Contumely

662. Notions. 1. Insult (Beschimpfung) is the unjust injury to another's honor which is inflicted on a person in some way present. As honor consists in an external act by which one signifies esteem toward another, so insult consists in an external act (by word or deed) by which one signifies contempt toward another on account of some vice, whether true or fictitious.

a. Therefore it differs from detraction in object: for it injures honor, not reputation; and in mode: for it is not committed secretly and against an absent person after the manner of theft, but openly against one present after the manner of robbery.

b. As honor is greater than the good of reputation, since it includes reputation, so also insult is more grave than detraction if, together with honor, as often happens, reputation also is injured. But if honor alone is injured, it is a lighter sin than detraction, just as honor separated from reputation is a lesser good than reputation: for a man values reputation without honor more highly than honor without reputation.¹

c. Someone can be present either physically or morally (through something by which he is represented, for example an image or a legate): for it suffices for insult that the other know or at least be able to know that he has been dishonored. Something can also be committed against the honor of someone absent, yet with others hearing or looking on, as if abusive words and reproaches are cast against someone in conversation with others or in public sheets. Whether these are properly so-called insults can be disputed; nevertheless they are commonly held as insults.

2. Insult can be inflicted positively, that is, by words or deeds which contain contempt; for there are certain words and deeds which, from the common use of men, signify contempt, and by these insult can be inflicted. It can also be inflicted negatively, or by omission of an act, namely when the omission of due honor, for example of a greeting, involves contempt; that omission, by reason of this contempt, constitutes insult.

According to the diverse manner in which insult is inflicted there are distinguished: mockery, if someone is treated with contempt by words and laughter; derision, if by ridiculous gestures; and reproach and reviling, if someone is contemned by having a vice or defect cast against him.

¹ Cf. Lugo, disp. 14, n. 9.

663. Moral and specific malice. 1. Insult is a sin from its kind mortal against justice: Whoever shall say to his brother, Fool, shall be liable to the fire of Gehenna.¹ And indeed it injures the neighbor in the good of honor, which according to the common estimation of men is preferred to goods of fortune; but to violate goods of fortune in a grave matter is a grave sin. It is against justice: for anyone has the right not to be contemned, but that the honor due according to his condition be shown to him.

In order that a grave sin of insult be committed, it is not necessary that insulting words be uttered with the intention of dishonoring another; but it suffices that in themselves or by reason of the injured person they be gravely insulting and be uttered with full advertence to this thing.

2. All insults, although some are more grave than others, are of the same moral species: for the same essential malice is found in all, namely injury to honor, just as all thefts, although diverse, injure goods of fortune. Therefore for the integrity of confession it is not required that one declare how he injured honor (whether by words or deeds and by what abusive words).

¹ Matt. 5:22.

664. Gravity of matter. When the neighbor suffers a notable injury of honor, so that insult is a grave sin, must be taken from the prudent consideration of the one injuring, of the one injured, and of the words or deeds.

a. Hence Lacroix rightly teaches that abusive words by which women and men of the lowest populace call themselves harlots, adulteresses, rogues, commonly are not grave sins, because those saying such things do not truly think so, and those hearing do not believe words of this kind uttered in the heat of passion.¹ Likewise parents are excused from mortal sin who call their children by insulting names (stupid, donkeys), because for the same reason they are not judged gravely to injure the honor of the children. Indeed, if they do this for the sake of correction, they commit no sin, although it would be better to abstain from insulting words even in corrections.

b. Insulting words uttered against someone before others indeed, but with the person himself absent, are scarcely grave sins, unless the one uttering the insult wills that the offended person learn the matter, or foresees that the matter will be communicated to him.

c. Joking mockery concerning a slight defect of another, so that he is suffused with a little blush, can happen without sin if it is done without contempt and without the anger or sadness of the other; indeed it is an act of the virtue of eutrapelia if it is done among friends for honorable recreation. But he sins against charity who, in jesting, casts a small fault against another while foreseeing that the latter will bear this thing badly: for charity and prudence demand that another's anger or sadness be avoided in jokes.² Nevertheless the one jesting does not sin gravely, even if he knows that the other takes a light joke gravely, because the cause of this grave embarrassment is not the mockery of the one jesting, which is light in itself, but the foolishness of the other.

¹ L. 3, pr. 2, n. 1224.

² Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 72, a. 2, ad 1.

665. On restitution of honor. 1. He who inflicted an insult on another is bound to return the honor taken away and to repair the damages which followed from it and were foreseen at least confusedly: for he who by injury caused damage to another is bound to repair it.

That restitution of honor is required which, by reason of the manner in which the insult was inflicted and by reason of the condition of the person offended, is judged sufficient for removing the injury or for signifying true esteem. Hence he who inflicted an insult publicly must restore publicly, that is, before those who were witnesses of the insult, or at least in such a way that the reparation can come to their knowledge. He who injured honor secretly must likewise repair the injury, but it suffices that this be done secretly. Satisfaction, however, can always be made through another who asks pardon in the name of the offender.

2. The mode of repairing injured honor which certainly suffices is that which, by reason of the condition of the offended person, signifies true esteem for him; therefore it is clear that one mode must be chosen in order that satisfaction be shown to a superior, and another in order that it be shown to an equal or a subject.

a. Various modes of repairing injured honor, which are listed by authors, are: to greet in a friendly way or first, to speak kindly, to visit at home, to invite to table, to drink to someone, to ask pardon, to fall upon the knees. Besides, as Lessius wisely notes, by the petition of pardon any injury, even one inflicted on a most noble man, is sufficiently repaired; if he is not content with this satisfaction, he can be referred to the judge.¹

b. The offender is excused from restitution: a. if he rightly supposes that the offended person condones restitution; b. if he has been punished by the judge on account of the injury inflicted; c. if the offended person has taken vengeance; d. if the offender and the offended person mutually inflicted equal abusive words on one another.

