note to no. 972, XI, is confirmed: how, under the appellation of benefices, the usurpation of goods pertaining to monasteries falls under the censure of excommunication reserved in a special manner.

III. Those ordaining someone without the title of a Benefice or patrimony, with an agreement that the ordained person not seek support from them, incur by the law itself a suspension for three years from the conferral of Orders. From the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis ⁴.

⁴ This suspension is imposed generally upon a Bishop who promotes to sacred Orders a cleric not possessing suitable means of support through a Benefice, patrimony, etc. And since the Holy Synod of Trent decreed, session 21, chapter 2, On Reformation, that henceforth no secular cleric be promoted to sacred Orders unless it is first legitimately established that he peacefully possesses an ecclesiastical benefice or patrimony which suffices for his honorable support; and since the laws, chapter Cum secundum 16, On Prebends, require that whoever promotes to sacred Orders a cleric lacking a benefice or patrimony be bound to supply him with what is sufficient for honorable support; it is therefore established that a Bishop prevaricates who ordains one destitute of the title of a benefice or patrimony and at the same time, by entering into an agreement, exempts himself from the burden of providing him with those things necessary for support. And indeed, the penalty of suspension inflicted for agreements of this kind is seen inserted in the canonical laws concerning Simony, chapter Si quis 45, since these agreements savor of a certain simony. This canon, however, has a limitation in our Constitution; for in it a three-year suspension from the Order thus received was also inflicted upon the ordained person, but by force of the new law only those ordaining incur the suspension. See Avanzini, Commentary, no. 49, where he suitably resolves at length the doubts concerning this matter.

Moreover, when a cleric is or is not to be judged, in the present matter, destitute of every title, the Rieti Commentary embraces briefly and properly thus (section 145): The Pontiff says, without a title. But one is understood to be ordained without a title also if he is ordained with a false title,

(which, namely, does not exist, whether the estates, instruments, or names of those establishing it are fictitious), or with one from which no right of receiving fruits passes to the ordained person. Not so, if my opinion is of any worth, for we are dealing with penal matters, if a right of this kind does indeed pass but: 1. the title is not sufficient; or the title is sufficient but the right of receiving the fruits was established, 2. from a certain day, for example, from the day of ordination to the subdiaconate, or 3. perhaps only until a day, for example, for three years. For in the first case some title exists; in the second it exists in law; in the third it exists in fact and reality. Nor does one incur the suspension if he ordained him under a fictive title, which, namely, really exists but was established for appearance's sake, that is, perfunctorily and without the intention of establishing it, or a fiduciary title, which, namely, is established under the condition that it be afterward restored following ordination, or that the ordained person not receive the fruits, because it is valid, according to the Sacred Congregation of the Council, 14 May 1671, apud Benedict XIV, Notification 26, no. 18; or under a title subject to restitution in integrum or rescission, because meanwhile it is valid; or under an unjust title, which, namely, was made without the form of law being observed, because it is uncertain whether it is invalid, at least in the forum of conscience, as St. Alphonsus has it, book 3, nos. 711 and 927.

IV. Those ordaining the subject of another ⁵, even under the pretext of a Benefice immediately to be conferred or already conferred but by no means sufficient, without dimissorial letters from his Bishop ⁶; or even their own subject who has remained elsewhere for so long a time that he could have contracted a canonical impediment there, without testimonial letters from the Ordinary of that place ⁷. From the same Constitution Apostolicae Sedis ⁸.

⁵ By the subject of another we must understand one who is not a subject of the one ordaining, either by reason of origin, domicile, benefice, or service or familiarity, although he may by chance have been born in the latter's diocese; for the Bishop of origin is said to be the one in whose Diocese his father had a domicile when the one to be ordained came forth into the light, or his mother if he is illegitimate. See the Rieti Commentary, section 140.

But the one ordaining will avoid the suspension intended here if he has ordained a cleric after first conferring a benefice upon him; for from this he has now begun to be his subject, provided that the benefice exists in his Diocese, from the Constitution Speculatores, section 3, of Innocent XII; that it is sufficient; and that the one to be ordained is in peaceful possession of it.

I said, that it is sufficient, etc.; for Innocent XII had provided all these things in the cited Constitution, section 3: Although a cleric by reason of any Benefice obtained in another Diocese is said to be subject to the jurisdiction of that Bishop in whose Diocese the Benefice is situated, nevertheless We will that henceforth in this matter the following rule be observed unshaken: that no one be considered to acquire a subjection of this kind for the effect of receiving Orders unless the aforesaid Benefice is of such revenue that, after burdens have been deducted, it suffices of itself for a fitting support of life, whether according to the synodal rate or, if that is lacking, according to the custom of the region for those to be promoted to sacred Orders, and unless it is peacefully possessed by the one to be ordained; every faculty of supplying what is lacking from the fruits of the same Benefice by the addition of patrimony, even abundant, which the one to be ordained might possess in the same or any other Diocese, being removed.

⁶ Those are called dimissorial letters by which faculty is given to another Bishop to ordain one's own subject under the condition that he nevertheless remain a subject of his own Bishop. Moreover, these letters can be given not only by the proper Bishop of the one to be ordained, but also by the Vicar General if the Bishop dwells in remote places; and even by the Capitular Vicar while the See is vacant, and indeed even within the year to those constrained, that is, those for whom, by reason of a benefice either received or to be received, it is necessary that the conferral of some sacred Order or tonsure not be deferred.

⁷ Those are called testimonial or commendatory letters by which the Ordinary certifies that the cleric to be promoted is adorned with such morals that he is fit to receive Orders. Moreover, testimonials must always be sought from the Bishop of domicile; likewise from the Bishop of origin and from the Bishop of that place where someone was born by chance, Constitution Speculatores, sections 4 and 5; and in addition where someone has remained for some time, where, finally, he has remained so long at that age that he could have contracted a canonical impediment there. For after seven years he could have contracted censures and irregularities; but a stay longer than six months recommends that testimony of a state free from the bonds of matrimony be required.

⁸ Those things said in the preceding Notes concerning testimonial and dimissorial letters pertain also to those who have given their names to Pious Societies or Congregations in which simple vows are vowed. Therefore, these too cannot be promoted to tonsure or Orders without dimissorials or testimonials from that Bishop in whose Diocese they are staying, Sacred Congregation of Bishops, 6 May 1864. The law is otherwise with Regulars. For them their one Ordinary is the superior of the domicile, that is, of the monastery in which the one to be ordained dwells. Therefore, they are not bound to present dimissorials of the Ordinaries of their own origin, Sacred Congregation of the Council, 28 February 1754, but those of their Regular Superiors; these nevertheless can be given only to the diocesan Bishop, Benedict XIV, Constitution Impositi nobis. And although formerly it was not sufficiently agreed by whom dimissorials should be given to Novices, St. Alphonsus, book 6, no. 765, today it is provided that, during the three years after novitiate and before solemn profession, they can be given by Regular Superiors only with respect to tonsure and minor Orders, Sacred Congregation of Regulars, 12 January 1858. But if they have deserted Religion or have been dismissed from it, whether the former after (before?) simple vows or the latter before solemn vows have been emitted, they fall again under the jurisdiction of the Bishop to whom they were subject before they entered Religion, Sacred Congregation of Regulars, 20 January 1860; Sacred Congregation of Bishops, 6 March 1864.

In addition to these, according to the Council of Trent: 1. one who ordains either his own subject or another's in the Diocese of another without the express permission of its Ordinary, session 6, On Reformation, chapter 5; 2. titular Bishops, if they promote anyone to minor Orders or first tonsure, session 14, On Reformation, chapter 2; finally, 3. Capitular Vicars who, within the year, grant dimissorials to Orders to persons who are not constrained, incur suspension: the former indefinitely, the second for one year from the exercise of Pontificals, and the third likewise for one year from office and benefice.

V. One who, except in a case of legitimate privilege, has conferred sacred Order without the title of a Benefice or patrimony upon a Cleric living in some Congregation in which solemn profession is not emitted, or even upon a religious not yet professed, incurs by the law itself a suspension for one year from the conferral of Orders ⁹. From the same Constitution.

⁹ That which the Council of Trent established concerning the title necessary for sacred Orders for the secular clergy, St. Pius V likewise sanctioned for the Regular clergy, Constitution Romanus Pontifex, 15 October 1568. The inconvenience which he willed to forestall he thus explains (section 2): Since... certain Religious or canons or clerics of certain Orders, as We have received with displeasure, living in common in the manner of Regulars within the cloisters of monasteries or houses, who never or only for a definite time emit profession and can freely and licitly depart from the cloister or be dismissed and return to the world, under the pretext of Religion presume to be promoted to sacred Orders neither with the title of a sufficient Benefice nor according to the tenor of the Decree, and are everywhere promoted by certain Bishops, and thence for the most part this inconvenience occurs, that those thus promoted and departing from the cloister and wandering through the world are compelled either to beg or to exercise sordid gain, not without their own disgrace, contempt for the Order, and the scandal of very many

of Christ's faithful. But St. Pius supplies the remedy thus (section 3): The aforesaid decree (namely, that of Trent, session 21, chapter 2, On Reformation), speaking of secular Clerics, by the tenor of these presents We extend and enlarge to each and every Religious Cleric of whatever Order, or secular Cleric living in common after the manner of Religious, not professed; and We interdict and prohibit the aforesaid Religious and other non-professed persons from being promoted to sacred Orders, and likewise all... Bishops... from conferring those Orders upon Religious persons of this kind, unless the form of the said Decree is observed...; and We suspend by the law itself for one year from the conferral of such Orders those who act contrary thereto.

In our Constitution is added: except in a case of legitimate privilege; that this was granted, for example, to the Society of Jesus is evident from these words of the Constitution of Gregory XIII (Constitution Ex Sedis Apostolicae, 28 February 1573): And likewise that those who have emitted the aforesaid three vows in the same Society may, with the permission of their Superior General, be promoted even to the sacred Orders of the priesthood, even before solemn profession has been emitted... approving the aforesaid Institutes, by the tenor of these presents and by Apostolic authority, insofar as there is need, We grant this anew.

VI. Expelled Religious living outside Religion incur by the law itself perpetual suspension from the exercise of Orders ¹⁰. From the same Constitution.

¹⁰ The canonical reason why an expelled Religious remains suspended is also this: one who is expelled from his Religion thereby lacks the title of his ordination, and indeed also a church to which he is attached. Thus Avanzini (Commentary, no. 53), who then asks why Apostates and fugitives do not incur the same penalty.

For, as the Rieti Commentary excellently states, two things are necessary for Religious to contract this suspension, namely, that they have been expelled and that they are living outside Religion. Therefore, apostates and fugitives do not incur it; nor are expelled Religious still bound by it if they have entered another Religion, even one less strict. And it is further necessary that someone have been justly expelled, that is, for a just cause and with the order of law observed; for there must be no departure here from that law which is constantly observed in other laws. Hence one who has been unjustly expelled ought indeed to abstain from the exercise of Orders, lest he cause scandal; but if he does not abstain, he sins against charity, but does not act against a censure; and therefore guilt binds him, not irregularity; and not even guilt, if scandal is absent, for example, if he celebrates where it is unknown that he has been expelled and this cannot easily become known.

VII. Those who have presumed to receive an Order from one who has been excommunicated, suspended, or interdicted by name, or from a notorious heretic or schismatic, incur by the law itself suspension from the Order received; but We declare that one who in good faith has been ordained by any one of them does not have the exercise of the Order so received until he is dispensed ¹¹. From the same Constitution.

¹¹ One who receives Orders, as the Rieti Commentary observes, incurs suspension under our Constitution in this case alone, namely, if he has received them from a Bishop excommunicated, suspended, or interdicted by name, or from a notorious heretic or schismatic.

And indeed, if someone receives Orders from one excommunicated by name by the Supreme Pontiff, he incurs in addition an excommunication reserved to the same Pontiff, according to what was said above, no. 975, XVII.

For the rest, under the Constitution it makes a difference whether someone received Orders in bad faith or in good faith. If in bad faith, that is, if he presumed to do so, he will be bound by perpetual suspension, from which it pertains to the Roman Pontiff alone to dispense; but if in good faith, he will not properly be called suspended, but only the exercise of the Order is interdicted to him until his Bishop has dispensed him. But what if he doubted

and, from culpable negligence indeed, but not broad, gross, or supine, neglected to inquire? Can he not be dispensed by the Bishop because he was not in good faith? Or can he, because he did not presume? And it replies: Since that which is more favorable to the accused must always be adopted, I think the latter. Furthermore, for someone to incur this suspension it is necessary that he have received an Order; therefore, if he was invalidly ordained, suspension cannot even be conceived.

VIII. Secular Clerics from outside Rome who have remained in the City for more than four months and have been ordained by someone other than their own Ordinary without the permission of the Cardinal Vicar of the City, or without a previous examination held before him, or even by their own Ordinary after they have been rejected in the aforesaid examination; and likewise Clerics belonging to any of the six suburbicarian Bishoprics, if they are ordained outside their own Diocese with dimissorial letters of their Ordinary directed to someone other than the Cardinal Vicar of the City; or if, before receiving sacred Order, they have not first made spiritual exercises for ten days in the Roman house of the Priests called the Congregation of the Mission, incur by the law itself, at the pleasure of the Holy See, suspension from the Orders thus received; while the Bishops ordaining them incur suspension from the use of Pontificals for one year. From the same Constitution.

1000. Suspensions Imposed by the Council of Trent, of Which Some Are Reserved to Bishops and Others to No One. - I. No Bishop may, under the pretext of any privilege, exercise Pontificals in the Diocese of another unless with the express permission of the Ordinary of the place and only upon persons subject to that Ordinary. If otherwise has been done, the Bishop is suspended by the law itself from the exercise of Pontificals, and those thus ordained from the exercise of their Orders (session 6, chapter 5, On Reformation) ¹².

¹² By this Decree it is not excluded that Clerics of other Dioceses also can be ordained by an outside Bishop in another Diocese when the Clerics both have dimissorial letters from their own Ordinary and this outside Bishop exercises Pontificals there with the express permission of the Ordinary of the place.

And according to a Resolution of the Sacred Congregation, 22 February 1630, which is customarily cited, a Bishop present in another Diocese can, with the aforesaid prior permission of its Ordinary, ordain both his own subjects and those of the Bishop granting permission without incurring the penalties.

II. Those who were not constrained by reason of a Benefice received or to be received and, while the See was vacant, were ordained within a year from the day of the vacancy by dimissorial letters received from the Chapter, if they were thus constituted in minor Orders, are to enjoy no clerical privilege, especially in criminal matters; but if thus constituted in major Orders, they are suspended by the law itself from the exercise of their Orders at the pleasure of the future Prelate (session 7, chapter 10, On Reformation) ¹³.

¹³ It pertains to the Capitular Vicar, and not to the Chapter, to grant dimissorial letters after a year, as is reported to have been decided in the Sacred Congregation of Bishops, 12 January 1604.

But the Vicar of the Pope is not prohibited from granting dimissorial letters even immediately after the Apostolic See becomes vacant; for the Tridentine Decree in no way restricts the jurisdiction of the Apostolic See, even when vacant.

But while an episcopal See is vacant, recourse for receiving Orders within the year must be had neither to the nearest Bishop nor to the Metropolitan, but to the Apostolic See.

Nevertheless, while the See is vacant, the Chapter can within the year give testimony of fitness, or testimonial letters.

III. None of the Bishops who are called titular, even if they reside or remain in a place of a Diocese nullius, even exempt, or in some monastery of any Order, may, by virtue of any privilege granted to him for the time being of promoting whomever comes to him, promote or ordain the subject of another, even under the pretext of familiarity and continual sharing of his table ¹⁴, to any sacred or minor Orders or to first tonsure without the express consent or dimissorial letters of his own proper Prelate. One who acts contrary is suspended by the law itself from the exercise of Pontificals for one year, and the one so promoted from the exercise of the Orders thus received until it shall seem good to his Prelate (session 14, chapter 2, On Reformation).

¹⁴ Namely, Pius IV had decreed that titular Bishops could ordain no one by reason of familiarity, Constitution Cum sicut accepimus, 12 May 1562.

IV. If anyone petitions to be promoted by someone other than his own Bishop, this is by no means to be permitted to him, even under the pretext of any general or special Rescript or privilege, unless his uprightness and morals are commended by the testimony of his Ordinary. If otherwise is done, the one ordaining is suspended from the conferral of Orders for one year, and the one ordained from the exercise of the Orders received for as long as it shall seem expedient to his own Ordinary ¹⁵.

¹⁵ Here the matter concerns only a lack of testimonial letters, and not the absence of dimissorial letters. And it can in fact happen that a Cleric approaches either with dimissorial letters or under the pretext of some general or special Rescript or privilege, and lacks the testimony of his Ordinary by which his uprightness and morals are commended (session 25, chapter 8, On Reformation).

What are the principal privileges of Bishops? - As regards preserving their dignity. If Bishops commit a crime which is forbidden under penalty of suspension or interdict, they do not incur these censures unless they have also been laid upon them by name. Their causes are to be terminated through the Supreme Pontiff. Trent, s. 13, c. 8 de R. But those who injure Bishops incur excommunication reserved in a special way to the Roman Pontiff. C. Apostolicae Sedis de censuris. - From the same Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, those violating an interdict and excommunication imposed by the Ordinary are punished with interdict from entrance into a church. They can wear a small skullcap of violet color, even in sacred offices and while they celebrate Mass, but not from the Preface to Communion, S. C. Cons., 1 May 1910. From the day of election they can wear a small skullcap and biretta of violet color.

As regards censures and irregularities. - Bishops can, by themselves or by another specially deputed, absolve subjects from hidden papal cases, except those which are reserved in a special way to the Supreme Pontiff. From the Declaration of S. O., 17 June 1866 and 4 Apr. 1871, there is also excepted the case of a person of whatever sex falsely denouncing a priest concerning the crime of solicitation in confession. They can likewise absolve those who strike a cleric lightly; and, if these are living collegially, although the striking was grave, but not if it was enormous. From the same censure they can also absolve those who are impeded from going to Rome. Cf. vol. 2, n. 1182. Various cases, however, are reserved to them by the law itself. C. Apost. Sedis; Decr. S. C. C. concerning the trafficking of Masses, etc. Cf. vol. 2, de Censuris.

They can besides dispense in all irregularities, and absolve from all suspensions incurred on account of hidden delict, except voluntary homicide, and other matters brought to the contentious forum. Trent, s. 24, c. Liceat. Probably they can dispense also in doubtful irregularities from defect. Moreover they can dispense in non-hidden irregularities from defect of birth for minor orders and simple benefices. As regards inabilities enjoined by Pontiffs as penalty, whether they can dispense is disputed, and the matter is very doubtful. Concerning homicide, "the common opinion is that the Bishop can dispense when danger of soul is imminent; or another most grave cause, and it would be difficult to have recourse to the Pontiff, etc." L. 51, 29, 35, 46, 47, 49, 52, 53; l. 3, n. 397; l. 6, n. 593, 705; l. 7, n. 353, 392, 394; E. M.

As regards ecclesiastical censures. The privileges of absolving from papal cases having been revoked by the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, regulars can still absolve from cases reserved to Bishops by the same Constitution, and from the censure of the canon, as before the aforesaid Constitution. - All regulars of either sex, in the time of a general interdict, can privately perform divine offices in their monasteries and receive the sacraments; and they can also celebrate publicly on several feasts: Easter, Pentecost, etc. L. 95 ff.; l. 4, n. 61.

What is sin? - Since "where there is no law, neither is there transgression," Rom. 4:15, sin, which is an evil human act, is rightly defined by St. Augustine as: a word, deed, or thing desired against the eternal law. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 71, a. 6. Deed, for "sin can happen whether someone does what he ought not, or by not doing what he ought." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 71, a. 5, ad 1. By doing, it is a sin of commission; by not doing, of omission. Against the eternal law, because every law, whether human or divine, has its force from this law; because there is no power except from God; because no transgression of law would be a sin unless it offended God; because in this which is said, against the eternal law, aversion from the end and all other disorders are touched.

Against law; if it is not against law but against counsel, it is imperfection, which is merely negative if it is a mere defect in a human act of further perfection, e.g., of greater fervor in an act of love of God; and positive if it is an involuntary transgression of a law lightly obliging, e.g., praying with distraction. But it is rather only material sin than imperfection. Or it is the voluntary omission of a greater good, notwithstanding divine inspiration of it; and this, practically and regularly, is not without venial sin, by reason of the disordered motive or end, as, e.g., for a religious to violate rules not obliging to sin. Sin is formal if the law is violated freely and knowingly; it is material if the transgression of the law is altogether involuntary. - Sin is a delict. Delict is so called because good is abandoned. Hence "delict, taken commonly, signifies any omission; sometimes, however, it is taken strictly for this, that something is omitted from those things which pertain to God; or when knowingly, and as if with a certain contempt, a man abandons that which he ought to do; and thus it has a certain gravity, by reason of which it needs greater expiation." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79, a. 4, ad 1. L. 1, 11; S. Th. de Malo, q. 2, a. 1, 2; 1 p., q. 63, a. 1; a. 7, ad 2; 1. 2. q. 71, a. 6, ad 5; q. 87; q. 76, a. 2, ad 1; 2. 2. q. 20, a. 3; Compend. Theol., c. 119; Wirceburg., D. 1, c. 1, 2; E. M.

Who have, by positive law, capacity for contracting? By positive law, in order that someone validly, or at least firmly, contract, it is required that he not be declared by law incapable of making a contract. From Roman Law a wife cannot contract or dispose concerning her dowry and its fruits; nor concerning goods common to the family, when the husband reasonably contradicts. But she can dispose at will concerning paraphernal goods, even against the husband's will. L. 489. A son under paternal power who is below puberty, even if he contracts with the father's consent and concerning military goods, is not obligated. But, if he is of puberty, he is obligated, provided that there is no question of alienating immovables and precious movables.

But he can by no means dispose concerning profectitious and adventitious goods. - A person below puberty deprived of a father contracts validly by authority of a tutor, and a minor with the consent of a curator, unless there is question of immovables and precious movables. But a ward can oblige another for his own advantage, for example by accepting a donation, even without the authority of a tutor. Inst. § 9 Pupillus de Inutil. stipul. - Those civilly dead can neither receive nor donate goods in any way; and their goods pass to the heirs. Those civilly dead are those condemned to death, to perpetual galleys, to deportation.

From C. I. 324 ff., 1105, 1106; C. G. 489 ff., 1123, 1124; C. H. 200, 1263, 1264; C. A. 21, 865, there are some to whom almost all contracts are prohibited, and others to whom only certain contracts are prohibited, or in certain cases. - Almost all contracts are generally prohibited to wives, minors, and interdicted persons. Among interdicted persons are to be counted the incapacitated, the deaf-mute, and those blind from birth. Someone is interdicted because of infirmity of mind. C. I. 324; C. G. 489. - He is declared incapable who indeed is of his own mind, but senseless, or inept, or prodigal. C. I. 324, 339; C. G. 513; Cf. C. A. 21, 269. - The deaf and mute, in civil law, are equated as to contracts with those under incapacity.

Those blind from birth are equated as to contracts with the deaf and mute. C. I. 340; C. A. 275. - Interdicted persons are equated to minors; therefore they are under tutelage. C. I. 329; C. G. 509. - A curator of incapacity is customarily given; with him they do all things legitimately, without him only those things which pertain to administration of goods. C. I. 339; C. G. 513. - Cf. C. H. 32, 170, 200, 221-220. From C. B. 104, one incapable of contracting is he who has not yet attained the seventh year, who labors under a mental disease excluding liberty, who is interdicted because of mental disease. From the same Code 105, the declaration of will of one incapable is null.

What about the contracts of wives, minors, and interdicted persons in more recent law? - A wife generally cannot contract firmly without the special consent of the husband, or, in his absence, without the authority of the judge. C. I. 135, 136; C. G. 217, 219; C. H. 61, 62, 65. Nevertheless she can buy necessaries for the family. In C. H. 62, a wife can contract without the special consent of the man when she makes ordinary expenses of the family. Likewise in C. He. 163, the wife represents the conjugal union for occurring necessities of domestic economy, and obliges also the husband, unless her acts have been excessive. From C. I. Comm. 14 § 2, a wife engaged in commerce is permitted even the alienation of her own immovable goods (not dotal goods). From C. B. 1365-1371, 1395-1400, 1405-1407, a wife can freely dispose of goods reserved to herself; but as to goods subject to the husband's administration and usufruct, she needs the husband's approval. Cf. C. A. 1237 ff. - Non-emancipated minors cannot contract firmly without the assistance of a tutor. C. I. 277; C. G. 450; C. H. 262, 1263; C. A. 152; C. B. 106 ff. But emancipated minors are capable of making acts of administration and contracts determined by law. But for the rest the assistance of a curator is required. C. I. 317-319; C. G. 480, 484, 487; C. H. 317. But in a matter of greater moment, the tutor and curator depend on the authority of the family council. C. I. 277, 301, 314 ff.; C. G. 450, 468, 483; C. H. 269. From C. I. Comm. 9 ff., emancipated minors, whether males or females, legitimately exercising commerce, are considered majors and can alienate their own goods, even immovable goods. Interdicted persons, namely those who by sentence of a judge are declared incapable of exercising civil acts because of a state of weakness, or dementia, or fury, as also prodigals juridically declared, cannot contract firmly without the assistance of a tutor or curator, or of a juridically constituted counselor. C. I. 329, 335, 339, 340; C. G. 502, 509, 513; C. H. 200; C. B. 114 ff. If the prescriptions of law are not observed, the contracts of these, namely of wives, minors, and interdicted persons:

1. Are valid, unless they are invalidated by the sentence of a judge. C. I. 1300, 1899; C. G. 1304, 2012; C. H. 1302; C. B. 106-113. - 2. Are rescindable at their discretion, but by no means at the discretion of the fellow contracting party. C. I. 341, 1107, 1300; C. G. 1125, 1304; C. H. 1302; C. B. 108, 111, 135, 144; except interdicted persons by way of penalty, against whom incapacity can be opposed by anyone having an interest. C. I. 1107. But where there is question of wives, the husband or their heirs also can oppose the nullity of the contract. C. I. 137; C. G. 225; C. H. 65.

3. Minors can invoke rescission because they are minors from C. I. 1300, 1303; C. H. 1300; because they are harmed from C. G. 1305, 1306. But wives and interdicted persons can invoke rescission even if they were not harmed. C. G. 1305, Rogron in this article; with the case excepted, however, for a minor, if, exercising commerce or an art, he contracted for matters of commerce or art, C. G. 1308; but for a wife, when she is occupied with public and separate commerce, C. G. 220, Rogron in this article; C. I. 135; or buys those things which are necessary for the support of the family, C. H. 62.

4. But they could not invoke this rescission in conscience whenever they acted by fraud and deceived the fellow party, and when the obligation arose from delict or quasi-delict. For no one ought to receive advantage from fraud; nor does the legislator intend to favor fraud and delicts, but the weakness of these persons. C. I. 1305, 1306; C. G. 1307, 1310; C. A. 865, 866; C. B. 109, 828.

5. Once rescission of the contract has been made, they must restore what they received, if they received advantage from the contract. C. I. 1307; C. G. 1312; C. H. 1303, 1304. If no utility came to them, they can use in conscience the benefit of the law, so that they not pay what they received, since such a law is just on account of the common good, for defending persons of this kind against the frauds of the wicked. C. I. 1307; C. G. 1312; C. H. 1163, 1304; Gousset 744-749; L. 918. Cf. here 667, 678, 1085. L. ult. C. de Temp. in integr. restit. grants four years for seeking restitution in full; C. I. 1300, five years. Cf. here 950.

Whether from damaging there arises an obligation of restitution? A damager is called one who injures another's right, harming his neighbor in his goods, yet without becoming richer thereby. Wherefore damaging is a source of restitution diverse from the preceding ones. "Whoever damages someone seems to take away from him that in which he damages him; for damage is so called from the fact that someone has less than he ought to have.... And therefore a man is bound to restitution of that in which he damaged someone." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, aa. 4, 6; Inst. l. 4, t. 3; C. B. 249 ff. Whatever act of man is the cause of damage to another obliges to reparation of that damage.

Nor indeed does only one's own act oblige to restitution, but also the act of another person or of a thing, of which someone has custody and care. And thus the proprietor of a house which falls because of defect of due conservation or construction is held concerning the damage which comes from it. The proprietor or custodian of an animal which causes pauperies is also held concerning damage. If a damaging act of this kind was committed with the intention of harming, it is called deceit and delict; if without that intention, from imprudence and negligence, it is called quasi-delict and juridical fault. C. I. 1151 ff.; C. G. 1382 ff.; C. H. 1089, 1092, 1104, 1105, 1902 ff.; C. A. 1293 ff.; C. B. 823 ff.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 1, ad 2; aa. 4, 7; E. M.

Whether occult compensation can licitly be made when only probability of right stands? Ithur. Cas. 3, n. 11, has this: "Whenever the opinion has been equally probable for each party, or, as frequently happens, one's own is more probable to each, compensation is made justly not in the whole, but certainly in half of the debt." The 1st reason is because in such a case "a judge can adjudicate the whole to neither, but ought to divide the thing between the litigants....

But it is licit for no one through occult compensation to acquire more than what could be adjudicated to him by a judge after allegations and proofs." The 2nd reason is because "whenever the right to the same thing is equal, the advantage of each party ought to be equal, justice so requiring, whose office it is to consult equality." But Cardinal Lugo, after reporting the common opinion which requires a certain right for compensation, then adds these things: "This doctrine, if it is understood as it sounds, is difficult, nor does it seem to be constantly retained by its own authors....

I will add some examples: first, concerning him who has been defamed by Peter, it is asked whether for the reputation which Peter does not wish or is not able to repair for him, it is licit for the defamed person to make compensation by denying monies which he owed to the same Peter. Lessius responds that he can, because the opinion is probable which teaches that infamy must be compensated by money when it cannot be restored in its own genus... although the truer opinion denies this.... Secondly, when two have mutually defamed each other, they can, when the damage is equal, compensate for themselves, so that neither is held to restore as long as the other does not wish to restore.... Which compensation in that case is founded only on a probable opinion, since the contrary is also very probable. Thirdly, he who ought to have a legacy from a less solemn testament, since it is a probable opinion that those legacies are owed in the forum of conscience, although the contrary opinion is sufficiently common and probable, can nevertheless retain the legacy, or accept it anew, or secretly compensate himself." Hence Lugo generally concludes: "it seems probable that a creditor, before the matter is brought to judgment... can secretly compensate his debt to himself.... Reason also seems to prove this, because, notwithstanding the possession of the debtor, the judge would pronounce sentence, or certainly could pronounce it for the creditor, by embracing the probable or more probable opinion which favors him.... Why therefore will the creditor himself, when he cannot recur to a judge without grave inconvenience, not be able to embrace the same opinion which the judge ought or could have embraced, and compensate the debt to himself?"

But the same Lugo notes that although a judge in judging is held to follow the more probable opinion, nevertheless the creditor in occult compensation does not seem to be obliged to this, because the reason on account of which especially a judge cannot do this is that "from office and from an implicit pact toward the Republic he seems to be held to inquiring into the truth as much as he can, which reason does not militate in the creditor, who is held by no such pact toward the Republic. Yet concerning this I wish to assert nothing; indeed I willingly abstain from final judgment concerning this whole point about compensation to be licitly made with an opinion only probable." d. 16, n. 94 seqq.; L. 521, 544, 700, 817, 928.; l. 1, n. 30. But the reason of the common opinion is: 1.

The danger in this matter of easy deception; hence, practically speaking, there is present a grave danger of injuring another's rights. 2. Because if the other truly possesses the thing in good faith and by a title at least reasonably presumed, he now has a certain right at least of detention of the thing, and consequently he cannot be despoiled of the thing until there is certainty concerning another's right and dominion of the thing. - Hence, as is clear, when there stands only probability of fact from which a right arises, it is in no way licit to despoil the peaceful possessor of his thing.

Who are obliged to the recitation of the canonical hours? - The canonical hours are public prayers, which its ministers pour forth in the name of the Church in the form prescribed by the same Church. Hence the fruit of these prayers is from the work of the minister working and from the work of the Church working; and it redounds to the minister himself, to those for whom they are specially applied, to the founders of benefices, and to all the faithful, for whom the Church prays.

In the Western Church the following are obliged to recite the canonical hours daily: 1. All clerics constituted in sacred orders, even those suspended and excommunicated. This is established from various places of Canon Law, from the Lateran Council of 1215, from the Bull of S. Pius V Quod a nobis, from the Constitution of Pius X Divino afflatu, Kalends of November 1911. 2. All beneficed persons who have right in the thing and full dominion of the benefice. It is drawn from the Lateran Council under Leo X, and also from the Bull of S. Pius V Ex proximo. 3. All religious of both sexes professed in an Order approved by the Church and destined for choir. This is clear from custom, and also from the Decree of Gregory X, etc. Cf. the Works of S. Peter Damian, Migne vol. 145, col. 222 ff.; Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 5, d. 5, 6.

In the Western Church; for, as Benedict XIV says, C. Eo quamvis tempore, §§ 44, 45, "deacons, subdeacons, and priests of the Eastern Church are compelled by no express law... to the recitation of the divine office." Nevertheless, "even among the Orientals the laudable custom of reciting the divine office has prevailed." And indeed this has the force of law; whence "the discipline of the Eastern Church subjects generally all those constituted in sacred order to the obligation and precept of reciting the divine office, according to the custom of the nation." L. 140 ff.; S. Th. 4, dist. 15, q. 4, a. 1, q. 3; E. M.

Who can enter religion? - From the preceding Law, still in force, but to which several other things have been added: all those and only those can enter religion who 1. are their own masters; 2. are not bound to others by some graver obligation; and 3. are not criminals. Those who are not their own masters, but depend on others, cannot validly enter and profess without their consent. But the others validly enter and profess, although illicitly. L. 65; St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 189, a. 5, 6; E. M.; Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 3, d. 1, d. 21; l. 4, d. 47.

261 bis. You will resolve: From the first head, the following cannot enter religion: those before puberty, because they are subject to parents or guardians as regards the disposition of life; spouses after consummated marriage, unless the other party is guilty of a delict on account of which he or she can licitly be dismissed. Religious profession entered into by a spouse, the other spouse being unwilling, is resolved into a simple vow of chastity from presumption of law, C. 3, 12 de Conv. coniug.

A Bishop already consecrated and even only confirmed cannot enter religion without the license of the Supreme Pontiff, because of the spiritual marriage by which the Bishop is bound to his church. C. Licet de Regular.; C. Inter de Transl. Episcop. - From the second head the following cannot enter: those liable to intricate and litigious accounts, those burdened with debt; those who have seduced a virgin with marriage promised; those who would leave brothers in extreme necessity, parents or unemancipated children in grave necessity. - From the third head those cannot enter whom from public acts it is established have been accused or investigated for crime. C. Cum de omnibus and C. Ad Romanum of Sixtus V; C. In suprema of Clement VIII. - Illegitimates from the same law are admitted validly and licitly. Sixtus V, C. Cum de omnibus, November 26, 1587; Gregory XIV, C. Circumscripta, March 15, 1591; Clement VIII, C. In suprema, April 2, 1862. From Clement VIII, C. Cum ad singularem, March 19, 1603: "If someone exceeding the twenty-fifth year has asked for the regular habit and is without learning, let him be counted only among the number of Conversi." - Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 3, d. 1; L. 65, 71, 76, 969, 971; St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 185, a. 4; q. 189, a. 5, 7; E. M.

What is censure? It is a medicinal spiritual penalty by which a baptized man, delinquent and contumacious, is deprived by ecclesiastical power of the use of certain spiritual goods. Penalty: i.e., chiefly of the external forum. Therefore only those can impose censure who have jurisdiction in the external forum. Spiritual: because it consists in a certain removal of spiritual goods; it is from spiritual or ecclesiastical power; for a spiritual good; and obliging in conscience. Medicinal: for it is properly imposed for this end, as a medicine for preventing sins not yet admitted and curing those admitted, namely so that one may not sin, and if he has sinned may return to better fruit. C. Cum medicinalis 1, de Sent. exc., in VI.

Hence, in order that a censure truly be imposed by way of censure, and not generally by way of penalty, it is necessary that it not be imposed in perpetuity, nor at the discretion of the one imposing it, but it must be imposed simply, so that as soon as the guilty person has amended himself he can be absolved; for when the disease ceases, the medicine ceases. Baptized man: for one who has not been baptized is not subject to the power of the Church. But he must be capable of reason and a subject: for one who is incapable of fault is not liable to penalty; and the power of jurisdiction, of which censure is an act, is exercised only upon subjects.

He must also be some determinate person, and not a moral person, which can indeed be deprived of the rights by which it enjoys, but cannot be struck with penalties and censures so that it may repent, since it has only a moral existence. Yet the individual persons of a moral body can be punished with censures. Cf. Schmalzgrueber, n. 44-46. But Cardinals and Bishops are not liable to censures issued by the law itself unless they are expressly included, except for excommunication; likewise those not yet pubescent, except in the case of violation of the enclosure of nuns. C. Apostolicae Sedis. But by a special privilege legitimately introduced in the course of time, kings and queens cannot be bound by censure except by the Pope. By ecclesiastical power: for a penalty cannot be imposed except by one having power, and spiritual penalty pertains to spiritual power.

Of the use of certain spiritual goods: therefore censures do not take away the goods themselves, nor power or rights to them, but only the use of them from the guilty person, until he has returned to better fruit. C. Ex litteris 11, de Const. But it deprives him of the use of those goods which are in the power of the Church, such as public prayers, administration of the sacraments, offering of sacrifice, ecclesiastical burial, etc. Therefore it does not deprive him of merely internal goods, e.g., the sacramental character, the power of order, nor of proper and private goods, e.g., faith, hope, charity, etc. And if sometimes it deprives him of human intercourse, this is done only secondarily. E.M.

What is the division of censures? According to the various goods of whose use censure deprives one, it is threefold, namely excommunication, suspension, and interdict. Excommunication and interdict touch all; suspension touches only clerics. Excommunication has the force only of censure, or medicinal penalty. Therefore it cannot be imposed upon a moral person. C. Romana 5, de Sent. exc., in VI; Suarez, disp. 18, sec. 2, n. 3. But suspension and interdict can be imposed also by way of mere penalty, or in vindication of fault, and by way of mere privation, which holds even without fault, and therefore both the guilty and the innocent. Hence suspension and interdict can be imposed for a merely past delict which has no successive continuance, without any preceding threat or warning, without any expressed cause, in perpetuity, or for a determinate time, or at the good pleasure of the one who imposed it. Likewise they can be imposed upon moral persons, e.g., a chapter, a city, etc., and with respect to the innocent they have the nature of mere privation. Violation of a censure imposed by way of censure brings irregularity if a cleric violates it by exercising an order; not likewise one imposed by way of penalty, unless something else has been specially provided by law.

Some censures are issued by law; others by man. The former are imposed by way of law, the latter by way of mandate or sentence. An example of the former kind is the censures contained in the constitution Apostolicae Sedis, and the censures contained in episcopal statutes. An example of the latter is if a Bishop, without judicial process, issues a mandate, or if a judge, after judicial process has been instituted, issues a sentence against an abductor, that he restore the abducted person to liberty within three days, otherwise he incurs excommunication. Suarez, disp. 3, sec. 1, n. 2. A censure issued by law still perseveres after the death of the author; not likewise one issued by man. Yet one who incurs the latter is held by it everywhere until he is absolved from it. Episcopal censures issued in synod are held as censures by way of law and, when the Bishop has died, they endure; but those issued outside synod are held as censures by way of simple statute, and when the Bishop has died, they cease. L. 6.

Likewise some censures are latae sententiae; others are ferendae sententiae. They are latae sententiae if they are established as to be incurred by the very fact by which someone acts against the law. They are ferendae sententiae if they are to be inflicted by the sentence of a judge. Therefore censures are ferendae sententiae if the words of the law require the ministry of a judge, or the action of another, for incurring the censure, e.g., if it is said: it is prescribed under penalty of excommunication; he will be excommunicated, etc. But they are latae sententiae if the words of the law do not include a condemnatory sentence, or at least a declaratory sentence of the crime, e.g., one doing such things is by that very fact, by the law itself, excommunicated.

What is required on the part of sin for incurring censures? It is required that it be mortal, for censure is a very grave penalty which consequently presupposes mortal fault. Hence they must be imposed soberly and with great circumspection. Council of Trent, sess. 25, chap. 3, de Ref.; Benedict XIV, De Synodo, book 10, chap. 2. Therefore, unless there is question of some light censure, or at least one for a brief time, which is imposed because of light fault, censures of excommunication, suspension, and interdict, as they are ordinarily imposed, can in no way be imposed for light faults. L. 30; Schmalzgrueber, book 5, title 39, n. 59; Suarez, disp. 4, sec. 6, n. 12; Lugo, De Iustitia et Iure, disp. 16, n. 61; Lessius, book 2, chap. 12, n. 54; Sanchez, in Decal., book 7, chap. 21, nn. 28, 29.

The sin must be external; for the Church judges in the external forum, to which censures pertain, not in the internal forum. Not only must the sin be exterior, but also grave in the nature of the external act. Therefore one who is excused from grave fault either as regards the internal act or at least as regards the external act is also excused from censure. It must be a sin consummated by deed, because penal laws are of strict interpretation. Namely, the sin must be complete in its own genus according to the proper meaning of the words which are contained in the precept or law. Schmalzgrueber, l.c., n. 64. It is required that the sin not be merely past, because censure is a medicinal penalty, which therefore cannot be imposed on those who have already returned to better fruit. Merely past; for if a past delict, such as theft, detraction, etc., has a successive continuance, censure can be imposed because of it, once it has first been denounced to the guilty person, unless he obeys the mandate to restore what was taken away, to repair reputation, etc., within a definite time. Merely past: namely, if the censure is truly imposed by way of censure, or medicinal penalty, and not by way of mere vindictive penalty. Therefore a superior who wishes to punish some sin with censure must first threaten this censure. L. 54. Finally contumacy is required. For by censures contumacy against the law of the Church is punished, and indeed against the Church threatening censure to the contumacious. C. Pia 1, de Except., in VI; C. Statuimus 3, de Sent. exc., in VI. Contumacy is from despising; hence it is contempt of censure. Therefore for incurring censure it is necessary that the censure first have already been imposed, either by way of general law, or by particular precept at least denounced as to be incurred unless the precept is obeyed. Hence if someone withdraws from contumacy before he actually incurs the censure to be incurred once the effect has followed, he by no means incurs it afterwards when the effect follows. Withdraws from contumacy, namely by confession, or sorrow, or retraction of the will, and in the way in which he can he tries to impede the effect, although the revocation cannot become known to him to whom perhaps he gave the command or counsel. L. 31, 39, 40; book 7, nn. 368, 373; book 6, n. 600.

Is warning required beforehand for incurring censure? R. Affirmatively. The reason is that censure is imposed because of actual contumacy and disobedience. But one who has not been warned by the one imposing the censure is not rebellious and disobedient to him. Therefore. Hence among the doctors it is commonly received that a censure with no warning at all first given is regularly null. Now as regards a censure issued by law by way of law, or issued by man by way of mandate, the law itself and the mandate itself warn. Yet if the delict is occult, for declaring a censure incurred, citation of the guilty person is certainly needed; otherwise the sentence will be null and void. But if the censure is not contained in a law or mandate, then it is necessary to threaten it, or it is necessary to warn the guilty person, and indeed a threefold warning is needed, although this does not pertain to validity; or one for three, with the space of at least two days observed between them, or between this and the sentence the space of at least six days. But warning must be made to the guilty person before witnesses, and it is customarily and must be done in writing, but it is valid by living voice. Although a censure imposed without writing is valid, nevertheless, because this is grave, if it has been imposed orally, it is presumed to be penalty rather than censure.

If the censure has already been threatened by law, if indeed there is question of a censure ferendae sententiae, whether a new warning is needed is disputed: some affirm it, and it is more equitable, because censures of this kind are for the most part unknown; others deny it, and it is more probable, because the law itself warns sufficiently. C. Reprehensibilis 26, de Appellationib., etc.; C. Cum medicinalis 1, de Sent. excomm., in VI; L. 22, 51, 65, 317; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 21, a. 3.

Who can impose censures? By ordinary law, every and only ecclesiastical superior having ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the external or contentious forum can impose censure, whether ordinary or delegated, namely the Pope and a General Council with respect to all the faithful; Cardinals in the churches of their titles; Primates and Archbishops, both in their own dioceses and in the dioceses of suffragans during the time of visitation, and also when there is question of a case brought to their tribunal, because then they have jurisdiction over the suffragans; Bishops in their dioceses, provided they have been elected and confirmed, although not consecrated; Legates of the Apostolic See in the provinces of their legation; Vicars General of Bishops, for they constitute one tribunal with the Bishops themselves; the Chapter, when the see is vacant and before the election of the Capitular Vicar, who afterwards enjoys such power exclusively; abbots, generals, provincials, rectors, conventual priors, guardians, etc., of religious orders with respect to religious subject to themselves; and all those to whom that power is specially committed by delegation from the aforesaid persons.

Therefore by common law both lay persons and all women, even abbesses, are excluded from this power, both ordinary and delegated. Likewise parish priests, since they do not have ordinary jurisdiction in the external forum, but only administration for the right ordering of the parish, do not have this faculty. As regards delegated power, this ceases with the death of the one delegating, when there is question of a case of justice, unless the case has already been begun by the delegate at least through citation. But one delegated to impose censures cannot subdelegate another, unless he has had express permission from the one delegating, or unless he is delegated at least for any causes whatsoever, or by the Roman Pontiff. CC. Perniciosa 1, Cum ab Ecclesiarum 3, Pastoralis 11, sec. Praeterea, Conquerente 16, Grave gerimus 19, de Off. iud. ord.; C. Cum Episcopus 7, e.t., in VI; C. Transmissam 15, de Elect.; C. Si pro debilitate, de Off. Deleg.; CC. Cum in Ecclesiis 10, His quae 11, de Maior. et obed.; C. Ea quae final, de Statu Monach.; C. Quaerenti 20, de Verbor. signific.; C. Cum medicinalis 1, de Sent. exc., in VI; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 22, aa. 1, 2; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 3, 12-21, 40; Engel, nn. 12-15; Pichler, Ius Canonicum, book 5, title 39, nn. 4, 5; Lugo, Resp. Mor., book 6, disp. 6; E.M.

What is required so that an ecclesiastical superior can impose censures? It is required: 1. That he be possessed of reason; indeed that he have the intention of binding him against whom he imposes the censure. The reason is that to impose censure is an act of jurisdiction, which has its whole force from the interior will. 2. That he have jurisdiction free as regards its use. Hence an excommunicated, suspended, heretical, or schismatic Bishop cannot impose censures; the same is to be said of his vicar. Yet an occult heretic or excommunicated person validly imposes censures, although illicitly, because for the public good, unless he is to be avoided, the Church preserves jurisdiction for him. Indeed there are not lacking those, and it seems today the common opinion, who hold that even one publicly excommunicated validly imposes censures if he has not been denounced by name, or if he is not a public striker of a cleric from the Extravagant of Martin V, Ad evitanda, where it is sanctioned that a tolerated excommunicated person is not to be avoided in those things which pertain to public office, nor even by those who know this. L. 12; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 22, a. 3. 3. That the one imposing censure act freely, not under compulsion. But whether a censure imposed from grave fear is valid, some deny, others more truly affirm: because an act done from grave fear is of itself valid unless it is invalidated by special positive law. But a censure imposed from fear is not invalidated by positive law. Therefore. Schmalzgrueber, n. 23; L. 12; E.M.

Can a Bishop impose censures if he is outside the diocese? R. Negatively. For no one can exercise contentious jurisdiction in another's territory. Yet the following cases are excepted: 1. If the censure is imposed not by way of sentence, but by way of precept or statute, for preventing future crimes. 2. If the censure is imposed by way of sentence which nevertheless does not need cognizance of the case and judicial commotion, either because the contumacy is manifest, or because the case has already been known in his own territory. If it needs judicial commotion, it is necessary that permission be given by the Ordinary of the place and that the parties consent; for no one unwilling can be drawn outside his own territory. 3. If the Bishop has been unjustly expelled from his own territory, for then permission sought from the Ordinary of the place suffices, although not obtained. C. Novit 7, de Off. leg.; Clementine, single chapter, de For. comp.