Whether there is an obligation of asking pardon in order that honor be repaired.

a. Subjects and equals must ask pardon if the injured person, affected by grave insult, demands it and is unwilling to accept another satisfaction; but if the injured person does not demand it, subjects and equals can also satisfy in another way.

b. Superiors are never obliged to ask pardon from a subject who has suffered injury, as a master from a servant, a prelate from a religious, a teacher or superior from pupils: for the injured honor is abundantly repaired by some sign of benevolence.

3. He who has been affected by insult must patiently tolerate it without hatred and without zeal for vengeance. He can indeed, and sometimes even must, demand satisfaction and a just penalty; yet he must be so disposed that, if need be, he sustain the injury without any reparation, and even do good to his enemy.²

¹ Lessius, l. 2, c. 11, n. 145.

² Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 72, a. 3.

The daughters of anger, or the sins which spring from the same root, are indignation and the swelling of passion, blasphemy, imprecation, quarrelling, and contumely; fighting, sedition, striking, and wounding; which are for the most part treated of in other chapters, or present no difficulty.

Contumely is an insulting word or gesture said or done in order to dishonour our neighbour. It is against charity, and of itself is a mortal sin except when the matter is trivial. A superior may, however, with moderation and caution treat a subject contumeliously, not in order to dishonour him, but to correct or humble him. Chaffing another about his foibles for the sake of recreation is not sinful unless it goes too far and provokes to anger or cuts too deep.

Our neighbour has a right not only to his good name but also to the honour or the external marks of our esteem, befitting his qualities and position. The Apostle exhorts us to “love one another with the charity of brotherhood, with honour preventing one another,’’¹ and in another place he bids us render honour to whom honour is due.² The sin of contumely is committed by any act or word which is contrary to the honour which we are bound to show our neighbour. It may be committed by neglecting to show him the honour which is his due, or by saying or doing something in his presence which expresses our contempt of him.

¹ Rom. xii 10.

² Rom. xiii 7.

Contumely of itself is a grave sin against justice and charity, for it injures a man in what he values more than wealth, and as a rule an insult wounds the reputation, as well as the feelings of him who is insulted. Our Lord’s words show how grievous a sin is committed by treating another with contumely: “‘ Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council. And whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire.”¹ Like most sins against justice and charity, contumely may be only a venial sin, for levity of matter, and chaff or banter, which is not intended to wound or irritate another, is of course harmless provided that it keeps within due bounds.

¹ Matt. v 22.

Inasmuch as contumely violates justice, proper satisfaction must be made for insults. The kind and manner of making satisfaction will depend much on the relative condition of the parties. Sometimes the person injured may be reasonably presumed not to wish the memory of the insult to be revived by formal apologies, and the danger of again arousing bitter and angry feelings may also excuse one from open acts of satisfaction.

(St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 72, 75, 105; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, book III, nn. 966, 984-990; Homo Apostolicus, tract 11, nn. 3-6.)

Honor is a testimony concerning someone's excellence, in his presence (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 103, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, III, 966). It is said:

1. Testimony; namely, either through words, or through actions, for example genuflection, etc., or through honorific things, for example through the erection of a statue, etc.

2. Concerning excellence, i.e. concerning superiority in some perfection, whether with respect to the one honoring, or with respect to others (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 103, a. 2). Moreover, "in anyone there is found something from which someone can reckon him superior, according to that saying in Philippians 2: in humility, considering others superior; and according to this also all ought to anticipate one another with honor" (St. Thomas, loc. cit., ad 3).

3. In his presence; these things will be clearer from the notion of the opposite, or insult, about which something must now be said.

I. Notion. Insult is an undue dishonoring of someone, or an undue testimony concerning someone's baseness, in his presence. It is said:

1. Undue; i.e. one which is made without a just cause.

2. Testimony; this can be made both by words and by deeds, insofar as they are signs or have the force of signifying words (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 72, a. 1), as if you strike someone with a slap, thereby signifying that he is base.

3. Concerning someone's baseness, or concerning this, that someone is unworthy of honor and worthy of contempt.

4. In his presence. "The insulting person," says St. Thomas, "speaks to a man to his face; whence if someone speaks badly about another before many people, with him absent, it is detraction; but if with him alone present, it is insult (II-II, q. 73, a. 1, ad 2); if with others present together with him, it is detraction and insult." But it suffices that someone be present through a representative; likewise, that someone should write injurious things to another.

Insult differs from that disordering which is called negative insult, and which consists in this, that someone merely omits to furnish due honor; this is opposed to observance. But the omission of due honor accidentally rather often contains true insult, namely if, considering the circumstances, it involves a signification of contempt, as if someone, meeting several equal superiors, shows honor only to one.

II. Morality. 1. Insult is a grave sin from its kind, and indeed against justice. It is said to be grave from its kind; this is clear both from Sacred Scripture¹ and from the fact that it contains a sin of injustice, which is grave from its kind (n. 978). It is opposed to justice; for everyone has the right that another not illegitimately signify to him that he is unworthy of honor and worthy of contempt (St. Alphonsus, III, 966).

The gravity of matter depends: 1° on the matter considered in itself, with attention both to the native signification of the words and to the affection from which they proceed, since this can temper the signification not a little. "Signification," says Aquinas, "proceeds from the interior affection; and therefore in sins of words it seems especially to be considered from what affection someone utters the words" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 72, a. 2). The gravity of matter depends 2° on the condition of the person injuring and the person injured; 3° on the common judgment of men in that region concerning the injury. Hence, for example, men of the lowest condition, who affect one another with insults, ordinarily do not sin gravely (St. Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, n. 37).

2. The diverse modes by which insult is inflicted, as such, seem to be of the same species, because, insofar as they are injurious to honor, they are not morally diverse, but differ only according to more and less.

3. The mere omission of due honor, or negative insult, which I have added because of the affinity of the matter, is opposed to observance, as we have already noted, and per se and for the most part is venial; yet accidentally, as was likewise noted, it rather often is equivalent to true insult.