Can a Bishop existing in his own diocese impose censure on a subject existing outside the diocese? A Bishop, existing in his own diocese, can bind by censures through sentence a subject existing in another diocese, both for a crime committed in his own diocese and also if the subject commits a delict outside the diocese, but there is question of a matter which is in it, as if clerics who do not come to the synod are excommunicated. Nor indeed does it stand in the way that citation cannot be made outside the territory; for then it suffices that the guilty person be cited in his own house or in a public place. Likewise if a Bishop by special precept prohibited some delict to someone under censure, the absent person incurs this censure. For the precept is personal. Therefore, since a subject outside the territory is bound by the precept, he is also bound by the censure. Thus St. Alphonsus, n. 23, who calls the denying opinion probable when someone commits a delict outside the territory of the one administering law, and adds: But it is certain from C. Ut animarum 2, de Const., in VI, that if the Bishop has previously given no precept to the subject under penalty of censure, he cannot punish him with censure if he commits a delict in another diocese. And the same must be said if he commits a delict in an exempt place, because in that place he remains as if he were in a place outside the diocese, from C. Cum Episcopus 7, de Off. ord., in VI; C. Volentes 1, de Priv., ibid.; Clementine Archiepiscopo 2, e.t.

Through sentence or special precept: for if the prohibition has been made by territorial statute, a censure imposed on delinquents does not affect one existing outside the territory of the one establishing the censure, as is expressly decided in C. Ut animarum 2, de Const., in VI. But regular prelates can bind their subjects with censures in whatever place they exist, because their jurisdiction is more personal than territorial. L. 20; Engel, n. 31; La Croix, book 7, n. 28; Pichler, Ius Canonicum, book 7, title 39, n. 6.

Can a Bishop bind by censure another's subject committing a delict in his diocese? Pilgrims probably, according to Lugo and others, do not incur censures issued by the special law of some place; for they are exempt from the very obligation of observing the laws of that place. But if there is question of censures issued by man through sentence, they can indeed be bound by censures by the Bishop of the place after they have committed a delict in that place by violating common law, and not only the law of his diocese, and after the Bishop has cited them, yet only if that common law prescribes or prohibits something under excommunication and other penalties to be inflicted by an ecclesiastical judge; for then by reason of the delict the pilgrim obtains the forum of the Bishop of that place in which he committed the delict. But if the Bishop himself by his own authority threatens excommunication against one violating the common law, e.g., stealing, not restoring, etc., the excommunication is null. For the immediate delict because of which excommunication is imposed is the contumacy and disobedience of a subject disobeying the Bishop who prohibits theft or prescribes restitution under censure. But the Bishop can neither command a pilgrim who is not a subject, nor consequently impose a special sentence on him as one not subject. Yet others, with Engel and La Croix, contradict this opinion, because just as laws can be imposed by which pilgrims are bound, e.g., concerning not carrying arms, so censure can be added to those laws, and such a pilgrim by reason of the delict becomes subject to such a Bishop. Hence at least he can, as an inhabitant and stranger, be restrained by censures by the office of the judge, C. final, de For. comp. La Croix, book 7, n. 32; Engel, nn. 35, 112; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 47-48; L. 19, 26, 27; book 6, n. 591; Lugo, Resp. Mor., book 6, disp. 22; Laymann, chap. 4, nn. 5, 6.

Can Bishops impose censures on regulars? R. Affirmatively, if they are not exempt; for then they are subject to episcopal laws and censures in plainly the same way as other clerics. Moreover, if they have the Bishop as their proper prelate, they can be bound by censures by him just as other regulars by their proper superiors. Sanchez, in Decal., book 6, chap. 1, n. 11; Schmalzgrueber, book 3, title 35, nn. 61, 62.

Affirmatively, if they are exempt and commit a delict concerning those things in which, by force of canons and Constitutions, they are subject to the jurisdiction of Bishops. And in such a case Bishops proceed not by ordinary but by delegated power. S.C.C., February 17, 1632; Benedict XIV, De Synodo, book 9, chap. 16, n. 5; book 7, chap. 41, n. 5; Barbosa, De Off. et Potest. Episc., part 3, alleg. 105, n. 14 ff. Negatively, if the discussion concerns those regulars who in this matter enjoy special exemption. For a twofold exemption of regulars, or immunity from the censures of Bishops, must be distinguished. The first proceeds from this, that regulars in certain things are exempt from the jurisdiction of Ordinaries, and therefore as regards these things they cannot be punished either by censures or by other penalties. Yet since in other things they are subject to Bishops, when they commit delicts in these matters they can be punished by them, even by censures. But the other proceeds from this, that certain regulars enjoy a special privilege, namely Mendicants and Religious of the Society of Jesus, so that they cannot be punished by Bishops with censures, although they can be punished with other penalties if they commit delicts in those very things in which they are subject to the Ordinaries of places. The case from the constitution Inscrutabili of Gregory XV is excepted, namely "if in churches of others, which are not of their orders, without the license of the Bishop; and in their own churches or those of their orders, without having sought his blessing, or while he contradicts, they presume to preach." Innocent X, Brief Cum sicut accepimus, May 14, 1653, declaring another case in the cited constitution Inscrutabili of Gregory XV, added a case, namely that of hearing confessions. A third case must also be added concerning the form and habit of sacred images from the constitution Sacramenta of Urban VIII, March 15, 1642.

Does ignorance excuse from incurring censure? Invincible ignorance, whether of fact, of law, or of penalty, i.e., of the censure attached, excuses from incurring it. For contumacy is lacking. Here forgetfulness and inadvertence operate the same as ignorance. Ignorance that is vincible and lightly culpable, or even gravely culpable if it is not crass or supine, also excuses from incurring censure; otherwise if it is crass and supine, from C. final, de Const., in VI, where it is said, "we do not wish the ignorant to be bound, when nevertheless their ignorance has not been crass or supine." But whether there is truly given gravely culpable ignorance which nevertheless is not crass or supine is disputed. Commonly they deny it; yet many affirm it, because for crass ignorance a certain highest negligence is required, and negligence can be gravely culpable although it is not the highest.

A fortiori affected ignorance, whether of fact, of law, or of penalty, does not excuse from incurring censure. Vincible ignorance that is gravely culpable, whether it is crass or supine, or, probably, even affected, excuses from incurring censure if in the Decree there is a clause: whoever does this knowingly, deliberately, rashly; whoever has presumed to do this, etc. For one who acts with ignorance of whatever kind surely does not act knowingly. And indeed, from the Holy Office, January 12, 1870, by these words, by rash daring, or from presumption, etc., it is signified that someone committed a delict not while compelled or ignorant, but prudently and knowingly; and moreover it ought not to be wondered that one devoid of every excuse is subject to censure. L. 43-45, 48.

Does grave fear excuse from censure? R. Affirmatively, unless nevertheless observance of the law is necessary for preserving the public good, or violation of it yields to contempt of faith, or of law, or of ecclesiastical power. The reason for the response is that one who commits a delict from fear sins rather from weakness of nature than from contumacy. The reason for the exception is that in the aforesaid cases the obligation even of human law does not cease.

Does an appeal legitimately interposed excuse from censure? R. Affirmatively, namely if it was interposed before the sentence, or after it indeed had been issued, but while the day from which, or the condition under which, it was issued, is pending. Likewise it ceases if, while the day or condition is pending, one ceases to be superior and the other ceases to be subject. But if the censure has already been issued absolutely, appeal does not suspend it, whence canonists say that the appeal is devolutive, not suspensive. Yet recourse to the Holy See is always given against its injustice. L. 63-65; Suarez, disp. 3, sec. 4, n. 10 ff.; sec. 5, n. 2; sec. 15, n. 18 ff.; Lugo, Resp. Mor., book 2, disp. 6.

Is one to be judged to have incurred censure who doubts whether he has incurred it? In a doubt of fact and in a doubt about the existence of the law, one is excused from incurring censure; not likewise in a doubt about the justice of the law, namely whether the censure is just. The first reason is that in doubt the condition of the possessor is better. But one who doubts whether by his act he has incurred censure possesses the right of using spiritual goods. Therefore he is not to be deprived of his right. Therefore. The second reason is that favors are to be enlarged and odious things restricted. Therefore a law inducing a doubtful penalty is to be taken in the more benign part; for penalty is odious. Therefore. The third reason is that in a doubt of justice, presumption favors the superior. When someone doubts whether he has been absolved from a censure which he incurred, in the external forum judgment must be made in favor of the censure, or bond, from C. Sicut 39, de Sent. exc., and therefore absolution must be sought. Likewise in the internal forum absolution must be sought, lest perhaps one become deprived of the goods of the Church. Lugo, De Poenit., disp. 20, n. 18; Sanchez, in Decal., book 1, chap. 10, nn. 55, 56; St. Thomas, Quodlibet 4, a. 14; L. 32, 39, 67, 68.

Is one bound by censure who knows it to be manifestly unjust? One is not bound by censure who knows it to be certainly unjust, whether because of a false presumption of fact, or because legal forms were omitted, or because the limits of jurisdiction were exceeded. Therefore he is not bound to observe it publicly, except by reason of scandal, if this is present. L. 68; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 21, a. 4; Laymann, chap. 6, nn. 2-4; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 89-94; Engel, nn. 103-113; Lugo, De Iustitia et Iure, disp. 37, n. 188.

Can someone be bound by several censures at the same time? Because of one and the same delict only one censure is incurred out of several perhaps imposed by one and the same legislator, namely that by which the others are eminently comprehended. Thus, e.g., those usurping goods pertaining to ecclesiastical persons by reason of their churches are bound only by the excommunication reserved to the Roman Pontiff, and not also by the Tridentine excommunication. Because of one and the same delict someone can indeed incur several censures imposed by different legislators, by the Bishop of the benefice and by the Bishop of domicile, by the Roman Pontiff and by the Ordinary of the place; e.g., if clerics violating the enclosure of nuns are punished by suspension in an episcopal Statute, they would also be liable to the excommunication simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff through the constitution Apostolicae Sedis. Because of the same delict repeated, and because of diverse delicts, someone can incur several censures, namely the same one several times, and several diverse ones, of the same or of a different nature. And here it must be noted that if the censure is reserved to the Pontiff, through this reservation the faculty of reserving the same censure to themselves then seems to have been taken away from inferior Prelates.

What is to be said generally about absolution from censures? "Absolution signifies an act of justice in which some case, or judgment, is terminated in favor of the guilty person.... But dispensation is an act of grace or mercy... by which something is relaxed from the common law in favor of someone." Thesaurus, De Poenis, part 1, chap. 20. For releasing a censure, absolution imparted by a legitimate judge or superior is necessary; and if the guilty person has ceased from his contumacy, justice itself requires that he be absolved from the censure.

And a censure cannot be released in another way, although satisfaction has already been made, if it was owed, and amendment has followed, except for censures imposed for a definite time: for when that has ended, they cease; and those which were imposed at the good pleasure of the one imposing them also cease when he has died, or when his right has been dissolved. This is established from C. Qua fronte 25, de Appell.; C. Ex litteris 11, de Const.; C. Cum desideres 15, de Sent. exc.; C. Relatum 37, ibid.; proposition 44 condemned by Alexander VII; L. 122. Absolution of this kind can be given by an ecclesiastical superior, or by his delegate, even if he is not a priest. And although the penalties of censure are especially of the external forum, absolution from them can nevertheless be given in the internal forum of conscience, as long as they have not been brought to the external forum; this is established by common doctrine and practice.

Absolution from censures, as removing an impediment, must be given first under grave obligation before absolution from sins; yet if it is given afterwards, it is valid; and if the penitent receiving this has not sinned gravely, the absolution from sins also is valid. But since it is not established that the penitent is bound by censure, it is prefaced only as a precaution. And from these things it is clear that absolution from censures is entirely distinct from absolution from sins, and one can stand without the other. St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 24, a. 2, ad 2; Laymann, chap. 7, n. 1; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 107, 111; E.M. 952.

Who can absolve from the various censures? From a censure, whether issued by man by way of precept or by particular sentence, or reserved by law, only these can absolve: 1. the one who imposed the censure; 2. his superior; 3. his successor; 4. another delegated by one of these. The reason is that it belongs to the one to absolve to whom it belongs to bind. L. 63; Laymann, chap. 7; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 85-93, 97; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 24, a. 1. A censure issued by man by way of precept or by particular sentence: for censures issued by man, but by way of statute or general sentence, according to the more probable opinion are equated with those issued by law which are not reserved. L. 73; Schmalzgrueber, 94; Engel, n. 124. From censures which are such less properly, namely those imposed until a certain day, in perpetuity, or at the good pleasure of the superior, only he or another having special faculty can absolve: since, although they are not expressly reserved, they are nevertheless implicitly reserved from their very nature. Cf. Suarez, disp. 29, sec. 1, n. 16.

Any confessor can absolve from censures issued by law and by no means reserved to the Pope or Bishop, both for the internal forum and for the external forum, C. Nuper 29, de Sent. exc.; formula of absolution in the Roman Ritual; Struggl, 29; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 24, a. 1; L. 69-71, 126, 322, 339; book 1, n. 191; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 95, 96. "Yet in order that someone can use the absolution publicly, it is necessary that it be publicly established.... But in order that it be judged publicly established, it is enough that it be publicly established that he was confessed... to one having power... provided that the satisfaction which was necessary has also been publicly exhibited." Suarez, disp. 7, sec. 5, n. 29.

For this is required, although the censure has not been juridically denounced, for preventing scandal, and so that it be established that he has withdrawn from his contumacy and has returned to obedience to the Church. Cf. Leo XIII, Monita pro Iubilaeo for the year 1900, Singulares, Kalends of November, 1899, sec. 8 ff.

From Trent, sess. 24, C. Liceat 6, and from the constitution Apostolicae Sedis, paragraph Firmam, Bishops can, in the forum of conscience, absolve from occult cases and censures reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, except those which are reserved in a special manner. The Capitular Vicar also enjoys this power, S.C.C., December 3, 1632. Bishops can also delegate this Tridentine faculty generally to some priest, provided that they expressly specify it; for special deputation is required from Trent. And they can absolve even pilgrims, since they become subjects by submitting themselves in the forum of conscience. But by this faculty Bishops cannot absolve from occult cases reserved by other Bishops. S.C.C., January 24, 1711; November 20, 1712; Benedict XIV, constitution Pias Christi, August 21, 1752.

But those cases are reputed occult which have not been proved in judgment and can still be concealed in the neighborhood in some way, as if it is known only to a few discreet persons, e.g., five or six, or if the fact appears doubtful. Probably a crime public in one place can be absolved by a Bishop in another place where it is occult, provided there is no fear that it will easily be made public where it is occult. Likewise an occult crime can be absolved by a Bishop, whether it is materially occult, because the committed delict is publicly unknown, or formally occult, namely because although the crime is known, nevertheless it is unknown that a censure is attached to it. L. 76, 78; book 1, appendix II, de Privil., n. 29 ff.; book 6, nn. 294, 593, 594.

That regular prelates by force of their privileges, as regards their subjects, 1. cannot absolve from censures imposed by the constitution Apostolicae Sedis, whether reserved in a special manner or simply to the Roman Pontiff; but 2. can absolve from censures reserved to Bishops, even if occult; and 3. as regards the faculty of the same prelates for absolving their subjects from censures reserved to the Roman Pontiff which are not contained in the aforesaid Constitution and which pertain to internal government, nothing has been innovated by the same Constitution; 4. regulars impeded from going to Rome cannot be absolved by their regular superiors from censures contained in that Constitution and reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, but must have recourse to the Holy See for the necessary faculties, was declared in the Holy Office, March 22, 1881. Synod of the Diocese of Ostia and Velletri, Rome, 1892, p. 122.

Those confessors who have the Pagella of the Sacred Penitentiary can also absolve from several censures, even reserved ones. Cf. the aforesaid Pagella.

Finally, as to who can absolve from papal cases and censures in the article of death and in the case of impediment from going to Rome, and how, cf. 773, 797, 799, 800.

What special circumstances of absolution from censures are to be noted? Various circumstances of absolution from censures to be noted are declared in the following propositions. An absent and unwilling person can be absolved from censures. For absolution from censures is not sacramental, but a mere relaxation of a bond imposed by the Church, which can also be pronounced upon the absent and unwilling. But this is not licit without grave cause. L. 117, 130; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 24, a. 2. One who is bound by several censures can be absolved from one, the others being left, because there is no necessary connection among them. C. Cum pro causa 27, de Sent. exc.; L. 118, 131; St. Thomas, q. 24, a. 3. Absolution extorted by force or grave fear unjustly inflicted is not valid, from C. single chapter, de His quae vi, etc., in VI; L. 119. The same is to be said if it is given by error concerning the motive cause. C. Offic. 42, de Sent. exc.; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 99, 100, 102; Thesaurus, De Poenis, part 1, chaps. 22-24.

Absolution cannot be given unless first, where there was need, the one to be absolved has repaired scandal, satisfied the injured party, or, if he cannot, has furnished suitable security, or unless he has sworn or promised that he will make satisfaction as soon as he can; and, if the crime is among the more atrocious, or there is question of striking clerics, that he will never relapse into it. But oath and pledge-security pertain to the external forum. As regards the internal forum, a simple and sincere promise suffices concerning making satisfaction, standing by the mandates of the Church, etc. C. Porro 7, de Sent. exc.; C. Per tuas 40, 10, 11, ibid.; C. Qua fronte 25, de Appell.; C. Odoardus 3, de Solut.; C. Ex parte 23, de Verb. sign.; Sacred Penitentiary, July 5, 1857. But when the Pontiff gives faculty of absolving "the party having been satisfied," whether this clause is always added as a condition sine qua non, some probably affirm, others probably deny. L. 121, 129; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 100, 101; Roman Ritual, de Absol. ab excomm.; the warnings cited at n. 1101.

Absolution can be given both absolutely and conditionally. Likewise absolution can be given with reincidentia, i.e., so that the absolved person, unless he performs something, for instance unless he has restored after such a time, falls back into the same censure by that very fact. Reincidentia is either by law or by man. It is by man only when it is added by the express will of the superior; but by law when it is contained in clear law. For we are in odious matters. Moreover the censure into which the absolved person is going to fall back is a new censure in number, although of the same species. Therefore reincidentia cannot be added to absolution except by one who has power of imposing censure, and it is not incurred without new fault and contumacy. L. 86, 87, 123-125; Laymann, chap. 7, n. 8; Lugo, De Poenit., disp. 20, nn. 213-214.

For validly absolving from censures, no determinate formula is prescribed in law. Therefore the will of the superior manifested by a sensible sign suffices, so that it becomes known to the other. Schmalzgrueber, n. 98. And although it can be given by the fact itself, speaking per se, nevertheless from the law it does not seem to be presumed that it was given thus. Cf. Clementine Si summus 4, de Sent. exc.; C. Si aliquando 41, e.t.; C. In praesentia 46, ibid.; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 77, 389; St. Raymond de Penyafort, Summa, book 3, de Sententiis Praecepti, etc., sec. 36. For licitly absolving in the sacramental forum, the formula must be used which is contained in the formula itself of sacramental absolution, and the same is used in the internal forum of conscience outside the sacrament. But in the external forum the formula prescribed in the Roman Ritual and Pontifical, and in C. A nobis 28, de Sent. exc., must be used. For solemn and public absolution, as described in the Ritual, the mandate of the Bishop is needed, who is accustomed to prescribe this only when there was scandal of the whole community; and the other solemnities of law must be observed.

And thus, if there is question of an enormous crime, before absolution the delinquent must swear, unless perhaps he is not yet pubescent, that he will not relapse further into such a crime. C. Ex tenore 10; C. De cetero 11, de Sent. exc.; Roman Ritual, de Absol. ab excomm. One who has power of absolving in the forum of conscience from a censure can do this also outside Confession, except in a jubilee, in which it must be given in the sacramental forum. Benedict XIV, constitution Inter praeteritos, sec. 63.

Absolution given in the external forum also benefits in the internal forum; given in the internal forum it benefits the tolerated even in the external forum, but it does not prevent action from being taken against them according to the norm of law; not likewise those to be avoided, when this is licit, as in a Jubilee and in the article of death. Benedict XIV, constitution Inter praeteritos, sec. 61. L. 70, 116, 126-129; book 6, n. 536; Laymann, part 2, chap. 6; Pichler, book 5, title 39, n. 13; Roman Ritual, de Absol. ab excomm.

What is excommunication, and how many kinds are there? Excommunication is a censure through which someone is deprived of communion with the Church. "It is a penalty, the gravest which the Church can inflict, and in itself it contains by force the other censures of suspension and interdict, as those which deprive one not so fully, but only partially, of the goods of the Church, or of their use." Pichler, book 4, title 39, n. 23. An excommunicated person who, after legitimate warnings, has not repented, and has grown filthy in excommunication for a year, or has persevered obstinately, incurs suspicion of heresy, because he seems to despise the authority of the Church. Council of Trent, sess. 25, chap. 3, de Ref. It is twofold: one is minor, the other major. This major excommunication is evident in two ways. For one is that by which someone is an excommunicated tolerated person, whom the faithful are not bound to avoid; the other is that by which someone is an excommunicated person not tolerated, whom they are bound to avoid.

What is to be said about an excommunicated tolerated person? As regards an excommunicated tolerated person, by canon law it is forbidden to anyone, even one secretly excommunicated, to communicate with others both in divine and in human things. But the faithful can communicate with him both in human and in divine things, even without necessity, although they are not bound to. Hence spiritual things, such as sacraments, can licitly be given to an excommunicated person; likewise sacraments can licitly be sought from an excommunicated person, even without necessity, precisely by force of excommunication; for if he is in mortal sin, a just cause is required. Therefore indirectly it has also been granted to an excommunicated person that he may be able to communicate without sin with those by whom he is asked. The same is to be said of one suspended and one interdicted, as regards those matters in which it is forbidden to communicate with them. Constitution of Martin V in the Council of Constance, Ad evitanda; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 121-125; L. 135, 138-140, 160.

What is to be said about an excommunicated person to be avoided? Only two excommunicated persons to be avoided are reckoned. The first is anyone excommunicated by name who at the same time has been specially and publicly denounced. By name, i.e., with the name expressed by words or indubitable signs, so that he cannot be confused with another. Hence we are not bound to avoid heretics, e.g., even if it is publicly known that they are excommunicated by law. Specially denounced, i.e., not denounced generally, but also denounced by name. Hence if it is said: We excommunicate Peter the arsonist and his accomplices, only Peter is to be avoided, but not the others, although they are publicly known; for the sentence as regards them is only general, and not special against a certain person. Publicly denounced, i.e., the denunciation must be made in a public place, according to the usage of the region. But here it must be noted that although it suffices that one excommunicated by law be denounced only as such, so that he is now to be avoided, nevertheless it does not suffice if the guilty person is declared by sentence only to have committed the crime to which excommunication is attached; rather, the excommunication itself must be denounced by the judge. The second is a notorious striker of a cleric. Notorious, i.e., according to St. Alphonsus, not only by notoriety of law, but also by notoriety of fact, at least commonly or ordinarily speaking. By notoriety of law: namely, that it is known either by sentence of the judge, or by confession of the guilty person in judgment, or by sufficient judicial deposition. By notoriety of fact: namely, that it is really known to many, so that the fact can no longer be hidden by any evasion. Otherwise the fact could always be excused by some favorable consideration. Hence probably the striker of a cleric, notorious in one place, is not to be avoided in another where he is not notorious. And the same is to be said of the former case, i.e., of one excommunicated by name and already publicly denounced in some place, who is entirely unknown in another place. And "unless at least it is publicly established by the fact itself that the striker advertently willed (knew and contemned) to incur the censure, he is probably never to be avoided" before the very sentence of the judge specially denouncing him. L. 144. This is established from the constitution of the Council of Constance, Ad evitanda; Holy Office, January 9, 1884.

L. 134, 146; Diana, tome 5, tract 1, de Excommunic., resolution 50, nn. 4, 5; Lugo, Resp. Mor., book 2, disp. 5; Laymann, chap. 4; Ferraris, Bibliotheca, v. Excomm., art. 9, nn. 5, 7; E.M.

What is to be said about minor excommunication? Minor excommunication deprives one per se only of the passive use, or reception, of the sacraments, and consequently of passive election to benefices and dignities of the Church. C. Si quem 59, de Sent. exc.; C. A nobis 2, de Except.; C. Si celebrat 10, de Cler. exc. min. It was incurred for only one cause, namely if someone communicated with an excommunicated person to be avoided, and it could be absolved by any confessor. C. Nuper 29, de Sent. exc. Cf. St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 23, aa. 1, 2; L. 147, 156; Suarez, disp. 24; Laymann, chap. 3, n. 6; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 198-211. Minor excommunication today has been removed by the constitution Apostolicae Sedis.

Thus the Holy Office, December 5, 1883, Leo XIII approving and fully confirming. Yet this does not prevent "a Bishop (even at present) from being able, in penalty of some crime, to forbid someone by name the passive use of the sacraments, or at least of Communion." L. 148. But because of communication with an excommunicated person, in certain peculiar cases major excommunication, suspension, and interdict are now incurred. Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, art. 16 and 17 of Excommunications reserved simply to the Roman Pontiff, art. 1 of Excommunications reserved to no one, art. 6 of Suspensions, and art. 2 of Interdicts. Holy Office, January 9, 1884. Synod of the Diocese of Albano, year 1880, appendix n. 10, sec. XI, n. 3; Pichler, nn. 34, 35; E.M.

What is to be said about major excommunication? Major excommunication has the following effects. It deprives one of receiving and of the passive use of the sacraments. C. A nobis 28, de Sent. exc.; C. Cum illorum 32, ibid.; C. Sacris 38, ibid.; C. Si quem 59, ibid.; C. final, de Cler. excomm. ministr. Hence "no excommunicated person, whether tolerated or not, can licitly receive them (but he validly receives them, except penance, unless he approaches in good faith) under mortal sin, unless invincible ignorance, fear of death, infamy, loss of goods, etc., excuses, because censure does not oblige with so great rigor." L. 158. Schmalzgrueber, nn. 146-153; Pichler, n. 29; Coninck, dub. 5.

It deprives, at least the non-tolerated, of the common suffrages and prayers of the Church, namely those which are made in the name of the Church by her ministers; likewise it deprives one of the fruit of indulgences. Common suffrages and prayers of the Church: therefore it does not deprive one of private suffrages and prayers, namely those which are made in one's own name. "Hence not only any private person, but even a priest can pray as a private person for the excommunicated, even in public prayers and the sacred rite; indeed, he can offer the action of sacrificing insofar as it depends on the private merit of the one operating, or remember him in particular in the Memento. This is certain with St. Thomas." L. 162. At least the non-tolerated, because, as the same Holy Doctor teaches, probably sacrifices, etc., can be offered for an excommunicated tolerated person even in the name of the Church. "The reason is that favorable laws are to be understood with every amplitude; therefore, while it was granted to the faithful to communicate with tolerated persons, it was also granted to offer public prayers for them; for to communicate also imports this, etc." L. 164. CC. cited; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 126, 134-139; Pichler, nn. 29, 33; Coninck, dub. 6; Engel, n. 38; Laymann, chap. 1, n. 4; Salmanticenses, tract 10, chap. 3, n. 56; Suarez, disp. 9, secs. 4, 5; St. Thomas, III, q. 82, a. 7, ad 3; Suppl., q. 21, a. 1, ad 2; a. 3. Cf. 610.

It deprives one of the active use, or administration, of the sacraments. C. Latores 4, de Cler. excomm. ministr.; C. final, ibid. Administration: for a non-tolerated person this is altogether illicit, except in the case of extreme necessity or grave inconvenience; nevertheless he validly confers the sacraments, except penance, which requires jurisdiction, and of this he lacks, unless there is common error of fact, or there is question of the article of death. But for an excommunicated tolerated person, it is sometimes licit, namely if he does not thrust himself in, but the faithful demand and ask; and thus he can celebrate if he is a pastor whose subjects are bound to hear Mass and there is no other who celebrates, for they are tolerated for the favor of the faithful, not in their own favor. Hence he also validly administers penance, since he is not deprived of jurisdiction; for this is expedient for the usefulness of the faithful. L. 165-170; St. Thomas, III, q. 64, a. 9; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 144-146; Laymann, chap. 2, n. 5; Ithur., case 42.

It deprives one of the use of divine offices, so that an excommunicated person, whether to be avoided or tolerated, not only lacks their fruit, but also under mortal sin cannot celebrate them or assist at them in a notable part, so that morally he is judged to communicate with others, unless ignorance or necessity of avoiding scandal excuses. Although the same law applies to those to be avoided and to those tolerated, nevertheless as regards the latter, since today there is scarcely a confessor who keeps an excommunicated person away from the divine offices and there is no excommunicated person who thinks that he must abstain from the divine offices, the rigor of the law in this matter seems to some to have been tempered. Similarly others sin who participate with an excommunicated person to be avoided by assisting at divine things with him, e.g., at the same Mass; and although this sin from its genus is mortal, nevertheless from smallness of matter it is venial, as if only a small part of the Mass, e.g., only up to the Gospel, is heard with him.

"23. Excommunications are only external penalties and do not deprive a man of the common spiritual prayers of the Church. - 24. Christians are to be taught to love excommunication more than to fear it." Propositions of Martin Luther condemned by Leo X.

"44. With respect to the forum of conscience, when the guilty party has been corrected and his contumacy has ceased, censures cease." Proposition condemned by Alexander VII.

"90. The Church has the authority of excommunicating in order that she may exercise it through the chief pastors, with at least the presumed consent of the whole body. - 91. Fear of an unjust excommunication must never prevent us from fulfilling our duty: we never depart from the Church, even when through the wickedness of men we seem to be expelled from her, when we are attached through charity to God, to Jesus Christ, and to the Church herself. - 92. To suffer in peace an unjust excommunication and anathema rather than betray the truth is to imitate Saint Paul: so far is this from being to raise oneself against authority or to rend unity." Propositions of Pasquier Quesnel condemned by Clement XI.

"19. Through the ecclesiastical censures of excommunication, suspension, and interdict, the clergy subjects the lay people to itself for its own exaltation, multiplies avarice, protects malice, and prepares the way for Antichrist. An evident sign, moreover, is that such censures, which they call fulminations in their processes, proceed from Antichrist, and by them the clergy proceeds principally against those who lay bare the wickedness of Antichrist, who will especially usurp the clergy for himself." Article of John Hus condemned by the Council of Constance.

"11. No prelate ought to excommunicate anyone unless he first knows him to have been excommunicated by God; and he who excommunicates in this way becomes by this fact a heretic or excommunicated. - 12. A prelate excommunicating a cleric who has appealed to the king or to the Council of the kingdom is by that very fact a traitor to the king and the kingdom. - 13. Those who cease to preach or to hear the word of God on account of the excommunication of men are excommunicated and will be regarded as traitors in the judgment of God. - 30. The excommunication of the Pope or of any prelate is not to be feared, because it is the censure of Antichrist." Propositions of John Wycliffe condemned by the Council of Constance.

"31. Likewise, whether he believes that the Pope or other prelates, the proper names of the Pope then reigning being expressed, or their vicars, can excommunicate their ecclesiastical or secular subject because of disobedience or contumacy, so that such a person is to be regarded as excommunicated. - 32. Likewise, whether he believes that, when the disobedience or contumacy of the excommunicated increases, prelates or their vicars in spiritual matters have the power of aggravating and reaggravating, of imposing an interdict, and of invoking the secular arm; and that inferiors must obey those censures. - 33. Likewise, whether he believes that the Pope or other prelates and their vicars in spiritual matters have the power of excommunicating disobedient and contumacious priests and laymen, and of suspending them from office, benefice, entrance into the church, and administration of the ecclesiastical Sacraments." Articles concerning which those suspected of the errors of Wycliffe and Hus are to be questioned by mandate of Martin V in the Bull Inter cunctas.

Cf. no. 1084.

"Those who are excommunicated by name, or are declared excommunicated by name, whether by the Supreme Pontiff or by bishops, are even today to be avoided according to the norm of the Constitution Ad evitanda of Martin V. Those communicating with excommunicated persons who must be avoided, however, do not after the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis incur major excommunication, except in the cases included in this Constitution. Notorious assailants of clerics are likewise excommunicated persons who must be avoided according to the Constitution Ad evitanda." Holy Office, 9 January 1884.

"Nearly all commentators on the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis teach that minor excommunication was abolished by force of this Constitution. Can this opinion be safely taught in the Seminary? - Response. Affirmative." Holy Office, 5 December 1883.

"Whether, minor excommunication against those who communicate with persons excommunicated by name by the Supreme Pontiff having been removed, the prohibition is also considered to have been removed? - Response. Negative." Holy Office, 2 August 1893.

"Titius, a priest, while he was bound by a reserved occult excommunication, from which he afterwards obtained absolution, requested and obtained from the Sacred Roman Congregations certain personal favors which were granted to him by special Rescripts: namely, from the Sacred Congregation of the Index the faculty of reading prohibited books; from the Holy Office the faculty, or dispensation, from fasting; from the Sacred Congregation of Indulgences the faculty of blessing crowns and other objects with the application of Indulgences; from the Sacred Congregation of Rites the faculty of blessing sacred furnishings and other things.

"But, having now learned that the excommunicated are incapable of obtaining Pontifical favors, he finds himself in great straits from the doubt whether he can validly use the aforesaid faculties and favors, on account of which he asks through me:

"a) whether the aforesaid Rescripts obtained by Titius while he was bound by excommunication are to be regarded as valid;

"b) and, in the negative case, how Titius ought to conduct himself so as not to disclose the cause of the invalidity of the Rescripts obtained. - Response. Let the petitioner rest content concerning the foregoing. For the forum of conscience only." Sacred Penitentiary, 9 September 1898. Cf. M. E., vol. 15, pp. 166-167.

"At every time the Church has been solicitous that not only should advancement to sacred orders be forbidden, but also that criminals should remain suspended from the exercise of those same orders.

"Since, however, an easy and prompt coercion of occult crimes also, which it would not be expedient to disclose, namely one free from judicial forms, is sometimes necessary for protecting the dignity of the sacred ministry and the welfare of the faithful, the Fathers of Trent with most wise counsel decreed in Session 24, chapter 1, On Reformation: 'For one whose advancement to sacred orders has been forbidden in any manner by his own prelate for any cause whatsoever, even for an occult crime, even extrajudicially; or one who has been suspended from his orders or grades or ecclesiastical dignities: no license granted contrary to the will of that prelate for having himself promoted, nor restoration to his former orders, grades, and dignities or honors, shall avail him.'

"From this provident decree, in that which relates to crimes of clerics which merit extrajudicial suspension from ecclesiastical offices, the penalty of suspension for causes known to the prelate has long been in use; this, namely, is called suspension ex informata conscientia. Therefore, in order that the Ordinaries of Catholic Missions may proceed in inflicting it with the greatest caution and security possible, the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith judged that the present Instruction should be issued, to which those same Ordinaries will take care to conform themselves in employing this extraordinary remedy.

"1. Suspension ex informata conscientia, no less than that which is inflicted by a judicial sentence, prohibits an ecclesiastical person from exercising his orders or grades or ecclesiastical dignities.

"2. It differs from judicial suspension principally in this: that it is employed as an extraordinary remedy in punishment of a crime committed; and therefore neither judicial forms nor canonical admonitions are required for its imposition. It will accordingly suffice if the prelate inflicting this penalty uses a simple precept by which he declares that he imposes suspension from the exercise of sacred offices or ecclesiastical duties.

"3. A precept of this kind must always be intimated in writing, with the day and month designated; and therefore it must be done either by the Ordinary himself or by another person by his express mandate. In the same intimation, however, it must be expressed that a punishment of this kind is imposed by force of the Tridentine decree, Session 24, chapter 1, On Reformation, ex informata conscientia, or for causes known to the Ordinary himself.

"4. The parts of the exercise of order or office to which the suspension extends must furthermore be expressed; but if the suspended person is interdicted from an office for which another must be substituted in his place, as, for example, an administrator in the care of souls, then the substitute shall receive compensation from the fruits of the benefice in that portion which shall be assessed according to the prudent judgment of the Ordinary. But if the suspended person considers himself aggrieved in this assessment, he can seek moderation before the archiepiscopal curia or even before the Apostolic See.

"5. The time of duration of the same penalty must likewise be expressed. Let Ordinaries, however, abstain from inflicting it in perpetuity. But if for more grave causes the Ordinary judges that it should be imposed not for a determined time but at his good pleasure, then it is regarded as temporary and therefore will cease with the jurisdiction of the Ordinary inflicting the suspension.

"6. A just and legitimate cause for suspension ex informata conscientia is furnished by a crime or fault committed by the person suspended. This, however, must be occult and so grave that it merits such punishment.

"7. For it to be occult, however, it is required that it has been brought neither into judgment nor into the rumors of the people, and furthermore that it is not known to such a number and quality of persons that the offense must thereby be regarded as notorious.

"8. The suspension nevertheless holds even if one of several offenses was known among the people, or if the crime which had been occult before the suspension was afterwards divulged by others.

"9. It is left to the prudent judgment of prelates either to disclose to the delinquent, or to conceal, the cause of the suspension, that is, the fault itself. Otherwise, it will be the part of their pastoral solicitude and charity that, if they judge that a penalty of this kind should be manifested to the suspended person, through the paternal admonitions which they interpose it may serve not only for the expiation of the fault, but also for the amendment of the delinquent and for removing the occasion of sinning.

"10. But let the prelates remember that if recourse is made to the Apostolic See against the decree by which the suspension was imposed, then the fault which furnished the occasion for it must be proved before the same See. It will therefore be advisable that, before this penalty is inflicted, proofs of it be collected, although extrajudicially and secretly, so that, by the very fact that one proceeds with complete certainty of culpability in inflicting the punishment, if the case must afterwards be examined before the Apostolic See, the proofs of the crime may not encounter those difficulties which very often occur in judgments of this kind.

"11. From a decree of suspension ex informata conscientia no appeal is given to a tribunal of higher order. Therefore, after a cleric has received the intimation of suspension, if he nevertheless presumes to interpose an appeal and, under its pretext, to minister at the altar or solemnly to exercise his order in any manner, he immediately falls into irregularity.

"12. Access to the Apostolic See nevertheless always lies open, and in a case in which a cleric considers himself punished by this penalty without a sufficient and reasonable cause, he can have recourse to the Supreme Pontiff. Meanwhile, however, the decree of suspension remains in force until it has been rescinded or even moderated by the Pontiff himself or by the Sacred Congregation which must judge concerning the recourse.

"13. Finally, since a penalty of this kind is an altogether extraordinary remedy which is employed especially for the expiation of crimes without judicial forms, let prelates keep before their eyes that which the Supreme Pontiff Benedict XIV, of holy memory, most wisely admonishes in his Treatise On the Diocesan Synod, book 12, chapter 8, no. 6: namely, that a bishop would be blameworthy if in his synod he declared that henceforth, on private knowledge alone, he would punish with suspension from divine offices clerics whom he had discovered to have committed grave offenses, although their offense could not be conclusively proved in the external forum or it would not be expedient to bring it to the knowledge of others.

"Rome, from the offices of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, 20 October 1884." A. S. S., vol. 19, p. 561 ff.

"The rite of the Church commands that the bodies of the faithful, in whatever manner they are conveyed (even by carriage), whether to the Church or to the Cemetery, must always be accompanied by a priest." Sacred Congregation of Rites, 15 July 1876; Santander.

"The practice of covering with branches and flowers the funeral monuments which are erected in churches on the occasion of funerals can be tolerated." Sacred Congregation of Rites, 16 June 1893; Goa, ad C.

"Bodies must be three cubits distant from the Altar; and three cubits are nearly one meter in length; and this distance of tombs from the Altar is sufficient." Sacred Congregation of Rites, 12 January 1897.

"The Sacred Congregation of Rites, adhering to the Rubrics of the Roman Ritual and to several other Decrees previously published, declares:

"I. The bodies of the dead are to be accompanied with one cross only, which must be that of the Church to which the body of the deceased is being carried; provided that the chapter of the cathedral church does not take part, under whose cross all accompanying the funeral must walk.

"II. The parish priest always has the right and duty, even when the chapter of the cathedral church is present, but outside that church, to put on the Stole and to perform all offices over the body of a deceased person belonging to his church, until it has entered the church of burial from the place of death; and the body is to be carried to that church by passing freely through other parishes also (by a direct route, however, unless custom provides otherwise).

"III. The same parish priest has precedence over all the clergy, except the chapter of the cathedral church, if it is present, which in the procession shall walk after the parish priest himself; except also the Chapter of a collegiate church, if custom so provides. In this case, however, the senior dignitary of the cathedral chapter shall walk with a Stole and also with a cope, which the parish priest, however, shall not wear; and the same shall be observed if the chapter of a collegiate church walks after the parish priest.

"IV. If the deceased is to be buried in another parish church, the rector of that church alone, likewise vested with a Stole, has the right and duty of performing the remaining offices there over the body and of preceding all others, not even excepting the parish priest of the deceased, who, when the body has been brought to the threshold of the church, shall withdraw.

"V. The Sacred Congregation of Rites orders all these things to be observed for any churches whatsoever, even collegiate churches, whether belonging to the secular or to the regular clergy, any custom whatsoever to the contrary notwithstanding.

"To no apostolic Missionary of whatever grade, condition, preeminence, religion, or state is it to be lawful in the future to commit to type any work of his own or of another, under any pretext whatsoever, by himself or through another or others, without the express license in writing of the S. C. itself, in the accustomed form, under penalty of privation of office, of active and passive voice, suppression of the same work, excommunication latae sententiae to be incurred by the very fact and reserved to Our Most Holy Lord alone, commanding the above-mentioned and each of them that, in the case in which they obtain the said license, they are bound to print the same at the beginning of the work itself, under the same penalties, notwithstanding whatsoever privileges, faculties, licenses, even orally, otherwise given or conceded, all and singular of which by the present Decree are to be judged revoked in every way." S. C. de P. F. 6 Dec. 1655.

"Therefore since, as we have received, although at another time the Congregation of Our Venerable Brothers the Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church for just causes had forbidden anyone without its license to publish by type books and writings in which Missions were treated in any way, nevertheless many, either ignorant of what the same Congregation had decreed, or rashly transgressing its decree, publish writings and books often containing false and inept things, not without offense of pious and learned men: We, moved by these and other grave causes, by the counsel of the mentioned Cardinals, by apostolic authority and the tenor of the present letters, again prohibit that anyone of whatever state, grade, and condition, even a regular of any Order, Congregation, Institute, and Society, even of Jesus, although he were one of whom specific and individual mention would have to be made, without license in writing of the Congregation of the same Cardinals, which he is bound to print at the beginning of the work, publish by himself or through another books and writings in which Missions or matters pertaining to Missions are treated, under the penalties of excommunication latae sententiae, from which no one can be absolved by anyone except by Us, or the Roman Pontiff existing for the time, unless constituted in the article of death, and of privation of office and of active and passive voice, and also of suppression of the works, to be incurred by the very fact." Clement X, Brief Creditae nobis, 6 Apr. 1673.

"It is in no way expedient that in the Empire of China and the Kingdom of Tonkin any writings or books be published, whether treating of Religion directly or indirectly, or discussing ecclesiastical matters, unless by prior examination and approval of the Sacred Congregation itself. Yet it declared small doctrines, catechisms, instructions, and prayers which serve the daily use of the faithful to be excepted from this law; nevertheless under this condition, that they cannot be scattered among the people unless the respective Bishops of the places, or Apostolic Vicars, shall first have seen them and permitted them to be emitted into the light." S. C. de P. F. 28 Dec. 1770; 31 March 1856 to the Apostolic Vicar of Cochinchina; 31 Aug. 1840 to the Apostolic Vicar of Siam; 30 Sept. 1848 to the Apostolic Vicar of Western Cochinchina.

"And since it has been discovered that in several Vicariates there are published books and booklets in which discourse is instituted concerning the morals and usages of the Gentiles, and which refer more or less directly to the interpretation of the Apostolic Constitution of Benedict XIV of holy memory which begins Omnium sollicitudinum, the Most Eminent Fathers judged that Apostolic Vicars and Missionaries are to be warned that an exemplar of whatsoever instructions and booklets must altogether be sent to this Sacred Congregation, in which there is question of matters pertaining in any way to the interpretation of the remembered Bull." Instr. S. C. de P. F. to the Apostolic Vicars of India, 8 Dec. 1868.

"Since from the year 1788 up to this day Breviaries, Diurnal Hours, Missals, Little Offices of the B. M. V., Offices of Holy Week, Rituals, and other things of that kind, which are newly committed to the press, no longer bear the attestations of the Reverend Ordinaries, by which it is declared that these exemplars agree with those which are printed at Rome according to the tracks of the Bulls of St. Pius V, Clement VIII, and Urban VIII, Supreme Pontiffs, which are found at the front of the Roman Breviary, the S. R. C. was supplicated that it be declared whether the recounted Pontifical Constitutions ought still to be observed, and whether transgressors incurred the penalties inflicted there. And the same Sacred Congregation, all things maturely weighed and accurately considered, judged that it must be rescripted and declared: the Pontifical Constitutions remain in their force, and the abuse is not to be tolerated." S. R. C. 26 Apr. 1834.

"1. Is it lawful to give one's name to societies whose proposal is to promote the use of burning human corpses? 2. Is it lawful to command that one's own or others' corpses be burned? Resp. To the 1st: Negatively, and if there is question of societies affiliated to the Masonic sect, the penalties laid against this are incurred. To the 2nd: Negatively. And when a report concerning these things had been made to Our Most Holy Pope Leo XIII, His Holiness approved and confirmed the resolutions of the Most Eminent Fathers, and ordered them to be communicated to the local Ordinaries, that they may take care opportunely to instruct the Christian faithful concerning the detestable abuse of burning human bodies, and that with all their strength they deter from it the flock entrusted to them." S. I. C. 19 May 1886.

7. The question likewise was whether, when an impediment stands, absolution is always given directly, or only indirectly. The present Decree also settles this question in favor of the opinion which, again congruently with the Law, asserted that absolution is given directly. For the Sacred Congregation declares that the faculty belongs to confessors of absolving even from censures reserved in a special manner to the Supreme Pontiff. Moreover the same S. C. adds that there is a penalty of reincidence into the same censures unless, within at least a month, the absolved person has recourse by letter to the Holy See. But now, if reincidence is had into censures, the penitent was truly absolved from them and consequently obtained absolution directly as to sins. Cf. Commentary on Censures, n. 51 ff.

1137. In order that laws may be observed more efficaciously, they must be fortified by some sanction; for this reason the Church is accustomed to sanction principal delicts with certain penalties. Now an ecclesiastical penalty is "the privation of some good, inflicted by legitimate authority, for the correction of the delinquent and the punishment of the delict."¹⁶

¹⁶ Code, c. 2215.

There are three kinds of penalties: 1. medicinal penalties or censures, which directly tend to the amendment of the delinquent; 2. vindicative penalties,¹⁷ which directly tend to the expiation and avoidance of the delict, for example, local interdict, infamy of law, deposition, degradation; 3. penal remedies,¹⁸ such as admonition, correction, precept, vigilance; and also penances,¹⁹ which are imposed so that the delinquent may either avoid a penalty, or receive absolution or dispensation from a contracted penalty, for example, spiritual exercises, recitation of determinate prayers.

¹⁷ Code, c. 2286.

¹⁸ Code, c. 2306.

¹⁹ Code, c. 2312.

Here, however, it must be noted that these penalties do not obtain their full effect in the external forum except after a declaratory sentence, as is established from can. 2232: "A penalty latae sententiae, whether medicinal or vindicative, binds the delinquent who is conscious of his delict ipso facto in both forums; nevertheless, before a declaratory sentence, the delinquent is excused from observing the penalty as often as he cannot observe it without infamy, and in the external forum no one can exact from him the observance of the same penalty..."

Here we shall treat especially of censures, leaving the other things to be explained by Canonists.

There will be three articles: in the first, we shall hand down general principles concerning censures; in the second, we shall treat censures in species, namely excommunication, suspension, and interdict; in the third, censures latae sententiae in the individual.

1138. 1. Definition of censure. Censure is defined: a spiritual and medicinal penalty, by which a baptized man, delinquent and contumacious, is deprived of certain spiritual goods, or goods annexed to spiritual things, until, withdrawing from contumacy, he is absolved.¹

¹ Code, c. 2241.

It is said: a) penalty, or something bringing trouble; and thus it is distinguished from irregularity, which is an inability for receiving or exercising orders, and from reservation, by which the jurisdiction of the confessor is limited without a penalty properly being inflicted on the penitent. b) This penalty consists in privation of certain spiritual goods, such as the sacraments, or of goods annexed to spiritual things, such as ecclesiastical benefices. c) Hence the penalty is spiritual. d) It is moreover medicinal, or tending to the amendment of the delinquent: whence it is imposed only until the guilty person, withdrawing from contumacy, receives absolution.²

² Code, c. 2248.