Corollary I. "Since the sin of abusive speech or insult depends on the mind of the one speaking, it can happen that it is a venial sin, if it is a slight abusive speech, not greatly dishonoring the man, and is uttered from some levity of mind or from slight anger, without a firm purpose of dishonoring someone; for example, when someone intends to sadden someone slightly through a word of this sort" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 72, a. 2, ad 3).

Corollary II. "Just as it is lawful to strike someone, or to damage him in his things, for the sake of discipline, so also for the sake of discipline someone can say some abusive word to another whom he ought to correct; and in this way the Lord called the disciples fools, and the Apostle called the Galatians senseless. Yet, as Augustine says in book 2 On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount (ch. 19), 'rebukes are to be employed rarely and from great necessity'" (St. Thomas, loc. cit., ad 2).

Corollary III. "To eutrapelia it pertains to say some slight abusive speech, not for the dishonoring or saddening of him against whom it is said, but rather for the sake of delight and jest; and this can be without sin, if due circumstances are observed" (St. Thomas, loc. cit., ad 1).

¹ Matt. V, 22; Rom. I, 30.

III. Restitution on account of insult. Insult always injures the honor of him against whom it is inflicted. Besides, if it is inflicted before others or afterwards becomes known to others, it can also have other connected damages, namely both a diminution of good estimation and the omission of due honor on the part of others. Now:

1. The insulting person is held to furnish satisfaction for the injured honor; but the damages perhaps connected with the insult, and at least confusedly foreseen, he is held to repair or avert.

2. With respect to the mode of making satisfaction and restoring, there is required such a mode as, considering the circumstances of the person injured and the person injuring, the gravity of the injury, the custom of the place, etc., suffices for repairing honor (St. Alphonsus, III, 986). Hence:

a) If the one dishonoring was a superior, it will suffice if he honorably greets the dishonored person, invites him home, shows benevolence, etc. The contrary holds if he was an equal or inferior; then greater satisfaction is required, namely that he anticipate him in greeting, yield place, ask pardon. This mode indeed is more apt for compensating insult. Besides, such a request for pardon is not necessary except when satisfaction cannot be made otherwise; hence a prelate is not held to ask pardon from a subject, a master from a servant, or a husband from a wife (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

b) If honor has been taken away publicly through insult, it must also be restored publicly before those who were present at the dishonoring, or at least in a mode by which the satisfaction can easily come to their knowledge (St. Alphonsus, III, 984). But if the dishonored person is judged rather to refuse than to desire that public satisfaction, lest the memory of the injury received return among others, or lest he himself be affected with more shame, another way of making satisfaction should be sought, for example by honoring the dishonored person with extraordinary actions (St. Alphonsus, III, 988).

3. The same things which excuse from restitution of reputation exempt from restitution of honor (n. 1074). Moreover, many times it will happen to be expedient that the confessor omit warning a penitent existing in good faith, who has dishonored another, about furnishing satisfaction, for example: 1° if he foresees that the warning will not be profitable; for experience establishes that penitents easily promise such satisfactions, but with difficulty actually fulfill them, on account of the shame which they afterwards feel or apprehend in this; 2° if there is danger lest, in the act of satisfaction, hatreds between the offended person and the offender be renewed (St. Alphonsus, III, 988).

Contumely.—Contumely is unjust dishonor shown to a person in his presence.

(a) It is unjust, and hence those are not guilty of contumely who speak words that are not honorable to persons deserving of reproof (e.g., in Luke, xxiv. 25, Our Lord calls the two disciples “foolish and slow of heart”; in Gal., iii. 1, St. Paul addresses the Galatians as “senseless”). Similarly, it is not contumelious to call another person by a name that sounds somewhat disrespectful, if this is done in banter or pleasantry and will be taken in good part by the other and do no harm. Thus, to send a comic valentine or good-naturedly to ridicule some of the spectators at a farce is not contumelious as a rule, since most persons are not galled by these gibes, nor are the jokes taken seriously as a rule by the public. But care must be exercised both in serious and playful rebukes to keep within moderation. St. Augustine declares that even in corrections one should use reproachful terms sparingly and only in case of great necessity.

(b) Contumely is dishonor, and so it is distinguished from injurious words that offend some other right (e.g., detraction offends reputation). Honor is an external manifestation of the respect felt for another’s excellence or superiority in some natural or supernatural perfection given by God, such as virtue, authority, nobility, rank, wealth, etc. Contumely, therefore, is either negative, as when one ostentatiously refuses to show another the honor due him (e.g., the salute or title or deference which custom allows him), or positive, as when one manifests signs of disrespect (e.g., names derogatory to virtue or intelligence, or which mean that the person addressed is vile and contemptible).

(c) Contumely is shown to another in his presence, that is, it is an affront directed to his person immediately (e.g., the mockery of Eliseus by the little boys near Bethel, in IV Kings, ii, 23), or mediately (e.g., the dishonor of David’s ambassadors by the Ammonites, in II Kings, x), or at least to his knowledge (e.g., the enemies of St. Paul in Phil., i. 17, who spoke of him insultingly in the expectation that their words would be carried to him).

Various Forms of Contumely.—(a) By reason of the signs used or the external form it takes, contumely is either in words (e.g., the names “thief,” “lunatic,” “bastard”) or in deeds that are equivalent to word (e.g., offensive cartoons or caricatures, insulting valentines or postcards, “poisoned pen” letters, lampoons, scurrilous or opprobrious gestures or acts, sardonic grins, mimicry).

(b) By reason of the thing signified or the contemptible quality that it ascribes to another contumely is also distinguished into reproach, which accuses another of sin (e.g., of drunkenness), revilement (convicium), which ascribes to another either a fault or its consequences (e.g., drunkenness or imprisonment, or diseases of alcoholism), taunting (improperium), which twits another with misfortunes or inferiority (e.g., his lowly origin or poverty or the favors one formerly showed him).

Manner of Confessing Contumely in the Sacrament of Penance.—(a) Circumstances that are of an essential kind, that is, those that change the species or add a new species, must be mentioned (e.g., the fact that contumely was blasphemous or calumnious or scandalous or directed against a cleric or parents). (b) Circumstances that are merely accidental, such as those given in the previous paragraph, need not be mentioned, for they are merely various ways of committing the same sin of contumely.

The Sinfulness of Contumely.—(a) From its nature contumely is a grave sin of injustice, for it robs one of honor, which is more prized than any other external possession, since it is a testimony to virtue and to the esteem of fellowmen honestly earned. Hence, men will often sacrifice health or wealth or life itself to save honor. He who calls his brother a fool is deserving of hell (Matt., v. 22), and the contumelious are classed with those who are delivered over to a reprobate sense (Rom., i. 30). But, as sins of the tongue are imputable only in so far as they express the mind of the speaker, contumelious words are gravely sinful only when they proceed from a direct purpose to inflict serious disgrace (e.g., Titus applies to Balbus an epithet that is not regarded as very abusive, but his purpose is to manifest his supreme contempt), or from an indirect intention to effect this (e.g., Claudius jokingly addresses Sempronius by a very disgraceful title, not meaning any great harm, but knowing that Sempronius will feel this deeply or that in the eyes of the bystanders he will be greatly dishonored).

(b) From the imperfection of the act or the smallness of the matter, contumely is made a venial sin. Thus, if one who is suddenly carried away by anger or who is not thinking of what he says calls another person a very vile name, there is not sufficient advertence for a grave offense; and if one who is acting with full deliberation addresses another in language that is only slightly disrespectful, there is not sufficient harm done to constitute a mortal sin.

The gravity of the matter in contumely depends, not only on the character of the signs of disrespect, but also on the persons concerned.

(a) Thus, the less the respect which the offender owes the offended party, the less the offense. Hence, for a subordinate to call his superior a liar or an ass is a more grievous fault than for a superior to give the name to his subordinate.

(b) The less authoritative the word of the person who utters contumely, or the less evil animus that attaches to his speech, the less the dishonor and the sin. Thus, fishwomen were once notorious for vituperation, but little attention or weight was given to their words. A person of that character, then, might commit only a venial sin by a very abusive word, whereas a person of more respectable character would sin mortally by using the same expression. Similarly, when parents or teachers berate their subjects as fools, blockheads, dunces, etc., there is generally no bad spirit behind these exclamations, and hence the use of such expressions is not very sinful, even when correction is not being made.

The Causes of Contumely.—(a) Pride is sometimes a cause, inasmuch as those who consider themselves better than others are quick to express the contempt they feel for others, if they hope that this will add to their own glory (Prov., xi. 2). But a proud person will just as often disdain to revile those whom he despises.

(b) Foolishness (see 1621) is sometimes a cause of contumely, for the foolish man speaks without thinking as he should or without caring what damage his words may cause (Prov., xx. 3). Hence, those who speak abusively to others merely in order to raise a laugh among the bystanders, little caring about the disrespect they show, cannot excuse themselves on the plea that it was all a joke.

(c) Anger is the usual cause of contumely, for the angry man seeks to show his revenge in some open and manifest way, and there is no easier or more ready means to this end than bitter, scornful or jeering words. Hence the danger of contumelious reprimands given by superiors. The subject will be enraged by the hard names applied to him, and the superior in his wrath will easily go to extremes, even of mortal sin, on account of the language he uses (e.g., exaggerated invective) or on account of circumstances (e.g., the scandal given).

The Duty of Bearing with Contumely.—(a) As to the internal disposition, one should be ready and willing to suffer insults without making any answer to them, if this is necessary. For the precept of patience requires that one be prepared in mind to tolerate injuries and to give place to wrath, should the circumstances at any time call for such restraint. In this sense Our Lord spoke when He commanded that one turn the other cheek to the striker (Matt, v. 39), and He practised His teaching by making no reply to the insolence of those who were implacable or who only sought material for accusations.

(b) As to external conduct, one should repel contumely when there are good and sufficient reasons for this course, and hence Our Lord protested against the unlawful blow given Him in the court room, and which the judge should have reprimanded (John, xviii. 23). He also refuted those who decried Him as a blasphemer, or glutton, or demoniac, or political disturber. But if no good end will be served by self-defense, or if greater evils will follow from it, no answer should be made. One should be more desirous to possess the right to honor and fame—viz., virtue and a worthy life—than to possess honor and fame themselves, for goodness is always a blessing, but prosperity is not unfrequently a real misfortune. Indeed, Our Lord says that to be persecuted, reviled and calumniated places one in the same class as the good men of the past (Matt., v. 11).

The Chief Reasons for Resistance to Contumely or Detraction.—(a) The good of the offender, in order that his boldness be subdued and that he be deterred from such injuries in the future, is a sufficient reason. Hence the words of Proverbs (xxvi. 5) that one should answer a fool, lest he think himself wise.

(b) The good of others is another reason, in order that they be not demoralized by the vilification of one whom they have looked up to as an example and guide, especially if silence will appear to be a sign of weakness or carelessness or guilt. Hence, St. Gregory says that preachers should answer detractors, lest the Word of God be without fruit.

(c) The good of self is a third reason for replying to contumely, for to enjoy the respect and esteem of others helps many a good person to act worthily of the opinion in which he is held, and it restrains many a sinner from descending to worse things than those of which he is guilty. Hence, Eccl., xli. 15, admonishes that one take care of a good name, and Prov., xxii. 1, places a good name above wealth.

The Duty of One Who Answers Contumely or Detraction.—(a) The spirit of the answer should be that of charity, not that of revenge or of unquiet or exaggerated anxiety about personal honor or fame; otherwise one becomes like to the offender (Prov., xxii, 2). A person would sin even by silence in the face of contumely, if the spirit behind his non-resistance was malicious (e.g., if he intended to enrage the other party the more by disregarding the attack).

(b) The manner of the answer should be moderate, and the reply should not go beyond the bounds of reasonable self-defense (see 1833). It is lawful to deny the charge, or by retort to turn the tables on the assailant, or to sue him for slander or libel; but it is not lawful to challenge him to a duel or to utter calumnies (see 1843).