1139. 2. Division of censures. a) By reason of the manner in which they are established, censures are a jure, if the determined penalty is established in the law itself; ab homine, if it is brought by way of a particular precept, or by a judicial condemnatory or declaratory sentence, even if established in law.³ b) By reason of the manner in which they are incurred, censures are latae or ferendae sententiae, according as they are incurred by the fact itself before any condemnatory sentence, or only after such a sentence. c) By reason of the manner in which they are absolved, censures are reserved, or reserved to no one, according as absolution is reserved to Ordinaries, or even to the Roman Pontiff, or can be given by all confessors. d) By reason of divulgation, censures are notorious when either by the sentence of a judge, or by the confession of the delinquent made in judgment, or by the perpetration of the delict in a public place, it is so known that someone has incurred a censure that this cannot be concealed; otherwise, they are called occult.⁴ e) By reason of the effects, that is, of the goods of which the censured person is deprived, three censures are enumerated, namely: excommunication, suspension, and interdict. We shall speak of each species in the following article.

³ Code, c. 2217.

⁴ Cod. jur. can., 2197.

3. Concerning the author of censures.

1140. A) He who enjoys the power of making law or imposing precepts⁵ can bring censures. - A vicar general without special mandate does not have this power.⁶

⁵ Ibid., 2220.

⁶ Ibid.

a) Therefore the power of bringing censures is had by: 1) the Roman Pontiff and the ecumenical Council for the universal Church; 2) apostolic legates, for the territory assigned to them; 3) the provincial Council, for its province; 4) bishops,⁷ upon their diocesans while they are staying in the diocese; also upon diocesans staying outside the diocese when they violate not the law but a precept of the bishop (more probably), or after they have committed a delict in their own diocese, indeed outside the diocese; upon pilgrims who, while they are traveling in some diocese, there commit a delict; upon exempt persons in cases determined by law; 5) superiors of religious, according to the statutes of their order, upon their subjects existing in any place whatever, since their jurisdiction is personal rather than territorial.⁸

⁷ Say the same, when the see is vacant, of the capitular vicar, or of the Chapter itself before the deputation of the capitular vicar. Abbots having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction are also assimilated to bishops in this respect.

⁸ Pastors cannot bring censures, because they never had true jurisdiction in the external forum.

b) All and only clerics to whom this has been committed by those having ordinary power have delegated power of bringing censures. But delegates cannot subdelegate unless this is expressly conceded to them, or they have been delegated by the Roman Pontiff, or for the universality of causes.

1141. B) Concerning the solemnities to be observed in bringing censures.

a) If there is question of censures ferendae sententiae and ab homine, a threefold warning, or at least one equivalent to three, which is called peremptory, must be sent beforehand;⁹ for censures can be brought only upon the contumacious (n. 1144). But the sentence must be delivered in writing, for liceity indeed, but not for validity.¹⁰

⁹ Cod. jur. can., 2233, 2242.

¹⁰ Cf. Code, c. 1877 and c. 2239, § 2.

b) But if there is question of censures latae sententiae or even of a censure ferendae sententiae but a jure, no special warning is required, since the law itself or the precept continually warns.¹¹

¹¹ Code, c. 2232, 2242, § 2.

1142. 4. Concerning the subject of censures.

From the definition itself of censure, it is required that the one to be censured be a man, baptized, delinquent, and contumacious.

A) A man,¹² wayfaring and capable of guile, that is, of sin, since censure supposes a delict.

¹² Excommunication against harmful animals, which was long in use, is not properly excommunication, but a suppliant prayer that God drive them away. Against demons, the Church uses exorcisms, not censures.

"Those who have not reached puberty are excused from penalties latae sententiae, and should be corrected by educative punishments rather than by censures or other more grave vindicative penalties; but those who have reached puberty, who have induced them to violate the law or have concurred with them in the delict, themselves indeed incur the penalty established by law."¹³

¹³ Code, 2230.

B) Baptized. For the Church does not judge those who are outside.¹⁴

¹⁴ 1 Cor. 5:12; Trent, sess. XIV, De Paenit., c. 2.

1143. C) Delinquent. Now the delict must be external, mortal, and consummated.

a) External: for the Church does not judge concerning internal things. We do not say public; for even an occult sin can be external, for example, heresy pronounced by mouth, even without any witness.

b) Mortal: otherwise there would not be proportion between the delict and the penalty, since censure is a most grave ecclesiastical penalty.

Therefore whatever excuses from mortal sin also excuses from censure.¹⁵ Hence if in fact the one against whom a censure has been brought has not committed a subjectively mortal sin, although in the external forum he must be held and conduct himself as censured in order to avoid scandal, nevertheless he is not truly censured before God, nor therefore deprived of those spiritual goods of which censure deprives.

¹⁵ "Not only the things which excuse from all imputability, but also those which excuse from grave imputability, likewise excuse from any penalty, whether latae or ferendae sententiae, even in the external forum, if the excuse is proved for the external forum." Code, 2218.

Moreover, the delict must be mortal insofar as it is external, so that, if the sin is mortal but not insofar as it is external, censure is not incurred: for example, a very slight striking of a cleric from a gravely evil intention.

c) Consummated: that is, it is required that precisely that delict which the legislator intends to prohibit under penalty be perfectly completed; for penal laws are of strict interpretation.¹⁶ Yet if the attempt of a delict is punished in law by a peculiar penalty, it constitutes a true delict and suffices for incurring censure.¹⁷

¹⁶ Cf. Cod. jur. can., 2219, 2228.

¹⁷ Code, c. 2212.

1144. D) Contumacious. For contumacy it is required that the delinquent know, at least habitually, even if he does not actually think about the prohibition and penalty, that something is prohibited by ecclesiastical law and under censure, and nevertheless freely act against the ecclesiastical prohibition.

But the following excuse from contumacy: a) grave fear, indeed even light fear when the censure is brought against those presuming, acting with rash daring, doing something spontaneously or knowingly or deliberately; b) ignorance of the law or penalty which is not affected, crass, or supine.¹⁸

¹⁸ Yet when a censure is brought against those who sin "rashly," "with rash daring," "knowingly," "deliberately," etc., even crass or supine ignorance excuses, but not affected ignorance. Cod. jur. can., 2229. - If there is question of a penalty ferendae sententiae, he is called contumacious who, having been canonically warned, perseveres in the delict (can. 2233, § 2).

1145. Various things to be noted. a) "Unless they are expressly named, Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church are not comprehended under a penal law, nor Bishops under penalties latae sententiae of suspension and interdict."¹⁹ Moreover those who hold the supreme principate of peoples, and their sons and daughters, or those who have the right of immediately succeeding to the principate, incur only penalties inflicted or declared by the Roman Pontiff.²⁰

¹⁹ Code, c. 2227, § 2.

²⁰ Code, c. 2227 and 1557.

b) In censures, the more benign interpretation is to be made.²¹ Hence censures brought upon the people do not bind the clergy; those brought upon the clergy do not bind the people, nor regulars who emit solemn vows, but more probably they bind religious of simple vows.

²¹ Code, c. 19, 20, 2219.

c) Someone can be simultaneously liable to several censures of different species (excommunication, suspension), or to several of the same species (for example, several excommunications): either because by the same or distinct action he has committed different delicts, each of which has a censure annexed; or because the same delict is punished by different censures by distinct Superiors; or because the delict punished by censure is repeated several times. - Censure ab homine is multiplied if several precepts or several sentences are violated.²²

²² Ibid., 2244.

d) In doubt whether a censure has been contracted or not, the censure does not bind,²³ unless there is doubt whether the penalty, inflicted by a competent Superior, is just.²⁴

²³ Can. 2233.

²⁴ Can. 2219.

1146. 5. Concerning absolution from censures.

Censure properly so called, once it has been contracted, is not removed by the death either of the censured person or of the one censuring; nor by the cessation of the law or precept; nor by the amendment of the guilty person, but only by absolution given by a competent superior.²⁵

²⁵ Can. 2248.

A) No one can absolve from censures brought ab homine, except the one who brought the censure, or his successor, or superior (provided he has jurisdiction over the censured person), or their delegate. In danger of death, every reservation ceases.

1147. B) Censures brought by common law are either reserved to no one, or reserved to the Roman Pontiff or to the Ordinary.

a) From censures reserved to no one, any confessor validly and licitly absolves in the sacramental forum; outside the sacramental forum, anyone who has jurisdiction over the guilty person in the external forum.²⁶

²⁶ Code, c. 2253.

b) From censures reserved to the Roman Pontiff, the following can absolve: the Roman Pontiff himself and the Major Penitentiary; bishops; delegated priests; indeed sometimes any priest, under conditions and with limitations to be explained in the Treatise on Penance.

c) In occult cases, the Ordinary can, by himself or through another, remit penalties latae sententiae established by common law, except censures reserved to the Holy See in a most special or special manner.²⁷

²⁷ Code, c. 2232, § 2.

1148. d) But from censures reserved to the Ordinary, the Roman Pontiff, the Bishop, the capitular Vicar, the vicar general, the regular Prelate (his own subjects), the Archbishop in the case of visitation or appeal, and their delegate absolve;²⁸ indeed sometimes any priest, as is explained in the Treatise on Penance.

²⁸ He who has delegated power of absolving from censures reserved to the Roman Pontiff is not for this reason able to absolve from censures reserved to the Ordinary. But he who has a special faculty of absolving from censures even reserved to the Roman Pontiff can absolve from censures (of common law) reserved to the Ordinary.

1149. C) From censures brought by particular law and not reserved, any confessor can absolve validly and licitly in the sacramental forum; outside the sacramental forum, anyone who has jurisdiction over the guilty person in the external forum.²⁹ - But if they are reserved, no one can absolve from them, except the one to whom they are reserved, or his superior, or successor, or delegate; yet in an urgent case, and in danger of death, any priest can absolve, under certain conditions, as is explained in the Treatise on Penance.

²⁹ Code, c. 2253, 1.

1150. Things to be noted concerning absolution from censures. A) For absolving from censures, jurisdiction over the one to be absolved is required in the one absolving, but not necessarily sacramental jurisdiction; for absolution from censures can be given by a Superior, or his delegate, even one who is not a priest.

B) Absolution from censures can be separated from absolution from sins.

Hence if sacramental confession cannot be had immediately, and on the other hand reasons are present that the guilty person be absolved immediately from censures, he can be absolved from censures, although not from sins: for example, if a priest having power of absolving from reserved censures does not have time to hear an integral confession, or if the guilty person is not prepared to make it, the priest can hear only the cases which have a censure annexed, and absolve from censures, and send the penitent to another who, after hearing the confession, would absolve from sins.³⁰

³⁰ Gury-Ballerini, n. 954.

"But if there is question of a censure which does not impede the reception of the Sacraments, the censured person, rightly disposed and withdrawing from contumacy, can be absolved from sins, with the censure remaining firm" (can. 2250).

If, from a rescript, absolution from censures cannot be given unless sacramental confession has first been heard, care must be taken that the penitent be disposed for the absolution of sins. But the absolution from censures would be valid provided the sacramental accusation of sins had preceded.³¹

³¹ S. Penit., January 4, 1839.

C) No special formula is required for imparting absolution from censures in the sacramental forum, unless otherwise prescribed in the rescript. The confessor absolves by the very formula of absolution. Yet for absolution from excommunication in the non-sacramental forum, it is regularly fitting to use the form handed down in the ritual books.³²

³² Can. 2250.

D) Absolution from censures can be given to one absent, indeed even unwilling. But absolution given to one unwilling does not have its effect as to a censure which is annexed to a sin still enduring, for example, adherence to a Masonic sect.

E) He who is bound by several censures can be absolved from one, without being absolved from the others. Hence "one seeking absolution must indicate all cases; otherwise the absolution is valid only for the expressed case; but if the absolution, although a particular petition was made, was general, it is valid also for things concealed in good faith, excepting a censure reserved to the Apostolic See in a most special manner."³³

³³ Can. 2249.

We shall declare its nature and effects.

1151. I. Nature. Excommunication is a censure by which someone is separated from the communion of the faithful.

Among the excommunicated, some are tolerated, others are to be avoided, according as it is lawful or not to communicate with them.

Formerly, all who were struck by major excommunication had to be avoided by the faithful. Now, no one is to be avoided unless he has been excommunicated by name by the Apostolic See, the excommunication has been publicly denounced, and in the decree or sentence it is expressly said that he must be avoided.¹

¹ Can. 2258.

1152. II. The effects are expressed by canonists in these little verses:

Sacred things, rites, communion, crypt, power,
Sacred estates, forum, civil rights are forbidden.

1. Sacred things. By these words there is interdicted to the excommunicated person both the reception and the administration of the sacraments.

A) As to the reception of the sacraments, the excommunicated person is prohibited under grave sin from receiving the sacraments,² unless grave necessity excuses, for example, fear of death, danger of grave infamy, etc.³ Yet an excommunicated person validly receives any sacraments, even penance itself, at least if he approaches it in good faith. But the excommunicated person is bound to dispose himself for absolution, so that he may satisfy the precept concerning paschal Communion.

² Code, c. 2260. Cf. can. 855, § 1.

³ Thus D'Annibale (I, n. 360) judges that an excommunicated person, even one to be avoided, is not kept from Penance if he is in lethal sin and would long be deprived of a confessor. For then grave necessity presses.

B) As to the administration of the sacraments: a) the excommunicated person is prohibited from licitly confecting and administering Sacraments and Sacramentals, with the exceptions which follow preserved:

a) The faithful can for any just cause seek Sacraments and Sacramentals from an excommunicated person, especially if other ministers are lacking; and then the excommunicated person who is requested can minister the same and is held by no obligation of questioning the one requesting about the cause; b) but from excommunicated persons to be avoided, and also from other excommunicated persons after a condemnatory or declaratory sentence has intervened, the faithful can, in danger of death alone, seek both sacramental absolution and also, if other ministers are lacking, the other Sacraments and Sacramentals.⁴ - Any excommunicated person is also prohibited from the right of electing, presenting, and nominating.⁵

⁴ Code, c. 2265.

⁵ Code, c. 2261.

1153. 2. Rites. Any excommunicated person lacks the right of assisting at divine offices, but not at the preaching of the word of God. If a tolerated person assists passively, it is not necessary that he be expelled; if one to be avoided does so, he must be expelled, or, if he cannot be expelled, the office must cease, provided this can be done without grave inconvenience; but from active assistance, which carries with it some participation in celebrating divine offices, not only one to be avoided is to be repelled, but also anyone who, after a declaratory or condemnatory sentence or otherwise, is notoriously excommunicated.⁶

⁶ Code, c. 2259.

3. Communion. By this word is indicated privation of common suffrages, that is, spiritual helps which are accustomed to come to the faithful from good works done in the name of the Church, or from the treasury of the Church. Of this kind are the fruits of Mass and the Breviary, insofar as they are performed in the name of the Church, indulgences, sacramentals, etc. - Excommunicated persons, even those to be avoided, are not deprived of private suffrages which, from good works done in a private name, are applied by private intention. - Indeed priests privately and with scandal removed can apply Mass for an excommunicated person; but if he is to be avoided, only for his conversion.⁷

⁷ Code, c. 2262.

1154. 4. Crypt, that is, ecclesiastical burial, must be denied: A) To excommunicated persons after a condemnatory or declaratory sentence.⁸ If, without signs of penance, an excommunicated person dies after a declaratory or condemnatory sentence, the cemetery is violated by his burial;⁹ but if he dies penitent, he must be absolved (cf. Rit. Rom., tit. 3, c. 4), and buried in a sacred place. B) But as to tolerated persons, although they have no right to ecclesiastical burial, this nevertheless can be conceded to them. Yet often it will have to be denied to them for another reason, namely if they are public sinners, or notorious heretics (or apostates).

⁸ Code, c. 2260.

⁹ Code, c. 1207, 1172.

To this pertain, for example, the responses of the Sacred Penitentiary concerning deputies or senators who in France approved laws against religion by their vote. They must be held as excommunicated; they are to be deprived of ecclesiastical burial if it is notoriously established that they died in their sin; but if they died penitent, they are not to be deprived of the customary honors. In doubt, let them be buried without solemnities, for example, let only a low Mass be conceded, with a simple absolution of the corpse.¹⁰

¹⁰ S. Penit., May 20, 1908; cf. Canoniste, XXXI, p. 558.

5. Power, that is, jurisdiction, is taken away from an excommunicated person if a condemnatory or declaratory sentence has been brought against him, so that he exercises it illicitly and invalidly, whether in the external forum or in the internal forum, except the case of necessity in danger of death. But a tolerated person, even a notorious one, is not deprived of jurisdiction, and exercises it licitly if he has been asked by the faithful.¹¹

¹¹ Code, c. 2261, 2264.

6. Sacred estates, or benefices, cannot validly be conferred upon an excommunicated person,¹² even a tolerated one. But an excommunicated person retains benefices previously possessed, and makes their fruits his own, provided a condemnatory or declaratory sentence has not intervened.¹³ But any excommunicated person is prohibited from performing ecclesiastical offices or functions and from enjoying privileges previously conceded by the Church.¹⁴ But one to be avoided remains at once deprived of dignity itself, office, or benefice.¹⁵

¹² Code, c. 2265.

¹³ Code, c. 2266.

¹⁴ Code, c. 2263.

¹⁵ Code, c. 2266.

By the new law, graces of every kind conceded by the Holy See, even to those entangled in censure, are ratified and legitimate, unless there is question of those who are excommunicated persons to be avoided, or excommunicated persons by declaratory or condemnatory sentence. The same things have been sanctioned as to the suspended and interdicted.¹⁶

¹⁶ Code, c. 2265, § 2; c. 2283; c. 2275.

7. Forum: namely every communication in the forum (formerly even in the civil forum) with the faithful is interdicted to the excommunicated person.¹⁷ And so: a) he cannot be judge, arbiter, advocate, procurator, notary, witness, etc. But if he is cited as accused, he can do all things which are required for his defense, unless he is one to be avoided or has undergone a declaratory or condemnatory sentence.¹⁸ b) But a tolerated person is excluded from no function by the law itself,¹⁹ but can be repelled by the judge, by the plaintiff, or by the accused.

¹⁷ Code, c. 2263: "An excommunicated person is removed from legitimate ecclesiastical acts."

¹⁸ Code, c. 1654.

¹⁹ Ibid.

1155. 8. Civil rights. "The faithful must avoid communion in profane matters with an excommunicated person to be avoided, unless there is question of spouse, parents, children, servants, subjects, and generally unless a reasonable cause excuses."²⁰

²⁰ Code, c. 2267.

Formerly communication in civil matters, even with tolerated persons, was prohibited. But Martin V (Const. Ad evitanda) benignly granted to the faithful that, scandal or danger of one's own perversion being excluded, no one was bound to abstain from communion with a tolerated person.

A) The acts prohibited with one to be avoided are expressed by this little verse:

Mouth, prayer, greeting, communion, table are denied.

Hence it is not lawful (unless in excepted cases) to write to one to be avoided, to give a kiss or some sign of special benevolence (mouth); nor to pray with him, even privately, at least under venial sin, unless a state of subjection excuses (prayer); nor to greet him for the sake of exhibiting honor, unless civility requires (greeting); nor to enter into society with him (communion), or to feast as a table-companion (table).

B) Excepted cases. Communication in civil matters with one to be avoided is lawful when necessity or utility excuses, whether spiritual or temporal, either of the excommunicated person himself, or of the faithful person communicating with one to be avoided, or of some third person.

C) Penalties against those communicating. That prohibition of communicating with one to be avoided, although in itself it does not oblige under mortal sin unless the communication is in divine matters, still subsists,²¹ and those violating it sometimes undergo certain penalties.

²¹ Holy Office, August 2, 1893, A. S. S., XXXI, 401.

We shall weigh its nature and effects.

1156. I. Nature. 1. Notion. Suspension is "a censure by which a cleric is prohibited from office or benefice or both." Hence: a) it touches only clerics, because only they can enjoy office or benefice and be deprived of it; b) suspension does not deprive one of ecclesiastical power itself, but only removes the right of using that power:²² and thus it differs from deposition,²³ which deprives the cleric of office itself.

²² Can. 2279, § 1.

²³ Can. 2303.

2. Species. a) Suspension ab homine can be brought in a threefold way: as a precaution, for removing scandals, against a cleric suspected of crime:²⁴ this suspension is not a penalty, but a simple prohibition; or by way of vindicative penalty, whether for a time or perpetually, in punishment of some delict; or by way of medicinal penalty, until the delinquent comes to his senses, and this is properly a censure. b) Suspension can be total or partial, according as it deprives a cleric wholly or partly of the use of ecclesiastical power.²⁵

²⁴ Code, c. 2222.

²⁵ Code, c. 2278.

1157. II. Effects. 1. He against whom total suspension is brought is suspended from office and from benefice, that is, from the exercise of a spiritual function (office), and from the right of using the temporal goods annexed to this function (benefice); but not from the right of administering benefice goods, unless the decree or sentence of suspension expressly takes away from the suspended person the very power of administering and attributes it to another.¹ - But the suspension which is brought absolutely without any determination is judged total.²

¹ Code, c. 2280.

² Code, c. 2278.

2. Partial suspension can be either from office or from benefice.

A) Office comprehends two things: the power of order and the power of jurisdiction.

a) Suspension from office simply, with no limitation added, forbids every act both of the power of order and of jurisdiction, and also of mere administration competent from office, with the administration of the goods of one's own benefice excepted.³

³ Code, c. 2279, § 1.

b) Suspension from divine things forbids every act of the power of order which one obtains either through sacred ordination or through privilege.⁴

⁴ Ibid., § 2.

c) Suspension from orders forbids every act of the power of order received through ordination; suspension from exercising a certain and definite order forbids every act of the designated order, the conferring of the same order, and the receiving of a higher one, and the exercise, after suspension, of one received; suspension from conferring a certain and definite order forbids the conferring of that order itself, but not an inferior or a higher one.⁵ - One suspended from an order, if he solemnly exercises an act of the sacred order from which he is suspended, becomes irregular.⁶

⁵ Ibid., § 2.

⁶ Code, c. 985.

d) Suspension from jurisdiction generally forbids every act of the power of jurisdiction for both forums, ordinary as well as delegated. Indeed a suspended person exercises jurisdiction invalidly if he is one to be avoided or under a declaratory or condemnatory sentence,⁷ and on the other hand jurisdiction is necessary for the validity of the act; but he does not become irregular. Someone can also be suspended from determinate acts of jurisdiction: in which case he can exercise other acts validly and licitly.

⁷ Code, c. 2265, 2283.

1158. B) Suspension from benefice deprives one of the fruits of the benefice, with habitation in the benefice buildings excepted, but not of the right of administering the benefice goods, unless this is expressly declared. - If, although the censure stands in the way, the beneficiary receives the fruits, he must restore the fruits, and can be compelled to this restitution even by canonical sanctions, if need be.⁸

⁸ Code, c. 2280.

If a community or college of clerics has committed a delict, suspension can be brought either upon the individual delinquent persons, or upon the community as such, or upon the delinquent persons and the community. 1) If the first, let the rules explained above be observed. 2) If the second, the community is prohibited from the exercise of spiritual rights which belong to it as a community. 3) If the third, the effects are combined.⁹

⁹ Code, c. 2285.

A suspended cleric can be absolved from sins by a simple confessor before he is absolved from a reserved suspension by a superior. For suspension does not deprive one of the reception of sacraments, excepting however order.¹⁰

¹⁰ Code, c. 2250.

1159. I. Notion. Interdict is a censure by which the faithful, while remaining in the communion of the Church, are prohibited from the sacred things indicated below.

It differs from excommunication and suspension. For excommunication "can affect only physical persons, and therefore, if at any time it is brought upon a moral body, it is understood to affect the individuals who have concurred in the delict; interdict and suspension can also affect a community as a moral person; excommunication and interdict can affect even laymen; suspension, only clerics; interdict can also affect a place; excommunication is always a censure; interdict and suspension can be either censures or vindicative penalties, but in doubt are presumed to be censures."¹¹

¹¹ Code, c. 2255, § 2.

1160. II. Species and effects. One must distinguish between personal interdict and local interdict.

1. Personal interdict is that which immediately and directly affects persons and adheres to them, so that they are subject to it everywhere.

Those personally interdicted: a) cannot celebrate divine offices or assist at them, except the preaching of the word of God; those passively assisting need not be expelled; but from active assistance, which carries with it some participation in celebrating divine offices, the interdicted must be repelled after a condemnatory or declaratory sentence has been brought, or when otherwise notoriously interdicted; b) they are prohibited from receiving the sacraments, and indeed, after a declaratory or condemnatory sentence, also sacramentals; they are also prohibited from confecting and administering Sacraments and Sacramentals; yet the faithful can seek sacraments and sacramentals for any cause from one simply interdicted, but from one to be avoided only in the necessity of danger of death; c) they are prohibited from the right of electing, presenting, nominating, obtaining dignities and offices in the Church, and receiving orders, and after a declaratory or condemnatory sentence they cannot validly obtain any pontifical grace; d) they lack ecclesiastical burial after a declaratory or condemnatory sentence.¹²

¹² Code, c. 2275.

1161. 2. Local interdict is that which directly affects places and not persons, so that persons in another place are not kept from divine things.

A) If it immediately touches some territory, for example, a kingdom, city, village, there is a general local interdict.

If nothing else has been expressed by the decree of interdict: a) clerics not personally interdicted are permitted to perform all divine offices and sacred rites privately, with doors closed; b) but in the cathedral church, in parish churches, or in a church which is the only one in a town, and in these alone, there are permitted the celebration of one Mass, reservation of the Most Holy Sacrament, administration of baptism, Eucharist, penance, assistance at marriages, with nuptial blessing excluded, funerals of the dead, preaching, etc., but without solemnity.¹³

¹³ Code, c. 2271.

B) If the interdict immediately touches certain sacred places, for example, this oratory, this church, or all churches of this place, there is a particular local interdict.

In this case, "if an altar or chapel of some church has been interdicted, no sacred office or sacred rite is to be celebrated in them. If a cemetery has been interdicted, the bodies of the faithful can indeed be buried there, but without any ecclesiastical rite."¹⁴ If capitular churches (the chapter not being interdicted) or parish churches have been interdicted, sacred rites without solemnity are permitted, unless the decree of interdict disposes otherwise.¹⁵

¹⁴ Code, c. 2272, § 1-2.

¹⁵ Ibid., § 3.

He who is subject to a local interdict or to an interdict upon a community or college, without having given cause for it, can receive the sacraments without absolution from the interdict or other satisfaction.¹⁶

¹⁶ Code, c. 2276.

N. B. "On the day of the Nativity of the Lord, Easter, Pentecost, the Most Holy Body of Christ, and the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary into heaven, a local interdict is suspended, and only the conferral of orders and solemn blessing of nuptials is prohibited."¹⁷

¹⁷ Code, c. 2270, § 2.

1162. Scholium. Akin to interdict properly so called is interdict from the entrance of the church and cessation from divine things.

"Interdict from the entrance of the church carries with it the prohibition that someone celebrate divine offices in a church or assist at them, or have ecclesiastical burial; but if he assists, it is not necessary that he be expelled, nor, if he is buried, is it necessary that the corpse be removed."¹⁸

¹⁸ Code, c. 2277.

1163. Preliminary remarks. - A) Censures latae sententiae in force today are found in the Code of Canon Law (c. 2314-2414),¹⁹ mixed with other penalties; we have thought it opportune to separate them.

¹⁹ For in canon 6, 5, it is read: "As for penalties of which no mention is made in the Code, whether spiritual or temporal, medicinal or, as they call them, vindicative, latae or ferendae sententiae, let them be considered as abrogated."

But it must be kept before the eyes that by these censures the principal accomplices of delinquents also are bound, as is established from can. 2231 and 2209: "If several have concurred in perpetrating a delict, although only one is named in the law, those also of whom in can. 2209, § 1-3, are held, unless the law has expressly provided otherwise, by the same penalty..." Moreover can. 2209 has itself thus: "§ 1. Those who by common counsel of delinquency physically concur together in a delict are all held guilty in the same manner, unless the circumstances increase or diminish the culpability of someone. § 2. In a delict which by its nature requires an accomplice, each party is culpable in the same manner, unless from the circumstances something else appears. § 3. Not only the one commanding, who is the principal author of the delict, but also those who induce to the consummation of the delict or in any way concur in this, contract, other things being equal, no lesser imputability than the executor of the delict himself, if the delict would not have been committed without their work."

They are of a threefold kind: excommunications, suspensions, and interdicts.

1164. Among excommunications, some are reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, others to Bishops, and others finally to no one. Again, from the new law, some are reserved to the Supreme Pontiff in a most special manner, others in a special manner, and others simply.

Now for absolving from a censure reserved to the Apostolic See, delegated power is required by anyone besides the Roman Pontiff, whether general, if the censure is simply reserved, or special, if reserved in a special manner, or most special, if reserved in a most special manner,¹ with the exception, however, of more urgent cases, concerning which the treatment is given in the Treatise on Penance.

¹ Code, c. 2253. - We treat absolution from censures in the Treatise on Penance; meanwhile let canons of the Code 2247-2254 be read.

Four are numbered in the Code:

1165. I. "He who has cast away the consecrated species, or has carried them away or retained them for an evil end, is suspect of heresy; he incurs excommunication latae sententiae reserved in a most special manner to the Apostolic See; he is infamous by the fact itself, and a cleric besides is to be deposed."²

² Code, c. 2300.

From this canon it is established that he who in the designated ways has violated the Venerable Sacrament of the Altar, besides suspicion of heresy (and the sanctions following from this suspicion, can. 2315), infamy contracted by the fact itself with its consequences (can. 2294), and deposition ferendae sententiae (can. 2303), incurs moreover by the fact itself excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See in a most special manner, with the consequences of such reservation indicated in canons 2247, § 3, 2249, § 2; 2252, 2253, 2254.

1166. II. "He who has laid violent hands on the person of the Roman Pontiff contracts excommunication latae sententiae reserved to the Apostolic See in a most special manner; and is by the fact itself to be avoided."³

³ Code, c. 2343.

1167. III. "One absolving, or pretending to absolve, an accomplice in a base sin incurs by the fact itself excommunication reserved in a most special manner to the Apostolic See; and this even in the article of death, if another priest, even one not approved for confessions, can receive the confession of the dying person without some grave infamy and scandal about to arise, except the case in which the dying person refuses to confess to another.

"The same excommunication is not escaped by one absolving, or pretending to absolve, an accomplice who indeed does not confess the sin of complicity, from which he has not yet been absolved, but conducts himself thus because he has been induced to this by the accomplice-confessor either directly or indirectly."⁴

⁴ Code, c. 2367.

1168. IV. "A confessor who has presumed directly to violate the Sacramental seal."⁵

⁵ Code, c. 2369.

The sacramental seal is directly violated when that which is matter of the seal is expressly revealed, and at the same time the person who did it is designated.

N. B. Here it can be added that an excommunication ab homine, which the Supreme Pontiff sometimes brings, is reserved to him in a most special manner.

Eleven are enumerated in the Code:

1169. I. "All apostates from the Christian faith, and all and individual heretics or schismatics."⁶

⁶ Code, c. 2314, § 1.

Moreover, "if they have given their name to, or publicly adhered to, a non-Catholic sect, they are by the fact itself infamous; and... clerics, after a warning has been sent in vain, are to be degraded."⁷

⁷ Ibid.

But those favoring heresy are not excommunicated by the fact itself, but are suspect of heresy: "He who in any way voluntarily and knowingly helps the propagation of heresy, or who communicates in divine things with heretics... is suspect of heresy."⁸

⁸ Code, c. 2316. Can. 2315 establishes by what penalties one suspect of heresy can be struck, and adds: "If within six months... he has not amended himself, let him be held as a heretic, liable to the penalties of heretics."

The one suspect of heresy does not fall under excommunication unless he is obstinate, below, n. [source gives no number after "n."]

1170. As to the absolution of this censure, let these things be noted:

If the delict of apostasy, heresy, or schism has been brought in any way to the external forum of the local Ordinary, even through voluntary confession, the same Ordinary, but not the vicar general without special mandate, can by his ordinary authority in the external forum absolve the one repenting, after abjuration has first been juridically performed and the other things to be observed by law have been observed; but one thus absolved can then be absolved from sin by any confessor in the forum of conscience. Abjuration, moreover, is held juridically performed when it is done before the local Ordinary himself or his delegate and at least two witnesses.⁹

⁹ Code, c. 2314, § 2.

But by delegated authority, by force of quinquennial Indult n. 3, bishops could absolve from the sin of heresy even when not brought to the external forum, under certain conditions; but, from the decree of the S. C. Consistorial, April 25, 1918, faculties of this kind have now ceased; therefore unless special Indults are obtained, recourse must be had to the Holy See for individual cases.

In the conversion of heretics, the Instruction of the Holy Office, July 20, 1859 (Collect., 2nd ed., n. 1178), must be kept before the eyes. First inquiry must be made concerning the validity of baptism received in heresy: (a) If it is judged certainly invalid, they must be baptized absolutely: then no abjuration nor absolution will be required; (b) If it was doubtfully valid, 1) let them emit an abjuration or profession of faith; 2) afterward let them be baptized again under condition; 3) finally let them make a sacramental confession, and be absolved conditionally; (c) if certainly valid, only the abjuration or profession of faith is received, which absolution from censures (and from sins) follows. Yet if the newly converted person greatly desires that the rites formerly omitted in his baptism be supplied on this occasion, it is lawful for the priest to satisfy this wish.¹⁰

¹⁰ Cf. other practical questions in Gennari, Cons. Moral., 122.

1171. II. "When a work has been made public, the publishers of books of apostates, heretics, and schismatics which defend apostasy, heresy, or schism, and likewise those defending the same books or other books prohibited by name through apostolic letters, or knowingly reading or retaining them without due license."¹¹

¹¹ Code, c. 2318.

Here by the name of books are not understood manuscripts, newspapers, journals, periodical publications taken individually, books written by heretics of the first centuries...; true books of apostates and heretics are understood, not indeed if they merely contain heresy, but if they defend heresy; and books written by any author whatever, but condemned by name, with the title of the book expressed, under penalty of excommunication reserved to the Roman Pontiff, through letters given by the Roman Pontiff himself or in his name. - Those, however, are struck by excommunication who knowingly read, understanding what is written, or retain or publish or defend in any way these books. But those defend books who praise or protect their authors or doctrines precisely insofar as they defend or contain heresy or schism.

Bishops formerly, by force of Indult, had delegated power "of absolving from censures incurred on account of the retention and reading of prohibited books: with a suitable salutary penance imposed; and with the obligation remaining firm of handing over, according to law, either by oneself or through another, without any delay, and, insofar as it can be done, before absolution, the prohibited books which the penitent retains in his power." (Indult. S. Penit., n. 5). Today recourse should be had to the Holy See.

1172. III. "All and individual persons of whatever state, grade, or condition, even if royal, episcopal, or cardinalitial, appealing from laws, decrees, or mandates of the Roman Pontiff existing at the time to a universal Council, are suspect of heresy and by the fact itself contract excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See."¹²

¹² Code, c. 2332.

By this excommunication are struck those appealing from any ordinance whatever of the Roman Pontiff as such to a Council, even one present and legitimately gathered, but not to a future Pope; yet in this latter case those appealing with difficulty escape the excommunication brought against heretics and schismatics. - Moreover those appealing are suspect of heresy, and therefore liable to the penalties enumerated in canon 2315.

25. The laws of the Index contain a few censures latae sententiae; they strictly command or forbid many things, with arbitrary penalties being threatened; they commend or advise some things; finally, they grant certain faculties.

General rule

On censures

1. That these censures latae sententiae are to be interpreted strictly, no one today doubts; formerly it was denied by Suarez.¹

¹ De Fide, disp. 20, sect. 2, n. 10. Cf. the responses of Schmalzgrueber, in book 5, title 7, n. 55; and Castropalao, treatise 4, disp. 20, point 10, section 1, n. 3.

84. Books are condemned which defend errors proscribed by the Apostolic See.

What errors are

1. Errors: propositions condemned at least as erroneous.

Apostolic See

2. By the Apostolic See: by the Supreme Pontiff either immediately, or by means of a Roman Congregation, namely the Holy Office.¹

Among these must be numbered books which defend or champion errors condemned by the Syllabus. Sacred Congregation of the Index, May 19-23, 1898, to 2.

To defend?

3. They defend: they do not merely assert, but are eager to vindicate; with sufficient abundance of words, so that the inscription of chapter 5 obtains.

N.B. When excommunication is committed

N.B. Those who teach or defend propositions condemned by the Apostolic See under penalty of excommunication latae sententiae, or that the practice of inquiring into the name of an accomplice is lawful, as it had been condemned by Benedict XIV, incur excommunication latae sententiae simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff (Const. Apostolicae Sedis, first excommunication of the second series).

¹ With us is Pennacchi, A. S. S., cited work, n. 52. Besides, on January 13, 1892 (N. R. Th., t. 24, p. 170), to the second, the Holy Office responded that by acts proceeding from the Apostolic See are designated acts "which mediately" proceed from it, that is, through the Sacred Congregation. But that, as the distinguished Planchard asserts, Rev. Th. Fr., cited place, n. 53, a proposition condemned by an ecumenical Council is not comprehended, this we by no means see. And decrees of a Council of this sort have customarily been promulgated through a pontifical Constitution.

Former law

125. By this article, in the same words, the Excommunication borne in the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, n. 2, of the first series, is repeated. Therefore in itself it will receive a similar interpretation. Hence:

What "knowingly" means

1. Knowingly. By this word the case of any ignorance is excepted, even, probably, affected ignorance. Moreover the word is referred also to those retaining, etc.¹

Reading books. Whether periodic fascicles are books of heretics

2. Reading books, in a notable quantity. Cf. here above n. 57. But who are readers was said in n. 57, 50. Also before, n. 33 and following, we weighed what comes under the name of book, and in what manner periodic publications are to be regarded as books. From this, in order that they be judged to protect heresy as a book, it is required that the periodic publications themselves rather generally stain themselves with this vice.

What apostates are

3. Of apostates. We defined these above as those who entirely cast off the Christian faith externally and internally, whether they pass over to the errors of Mahomet, etc., or simply profess themselves to be perfect "free thinkers." Cf. Avanz., p. 8.

Heretics and a heretical book

4. And of heretics. It is necessary that the heresy be plainly established, either from the heretical sect to which the writer belongs, or, when the book is anonymous, or by an author hitherto Catholic, from manifest doctrine,² and proposed pertinaciously.

Therefore books of this kind are not those which principally belong to a Catholic author, although a heretic has appended scholia, unless these are the greater part of the book; nor those which report some text of heretics "even if you read with the mind of learning heresy." Laym.³ Cf. Piat,⁴ against Arndt.⁵

Nor books of infidels, Jews, schismatics, at least as such.

Nor are books of heretics which pertain to the first centuries of the Church, as now altogether harmless, comprehended here. Lehmkuhl, II, 923. Cf. above n. 66, where we transferred the same rule also to medieval heretics.

To defend heresy

5. Defending heresy. Not merely containing, or briefly defending as if while doing something else, but of set purpose, by bringing forward reasons. But it is not necessary that the subject matter of the book be religious. It is enough that the book defend one heresy in this way.

6. As well as books of any Author prohibited by name through Apostolic Letters. This clause requires:

Through Apostolic Letters

a) Apostolic Letters, or letters proceeding immediately from the Supreme Pontiff: a Brief, Bull, Encyclical, etc. Piat, on V. der Velden, p. 623.

Made by name

b) A prohibition made by name, that is, one by which a book is designated by its proper title. Yet a singular designation, for example of the author, is not demanded. Indeed, a generic indication of title seems to suffice. Hence B. P.⁶ judges that the clause is verified in the Constitution Ecclesiam, by which, in 1821, there were prohibited by Pius VII, under excommunication reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, "the catechisms of the Carbonari, the books by which they describe the things which are customarily carried on in their meetings, statutes, codes." But a disposition is not enough by which, for example, Innocent XI condemned all books and writings of Michael Molinos.⁷ Cf. Avanz.-Penn., Appendix III.

It is required that it be made under excommunication reserved to the Holy See

c) A prohibition under excommunication reserved to the Holy See. Thus the common opinion: Avanzini, Lehmkuhl, Bucceroni,⁸ etc. The reason is drawn from the end of the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, by which this censure was borne. For Pius IX wished to narrow censures. Therefore it would in no way be likely that under the gravest censure (specially reserved) he prohibited books which his predecessors had condemned without reserved excommunication.⁹ Cf. Avanzini, cited place. Wherefore if, for example, you read without faculty the work of Lamennais, Les paroles d'un croyant, you will have committed no pontifical censure, since the apostolic letters by which it is reprobated contain none. The same is the case with the works of Jacob Frohschammer.

Those which were proscribed under another penalty latae sententiae have now been simply condemned, unless they are heretical and at the same time have defended heresy. Except those which, for the causes indicated elsewhere, have fallen from the Index.

d) Yet it is not necessary that those letters bear the penalty of excommunication specially reserved; otherwise the present clause would effect nothing special. Thus the authors.

e) Finally, the disposition affects future proscriptions equally with past ones.

Therefore in a few words: from article 47, those books which the Supreme Pontiffs formerly proscribed by name through apostolic letters under excommunication latae sententiae reserved to themselves are now prohibited under excommunication specially reserved.

What concerning future proscriptions?

Must it be said in the same way if certain books are hereafter condemned by the Supreme Pontiffs through apostolic letters by name? We think it must be said in the same way.

And Hollweck¹⁰ and Wernz¹¹ judge that in this article no times are distinguished. Nevertheless, since the legislator merely uses the past tense, while he could so easily have said prohibited or to be prohibited, the matter seems uncertain to us.

But if future proscriptions are touched, there is no cause why in these you should require mention of reserved excommunication, unless there is a cause on account of which the Pontiff must be judged to have been unwilling to refer himself to the present article, but to pronounce absolutely concerning the sanction.

What books are touched by this clause?

N.B. Because other apostolic letters by which works are condemned either do not bear the penalty of reserved excommunication, or indeed bear it but one afterwards removed, or do not indicate books by name, in reality this clause today has force only concerning 82 books which in the eighteenth century were proscribed by apostolic letters,¹² concerning the work of Fr. Vigil,¹³ and concerning two books of J. Nuyts,¹⁴ which Pius IX condemned by Briefs of June 10 and August 22, 1857. Wherefore in sentences of this kind inquiry must be made only from the beginning of the eighteenth century.¹⁵

Yet it easily happens that, on account of another cause, because they have been written by a heretic and defend heresy, they are prohibited by law under the penalty of excommunication specially reserved.

When those retaining are punished

7. And retaining the same books: knowingly and in that manner in which it is prohibited under grave obligation. Cf. above n. 51 and 58.

Who those printing are

8. Printing, in the commentaries on the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, were understood as all who cooperate proximately, by mortal cooperation, toward "printing." Cf. Lehmk., II, 924.

But, from the general canon which we proposed at the beginning, we are not forbidden, the former law having been put aside, to explain this censure according to the benignity of the present Constitution. Now it seems sufficiently discordant that the same word "Printing" be taken in a different sense in two articles, of which one excepts the other. But in article 48, unless we wish, without a compelling reason, to interpret the words more strictly than formerly, the printer is he who undertakes the work to be printed: namely the impresser, whom in French we properly call l'Imprimeur. From another side it agrees very much with our benign law not to strike with censure those workers who cannot pass judgment on the books toward whose printing they cooperate, will for the most part be ignorant of the penalty borne, and not rarely are excused from contumacy by moral necessity. Wherefore the sentence of Hollweck¹⁶ is not displeasing to us, according to which those printing are only the editor and the "impresser." The corrector, however, will be punished as reading. With us concerning workers is Boudinhon.¹⁷

Those defending. Inefficacious defense suffices

9. And defending in any way. Cf. n. 48 and 55.

Observe, since the censure strikes readers, retainers, printers, and defenders in the same manner, namely directly and principally, defense is considered as a delict consisting in itself. Wherefore it is not necessary that the effect of the defense have been obtained, or that in reality, for example, you snatch the book from the flames. The act is judged consummated by the defense itself. Cf., for example, Lehmk., cited place.

What force special reservation has

10. By the fact itself an excommunication specially reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. Moreover this special reservation operates:

a) So that neither Bishops can for this case, even an occult one, use the faculty which they hold from chapter Liceat of the Council of Trent; nor is the case judged contained in the faculty simply given of absolving from reserved cases.

b) So that he who without faculty shall have presumed to absolve someone from that excommunication commits an excommunication simply reserved to the Holy See from the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis (after the first series).

c) So that one absolved, even in danger of death, by an inferior (that is, by one who did not have at least delegated faculty), must, under the penalty of falling again into censures, after he has recovered, within a month either seek a new absolution from one having faculty, or, either himself by himself or through the mediation of a Confessor, have recourse by letter to the Holy See and obey its commands.

¹ Cf. Hollweck, Die kirchl. Strafgesetze, sec. 107.

² Lehmk., II, n. 923; Bucc., II, p. 339; B. P., t. 7, n. 424.

³ L. 2, tr. 1, chapter 15, n. 1.

⁴ On V. der Velden, p. 621.

⁵ P. 124, 3, n. 103.

⁶ De Cens., t. 7, 456. Yet against this, Piat, cited work, p. 625, because works published after this Bull cannot be said to be prohibited by name through it.

⁷ Yet this cause has that peculiar thing, that there is only one work of Molinos, Guida spirituale, besides two little works which afterwards were published together with the former work. Nevertheless we judge that the nominal indication is lacking which is required for incurring excommunication. The propositions of the work were proscribed as heretical; but since the writer retracted the errors, the work does not seem to be that of a heretical author.

⁸ Appendix III, pp. 126, 129; II, n. 923; p. 340.

⁹ Nothing prevents our present Constitution, although in itself it softens the former laws, from increasing their sanction accidentally. From September 5, 1757 to November 11, 1784, by seven letters in the form of a Brief, works were proscribed under the penalty of reserved excommunication latae sententiae for laymen, and of suspension latae sententiae for clerics. In the same way, on August 2, 1851, two works of J. Nuyts were proscribed. That suspension is suppressed by our law; but, as it seems to us, now for all, even clerics, who unduly read those works, there remains, from our article 47, the penalty of excommunication which is specially reserved to the Supreme Pontiff.

¹⁰ Das kirchl. Bucherverbot, in this place.

¹¹ Ius Decretal., t. 3, n. 121, note 117.

¹² Cf. Hilgers, Der Index, p. 90 and following. He diligently explored this matter and afterwards accurately exhibits it in his valuable chronological Index of proscribed works (same place, pp. 418, 475). The same warns that those books can be found with difficulty, so that they can now do little harm.

¹³ Defensa de la autoridad de los gobernios y de los obispos contra las pretensiones de la curia romana (6 vols.).

¹⁴ Institutiones ecclesiasticae; Tractationes in ius ecclesiasticum universum.

¹⁵ Thus Avanzini, cited work, pp. 130, 131.

¹⁶ Cited work, pp. 48, 49, notes 1 and 2.

¹⁷ Cited work, p. 304. Wernz, n. 121, note 118, seems to favor us sufficiently.

Difference from the Tridentine censure

126. 1. Thus, by expressing it more clearly, the Tridentine excommunication is renewed,¹ which nevertheless struck only anonymous books, while, according to interpreters of the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis (which confirmed the same censure), books which bear before themselves the name of the author are now also comprehended.

It is necessary only that the approval of the Ordinary was given

2. Without the approval of the Ordinary. It is enough, for escaping the censure, that it has been given, although perhaps not in writing nor appended in the book. And although regulars besides need the license of their Prelate, they do not commit the excommunication if the book is approved solely by the Ordinary of the place.

Who are printing?

3. Printing, in the present case, seem to be only those who either are owners of the typography or sustain their person, so that they conduct the matter in their name. For the Tridentine text in the cited place contains commands and penalties which cannot be accommodated to workers, etc. Cf. Pennacchi, Ballerini, Arndt,² Hollweck,³ against Piat (on Van der Velden), p. 861.

Causing to be printed

4. Causing to be printed: as the editor of the book, he by whose care the book is printed; not necessarily the author, for example, if he merely gave or sold the manuscript, caring nothing for the printing.

Who absolves from this excommunication?

5. Excommunication reserved to no one. Therefore every Confessor can absolve from it, provided that contumacy has ceased.

¹ Session 4 (Decree concerning the edition and use of sacred books). As Hollweck, Die Strafgesetze, etc., sec. 108, 1, wishes, also for this reason it is established a little more severely than in the Council of Trent, because the Tridentine decree did not clearly comprehend Sacred Scripture itself.

² Avanz.-Penn., t. 2, appendix 38, p. 232; note 62 on Gury, II, 789; cited work, pp. 246, 247, n. 180.

³ Cited place. This sentence, which earlier, by I know not what law, R. D. Van Coillie, Collat. Brugg., p. 551, had accused of too much benignity, he sincerely confessed in the Commentary in this place to be sufficiently pleasing to himself.