The Duty of Making Restitution for Contumely.—(a) If contumely is not contrary to commutative justice, there is no duty of restitution. Hence, dishonor that is purely negative, such as the refusal to uncover on meeting a clergyman, does not oblige one to make restitution, for the omission is contrary to the virtue of observance or reverence but not to commutative justice. The case would be different, however, if negative dishonor were so marked or noticeable as to be equivalent to positive disrespect, as when at the entrance of a distinguished personage all in the room arise except one man who remains seated and gives a bitter look at the newcomer.

(b) If contumely is contrary to commutative justice, restitution is due. All agree that commutative justice is violated when contumely becomes vilification, or when an insult is committed in the presence of onlookers with the purpose of making the offended person seem contemptible in their eyes. But there are two opinions about the case when contumely is merely revilement, or an insult offered when there are no others present and the purpose is to make the offended person appear vile in his own eyes.

What Kind of Reparation Should Be Made for Contumely?—(a) In general, the rule is that contumely should be repaired by a bestowal of the same kind of goods as those of which the offended party was deprived; and hence dishonor is repaired by honor, disrespect by respect. The injured party should be aware that reparation is being made, or at least that honor is being shown him. If by reason of contumely one is responsible for other damages that followed (e.g., if one foresaw that one’s affront would lead to money losses, enmities, quarrels, bloodshed, etc.), one is duty bound to make good these losses also.

(b) In particular, the honor that should be offered in atonement is generally an apology, for this is both satisfaction for the wrong done and a token of esteem. At times, according to some, more is required, for if the insult was very gross, a mere request for pardon is perhaps not sufficient; on the other hand, less may suffice, as when the indignity was slight. Many authors hold that a respectful apology is sufficient reparation for any contumely. Among the lesser forms of restitution for dishonor are signs of friendship, courteous greetings, a pleasant chat, an invitation to call at one’s home, a dinner or toast, a eulogistic speech, etc.

The Manner of Making Apologies.—(a) They should be made with at least as much formality as accompanied the insult. Hence, if the injury was public, the acknowledgment of error should also be public. (b) They may be made either personally or by intermediary. If the guilty person cannot very well appear before the offended person, he may send his regrets by letter or through a representative.

Cessation of Obligation of Restitution.—The obligation of restitution for contumely ceases in certain cases (see 1797, 1798). (a) Thus, impossibility excuses, as when one cannot make reparation without renewing an old feud that has been buried and forgotten. (b) Forgiveness by the offended person excuses. The offended party forgives the debt expressly when he says or shows that he does not care to have an apology; he forgives implicitly, when he retaliates by an equally injurious action, defends himself by retorting equal contumely on his adversary, or obtains equivalent satisfaction from a court of justice.

The Differences between Defamation and Contumely.—(a) They differ in their purposes, for the defamer intends to hurt another in his reputation before the public, while the contumelious man intends to hurt another in his honor, either in his own eyes or in those of others. (b) They differ in their manner of procedure, for defamation is behind the back, contumely before the face, of the party who is injured. The defamer has some respect for his enemy, for he fears to face him and resorts to undermining, but the contumelious sinner despises his enemy and shows it by insulting him to his face.

What is contumely, how manyfold is it, and what kind of sin is it? Contumely is: the unjust violation of the honor of a present person. Therefore contumely differs from detraction first in this, that detraction directly injures reputation, or the internal estimation which others have of neighbor; but contumely directly injures honor, or the external attestation of such estimation, whether it is done by words or deeds. Secondly, contumely differs from detraction in this, that detraction is done secretly and in the absence of the other; but contumely is done openly and in the presence of the other, through contempt of him, whether in himself, who is present, or in another, e.g., in his legate or statue; for contumely is so called from contemning. Nevertheless, as honor can be shown to an absent person, e.g., by a laudatory oration before many, so also contumely can be done to an absent person by an atrocious injury before many, because namely it is foreseen at least confusedly that the offended person will find it out. L. 1. 3, n. 334.

Contumely is done in three ways, namely by word, writing, and deed. Moreover, under contumely which is done by word are comprehended reviling, reproach, opprobrium, and curse. Under contumely which is done by writing from the mind of defaming another is comprehended a defamatory libel. And finally under contumely which is done by deed are comprehended mockery, derision, and scoffing. "Meanwhile, however, these species of contumely in the theological forum are only material; for formally all pertain to the unjust injury of another's honor." Struggl 33. But from St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 75, a. 1, "derision is a special sin." For "just as someone by reviling intends to depress the honor of the one reviled... so also by mocking someone intends that the one mocked blush." Hence derision, which is done by mouth, word, and laughter, and scoffing, which is done by wrinkled nose, "differ from contumely as shame differs from dishonoring: for shame is fear of dishonoring." St. Thomas ibid. ad 1. Indeed, "from a virtuous work someone merits among others both reverence and reputation, and within himself the glory of a good conscience; according to that saying, 2 Cor. 1:12, this is our glory, the testimony of our conscience." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 75, a. 1 ad 2. Hence conversely "from a base or vicious act, a man's honor and reputation are taken away among others; and to this end the contumelious man and the detractor say base things about another; but within himself, through the base things which are said, someone loses the glory of conscience through a certain confusion and shame, and to this end the mocker says base things." Now security of conscience and its quiet is a great good. "And therefore he who disquiets someone's conscience by confounding him inflicts on him some special harm." Injury of due honor is not only against charity, but also against justice; for individuals have a right to a certain honor, and not to be held in contempt. Yet greater honor and a certain quasi-worship is owed to Prelates and persons excellent in dignity, and to parents; which in the former belongs to observance, in the latter to piety. But any injury of honor, if only that is considered and not other extrinsic effects, is of the same lowest species, except that which is against parents and which also violates observance or piety. Lugo de Poenit., d. 16, n. 265.

St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 72, a. 1.; q. 73, a. 3.; q. 75.; q. 103, a. 1, 2.; L. 966.; Struggl 23-27.; Ithur. Cas. 30, n. 5.

What are reviling, reproach, opprobrium, mockery, scoffing, derision, imprecation? "Reviling, as if called a clashing of voices, properly signifies voices of several persons striking against each other, or a disordered clamor; and because reproaches are often hurled with contention employed, therefore in strictness it ought to be used for contumely done by several; yet usage bears that reviling be confused with contumely, as if it is an injury by which some crime, or also an evil either of punishment or of nature, is thrown in the face of someone present.... Reproach is an injury by which someone objects to another a benefit previously conferred upon him, upbraiding his ungrateful mind toward the benefactor.... Opprobrium in law means the same as reproach, L. Probrum ff. de Verbor. signific.; it is as though a reproach objected; hence, since reproach signifies dishonor or infamy from delict, opprobrium is an injury by which someone objects to another the dishonor with which he is affected on account of a crime.... Mockery and derision mean the same thing and are derived from deriding and mocking, which signify laughing with contempt of another. And according to St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 75, it happens when someone turns another's evil or defect into play and laughter so that the other may blush. If laughter or loud laughter is added to words, it is properly called derision; it should be called scoffing if a movement of the nose, head, or some other member of the body is added, indicating another's vice, so that he is suffused with shame; but if other deeds are added to words for this same end, derision will be called mockery. But it will be called irony if you then especially blame another when through derision you praise him.... To these add imprecation, that vice... by which someone calls down upon another some evil of fault, punishment, or nature." Ithur. Cas. 30, n. 5. A curse, made against an absent person, is repugnant only to charity; for through a curse evil is pronounced against someone either by commanding or by wishing. But made against a present person, it often is repugnant also to justice; namely when it injures the honor owed to another, and takes on the nature of contumely. Struggl tr. 4, q. 5, n. 13.; Lugo d. 14, n. 193.; St.

Thomas, 2. 2, q. 72, a. 1; q. 75, 76. "Reviling and reproach consist in words, as also contumely does, because through all these some defect of someone is represented to the detriment of his honor. But a defect of this kind is threefold: namely a defect of fault, which is represented through contumelious words; and a defect generally of fault and punishment, which is represented through reviling.... But sometimes someone represents to another a defect of diminution or indigence...; and this is done through the word of reproach, which properly is when someone injuriously recalls to another's memory the help which he conferred upon him while he was suffering necessity." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 72, a. 1 ad 3.

"It happens that a word of curse uttered is a venial sin either on account of the smallness of the evil which someone calls down upon another by cursing, or also on account of the affection of him who utters the words of cursing, while he utters such words from a slight movement, or from play, or from some surreption, because sins of words are weighed especially from affection." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 76, a. 3.

Whether contumely and mockery are grave sins? - Contumely is a mortal sin from its genus. For from the fact that someone openly utters words against another, he seems to make little of him; hence from this very thing he is dishonored, and therefore contumely brings detriment to the honor of him against whom it is uttered. Therefore from this it is per se a mortal sin no less than theft or robbery. For man does not love his honor less than a possessed thing. And it is a graver sin than detraction itself, as robbery is graver than theft. For it brings greater contempt of neighbor. This is clear besides from the words of Scripture, Matt. 5:22: But whoever shall say to his brother: Raca, shall be liable to the council; and whoever shall say: Fool, shall be liable to the gehenna of fire. From its genus; for it will be venial both from imperfection of the act, and "if it is a light reviling, not much dishonoring a man, and is uttered from some levity of mind, or from slight anger, without a firm purpose of dishonoring someone." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 72, a. 2.; q. 73, a. 1, 3.; L. 966.; E. M.

Mockery, or derision, or illusion is done only concerning some evil or defect which is turned into laughter or play, and therefore is taken as if small. For what is great is taken not for play, but seriously. Therefore when someone puts the evil or defect of another person into play or laughter, because according to itself it is a small evil, it is a sin according to itself venial. But if he puts the evil or defect into play or laughter as small by reason of the person, then to mock or deride someone in this way is to make altogether little of him, and to esteem him so vile that there is no need to care about his evil, but it is to be held as if for laughter and play. And thus derision and mockery are per se mortal sins, and graver than contumely; because the contumelious man takes another's evil seriously, but the mocker turns it into play and laughter; and therefore there is greater dishonoring and contempt. But the sin is so much graver as the reverence owed to the person who is mocked is greater. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 75, a. 2.

Whether an obligation of restitution arises from contumely? - Contumely of itself induces a strict obligation of restoring honor and repairing damages, if any have followed, at least if they were foreseen confusedly. The reason is that contumely contains injury, and any injury requires satisfaction, and if it is damaging, moreover compensation of damages. - Cf. 1506 seqq.; L. 966.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 2 ad 3.; C. A. 1330.

Resolutions: Honor publicly taken away through contumely is to be restored publicly before those who were witnesses of the dishonoring, or at least in such a way that the satisfaction can come to their knowledge. But it suffices that satisfaction be made through another person, who asks pardon in the name of the one dishonoring. L. 894. That restitution of honor is required which is judged sufficient for manifesting estimation according to the condition of the offended person. For if he who dishonored was a superior, it will regularly suffice if he greets the one dishonored, visits him at home, or shows benevolence to him.

But if he was an equal, or a fortiori an inferior, greater satisfaction is required, namely that he anticipate in greeting, yield place, ask pardon, etc., if he cannot sufficiently satisfy in another way. L. 986.; Lugo d. 15, n. 57. If the one dishonored has taken revenge, e.g., by striking, wounding the other, for the most part further satisfaction is not required for honor; because that one seems to accept revenge as satisfaction, and the other, by not resisting, seems to confess his fault and his estimation of the other. L. 989.

Likewise rustics are exempted from restitution of honor if equal revilings or reproaches have been mutually hurled among them, because by that very fact compensation is made. In practice many times it is expedient that the confessor omit admonishing a penitent existing in good faith concerning the obligation of satisfaction, especially if he foresees that admonition is not going to profit; or if he thinks that he who was dishonored will easily condone it, or will refuse reparation, especially public reparation, lest the memory of the injury return among others, or lest he himself be more affected with shame, etc. L. 988.