1. GENERAL REMARKS.—The belief that we owe reverence and respect to the bodies of our departed fellowmen is deeply ingrained in human nature.

a) All nations agree that it is the duty of a dead man’s relatives to provide for the decent burial of his body and that his friends and those indebted to him for favors should join in paying him the “last honors,” i. e., accompany his corpse to its final resting-place.¹ From this conviction arose certain burial forms or rites, which differed according to the stage of culture. Equally general is the belief that the denial of the customary burial rites is an act of dishonor towards the dead, his relatives and friends. An honest burial may be denied only to those who at the time of their death had notoriously forfeited every claim to honor and consideration.

¹ Cfr. Gen. XLVII, 29; L, 1–13; 1 Kings XXXI, 11–13; 2 Kings II, 5.—Cfr. P. Lex, Das kirchliche Begräbnisrecht, pp. 3 sqq.

b) The Catholic Church has approved and sanc- tified these general notions and customs regarding burial. In the light of Christian belief the mortal remains of the dead are invested with a higher significance. We owe them honor and reverence because they were organs of the spirit, and likewise on account of their participation in the supernatural life of grace and virtue led by the Christian believer, and because they are destined to rise again and become reunited with their souls.² The Church, therefore, did not abolish the civil funeral ceremonies, but transformed them into a religious and liturgical rite, the essential elements of which are the solemn blessing of the corpse, usually in church, and burial in consecrated soil and the offering up of prayers and sacrifices for the repose of the soul.

² St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, l. I, c. 13: “Nevertheless the bodies of the dead, and especially of the just and faithful, are not therefore to be despised and cast away; the Holy Spirit used them as organs and vessels for all good works.” (Migne, P. L., XLI, 27). Cfr. also the same author’s treatise, De Cura pro Mortuis Gerenda, c. 7, n. 9 (Ibid., XL, 598).

The Church denies the “last honors” of Christian burial only to those who, by some definite sinful act, have deprived themselves of honor among their fellowmen. She permits the erection of beautiful monuments to the dead for the reason that exhibition of honors does not cease with death,³ and honors shown to a dead person reflect glory upon his family. But she condemns mere pomp or hypocritical ostentation as unbecoming.

³ Apoc. XIV, 13.

2. BURIAL OR CREMATION?—The interment of the dead, commonly known as burial (inhumatio), dates back to the beginnings of the human race. The divine sentence: “In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread till thou return to the earth, out of which thou wast taken: for dust thou art, and into dust thou shalt return,”⁴ was verified among all the nations of antiquity, and even to-day burial is looked upon by all highly civilized peoples as the most becoming method of disposing of the mortal remains of man.

⁴ Gen. III, 19; cfr. Ecclus. XL, 1.

The custom of burying corpses in the earth, or in sealed coffins in mausoleums above the earth, has entered into the practice and ritual of the Catholic Church. She devotes a special religious cult to the bodies of the dead and surrounds the ceremony of burial (ordo exequiarum), the place of burial, and the monument erected upon the grave with a profound and beautiful religious symbolism.⁵

⁵ Rit. Rom., tit. VI, c. 1 and 3; cfr. F. Probst, Die Exequien, Tübingen 1856; C. Krieg, Die Wissenschaft der Seelenleitung, Vol. I, pp. 232 sqq.

a) The custom of burning the bodies of the dead (crematio) is of pagan origin and anciently was practiced mostly in connection with fire worship. The Jews never burned, but always buried, their dead.⁶ Only in exceptional cases, to aggravate capital punishment, in times of war or epidemics, or to prevent dishonoring by pagan enemies,⁷ were corpses consigned to the flames. Cremation in the Old Testament was regarded either as a disgrace inflicted on the body, or as a sign of extreme necessity. Certain passages which have been quoted to prove that cremation was customary among the Chosen People, refer to the burning of aromatic spices at burials.⁸

⁶ Cfr. Gen. XXIII, 19; XXV, 9 sq.; XLVII, 29; XLIX, 30 sq.; L, 2, 25.

⁷ Gen. XXXVIII, 24; Lev. XXI, 9; Am. VI, 10; 1 Kings XXXI, 12.

⁸ Jer. XXXIV, 5; 2 Chr. XVI, 14; cfr. J. Benzinger, Hebräische Archäologie, 2nd ed., Tübingen 1907, pp. 127 sqq.

Christianity followed the Jewish practice of burying the dead, and ever since the earliest days of the Church, inhumation was looked upon as a specifically Christian and cremation as a specifically pagan custom,⁹ though the New Testament contains no express prohibition of the latter.¹⁰

⁹ Minucius Felix, Octavius, c. 11: “[Christians] both execrate pyres and condemn burials by fire.” (Migne, P. L., III, 267).

¹⁰ John XII, 7; cfr. D. A. Petrakakos, Die Toten im Recht, Leipsic 1905.

It is recorded that, in times of persecution, the early Christians risked their lives to recover the bodies of their martyrs, that they might be buried with the sacred rites of the Church. The pagans, to destroy faith in the resurrection of the body, often cast the corpses of martyred Christians into the flames. Minucius Felix thus adverts to their belief that cremation makes resurrection impossible: “Nor do we fear, as you suppose, any harm from [this mode of disposing of the body], but we adhere to the old and better custom of inhumation.”¹¹

¹¹ Octavius, c. 34: “Nor, as you believe, do we fear any harm from burial, but we follow the ancient and better custom of interment.” (Migne, P. L., III, 347).—A council held at Paderborn (Germany), in 785, decreed (can. 7): “Whoever cremates a corpse according to pagan custom, shall be punished with death.” And again (can. 22): “The dead bodies of the Christian Saxons should be brought into the cemeteries of the Church and not buried in the mounds of the heathen.” (Hefele, Konziliengeschichte, Vol. III, 2nd ed., pp. 636 sq.). The Order of the “Teutonic Knights” forbade the Prussians in the peace treaty of 1249 to burn the corpses of their dead. (Voigt, Geschichte Preussens, Vol. II, p. 626).

It is only of late years that in some countries cremation has been substituted for burial, and crematories with rooms for the storage of urns containing the ashes of the dead have begun to take the place of Christian cemeteries.

b) The reasons given for cremation are partly esthetic, partly psychological, partly economic, and partly hygienic.

α) From the standpoint of esthetics,¹² the cremationists contend, it is more becoming to the beauty of the human body to be dissolved by fire, which is a pure and cleansing element, than to rot in the earth, which is unclean and soiled. Cremation furthermore makes it possible to realize the poetic idea of preserving a genuine memorial of the departed in the form of their own ashes, kept in an urn, which serves as a decorative object.

¹² Cfr. J. Grimm, “Ueber das Verbrennen,” in Kleinere Schriften, Vol. II, Berlin 1865, pp. 211–313; K. Th. Schulz, Eine neue Bestattungsart, Berlin 1897, pp. 61 sqq.

In answer to this argument we may say that the process of cremation, while it is more rapid than that of natural decomposition, is by no means more attractive or more esthetic. The poetic idea referred to is merely a sentimental apotheosis of human nature, and its object can be more effectively realized by honoring the grave in which the mortal remains of the departed rest.

β) From the point of view of psychology this argument is advanced: It is repugnant to natural sentiment, and therefore inhuman, to commit the body of a departed relative or friend to a process of decay which cannot be visualized without a shudder. Cremation excludes the horrors of inhumation and is therefore to be preferred.

We answer: Aside from the fact that in a properly constructed grave the corpse does not become the prey of worms, human sentiment is repelled even more by the brutal destruction of the bodily remains of a relative or friend by fire, whereas, on the other hand, it is consoling to be able to visit the grave where a departed relative or friend has found his last resting-place after the labors and trials of life.

γ) In the interest of agriculture it is asserted that inhumation injures the public good by withdrawing a vast amount of soil from cultivation and confining a number of chemical elements indispensable to vegetation in a place where they cannot be utilized, thus gradually bringing about a lack of food, whereas cremation prevents this danger.

This argument is as unconvincing as the other two. The ground devoted to the burial of the dead in any given country is extremely small in proportion to the total area of arable land. Moreover, the chemical elements into which the body is dissolved in the grave are not lost, but for the most part absorbed by the ground water, which redistributes them in every direction.

δ) The principal argument adduced in favor of cremation is that derived from hygiene. It is claimed that cemeteries are a constant menace to the public health because of the poisonous gases they exhale into the atmosphere and the decayed substances with which they infect the ground water, which feeds the wells and springs of the vicinity.

This specious argument is refuted by the testimony of competent experts, who declare that there is no danger whatever to the public health from properly kept cemeteries. No poisonous gases arise, and if any should arise, they would be instantly dissipated by the fresh air. Poisonous infiltration of the ground water is improbable, and we know of no case where it was ever proved that a well was poisoned by infiltration from a burial ground. Neither has it ever been demonstrated that an epidemic started from a cemetery, or that cemeteries, of which there are so many in or near our cities and towns, are a menace to health.¹³ If such a danger were ever shown to exist, it could easily be obviated by the proper construction of coffins and tombs and the rational treatment of corpses. The danger of burying apparently dead persons can be avoided by legally enforced autopsy.

¹³ J. Rochard, “La Crémation,” in the Revue des Deux Mondes, Vol. XCVIII (1890), pp. 916–944; G. Cornet, Die Tuberkulose, Vienna, 1899, pp. 29 sq., 40.

So much for the negative side of the question. Positively, it can be shown that inhumation is the best and simplest means of disposing of the mortal remains of the dead. It has been practiced from most ancient times and appeals to human sentiment as eminently decent and proper. Cremation, on the contrary, runs counter to that sentiment, and is, moreover, impractical. In the first place, crematories and columbaria would withdraw nearly as much soil from agriculture as burial grounds. Second, they are costly to erect and to operate. Third, cremation makes the post-mortem examination of corpses for medical and judicial purposes impossible, or at least extremely difficult, as some crimes cannot be detected by an analysis of the ashes after the corpse is burnt.¹⁴ Inhumation has this further advantage over cremation that it makes possible the disinterment of a corpse long after death in case a suspicion of foul play arises where no one thought of it at the time.

¹⁴ Cfr. F. Goppelsröder, Ueber Feuerbestattung, Mühlhausen 1890.

It is asserted that cremation can at least be justified in exceptional cases, for instance, during dangerous epidemics or on the battlefield in time of war. But even this is doubtful. When an epidemic rages, the corpses of the victims can be more rapidly buried than burned, and to compel an army to drag along crematories would be an undue burden.

3. The Catholic Church forbids her children to enrol in societies established for the purpose of promoting cremation, or to direct that their own bodies or those of fellow-Catholics be burned after death. She has issued this prohibition for the reason that she looks upon cremation as a detestable abuse.¹⁵ This opinion is based, not upon any dogmatic teaching concerning the human body and its resurrection,—for God can collect and revitalize ashes as easily as dust,—¹⁶ nor on the impossibility of performing the burial rite over the remains of a burnt corpse, which is quite often done for victims of conflagrations, but mainly on the anti-Christian, anti-ecclesiastical, materialistic, and pagan tendency of the cremation movement, and on the human, and particularly the Christian sentiment towards the mortal remains of man. It is repugnant to human nature to interfere arbitrarily and violently with the natural process of decay which the body undergoes after death, and in the second place the faithful Catholic, who regards Christ’s death and grave as the pattern of his own demise and burial, can ask nothing better than that his mortal remains be buried as the sacred body of the Redeemer was buried, like “a seed sowed in God’s acre, to mature in glory on the day of the resurrection.”¹⁷

¹⁵ “Detestabilis abusus;” S. C. Offic., d. d. 19 May, 1886; d. d. 15 Dec., 1886; d. d. 27 July, 1892 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1863 sq.).

¹⁶ Matth. XXII, 29.—Minucius Felix says (Octavius, c. 34): “Every body, whether it dries into dust, or is dissolved into moisture, or is compressed into ashes, or is attenuated into vapor, is withdrawn from us, but is reserved for God in the custody of the elements.” (Migne, P. L., III, 347). And again

¹⁷ “Saat gesäet von Gott, am Tage der Garben zu reifen,” as the poet Klopstock puts it beautifully.—Cfr. Matth. XXVII, 58 sqq.; John V, 28 sq.; XI, 23; XIX, 38 sqq.; 1 Cor. XV, 24 sqq.; 2 Cor. V, 10; Phil. III, 21.—St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, l. I, c. 13: “These authorities (Matth. XXVI, 10–13; John XIX, 38–42) do not teach that any sensation inheres in corpses, but signify that the bodies of the dead also pertain to God’s providence, to which even such offices of piety are pleasing, in order to build up faith in the resurrection.” (Migne, P. L., XLI, 27).—St. Gregory the Great says (Moral., l. IV, c. 27, n. 52): “For what else is it to bury than to conceal?” (P. L., LXXV, 633).

“What principally determined the Church to forbid cremation,” says Msgr. Meyenberg, “was the observation that the advocates of this practice everywhere employed it as a means to undermine belief in the resurrection of the dead and to de-Christianize public life.”¹⁸

¹⁶ (op. cit., c. 11): “As though every body, even if it is withheld from the flames, is not nevertheless resolved into earth by years and ages, and as though it mattered whether wild beasts tear it apart, seas consume it, earth covers it, or flame carries it off, since for corpses every burial is good if they feel, and if they do not feel, it is a remedy by the very speed of destruction.” (P. L., III, 267 sq.).

¹⁸ Schweizerische Kirchenzeitung, Lucerne, 1909, p. 53.

The question of cremation does not involve an ecclesiastical dogma, nor is it a purely denominational question, but one in which all Christian churches should be equally interested for the sake of the preservation of an ancient Christian custom which cannot be abolished without grave scandal to the faithful.

It will not do to say that cremation is purely voluntary and must be conceded as a part of that religious freedom of which our age is so proud, for the advocates of cremation aim at making it compulsory, and they are not a religious sect. nor is cremation a religious rite. What they demand is not tolerance, but the enforcement of their impious and un-christian ideas.

The Holy Office has decided¹⁹ that if a corpse has been cremated, not by order of the deceased, but at the command of others,²⁰ it may be buried with religious honors, provided the exsequies do not take place at the crematory and no scandal is given. Scandal need not be feared if it is publicly known that the deceased did not wish his body to be cremated. The new Code re-inforces the law that if a Catholic, while living, com- mands his body to be cremated, he is to be denied ecclesiastical burial.²¹ If any one compelled a priest to give such a person ecclesiastical burial, he would be ipso facto excommunicated.²² Formal co-operation in the act of cremation, be it by command or counsel, is unconditionally forbidden, though material co-operation may be tolerated under certain conditions.²³

¹⁹ Dec. 15, 1886.

²⁰ “Alienâ voluntate.”

²¹ C. I. C., can. 1240, 1, 5.

²² Ibid., can. 2339.

²³ Decree of the Holy Office, July 27, 1892.

Lehmkuhl lays down the following rules for the guidance of Catholics:

a) It is not permitted actively to promote cremation, or to render it lawful, even for non-Catholics, by a positive concession, because it is objectively bad, saltem ex adiunctis. It is a rite pertaining to religion and consequently subject to the judgment of the Church, who has declared it illicit.

b) It is, however, permissible, for an adequate cause (ex causa proportionate gravi) to permit cremation negatively, i. e., not to prevent others from performing it.²⁴

²⁴ Lehmkuhl, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 11th ed., p. 676, 6.

4. The section of corpses for juridical or scientific purposes is permissible because of its importance for the study of medicine and for the benefit of suffering humanity.²⁵ It goes with- out saying, however, that corpses used for this purpose must be properly interred and must not be abused. To treat human remains (whole corpses or portions thereof, bones, skeletons, etc.) irreverently is a sin, nay, under certain conditions, it may even be a sacrilege. The violation and desecration of graves and the scattering of human remains has always been regarded as a crime and severely punished.

²⁵ Cfr. K. Gegenbaur, Lehrbuch der Anatomie, 6th ed., Leipsic 1895; F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheol., pp. 490 sqq.; J. Donat, S. J., Die Freiheit der Wissenschaft, Innsbruck 1910, pp. 214 sq. (English edition, The Freedom of Science, New York 1913).

Pope Boniface VIII, in his oft-quoted decretal,²⁶ did not forbid the anatomic section of corpses, but only the abuse, which had originated during the crusades, of separating the flesh from the bones in order to make possible the transfer of the latter to the home of the deceased.²⁷

²⁶ Extrav. Com., Cap. I l. 3, tit. 6: “Those who disembowel the bodies of the dead and inhumanly boil them so that, the bones having been separated from the flesh, they may carry them to be buried in their own land, are excommunicated by the fact itself.”

²⁷ Cfr. E. Michael, S. J., Geschichte des deutschen Volkes, Vol. III, p. 433 sq.; Lex, Das kirchliche Begräbnisrecht, pp. 229 sqq.

It has been decided that the hearts of dead persons may be preserved in jars or urns.²⁸ For the honor of humanity let us assume that the horrible crime of the sexual violation of corpses is committed only by insane persons.²⁹

²⁸ S. R. C., d. d. 11 Feb., 1898: “The preservation is carried out in this way: the heart is enclosed in a glass vessel, ordinarily placed in a visible place and among flowers. May this practice be continued? Resp.: Affirmatively, provided that the preservation described does not take place in a sacred place.”

²⁹ Maschka, Handbuch der gerichtlichen Medizin, Vol. III, 192.

READINGS.—J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. II, n. 790–796.—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 487 sqq.—L. Ruland, Die Geschichte der kirchlichen Leichenfeier, Ratisbon 1901, pp. 2 sqq.—L. Henry, L’Inhumation et la Créma- tion, Louvain 1876.—A. Besi and E. Holzinger von Weidich, Die Beerdigung und Verbrennung der Leichen, Ratisbon 1889.—G. Hassl, Gottesacker oder Leichenofen? Augsburg 1898.—P. Winkler, Verbrennen oder Begraben? Innsbruck 1902.—F. Probst, Die Exequien, Tübingen 1856.—E. Berardi, De Crematione Cadaverum, Bruges 1904.—Wm. Devlin, S.J., art. “Cremation” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IV, pp. 481–483.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 742 sqq.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 673 sqq.—B. L. Conway, C.S.P., The Ethics and History of Cremation, N. Y. 1923.

Usefulness. - Concerning this especially canonical treatise, these things must chiefly be known in sacred ministries: a) how far penalties and censures can stand in the way of receiving or administering the sacraments; b) what things excuse from contracting them; c) how far they can be absolved or dispensed; d) what certain few censures, more easily known to those who by committing a delict are liable to these penalties, suppose.

Since most censures have each been declared in their own place in our work, it will be permitted to contract the discussion to a few things.

— I. Notions. 1. A censure is a penalty by which the correction of the delinquent is primarily intended. Wherefore it is called medicinal, and is distinguished from a vindicative penalty, which immediately follows upon the punishment of the delict.

But it is defined by the Code: "A penalty by which a baptized man, delinquent and contumacious, is deprived of certain spiritual goods or goods annexed to spiritual things, until, withdrawing from contumacy, he is absolved" (c. 2211, §1).

It always supposes a grave, external delict, consummated in its juridic character, joined with some present contumacy. Wherefore, for a past delict, to which no obligation, at least of repairing consequences, is joined, a censure cannot be imposed; but there lies place only for a vindicative penalty. Thus a thief can be punished by censure not because of the theft, but that he may restore what was taken.

But there are three censures: excommunication, suspension, interdict; but suspension and interdict can also be vindicative penalties.

2. Penalties which are established in the law itself are called from the law, or latae sententiae; while those are from man which have been imposed by way of precept or by a condemnatory sentence. "A penalty of ferendae sententiae added to a law, before a condemnatory sentence, is from the law only; afterwards it is from the law and at the same time from man, but it is considered as from man" (c. 2217). If a merely declaratory sentence is pronounced, the censure remains from the law, and is considered to have been contracted from the moment of the delict.

3. "A penalty is always understood to be of ferendae sententiae, unless it is expressly said to be of latae sententiae, or to be contracted by the very fact or by the law itself, or unless other similar words are used" (c. 2217, §2).

Nevertheless, not once only must censures concerning which those words are lacking be ascribed to penalties of latae sententiae. This happens whenever a censure is declared reserved to the Ordinary or to the Holy See. For a censure of ferendae sententiae is necessarily reserved to him who brought the sentence.

— II. Author and subject of censure. 1. All who possess the power of making laws or imposing precepts by force of jurisdiction can annex censures to their law or precept.

Yet an Ordinary cannot bring another censure reserved to himself against a delict to which a censure reserved to the Holy See is annexed (c. 2247, §1).

2. a) They who hold the supreme principate of peoples, and their sons and daughters or those to whom there is the proximate right of succeeding in the principate; Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church; Legates of the Holy See, are subject only to penalties inflicted or declared by the Roman Pontiff. Nor are Cardinals comprehended by any penal law nor Bishops by suspension or interdict unless they are expressly named (c. 2277).

b) The impubes are exempt from penalties latae sententiae; but the puberes who have induced them to violate the law or have concurred with them in the delict, by physical or moral causality either necessary or principal, themselves indeed incur the penalty established by law (c. 2230). Here impubes can be understood as all who, even girls, have not completed 14 years.

c) Cooperators of the kind described under b) are held by penalties unless the law has expressly provided otherwise, while the other cooperators, by secondary and non-necessary action, escape penalties unless they are expressly named.

d) Affected ignorance, whether of the law or of the penalty alone, excuses from no penalties of latae sententiae; if the law has used words: has presumed, knowingly, studiously, etc., any diminution of imputability whatsoever, whether on the part of the intellect or on the part of the will, exempts from penalties of latae sententiae. If these words are lacking in the law, ignorance which was neither crass nor supine excuses from medicinal penalties, but not from vindicative penalties latae sententiae (c. 2229).

e) Grave fear of itself excuses, unless the delict tends to contempt of faith, or of ecclesiastical authority, or to the public harm of souls (c. 2229, §3, 3°).

f) An ecclesiastical penalty always supposes grave sin (cf. I, 63 and c. 2218, §2).

— III. Obligation of censure. A censure latae sententiae indeed holds the delinquent, conscious of the delict, by the fact itself in both forums; before a sentence, however, he is excused from observing the penalty as often as it cannot be observed without infamy (c. 2232, §1).

— IV. Absolution of censure. 1. A censure once contracted is not removed except by legitimate absolution; yet this cannot be denied as soon as the delinquent has withdrawn from contumacy. But once removed by absolution, it does not revive unless the burden imposed under penalty of reincidence has not been fulfilled (c. 2248).

2. But some censures are not reserved (for absolution), others are reserved.

Concerning the various reservations and absolution, cf. what was said, nn. 473-476.

Only observe that absolution from censure in the sacramental forum is already contained in the customary form of absolution from sins; in the non-sacramental forum it can be given in any manner whatsoever, yet, for excommunication, a form is handed down in the ritual books which it is fitting to observe (c. 2250, §3).

Moreover c. 2252 does not strictly impose in danger of death the admonition concerning recourse to be made, which c. 2255 enjoins to be made by the confessor who in more urgent cases absolves from reserved censures.

— Unless perhaps scandal given or the special gravity of transgression requires otherwise, the violator of a law which has no sanction placed upon it (you may say the same of the violation of a precept) cannot be punished unless first an admonition has been made with threat of penalty.

A vindicative penalty is now recognized by this sign: that it is brought for a definite time or in perpetuity. Brought without a term, or indefinitely, it is equated with a perpetual one. When the day to which it was brought arrives, the vindicative penalty ceases by the fact itself; while a censure is not removed except by received absolution.

— I. On Excommunication. 1. Excommunication is a censure by which someone is excluded from the communion of the faithful with the inseparable effects enumerated in the Code. An excommunication solemnly imposed is called by the special name anathema.

2. Excommunicates: a) some are to be avoided, others not. No one is to be avoided unless he has been excommunicated by name by the Apostolic See, has been publicly denounced, and in the decree or sentence it is expressly said that he must be avoided, or unless he has notoriously laid violent hands upon the person of the Supreme Pontiff; b) some are before such a sentence [printed/OCR: "have avoided the sentence"], others have been marked by a condemnatory or declaratory sentence of censure.

3. Effects of excommunication. It deprives: a) of the right of assisting at divine offices, preaching excepted; b) of the reception of the sacraments (which nevertheless are validly received), and, after a declaratory or condemnatory sentence, also of sacramentals; c) of licit confection and administration of the sacraments, saving the temperaments indicated at n. 211; d) of indulgences, suffrages, and the public prayers of the Church. Yet priests can privately and with scandal removed apply Mass for an excommunicate; but, if he is one to be avoided, only for his conversion. Moreover, an excommunicate is removed from legitimate ecclesiastical acts (e.g., the office of sponsor); he is prohibited from performing ecclesiastical offices, from placing acts of jurisdiction; from electing, presenting, nominating; he cannot obtain ecclesiastical offices. For the validity of acts, an excommunicate who is to be avoided, or who by sentence has been condemned or declared excommunicated, must be distinguished from another excommunicate (cf. cc. 2259-2266).

Communication in profane matters is not imposed as to be avoided except with an excommunicate to be avoided, and the excuse of kinship, service, and reasonable cause is admitted, so that this prohibition is not judged grave (c. 2257).

— II. 1. "Interdict is a censure by which the faithful, remaining in the communion of the Church, are prohibited from the sacred things" enumerated in the Code.

It is distinguished into personal, by which certain persons are directly prohibited from those goods, and local, by which in certain places the dispensation or reception of the same is forbidden. It is subdivided into general, of some territory or people, and particular (cf. cc. 2268-2276).

Interdict from entrance into a church contains the prohibition "that someone celebrate divine offices in church or assist at them or have ecclesiastical burial; but if he assists, it is not necessary that he be expelled, nor, if he is buried, is it necessary that the corpse be removed" (c. 2277).

— III. 1. "Suspension is a censure by which a cleric is prohibited by office or benefice or both" (c. 2278). Therefore it directly deprives at least of the licit use of ecclesiastical power. And it can be total or partial. Suspension brought without addition is understood as total, and it carries with itself all the effects indicated by the canons. Partial is suspension from office, which forbids every act of the power of order and jurisdiction, indeed of mere administration competent from office, except the administration of the goods of one's own benefice (c. 2279, §1); and suspension from benefice. And there are more partial ones. Thus suspension from jurisdiction forbids every act of the power of jurisdiction for both forums, both ordinary and delegated; suspension from divine things forbids every act of power which someone obtains either through sacred ordination or through privilege; from orders, every act of the power of order received through ordination; from sacred orders, every act of the power of order received through ordination in sacred orders; from exercising a certain and definite order, suspension prohibits every act of the designated order, and besides the conferral of the same order and the reception of a higher order and the exercise of this, if it has been received after the suspension (c. 2279, §2, 3°-5°).

2. Suspension from informed conscience is an extraordinary remedy, whose use is not licit if the Ordinary can proceed by the ordinary juridic way without grave inconvenience. But it consists in this, that the Ordinary expressly, by simple decree, declares that he, from causes known to himself, imposes suspension. The Ordinary must be certain concerning the delict and its gravity; he can never act thus on account of a notorious delict (cf. cc. 2186-2191).

In the Code there first occurs a very logically ordered distribution of penalties according to the varied nature and reason of delicts. For our use, we shall enumerate censures in order according to their severity. Those which pertain to moral theology have almost all been explained in their own places.

— I. Excommunications most specially reserved have been brought:

1. against him who has thrown away the consecrated species or has carried them off or retained them for an evil end (c. 2320).

Therefore there are punished the thief who throws away the species in order to steal the pyx, and the impious man who carries off or retains the consecrated species for sacrilegious abuses;

2. against him who has laid violent hands upon the person of the Roman Pontiff (c. 2343);

3. against one guilty of the absolution of an accomplice (c. 2367). Cf. what has been said at n. 502;

4. against a confessor who has presumed directly to violate the sacramental seal (c. 2368. Cf. what has been said at n. 524);

5. against those violating the secret of the Holy Office concerning the information required about candidates for the episcopate (cf. resp. S. C. Cons., 24 Apr. 1917, A.A.S. IX, 232);

6. against those who, having a part in the conclave, shall have directly or indirectly violated the secret in those things which regard the election of the Roman Pontiff and which are transacted in the conclave or in the place of election (Vacante Sede, Pius X, 25 Dec. 1904, nn. 51, 52).

You should observe that both of the latter are governed by a more severe law, since outside danger of death they cannot be absolved even by the Major Cardinal Penitentiary himself. But in practice the same Cardinal will be the smoother and safer way by which absolution can be obtained from the Supreme Pontiff.

— They incur an excommunication specially reserved to the Roman Pontiff:

1. apostates, heretics, schismatics (c. 2314);

2. those suspected of heresy, if, having been warned, after six months they do not amend themselves (c. 2315).

The following are suspected of heresy: those favoring the propagation of heresy or communicating in divine things with heretics (c. 2361); those who enter into a pact concerning the non-Catholic education of offspring or who procure its baptism or education outside the Catholic Church (c. 2319); those who sacrilegiously treat the consecrated species according to the norm of c. 2320; those appealing from the decrees of the Roman Pontiff to a Universal Council (c. 2332); those who, with hardened mind, for a year have remained sordid in excommunication (c. 2340); those who are ordained simoniacally, ordain, or administer other sacraments (c. 2371);

3. those publishing books of apostates, heretics, or schismatics which defend apostasy, heresy, or schism; those defending or knowingly reading the same books or books prohibited by name through apostolic letters (c. 2318; cf. n. 901 [apparent intended cross-reference: n. 904]);

4. one not promoted to the priesthood who simulates the celebration of Mass or hears a confession (c. 2322);

5. those appealing to a universal Council (c. 2332);

6. those impeding the letters or acts of the Holy See or of its legates (c. 2333);

7. those issuing laws, mandates, or decrees against the liberty or rights of the Church; those recurring to any lay power whatsoever to impede the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction (c. 2334).

"Those issuing," by force of the word, are only those promulgating, and Cerato, De censuris, n. 96, comprehends only them. Yet the more common opinion, relying on the interpretation of the old law, also embraces those who establish the same things either by individual will or by common and efficacious suffrage. Cf. Epitome Iuris, III, 684.

In the other part of the censure, recourse is understood as efficacious, and as made to some lay power;

8. those dragging before a lay judge a Cardinal, a Legate of the Holy See, a higher official of the Roman Curia, or their own Ordinary (c. 2341. Cf. n. 12 on the privilege of forum);

9. those laying violent hands upon a Cardinal, a Legate of the Holy See, a patriarch, archbishop, or bishop (c. 2343; cf. n. 10);

10. those usurping or detaining, by themselves or through others, the goods or rights of the Roman Church (c. 2345);

11. forgers of letters of the Holy See and those using forged ones (c. 2360);

12. one falsely denouncing a confessor for solicitation before Superiors (c. 2363; cf. n. 569).

— III. They incur an excommunication simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff:

1. those making gain from indulgences (c. 2327).

They make gain from indulgences who strive to obtain monies either for the obtaining, or for the concession, or for the publication of indulgences, even in favor of a pious cause. From the moment the money has been accepted, the excommunication is contracted. All, and no longer only those inferior to bishops, as in the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, are punished by this penalty.

— 2. Those giving their name to a Masonic sect (c. 2355).

Sects here are distinguished by two notes: 1. by secrecy, by which, whether members or leaders, they are bound as to the constitution, ends, and means of the sect; 2. by machination, secret or open, against the Church or legitimate civil powers.

Religious or clerics giving their name to a sect of this kind must be denounced to the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office.

You ask what things must be required for absolving him who has given his name to a Masonic sect?

1. If the faculty has been sought from the Sacred Penitentiary, its prescriptions must be observed, and recourse must be made to it if any difficulty seems to obstruct the execution.

But the Holy See is accustomed to require, besides separation from the sect and repair of scandal, abjuration of the sect [printed/OCR: "stopping up of the sect"] (excepting children and the dying), the handing over of books, manuscripts, and signs pertaining to the sect into the hands of confessors, so that they may be transmitted as soon as possible to the Ordinary, or at least, if just and grave causes demand it, burned; and the injunction of a grave penance with frequency of the sacraments.

2. Therefore we shall prudently try to obtain these things, even when recourse to the Holy See was not necessary. If too great a difficulty has obstructed this, at least those things must be required which the natural law demands: the suppression of cooperation, the repair of scandal, the revelation of a harmful secret. But let us explain the obligations in such a way that we seem to require nothing which is opposed to "honor."

Nor are those immediately to be dismissed unabsolved who, in order to avoid penalties, do not break off all communication with the sect, if the communication is neither scandalous, nor useful to the sect, nor spiritually dangerous to themselves (cf. d'Annibale, I, 391, note 4).

Those will be able to be absolved more easily who no longer attend meetings, but, for grave reasons, abstain from formal repudiation.

A dying man, near to death and who seems to be constituted in good faith, will be able to be absolved if in general he subjects himself to the authority and mandates of the Holy See. But the scandal is to be repaired in the best way in which it can be, even after death;

— 3. those absolving without faculty from an excommunication most specially or specially reserved to the Holy See (c. 2338);

4. those communicating in a delict or in divine things with an excommunicate to be avoided (c. 2338);

5. those dragging before a lay judge a Bishop, a Prelate nullius, or a supreme religious Superior (c. 2341);

6. those violating the cloister of nuns, and nuns illegitimately going out from the cloister (c. 2342; cf. n. 145);

7. those violating the cloister of Regulars (c. 2342; cf. n. 145);

8. those usurping ecclesiastical goods (c. 2346);

9. duelists and their accomplices (c. 2351; cf. tome II);

10. clerics in sacred orders and those bound by a solemn vow of chastity, attempting matrimony, and their partners (c. 2388; cf. n. 128);

11. simoniacs in offices, benefices, and dignities (c. 2392; cf. tome II);

12. those removing or changing a document from the episcopal Curia (c. 2405).

— IV. They incur an excommunication reserved to the Ordinary:

1. those entering into matrimony before a non-Catholic minister (c. 2319);

2. those contracting matrimony with a pact that offspring be educated outside the Church (c. 2319);

3. those knowingly offering children to be baptized by a non-Catholic minister (c. 2319);

4. those knowingly handing over children to be educated in a non-Catholic religion (c. 2319);

5. those making, distributing, or exposing false relics (c. 2326);

6. those laying violent hands upon simple clerics or religious (c. 2343; cf. n. 12);

7. those procuring abortion, the effect following (c. 2350; cf. tome II);

8. a religious apostate from religion (c. 2385; cf. n. 155);

9. professed of perpetual simple vows contracting matrimony, and their partners (c. 2388; cf. n. 137).

— V. They incur an excommunication reserved to no one:

1. those publishing without license books on Sacred Scripture (c. 2318; cf. n. 900):

— 2. those daring to order or compel that unbelievers, apostates, non-Catholics, censured persons excluded by c. 1240 be given ecclesiastical burial (c. 2339).

Unless before death they have given some signs of repentance, the following are deprived of ecclesiastical burial: 1. "notorious apostates from the Christian faith, or those notoriously attached to a heretical or schismatic sect, or to a Masonic sect or other societies of the same kind; 2° excommunicates or interdicted persons after a condemnatory or declaratory sentence; 3° those who killed themselves by deliberate counsel; 4° those who died in a duel or from a wound received from it; 5° those who have ordered their body to be given to cremation; 6° other public and manifest sinners" (c. 1240, §1).

To remove scandal in certain cases, as c. 1240, §2 insinuates, every funeral pomp will sometimes have to be denied; in doubt about this matter, the Ordinary will have to be consulted.

Ecclesiastical burial embraces three things: the transfer of the corpse to the church; the obsequies celebrated over it; its deposition in a place legitimately deputed for burying the faithful. Wherefore several authors, Cerato, n. 64; Eichmann, Strafrecht der Kirche, §41; Cappello, De Censuris, n. 173, think that the censure is not contracted by those who merely order inhumation, but not the sacred rite; nevertheless most judge that these are affected by the censure, e.g., Creusen, III, 538: that severity is required by the interpretation of the old law, by the end of the law, and by the manner in which the rights of the Church are violated today. Yet we would not wish to call the more benign opinion improbable, especially if we consider the number of those who are ordered to be deprived of burial.

Although even private persons can compel, nevertheless those ordering or compelling can be understood only of public powers. But those who are compelled by law are immune from censure, since a daring act is required.

Finally, on 30 March 1859, the Holy Office declared that it can be tolerated that non-Catholic blood-relatives be brought into the family tomb of Catholic families, to avoid greater evils.

Concerning cremation, let these things be noted. A twofold cremation must be distinguished: one which is sometimes commanded for reasons of public health or of promoting anatomical science; this the Church tacitly tolerates; another which attacks the very inhumation of bodies in a general way. This the decrees of the Holy Office severely forbid, as one which is opposed to the reverence of the Christian body, which is alien from the usages of the Church, and which is propagated with a mind hostile to religion. As is clear, those alone who by their own will have chosen cremation for themselves are to be deprived of ecclesiastical burial. Besides, giving one's name to sects which promote cremation is forbidden; and never (therefore not even if an inheritance can be entered upon for this reason alone) is it licit to cooperate formally with cremation by command or counsel (S. Off., 27 July 1892). Material cooperation, with due cautions, for a proportionate cause, will sometimes be able to be tolerated: for example, that of workers who are hired in cemeteries. He also will sometimes be able to be excused who accompanies the corpse of a blood-relative or connected person as far as the place of combustion, scandal having been removed (Genicot-Salsmans, II, n. 628);

— 3. those omitting the apostolic beneplacitum for alienating ecclesiastical goods (c. 2347). Ecclesiastical goods are goods which belong to an ecclesiastical moral person.

Alienation designates every act by which ownership is either transferred or, a right in the thing having been conceded, diminished, e.g., sale, exchange, the constitution of a passive mortgage or servitude, the renunciation of an active servitude; and also a lease beyond nine years.

Besides the other conditions of every ecclesiastical alienation, the apostolic beneplacitum must be sought when there is question of precious things, or of things which, according to the estimation of experts, exceed the value of 30,000 lire or francs; or when the value of the lease (for individual terms) exceeds 30,000 lire or francs (cc. 1532, 1541).

But things are precious to which there belongs a notable value because of art or history or material (c. 1497, §2). But a notable value can be estimated at about 1000 lire or francs.

Those lire seem able to be taken as gold money, lest the value itself be too uncertain.

N.B. Nor can notable relics or relics of great devotion be alienated or transferred without the permission of the Holy See (c. 1281, §1);

4. those compelling someone to embrace the clerical or religious state (c. 2352);

5. one knowingly omitting to denounce a confessor by whom he has been solicited (c. 2368; cf. n. 611).

Although this censure is reserved to no one, nevertheless he cannot be absolved from it unless he has satisfied the obligation or has seriously promised that he will fulfill it.

— I. They incur a suspension reserved to the Holy See:

1. from divine things: those presuming to receive orders from an apostate, heretic, schismatic, or censured person (c. 2372; cf. n. 737);

2. a general one: a bishop consecrating a bishop without the mandate of the Holy See, and his assistants (c. 2370; cf. n. 683); those knowingly, through simony, ordaining or being ordained, administering or receiving sacraments (c. 2371; cf. n. 673).

II. They incur a suspension reserved to the Ordinary:

from office: those dragging before a lay judge a simple cleric or religious (c. 2341; cf. n. 12).

III. They incur a general suspension reserved to the major Superior: fugitive religious (c. 2386; cf. n. 144).

IV. They incur a suspension reserved to no one:

1. from hearing confessions: one absolving from reserved cases without faculty (c. 2366);

2. from divine things: one presuming to hear confessions without jurisdiction (c. 2366); one presuming to resign an office, benefice, or dignity into the hands of laymen (c. 2400); a capitular Vicar unduly granting dimissorial letters for ordination (c. 2409; cf. c. 958);

3. from the order received: one ordained without dimissorial letters, before the age, or by leap (c. 2374; cf. n. 737);

4. from jurisdiction: a Prelate nullius not seeking the blessing within the due time (c. 2402, §2; cf. 322, §2).

— I. They incur an interdict specially reserved to the Holy See:

moral persons appealing to a universal Council (c. 2332).

II. They incur a personal interdict reserved to no one:

those who have given cause to a local interdict or to an interdict upon a community (c. 2338, §4).

III. They incur an interdict from entrance into a church reserved to the Ordinary:

those spontaneously giving ecclesiastical burial to those whom the law prohibits (c. 2339).

— I. On penalties in general. 1. Penalties are established in law as latae sententiae, which are incurred at the very moment of the delict, without a sentence, and as ferendae sententiae, which require condemnation. Penalties are of ferendae sententiae unless they are expressly or equivalently said to be contracted by the fact itself or by the law itself.

2. Before a sentence, at least a declaratory one, he who cannot observe it without infamy is excused from observing the penalty.

3. If the amendment of the delinquent is principally intended, the penalty is medicinal; otherwise it is vindicative. A medicinal penalty is a censure, which always supposes a grave delict, external, consummated according to the description of the law, and joined with contumacy, i.e., with some evil will from which there must be withdrawal. If there is withdrawal from this, the penalty does not cease by the fact itself, but the guilty party has the right of obtaining absolution.

A penalty established by law is also incurred by one who has concurred in the delict by physical or moral, necessary or principal causality.

The impubes escape penalties latae sententiae, and so do Cardinals, unless they are expressly named.

Affected ignorance excuses from no penalties latae sententiae; nor does crass or supine ignorance, unless the law has used the words: has presumed, knowingly, studiously. Simple ignorance excuses from medicinal penalties, but not from vindicative penalties which are established without the words "has presumed" or similar words.

Grave fear of itself excuses, unless the delict tends to contempt of faith or of ecclesiastical authority, or to the public harm of souls.

II. On censures. 1. They can annex censures to a law or precept who can make laws or command by force of jurisdiction.

Concerning the reservation of censures and absolution, cf. what has been said in the treatise on Penance. There are three censures: excommunication, suspension, interdict.

II. Excommunication directly excludes from the communion of the faithful; and consequently: a) it deprives one of the right of assisting at divine offices, preaching excepted, of the licit reception of the sacraments, and, after sentence, also of sacramentals, of the licit confection and administration of the sacraments, saving the temperaments indicated where the sacraments were treated; of indulgences, suffrages, public prayers; b) it prohibits the attainment and execution of offices, acts of jurisdiction, election, presentation, nomination: for validity, an excommunicate to be avoided and one declared excommunicated must be distinguished from another excommunicate.

An excommunicate is not to be avoided unless, in the decree or sentence, the Apostolic See has expressly said that he must be avoided, or unless he has been a notorious striker of the Supreme Pontiff.

III. Suspension prohibits by office or benefice, or by both; it is total, or partial in various ways.

Suspension from informed conscience is had when the Ordinary, to avoid grave inconveniences, declares by simple decree that he imposes suspension from causes known to himself. The Ordinary must be certain concerning the grave delict, which is not notorious.

IV. Interdict directly prohibits from sacred things. It is distinguished into personal and local, which can be general or particular.

Interdict from entrance into a church prohibits participation in divine offices in church, and ecclesiastical burial.

V. On certain absolutions or censures. 1. He who absolves an adherent of a Masonic sect by force of a faculty given by the Sacred Penitentiary must observe its prescriptions, and must recur to it if a difficulty arises. He who absolves without recourse, for example by force of a privilege, must always prudently require what the natural law requires: suppression of cooperation, repair of scandal, revelation of a harmful secret. And unless too great a difficulty obstructs, he will prudently ask the other things which the Holy See is accustomed to require.

2. On the apostolic beneplacitum in alienation. Alienation designates every act by which ownership is either transferred or, a right in the thing having been conceded, diminished, and also a lease beyond nine years. The apostolic beneplacitum must be sought when there is question of precious things, or of things which, according to the estimation of experts, exceed the value of 30,000 lire or francs, or when the value of a lease made beyond nine years, for individual terms, exceeds the same sum.

But precious things are things in which there is a notable value of art or history or material. Notable value can be estimated at about 1000 lire or francs. And the lire seem able to be taken as gold money.

Nor without the permission of the Holy See can notable relics or relics of great devotion be alienated or transferred elsewhere.

3. On those compelling that ecclesiastical burial be given. Those ordering or compelling are understood as those who, endowed with public authority, command, or those who compel others by force or fear. If they themselves are compelled by law, they do not act with rash daring, which here is required for the censure. And since ecclesiastical burial embraces the obsequies and deposition in a sacred place, this censure seems to certain commentators not now to punish merely inhumation alone in a sacred place.

Cremation which is commanded by no different reason of public utility is so prohibited from being chosen by Christians in place of inhumation that formal cooperation is never excused.

1249. • All delicts, and especially public delicts, import a perturbation of order, both with respect to God, and with respect to society, and with respect to the delinquent himself.

Therefore the disturbed order must be restored. But it is restored by PENALTIES, both vindicative, by which, namely, the injured honor of God is vindicated; and exemplary, by which others are deterred, lest they also offend; and medicinal, such as ecclesiastical censures are, by which the guilty are incited to come to their senses more quickly.

1250. It pertains to Canon Law to treat of these various penalties, insofar as they regard the external forum. Nevertheless, moral science also ought to hand down notions concerning Censures and Ecclesiastical Penalties, at least concerning those which are more useful and more necessary for the confessor to know.

We shall speak: 1. of censures in general; 2. of the three species of censures, which are: Excommunication, Suspension, and Interdict; 3. of the censures which in present times are in force in particular; 4. of certain other penalties inflicted by the Church.

St. Alphonsus, VII, 1-133; ed. G., IV, p. 171; H. Ap., tr. XIX, c. 1; Suarez, de Cens.; Berardi, Comment. in Jus, vol. II, Diss. III; Aichner, Comp. Jur. eccl., sect. III, c. 2, a. 2; Lega, de Judic. eccl., l. 2, P. 1, tit. 3; Bucceroni, de Cens.; Hilarius a Sexten, Bargilliat, Hollweck and others, on the same matter.

We must treat: 1. of the notion and division of censures; 2. of their infliction, valid or licit; 3. of causes excusing from censure; 4. of absolution from censures.

1251. DEFINITION. A censure is a spiritual and medicinal penalty, inflicted by ecclesiastical power, through which the use of certain spiritual goods is taken away from a baptized man who is delinquent and contumacious.

It is called: 1. a penalty, strictly speaking, that is, an evil inflicted by legitimate authority because of fault; 2. spiritual, because it deprives one of spiritual goods, as is clear from the Bull Auctorem fidei under n. 46; 3. medicinal, that is, inflicted so that the guilty person may come to his senses and be amended: this is the primary and specific end of censure; it is not inflicted on those whose correction is despaired of, except sometimes for the terror of others; 4. on a baptized man; for an infidel is not subject to the Church; 5. delinquent and contumacious, namely, one who, by an external action, from a certain at least virtual contempt, does not obey the warnings of the Church; 6. the use of certain spiritual goods, namely of those which are subject to the power of the Church, as will presently be explained.

1252. ON THE SPIRITUAL GOODS OF THE CHURCH. In the Church there exist goods of a threefold kind: 1. Some proceed immediately from the Head, or Christ, as various graces. Censure does not deprive one of these, because they do not depend on the Church; whence censure can coexist with the state of grace, for example in one who incurs a censure because of a sin concerning which afterward he is perfectly contrite. 2. Others proceed from the members taken privately, as the prayers and good works of individual faithful. Nor does censure take away these goods, at least of itself, because the Church cannot impede that communion of Saints which proceeds from faith and charity. 3. Finally others proceed from the body, or the Church, as the use of the sacraments, divine offices, indulgences, jurisdiction, benefice, common suffrages. Censure deprives one of these, either wholly or in part. It can also deprive one of the use and commerce of the faithful in civil matters, for example honor, salutation, etc., but only secondarily and in order to spiritual things (Suarez, l. c., disp. I, s. I, n. 6).

1253. From these things you will gather: Censure differs: a) from deposition, degradation, and privation of benefice; for these penalties are primarily vindicative, in such a way indeed that of themselves they are perpetual, and can be inflicted even after amendment of sin, and, when the sinner has now been amended, still endure; b) from irregularity, which of itself is not a penalty, but is a canonical impediment; whence it is removed only by dispensation; c) from cessation from divine things, which is imposed primarily for repelling an injury inflicted on the Church (VII, 2-5).

Note. The effects of censure in particular are indicated in n. 1291 sqq., 1304, 1308.

1254. DIVISION. Censure is distinguished in manifold ways:

1. By reason of species it is threefold, namely: excommunication, suspension, and interdict.

The last two are not always censures; sometimes they are merely medicinal penalties, but sometimes they also assume the nature of a vindicative penalty, as we shall say below (n. 1300).

2. By reason of the mode by which it is inflicted, one is from law, another by man.

a) A CENSURE FROM LAW is that which is issued through canons or ecclesiastical laws, for example through a synodal statute. This does not cease by the death or removal of the legislator. - b) A CENSURE BY MAN is that which is inflicted by a legitimate Superior, whether by way of judicial sentence, or by way of precept.

But a precept, although transitory, is either general, without determination of persons, for example: if anyone knows the perpetrator of this delict, he is bound to denounce him, under penalty of excommunication; or particular, affecting determinate persons. A censure of this kind ceases by the death or removal of him who issued it, that is, it is no longer incurred; for if it had already been contracted, the bond would be removed by absolution alone (VII, 6; Lehmkuhl, II, 1102).1

Note. A censure by man can also be issued ex informata conscientia, as we shall explain below (n. 1301).

3. By reason of the mode by which it is incurred, a censure is latae sententiae or ferendae sententiae.

a) A CENSURE LATAE SENTENTIAE (which is proper to the Church, unknown in the civil Code) is that which is incurred by the very fact by which someone has violated the law, without a condemnatory sentence of the judge being required.

Such it is: if in the law it is said: by the very fact, by the very law, by law, by that very thing, from then, immediately, forthwith, without another sentence; if the words are of past or present tense, for example: we have excommunicated, I excommunicate, they are suspended, they are interdicted; if it is said in the imperative mode: let him fall into excommunication, let him remain suspended or interdicted, we will or command that he be excommunicated, suspended; or even: let him be excommunicated, let him be suspended, etc., namely absolutely without the ministry of another; but not if the precept of excommunicating, suspending, etc., is imposed on another, say, the Bishop.

b) A CENSURE FERENDAE SENTENTIAE is that which is not contracted unless the sentence of a judge accedes.

Such it is judged to be: if the words are of future tense, for example: he will be excommunicated, he will be suspended; if they express the precept of excommunicating, suspending, for example: let him be excommunicated by the Bishop; if they are comminatory, for example: under penalty of excommunication, under threat of anathema, etc.; unless, however, something else is gathered from the adjuncts; likewise, if they are ambiguous; for according to Rule of Law 49 in the Sixth: "In penalties the more benign interpretation must be made." But ambiguous would be, for example, these words: let him be excommunicated. But in the case of heresy, they are latae sententiae, as all teach (H. Ap., XIX, at the beginning).

4. By reason of the power of absolving, censures are reserved or non-reserved. a) NON-RESERVED are those which can be absolved by inferiors. b) RESERVED are those which cannot be absolved except by the one issuing them, or by another to whom they have been reserved.

Some are reserved to the Roman Pontiff, either in a special way, or simply. Others are reserved to Bishops or prelates, either by common Law, that is, through canons or papal constitutions, or by particular Law, for example through the statutes of a diocese or Religion.

Censures by man, however, are always judged reserved, unless they have been issued through a general precept.

Note. 1. From the fact that something is prohibited under censure, as penalty, it does not always follow that the law obliges under mortal sin (cf. n. 1263, 2). 2. He who can absolve from censures as censures, can also absolve from them as penalties (D'Annibale, Summula, I, n. 358).

1 There are not lacking those who think that censures issued by a Bishop outside a synod are from Law (cf. Ami du Cl., 1910, p. 229). Nevertheless those things which the Salmanticenses, Roncaglia, and Croix establish, with St. Alph., l. c., are more pleasing to us.

The conditions required for censures to be inflicted validly and licitly regard their author, subject, matter or cause, and form.

1255. PRINCIPLES. I. The power of issuing censures is in the possession of the Church. This is of faith, against the innovators, and is clear both from the fact that Christ gave pastors the power of punishing; and from the use of the apostles and the constant practice of the Church; and finally from the Council of Constance, Sess. 8, err. 3, as well as from the Bulls of Martin V and Leo X (VII, 9).

1256. II. The ordinary power of issuing censures is in the possession of all and only ecclesiastical Superiors having jurisdiction in the external and contentious forum. This is clear from various places of Canon Law. The external forum is the place, territory, in which matters pertaining to the external government of the Church are treated. The contentious forum supposes lawsuits and judicial noise.

Hence, the following can issue censures: 1. The Pope and a general Council, with respect to the whole Church. 2. Roman Congregations, as the Congregation of the Council, of the Holy Office, of Religious, etc., even for the universal Church, in those things which have been committed to them to execute. 3. Apostolic legates, in the territory assigned to them; Cardinals, in their churches. 4. Patriarchs and Archbishops with respect to the subjects of their own diocese; but not in the diocese of suffragans, unless at the time of visitation, or unless a cause is devolved to them by appeal. 5. Bishops, with respect to their own diocese, provided they have been confirmed, although not yet consecrated. 6. Vicars general of Bishops, with respect to the diocesans; because they constitute one tribunal with their own Bishop. 7. Generals, Provincials, and local Superiors of Religions, namely of regulars, as priors, guardians, rectors, with respect to subjects, and according to the various statutes of the Orders.⁰¹ - 8. Provincial Councils, Congregations of Religions, the Chapter of a cathedral church when the see is vacant and the Vicar has not yet been elected; then the capitular Vicar: each respectively for his own subjects. 9. Certain others by privilege, as many Archdeacons, Archpriests, and Deans are. 10. All who, through common error, with a presumed title, are regarded as Superiors (cf. n. 139-144).

Note. Parish priests cannot issue censures; for they have no power in the external forum (VII, 10, 11); nor does custom favor them.

1257. • III. The delegated power of issuing censures is usually committed to clerics alone. The reason is that ordinarily clerics alone are capable of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Married clerics, however, are declared by Law incapable of this jurisdiction (c. de Cler. conjug., in 6).

It is said: to clerics alone; but it suffices that they be marked with first tonsure; is usually committed: by these words regard is had only to ordinary cases. For in an extraordinary case, a baptized layman could be deputed to issue censures, but from the sole Commission of the Supreme Pontiff. Baptized, we have said; for he who is not in the Church is not capable of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, as the truer opinion teaches.

It is a great question whether a woman, for example an Abbess, can be delegated.

The first opinion says: a woman by divine Law is incapable of an office properly ecclesiastical; yet from this it does not necessarily follow that the Supreme Pontiff, from absolute power, can commit no delegation to a woman, by way of a transitory act (Suarez, de Cens., disp. 2, s. 3, n. 7). Lugo defends the same opinion (Resp. mor., l. 6, c. 6, n. 9), where he asks whether the Supreme Pontiff can delegate spiritual power to an unbaptized man (cf. Lehmkuhl, II, 1118).

But the second opinion, to which St. Alphonsus adheres (VII, 12), holds with St. Thomas (in 4. D. 19, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 3, ad 4), the Salmanticenses, and others, that a woman can in no way have either the key of order, or the key of jurisdiction (cf. Vind. Alph., P. VIII, q. 5). But an Abbess could obtain a Decree by which, under penalty of censure, her commands must be observed.

Note. a) Delegated power ceases by the death or removal of the delegating one, unless the cause has already been begun by the delegate, at least by citation of the accused. b) A delegate cannot subdelegate, unless he has a special commission for this, or unless he is delegated by the Roman Pontiff or for the universality of causes, and, in both cases, by way of office (cf. n. 322).

1258. IV. For the valid exercise of the power of issuing censures there are required: the intention of binding and a power unimpeded as to use. The first is evident. As to the second, everyone knows that the excommunicated, suspended, heretics or schismatics, if they are to be avoided, can issue no censures, since their power is bound by Law (VII, 12).

Note. He who issues a censure from grave fear validly binds the censured person; because an act done from grave fear does not of itself take away the voluntary; it is therefore valid, unless it is specially nullified by positive Law. Concerning absolution from censures extorted by grave fear, see what is to be said n. 1286.

Corollaries. Since the power of issuing censures is something annexed to legislative power, the following things follow:

1. A Bishop existing OUTSIDE his own diocese can issue censures upon subjects, by way of statute, or precept, for preventing future crimes, because for issuing a censure in this way judicial noise is not required; but not by way of sentence, because no one is able to exercise contentious jurisdiction in another's territory.

Except: a) If the contumacy of the delinquent subject is so manifest that it does not need cognition of the cause. b) If the cause has already been judicially cognized in his own territory. c) If the Bishop has been unjustly expelled from his diocese; in which case, he can exercise his jurisdiction in nearer places, permission having been sought from the Ordinary of the place, although not obtained. d) If, in other cases, the Ordinary of the place consents; provided that the consent of the parties also accedes, because no one can unwillingly be drawn outside his territory (VII, 21).

2. Regularly it is not expedient that a Superior issue censures in his own cause; this is reputed in Law as vengeance.

Except: a) if it is done not by way of judgment, but by way of defense, against him who inflicts violence; because it is permitted to repel force by force; b) if the cause is so public and manifest that it can neither be denied nor needs any examination (Konings, 1662).

1259. PRINCIPLES. I. A Superior can issue censures upon all and only his subjects. The reason is that subjection and jurisdiction are correlative (VII, 13). Therefore, that someone may be able to be bound by censure, it is required: 1. That he be a man; for against demons the Church uses exorcisms, not censures. 2. Baptized; whence heretics can be excommunicated, but not catechumens. 3. A wayfarer; because the dead are only declared excommunicated, or are deprived of suffrages and ecclesiastical burial. 4. Not exempt; because through the privilege of exemption jurisdiction is taken away, namely within the limits of the exemption.

1260. From these things you will gather: a) THE POPE cannot be bound by censures; not indeed by another, because he has no superior; nor by himself, because he is not bound by his own precepts by coercive force.

b) BISHOPS are not bound by censures emanating from themselves, because no one is his own subject. Indeed, by privilege of Law, Bishops and Cardinals do not incur suspension or interdict, unless express mention is made of them, at least indirectly, for example by the clause: "even those worthy of special or individual note." But they are subject to papal excommunication excepted above, even if in the law no mention is made of them (Giraldi, Exp. Jur. pont., P. I, s. 623).

c) KINGS and QUEENS, although they are subjects to Bishops in spiritual matters, nevertheless cannot, by custom, be bound by censure by them. But they are subject to pontifical censures, even those issued by Law, for example against invaders of the temporal dominion of the Holy See and their helpers (VII, 16).

d) EXEMPT RELIGIOUS cannot be bound by the censure of a Bishop. Except if they offend concerning those things in which they are subject to the Bishop as apostolic delegate, for example concerning the celebration of Mass. Indeed, some religious, as mendicants and Jesuits, enjoy a broader privilege, so that they can never be punished by episcopal censure, except in one or another case in which their privileges have expressly been derogated. Nevertheless they can be coerced by other penalties (St. Alph., de Privil., 75; H. Ap., XIX, 43; cf. Lehmkuhl, II, 1117).

1261. • II. Censures are not usually issued against prepubescent persons, nor against indeterminate persons. Thus from the practice of the Church (VII, 14-19).

1. As regards prepubescent persons, if they are already capable of deceit,1 all authors indeed affirm that they can be bound by censure, by way of law or precept. But since prepubescents cannot defend themselves in judgment except through another, there is controversy whether they can also be bound by a censure which is issued by way of sentence.

Each opinion indeed is probable; but in fact, from the common interpretation of laws it is certain "that censures generally issued by Law or by man are not incurred by prepubescents, unless this is expressed in the law: as it is expressed concerning the entrance of boys into monasteries of nuns, and concerning prepubescent strikers of clerics," as we shall note below, n. 1329 and 1333.

2. But as regards indeterminate persons, they indeed can be punished by censures which are issued after the manner of statute or precept (cf. n. 1254).

However: a) EXCOMMUNICATION which is inflicted by way of sentence is null, if it is issued against some uncertain person from a community, for example in these words: he who has perpetrated such a delict, let him be excommunicated.

But if all of some community, after examination has been made, are found guilty, the whole community can validly and licitly be excommunicated by the Pope; but by other Superiors it would be excommunicated illicitly, since this is prohibited by positive Law; and also invalidly, according to the probable opinion. Wherefore the Bishop or prelate ought to excommunicate each guilty person by name.

b) SUSPENSION and INTERDICT can indeed be issued by way of sentence against a whole community, for example against a college or chapter; but then personal rights remain intact, as will be explained in its own place (n. 1303, 5).

1262. III. A subject offending in another's territory or in an exempt place cannot of himself be punished by his own Superior with censure. For a censure issued through a general statute immediately affects the territory, and is restricted to it; when intimated through a particular precept, it touches the delinquent only in the case in which the Superior, before the delinquent's departure, should impose on him the precept under censure (VII, 23). Here the axiom holds: "He who pronounces law outside his territory is not obeyed with impunity" (l. fin., ff., de Jurisdict.).

This opinion is probable, St. Alphonsus being witness (l. c.). There is another opinion, which appears a little more probable to our holy Doctor, resting on this principle, that a precept affects the person and clings to the bones. Whatever the case may be, a censure inflicted by way of sentence touches the subject, even if he exists in another's territory: if he offended in his own territory, or if the delict has its effect in it, for example if a cleric ordered to go to a synod does not obey. But otherwise in other cases (VII, 22).

IV. Travelers or wanderers can be bound by censure by the Superior of the place in which they offended, provided it is done by way of sentence. For any delinquent obtains the forum of the place in which he has sinned.

Yet observe: 1. an inferior cannot bind his own Superior by censure if that Superior has offended in the territory of the inferior; 2. a delinquent traveler, that he may be punished, must by law be warned: for only the contumacious obtain the forum of the place; furthermore, he must be anticipated by citation before he leaves the territory, so that thus, by reason of the judgment begun, he remains subject to the Superior of the place.

We have said: provided it is done by way of sentence; for more probably a delinquent traveler cannot be punished by the Superior of the place by way of statute or particular precept; because a traveler (cf. n. 204), unless he has acquired at least a quasi-domicile, is not certainly subject to the Superior of the place (VII, 26, 27).

IT IS ASKED. Can someone be bound by SEVERAL censures at the same time?

Resp. In the affirmative, because it is not repugnant for someone to be constrained by several chains at the same time, and, being released from one bond, to remain bound by others.

This indeed can happen in a threefold way:

1. If the guilty person has committed several sins to which some censure is annexed. Thus, for example, he who believes a heretic and reads his book is entangled in a double excommunication (cf. n. 1314, 1316). Likewise, he who twice absolves an accomplice from the sin of complicity, or struck two clerics, although by one act.

2. If several legislators have inflicted a censure on the same sin. Thus, for example, he who kills a cleric, although already excommunicated by the Pope, can also be excommunicated or suspended by the Bishop, either by sentence, or by statute, for example one issued against murderers. Thus more probably Suarez with others; and the reason is that the jurisdiction of one legislator does not take away the jurisdiction of another. "This, however, must be understood if the second Superior intends to impose a new penalty; otherwise regularly, the second censure, if it is of the same species, is held as an innovation or publication of the first."

3. If, because of one and the same sin, the same legislator has inflicted several censures of diverse species. Thus, for example, Bishops, because of intrusion, incur the double penalty of suspension and interdict: from the Constitution Romanus Pontifex (cf. n. 1375 and 1376). - We have said of diverse species; for it seems alien to Law that someone, because of the same sin, be punished by the same legislator with several censures of the same species, for example one reserved and another non-reserved (VII, 28).

1 This must always be presupposed; for censure, since it is a penalty, always prerequires on the part of the one to be punished the use of reason: whence the perpetually insane cannot be punished. As regards those who have lucid intervals, they can be bound by censures to which they gave cause during the use of reason. The Superior of whom there is speech here is not the Supreme Pontiff, to whom the whole world is subject, nor a regular Prelate, who governs his own by precepts, and therefore can everywhere touch persons subject to himself. The question concerns other Ordinaries.

1263. PRINCIPLE. Censures are not usually inflicted except because of a grave, external sin, consummated in its own genus, conjoined with contumacy. Thus from the use and practice of the Church. Therefore, unless the law expresses otherwise, all these conditions are required for the validity and effect of the censure. If doubt is present in relation to the enumerated conditions, see below n. 1273.

There must be present: 1. SIN: for censures are medicinal penalties, as has been said (n. 1251).

Among censures, however, there is this distinction: a) excommunication, as being the gravest penalty, is not inflicted except because of personal fault; b) but suspension and interdict can be issued against a community, because of its fault or that of its head, so that they even bind the innocent, insofar as and as long as they belong to the community. To this pertains Rule 23 of Law in the Sixth: "Without fault, unless a cause is present, someone is not to be punished." Yet it is probable that suspension and interdict, for those who have admitted no fault, do not assume the nature of a true censure, but rather of a simple privation, whose violation, although culpable, does not carry irregularity with it.

2. GRAVE, either of itself, by reason of matter, or from an adjoined circumstance of scandal, danger, intended end, and the like. The reason is that a penalty, by both natural and divine Law, ought to be proportionate to the fault (VII, 31).

In doubt concerning the gravity of the matter, a precept imposed under censure obliges, because the power of the Superior possesses. But prelates ought carefully to beware lest they burden subjects with censures because of matters not so grave, when it is not established for them that those matters conduce greatly to a good end. These things are to be understood of a grave and properly so called censure; for suspension or interdict for a short time, and depriving one only of some use, can be inflicted because of venial sin, as is commonly taught (VII, 337).

3. EXTERNAL, although perhaps it remains occult; for the Church, in the external forum, does not judge concerning merely internal sins: therefore neither can she punish them. Indeed, for a grave censure, the sin ought to be grave as to the substance of the external work.

Whence a mortal act from evil intention alone, or from an erroneous conscience, does not suffice. Thus, for example, he does not incur excommunication who strikes a cleric altogether lightly, although with the intention of killing him; nor he who strikes a table, or says: "so it is," intending to confirm an internal heresy etc.; nor finally he who falsely thinks himself to violate a law, for example by reading a book which he believes to be condemned: for all these indeed sin against conscience, but not against Canon Law (VII, 34).

4. CONSUMMATED IN ITS OWN GENUS, that is, completed in work and indeed as to the lowest species; unless the words of the law express otherwise. The reason is that penalties and odious things are to be restricted. Hence he is not bound by censure who only counsels some crime, if in the law no others than the perpetrators are noted; but he will be bound if the law also designates counselors, or those cooperating in any way.

Wherefore St. Alphonsus notes: a) If the censure is issued principally against doers, and accessorily against commanders, counselors, etc., the commander, counselor, or one casting a vote does not incur it if the command, counsel, or vote did not effectively influence the crime, or if the crime was not carried through to effect. Thus, for example, he is exempted from excommunication who gave a command or counsel to him who was already prepared to perpetrate the delict; likewise, the one commanding a cleric to be struck is exempted if in reality the striking did not happen. And the same must probably be said if it is doubted whether the command or counsel influenced. b) On the contrary, if the censure is issued principally against commanders, counselors, etc., it is incurred as soon as the command or counsel is given, although the effect does not follow. The reason is that then the censure is imposed precisely because of the command or counsel, and not because of the work to be caused from the command or counsel (VII, 36-39).

5. CONJOINED WITH CONTUMACY, which indeed imports at least virtual contempt of the censure.1 For it is clear from the use of the Church and from the nature of censure that this is not incurred except by him who spurns the warnings of the Church, or who, after the precept or statute of the Superior issued under penalty of censure has been known, does not desist from sin. The words of Christ indicate the same, saying (Matt. 18:17): But if he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the heathen and the publican (VII, 43, 54).

1264. From these things you will gather: a) Censure cannot be inflicted because of a PAST sin, for example blasphemy, unless this has, as they say, a successive tract into the future. - Therefore, because of theft someone can be excommunicated if, warned under penalty of censure, he refuses to restore. - Apply the same to the case of scandal given and not yet repaired.

b) More probably censure is not incurred if someone, BEFORE the evil work is consummated, revokes the command or counsel as much as he can, or, not being able to impede the consummation of the delict, at least warns the one to be injured that he should take care for himself. - Likewise, one who gave poison to a cleric, and before the poison begins to operate retracts his intention and sees to it that the effect is impeded, probably does not incur excommunication. - The reason is that, in these cases, the delinquent is no longer contumacious at the time at which the sin can be said to be consummated in work. - Nevertheless, restitution is subject to other rules, as was seen n. 949.

Note. Some authors with Ballerini indeed defend another opinion, but the opinion of the holy Doctor seems safe to us (cf. Vind. Alph., P. VIII, q. 1).

1 Virtual contempt is present if someone habitually knows that such an action is prohibited under penalty. Others use the name: general contempt.

FORM, or the formality required in issuing censures, regards either the warning of the guilty person, or the sentence of the judge.

1265. • A. On warning. Warning is defined: a declaration made by the judge to the delinquent that he is about to incur censure if he does not come to his senses, or does not obey. It differs from citation, which is intimated to the accused, that he should present himself before the judge for his defense, or to hear the sentence.

1266. PRINCIPLES. I. Censures should never be issued without some previous warning. For censure is issued to break the contumacy of the guilty person;

but the guilty person cannot be said to be contumacious unless he has been forewarned concerning the penalty to be inflicted (VII, 51-53).

We have said 1. Censures, that is, properly so called; because, if suspension or interdict is issued by way of pure penalty, warning is not necessarily to be sent beforehand.

2. Should never be issued; because warning is required for the liceity of a censure, in every case.

But whether it is also required for validity is a controverted question. The more common and more probable opinion indeed affirms; but the denying opinion is also probable, at least with respect to the Roman Pontiff, if he should act from the plenitude of power.

3. Without some warning; so that it may be understood that a different one is required according to the diversity of the case.

For if a censure is issued by man by way of sentence, canonical warning is required, as above. But if it is issued by Law or by man, by way of precept, with respect to a future act, then the law itself or the precept sufficiently warns, nor is another warning required, unless Law prescribes it. And the same must more probably be said if the censure is threatened by Law, or ferendae sententiae; because in this case also the law sufficiently admonishes (VII, 53, 55).

1267. II. From Canon Law, for the liceity of a censure judicially to be issued there is required a threefold warning, or at least one peremptory warning. This is gathered from c. Const., de Sent. excomm., in 6.

A peremptory warning is that in which it is expressed that it is valid for a threefold warning, and in which time for coming to one's senses equivalent to the time of three warnings is conceded, namely two days for each warning, and therefore a space of six days: for example, "we command that within six days you cast such a woman out of the house; otherwise by the very fact you are excommunicated." But from a just cause, the three spaces can be reduced to one day or to a briefer time; but if there is danger in delay, as if it is a question of repressing violence, for example of church-wardens refusing to open the doors of the church, a single warning suffices, provided that time for coming to one's senses, say the space of one hour, is designated (VII, 56-58).

1268. B. On the sentence of the judge. The following are to be noted:

1. That a censure be issued licitly by way of sentence, it is required that the judge issue it in writing, noting in it, and indeed distinctly, both the person, and the censure, and the cause in species. But if the one to be censured demands for himself a copy of this writing, it must be furnished.

It was said licitly; for if the censure is issued with the solemnities disregarded, it is indeed valid, but the judge, unless excused by necessity or ignorance, sins gravely (VII, 50).

2. The censured person, so that he may come to his senses more quickly, ought, unless circumstances suggest otherwise, to be denounced.

Moreover, if he has been censured by man, the denunciation is to be made by the author of the censure itself, or by his delegate, and indeed publicly, for example in the church, at the time of Mass or sermon, by the living voice, or through a sheet affixed to the doors of the church, according to the custom of the region. But if he has been censured by common Law, the denunciation, in the same way, is to be made by the Ordinary of the place in which the censure was incurred. But then, before denunciation, there ought to precede the citation of the guilty person, to be made by his own Superior, a term having been given to him for declaring his right; otherwise the denunciation will be null, unless perhaps, Bonacina excepts, the crime is so notorious that it is evidently established that no defense is available to the guilty person (VII, 55 and 65, note 3).

3. As soon as the guilty person offers satisfaction, he is to be absolved.

1269. Four things excuse from censure: 1. ignorance; 2. fear; 3. impotence; 4. nullity of the censure.

I. IGNORANCE excuses; because he who does not know the censure cannot be said to be contumacious. And this is true even if the ignorance is merely concomitant, for example when someone kills a cleric not knowing that he is a cleric, but so prepared in mind that, if he had known, he would also have killed him.

Hence: 1. Ignorance excuses both of law, when someone, namely, is ignorant either that the crime is prohibited by the Church, or that a censure is annexed to the crime; and of fact, when someone is ignorant that he is positing an act forbidden under censure. Thus, for example, you are excused if you do not know that the book which you read or retain has been prohibited by name through Apostolic Letters.

2. Even vincible ignorance excuses, if it is not gravely culpable. For light fault is not punished by a grave penalty. But ignorance GRAVELY culpable generally does not excuse; because this can practically be called crass. Now in Law it is said: "We do not wish the ignorant to be bound; provided, however, that their ignorance has not been crass or supine" (Boniface, c. 2, de Const. in 6).

3. Even gravely culpable ignorance excuses sometimes; namely when in the decree of censure it is said: "he who shall have done this knowingly, deliberately..." or also: "he who shall have presumed..., by rash daring," or something similar, by which certain knowledge or a direct and perfect voluntary is required (cf. n. 220).

But whether affected ignorance itself also excuses in this case is disputed. Others more commonly deny it; because this includes deceit and is equivalent to knowledge. But others, and not improbably, affirm it, at least if it is a question of a censure inflicted on those sinning knowingly; because he indeed who knowingly sins against the law truly contemns it; but he who sins from affected ignorance, although he wishes to be ignorant so that he may sin more freely, nevertheless demonstrates some reverence toward the law, while he seeks to be ignorant of it from fear that, if he should know it, he may be drawn back from sin: therefore he shows virtual deceit, not formal deceit (VII, 45-48, 301).

1270. II. GRAVE FEAR excuses as often as it frees from a delict against ecclesiastical law. The reason is that censure, as a sanction of law, is not incurred except because of transgression of the law itself.

We have said: as often as it frees from a delict against ecclesiastical law; now, grave fear of imminent harm from observing an ecclesiastical law, and consequently from delict, excuses, unless from neglect of the law a greater harm follows than is the inconvenience which its fulfillment carries with it (cf. n. 223).

This holds even in the case in which fear would not excuse from fault against divine Law. Thus, for example, he who from fear lest he himself be killed, kills a cleric, certainly sins against the law of God; but because of the straits of the case, ecclesiastical law ceases to oblige, and therefore the censure is not incurred. But otherwise, if the law of the Church is of such a kind that it obliges even with fear of grave evil; if, say, its observance is morally necessary for the public good, or if its violation yields to contempt of faith or of ecclesiastical power (VII, 46; H. Ap., XIX, 8, 2). Cf. Nouv. Rev. Theol., 37, p. 524.

Note. If it is a question of a censure established against those presuming, even light fear would excuse from incurring it.

1271. III. IMPOTENCE, whether physical or moral, likewise excuses from censure, as is evident. Thus, for example, he who does not have whence to restore, or who cannot restore without grave inconvenience, does not incur censures issued against retainers of another's goods (VII, 42).

1272. • IV. NULLITY OF THE CENSURE can be had from a threefold head:1 1. From defect of the one issuing it, that is, if he lacks jurisdiction, whether he has it impeded through censure, or suspended through a legitimate appeal which has been interposed before the sentence was absolutely issued. 2. From defect of form, that is, if the substantial order of judgment is omitted; as, if the guilty person is not cited, nor warned under threat of censure, according to what was said n. 1266. 3. From defect of a just cause, or matter (VII, 50, 51, 66).

But a just cause can fail in a threefold way: a) "If it subsists neither on the part of the thing, nor according to the allegations of the external forum. b) If on the part of the thing the crime indeed subsists, but not in order to judgment, because the guilty person does not confess it, nor is he legitimately convicted of it. c) If on the part of the thing the crime does not subsist, although it is juridically proved, and therefore the judge has a presumed title or cause. In which case, although the sentence on the part of the thing is unjust, and therefore more probably the censure does not bind in the forum of conscience, nevertheless in the external forum it must be observed, because of scandal" (VII, 66). Whence for the external forum he needs absolution who contracted marriage before a little minister (Holy Office, 1892).

1273. IT IS ASKED. In DOUBTS concerning censures, what is to be held?

Resp. 1. In a doubt antecedent to action, he who suspects that a censure is annexed to his action ought to inquire into the truth. If, after diligence has been applied, he does not find it, he is excused from censure by reason of invincible ignorance.

But if in inquiring he neglects all diligence, or uses only very little, he will not be immune from crass ignorance, and consequently is not exempted from censure, unless in the law it is said: he who shall have done this knowingly, etc. See what was said n. 1269, 3.

2. In a doubt consequent to action, that is, in doubt whether a censure has been incurred or not, "in the forum of conscience we are not held to conduct ourselves as censured persons."

And this whether the doubt is of fact, that is, concerning the crime, for example whether the striking of a cleric was gravely injurious; or whether the doubt is of law, that is, concerning the sentence, suppose if it is doubted whether a censure was latae or ferendae sententiae, or whether a condition placed in the sentence has been fulfilled or not. The reason, for doubt of fact, is that no one in doubt is to be stripped of his right of communicating with the Church, which he possesses; but for doubt of law, because penalties are to be restricted, whence in doubt they are not incurred.

3. In a doubt concerning the cessation of a censure certainly inflicted, that is, if the censured person doubts concerning absolution obtained, concerning the effect of an appeal interposed, and similar things, he ought still to hold himself as censured; because possession stands for the law, or for the Superior.

And the same must be said if he doubts concerning the power of the Superior, when this Superior peacefully possesses it. Likewise, more truly, in doubt whether the censure is just or not, whatever some say; because even in such a doubt, the power of the Superior possesses (n. 55). Cf. St. Alphonsus, VII, 45, 67, 68; D'Annibale, Summula, I, 312.

1 The things noted here refer to censures issued by man alone. Cf. Aertnys (l. VII, n. 17), who explains these things lucidly.

Three things are to be weighed: 1. how incurred censures are released; 2. who can absolve; 3. what conditions are required.

1274. DEFINITION. The absolution of a censure is the relaxation of the penalty itself, made by the power of the keys, through a fit Superior. Of itself and primarily it is an act of jurisdiction of the external forum, just as the infliction itself of censure is. It differs from dispensation, which takes away the bond of a law or precept (cf. n. 227).

DIVISION. Someone can be absolved from censure in manifold ways: 1. as to all effects, or only as to some; 2. absolutely or conditionally; 3. with falling back; 4. for caution (D'Annibale on the Constitution Apost. Sed.).

Now: 1. Absolution is given ordinarily to take away ALL EFFECTS; sometimes it is given FOR A PARTIAL EFFECT, for example to remove privation of active voice in a canonical election.1

This, however, is improperly called absolution, because it presents the appearance of a dispensation (VII, 125, end).

1 Thus, for example, censures by which the Cardinal electors of a new Pontiff perhaps are punished are suspended for the effect of election, while otherwise remaining in their force (Const. Vacante Sede Apost., n. 29 and 79; Acta Pii X, vol. 3, p. 253 and 282).

2. Absolution can be given UNDER CONDITION, either concerning the past, for example: "if you have already satisfied, I absolve you"; or concerning the present: "if I can absolve"; or concerning the future: "if you will satisfy hereafter, now for then I absolve you."

This last absolution, however, is illicit, unless it is made honorable by some grave cause, say, if afterward he from whom the censured person can be absolved would be lacking (VII, 123).

3. Absolution is sometimes given WITH FALLING BACK, which is a species of condition; namely so that the absolved person, unless within a certain time he shall have performed something, for example unless within a month he shall have restored, or gone to the excommunicating one, falls back by the very fact into the same censure.

Moreover, falling back is by man or by Law: a) It is by man, as often as it is adjoined by the will of the absolving Superior himself. b) It is by Law, when it is imposed by force of law: which is done, for example, when someone, either in urgent necessity, or in the article or danger of death, is absolved from censures reserved to the Pope in a special way (VII, 86, 87, 125). See what is to be said n. 1282 and 1284.

4. Absolution FOR CAUTION is that which is given to remove or to suspend a censure perhaps unknown.

Of this kind is that which is given before absolution of sins, to avoid irreverence; or before conferral of orders, benefices, etc., to remove the impediment of a censure perhaps forgotten, or incurred with crass ignorance. Cf. Sanchez, Decal., l. I, c. 10, n. 55.

Note. It is EXPEDIENT to give absolution for caution as often as there is doubt concerning excommunication incurred: a) because, once it has been given, the censure ceases, even if afterward it appears certain; b) lest perhaps, in doubt of fact, whether someone has really contracted it, whether he has been absolved from it, he remain outside the Church, bereft of her goods; for in such a doubt, our false estimation does not change the truth of the thing. Nor ought the form of absolution from the Roman Ritual to be vain and useless. Otherwise in doubt of law, because a doubtful law certainly does not oblige (Lugo, de Poenit., disp. 20, n. 22, 23).

1275. • PRINCIPLES. I. Censures once incurred are removed through the absolution alone of a legitimate judge. This is clear from the sacred canons (VII, 122).

Hence: 1. Censure is not removed through the amendment of the guilty person; which moreover is clear from proposition 44 condemned by Alexander VII: "As regards the forum of conscience, when the guilty person has been corrected and his contumacy has ceased, the censures cease." 2. It is not removed by the death or removal of the one issuing it, as is clear from c. Pastoralis, de officio judicis ordinarii; and the reason is that a penalty once inflicted passes into a matter adjudged. 3. It is not removed by the death of the censured person, as is clear from c. Sacris, de Sent. excomm. Wherefore a dead person, although he died contrite, is deprived of the suffrages of the Church and ecclesiastical burial.

It was said: 1. Censures, that is, properly so called; for suspensions and interdicts which are inflicted by way of vindicative penalty cease, not through absolution, but through time elapsed, or a condition fulfilled, or through dispensation of the Superior (cf. n. 1305). - 2. Once incurred; because censures not yet incurred are deleted either by abrogation of the law, or by revocation of the precept, or also by the death of the Superior issuing a particular sentence.

1276. II. Absolution from censures can be given both in the external forum and in the internal forum. Indeed, since censure without fault cannot even be understood, in the sacramental forum absolution must be given at the same time from censures and from sins, but first from censures. If absolution from censures is given after absolution from sins, it is gravely illicit, nevertheless valid; and if the penitent, in receiving it, was in good faith and otherwise disposed, absolution from sins also will be valid (VI, 430, end; VII, 70, 126).

1277. • III. The value of absolution from censures is one thing in the external forum, another in the internal forum. Absolution given in the external forum always avails for the internal forum. Given in the internal forum, it does not profit before the judge or the faithful unless it is publicly established, for example if it is known that the censured person has confessed and has offered satisfaction, if any was necessary. But prudence forbids that absolution in the internal forum be granted if the case has already been brought into the contentious forum or is soon to be brought there (Suarez, de Cens., disp. 7).

A great difference intervenes between absolution from SINS and absolution from CENSURES.

1. The former is given to reconcile us to God; but the latter to restore those things which are proper to the Church militant. 2. The former extends to all sins, but the latter is sometimes restricted to one censure. 3. The former is given only to the contrite and willing; the latter is validly granted even to the contumacious, and to the unwilling themselves; indeed also licitly in some cases, for example when this conduces to the common good. 4. The former, of itself, is absolute; the latter is often given under condition, from day to day, with falling back, for caution, for a particular effect, etc. 5. The former is given only to those present; the latter is rightly given also to the absent by letters or telephone or intermediary, if an urgent cause is present, except if it has been committed to someone to absolve in the form customary to the Church. 6. The former is given by an approved priest alone; the latter can be given by a simple cleric endowed with due faculty. 7. Finally, sins can be absolved not only directly, but also indirectly, that is, by concomitance with those things which are subject to the keys; but censures are absolved only directly; because among them there is not a necessary connection, but they are held like chains, some of which are released without the others (VI, 597, 618; VII, 117, 131).

1278. PRINCIPLES. I. From a censure inflicted through a particular sentence upon a determinate person, no one can absolve except he who inflicted it, or his successor, or Superior, or the delegate of these. Such a censure, from its own nature, is most specially reserved, even in a Jubilee; and the reason is that otherwise the order of judgments would be disturbed (VII, 72; H. Ap., XIX, 11).

Wherefore St. Alphonsus notes: "1. That a Bishop, even in another's territory, can absolve his own subjects, in the forum both external and internal, whenever the absolution is without judicial noise. 2. That if someone offends in another's territory, and is specially excommunicated by that Bishop, he cannot be absolved by his own Bishop, except by permission of the Bishop of the place" (cf. n. 204).

1279. II. From censures issued, whether by Law, or by man through a general sentence against indeterminate persons, which censures are equated with censures issued by Law, if they are not reserved, any confessor can validly and licitly absolve, for both forums. Thus commonly, from the concession of Innocent III, c. Nuper, de Sent. excomm., and from the universal practice of the Church.

We have said: 1. From censures, for otherwise, if some penalty, stated under the form of censure, is really vindicative (cf. n. 1300). 2. Any confessor, namely approved, and having jurisdiction over the censured person. But a simple priest, outside the case of danger of death, cannot absolve anyone even from excommunication reserved to no one, whatever some say. 3. For both forums: whence this absolution can be given both outside and within confession, and it avails also for the external forum, in non-contentious cases, according to what was said n. 1276 (VII, 70-73).

1280. • III. From censures reserved by Law no one can absolve, except he to whom they are reserved, or his Superior, or successor, or one duly delegated. This is clear from c. Nuper, de Sent. excomm., and from Trent, Sess. 14, c. 7.

As regards delegated faculty let the following rules stand:

FIRST RULE. If censures are reserved to the Roman Pontiff in a special way, for absolving, outside the case of necessity, a special concession is required, which is not usually granted by the Holy See except for a time, or for the life of the person, or for a certain number of cases.1 This is clear from the practice of the Holy See and from the Constitution of Pius IX, by which censures were limited, and at the same time all real privileges were revoked, as regards absolution from censures, whether specially or simply reserved.

Moreover, the SPECIAL concession is made, for example, through the indult of a Jubilee, through a little document of the Sacred Penitentiary, through quinquennial faculties and other personal faculties of this kind. The Pontiff did not revoke these faculties, as is clear from an oracle of the living voice promulgated by the Holy Office, 1 Feb. 1871.

SECOND RULE. If censures are simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff, Bishops in their own diocese can, by themselves or through another specially to be deputed for this, absolve any of their subjects; but only in occult cases, and in the forum of conscience. Thus from the celebrated chapter Liceat of the Council of Trent, whose disposition Pius IX confirmed in the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis.

Now these are the words of Trent (Sess. 24, c. 6, de Reform.): "It is permitted to Bishops, in all irregularities and suspensions proceeding from an occult delict, except that which arises from voluntary homicide, and except others brought to the contentious forum, to dispense; and in any occult cases whatever, even those reserved to the Apostolic See, to absolve, gratuitously, in the forum of conscience, any delinquent subjects of their own, in their own diocese, by themselves or by a vicar specially to be deputed for this, a salutary penance having been imposed."

Under the words: 1. Bishops, there also come Abbots having territory, capitular Vicars, and others enjoying episcopal jurisdiction (VII, 79); but not Vicars general from their general commission (de Privil., 31); nor regular prelates, as is clear from the Response of the Sacred Penitentiary, 5 Dec. 1873. Cf. Lehmkuhl, II, 1123. 2. Through another specially to be deputed... understand either for one case, or for all cases, provided the delegation is made not to all in common, but to individual persons, this faculty being expressly named, as the authors most commonly interpret (VII, 93; de Privil., 34; cf. Ami du Cl., 1911, p. 223). 3. Their subjects... understand those staying in the diocese, or even outsiders approaching the sacred Tribunal in the diocese: because by this very fact they become subjects as regards absolution, although not yet as regards dispensation from an irregularity or suspension reserved to the Pontiff (VI, 593). 4. In occult cases, which namely are not formally notorious, either by notoriety of law, or by notoriety of fact, according to the sense which we stated n. 1190. 5. In the forum of conscience, that is, in the sacramental forum, as St. Alphonsus judges more probably (de Privil., n. 29); or at least not in the external and contentious forum, as is altogether certain from Trent (cf. n. 138).

THIRD RULE. If censures are reserved to Bishops, or Ordinaries, by pontifical Law, Bishops, Abbots, capitular or general Vicars, and all Ordinaries can absolve, in both forums, from cases even notorious.1 In the internal forum, regulars can absolve from cases not brought to the judicial forum nor easily to be brought there (I, App. II, n. 100; ed. G., I, p. 239): for nothing, as regards cases reserved by law to ORDINARIES, has been innovated through the Bull Apostolicae Sedis.

Under the name of Ordinaries regular prelates also come with respect to their own subjects: for these, as exempt, have no other Ordinaries than their own prelates. Therefore these can absolve their own, even novices and familiars, from cases reserved to the Ordinary, but not from cases, whether public or occult, reserved in any way to the Roman Pontiff. S. Poenit., 5 Dec. 1873 (ap. Noldin, de Poenit., n. 381). As regards absolution from cases pertaining to internal governance, nothing indeed has been innovated through the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis (Holy Office, 22 Mar. 1881), but see the new Decree, 5 Aug. 1913 (cf. what is to be said n. 1762).

1281. • FOURTH RULE. If censures have been reserved by other Bishops, any Bishop can, by himself or through another, absolve from them, but only in occult cases. For it is read in c. Liceat: "In any occult cases whatever, EVEN those reserved to the Apostolic See." Whence, the authors say, lest the particle "even" seem to have been placed uselessly, it must be understood that the faculty of absolving from occult censures which other Bishops reserved to themselves is conceded to Bishops. Thus Bonacina (de Cens., disp. 1, q. 3, punct. 2, n. 6), who adds that this seems to be received by custom, which is wont to confer jurisdiction. Cf. St. Alph., de Privil., n. 35.

Nevertheless censures issued through a particular sentence are excepted (cf. n. 1278).

Hence: A simple confessor cannot absolve a traveler from a censure reserved in the traveler's homeland; but a regular validly absolves novices as regards episcopal censures contracted before entrance (VI, 583).

Concerning the faculty of absolving from censures in the time of Jubilee, see the treatise on Penance (cf. n. 1736, B).

Preliminary note. Although the discipline concerning ecclesiastical penalties properly pertains to Canon Law, nevertheless it is found in almost all modern Manuals of Moral Theology, because it is very necessary in the practice of the confessor. Therefore we too here explain ecclesiastical penalties very briefly, as a complement to the treatise on penance and for the benefit of confessors; but we omit vindicative penalties (for example, degradation and deposition) and penances, both because such penalties are very rare today and because this matter pertains solely to Canon Law. The whole treatise is divided into three chapters: 1. on ecclesiastical penalties in general; 2. on censures in general; 3. on censures in particular.

Censures must be considered both in general and in species.

We must treat 1° of the nature and division of censures; 2° of the principle or author of censures; 3° of the subject of censures; 4° of absolution from censures.

Note. - In this Treatise we have taken many things from the little work both of Peter Avanzini, whose title is: On the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, and of the Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Fr. Aegidius Mauri, O.P., whose title is: Commentaries on the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis. The former is cited according to the 3rd Edition by the word: "Avanz."; the latter according to the 2nd Edition by the word: "Comm."

1660. - Censure is commonly accustomed to be defined thus: It is a spiritual and medicinal penalty, by which a baptized man, delinquent and contumacious, is deprived by ecclesiastical power of the use of certain spiritual goods.

It is said:

1° Penalty, because it supposes fault.

2° Spiritual, both because it is brought by a spiritual power for the spiritual utility of Christians, and because it immediately takes away spiritual goods, and because, as the Bull Auctorem fidei defines, condemning the contrary doctrine as false, pernicious, and at least erroneous (p. XXXII. p. 46), it binds in heaven and obliges souls.

3° Medicinal, because it is brought for this end, that the soul may return itself to better fruit. From this, however, you will not infer that those of whose correction there is despair are never to be punished by this penalty, or that those who have amended themselves are immediately to be absolved from it. For although this is generally true, nevertheless, according to St. Alphonsus¹ and St. Thomas, this does not impede that censure can also be brought for the terror of others, and that absolution from it can be deferred either for a fuller repentance of the matter, or for the edification of the faithful and for repairing scandal; wherefore the correction of the delinquent is not the only end of censure.

4° A baptized man, because those who are not baptized are not subject to the legislative or coercive power of the Church; but power is exercised over subjects.

5° Delinquent and contumacious, because a penalty is inflicted only on the delinquent; but medicine ought not to be extended except to those whose contumacy needs so great a remedy. Yet formal contempt is not required for this contumacy, but virtual contempt suffices, consisting in this, that someone, knowing, or at least doubting, that something is prohibited by the Church under censure, nevertheless wills to do it.

6° Is deprived of the use of certain spiritual goods, namely of goods which are subject to the power of the Church. For goods of a threefold kind exist in the Church. Some proceed immediately from the head, or Christ, as the various graces; others proceed from the body, or the Church, as the administration of the Sacraments, common suffrages, etc.; but others proceed from the members, such as the prayers and good works of individual faithful. Now, therefore, censure does not take away the use of goods of the first kind, since they do not depend on the Church; and hence censure can stand together with the state of grace, e.g. in him who incurs censure because of a sin concerning which he afterward is perfectly contrite;² likewise, per se, neither does it take away the use of goods of the third kind; for the Church cannot impede that communion of Saints which exists from faith and charity among the members; but it only takes away or prohibits the use of goods of the second kind, sometimes indeed entirely, but sometimes only in part.

"Secondarily" censure can also deprive one "of the use of corporal goods, or of external actions, namely human communication, honor or salutation, etc.; which, however, is always as it were indirectly, and in order to spiritual things." Thus Suarez.

Hence censure differs:

1° From deposition and degradation, which are not medicinal, nor for a time, but only for penalty and perpetually, and because of a past sin, even one amended, can be inflicted.¹

2° From irregularity, which can be contracted because of only a defect also, either of soul or of body, without any fault, and therefore per se is not a penalty, but only a canonical impediment, although, inflicted because of certain crimes, it can also have the character of penalty, yet not medicinal, but punitive, and of itself perpetual.

3° From cessation from divine things: because this is indicated for warding off an injury inflicted on the Church, not for amending the guilty person.

4° From privation of a benefice, prison, etc.; because these do not deprive one of the use of spiritual goods.

Particular suspension and interdict³ sometimes put on the nature of censure, sometimes of vindicative penalty. But you will recognize that it is a vindicative penalty both if it is brought because of a merely past delict, and if it is inflicted perpetually or even for a determined time, say for two or three months. - They add that those penalties also then have the character of pure penalty, if some condition is lacking, from the defect of which censure, but not a pure penalty, is invalidated, or if the will of the Superior of constituting a mere penalty can be known from something.⁴ Moreover, to penalties of this sort, if they are not censures, those things cannot be applied which the law establishes concerning censures as such.⁵ Yet it is otherwise if something else is expressly provided by the law itself. See n. 1771. I said: 4°.

1661. - They are distinguished in various ways, namely:

1° By reason of species, into excommunication, suspension, interdict, concerning which we shall speak in particular.

2° By reason of the mode by which they are inflicted, into censures brought by law or by man, according as they are brought through canons or ecclesiastical laws (under which also come statutes established in a diocesan synod), or are brought by a legitimate Superior, whether by way of judicial sentence, e.g. if satisfaction is commanded by sentence of the judge under threat of censure to someone who has been found culpable; or by way of precept upon one or upon several. If censure by man affects determined persons, it is particular; but if it is brought generally and without determination of persons, it is general. - But they differ from each other especially in this, that a censure brought by law, when the author who brought it is dead, perseveres after the manner of all laws. But one brought by man, since it depends upon his jurisdiction and authority, when this ceases, he being dead or removed from office, also ceases, unless it has already been contracted; for, if someone has incurred it, the bond is taken away only by absolution.

3° By reason of the mode by which they are incurred, into censures of sentence already passed or to be passed, according as the Superior establishes that the censure is incurred by the very fact by which someone violates the law, or only after the sentence of an ecclesiastical judge has been inflicted. It is asked how these are distinguished from each other.

a) They are of sentence already passed: 1) if the law says: by the very fact; by the law itself; without another sentence;¹ 2) if the words are of the past or present tense, e.g. we have excommunicated, I excommunicate;² 3) if absolutely, in the imperative mode, it is said: let him be excommunicated, let him be suspended, etc.; but not if by these words only a precept of excommunicating, suspending, etc., is imposed on another, say the Bishop.³ Nearly the same distinction, according to Suarez⁴ and Croix,⁵ is to be employed if it is said: immediately; continuously; from then; on the spot.

b) They are of sentence to be passed, if the words are either 1) of the future tense; or 2) threatening, unless something else is gathered from the adjuncts;⁶ or 3) ambiguous; for, from Rule of Law 49 in 6°, "in penalties the more benign interpretation is to be made."⁷ But ambiguous would be, for example, these words: let him be excommunicated.⁸

4° By reason of the power of absolving, into reserved censures or non-reserved censures, according as the Superior reserved to himself absolution from them, or permitted ordinary Ministers to absolve from them. Some are reserved to the Pope, others to Bishops. Those reserved to the Pope are reserved either specially, or simply (see n. 1701 sq.). But to Bishops some are reserved by law (see n. 1733 sq.), and these are properly reserved to the Pope with the faculty made to Bishops that they can absolve from them; others are reserved by Bishops themselves. Censures by man are always judged reserved, unless they were brought by a general precept. - Finally, these also deserve to be distinguished:

5° Notorious or occult censures, according as it is clear to others that someone has incurred them because of a fact which is so known that it can no longer be hidden; or otherwise; and

6° Just or unjust, valid or invalid censures, according as the Superior has consulted justice, truth, and law, or not, in imposing the censure.