Whether, if the offender is publicly punished by a judge, he is still held in conscience to furnish satisfaction for the injury inflicted? Lugo, with the common opinion, most probably denies it. The reason is that the punishment itself inflicted for the honor taken away from you seems sufficiently to repair your honor. Thus also, if the offender, compelled by a judge, furnished due satisfaction to you; for then, although compelled, he has now truly furnished testimony of the estimation of your dignity. L. 990.

When contumely was hidden, is satisfaction owed? Molina, Laymann deny it. But it must altogether be affirmed with the common and true opinion, which Lessius, the Salmanticenses, etc., hold; because in every contumely, even still hidden, besides injury there is damage of honor unjustly injured, since each one has a right that due honor be preserved for him. L. 985.

Whether and when contumely is licit? - Contumely is licit in the following cases: 1. If for the sake of a joke, through suitable recreation, light defects are objected, it is urbanity, according to St. Thomas, provided the other is not saddened, nor moved to anger. 2. If it is done with the mind of correcting, humbling, or for another reason; thus Christ called the Apostles foolish; and the Apostle called the Galatians senseless. Thus St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 72, a. 2 ad 2, who says "that just as it is licit to strike someone for the sake of discipline, so also someone can say to another whom he ought to correct some reviling word." L. 966.

How ought one affected by contumely to conduct himself? - "We are all held to tolerate contumelies, casting away the mind of revenge. Yet sometimes it will be expedient to repel contumelies, namely when tolerance is foreseen to be ascribed to inability to resist, or to foolishness; or if it can harm the common good, as if a prelate by tolerating would be rendered contemptible, and thus the insolence of subjects would be increased." L. 966.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 72, a. 3.; q. 108, a. 1 ad 4.; Quodl. 5, a. 26.; Quodl. 10, a. 13.

462. • Contumely is the unjust injury of honor inflicted on one present and knowing it. But honor is the external testimony of esteem, which is held internally concerning someone's excellence. Now someone can be present either personally or physically, or morally through an image, and through something else in which he is represented in some measure.

But contumely can be done, 1. negatively, by omission of the honor due here and now; 2. positively, both by words and by deeds or signs of contempt.

To contumely are referred, 1. mockery, by which someone is contemned by words and laughter; 2. derision, by which someone is ridiculed by ridiculous gestures; 3. reproach, by which poverty, defects, or obscurity of birth are cast up to someone.

463. • I say I. Contumely is a mortal sin from its genus. For it is something graver than detraction, which per se is grave. It is clear besides from the words of Scripture, Matth. 5. 22: "But he who shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be guilty before the council; but he who shall say: Fool, shall be guilty of hell fire."

I say II. Contumely per se brings in a strict obligation of restoring honor and of repairing damages, if any have followed, at least if they were foreseen in general, as is clear from the things said concerning restitution of reputation. - St. Lig., n. 966.

Although we are bound to tolerate contumelies by casting away the spirit of vengeance, yet sometimes it will be expedient to repel contumelies, namely when tolerance could harm the common good; for example, if a Prelate by tolerating would be rendered contemptible, and thus the insolence of subjects would be increased, etc. - St. Lig., n. 966.

464. Resolves. - 1. Honor publicly taken away by contumely must be restored publicly before those who were witnesses of the dishonoring, or at least in such a way that the satisfaction can come to their knowledge. But it suffices that satisfaction be made through another person, who in the name of the dishonorer asks pardon. - St. Lig., n. 984.

2. Honor injured by hidden contumely must likewise be restored, because true damage of honor was inflicted on the neighbor; yet reparation can be made secretly. - St. Lig., n. 985.

3. That restitution of honor is required which is considered sufficient for manifesting esteem according to the condition of the person offended. For if he who dishonored was a Superior, it will suffice if he salutes the dishonored person, visits him at home, or shows him benevolence. But if he was an equal, or a fortiori an inferior, greater satisfaction is required, namely that he anticipate him in saluting, yield place, ask pardon, etc., if he cannot satisfy sufficiently in another way. - St. Lig., n. 986.

4. If the one dishonored took vengeance, for example, by beating another, wounding him..., for the most part further satisfaction is not required for honor; because he seems to accept vengeance as satisfaction, and the other by not resisting seems to confess his own fault and his esteem concerning the other. - St. Lig., n. 989. - Likewise peasants are exempted from restitution of honor if equal insults or reproaches have been hurled mutually among them, because by that very fact compensation is made.

5. In practice it is often expedient that the Confessor omit admonishing a penitent existing in good faith about the obligation of satisfaction, especially if he foresees that the admonition is not going to be of profit; or if he thinks that he who was dishonored will easily condone it, or will refuse reparation, especially public reparation, lest the memory of the injury return among others, or lest he himself be more affected with shame, etc. - St. Lig., n. 988. - See Cases, n. 434.

397. 1. Notion and species. Just as reputation is injured by rash judgment and defamation, so honor is injured by contumely. For honor is the external manifestation of reverence owed to the neighbor on account of his excellence; it is owed to all those who, although otherwise imperfect, are endowed with certain distinguished gifts. - To this is opposed contumely, which is the unjust injury of honor inflicted upon one present and knowing it; or at least with the intention that it become known to the one injured, whether through a messenger or through letters. Therefore it differs from detraction by reason of the object, because it directly injures honor, not reputation; by reason of the mode, because it is done to one present, while for the most part detraction is done concerning one absent. - Yet sometimes contumely is done before others, to whom a hidden offense of the offended person is manifested, and in this case it is joined with detraction.

⁴ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 72; Soto, lib. V, quaest. 9, art. 1; Lugo, disp. XIV, n. 189-196; Sayrus, lib. XI, cap. 8; St. Alphonsus, n. 984-990; Carriere, n. 977-980; Martinet, lib. IV, art. 14, § 2; Noldin, n. 651-654.