1662. - For the validity of censure there is required sin, and this proportioned to the censure, external, regularly consummated, not merely past, and joined with contumacy.

1° Sin. Hence, if the crime on account of which censure is inflicted either does not subsist, or has not been legitimately proved, the censure does not bind in the forum of conscience. But if for the external forum it appears valid, it must be observed externally to avoid scandal and disturbance of judgments.¹ Furthermore, censure ought not to be fulminated in one's own personal cause, since this is reputed in law as vengeance.² Except, however, 1) if this is done not by way of judgment, but by way of defense against him who inflicts violence, because it is lawful to repel force by force;³ 2) where the cause is so public and manifest that it can neither be denied, nor needs any examination.⁴

2° Proportioned to the censure, and hence ordinarily mortal; for censure, since it is a most grave penalty, requires mortal fault. Yet I said: ordinarily mortal; for suspension or interdict for a brief time and depriving one only of some use, likewise minor excommunication, can be brought because of venial sin.⁵

3° External; for the Church judges in the external forum, to which censures pertain; but not concerning merely internal things. Moreover, the sin ought not only to be exterior, but also grave as to the substance of the external act. Whence it does not suffice that the act is mortal from a depraved intention or from an erroneous conscience. - Thus, e.g., he who strikes a cleric only lightly, although with the mind of killing him, does not incur excommunication; nor does he who strikes a table, or says: thus it is, intending internally to confirm heresy, etc.; nor finally he who falsely thinks himself to violate the law, e.g. by reading a book which he falsely believes condemned. For all these indeed sin against conscience, but not against Canon Law.⁶

4° Regularly consummated by work in its own kind, according to the property of the words which are contained in the precept or law inflicting the censure, and according to the principal end of the law. The reason is because penal laws are to be strictly interpreted according to the Rule of Law: Odia are to be restricted, favors ought to be enlarged.

I said: 1) regularly. For sin begun, or even an attempt or assistance toward it, can be punished by censure and in fact sometimes is punished, as, e.g., provocation to duel or acceptance of it, even though the fight does not follow; likewise to furnish work or favor to the same. But unless it is expressed in the law, an extension of this sort is not to be made. Therefore,

I said: 2) according to the property of the words, etc. Wherefore, he who only counseled some crime is not bound by censure, if in the law no others than perpetrators are noted; but he will be bound if also counselors or those in any way cooperating in the same are noted.¹ Hence also, as St. Alphonsus notes,² if the censure has been brought principally upon those doing, and accessorily upon those commanding, counseling, etc., the one commanding, the one counseling, the one carrying a vote, does not incur it, if the command, counsel, or vote does not efficaciously influence the crime; or if the crime is not brought to effect. Thus, e.g., he is exempted from excommunication who gave a command or counsel to him who was already prepared to perpetrate the delict; likewise the one commanding a cleric to be struck is exempted if in fact the striking does not occur. And the same must probably be said if it is doubted whether the command or counsel influenced. - On the contrary, if the censure has been brought principally upon those commanding, counseling, etc., it is incurred immediately whenever the command or counsel has been furnished by them, even with the effect not following; the reason is because then the censure has been imposed precisely because of the command or counsel, and not because of the work which would be caused from the command or counsel.

5° Not merely past, or not having, as they say, a successive tract, because censure is a medicinal penalty, and therefore cannot be brought upon those who have already returned themselves to better fruit. "Therefore, when someone is excommunicated because of theft, he is excommunicated by reason of contumacy, either because the thief knew theft to be forbidden under censure, or because, having been admonished under penalty of censure, he refuses to restore."¹ Apply the same to the case of scandal given and not yet repaired.

6° Joined with contumacy against the law or precept of the Church. The reason is because the principal end of censure is to break pertinacity. Recall the things said n. 1660. It is said: 5°.

1663. Resolves. - 1° Because one is excused from grave fault because of some circumstance, he is also excused from censure, although the matter is grave in itself.

2° If something altogether light is commanded under censure, this is not incurred, provided that the thing which appears light under some respect does not become grave from elsewhere.

3° The Superior would act imprudently and illicitly, but nevertheless validly, who brought censure because of any grave fault whatever; for the end of the Church is to punish only graver crimes.²

4° More probably, censure is not incurred if someone, before the evil work is consummated, as far as he can revokes the command or counsel, or, not being able to impede the consummation, at least warns the person to be harmed, that he may be on his guard; for he would not be contumacious at the time at which the work obtains the final effect required for incurring censure. Concerning restitution in this case see nn. 760. q. 1°. 5; a. 168. q. 1°.

5° Excommunication which is said to be brought upon harmful animals, e.g. locusts, is not excommunication properly so called, but adjuration, or a prayer made for their destruction, lest they harm. Cf. n. 376. III.

6° Likewise, when the dead are said to be excommunicated, this must be understood of a certain execration or declaration of excommunication which they incurred before death, and in which they died. Therefore, absolution imparted to the excommunicated who died with signs of penitence is extended directly not to the dead themselves, but to the living, inasmuch as they are loosed from the obligation not to communicate with the departed in burial and public prayers.

1664. Questions. - Query 1° Whether one doubtful concerning a contracted censure in the internal forum is to be held censured?

Resp. Negatively, in a doubt both of fact and of law, i.e. whether you doubt whether you have offended, or whether the case falls under censure. The reason is both because in doubt no one is to be stripped of the right, which he possesses, of using spiritual goods, and because odia are to be restricted. Thus commonly. Hence regularly you do not incur censure unless the sin is so certain that no prudent doubt remains whether it was perpetrated; whether it is internally and externally grave; whether it is consummated in its species; whether it was committed by one past puberty (see n. 1668. II.).

It is said in the question: he who doubts whether he has incurred it; for in a doubt preceding the action, the things to be said in the following questions 2° and 3° are to be applied.

In a doubt concerning absolution obtained, concerning an appeal interposed in time, and similar things, the guilty person ought to bear himself as censured; likewise in a doubt concerning the power of the Superior when this Superior peacefully possesses it, and more truly also in a doubt whether the censure is just, because in these doubts the power of the Superior possesses. - A censure brought from a false presumption of fact, unless or until its injustice is publicly known, must be observed in public, lest scandal be given.

Query 2° Whether ignorance excuses from censure?

Resp. 1° Certainly ignorance of fact excuses, namely when someone is ignorant that he is placing an act prohibited under censure. Thus, e.g., if someone strikes a priest thinking him to be a layman, he does not incur the censure brought upon strikers of Clerics. The reason is because censure ought to be known to the sinner, so that he may be contumacious. Thus in Canon Law.²

Resp. 2° Ignorance of ecclesiastical law commanding or prohibiting something under censure also excuses. This is clear from the same reasons just adduced; for he cannot be called contumacious against the Church who is ignorant of its law, as is clear from Canon Law,³ where it is said: "We do not will that the ignorant be bound, provided however that the ignorance does not smack of crassness or supineness."

Query 3° Whether vincible ignorance excuses from censure?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if this is not gravely culpable; because then the one ignorant cannot be called contumacious against the Church. - Thus all.

Resp. 2° But negatively, if that ignorance is gravely culpable; because then practically it can be called crass: moreover, crass ignorance does not excuse from censure, as is clear from the cited Canon Law. For this ignorance does not impede that someone be contumacious against the law which he culpably ignores. - St. Alphonsus¹ and others commonly.

Except, however, if in the Decree of censure it is said: whoever shall have done this knowingly, deliberately, rashly, whoever shall have presumed, etc. For these words demand a perfect and direct voluntary act, and from certain knowledge of the censure.² But more commonly they deny that by these clauses even affected ignorance, as including fraud and being equated to knowledge, is excused; and to this sentence, as more common, St. Alphonsus, although the opposite does not seem to him improbable, adheres the more.³

Query 4° Whether those who have committed some sin to which censure has been annexed by law are to be admonished by the confessor both concerning the sin and concerning the censure annexed to it, if they are ignorant either of the sin or of the censure?

Resp. The question must be resolved according to the things said in n. 1423, and according to the things to be said in nn. 1753-1757. q. 3°.

Query 5° Whether grave fear excuses from censure?

Resp. Affirmatively, even when there is question of a censure established against those transgressing a divine precept, whether positive or natural, provided that a) fear of this kind is such that it excuses from fault those violating the precept, if it were ecclesiastical; b) the law does not dispose otherwise. The reason is because ecclesiastical laws, such as are those which establish censures, cease to oblige where grave fear presses. - Yet I said: a) fear of this kind is such, etc. Hence, when the observance of human law seems morally necessary for preserving the public good, or if its violation redounds to contempt of the Faith, or of the law, or of ecclesiastical power, one transgressing from grave fear, even of life, a law placed under censure is not excused from it. I said: b) the law does not dispose otherwise, whether explicitly, or implicitly, as, e.g., with regard to duelists.⁴

Query 6° Whether it is required that admonition of the delinquent precede the censure?

Resp. 1° No admonition is required for censures established by law, because the law itself, having been brought and known, sufficiently admonishes the subjects. - Thus all. Yet, more probably, according to St. Alphonsus,¹ citation of the guilty person is required where there is question of censure of a sentence to be passed, in the case in which the delict and contumacy are not so notorious that it is evidently clear that no defense belongs to the guilty person.

Resp. 2° But admonition is required for censures to be brought by man, and indeed more commonly and more probably for validity. The reason is because he is not contumacious who previously was not admonished concerning the precept and concerning the penalty annexed. Indeed, from Canon Law, for liceity, a triple admonition is required, or at least one peremptory admonition, or one in which it is expressed that it has the force of three, and in which time for repentance equivalent to the time of three admonitions is granted, namely a period of two days for each admonition, and therefore a space of six days, e.g. "we command that within six days you cast such a woman out of the house; otherwise by the very fact you will be excommunicated."² But for a just cause three spaces can be reduced to one day or to a shorter time, and, if there is danger in delay, as if there is question of repressing violence, e.g. of trustees refusing to open the doors of the church, one admonition suffices, provided however that time for repentance, say the space of one hour, be designated.³

Except: 1° if there is question of censure by man by a general precept, or even a special precept with respect to a future act; for then admonition is not necessary, since the Decree concerning bringing censure holds the place of admonition.

Except: 2° if there is question of suspension and interdict of this kind, which are not censures properly so called and medicinal, but are brought only by way of penalty.⁴

Note. - Concerning the solemnities required for censures strictly such to be brought licitly, see, if you wish, Canon Law⁵ or St. Alphonsus.⁶ - Concerning these, observe: a) that they are required only in censures by man, and indeed brought by a particular sentence; but not in censures established by law, or by man indeed, but by way of a general or particular precept;¹ b) that among other things it is required that the censure and its cause be pronounced in writing, and that an authentic copy of the writing be handed over to the guilty person asking for it within a month. But since, as Kenrick astutely remarks,² "in this region lawsuits are sometimes brought against a Bishop bringing censures, he ought to take care here that he hand over nothing in writing which could furnish occasion for a civil action, or which otherwise would redound to the detriment of Religion; but a civil action does not seem to be given, if to the guilty person asking, the cause proved in judgment" (ecclesiastical) "is set forth; otherwise if the Bishop communicates the judgment" (ecclesiastical) "to others whom it does not concern."

1665. Principles. - I. The Church enjoys true power of bringing censures. See the arguments among the Dogmaticians.

II. All and only ecclesiastical Superiors having jurisdiction in the external and contentious forum can bring censures by ordinary right. This is clear from the words of Christ in Matthew:³ Whatever things you shall bind, etc. For by these words Christ gave to the Prelates of the Church, in the person of the Apostles, every power for the good and right administration of the Church. It is also clear from several places of Canon Law.

III. Censures can be brought, by that delegated power, by all and only Clerics to whom it has been granted by a Superior having ordinary jurisdiction. The reason is because every and only Cleric is capable of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which is required for bringing censures.⁴

1666. Rules. - 1° By ordinary right the Pope and a General Council can bring censures with respect to the universal Church; - the Roman Congregations, as the Congregation of the Council, of the Holy Office, of Bishops and Regulars, etc., likewise for the universal Church, in those things committed to them to be executed; - Archbishops both in their own dioceses and in the dioceses of suffragans at the time of visitation, and also when there is question of a cause brought to their tribunal by appeal, because then they have jurisdiction over suffragans; - Bishops with respect to their own diocese, provided they have been confirmed, even if not consecrated, and more truly also their Vicars General, because with the Bishop they constitute the same tribunal. Except the case of which in n. 1164. I. 10); - Legates in the territory of the legation, and Cardinals in the Church of their own title; - provincial Councils in their provinces; Generals, Provincials, and local Superiors and general Chapters (among some regulars also provincial Chapters) of religious Orders according to their various statutes; - the Chapter of the cathedral Church, the See being vacant, and before the election of the capitular Vicar, who (among us, the Administrator) thereafter will enjoy such power exclusively.¹

2° Pastors cannot, by ordinary right, bring censures, because today they do not have jurisdiction in the external and judicial forum, but only administration for the right order of the parish.²

3° Women, more probably not even by delegation, can bring censures. Therefore Abbesses of Nuns cannot bring them by their own authority, but can only obtain a Decree by which their commands must be observed under penalty of censure. - But the incapacity of a lay man is only by ecclesiastical law. Therefore the Pope can delegate this power to a lay man.³

4° Delegated power ceases by the death of the one delegating, or by his removal from office, unless the cause has already been begun by the delegate, at least by citation (cf. n. 151. 6°). But one delegated for bringing censures cannot subdelegate another, unless he has express license from the one delegating, or unless at least he is delegated to any causes whatsoever by way of office, or by the Pope (cf. however n. 150. R. 2°).

1667. Questions. - Query 1° Whether heretical, excommunicated, and suspended Bishops can validly bring censures?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if they are occult heretics, excommunicates, or suspended persons. The reason is because the Church, on account of the common good, does not take away from them the use of jurisdiction. Yet they act illicitly whenever they bring censures. - Thus commonly the Theologians with St. Alphonsus.⁴

Resp. 2° Negatively, if they are excommunicated persons to be avoided, or not tolerated, because then they are deprived of all ecclesiastical jurisdiction. (The same, for the same reason, holds concerning those suspended from jurisdiction.) But what if they are indeed notorious, but not to be avoided? It seems that they nevertheless can validly bring censures, because, they say, it is gathered from the Constitution of Martin V, Ad evitanda, where it is sanctioned that an excommunicated tolerated person, in those things which pertain to public office, is not to be avoided, not even by those who know it.¹

Query 2° Whether a Bishop can bring censure if he is outside the diocese?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if the censure is brought by way of precept or statute for guarding against future crimes.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively also, if the censure is brought by way of sentence, which nevertheless does not need knowledge of the cause and judicial process (whether because the contumacy is so manifest that it does not need knowledge of the cause, or because the cause was already known in the proper territory), or, even if it needs judicial process, permission nevertheless has been given by the Ordinary of the territory and the parties consent, since no one unwilling can be drawn outside his proper territory.

Resp. 3° Negatively, if the censure must be brought with judicial process, and the Ordinary of the place denies license. Except, unless the Bishop was unjustly expelled from his own territory; for then in the nearer places he will be able to exercise his jurisdiction, license having been sought from the Ordinary of the place, although not obtained.²

The reason for the threefold response is that, in the case of Response 1st and 2nd, either contentious jurisdiction is not exercised, or it is exercised with the consent of the Ordinary of the territory; but in the case of Response 3rd, such jurisdiction is truly exercised, and indeed without the consent of the Ordinary. But the reason for the exception in Response 3rd is that then it does not stand through the Ordinary that it be exercised in the proper territory from which, as is supposed, he was unjustly expelled.

Query 3° Whether, vice versa, a Bishop existing in his own diocese can bring censure against a subject existing outside the diocese?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if there is question of a crime committed in his own diocese. The reason is because otherwise the delinquent could be punished by no one; and, although he has gone away, nevertheless he does not cease to be subject to the jurisdiction of his own Bishop. Nor does it stand in the way that citation cannot be made outside the territory; for it suffices for incurring the censure that the guilty person be cited in his own house or in a public place.¹

Resp. 2° Indeed, the Bishop can bring censure against a subject sinning outside the diocese, if there is question of a matter pertaining to his diocese. Thus Clerics can be excommunicated who, having been ordered to come to the Synod, do not obey; but otherwise, more probably, if the crime were consummated outside the territory, or in an exempt place of the same territory, e.g. in a church or convent of Regulars. Except, if the discussion is of a censure brought against someone by way of a special precept for guarding against crime, as St. Alphonsus more probably teaches, although the contrary sentence also is probable for him, "since one who speaks law outside the territory is not obeyed with impunity."²

Query 4° Whether a Bishop can bind with censure the subject of another, who, namely, has neither domicile nor quasi-domicile in that diocese, but sins in his diocese?

Resp. Affirmatively. The reason is because every delinquent obtains the forum of the place in which he sins. Thus from Canon Law.³ Except, if the delinquent were the Superior of that Bishop, e.g. the Metropolitan of that Bishop. But although a Bishop cannot bring censure against a stranger before admonition, nevertheless, after he has offended in the place and the Bishop has cited him, he can. - These things are said concerning censures by man through sentence. For if the discussion is of censures inflicted by the special law of that place upon delinquents, whether against common law or against the proper laws of that same place, according to the more common and more probable sentence, which exempts newcomers and travelers from the obligation of observing the proper laws of those places, they do not incur them.⁴

Query 5° Whether Regular Prelates can bring censure against subjects existing in whatever place?

Resp. Affirmatively, according to the common sentence. The reason is because the jurisdiction of Superiors is not only territorial, but more personal; whence a change of place on the part of the subject detracts nothing from the jurisdiction of the Superior.

1668. Principles. - I. The subject of censure can be nothing except a baptized man, capable of reason, and a subject: 1° he must be baptized, because according to the Apostle the Church does not judge concerning those who are outside; 2° capable of reason, because censure is ordered toward the correction of the delinquent; but this has no place in him who lacks the use of reason. Yet he who has lucid intervals is bound by censures, provided that at the time when he was possessed of reason he gave the cause; 3° a subject, because censure is an act of jurisdiction, which can be exercised only over subjects. Cf. however n. 1667. q. 4°.

II. Those not yet of puberty, although they can be bound by censures absolutely, nevertheless, because of the lightness of age, from the indulgence and benignity of the Church they do not incur them, unless it has been specially expressed in the law, or unless the censure is brought by way of particular precept, and in each case, as is clear of itself, there is question of those not yet of puberty who are capable of fraud.²

But a twofold case only is found expressed in law, namely: 1° if they have entered monasteries of Nuns. Trid.³ - 2° if they have struck Clerics.⁴

1669. Questions. - Query 1° Whether Kings and Queens can be bound by censures by Bishops?

Resp. Negatively. For although in spiritual matters they are subject to Bishops, nevertheless by privilege they cannot be punished with censure by them. But this privilege was legitimately introduced by the course of time, and is commonly attributed to them by the Doctors.⁵ Yet they are subject to Pontifical censures, even those brought by law, e.g. against those invading cities, lands, places, or rights pertaining to the Roman Church.

Query 2° Whether Bishops and Cardinals are subject to censures?

Resp. 1° Certainly they cannot be subject to censures brought by themselves, because no one is subject of himself.

Resp. 2° But they are subject to papal censures, because the Pope is the Superior of all, even of Bishops. Nevertheless, by privilege of law they are bound neither by interdict nor by suspension, unless mention of them is made in decreeing those censures,¹ at least indirectly, e.g. through the clause: even those worthy of special or individual note.²

Query 3° Whether religious can be bound by episcopal censures by the Bishop of the place?

Resp. Distinguish. Either they are exempt, or they are not. - If they are not exempt, affirmatively, as is clear of itself. - If they are exempt, subdistinguish. - Affirmatively, if they enjoy only a general privilege of exemption, but then only in those things in which they are subject to the Bishop, whether as Ordinary or as Apostolic delegate. What these are, see nn. 1197-1202. - But negatively, if from a special privilege they cannot be struck with censures even in those things in which otherwise they are subject to the jurisdiction of Ordinaries, although by the same they can be coerced and punished by other penalties. The Mendicants and Jesuits enjoy such a privilege.³

Query 4° Whether someone can be bound by several censures at the same time?

Resp. Affirmatively. For nothing prevents someone from being constrained by several bonds at once. For just as someone can perpetrate several sins diverse in species and number, so also he can be bound at the same time by censures diverse in species and number, e.g. by excommunication, suspension (if he is a Cleric), and interdict, and also by several excommunications, etc. Indeed, because of one delict someone can be bound at the same time by law and by man, by the Pope and by the Bishop, so that he must be absolved by each, provided that the one Superior intended to impose a new penalty; otherwise, regularly, the later censure is held as an innovation or publication of the prior one. - Thus commonly and absolutely more probably according to St. Alphonsus.⁴

Hence: 1° If someone by one act commits two sins diverse in species, to each of which censure is annexed, he incurs two censures, e.g. he who kills a Cleric in a place where homicide is prohibited under penalty of censure. But it is otherwise if that one sin does not have malices diverse in species.¹

2° If someone repeats the same crime to which a censure is annexed, by an act morally distinct from the first, he again incurs the same censure; but it is otherwise if the repeated acts are not morally distinct from each other. Thus one striking a Cleric three or four times, with a notable interval posited between the individual blows, incurs three or four censures, while he incurs one if he strikes him several times continuously.

3° Likewise, an excommunicated priest will incur several irregularities who absolves several penitents successively, because so often he confers a new Sacrament.²

Query 5° Whether an appeal excuses from incurring censure?

Resp. 1° A legitimate appeal excuses from a conditional censure, i.e. from a censure of a sentence to be passed or to be incurred in the future, provided it is made before the lapse of the time granted for fulfilling the condition.

Resp. 2° A legitimate appeal from a censure already brought, i.e. which someone has already incurred, generally does not suspend it. Whence the common saying of the Canonists is that the appeal then is devolutive, but not suspensive. - Thus Benedict XIV, Constitution Ad militantis, March 30, 1742, § 38.

Query 6° Whether the subject of censure can be an entire community?

Resp. 1° Negatively with regard to excommunication, and this probably not even validly. Hence a Bishop who wishes to excommunicate a body of church trustees (trustees) trampling on the rights of the Church must name the individual members of the body.³ Yet the Pope can excommunicate all from a community whom he has found guilty, without designating the individuals by name.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively with regard to suspension, yet so that it strikes the individual members of the community only as regards the functions and rights belonging to the community itself as such; but not as regards the functions and rights which belong to them singly.

But if suspension is inflicted on the community and on the individual persons of it, then it does not affect the innocent, but only the delinquents.

Resp. 3° Affirmatively also with regard to interdict; this censure has this singular thing, that, if it is general, it binds an entire community, and in this even the innocent.¹ Yet he who brings the censure cannot for that reason be charged with injustice; since by such an interdict, properly speaking, the innocent are not punished, but the Church for just causes withdraws its benefits and offices from the guilty as well as the innocent. Common.²

Things to Be Noted Beforehand. - Someone can be absolved from censure in a multiple way:

1) As regards all effects, or as regards some effect only; 2) absolutely or conditionally; 3) to reincidentia; 4) for caution.

Now therefore: 1° Absolution is ordinarily given as regards all effects, but sometimes it is given for a partial effect, e.g. for taking away privation of active voice in canonical election; this absolution, however, is improperly so called, and bears the species of a dispensation.³ Another for an effect, see n. 1403. q. 1°.

2° Absolution can be given under a condition either concerning the past: e.g. if you have already satisfied, I absolve you; or concerning the present: if I can absolve; or concerning the future: if you will satisfy hereafter, now for then I absolve you. This last, however, is illicit unless it is made honorable by some grave cause, say if afterward there would be lacking someone who could absolve the censured person.⁴

3° A species of conditional absolution is that which is given to reincidentia; in such a way, namely, that the one absolved, unless within a certain time he furnishes something, e.g. unless within a month he restores, or approaches the excommunicator, relapses by the very fact into the same censure. - Moreover, reincidentia is by man or by law: a) it is by man whenever it is added by the will of the Superior himself absolving; b) it is by law when it is incurred by force of law: this has place in only two cases, namely when someone either, detained by a lasting impediment [n. 1402. II. 2)], or in danger of death, is absolved by him who has no jurisdiction over the censure reserved to the Bishop or specially to the Pope.⁵ He, namely, although truly absolved and amended, when the impediment or sickness ceases, ought, as soon as he conveniently can, by himself or through another, to present himself to the excommunicator (or his delegate), not indeed to be absolved again, but humbly to receive a mandate² from him, as the Canons say; otherwise he relapses by the law itself into the same censure (because of his new contumacy).

4° Absolution for caution is that which is given, e.g., before absolution from sins, to take away a censure perhaps unknown.

1670. Principles. - I. Censures which the guilty person has already incurred are not loosed by the delinquent's penitence alone or obedience toward the mandates of the Church, nor, if you except suspensions from informed conscience (see n. 1686. 1° at the end), by the death of him who brought the censure; but absolution imparted by a judge, or legitimate Superior, is necessary. It is manifest from Canon Law,³ and from the 44th proposition condemned by Alexander VII, p. XIV. But if a similar penalty has been brought not as a censure but as a pure penalty, it is taken away by relaxation or dispensation.⁴

II. From a censure brought by man through a particular sentence, only these can absolve: 1° he who brought the censure; 2° his Superior as such. Therefore not the Metropolitan, except in the case of appeal or visitation of the diocese of the suffragan; 3° his successor; 4° another delegated by one of these. The reason is because it belongs to him to absolve to whom it belongs to bind. Therefore this holds even if the guilty person changes domicile. Hence St. Alphonsus⁵ warns that, if someone in another territory has offended in such a way that he was specially excommunicated by the Bishop of that place, he cannot be absolved by his own Bishop, unless with the license of the excommunicating Bishop.

But note that this is said concerning a censure by man brought through a particular sentence; for censures by man indeed, but brought through a general sentence, according to the more probable opinion, are equated to those brought by law which are not reserved; and therefore whoever has jurisdiction over the guilty person can absolve him.⁶

What has been said concerning absolution from a censure brought by man through a particular sentence, the same must be said concerning censures reserved by law. See also n. 1403. q. 7°.

But if a censure is specially reserved to the Pope, for absolution from it to be imparted a general concession of absolving from cases and censures reserved to the Roman Pontiff in no way suffices, but a special one is required. But those presuming to absolve without due faculty, even under whatever pretext, incur by the very fact an excommunication simply reserved to the Pope, provided there is not question of the article of death; in this, however, the obligation of standing to the mandates of the Church remains firm for those absolved, if they recover. - Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, dated October 12, 1869, § A quibus.

III. Any confessor can absolve from censures not reserved to the Pope or Bishop,¹ except however censures brought by law against some place or against a community; for a place and a community are not subject to the penitential forum.²

But absolution of this kind can be given by confessors both outside and within Confession, and also holds for the external forum.³ But if the penalty is notorious, because of scandal it will be necessary that the absolution also be publicly clear; for this, however, it suffices that it be known that the censured person has confessed,⁴ and that satisfaction, if any was necessary, has been exhibited by him. Wherefore absolution would be given imprudently, even only in the internal forum, from a case already brought to the contentious forum, or soon to be brought there.

Note. - 1° In what cases Bishops, or their delegates, can absolve from censures reserved to the Pope, see n. 1402. II.

2° When, and in what manner, someone can absolve from censures reserved either to the Pope or to the Bishop, whether every priest or a simple confessor, see n. 1402. IV and n. 1403. q. 1°. q. 2°. q. 4°. q. 5°. q. 7°.

1671. Resolves. - 1° An ecclesiastical Superior or delegate can absolve from censures, even if he is not a priest. The reason is because jurisdiction, which is required for absolving from censures, can reside in a Cleric even initiated only by tonsure.

2° A faculty granted by the Bishop for reserved sins is not understood for sins reserved with censure; otherwise if the concession has been made by the Pope, because papal cases are all reserved with censure, except those two which are indicated in n. 1400. IV.

3° Absolution for caution does not seem necessary to me in a doubt (even of fact) whether a censure has been contracted. Sanchez has one exception.¹ But absolution from excommunication, at least for caution, is always given (and, if some probable suspicion is present that it has been contracted, it must be given under venial sin) to any penitent, before he is absolved from sins, so that an impediment to receiving the Sacrament, if any perhaps exists, may be removed. Yet absolution from sins is valid although absolution from excommunication was not premised, provided the penitent is in good faith and otherwise rightly disposed.² - From the Roman Ritual.

A determined form of words is not required per se for valid absolving, but the will of the one absolving, manifested by some sign, suffices and is required. Let the one absolving use, for the internal forum, that form which is already contained in sacramental absolution itself; but for the external forum, that which is described in the Roman Ritual. - "The rite," says Kenrick,³ "of lightly striking the shoulder of the man with a rod," which is prescribed in the form for the external forum, "will be able to be committed to execution with difficulty, on account of the customs of the region being opposed ... Busembaum teaches," according to St. Alphonsus,⁴ "that this striking can be omitted for a just cause."

1672. Questions. - Query 1° Whether an absent person can be absolved?

Resp. Affirmatively, at least validly. The reason is because just as a penalty can be established against an absent person, so also it can be taken away. This is also evidently deduced from Canon Law. Except, if the faculty of absolving has been so granted that the absolution must be given in the act of Sacramental Confession.

Query 2° When is a faculty of absolving judged to have been so granted that it must be exercised in the act of Sacramental Confession?

Resp. There is not one sentence of all concerning this matter. St. Alphonsus teaches that it must be exercised in the act of Sacramental Confession if in the faculty it is said: in the forum of conscience. This is clear from those things which he teaches concerning the faculty of Bishops from the chapter Liceat, or from the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, § Firmam tamen.¹ Cf. n. 1402. II. 1).

Query 3° Whether an absent Bishop can absolve one existing in the diocese?

Resp. Affirmatively, according to all. The reason is because for absolution there is not required knowledge of the cause, nor judicial process; and therefore nothing prevents the Bishop from exercising such an act of jurisdiction in another territory. But it is otherwise if judicial process is sometimes required, or if the faculty given to the Bishop perhaps has been restricted in this.²

Query 4° Whether one unwilling can be absolved?

Resp. Affirmatively, provided he is absolved by the Superior; for just as a penalty can be brought against an absent and unwilling person, so also it can be taken away from him; nevertheless it is not expedient that this be done without a very grave reason, and care must be taken lest, while he does not cease from contumacy, the censure be held in contempt. Hence it is required that the censured person ask absolution, although it is valid even when not asked, provided (if it is given by a delegate) there is question of one amended.³

Query 5° Whether absolution extorted unjustly by force or grave fear is valid?

Resp. Negatively, as is clear of itself, and as the law itself disposes.⁴⁵

Query 6° Whether he who is bound by several censures can be absolved from one, the others remaining?

Resp. Affirmatively. The reason is because among them there is no necessary connection. And mortal sins indeed can in no way be absolved one without the others; but it is otherwise concerning censures, the absolution of which does not confer sanctifying grace on the censured person. Therefore they are had after the manner of chains, of which some can be loosed without others.

Query 7° Whether he can be absolved from censures who has not yet publicly repaired the scandal because of which he was subject to censure?

Resp. Negatively, at least per se, and speaking generally. It is clear from the Declaration of the Sacred Penitentiary on the 5th day of July, 1857.

Query 8° In what way must scandal in the said case be repaired by those to whom such reparation is difficult and exposed to dangers?

Resp. The Sacred Penitentiary, December 10, 1860: "that the reparation of scandal is necessary by divine law, and that it must be made in the better way in which it can be, by the judgment of the Ordinary or confessor."¹

Query 9° In what way is satisfaction to the injured party, if it is necessary for taking away censure, to be exhibited?

Resp. See n. 1402. IV. c). And these things indeed must be observed under penalty of nullity, if absolution from reserved cases is given through a delegate under this condition: but that a condition of this kind is expressed by the clause: the party having been satisfied, is taught by the opinion which seems truer to St. Alphonsus.²

Query 10° Whether and when an oath must be exacted before absolution?

Resp. It must be exacted universally whenever it is prescribed; but specifically: 1° in the case of which in n. 1402. IV. c), if absolution is given by a delegate with this condition, and then more truly³ it is required for validity, unless there is question of a penitent who would be perpetually unable to satisfy;⁴ 2° in the case of which in n. 1402. IV. e);⁵ 3° in the case in which absolution is given by a Bishop because of an impediment of approaching the Holy See, which is not perpetual; before absolution, namely, the censured person in this case ought to swear (or, if there is question of absolution in the internal forum, to promise), that when the impediment ceases he will approach the Holy See.⁶

Note. - From the things said it follows that a great difference intervenes between absolution from sins and absolution from censures. For:

1° The former is given for reconciling us to God; but the latter for restoring those things which are proper to citizens of the Church militant. - 2° The former must be given from all sins; the latter is rightly given even from one censure. - 3° The former can be bestowed only upon the contrite and willing; the latter is validly imparted even to the contumacious and unwilling, at least by the Superior. - 4° The former must be given purely; the latter can be given under condition, from day to day, to reincidentia, for caution, etc. - 5° The former, because it is part of a Sacrament, is given only to those present; the latter is rightly given also to the absent. - 6° The former, extorted by fear, is valid; the latter is not so. - 7° The former can be imparted only by an approved priest; the latter by a simple cleric obtaining external jurisdiction.

Furthermore: 1° Whenever a censure is reserved, the sin also is liable to reservation. But between reservations introduced by the Roman Pontiff and reservations introduced by Ordinaries there is very much distance, as is clear from the things said in n. 1400. IV., 1401. q. 2°. - 2° Sins liable to reservation can be absolved not only directly, but also indirectly, from a just cause (n. 1403. q. 1°. q. 2°); but censures can be absolved only directly.²

It must be treated 1° concerning its nature and division; 2° concerning its effects.

1673. Definition. - Excommunication is a censure by which someone is deprived of communion with the Church; or a censure by which a Christian is deprived, either wholly or in part, of the common spiritual goods of the Church, the distribution of which belongs to the Church herself (n. 1660. 6°).

It is distinguished: 1° Major, which deprives one of all common goods of the Church; 2° Minor, which deprives one only of some goods. - But by the name of excommunication there is almost always understood in law the Major, as St. Alphonsus notes from the common opinion;³ nevertheless before Gregory IX the Minor also sometimes came under it. - But the word anathema is used in the Sacred Canons sometimes for the distinction of minor excommunication, as in c. 12. Caus. 3. q. 4; sometimes to signify excommunication inflicted because of heresy, or suspicion of it; finally to signify certain solemnities, when, for example, excommunication is denounced with candles lighted and afterward extinguished, and with other ceremonies instituted by the Church.

Of those excommunicated by major excommunication, some are called tolerated, whom the faithful are not held to avoid; others are not tolerated or to be avoided, whom the faithful must avoid.

Formerly all who were bound by excommunication were to be avoided (i.e., communication with them was forbidden to the faithful in those acts which are prohibited to excommunicates by the censure), and indeed to be avoided publicly, if the censure was notoriously established; but otherwise privately by those who knew that someone was bound by censure.¹

But "for avoiding scandals and many dangers which can befall fearful consciences," the Constitution Ad vitanda of Martin V in the Council of Constance granted to the faithful of Christ communion, even in divine things, with those (the living, namely) who are bound by any ecclesiastical censure, unless either they have been excommunicated by name, or (according to the Theol. Patav. n. 299. 302, even after the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis) they are notorious strikers of clerics.²

Nevertheless it must be noted:

1° The aforesaid Decree does not grant communion to those who are subject to censure, as is gathered from the words of the Constitution itself, "to the faithful of Christ ... we mercifully grant," and interpreters, by common opinion, defend as truer. - Cf. n. 1243. q. 5°.

2° Although now by no ecclesiastical law is it forbidden to the faithful to associate with tolerated persons, even in sacred things, and to request them for such acts, nevertheless at times divine law, whether natural or positive, will obstruct such communication because of injury to prudence and charity, e.g., through scandal which is given; through spiritual harm which threatens the faithful person; through delay of the amendment of the excommunicated person, etc. - Cf. n. 1317. q. 2. R. 8°.

3° Authors commonly assert that it is lawful for tolerated excommunicates to communicate with the faithful, if they have been expressly or tacitly requested by these.³

1674. Questions. - Query 1° Whether, in order that an excommunicated person who is to be avoided must be avoided, it is necessary that he be publicly known as such?

Resp. Affirmatively, i.e., it is required (ordinarily, even if there is question of one who struck a cleric) that the fact of that excommunication be truly notorious, namely, that it be morally certain to you, e.g., through public fame or through two trustworthy witnesses, that he was excommunicated by name and publicly, or denounced as already bound by excommunication.¹ But he is excommunicated by name who is designated by express name or office, by words or signs so indubitable that he is altogether separated from others. But he is said to be publicly excommunicated who is denounced as such in a public place, e.g., in church, at the time of Mass or of sermon, by living voice, or through a notice in a public place according to the custom of the region. - I said: that it be morally certain to you. Yet in doubt whether someone is to be avoided, it will not be lawful for you to confess to him, lest perhaps you be absolved invalidly.²

Query 2° What must be held concerning MINOR excommunication?

Resp. Before the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, illicit communication in divine things or in civil things with one to be avoided was punished by the very fact with at least minor excommunication. But under grave obligation it deprived one of the reception of Sacraments, likewise of passive election to benefices and dignities of the Church.³ - For the external forum the ordinary ecclesiastical judge absolved from it; for the internal forum, the confessor.

After the said Constitution this excommunication seems to have been removed.⁴ Some, however, deny this. Yet sometimes communication with one to be avoided is punished with major excommunication simply reserved to the Pontiff, or with other censures. - See n. 1731. 1736. 1747. 1751. - Besides this, the Bishop can, not indeed by statute, but by name, forbid to someone the passive use or reception of the Sacraments, or at least of Communion.

1675. - The effect of excommunication, whether in a tolerated person or in one to be avoided, generally is the privation of whatever right belongs to a baptized person as a member of the Church. - In species eight are numbered, namely: 1° privation of the Sacraments; 2° privation of divine Offices; 3° privation of the suffrages of the Church; 4° privation of ecclesiastical burial; 5° privation of ecclesiastical jurisdiction; 6° privation of benefices; 7° privation of forensic communication; 8° privation of civil society.

The goods of which excommunication deprives one are comprehended in these little verses:

Res sacrae, ritus, communio, crypta, potestas,
Praedia sacra, forum, civilia jura vetantur.

Sacred things, rites, communion, the tomb, power, sacred estates, the forum, civil rights are forbidden.

And these indeed are the immediate effects of excommunication; but the mediate effects are two: 1) Irregularity, which can be incurred because of violation of the censure (n. 1771). 2) Suspicion of heresy, which he incurs who for a whole year contumaciously (according to St. Alphonsus in any censure, but especially) persists in excommunication, or, as the laws speak, grows filthy in it. - But that suspicion effects this, that he who thus grows filthy is held to purge himself canonically (see p. LXI. note 2), because from growing filthy there exists a sufficient presumption that he thinks badly concerning the power of the Church and concerning the Sacraments. But if he does not purge himself, he is held as convicted.¹

1676. - Excommunication deprives one of the right both of receiving and of administering the Sacraments. Hence resolve:

1° Per se an excommunicated person sins gravely, whether one to be avoided, or even tolerated, who receives or confers the Sacraments.

Except: a) when there is question of the recipient, if, otherwise disposed, he is in invincible ignorance, or a grave evil (such as scandal, killing, mutilation, infamy, grave loss of goods, etc.) would otherwise threaten, provided that fear of evil of this kind has not been instilled in contempt of the censure. - I said: he sins gravely; for if you except the Sacrament of Penance (which, as one disobedient to the Church, he would receive without contrition), he receives the others validly.²

Except: b) when there is question of the one conferring: 1) If he confers the Sacraments in a case of necessity (e.g., if otherwise true and grave inconvenience for him would be feared), or with ignorance of the prohibition.¹ Yet in the former case account must also be taken of scandal. - Otherwise, even outside a case of necessity, he validly confers the Sacraments, if you except the Sacrament of Penance conferred by one to be avoided outside the case of common error or of danger of death.² - 2) If a tolerated person confers them, having been asked by the faithful themselves. Cf. n. 1673. 3°. - 3) If one to be avoided confers them in cases of extreme or gravest necessity of the faithful, which cases see n. 1243. q. 5°.

2° Ministers of the Church sin gravely who confer the Sacraments on excommunicates, whether on those to be avoided, or on those simply tolerated, at least per se, since they are unworthy. - Nevertheless he who confers the Sacraments on tolerated persons alone does not sin against a prohibition of the Church, but only against divine law. The reason is that the Church no longer prohibits communion, even in divine things, with tolerated persons. But they sin against divine law, because it is never lawful to give holy things to dogs.³

I said: at least PER SE; unless, namely, either the excommunicated person perhaps lawfully seeks the Sacraments, or the one administering is excused by circumstances (see n. 1231. q. 4°). - In doubt whether someone has or has not been absolved from censure, the Sacrament cannot be denied to one asking, especially if he affirms that he has been absolved; because in doubt no one is presumed a liar.⁴

Note. - For what reason the use of Sacramentals is permitted to an excommunicated person, see n. 1678. 3°.

1677. - Divine Offices are understood to be Mass, public Processions, Hours solemnly sung, solemn Benediction, consecration of Chrism, and other ceremonies of this kind, which are done by institution of Christ or of the Church, or which are proper to the Clerical Order, as the singing of the Epistle or Gospel with proper ornaments, ecclesiastical burial.

1678. Hence resolve. - 1° Any excommunicated person is prohibited under grave obligation from hearing Mass, and from all other divine Offices properly public, even on days of precept.¹

Concerning a Mass to be broken off when one to be avoided remains in church,² note the faculty which is granted to our Bishops, and is usually communicated to priests, namely, "of celebrating ... when heretics, schismatics, infidels and excommunicates are present, if it cannot otherwise be celebrated." See p. LXXI. n. 23.

2° Nevertheless an excommunicated person, even one to be avoided, can, at a time when divine things are not being celebrated, pray in the same place in which others pray, but apart and separated from the assembly of the faithful; he can also attend a sermon, the reading of Sacred Scripture and of Theology; because these do not come under the name of divine Offices, and the Church gladly permits these things to him, that he may be led to conversion. - But he is deprived of the faculty of preaching and of lecturing in Theology or in Canon Law, unless he is tolerated and requested by others.³

3° He can also use images, relics, blessed water, and other sacred things, that he may venerate them, and thus obtain the graces of which he has need. Nevertheless he does not gain Indulgences attached to sacred things, nor does he perceive from blessed water and other Sacramentals the fruit which comes from the blessing of the Church.⁴

4° An excommunicated person, bound to the canonical Hours, is not dispensed from them; but he must recite them privately, nor can he employ a companion, unless he is tolerated and requested. Nor can he say: Dominus vobiscum; but in its place he ought to say: Domine, exaudi orationem meam. Nevertheless by saying: Dominus vobiscum, he would sin only venially, and, according to some, whose opinion St. Alphonsus seems implicitly to admit, not even venially, when he recites alone.⁵

1679. - The suffrages of the Church are either common or private. Common suffrages are those which come to the faithful from good works done in the name of the Church by her Ministers; such are Masses, canonical Hours, and other prayers and works which are done by Ministers of the Church insofar as they are such, and are performed in the name of the Church herself. To these also must be reduced the satisfactions of Christ, of the Blessed Virgin, and of the Saints, which constitute the Treasury of the Church, and are applied by the Prelates of the Church through Indulgences.

Private suffrages are those which come from good works which the faithful perform in their own name. Such are fasts, prayers, and other good works, which are done by private faithful, or by Ministers of the Church as private persons.

1680. Hence resolve. - 1° Excommunicates who are to be avoided are deprived of all common suffrages of the Church. It is clear, because the Church by her own right prohibits that prayer be made for them, or that any part of her goods come to them. And this holds, even if they were contrite and converted to a better life, because the excommunication still endures.¹

2° Neither tolerated persons, nor even those to be avoided, are deprived of private suffrages. The reason is that the faithful are not prohibited from praying privately for excommunicates, even in the Church and in a public place; therefore they can apply the fruit of good works to them.²

3° Tolerated excommunicates probably are not deprived of common suffrages. The reason is that the Church no longer prohibits the faithful to communicate with tolerated persons, as is deduced from what was said above (n. 1673). - Concerning offering Mass for an excommunicated person or not, see n. 1317. q. 2°. R. 8°. 4°.³

1681. - Ecclesiastical burial is that which is done in a sacred place, or in a place blessed for the burial of the faithful. Hence:

1° An excommunicated person who is to be avoided cannot be buried in a sacred place; but if he has been buried in such a place, his corpse must be dug up, if it can still be done, and the sacred place polluted by such contact must be expiated.⁴

2° A tolerated excommunicated person, provided he is notoriously excommunicated,⁵ likewise is deprived of ecclesiastical burial; and, if he has been buried in a sacred place, he must be extracted from there. Yet the place is not judged polluted, and therefore does not need expiation. - If he gave signs of penitence, he can be buried in a sacred place, although it is fitting¹ that he first be absolved from excommunication.

3° Even one to be avoided, who gave signs of penitence before death, can be buried in a sacred place; but absolution must first be imparted to him. Nevertheless he must not be moved from a sacred place, if he was buried without absolution.²

4° To this bear, from the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, excommunication 1 among the non-reserved (n. 1736), and interdict 2 (n. 1751).

631. Dispositions of canon law concerning the absolution of an accomplice. - According to can. 884: "The absolution of an accomplice in a shameful sin is invalid, except in danger of death; and even in danger of death, outside the case of necessity, it is illicit on the part of the confessor, according to the norm of the apostolic constitutions and especially of the Constitution of Benedict XIV, Sacramentum Poenitentiae, June 1, 1741."

This law is also sanctioned by penalties, from can. 2367:

"§ 1. One absolving or pretending to absolve an accomplice in a shameful sin incurs by that very fact an excommunication reserved in a most special manner to the Apostolic See; and this even in the article of death, if another priest, although not approved for confessions, can hear the confession of the dying person without some grave infamy and scandal about to arise, except in the case in which the dying person refuses to confess to another.

"§ 2. He who absolves or pretends to absolve an accomplice who indeed does not confess the sin of complicity from which he has not yet been absolved, but conducts himself thus because he has been induced to this by the accomplice-confessor either directly or indirectly, does not escape the same excommunication."

632. An accomplice is a partner and one as it were entangled in sin. This is to be understood without restriction, of whatever sex, age, and condition: anyone, whether male or female, whether pubescent or impubescent, provided he is capable of grave sin; indeed even the person with whom the priest had sinned before receiving the priesthood, as the Holy Office declared, January 22, 1879. And therefore he invalidly absolves here the accomplice who makes a general confession of sins, if the previous confessions were certainly sacrilegious, or even simply invalid.

But for complicity there is required:

1. Mutual sin, namely, that each one internally and externally committed the same grave sin; or the consent of two persons in the same grave and external shameful sin, whether each cooperates, as in mutual conversations and embraces, or one only acts, e.g., by touch, provided the other consents externally and internally at the same time; which consent is sufficiently presumed to be present if he resists in no way. Hence there does not fall under the law: a) an act which is mortal on one side, only venial on the other; b) nor an externally light act, although internally grave on both sides; c) nor an act, however grave, to which the other does not consent, indeed to which he has not furnished external consent, although he consents internally.

2. Formal complicity: a) at the same time of the sin; for in the case of sin with one sleeping, unwilling, totally drunk, insane, or ignorant of the shamefulness of the sin from erroneous conscience, or not attending to it in good faith, even if he was induced into error by the confessor, complicity is not present; - b) at the time of absolution; for 1. if the confessor during absolution inculpably does not recognize his accomplice, or 2. if he doubts and, by prudently questioning as much as he can without danger of his own infamy or scandal to the penitent, cannot remove the doubt, or 3. if the priest in no way (neither in the act of sin nor afterward) is known as a priest, but the penitent is altogether ignorant that his accomplice is a priest, the absolution is valid and licit. Namely, then the abuse of power which the Church prohibits is not present.

Yet it makes no difference if the confessor, as accomplice, was not known by the penitent in confession, provided it is verified that he truly is an accomplice, and the confessor knows him as such, and nevertheless absolves him: in this case the absolution is invalid.

633. Shameful sin is to be understood without restriction: any sin whatever of lust, i.e., against chastity and the sixth precept, not only perfect and consummated, but also imperfect and begun, such as touches, kisses, embraces, indeed shameful speech and looks, as the Holy Office declared, May 28, 1873, provided they are strictly lustful and import complicity; - not, however, sins against other virtues and precepts. Hence to absolve an accomplice in a sin of injustice, e.g., in homicide or in theft, is not specially prohibited; although even such an absolution is unbecoming.

But it is necessary that the sin of lust be grave, - external, - mutual, - not directly remitted, - and certain.

1. Grave, both objectively and subjectively, namely materially and formally. Therefore light sins are excluded, whether from imperfection of the act, or from erroneous conscience, or from lightness of matter, when there is question of lust voluntary only in its cause. Hence if a boy from erroneous conscience certainly judges that touches immodestly perpetrated by a priest are not a grave sin, he could be absolved by this priest.

2. External, so that both the internal and the external sin is grave, and also so that it as such, namely in the notion of an external act, is gravely sinful. For this reason sins merely internal, of morose delectation and desire, are excluded, as are external sins under every respect venial, and also grave sins whose grave malice is not fully manifested exteriorly. Hence if kisses or touches had from an internal lustful affection, as external acts, are not in themselves gravely evil, and the libidinous affection from which they are done is not fully manifested exteriorly, they can be absolved.

3. Mutual, so that each accomplice internally and externally committed the same grave sin against chastity, or consented in the same grave and external shameful sin, as was explained in the preceding number.

4. Not directly remitted. Hence if the sin has already been duly accused and validly remitted by direct absolution, so that it is now free matter of confession, the priest can absolve from it (Holy Office, May 29, 1867), although nevertheless it is altogether to be advised that he never hear the confession of his accomplice unless necessity compels, on account of the danger of temptation or irreverence toward the sacrament.

5. Certain, so that every founded doubt of law and of fact is excluded; otherwise the rule must be applied: in doubt, odious things are to be restricted. Therefore it is required that the shameful sin be certain, certainly grave, as such certainly external, certainly mutual, and that the complicity in it be certain.

Hence the case of complicity in a shameful sin probably is not present:

a) If it is doubtful whether the penitent sinned gravely.

b) If there was simple connivance from the fact that the other did not impede a sin which from office he ought not to impede, or approval of a heard shameful conversation which did not stir up other shameful conversations.

c) If the accomplice is not a partner immediately in the shameful act itself or in a sin libidinous according to itself, but only in a shameful agreement about seducing a woman who in reality is not seduced, or only in a shameful permission or invitation to sin with a spouse or offspring who nevertheless is not corrupted. Namely, mere cooperation in the shameful sin of another does not suffice.

d) If the accomplices are in an external act venial from its object (such as pressure of the hand, a light kiss, a momentary touch, or an embrace in an honorable part), although on both sides internally it is done from a shameful affection or intention, provided it has no externally immodest adjunct circumstance, or manifestation by which the affection or intention of immodesty sufficiently becomes known externally.

634. The absolution of an accomplice is radically invalid because of the privation of all jurisdiction. Therefore it is not, as some thought, a case of reserved sin, because there is not restriction but removal of power; for the incapacitating law makes the confessor lack all jurisdiction toward an accomplice accusing a shameful sin (or culpably concealing it), and the very absolution of the accomplice as such, and not only of the sin of complicity, is void, so that there is not given a valid absolution either direct of the other sins, nor consequently indirect of the sin of complicity.

Thus not only according to the tenor of can. 884, but also expressly according to the Benedictine Constitutions and the instruction of the Holy Office, February 20, 1867.1 Hence also in the instructions given by the Sacred Penitentiary for priests to be absolved from censure because of absolution of an accomplice, there occurs the clause that the accomplice-confessor should admonish the penitent "about the nullity of past confessions," and indeed without any restriction or distinction between the case of good or bad faith on the part of the penitent; indeed, from the fact that the penitent is said to be admonished, good faith is rather supposed.

Against this do not stand the words of the Sacred Penitentiary, May 16, 1877, affirming that the privation of jurisdiction "is in order to the shameful sin itself in which the confessor was an accomplice." For there the privation of jurisdiction is not denied but affirmed; it is not said that the privation of jurisdiction affects only the sin of complicity, but the absolution of the accomplice in order to the sin of complicity, so that the confessor is deprived of all jurisdiction and toward every sin, but uniquely in view of and by reason of complicity, i.e., when that sin is accused. Moreover the Sacred Penitentiary could not temper by its own authority and without special intervention of the Supreme Pontiff the law of the Holy Office or of the Benedictine Constitution, concerning which in the case nothing is reported.

Hence, if in urgent necessity an accomplice-penitent could not omit holy communion without grave scandal or infamy, nor could approach another confessor, content with a simple act of perfect contrition, he would have to approach holy communion, nor could he be absolved by the accomplice-priest.

635. An exception is given in the case of extreme necessity, i.e., in the article of death, - and also in a grave danger of proximate death prudently judged, which in law is equated with the article,2 - if another priest is lacking, even one not approved, who can be called or can approach without some grave infamy or scandal about to arise, and to whom the penitent wishes to confess: for then it is the same as if another priest were truly lacking, says Benedict XIV in the constitution Apostolici muneris, February 28, 1745.

A. Therefore in this danger absolution is always valid lest someone perish on this occasion; - but on the part of the confessor it is not licit, nor is the penalty of excommunication avoided, unless another priest is lacking who can be called without great inconvenience, and who does not refuse to hear the confession of the dying person (e.g., because of excessive familiarity with the penitent who is his blood-relative or maidservant), and to whom the penitent does not refuse to confess.

There will be a cause of excuse:

1. if the sick person publicly asks the confessor, while he is bringing Viaticum to him, that he would hear his confession, because the confessor, without scandal and danger of infamy, especially if he were pastor, could not refuse this;

2. if the dying person, without any fault of the accomplice-confessor, altogether refuses to confess before another priest;

3. if without danger of infamy or scandal, or of a sacrilegious confession, the accomplice-priest could not depart, or another could not be called or approach;

4. also probably, if there is present only a priest notoriously suspended or excommunicated: for such a one does not seem to be one who can discharge the office of confessor; and moreover he would not easily be called without infamy or scandal.

On the contrary, absolution is illicit, and excommunication is incurred:

1. if, while another priest is present who is not impeded or can easily be called, the accomplice-priest absolves;

2. if another priest can be called, but the accomplice-priest invents a danger of infamy or scandal where there is none;

3. if the accomplice-priest, as much as is in him, does not employ opportune means so that danger of infamy or scandal does not follow and so that room for confession lies open to another priest, e.g., by not coming under some pretext, or by departing from the house, feigning illness, forewarning the penitent, sending another priest to the sick person, etc.;

4. if there is present a priest who would not himself be exposed to his own infamy, but before whom the accomplice-priest would be defamed: with respect to one person, either there is no infamy, or the accomplice ought to bear it to some extent on account of the fault committed; otherwise it could scarcely happen that, when a priest is present, the accomplice-confessor could not absolve.

B. Danger of death is any gravely dangerous case, whether from within, from illness or childbirth, or from without, from very dangerous sailing, imminent battle, or an inflicted blow. To those in danger can be equated, by a quasi-privilege conceded by extensive interpretation, soldiers who are constituted in a state of military calling-up or mobilization (Sacred Penitentiary, May 29, 1915); likewise from the nature of the thing, those who are in danger of perpetual insanity.

But now many, having gone farther, from epikeia wish to equate with danger of death the case of a penitent who in a remote region, e.g., of the Missions, would greatly fear that he could never, or only after a very long time, have a confessor, unless he confessed to the accomplice. But in the Constitutions of Benedict XIV and in the Code of Law only the case of danger of death is excepted; although nevertheless occurrences in mission regions could not have been unknown to them: "absolution is invalid except in danger of death," says the code; what is clearer?

Therefore the exception does not seem to be extended to other cases, except those which are commonly judged equivalent to death. Interpretation, even if it were of many theologians or canonists, does not suffice to restrict or extend the sense of the law, but only authentic interpretation can do this; especially because a place is not usually given to epikeia in invalidating laws on account of the common good. Therefore no foundation is present for the more indulgent opinion, which consequently is not solidly probable. Indeed, it is altogether important for the common good that missionaries who, because of special circumstances, are exposed to greater danger, should not know for themselves an excessive facility of absolving an accomplice and escaping the consequences of their sin.1

5. Sacraments ministered to sinners deprived of the senses, who gave no signs of contrition, are not a title to ecclesiastical burial.

I. The obligation of the confessor as regards excommunications. - Not rarely penitents occur who have contracted the penalty of excommunication. Hence it seems opportune summarily to set forth those things which concerning this matter are more necessary in practice and therefore specially to be attended to.¹ And indeed the confessor has the obligation both of knowing sufficiently those things which regard excommunications, and of admonishing penitents concerning these things.

¹ Authors who have written after the promulgated Code can be inspected, such as Prummer and Vermeersch. Cf. Revue Eccl. de Liege, Nov. 1928.

A. There is the obligation of knowing with habitual knowledge:

1. At least the better known or more frequently occurring censures.

Therefore let him know that the following are excommunicated by the very fact from law: apostates, heretics, schismatics; those publishing, defending, reading, or retaining books of these persons defending apostasy, heresy, schism, or other books prohibited by name through apostolic letters; authors or publishers of books of Sacred Scripture or commentaries printed without license; those issuing laws, commands, decrees against the liberty or rights of the Church, or impeding the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction by recurring to lay power; those giving their name to a Masonic sect or similar association plotting against the Church or legitimate civil power; those laying violent hands on clerics or religious persons, especially on bishops and cardinals, most of all on the Supreme Pontiff; whoever communicate in the offense, and clerics in divine things, with an excommunicated person to be avoided; those sacrilegiously casting away the consecrated species or carrying them away or retaining them for an evil end; those procuring abortion when the effect has followed; those dueling and their accomplices; those absolving accomplices in a base sin; those falsely denouncing a confessor concerning solicitation; those solicited by a confessor and not denouncing him; apostates from religion; those presuming to enter marriage while the impediment of a vow of chastity stands, whether solemn, or simple and perpetual emitted in religious profession; those violating religious enclosure; those entering marriage before a non-Catholic minister or with a pact of educating offspring in a non-Catholic religion; likewise those handing over children to be baptized by a non-Catholic minister or to be instituted in a non-Catholic religion; those commanding or compelling non-Catholics or others interdicted to be handed over to ecclesiastical burial; those usurping ecclesiastical goods, and those alienating precious things or things exceeding the value of 30,000 fr.,² etc.

² Several understand this of value in gold.

2. Also to know which of these are reserved.

For there are altogether few which are reserved to no one and can be absolved by any confessor, namely those which affect persons publishing books concerning Sacred Scripture without license, those handing over the unworthy to ecclesiastical burial, those illegitimately alienating ecclesiastical goods of great value, those compelling one to embrace the clerical or religious state, and those not denouncing the confessor by whom they were solicited. All the others are reserved either to the Ordinary, or to the Supreme Pontiff: either simply, or specially, or even most specially, such as sacrilegious casting away or carrying off or retaining of the consecrated species, laying a violent hand on the Supreme Pontiff himself, and absolution of an accomplice. It should be noted:

a) those absolving from an excommunication latae sententiae reserved in a most special or special manner without due faculty incur by the very fact an excommunication simply reserved to the Apostolic See, can. 2338, § 1; nevertheless in doubt either of law or of fact, reservation does not urge, can. 2245, § 4;

b) besides, all censures ab homine by that very fact are reserved to him who inflicted the censure or pronounced the sentence, can. 2245, § 2.

3. To know also the conditions required for incurring them.

They are: a) on the part of the subject, that he be baptized; in possession of reason and capable of malice; pubescent, according to the discipline now in force; and subject to the jurisdiction of the one excommunicating;

b) on the part of the object, that the sin be external, grave, consummated, and not only attempted, in the species which is reserved, in this sense that it fulfill all the conditions placed in the pronouncement of the censure, and joined with present contumacy, can. 2242, § 1. Hence in the sinner there is required knowledge both of the law prohibiting and of the special penalty to be inflicted on transgressors;³ and therefore ignorance, even culpable, excuses, not however affected ignorance, which is equated with knowledge, nor always gross ignorance, unless the censure is brought against those who presumed, dared, knowingly, studiously, deliberately, rashly acted, can. 2229.

³ Prummer, Th. M., III, n. 485, observes: "In the external forum presumed contumacy sometimes suffices. For when some ecclesiastical law has been sufficiently promulgated, knowledge of it is presumed in all subjects, who, if they transgress this law, must pay the penalties and censures sanctioned. Hence, for example, a Catholic who contracts marriage before a non-Catholic minister incurs the excommunication brought, although he is ignorant of the existence of this censure, Holy Office, 11 May 1892. Therefore such a Catholic truly ignorant of the excommunication can be absolved in the internal forum by any confessor, but still needs absolution in the external forum."

B. Generally there is the obligation of admonishing delinquents who are ignorant of excommunication, so that, namely, they may know the obligation of ecclesiastical law and conceive greater horror of sin, and thus the law attain its end.

Nor in the case can the principle rather often praised be applied: admonition is not to be made if it is not hoped that it will profit. For this principle can be invoked only when it is a question of ignorance of law and sin, for the good of the penitent and unless graver inconveniences are feared, namely for avoiding formal sin. For if he in good faith is ignorant of law and sin, and it is not foreseen that he will be amended, it is better to abstain from admonition and to permit inculpable transgression and material sin than by admonishing to provoke culpable transgression and formal sin. But that does not hold in the case when it is a question of mere ignorance of the penalty; for formal sin is already present. Hence then there is no reason for omitting admonition, but it must be made with every solicitude so that sin may be avoided in the future. - But if some do not care concerning this, or even deliberately omit it, they act thus so that they may avoid for themselves the inconveniences of future recourse to the Ordinary or to the Sacred Penitentiary. This is to seek one's own convenience, not the good of the penitent or of the Church, concerning which alone the faithful minister must be solicitous.

II. When the confessor can absolve from reserved censures. - One who is excommunicated is not freed from a censure except by legitimate absolution, can. 2248, § 1; but a simple confessor of himself cannot absolve from a reserved censure, but only he who has due jurisdiction for this, ordinary or delegated. Yet when the cause is more urgent, delegated jurisdiction for absolving from reserved censures is granted by the law itself, namely:

1. In danger of death, any priest, even if an approved priest is present, can licitly and validly absolve in the sacramental forum any penitents whatever from all censures without exception, can. 882. Nevertheless the dying person, after he has recovered, is held to have recourse within a month, by himself or through the confessor, to the legitimate superior or to another furnished with faculty, under penalty of falling again into the censure, and to stand by their commands, but only in two cases: if the censure was brought ab homine through a particular sentence, or if it is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff in a most special manner, can. 2252.

2. In more urgent cases, any confessor can directly absolve in the sacramental forum from all reserved censures latae sententiae, but by explicitly imposing the burden of having recourse, under penalty of falling again, within a month, at least by letter and through the confessor, if this can be done without grave inconvenience, the name being kept back, to a superior furnished with faculty and of standing by his commands; or of approaching another confessor furnished with faculty, so that from him, confession being repeated at least of the offense with the censure, he may obtain absolution and receive commands from him.

The more urgent cases are determined by law: if namely censures latae sententiae cannot be observed

a) without danger of grave scandal, e.g., if because of the excommunication of a parish priest or magistrate grave anger or disturbance would arise in the people; or

b) without danger of infamy, e.g., if all things are now prepared for nuptials, or a parish priest or vicar cannot omit celebration, or a layman Easter communion, without infamy; or

c) if it would be hard for the penitent to remain in the state of grave sin for the time necessary for the competent superior to provide, Holy Office, 16 June 1897, and can. 2254, § 1 and 2; yet this is not hard for all.

3. Indeed in an extraordinary case, when this recourse is foreseen as morally impossible, any confessor, except in the case of absolution of an accomplice, can grant absolution without the burden of recourse, or of confession to be made before a privileged confessor, but with a twofold condition: a) the things to be enjoined by law having been enjoined, namely removal of scandal or proximate occasion, and reparation of damage, and b) a fitting penance and satisfaction for the censure having been imposed, besides the sacramental penance. This indeed in such a way that the penitent, unless within a fitting time to be determined beforehand by the confessor he has done penance and given satisfaction, falls again into the censure, can. 2254, § 3.

Recourse can be made orally, or by letter, or through another, e.g., the confessor. In this last case it is morally impossible if neither the confessor, because, for example, he must depart before the response and while absent cannot safely communicate the response without others suspecting, nor the penitent, perhaps inexperienced, can send a letter, and at the same time it is hard for the penitent to approach another confessor, Holy Office, 9 Nov. 1898; 5 Sept. 1900. But if the penitent is a priest, he is never excused from recourse, because he himself can easily write to Rome and seek a response under a fictitious name, Holy Office, 3 June 1899.

III. Absolution of excommunication in the external forum and in the internal forum. - Excommunication latae sententiae of itself holds the delinquent who is conscious of the offense in each forum; yet in such a way that before declaratory sentence he is excused from observing the penalty as often as he cannot observe it without infamy, and in the external forum no one can exact the observance of the penalty from him unless the offense is notorious, can. 2232, § 1. Hence absolution can be given in each forum: by the confessor in the sacramental forum; outside the sacramental forum by him who has ordinary or delegated jurisdiction in the external forum over the guilty person.

Absolution given in the external forum holds also in the internal forum; hence if someone was absolved from a reserved censure, the sin is no longer reserved. Absolution in the internal forum of itself does not hold in the external forum unless it is proved or legitimately presumed, and otherwise the superior can urge observance until absolution in the external forum has been had, can. 2251. Therefore, scandal having been removed, e.g., if the excommunication was not public in the place or if it is sufficiently established concerning absolution received, one absolved in the internal forum can conduct himself as such in acts of the external forum.

Ordinarily, however, for public offenses, absolution is not to be given in the internal forum before absolution in the external forum has been obtained; hence what was said above concerning more urgent cases, namely danger of grave scandal or infamy, holds only if reputation is still intact and the offense is not notorious; and therefore it does not hold concerning penalties ferendae sententiae, which are considered as ab homine, can. 2217, § 3. But if then for someone it would be especially hard to remain in the state of grave sin, he could be absolved, but only from a censure latae sententiae, in the internal forum provisionally under the burden of recurring within a month; but in the external forum he would have to conduct himself as excommunicated and abstain from public reception of the sacraments until, scandal having been sufficiently repaired, he has also been absolved in the external forum.

In the sacramental forum the customary form of absolution is to be employed, in which absolution from censures is contained; in the external forum, unless the superior granting the faculty has prescribed a more solemn form, it can be given in any manner; nevertheless it is fitting to observe the form handed down in the rituals, can. 2250, § 3.

IV. Manner of proceeding in practice. - Therefore the confessor receiving accusation of a sin which incurs excommunication should proceed thus:

1. First let him carefully examine whether all conditions, on the part of the subject and object, necessary for incurring the censure are present.

2. Likewise whether the further conditions of the censure as it is reserved are present; but if some founded doubt remains, the case is not reserved, can. 2245, § 4.

3. But if all required conditions are present, then it must be investigated whether it is a more urgent case or not; but if it is not, the penitent cannot be absolved, but is to be sent to another privileged confessor, or first the faculty of absolving is to be sought.

4. If it is a more urgent case, the penitent is to be admonished concerning the reserved censure and concerning the obligation of recurring within a month; and if he seriously promises, he can be absolved. And meanwhile the due faculties should be sought from the superior.

5. If he does not promise to recur, and does this because he foresees that recourse is morally impossible, then both reparation of scandal and damage and a special and fitting penance to be fulfilled within a fixed time are to be imposed on him; and if he promises to fulfill them, he will be able to be absolved.

6. If without sufficient reason he refuses to promise, he cannot be absolved, but can be sent to the superior or to another confessor having special faculties, from whom he may seek absolution.

7. If the penitent, notwithstanding the first promise, does not return to hear the commands of the superior, and thus acts from culpable negligence, he falls again into excommunication, because he makes little of the gravely prescribed recourse, which is not completed until the penitent has accepted the commands. But if he could not return without great inconvenience, he does not fall again into excommunication, but the obligation of recurring remains afterward as soon as he can;⁴ but if recourse becomes morally impossible, what was said above under 5 must be done, and due reparation and a fitting penance imposed.

⁴ From the nature of the thing it is established that a determined time was fixed for urging the obligation.

V. Observations. - 1. The reservation of the sin ceases when the reservation of the censure ceases.

2. When there exists a censure which impedes reception of the sacraments, as excommunication does, the censured person cannot be absolved from sins unless he first has been absolved from the censure, can. 2250, § 2. Nevertheless if absolution were granted by one having power, it would be valid, while the penitent was in good faith.

3. Ignorance of the censure generally excuses from its reservation, but ignorance of the reservation of the censure, once the censure is known, does not excuse.

4. "If the confessor, ignorant of the reservation, absolves the penitent from censure and sin, the absolution of the censure holds, provided it is not a censure ab homine or a censure reserved in a most special manner to the Apostolic See," can. 2247, § 3. Indeed also absolution from the sin holds; for if someone has been absolved from a censure, the reservation of the sin altogether ceases.

5. Not only diverse censures, but even a censure of the same species, can be multiplied in the same subject, can. 2244, § 1. Hence "if he is held by several censures, he can be absolved from one, with the others by no means absolved. One seeking absolution must indicate all the cases; otherwise the absolution holds only for the case expressed. But if the absolution, although a particular petition was made, was general, as it is customarily given in sacramental confession, it holds, provided the one absolving has the competent faculty, also for those kept silent in good faith, excepting a censure reserved in a most special manner to the Apostolic See, but not for those kept silent in bad faith," can. 2249.

I suppose 1° that invincible ignorance of law or fact, which excuses from all sin, excuses from penalty, because just penalty is decreed only on account of guilt, otherwise it would be

I said: « Which excuse from all sin; » because, if ignorance should excuse from sin against one law only, suppose a human law which is ignored, and not excuse from sin against another law, suppose divine or natural which is not ignored, I judge it more probable that the sinner be not exempted from penalty by human laws enacted, if there be no ecclesiastical censure; because the human legislator intends not only to urge by penalties observance of his own law, but also of natural or divine law, of which he ought to be guardian and protector. Whence a thief who, conscious of natural law, ignores theft to be prohibited by human law, nevertheless incurs the penalty of hanging.

I suppose 2° that vincible ignorance of law or fact which excuses from mortal also excuses from penalty at least so great, because positive laws are not reckoned to decree grave penalties for venial sins. But that vincible ignorance is reckoned as excusing from mortal which is not gross and supine; for thus it is reckoned light.

I suppose 3° that vincible ignorance, even gross and supine, of a law bearing penalty under these or similar formulas: « Whoever knowingly, rashly, with rash daring shall act against, or shall have dared to act against, or presumed, » excuses from penalty; because, as Cajetan says, 2ª 2ae, q. 53, a. 3, « the words of law are not appended in vain nor to be taken improperly; » in vain would they be appended, nor would they be taken with restrictive propriety, if delinquents through ignorance even gross incurred the penalty. Otherwise, more probably, must be said if ignorance be affected; because, according to the laws, affected ignorance is equated with knowledge, and it is not likely that legislators wish to exempt from their laws and penalties those who affect to ignore them, that they may transgress them more freely.

The question therefore remains whether ignorance of penalty excuses from it him who sins gravely against a law he knows, or ignores through gross and supine ignorance. For whose resolution

I say 1°: Ignorance even invincible of penalty does not exempt from it him who sins gravely against a law which either he knows, or ignores through gross and supine ignorance, unless it be an ecclesiastical censure.

It is proved. Laws establish penalties condign to guilts. Ergo whoever commits guilt is liable to penalty, even though invincibly ignorant of it; for it is not of the nature of penalty that it be known or willed, since it has of itself that it be violent and against the will.

I said: « Unless it be an ecclesiastical censure. » For which I say 2°: Invincible ignorance of an ecclesiastical censure exempts from it one sinning knowingly against the law by which it is decreed. This is common opinion.

It is proved. That is special and proper to ecclesiastical censure, that it be not incurred except on account of contumacy against the Church — not in whatsoever manner, but against the Church commanding or prohibiting under censure, whose sign is that no one incur censure unless there precede warning of law or judge, not any whatsoever, but with threat of censure. Yet he who invincibly ignores the censure is not contumacious against the Church in this manner. Ergo.

It is confirmed. Ecclesiastical censure is not so much vindicative punishment in vengeance for crime as medicinal punishment deterring from crime. Yet unknown punishment does not deter. Ergo.

I say 3°: It seems more probable that ignorance even vincibile, provided it be not gross and supine, exempts from an ecclesiastical censure one sinning knowingly against the law by which it was established. So Sylvester, under Excommunicatio I, q. 3, Navarrus, Covarruvias, and many others.

It is gathered from Cap. Ut animarum, de Constitutionibus in Sexto, lib. I, tit. 2, c. 2, where we have this: « Lest perils of souls be encountered, we do not will that those ignorant be bound by sentences issued through statutes of whatever Ordinaries, provided however their ignorance be not gross and supine. »

The Reason supports it. He who ignores the censure, even though vincibly, but with lightly culpable ignorance not gross and supine, is not properly called disobedient and contumacious against the Church commanding or prohibiting under censure. Yet contumacy of this kind is required for incurring censure, as was said. Ergo. Otherwise, we judge, must be said of irregularity, even from delict, which we do not reckon a censure, as we shall say elsewhere.

You will ask whether, as often as the will sins, some practical error precedes in the will.

I answer. affirmatively ¹. Because insofar the will sins, insofar it prefers useful or delightful good, as ¹ Here q. 77, a. 2, o., et alibi.

^{1 1} Here q. 77, a. 2, o., et alibi.

fitting itself, to honest good. Yet the will, since it is a blind potency, born to follow the guidance of intellect, cannot prefer delightful good, as fitting itself, to honest good, unless the intellect judge here and now delightful good to be fitting itself and preferable to honest good: wherein practically it errs. Ergo. And in this sense is verified that Prov., XIV, 22: They err that work evil. And this common saying taken from the Philosopher, I Ethic., c. 3: « Every sinner is ignorant, » namely practically and in particular, not speculatively and in common; otherwise every sinner would be heretic.

I say 1°. § 1. By the name of delict, in ecclesiastical law, is understood an external and morally imputable violation of law, to which there has been added a canonical sanction at least indeterminate.

§ 2. Unless something else appears from the adjuncts, those things which are said concerning delicts are applied also to violations of a precept to which a penal sanction has been annexed (Can. 2195).

A delict says three things: a violation of law; external and imputable; to which a canonical sanction has been added at least indeterminate. Therefore it is not the simple violation of any law whatever, but only of that law for whose observance provision is made by some penalty, definitely or indefinitely commemorated in the law itself. The Church, nor any human superior, burns thoughts with penalties; the adage is: no one suffers a penalty of thought. Besides, the Church, a pious Mother, does not pursue every sin whatever with her penalties, but only the graver ones, say, incontinence of clerics, homicide, simony. This violation must also be morally imputable. Surely one whose action is not imputed to him unto fault does not deserve penalty.

It must be noted that, unless something else is established, those things which are said concerning delicts are applied also to violations of a precept to which a sanction has been annexed.

Question 1. What delict is judged to be public, notorious, occult?

Resp. A delict is:

1°. Public, if it has already been divulged or has happened or is situated in such adjuncts that it can and ought prudently to be judged that it will easily be divulged;

2°. Notorious with notoriety of law, after the sentence of a competent judge which has passed into a matter judged, or after the confession of the delinquent made in judgment according to the norm of can. 1750;

3°. Notorious with notoriety of fact, if it is publicly known and committed in such adjuncts that by no tergiversation can it be concealed and by no support of law can it be excused;

4°. Occult, that which is not public; materially occult, if the delict itself lies hidden; formally occult, if its imputability does (Can. 2197).

A man outstanding in authority is killed on a public way by a wicked man, when very many men were diverting themselves there. It is simply public. In judgment he has now been marked by a capital sentence by competent authority, since he has been declared guilty of homicide and to be punished by this penalty by law. In a public tribunal before a judge he has spontaneously confessed that he is guilty of the crime. In each case it is notorious with notoriety of law. - A public usurer or concubinarian is either known to all as such or soon to be known, since the delict can neither be concealed nor excused. It is notorious with notoriety of fact. Occult is that which neither came into judgment nor was brought into the rumors of the people, and moreover is not known by such a number and quality of persons whence it ought to be public. - Titius, secretly, with no one knowing, killed by Theodore; no one knows that homicide happened: the delict is also materially occult. Finally, when the imputability of an evil act lies hidden, then the delict is formally occult.

Question 2. In what way must one judge concerning the guilt of those who concur in a delict?

Resp. § 1. Those who by a common design of delinquency physically concur in a delict are all held guilty in the same mode, unless the adjuncts increase or diminish the culpability of someone.

§ 2. In a delict which by its nature demands an accomplice, each party is culpable in the same mode, unless something else appears from the adjuncts.

§ 3. Not only the one commanding, who is the principal author of the delict, but also those who induce toward the consummation of the delict or concur toward this in any way whatever, contract no less imputability, other things being equal, than the executor of the delict himself, if the delict would not have been committed without their work.

§ 4. But if their concurrence only rendered easier the delict which would have been committed even without their concurrence, it carries with itself lesser imputability.

§ 5. One who has fully withdrawn his influence in perpetrating the delict by opportune retraction is freed from all imputability, even if the executor nevertheless perpetrated the delict on account of other causes proper to himself; if he has not fully withdrawn it, retraction diminishes, but does not remove, culpability.

§ 6. One who concurs in a delict merely by neglecting his office is held by imputability proportioned to the obligation by which he was driven to impede the delict by his office.

§ 7. Praise of a perpetrated delict, participation in the fruits, concealment and reception of the delinquent, and other acts following a delict already fully completed can constitute new delicts, if namely they are punished by a penalty in the law; but, unless there had been agreement with the delinquent concerning those acts before the delict, they do not carry with themselves the imputability of the perpetrated delict (Can. 2209).

In this canon there is question of a very grave matter, that is, of establishing the imputability of delinquents. When several persons, willing, by common design perpetrate a delict, that is, physically concur for doing it, the existence of the delict is owed to all and each, because they are individually and all together its causes and authors. All will the delict as something intended; they do something exteriorly so that it exists as the physical effect of that which they do exteriorly. From the common action of several persons concurring together the delict has its origin. The delict is objectively one, subjectively multiple. All these are fellow-guilty, guilty in the same mode as principals. It can be that the culpability of one is greater because he acts with greater hatred toward another, for example, in homicide, or because the consanguineous relative of one is killed.

In adultery and other delicts which import complicity, each party is culpable in the same mode, unless something else appears from the adjuncts. And thus the penalty established by reason of this crime strikes each.

The executor and the one commanding hold the first places among delinquents; nevertheless those also are truly regarded as authors to whose concurrence the consummation is owed and without which the delict would not have been committed. For in this case the matter is also imputed to them, as, for example, superiors of regular men introducing women into enclosure; a physician instructing a pregnant girl how an abortion may be done, giving medicine to her who knows nothing concerning these crimes, furnishing care to her, say, in a private hospital, etc., when otherwise the woman would have borne offspring in the natural mode. The perfection of every action is its consummation in its own order; therefore all who induce toward this, thus by ordering, or who concur in any way whatever, thus the aforesaid physician procuring abortion in that hospital, all, other things being equal, have the same imputability.

If the delict would have been committed without their cooperation, and the concurrence given only rendered the delict easier, they have lesser imputability.

Besides, one who has opportunely withdrawn his influence, say, for example, not only by retracting the counsel but also by adding reasons valid against his counsel previously given, loses all imputability; but if the retraction was not full, neither was the imputability full, but diminished according to the mode of retraction.

When someone was obligated by his office to avoid a delict, and by neglecting his office concurred toward it, his imputability is measured by the obligation by which he was bound to impede it.

Favor furnished to a delinquent after the delict, reception of the thing, concealment, defense, protection, can constitute new delicts; but unless there had been an agreement concerning these things before the delict was committed, they do not carry with them the culpability of the delict itself to be imputed.

Question 3. By how many names is penalty called?

Resp. § 1. Penalty is called:

1°. Determinate, if it has been taxatively established in the law or precept itself; indeterminate, if it has been left to the prudent judgment of the judge or Superior, whether by preceptive or facultative words;

2°. Latae sententiae, if a determinate penalty has been so added to the law or precept that it is incurred by the very fact of the committed delict; ferendae sententiae, if it must be inflicted by the judge or Superior;

3°. A iure, if a determinate penalty is established in the law itself, whether it is latae sententiae or ferendae; ab homine, if it is brought by way of a peculiar precept or through a condemnatory judicial sentence, even if established in law; wherefore a penalty ferendae sententiae, added to a law, before the condemnatory sentence is only a iure, afterward both a iure and ab homine, but is considered as ab homine.

§ 2. A penalty is always understood as ferendae sententiae, unless it is expressly said to be latae sententiae, or to be contracted by the fact itself or by the law itself, or unless other similar words are applied (Can. 2217).

In every penal law a penalty, or privation of some good, is established against the delinquent. But that penalty is either determined by the law itself, for example, a censure reserved to no one, or suspension, etc.; or it is left to the judgment of the judge, either by prescribing that he impose some penalty, or by leaving to his judgment to punish or dissemble. Although the penalty in the law is determinate, nevertheless the mode by which it strikes the subject varies; for either he incurs it by the very fact of the delict, and it will be a penalty latae sententiae, or the law affirms that the penalty must be inflicted by the judge or superior, and it will be a penalty ferendae sententiae.

If a determinate penalty is established in the law itself, whether it is latae or ferendae sententiae, it is called a iure; therefore a determinate penalty which is called a iure is either latae or ferendae sententiae. That is called ab homine which is brought by way of a particular precept or through a condemnatory sentence of the judge, even if it has been established in law; wherefore a penalty ferendae sententiae before the condemnatory sentence is held only a iure; after the condemnatory sentence, a iure and at the same time ab homine, but it is considered as ab homine. This matter is very much to be noted, for in this division attention is paid especially to the mode of binding and loosing the bond; moreover a censure or penalty contained in law as ferendae sententiae, inflicted through a condemnatory judicial sentence, thereafter remains reserved to the superior of the judge or to the judge himself. Moreover, a penalty in law is always held as ferendae sententiae unless by the words by the fact itself or by the law itself, or equivalent words, something else is said. - Cf. Wernz, v. 6, p. 152, n. 16.

Question 4. Who punishes those holding supreme civil principality, Cardinals, Legates of the Holy See? Are Cardinals and Bishops comprehended by penal law?

Resp. § 1. A penalty can be inflicted or declared only by the Roman Pontiff upon those of whom in can. 1557, § 1.

§ 2. Unless expressly named, Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church are not comprehended under a penal law, nor Bishops under penalties latae sententiae of suspension and interdict (Can. 2227).

Hence those holding supreme principality, and their sons and daughters, and those to whom there is a right of succeeding in the principality, Cardinals, Legates of the Apostolic See, and in criminal matters Bishops, even titular Bishops, can be punished or declared subject to penalties by the Supreme Pontiff alone. - Cf. Can. 1557, § 1.

Question 5. Does ignorance excuse from penalties?

Resp. § 1. Affected ignorance, whether of the law or of the penalty alone, excuses from no penalties latae sententiae, even if the law contains the words of which in § 2.

§ 2. If the law has the words: has presumed, has dared, knowingly, studiously, rashly, has acted deliberately, or other similar words which demand full cognition and deliberation, any diminishment of imputability, whether on the part of the intellect or on the part of the will, exempts from penalties latae sententiae.

§ 3. If the law does not have those words:

1°. Ignorance of the law, or even of the penalty alone, if it was crass or supine, exempts from no penalty latae sententiae; if it was not crass or supine, it excuses from medicinal penalties, but not from vindicative penalties latae sententiae;

2°. Drunkenness, omission of due diligence, weakness of mind, impetus of passion, if, notwithstanding the diminishment of imputability, the action is still gravely culpable, do not excuse from penalties latae sententiae;

3°. Grave fear, if the delict inclines toward contempt of the faith or of ecclesiastical authority or toward public harm of souls, in no way exempts from penalties latae sententiae.

§ 4. Although the guilty person is not held by censures latae sententiae according to the norm of § 3, n. 1, this nevertheless does not impede him, if the matter bears it, from being affected by another suitable penalty or penance (Can. 2229).

Affected ignorance is ignorance directly willed and studiously acquired or not rejected; the end is that which someone regards, so conducting himself that he remains in ignorance. Such a one strives that knowledge of the law not be acquired.

Not likewise one who labors under crass ignorance, which does not arise, as such, from the fact that someone directly wishes not to acquire knowledge or to retain ignorance, but because for another cause, on account of love of leisure, weariness of study, he is excessively negligent in fulfilling the obligation of learning the law and driving away ignorance. Therefore this ignorance, excessive negligence of study, is crass, and thence the man himself is crassly ignorant, because, supine, he lies as if content in the mire of ignorance. This is indirectly voluntary ignorance.

Surely he is not worthy of immunity and liberty from a penalty conjoined with violation of the law who acts precisely so that he may not know the law. Such a one esteems the law itself little, indeed least of all. Wherefore one acting from affected ignorance is equated with a man acting knowingly when it is a question of penalties latae sententiae; from which, therefore, this ignorance does not excuse, not even when there are in the law the words knowingly, etc., as in § 2.

But when the words of the law demand a perfect voluntary, namely full cognition and deliberation, any diminishment of imputability arising from the part of the intellect or from the part of the will exempts from a penalty latae sententiae. In other words, the very extreme things required by the law must be verified.

When the law does not have the words has presumed, etc., ignorance whether of the law or of the penalty alone does not excuse, if it was crass and supine, from any penalty latae sententiae; such ignorance, so gravely and altogether culpable, is not worthy to be granted immunity; it is surely a certain great contumacy, and no cause is present for exempting a man who applied either no diligence or very slight diligence so that he might know what he is bound to know.

But it is otherwise if it was not crass, and it is a question of medicinal penalties; for to what end is a penalty or medicine for one who is ignorant? and therefore, since a penalty which he does not know does not amend him, in those ignorant persons who are not crassly, although gravely, ignorant, an excuse is present: "that dangers of souls may be met, we do not will those ignorant to be bound by sentences brought by the statutes of any Ordinaries whatever, provided nevertheless their ignorance was not crass or supine" c. 2, I, 2, in VI°. But the same gravely culpable ignorance does not excuse from vindicative penalties; for such a delict is voluntary in the cause and therefore imputable, and the man by transgressing the law placed the cause of the penalty, which can by law be brought upon the unwilling. But in general, although the guilty person is not entangled in censures latae sententiae, let him be affected by another suitable penalty or penance.

By equal reason fear does not excuse from penalties latae sententiae when the delict inclines toward contempt of the faith or of the Church or toward public harm of souls.

Question 6. By what penalty are accomplices or concurrents punished, although only one is named in the law?

Resp. By the same penalty by which that one is held are held those physically concurring in a delict by common design, partners in a delict demanding complicity, those commanding, inducing, and concurring toward the consummation of a delict which otherwise would not have been committed. - Cf. Can. 2231.

Question 7. When does a penalty latae sententiae hold the delinquent?

Resp. § 1. A penalty latae sententiae, whether medicinal or vindicative, holds the delinquent who is conscious to himself of the delict, by the fact itself, in each forum; nevertheless before a declaratory sentence, the delinquent is excused from observing the penalty as often as he cannot observe it without infamy, and in the external forum no one can exact from him observance of the same penalty, unless the delict is notorious, with the prescription of can. 2223, § 4 remaining firm.

§ 2. A declaratory sentence retrotracts the penalty to the moment of the committed delict (Can. 2232).

Question 8. Can the Ordinary remit penalties latae sententiae established by common law?

Resp. § 1. In public cases the Ordinary can remit penalties latae sententiae established by common law, with the exception of:

1°. Cases brought to the contentious forum;

2°. Censures reserved to the Apostolic See;

3°. Penalties of inability for benefices, offices, dignities, functions in the Church, active and passive voice, and privation of the same, perpetual suspension, infamy of law, privation of the right of patronage and of a privilege or grace conceded by the Apostolic See.

§ 2. But in occult cases, with the prescription of can. 2254 and 2290 remaining firm, the Ordinary can remit, by himself or through another, penalties latae sententiae established by common law, with the exception of censures reserved in a most special or special mode to the Apostolic See (Can. 2237).

Question 9. Can a penalty validly be remitted to one present or absent?

Resp. § 1. A penalty can validly be remitted to one present or absent, absolutely or under condition, in the external forum or only in the internal.

§ 2. Although a penalty can also be remitted orally, nevertheless, if it was inflicted in writing, it is expedient that its remission also be conceded in writings (Can. 2239).

Question 10. Can any confessor in more urgent cases suspend the obligation of a vindicative penalty?

Resp. § 1. In more urgent occult cases, if from observance of a vindicative penalty latae sententiae the guilty person would betray himself with infamy and scandal, any confessor can, in the sacramental forum, suspend the obligation of observing the penalty, with the burden enjoined of recurring at least within a month by letter, and through the confessor if that can be done without grave inconvenience, the name having been suppressed, to the S. Penitentiary or to a Bishop endowed with the faculty, and of standing by his mandates.

§ 2. And if in some extraordinary case this recourse is impossible, then the confessor himself can concede a dispensation according to the norm of can. 2254, § 3 (Can. 2290).

Question 11. How manyfold is infamy?

Resp. Twofold:

§ 1. Infamy is either of law or of fact.

§ 2. Infamy of law is that which is established in cases expressed by common law.

§ 3. Infamy of fact is contracted when someone, on account of a perpetrated delict or on account of depraved morals, has lost good estimation among upright and grave faithful, concerning which judgment belongs to the Ordinary.

§ 4. Neither affects the consanguineous or affine relatives of the delinquent, with the prescription of can. 2147, § 2, n. 3 remaining firm (Can. 2293).

Question 12. In what way does infamy, whether of law or of fact, cease?

Resp. Infamy of law ceases only by dispensation conceded by the Apostolic See; infamy of fact ceases when good estimation among upright and grave faithful, all adjuncts having been weighed and especially through lasting amendment of the matter, has been recovered, in the prudent judgment of the Ordinary (Can. 2295).

Censure is commonly defined: A spiritual and medicinal penalty, by which a baptized man, delinquent and contumacious, is deprived by ecclesiastical power of the use of certain spiritual goods. It is called 1°. a penalty, because it supposes fault; 2°. spiritual, both because it is brought by spiritual power for the spiritual utility of Christians, and because it takes away spiritual goods primarily and immediately, temporal goods only secondarily and mediately; 3°. medicinal, because regularly it is brought and ought to be brought for this end, that the soul may bring itself back to better fruit; nevertheless accidentally, when this is expedient, it is brought even against him of whose conversion there is despair; for although it is a medicine, it is also a penalty, and therefore, when the primary end of correction ceases, secondary ends are still obtained, namely that the guilty person be chastised and fear be instilled into others; 4°. a baptized man, because those who have not been baptized are not subject to the power of the Church; but power is exercised over subjects; 5°. delinquent and contumacious, because a penalty is inflicted only on a delinquent, but medicine ought not to be offered except to those whose contumacy needs such a remedy; 6°. he is deprived of the use of certain spiritual goods, namely of goods which fall under the power of the Church, such as public prayers, sacraments, etc. - Hence censure differs 1°. from deposition and degradation, which are not medicinal nor for a time, but only penal and perpetual; 2°. from irregularity, which can be contracted also on account of a mere defect of mind or body without any fault, and therefore of itself is not a penalty, but only a canonical impediment.

The Code gives nearly the same definition.

§ 1. Censure is a penalty by which a baptized man, delinquent and contumacious, is deprived of certain spiritual goods, or goods annexed to spiritual goods, until, withdrawing from contumacy, he is absolved.

§ 2. Let censures, especially latae sententiae, above all excommunication, not be inflicted except soberly and with great circumspection (Can. 2241).

Censures are distinguished in many ways, namely:

1°. Excommunication, suspension, interdict, concerning which we shall treat specifically. - Nevertheless it must be noted that excommunication is always a censure; but suspension and interdict take on the nature sometimes of a censure, sometimes of a vindicative penalty. But you will recognize that they are vindicative penalties both if they are brought on account of a merely past delict, and if they are inflicted perpetually, or even for a determinate time, for example for two or three months; for these things are a certain indication that not the amendment of the guilty person, but his punishment, is intended.

2°. § 1. Some censures are reserved, others non-reserved.

§ 2. A censure ab homine is reserved to him who inflicted the censure or pronounced the sentence, and to his competent Superior, or successor, or delegate; but of censures reserved a iure some are reserved to the Ordinary, others to the Apostolic See.

§ 3. Of those reserved to the Apostolic See, some are reserved simply, others in a special mode, others in a most special mode.

§ 4. A censure latae sententiae is not reserved unless this is expressly said in the law or precept; and in doubt whether of law or of fact, the reservation does not press (Can. 2245).

3°. Notorious or occult censures, according as it is publicly established that someone has incurred them on account of a fact which is so known that now it cannot any longer be concealed; or otherwise.

4°. Just or unjust censures; valid or invalid; according as the superior has consulted justice, truth, and law, or not, in imposing the censure.

The conditions required for the validity of censures are that the sin, on account of which it is inflicted, be mortal, external, consummated, not merely past, and that it be conjoined with contumacy.

§ 1. By censure only an external, grave, consummated delict, conjoined with contumacy, is punished; but censure can also be brought against unknown delinquents.

§ 2. If there is question of censures ferendae sententiae, he is contumacious who, notwithstanding the admonitions of which in can. 2233, § 2, does not desist from the delict or refuses to do penance for the perpetrated delict with due reparation of damages and scandal; but for incurring a censure latae sententiae the transgression of the law or precept to which a penalty latae sententiae is attached suffices, unless the guilty person is excused from this by a legitimate cause.

§ 3. Contumacy must be said to have ceased when the guilty person has truly repented of the committed delict and at the same time has given congruous satisfaction for damages and scandal, or at least has seriously promised it; but to judge whether the penance is true, whether the satisfaction is congruous or the promise of the same serious, or not, belongs to him from whom absolution from the censure is sought (Can. 2242).

Question 1. In what way is a censure latae sententiae discerned from a censure ferendae sententiae?

Resp. Generally a censure will be latae sententiae: 1°. if the words by which it is expressed exclude the action or ministry of any other, for example, if it is brought by these words: by the fact itself - by the law itself - by that very thing - without any other sentence; 2°. if the words are of the present or past time, for example, we excommunicate - we have excommunicated, etc.; 3°. if the words are of the imperative mode, for example, let him fall into excommunication - let him remain suspended - interdicted, etc.

But a censure must be held as ferendae sententiae: 1°. if the words by which it is brought demand the work and ministry of another, for example, let him be excommunicated by the Bishop; 2°. if they are only threatening, for example, we prescribe under threat of anathema, unless something else is gathered from the adjuncts; 3°. if they express future time, for example, he will be excommunicated - he will be excommunicated, etc. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 7 and 8.

Question 2. Must he be judged to have incurred a censure who doubts whether he has incurred it?

Resp. Negatively, whether he doubts whether he has gravely offended, or whether the case falls under the censure.

§ 1. In penalties the more benign interpretation must be made.

§ 2. But if it is doubted whether a penalty, inflicted by a competent Superior, is just or not, the penalty must be observed in both forums, except the case of an appeal in suspensive effect (Can. 2219).

Question 3. Is someone bound by a censure which he knows to be manifestly unjust?

Resp. Negatively, whether the superior, relying on a false presumption, has condemned an innocent man as guilty, or whether he has omitted legal forms, or has exceeded the limits of jurisdiction. Nevertheless the danger of hallucination in one's own cause must be carefully avoided; and if it is not publicly established that the censure is null, this must altogether be observed in order to avoid scandal. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 68.

Question 4. Does ignorance excuse from censure?

Resp. Ignorance of fact certainly excuses, namely when someone does not know that he is placing an act prohibited under censure. Thus, for example, if someone strikes a priest, thinking him to be a layman, he does not incur the censure brought against strikers of clerics, and the reason is that the censure ought to be known to the sinner, so that he may be contumacious. - Ignorance of ecclesiastical law prescribing or prohibiting something under censure also excuses. This is clear from the same reason just given; for he cannot be called contumacious against the Church who does not know her law, as is clear from canon law, in VI°, lib. 1, tit. 2, de Constit., cap. 2, where it is said: "We do not will the ignorant to be bound, provided nevertheless that the ignorance was not crass or supine." - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 43 and following; Can. 2242, § 2.

Question 5. Does vincible ignorance excuse from censure?

Resp. Affected ignorance excuses from none. If the law has the words: has presumed, has dared, any diminishment of imputability excuses. If the law does not have those words, crass or supine ignorance does not excuse; but that which is not crass or supine excuses. - Cf. Can. 2229.

Question 6. Does grave fear excuse from censure?

Resp. Affirmatively, speaking generally, and the reason is that ecclesiastical penal laws do not seem to press with such rigor; for since ecclesiastical laws themselves, if very grave fear presses, cease to oblige, the penalty itself annexed to them must necessarily fall.

§ 3. Grave fear, if the delict inclines toward contempt of the faith or of ecclesiastical authority or toward public harm of souls, in no way exempts from penalties latae sententiae (Can. 2229, n. 3). - Cf. Can. 2205.

Question 7. Is it required that admonition of the delinquent precede the censure?

Resp. No admonition is required for censures brought a iure, because the law itself, brought and known, sufficiently admonishes subjects.

§ 1. No penalty can be inflicted unless it is certainly established that the delict has been committed and has not been legitimately prescribed.

§ 2. Although this is legitimately established, if there is question of inflicting a censure, let the guilty person be reprehended and admonished to withdraw from contumacy according to the norm of can. 2242, § 3, with a congruous time for returning to his right mind being given, if in the prudent judgment of the same judge or Superior the case bears this; if contumacy persists, the censure can be inflicted (Can. 2233).¹

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1106, n. 48.

Question 8. Does he incur a censure if it repents him of the fact which he placed before the consummation, or before the effect follows?

Resp. He does not incur it if he was able to prevent the effect and did prevent it. But if he was not able to prevent the effect, although he tried, it is controverted: those affirming say that contumacy is in this, that someone knowingly and willingly violated the law, nor does contrition impede the effect. But others deny it, because the censure is brought against the contumacious; but this man, when the effect actually follows, is not contumacious; therefore censure cannot be brought upon him; concerning which opinion D'Annibale, n. 333, says: "Which either is the truer, for to what purpose is medicine when the disease has been healed? Or it is the more equitable." And in a note, applying this opinion, which from St. Alphonsus he made his own, he says: "As, behold, if he gave an abortive to a girl, or to someone counsel, a mandate of killing; and before she expelled, or this one killed, it repented him of the fact." - Cf. Ferreres, 8°, n. 1189, 3°.

I say. § 1. It is the native and proper right of the Church, independent of any human authority, to coerce delinquents subject to her by penalties both spiritual and also temporal.

§ 2. But let there be kept before the eyes the admonition of the Council of Trent, sess. XIII, de ref., cap. 1: "Let Bishops and other Ordinaries remember that they are shepherds, not strikers, and that it is fitting for them so to preside over those subject to them that they do not dominate them, but love them as sons and brothers, and labor by exhorting and admonishing to deter them from illicit things, lest, when they have offended, they be compelled to coerce them with due penalties; nevertheless, if it should happen that they sin in anything through human frailty, that precept of the Apostle must be observed by them, that they reprove, entreat, rebuke them in all goodness and patience, since benevolence toward those to be corrected often does more than austerity, exhortation more than threat, charity more than power; but if, on account of the gravity of the delict, there shall be need of the rod, then rigor is to be employed with meekness, judgment with mercy, severity with mildness, so that discipline, salutary and necessary for peoples, may be preserved without harshness, and those who have been corrected may be amended, or, if they refuse to return to their right mind, others, by the salutary example of punishment upon them, may be deterred from vices" (Can. 2214).

Who are adorned with this power is clear from the canon:

§ 1. Those who are strong with the power of bringing laws or imposing precepts can also attach penalties to a law or precept; those who have only judicial power can only apply legitimately established penalties according to the norm of law.

§ 2. The Vicar General without a special mandate does not have the power of inflicting penalties (Can. 2220).

Question 1. Can heretical, excommunicated, and suspended Bishops validly bring censures?

Resp. Affirmatively, if they are occult heretics, excommunicated, or suspended. The reason is that the Church, on account of the common good, does not take from them the use of jurisdiction. But one must respond negatively if they are excommunicated to be avoided, or not tolerated, because then they are deprived of all ecclesiastical jurisdiction. But what if indeed they are notorious but not to be avoided? Or if a declaratory or condemnatory sentence has been brought against them? - Cf. Can. 2264, below, n. 960.

Question 2. Can a Bishop bring a censure if he is outside the diocese?

Resp. Affirmatively, if the censure is brought by way of precept or statute for guarding against future crimes, or by way of sentence, which nevertheless does not need cognition of the cause and judicial formality, or, even if it needs judicial formality, nevertheless permission has been given by the Ordinary of the territory. - But one must respond negatively if the censure must be brought with judicial formality, and the Ordinary of the place denies permission. Except, unless the Bishop has been expelled by force from his own territory; for then permission asked from the Ordinary of the place suffices, even if not obtained. - Cf. Schmalzgr., lib. 5, tit. 39, n. 26; St. Alphonsus, n. 21; Can. 201, §§ 2, 3; 1637.

Question 3. Conversely, can a Bishop existing in his own diocese bring a censure against a subject existing outside the diocese?

Resp. Affirmatively, if there is question of a crime committed in his own diocese. The reason is that otherwise the delinquent could be punished by no one; and although he has gone away, nevertheless he does not cease to be subject to the jurisdiction of his own Bishop. Nor does it stand in the way that citation cannot be made outside the territory. Although after the delict the guilty person has departed from the place, the judge of the place has the right of citing him to appear and of bringing sentence against him. Indeed the Bishop can bring a censure against a subject delinquent outside the diocese, if there is question of a matter pertaining to his own diocese; thus clerics who, ordered to come to the Synod, do not obey can be excommunicated; but otherwise, at least more probably, if the crime were consummated outside the territory, unless the discussion is of a censure brought against someone by way of special precept for preventing crime, as St. Alphonsus, n. 23, more probably teaches, and Laymann confirms with valid reasons, lib. 1, tract. 5, part. 1, cap. 4, n. 7. Can. 1717, § 2; 1561; 1566.

Question 4. Can a Bishop bind by censure an alien subject delinquent in his own diocese?

Resp. Affirmatively, and the reason is that every delinquent obtains the forum of the place in which he offends. Thus from canon law, lib. 2, tit. 2, De foro competenti, cap. 3. But although the Bishop more probably cannot bring a censure against a sojourner before admonition, nevertheless he can after he has offended in the place and he has cited him. Then by reason of the delict the Bishop can punish the sojourner when that delict is prohibited by ecclesiastical law of common law under excommunication or other penalties to be inflicted by the ecclesiastical judge. But a sojourner cannot be inflicted with penalties while he is traveling, whether he has violated laws of his own or of another diocese, for while staying outside his own diocese he is not obliged by the particular laws of his diocese, nor by the laws of this diocese, as is clear from what was said on Laws, n. 80, Q. 3°. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 26; and on the Sacrament of Penance, n. 591. - Cf. Can. 14, § 1.

I say 1°. The subject of censure can be only a baptized man, capable of reason, and a subject. Therefore 1°. he must be baptized, because, according to the Apostle, the Church does not judge concerning those who are outside; 2°. capable of reason, because censure is ordered to the correction of the delinquent, which certainly does not have place in him who lacks the use of reason; 3°. a subject, because censure is an act of jurisdiction, which cannot be exercised except over subjects.

I say 2°. Those under puberty are excused from penalties latae sententiae, and are to be corrected rather by educative punishments than by censures or other more grave vindicative penalties; but those of puberty who have induced them to violate the law or have concurred with them in a delict according to the norm of can. 2209, §§ 1-3, themselves indeed incur the penalty established by law (Can. 2230).

Among those under puberty, on account of defect of age, rigor must be tempered with meekness. c. 60, X, v. 39. In children much is usually left alone which, in others of more advanced age, human laws say must be punished more severely; in them sins seem not to be punished in the same way as in adults. But those of puberty who induce them to violate the law, or physically concur with them by common design, or join themselves to them in a delict which demands an accomplice, or as those commanding, or inducing toward the consummation of the delict or concurring toward it, themselves incur the penalty.

Question 1. Are Cardinals and Bishops subject to censures?

Resp. § 2. Unless expressly named, Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church are not comprehended under a penal law, nor Bishops under penalties latae sententiae of suspension and interdict (Can. 2227).

Question 2. Can exempt Religious be bound by episcopal censures by the Bishop of the place?

Resp. Affirmatively, they can be punished by the Ordinary of the place in all things in which they are subject to him. - Cf. Can. 619.

Question 3. Can the subject of censure be an entire community?

Resp. § 2. Excommunication can affect only physical persons, and therefore if at any time it is brought against a moral body, it is understood to affect the individuals who have concurred in the delict; interdict and suspension can affect also the community (Can. 2255).

Question 4. Can someone be bound by several censures at the same time?

Resp. § 1. Not only a censure of diverse species, but even a censure of the same species, can be multiplied in the same subject.

§ 2. A censure latae sententiae is multiplied:

1°. If diverse delicts, each of which carries a censure with itself, are committed by the same or by distinct action;

2°. If the same delict, punished by censure, is repeated several times so that there are several distinct delicts;

3°. If a delict, punished by diverse censures by distinct Superiors, is committed once or several times.

§ 3. A censure ab homine is multiplied if several precepts or several sentences, or several distinct parts of the same precept or sentence, each inflict its own censure (Can. 2244).

Question 5. How is the subject of censure to be interpreted?

Resp. Strictly; a censure brought against the people does not strike the clergy, nor conversely does one brought against the clergy strike the people; one brought against clerics does not strike Regulars who are not clerics; one brought against Regulars holds only them and not other religious. - Cf. D'Annibale, n. 325.

Question 6. What is the law concerning censures to be reserved?

Resp. § 1. Let no censure be reserved unless attention has been paid to the peculiar gravity of the delicts and the necessity of more suitably providing for ecclesiastical discipline and of healing the consciences of the faithful.

§ 2. Reservation receives a strict interpretation.

§ 3. The reservation of a censure impeding the reception of the Sacraments imports the reservation of the sin to which the censure is annexed; but if someone is excused from the censure or was absolved from it, the reservation of the sin completely ceases (Can. 2246).

Question 7. Can the Ordinary bring a censure reserved to himself against a delict to which a censure reserved to the Apostolic See is attached?

Resp. Negatively; § 1. If a censure is reserved to the Apostolic See, the Ordinary cannot bring another censure reserved to himself against the same delict (Can. 2247).

Question 8. What is the law with relation to the reservation of censure in a particular territory?

Resp. § 2. Reservation of censure in a particular territory does not exert its force outside the limits of that territory, even if the censured person goes out of the territory to obtain absolution; but a censure ab homine is reserved everywhere, so that the censured person can nowhere be absolved without the due faculties (Can. 2247).

Question 9. If a confessor, ignorant of the reservation, absolves a penitent from censure and sin, is the absolution of the censure valid?

Resp. The absolution of the censure is valid, provided it is not a censure ab homine or a censure reserved in a most special mode to the Apostolic See (Can. 2247, § 3). - Cf. S. Off., 11 May, 1892.

I say 1°. Censures are not loosed by the repentance alone of the delinquent or by obedience toward the mandates of the Church, nor by the death of him who brought the censure; but absolution imparted by a legitimate judge or superior is necessary.

§ 1. Any censure, once contracted, is removed only by legitimate absolution.

§ 2. Absolution cannot be denied as soon as the delinquent has withdrawn from contumacy according to the norm of can. 2242, § 3; but he who absolves from a censure can, if the matter bears it, inflict for the perpetrated delict a congruous vindicative penalty or penance.

§ 3. A censure, removed by absolution, does not revive, except in the case in which the burden imposed under penalty of reincidence has not been fulfilled (Can. 2248).

I say 2°. Neither from censures reserved a iure, nor from censures ab homine brought by a particular sentence, can simple confessors absolve, but only 1°. he who brought censures of this kind; 2°. his superior; 3°. his successor; 4°. another delegated by any one of these. The reason is that it belongs to him to absolve whose it is to bind. - But any confessor can absolve from censures a iure which are not reserved to the Pope or to the Bishop. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 70 and 72.

I say 3°. Any priest, even one not approved, can absolve from any censure those who are placed in the article of death. - Cf. below, Q. 9.

I say 4°. He is said to absolve in the internal forum or forum of conscience to whom the Superior has conceded the faculty of absolving, with the right of taking cognizance of that delict in the external forum and of imposing a penalty and satisfaction for it remaining safe.

If absolution of censure is given in the external forum, it affects both forums; if in the internal forum, the absolved person, scandal having been removed, can hold himself as such even in acts of the external forum; but unless the concession of absolution is proved or legitimately presumed in the external forum, the censure can be pressed by Superiors of the external forum, whom the guilty person must obey, until absolution shall have been obtained in the same forum (Can. 2251).

Absolution from censure given in the external forum takes it away both before the Church and before God; given in the internal forum, it takes it away before God, but not before the Church, because censure is a bond of the external forum, and although absolution in the internal forum takes it away before God, the Church can regard the person as censured in the external forum. Namely, perhaps it happens that someone has been censured on account of an occult delict; and such a one, for example a priest, must minister the sacraments to the faithful asking who do not know that he is bound by censure; nor is he himself held to defame and betray himself, which nevertheless he would have to do if he were obliged to deny the sacraments. And therefore provision must be made for both: namely, that censures not lose their medicinal force, and that the faithful receive the sacraments by the valid and licit action of the censured person. Accordingly there is this medium of absolution under certain conditions in the internal forum; but the Church can press the force of the censure until absolution is obtained in the external forum.

Question 1. What comes under the name of absolution to reincidence?

Resp. Absolution to reincidence is a certain species of conditional absolution, not insofar as he who has received it is not truly absolved, but insofar as he must fulfill certain conditions placed by law or by man; unless he fulfills these, he again falls into the same censure on account of new contumacy. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 87 and 125.

Since it is a nefarious crime unjustly to take away the life of a man, at all times various punishments have been established by laws against homicides, many of which, commemorated in the Seraphic Doctor Bonaventure, I shall here set forth.

From the Council of Elvira it is found cited by Martin of Braga cap. 78.: If anyone shall have committed homicide willingly, let him ever lie at the doors of the Catholic Church, and receive communion at the end of his life; but if he shall have committed homicide not willingly, but by some accident, the first canon ordered him to do penance seven years, the second canon enjoined five: Thus relates the Holy Doctor in the Confessionale, cap. 3. part 13.

He also found part fourteen, from dist. 4.: Who, heedless out of regard for discipline, kills by striking, let him be deposed, extra de homicid. presbyterorum. And it speaks of priests.

From the Council of Lerida dist. 50. it is enjoined that Clerics, in a besieged city, where there was no necessity, killing an assailant, be deprived for two years both of office and of the communion of the Body of Christ, meanwhile assigned to fastings, prayers, vigils, and almsgiving, and finally be restored to communion; yet so that they be not promoted to the former offices. But if there were an unavoidable necessity of fighting, it would be imputed to them in nothing, dist. 50. Quia te, which, it says, is true as to sin, but as to caution it is a good thing to regret it, as extra de homicidio, cap. 2. in the Roman Penitential.

He who kills a brigand, where he could have seized him without killing, for forty days shall not enter the Church, and clothed in a hair garment, from the foods and drinks which are interdicted, and from bed, and sword, and riding, he shall abstain for those days aforesaid. But on the third and fifth feria, and on the Sabbath, let him use some kind of legumes, herbs, fruits, and little fish with moderate beer, temperately.

If a Priest has done the same, let him not be deposed; nevertheless, as long as he lives, let him do penance.

PART fifteen relates the penance of a matricide can. 33. quaest. 2. from Pope Nicholas. For one year, barred from entering the Church, he shall lie at its doors, praying. After a year he may enter the Church, but not communicate. Three years completed, let him be admitted to communion, but let him not offer the oblations until after the course of seven more years. In all these years let him abstain from meat, nor let him presume to drink wine, except on feast days and Sundays, and from Easter until Pentecost; and wherever he wishes to go, let him be conveyed by no vehicle. Let him fast until vespers three days in the week. If before the course of three years he draws near to death, let him be given the Viaticum. More mildly, however, it commands that things be done, if he show signs of great penitence.

PART sixteen relates the tearful letter of Pope Stephen V to Astulphus the wife-slayer, upon whom he imposes entrance into a monastery under the rigid discipline of the monks. But if he wish to do his penance in the world, it imposes most severe penances: perpetual abstinence from flesh, and wine, and cider; fasting on bread and water; and let him live in vigils and prayers: See him, and in this manner let you wither away.^{1 1} N. Editor's note: the print/OCR reads 'Eum vide, et hoc etimen exhotresces'; 'etimen' and 'exhotresces' are corrupt (perhaps 'et hoc modo exhortare' or 'exaresces' — 'by this means you will win him over / harden him not'); rendered tentatively from context of encouraging penitential perseverance.

PART seventeen sets forth the penances due to a parricide and a filicide, whom Alexander III condemns to perpetual penance, most severe, within the precincts of the Monastery.

PART forty-one relates the penance enjoined on him who killed a priest, which is of 12 years, extra de poenit. et remiss. from the C. Moguntin, and moreover, once convicted, let him lack marriage and the belt of knighthood until death.

But CAPITULUM five of the Confessionale part. 37. sets forth the irregularities and depositions due to Cleric homicides.

He who shall have committed homicide without just cause, is not dispensed with in this. If the cause be of justice, he is not dispensed with in this either, so that he might be promoted; but if he has been promoted, in those orders themselves he can be dispensed with by the Pope, dist. 51. l. 1. Aliquantos. Otherwise, if he shall have committed homicide spontaneously, let him be deposed without hope of recovery and dispensation, dist. 50. Clerici. And C. si quis viduam. If by avoidable necessity, similarly he cannot ascend to the higher orders, but in the orders received he can be dispensed with, although it is not easily dispensed, even by the Pope; if by unavoidable necessity, the counsel is given that a homicide not minister, even in the orders received, dist. 50. De his clericis; yet he is not deposed, but is tolerated in his order by law without dispensation, according to the Letter and Raymundus, extra de homic. cap. 2. and according to Bernardus in the apparatus, upon that chapter extra, Cod. sicut dignum. If he has killed by accident with fault and negligence, he shall cease in perpetuity from the order received, dist. 50. Hi qui arborem, and extra eod. Presbyterum. Yet the Bishop can dispense in the minor orders, and in the subdiaconate already received, extra eod. continebatur. If he be a Deacon or Priest, it belongs to the Pope, that in those orders he either minister or be promoted to them, as in the said C. continetur, and C. Later praesentium. According to Raymundus, however, the Bishop cannot dispense, dist. 50. Miror, which some understand indiscriminately both of the voluntary and of the casual; others, of the voluntary homicide. This is Raymundus. If without fault and negligence, he will be able to minister in the order received, and be promoted to the greater orders, extra eod. Litteris significastis, cap. Dilectus, cap. ex litteris. And some say that he need not be dispensed by them, as appears in the said chapters. But it is safer and more secure that at least the Bishop dispense him by them, dist. 50. Clerico. This the Holy Bonaventure relates.

From what has been said above, you have that it is false, in the time of D. Bonaventure and D. Thomas, that one who kills with the moderamen of blameless self-defense was irregular, as Valentia thinks, quaest. 8. punct. 4., which he thinks is gathered from D. Thomas, quaest. 64. art. 4. ad 3. Sylvester v. homicid. 1. quaest. 9. dict. 4. Matulius l. 1. de irregularitate, cap. 48. num. 9., who cite the chapter de his clericis, 1. dist. 50.*

TRULY D. Bonaventure asserts the opposite above, and so held the Gloss on cap. si quis viduam, v. Defensionis, and on C. sicut dignum, same title.

But that chapter De his clericis gives only counsel, as the Holy Bonaventure notes; the law nevertheless neither deposes nor commands, as Raymundus expounds, and it is found extra de homicid. cap. 2. and according to Bernardus on C. Extra, same place, sicut dignum, and Fagundez also notes it, l. 5. cap. 3. num. 3.*

FINALLY the Council of Elvira can. 50. decrees: If any woman, set afire by fury and zeal, shall have beaten her maidservant with whips, so that within the third day she expire with torment, since it is uncertain whether she killed her willingly or by accident: if willingly, after 7 years; if by accident, after the times of years, lawful penance having been performed, it has pleased that she be admitted to communion. But if within the appointed times she shall have fallen ill, let her receive communion. Thus relates the Holy Bonaventure in the Confessionale cap. 3. part 13.

I. All human and divine laws decree that sorcerers are to be punished. God commands (Lev. 20): "A man, or woman, in whom there is a pythonic or divining spirit, dying let them die: they shall stone them with stones." Likewise (Exod. 22): "Wizards thou shalt not suffer to live." There are many civil laws — Book 9, title 18, law 7, "Nemo" — which decree that all soothsayers are to be punished with death. Canon law establishes the same penalty.

II. Theologians dispute whether an excommunication has already been decreed against sorcerers, or whether it must be freshly imposed. The more common and true opinion holds that all such persons are already, in fact, excommunicated by the law itself — which is proven from the chapter Si quis hariolos, where it is stated: "If anyone shall have observed soothsayers, haruspices, or enchanters, let him be anathema." These words, "let him be anathema," signify a censure already imposed, not one to be imposed. For a law does not merely express a wish; it commands. Wherefore, although the aforesaid words might, taken absolutely, be understood as an expression of mere wish, nevertheless, as employed by the law, they absolutely decree and impose the penalty. There is also cited the Extravagant of John XXII, beginning "Super illius," as related by Eymerich in his Directorium Inquisitorum, in which excommunication is expressly established against all sorcerers. Others reject this constitution, since it is not found in the Bullary. Setting aside, then, this uncertain constitution, I will transcribe the constitution of Gregory XV, issued March 20, 1623, beginning as follows: "But by the will of Almighty God... Of our own accord, therefore, and from certain knowledge, and mature deliberation, and from the plenitude of apostolic power, by the tenor of these presents We decree, ordain, and command: that whensoever anyone shall have entered a pact with the devil, and, having apostatized from the faith, shall have injured one or more persons by sorceries or witchcraft, such that death has followed upon such sorceries or witchcraft — even for a first offense, he is to be handed over to the secular court, to be punished with the penalties owed him. But whoever, having likewise apostatized, and entered a pact with the devil, shall have committed sorcery or witchcraft, though death has not followed, yet illness, divorces, impotence to procreate, or notable harm to animals, crops, or other produce has resulted — he is to be confined for life, or perpetually imprisoned, in the strict custody of the Office of the Inquisition, where it exists, to be provided. Those, moreover, who have true knowledge of such offenders are bound to denounce them to the Bishop, or Inquisitor..." etc.

Since, then, sorcery is joined with the crime of apostasy, it pertains to the tribunal of the Inquisition to inquire into and take notice of such sorcerers — nor is there any doubt about this — since, when sorcerers fall into apostasy, or rush headlong into heresy, they thereby become subject to the excommunication latae sententiae pronounced in the Bull "In Coena Domini," or else, if they do not actually fall into heresy, they at least give rise to a strong suspicion of it. Now the signs of a vehement suspicion of heresy are these: an explicit pact with the demon; the abuse of sacred things; the worship of the devil; his invocation, in order to know things that exceed the natural power of knowing. And when either heresy, or a grave suspicion of it, is attached to sorcery, the judges of such a crime are the Inquisitors of heretical depravity. And since it is scarcely found that a sorcerer is not guilty of heresy, or at least vehemently suspected of it, sorcerers are for this reason to be remanded to the Inquisitors.

I. Under the Old Law, blasphemers were punished with death: "He that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, dying let him die: all the multitude shall stone him, whether he be a native or a stranger" (Lev. 24). Likewise, the common civil law decrees that all blasphemers are to be punished with the ultimate penalty. Although these laws, as regards this ultimate penalty of death, have fallen out of use through disuse, nevertheless kingdoms and principalities generally still punish blasphemers with the gravest penalties. In some places, common blasphemers are first flogged, then have their lips branded with a hot iron, and, for a third offense, their tongues are cut out. Elsewhere they are exposed to public derision. Canon law (ch. Statuimus, on maledictions) commands that blasphemers stand before the doors of the church for seven Sundays while the sacred rites are being performed, and, every Sunday, without their cloak, barefoot, a rope bound about their neck, present themselves to public view; and that on seven Fridays they fast on bread and water. If they neglect to do this, they are to be barred from entering a church, before which they must stand; and, living, are to be barred from entering the church, and after death, deprived of ecclesiastical burial. The Fifth Lateran Council (session 9, ch. Abusum) punishes blasphemous Clerics for a first offense with the forfeiture of a year's income from their benefice; afterward it removes them from the benefice; and finally declares them incapable of holding any ecclesiastical revenues whatsoever. For noble laymen, it imposes a fine of twenty ducats for a first offense, fifty for a second, and finally pronounces them stripped of their nobility. Common people who have blasphemed twice must stand before the doors of the church with a shameful miter placed on their head. If they have become habitual blasphemers, they are condemned to the galleys, or to prison.

II. Question I. Is one who hears a blasphemer bound to denounce him to a judge? Response: The common opinion affirms this; and this is prescribed both by Julius III in his constitution beginning "In multis," and by the Lateran Council, in these words: "Whoever shall hear a blasphemer is bound to rebuke him sharply with words, if this can be done without danger to himself; and he is bound to report, or notify, this to an ecclesiastical or secular judge within three days; and if several hear the same blasphemer together, each individually is bound to accuse him, unless perhaps they all agree that one should perform this office on behalf of all." Several points arise here concerning this denunciation, which I prefer, however, to postpone to another place. This much only I will say here: that fraternal correction is enjoined on everyone, and that it is only to be omitted for a truly urgent reason, or under the pretext of a fleshly prudence. Prudence is indeed necessary; I do not deny this in correcting one's brethren; but I would likewise warn that love of earthly things, worldly regard, and considerations of convenience must not be allowed to disguise themselves as Christian prudence. If you hear a blasphemer overcome by anger, correct him once his anger has subsided. Sometimes correction ought to be made immediately, depending on the character of the one blaspheming. If the blasphemies are heretical, they must be denounced to the legitimate judge, in accordance with the pontifical precepts on this matter. The judges of heresy are either the Inquisitors, or the Bishops. But more on this in its proper place.

III. Question II. How ought a confessor to conduct himself with blasphemers? Response: If the blasphemies are simple, the confessor can absolve the penitent of them, since such simple blasphemies are commonly not reserved. The Bishop, however, may reserve even these simple blasphemies, and once such a reservation is made, an ordinary confessor cannot grant absolution.

IV. Blasphemy is sometimes external and heretical in form, insofar as the words uttered smack of heresy; yet the blasphemer harbored no internal error in his mind while blurting them out. In this case, the common opinion teaches that a regular confessor can absolve the penitent in the internal forum, just as he can absolve from sortilege, magic, or sorcery — provided there was no error in the mind. On this matter, see the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 13, punct. 10, n. 131). But more on this in the treatise on penance.

V. Question III. What penance ought a confessor to impose on penitent blasphemers? Response: The Lateran Council decreed that blasphemers are not to be absolved except with a most rigorous penance imposed by confessors. These are the Council's own words (session 9): "To be abolished. In the forum of penance, let no one guilty of blasphemy be absolved, except with a most rigorous penance imposed at the severe confessor's discretion." More recent Probabilist authors answer that this decree is not received in practice. And this is true in a sense. For if blasphemers were subjected to the gravest penalties, as the Council commands, and as the equity of judgment demands, God's holy name would not be blasphemed so frequently. But because not a few confessors absolve false penitents of the crime of blasphemy, as of other crimes, with only a light penance imposed, crimes of every kind run rampant, and flood the whole earth. But it is one thing to say that this decree is not received in practice, or that casuists and confessors, in fact, rarely impose the most severe penances on blasphemers as its prescription requires; it is quite another to say that the decree itself has become obsolete. This latter claim we deny, against Leander (disp. 5, q. 16), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 13, punct. 10, n. 131), Castropalao (disp. 2, punct. 1, §3, n. 2), Sánchez (Bk. II, On the Decalogue, ch. 32, n. 44), and many others. If you ask them why this decree has no force, they answer only that it is not received in practice. This is their sole reason — which, if it held good, would mean the death and burial of every law that transgressors fail to receive in use, or execution. Ought not satisfaction to God be the graver, the graver the offense? Does not the Council of Trent command that penances be imposed proportionate to the gravity of the crime? Since blasphemy is a most grave crime, why should the gravest penances, which the Council commands, not be imposed on blasphemers? Both divine and natural law prescribe this equality of proportion. See, Christian reader, where the leniency of casuists tends! They make both the prescription itself, and the divine and natural laws themselves, subject to disuse. Away with so cruel a kindness! Let confessors, then, take care not to grant absolution without subjecting penitent blasphemers to worthy penances.

VI. Question IV. Are those bound by a habit of blaspheming obliged to abstain from confession beforehand, until freed from the habit? Response: Leander affirms, according to his custom (disp. 5, q. 17), that it is more probable, in his own view, that blasphemers ought to be absolved even if they have not amended, provided they truly grieve for their sins — even if often admonished, they have not reformed; and for this opinion of his he cites Sánchez, Castropalao, Hurtado, Trullench, and others. How lax this opinion is, everyone can see. They believe they escape every mark of laxity by saying, "provided they truly grieve for the blasphemies committed." But on what basis can you presume that a penitent is affected by sincere sorrow, if, having repeatedly spurned admonition, he has in no way turned to a better way of life, and shown no sign at all of amendment? Let the confessor, then, seriously consider with what zeal, effort, and diligence blasphemers have striven to restrain their tongue. Let him weigh whether they have put into practice the remedies prescribed for their amendment by other confessors. If he perceives progress, if he discerns a real effort at amendment in the penitent, he may absolve him. If not, let him defer absolution, and prescribe remedies more surely by which the penitent may abstain from blaspheming. An inveterate custom of long standing cannot be entirely rooted out all at once. It must, then, be broken and interrupted little by little, until, with the utmost diligence applied, it is entirely uprooted. Let him prescribe an alms to be given at once, if the penitent's means allow, as often as he happens to blaspheme; or let him impose the marking of so many crosses with the tongue on the bare ground, or some similar or harsher penance. If penitents truly grieve by this method, they will quickly amend themselves; and within a week or two, each will find himself reformed. The opinion of Leander and others cited above has been proscribed by Innocent XI, in this proposition: "To one who has a habit of sinning against the law of God, of nature, or of the Church, even though no hope of amendment appears, absolution is neither to be denied nor deferred, provided he says with his mouth that he intends to amend." Our younger casuists will, no doubt, clamor as usual for us to consult the theologians they cite, or will claim that similar teachings are found in other theologians too (which, if true, is only worse), or that their opinions have been reported without due fidelity. This is a rather stale objection, which we have several times, quite rightly, dismissed as ridiculous.

VII. But more on this when we come to discuss proximate occasion [of sin]. For now I will indicate what Comitoli teaches (Bk. IV, ch. 9, q. 9). He was accustomed to require his penitents, habituated to blasphemies against God and the Blessed Virgin, to recite the seven penitential psalms and the litanies with prayers, thirty, forty, or fifty times more or less, on bended and bare knees, touching the ground. He likewise required them to beg pardon of God, the Blessed Virgin, and the Saints ten times, on their knees; to mark a cross with the tongue on the ground ten times each day; and to strike their breast ten times. Confessors may impose these and similar penances on blasphemers, so as to free them from the habit of blaspheming. If they are wealthy, let confessors order them to give twenty solidi in alms for each blasphemy or perjury. If poor, let them oblige them to trace twenty crosses on the ground with the tongue, and to recite as many prayers. By these or similar means, some remedy will be found against this most wicked vice of blasphemy.

I. QUESTION I. What is a censure, and of how many kinds is it? ANSWER. It is an ecclesiastical medicinal penalty of the exterior forum, by which a baptized believer is deprived of the use of certain spiritual goods, that he may depart from contumacy. It is called a penalty, because it supposes a fault. Medicinal, because it wills amendment. Of the exterior forum, because he who inflicts it must be endowed with jurisdiction. It deprives of the use of certain spiritual goods, which are proper to Christians. The very conversation with the faithful of which excommunication deprives one is a certain spiritual good.

II. A censure is distributed into three species: excommunication, suspension, and interdict. Irregularity from a delict, deposition, and degradation are not medicinal penalties. Cessation from divine offices is not a censure, but a precept.

III. One censure is from man, another from law. All indeed are from man; but when superiors by force of a law or statute inflict a censure, it is called a censure from law. Wherefore the Pontiffs alone and oecumenical Councils can pass censures from law in the universal Church, and a bishop in his own diocese. Censures from man all superiors who have jurisdiction in the exterior forum can inflict. This censure, if it be not contracted, vanishes when the superior dies; if it be contracted, it lasts even when the superior is dead, until absolution be obtained. A censure passed from law lasts as the law lasts. Another censure is called general, passed against all who, for example, steal in such a place; another particular, passed against this or that person. Another is of sentence passed, which by the very deed binds the guilty before the judge's sentence. Another of sentence to be passed, which is incurred only after the judge's sentence. It is reputed of sentence passed when it is said by that very deed, straightway, forthwith, immediately. It is judged of sentence to be passed when the superior says We command under penalty of excommunication or interdict, or he shall be excommunicated, he shall be suspended. In doubt it is to be judged that the censure is of sentence to be passed, not of sentence passed. When it is said let him be anathema, or let him be excommunicated, the censure is of sentence passed.

IV. QUESTION II. Who by ordinary right can pass censures? ANSWER. It is a truth of faith that the Church can pass censures. In the first place, the Supreme Pontiff by ordinary right has power in the universal Church of passing censures. Similarly general Councils in the universal Church, provincial ones in the province, diocesan ones in the diocese, enjoy the same power; and likewise Patriarchs, Archbishops, and Bishops; Cardinals in their own Churches can pass censures; likewise Generals, Provincials, Rectors, Provosts, Priors, and Guardians of Regulars in respect of their own subjects; and the Chapter of a cathedral Church, the See being vacant.

V. This power can be delegated by ordinary right even to a cleric, and not only to a priest, provided the cleric be not married. This power delegated by the Supreme Pontiff can be subdelegated by force of a privilege granted by the Apostolic See to papal delegates. No one can excommunicate himself, just as neither can he pass sentence in his own cause. He who inflicts censures is required to be baptized, a cleric not married, marked at least with the first tonsure.

VI. The mode of passing censures has no determinate formula or precise words; but it is enough to employ those which suffice for expressing the judge's will. But tribunals have their own prescribed formulas. An admonition ought to precede a censure, because a censure is not passed save against the contumacious. But he is not called contumacious who was not first admonished. And this admonition must needs be canonical, even if the delict be notorious. This admonition ought to be threefold, or one which is equivalent to three. Then a threefold admonition precedes when the guilty party is thrice admonished at a congruous time, the space of two or more days flowing between. One is equivalent to three when the judge assigns a congruous time for three, for instance of six or ten days. If there be danger in delay, within the same day, nay within a few hours, three intervals being always assigned for the threefold admonition, he can pass the censure. This admonition must needs be made in writing or before witnesses. If a censure is to be passed against several, it is enough that it be made in the church before the people. If an interdict is to be passed against a community, not individuals but only those are to be admonished whose fault is the cause of the interdict. If the delinquent study to decline the admonition, it suffices that the admonition be made either in the church or at his house. Authors assert no censure valid unless a threefold admonition, or one equivalent to three, precede.

VII. On festal days censures ought not to be passed; they are nevertheless valid, though unlawful, even when passed on these days. Those who have a limited territory cannot pass censures outside it. When nevertheless the cognizance of the cause has been made in their own territory, or when the contumacy is so notorious that it needs no discussion, and a canonical admonition has preceded, a censure can validly be passed by a bishop even dwelling in another's territory. When a bishop has been unjustly expelled from his own diocese, he can in places nearer to it exercise contentious jurisdiction over his own subjects, licence having been sought from the Ordinary, although not obtained, as is had in the Clementine Quamvis on the competent forum. A bishop can also inflict censures upon a subject delinquent in his own territory, even if he has passed to another territory: otherwise delicts would remain unpunished, and ecclesiastical discipline would be frustrated, since a subject could not be punished by another bishop. But a bishop cannot punish with censures a subject sinning in another's territory. If nevertheless he return to his own diocese, and there be convicted by the injured party of a delict committed in another's territory, he can be compelled by censures by the bishop to repair the injured party. Another's subject delinquent in his own diocese a bishop can punish, unless he depart before the cause be known.

I. QUESTION I. Whether for the passing of a censure a proper fault and contumacy be required? ANSWER. A censure is an ecclesiastical penalty; therefore it supposes a fault against the precepts of the Church. Wherefore delicts against natural or divine right, unless they be at the same time forbidden by the Church, do not lie subject to censures. Because censures are passed for the repressing of contumacy against the Church. Hence a censure cannot be inflicted for a sin altogether past or present, unless it have a successive course, by force of which someone can be called contumacious. No one can be bound with censures for another's fault. A general interdict does not touch the innocent immediately, save inasmuch as they have a connexion with the guilty.

II. The lesser excommunication can be passed for a venial fault, and in fact is inflicted for civil communication with an excommunicate to be shunned, which unless it be done in contempt, or in the crime for which the censure has been contracted, or in sacred matters, does not exceed a light fault. But the greater excommunication, suspension, and interdict, since they are most grave penalties, cannot be inflicted save for a mortal fault. A fault can be light in itself, but grave in order to the end. It is the part of superiors to judge whether such an action, the circumstances being regarded, be grave in respect of the end. Wherefore when superiors forbid something by an express precept, a censure being added, the transgression is mortal, and the censure is incurred. For an internal act a censure cannot be passed. Wherefore for a merely internal heresy excommunication cannot be passed, unless it be manifested by an external sign; but it suffices that a man alone in his chamber manifest it, because then it is external, though occult. On the contrary, if anyone exercise an external act of heresy or of idolatry without an interior act, he does not incur excommunication in the interior forum; although in the exterior forum he would be held as excommunicated, if it became known. When an internal act is connected with an external action, as attention of mind with vocal prayer, then he who should omit the internal act, although he posited the external, would be obnoxious to the censure: since although the Church lacks direct power over interior acts, yet while she commands external ones, she indirectly enjoins the internal which are necessarily conjoined with the external. By this reason the Church punishes interior simony connected with an exterior largess; she excommunicates Inquisitors who out of hatred or love of gain do or omit anything, provided this hatred or love break forth into external acts. The exterior sin on account of which a censure is inflicted ought in its own kind to be consummated: as if stuprum be forbidden under a censure, consummated copulation is understood, unless the law express the attempt also.

III. QUESTION II. Whether a censure passed against the executors of a crime comprehends also those commanding and counselling? ANSWER. The common opinion denies that those commanding and counselling are comprehended, unless in some clause they be expressly or implicitly included, because in merely penal matters odious things are to be restricted. When a censure is passed against those counselling or commanding homicide, even if the man be prepared for the homicide, those who counsel or command incur the censure, whatever some say to the contrary.

IV. What if the counsellor revoke his counsel, and the one commanding his mandate, before the execution of the work? Some distinguish between a counsellor and a mandatary. Others reject this distinction in this business. But they dispute whether they incur the censure when the revocation becomes known to the mandatary or counsellor, made with a sincere mind, not languid but efficacious and valid, by the one commanding and counselling. The first opinion denies it. The other affirms it; and the arguments of this second opinion seem the more urgent. What if the revocation, efficacious and validly made, do not become known to the mandatary or counsellor? That even then the revokers incur the censure the Salmanticenses with very many others defend. But this opinion is false.

V. QUESTION III. What conditions are required that anyone can be entangled in censures? ANSWER. Several. 1. That he be a wayfarer; 2. That he be a subject; 3. That he be baptized; 4. That he be endowed with reason; 5. That he be a determinate person. This last condition is understood of excommunication, which cannot be passed against a community, city, college, and so forth, as is gathered from chapter Romana on sentences of excommunication, in the Sixth. One person can be struck with several censures, as all teach. He who is excommunicated can be interdicted and suspended. A man can be excommunicated by diverse judges for the same delict — namely by the bishop of origin, of domicile, and by the Pontiff. In practice nevertheless no guilty party is excommunicated for one delict save by a single excommunication.

VI. Authors dispute whether censures are multiplied as often as transgressions against a precept to which a censure is annexed are repeated. And they commonly answer that if the transgressions be formally interrupted — as if someone today should strike a cleric, and after a week again strike the same or another cleric — the censure would be multiplied according to the formal multiplication of the transgressions. When one man strikes three clerics at once, just as he perpetrates three crimes, so he incurs a threefold penalty of censure, as seems the more probable.

VII. QUESTION IV. What causes excuse from censures? ANSWER. Several. 1. Necessity of acting against a precept, just as it excuses from sin, so it excuses from a censure. An excommunication has been passed against those labouring on a feast day. That necessity which renders the work lawful on such a day likewise exempts from the censure. 2. The nullity of the censure; 3. The innocence of the man; 4. Ignorance; 5. Impotence; 6. Fear; 7. The injustice of the cause.

VIII. Ignorance, as has been said elsewhere, is of one kind of right, of another of fact, of another of penalty. One is invincible, another vincible; another gross, affected, or supine. He labours under ignorance of right who is ignorant of a law forbidding or commanding. He labours under ignorance of fact who is ignorant that he whom he beats is a cleric. Ignorance of penalty is when someone is ignorant that a penalty has been appended to such a crime. You know that the beating of a cleric is forbidden; you know that he whom you beat is a cleric; but you know not that a penalty has been appended to this unlawful beating of a cleric. That is invincible which cannot be overcome by human industry; and vincible which can be overcome.

IX. Fr. Viva, question 1 on censures, article 6, no. 7, with the Probabilists distinguishes vincible ignorance into inculpable and culpable. He calls culpably vincible that which a man can overcome, and believes himself bound to employ the diligence by which he may overcome it and acquire the knowledge of the truth. He calls inculpably vincible that which a man can overcome, diligence being employed, but believes himself not bound to employ this diligence, that he may attain the truth. This vincible ignorance void of malice, new and unheard-of, burst into the light after the birthdays of Probabilism, which in Vol. II of the Apparatus I have utterly routed. This vincible ignorance, which is always noxious, is of one kind called affected, when a man studiously wills to be ignorant of what he is bound to know. Another is gross, when from a certain torpor a man neglects the inquiry into truth. Another is called supine, when a man, distracted by various businesses, omits to investigate what he is bound to know. Lastly another is antecedent, which is the cause of the act. Another is concomitant, which is not the cause of the act, but without it the act would be done — as when someone burns so with hatred against a man that, killing him who is truly a cleric but is in fact unknown by him to be so, he would kill the same if he did know it.

X. Ignorance truly invincible, whether of right or of fact, just as it excuses from fault, so it exempts from censure. Ignorance venially vincible excuses from a censure for the incurring of which a mortal fault is required. Ignorance nevertheless is not presumed in the exterior forum unless it be proved, as is said in chapter Ignorantia on the rules of law in the Sixth. Ignorance of fact excuses, but not of law. He who knows that homicide is forbidden by divine right, but is invincibly ignorant of the ecclesiastical law forbidding it under a censure, does not according to very many incur the censure, although he sin against natural and divine right: because, they say, for the contracting of a censure contumacy is necessary, which an admonition ought to precede. For the penalty of censure differs from those penalties passed either by the civil forum or by the ecclesiastical forum, which are contracted even if they be ignored, when the law is known. Wherefore a homicide, from whom the law forbidding it is not hidden, is obnoxious to capital punishment even if he be ignorant of this penalty. Similarly he who knows the ecclesiastical law forbidding such an act would incur irregularity from a delict, although he were ignorant of such a penalty. On the contrary, if he were invincibly ignorant of the ecclesiastical law, just as he would be immune from fault, so he would be free from irregularity from a delict.

XI. Very many and grave theologians teach that invincible ignorance of a censure alone, passed by a universal law of the Church or a universal canon, does not excuse from incurring it him who knows the same law. Fr. Antoine turns over this question at large. I settle the matter in few words. The hypothesis being admitted that the ignorance of the censure were utterly invincible, it would not be contracted, although passed by a universal law or canon. But because it does not so easily happen that ignorance of a censure annexed to a universal law be truly invincible, therefore transgressors of the same law are not easily to be judged exempt from it. Who would judge that man immune from a censure who should commit a duel, knowing it to be forbidden by the Church, because he is ignorant that a censure has been annexed to this prohibition?

XII. When in a law it is said, he who shall knowingly do this, he who shall presume to do it, he who shall rashly do it, then by reason of clauses of this kind authors commonly teach that vincible ignorance excuses from the censure: because by such clauses the law requires a greater knowledge than other laws destitute of these clauses. The Salmanticenses with others contend that even affected ignorance itself excuses from the censure. But this opinion to me is false, because affected ignorance is equivalent to knowledge.

XIII. Grave fear falling upon a constant man excuses from a censure, even from a sin forbidden only by ecclesiastical right. If the thing forbidden be of divine right, under an ecclesiastical censure, it does not excuse from the sin, but from the censure only. He who, struck by grave fear, should kill a cleric, would sin against natural and divine right, but would not incur the censure.

XIV. He who doubts whether a judge has passed a sentence of censure or not, ought to judge that it has not been passed, because in merely penal matters the milder part is to be embraced. He who is certain that a censure has been passed, whether from law or from man, but doubts whether he has contracted it, ought to bear himself as if he were entangled in the censure, until either he lay aside the doubt, or be absolved from the censure.

XV. An innocent man who in the exterior forum is excommunicated according to what is alleged and proved is before God not excommunicated. But in the presence of those who are conscious of the excommunication, if they be uncertain of his innocence, he ought to bear himself as entangled in the censure: because a judge's sentence, valid and lawful although in fact unjust, is to be obeyed, both for the avoiding of scandal and in obedience to the supreme authority. Wherefore it is the more probable that this innocent man ought to abstain from the reception and from the administration of his own Order, even privately, and from external communication with the faithful: whence Clement XI by right disapproved theses 90, 91, and 92 of Paschasius Quesnel.

I. QUESTION I. Whether one entangled in a censure is bound under mortal sin to seek and solicit absolution as soon as he can? ANSWER. The affirmative opinion is common. The Salmanticenses, tract 10, chapter 1, point 1, no. 1, say: Any delay is mortal of its own kind, unless it be excused by smallness of matter or from other heads. With both thumbs I subscribe to this doctrine; whence it is inferred how false is the opinion concerning the delay of a sinner's conversion to God. Any delay in procuring absolution from an ecclesiastical censure, which deprives one of the use of certain spiritual goods, is of its own kind a mortal sin; and shall the delay of seeking absolution from a mortal sin, which deprives one of eternal life, be immune from mortal fault? I fear lest in respect of some that axiom be true: These men amplify ecclesiastical right, and cut short the Decalogue. Segregation from God, from the fellowship of the Angels, destination to dwell with devils — because it is remote from the senses — does not urge, does not prick, as does segregation from external and visible communication with the faithful.

II. QUESTION II. Of how many kinds is absolution from a censure? ANSWER. One is absolute, by which the guilty party is absolutely loosed from the bond. Another conditioned, which depends upon a condition either past or present, as if thou hast satisfied the party, if thou shalt satisfy. Another absolution is called for caution, as when someone doubts that he is affected by a censure; which absolution can be imparted by any confessor whatsoever, a promise being made of furnishing satisfaction to the party, or of approaching the superior when the truth is discovered. Others are called with relapse, or with the penalty of falling back into the same censure, unless he who is absolved shall have performed what is imposed. Another is from one determinate effect, the rest being left, as when the Pontiff absolves someone and renders him fit for obtaining a benefice or another privilege. Without one of these absolutions a censure does not cease, neither by the death of the Superior passing it, nor by change of territory, nor by the death of the excommunicate: for the contrary opinion has been condemned by Alexander VII, no. 4: As regards the forum of conscience, the guilty party being corrected and his contumacy ceasing, the censure ceases.

III. In absolution from a censure the formulas prescribed in the Rituals are to be observed. The solemnity to be observed in absolutions of this kind is had in chapter Per tuas on sentences of excommunication. The conditions nevertheless there prescribed are not today observed. Theologians dispute whether absolution be valid, the injured party not being satisfied with a real or pledged satisfaction. Many affirm it; but they say that the one absolving sins mortally and is obnoxious to restitution. When in a bull of Jubilee, or in another privilege, a faculty is granted of absolving from censures with this clause, the party being satisfied, otherwise let the absolution not hold, the absolution is not valid, the condition not being fulfilled, unless the one to be absolved be impotent to satisfy.