Contumely can be inflicted positively by words or deeds which express contempt; and negatively, by omitting due honor, e.g., a greeting in circumstances in which this is owed. To contumely is referred mockery or derision, by which the defects of the neighbor are turned into laughter, to his shame and confusion; and also insult, or reproach, by which a vice is disgracefully cast before him. For the most part contumely, mockery, and insult arise from anger, or from hatred.

398. 2. Principle: Contumely is a sin mortal from its kind against justice.

For every man has a right to honor on account of the natural or supernatural gifts with which he is endowed, - for example, on account of the grace and virtues with which he is adorned, doctrine or prudence or other qualities by which he shines forth, or by reason of the duty or office committed to him; and this indeed is true even if he labors under certain defects or vices, since by these the excellent gifts with which he is furnished are not taken away. Now contumely violates that right, by despising the neighbor through words, deeds, or omission of due reverence; but this injury is of itself grave, because honor, by the common estimation of men, is placed before the goods of fortune, and therefore is held as a good of great moment; yet it can be venial from lightness of matter or imperfection of the voluntary act. Hence Scripture strictly prohibits injuries of this kind, under most grave penalties: "But he who shall say to his brother, raca, shall be guilty before the council; but he who shall say, fool, shall be guilty of the hell of fire";¹ on the contrary, it wills that Christians be "anticipating one another with honor,"² and "in humility esteeming one another superior to themselves";³ wherefore he who despises his brother is wholly opposed to the evangelical spirit.

¹ Matt., V, 22.

² Rom., XII, 10.

³ Philip., II, 3.

399. 3. On the gravity of contumely. In order that judgment may be made rightly concerning the gravity of contumely or mockery, attention must especially be paid to these things:

(A) To the dignity of the person offended and the gravity of the injury; generally the more honorable the offended person is, the graver the contumely is, other things being equal; but the gravity of the injury is not taken only in itself, but in relation to the person; thus insults with which common people affect one another injure honor less than similar words held among persons of a nobler condition.

(B) To the person offending, and his dispositions; if he is endowed with authority, the offense is greater, because more care is taken of it; if he is of a more lowly condition, it is more easily held as nothing; likewise, if it arises from anger or levity, it is certainly less grave than if from hatred, envy, or contempt.

(C) To the effects going to follow from it; namely, the sin is greater if it is done before many persons, who take scandal from this; likewise if it is foreseen that quarrels, enmities, and contentions are going to arise from it.

400. Corollaries. (A) Mockery is a sin of the same species as contumely; therefore the same must be said concerning its gravity. Yet an urbane kind of joking is more easily excused from sin, if it is done by way of honorable recreation, among friends who plainly understand the matter. Nevertheless, even in these circumstances, let it be used soberly and prudently, and not for too long, lest perhaps he concerning whom there is question be made too sad or be provoked to anger.

(B) Sometimes insult and reproach are not only excused from sin, but are praiseworthy, namely when they are done cautiously and moderately by superiors or friends from the intention of correcting a subject or brother. But then let them be done with right intention, when a grave reason is present, and indeed in such a way that it can be understood that they are brought forward not from anger or passion, but from the mind of correcting and amending the offender.

182. Notions. Honor is the testification concerning someone's excellence.³⁶⁰ This testification indeed is usually made in a threefold way: by words, when someone pronounces by mouth the excellence of someone; by deeds, such as by inclinations, by yielding the first place; by external things, e.g., by the offering of gifts, the conferring of dignity, etc. But this testification must be shown to the person present, or at least to his image or another representative. Thus the king present is honored, or represented through his delegate; thus the saints are honored in their images or relics. When the testification of excellence regards someone absent, it pertains more to his reputation than to his honor.

The difference from St. Thomas between honor, reverence, praise, and glory must be noted.

"Reverence is not the same as honor. But on the one hand it is the first motive for honoring, insofar, namely, as someone from the reverence which he has toward someone honors him; but on the other hand it is the end of honor, insofar, namely, as someone is honored for this, that he may be held in reverence by others."³⁶¹

"Praise is distinguished from honor in two ways: in one way, because praise consists only in signs of words (whether oral or written); but honor consists in any external signs whatever, and according to this praise is included in honor. In another way, because through the exhibition of honor we render testimony concerning the excellence of someone's goodness absolutely; but through praise we testify concerning someone's goodness in order to an end, as we praise one who works well for the sake of the end. But honor is also of the best things, which are not ordered to an end, but are already in the end.

"But glory is the effect of honor and praise, because from the fact that we testify concerning someone's goodness, his goodness becomes clear in the knowledge of many; and this the name of glory imports; ... for glory is clear knowledge with praise."³⁶²

The difference between honor and reputation must also be noted. Honor is a testification of another's excellence; reputation is public opinion concerning another's excellence. Honor is shown to one present; reputation is borne concerning one absent. Honor is wounded by contumely; but reputation is wounded by calumny, detraction, and whispering.

³⁶⁰ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 103, a. 1. But since the excellence of a man is considered especially according to virtue (ibid. q. 145, a. 1), all other things which are below virtue are honored insofar as they assist toward works of virtue, such as nobility, power, riches (ibid. ad 2). H. Gay has written well on honor, L'honneur, sa place dans la Morale (Fribourg, Switzerland, 1913).

³⁶¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 103, a. 1 ad 1.

³⁶² Ibid. a. 1 ad 3.

183. Injury to honor. Honor is chiefly wounded by contumely,³⁶³ which can be defined: unjust dishonoring of a person present. This dishonoring for the most part is done by a positive act, namely, by word or deed; but ordinarily the omission of an honorific act does not suffice. Thus, e.g., when a friend from anger or for another reason now no longer greets a former friend, he does not yet commit contumely, unless nevertheless that omission, on account of special circumstances, is equivalent to a positive act.

Dishonoring can be done in many ways: 1. by objecting moral vices to another, e.g.: you are a thief - and then this dishonoring is called contumely in the strict sense;³⁶⁴ 2. by objecting physical defects to another: you are one-eyed, or blind cow; and especially "when someone injuriously brings back to another's memory the help which he conferred upon him suffering necessity. Hence it is said in Eccli. 20, 15: He will give little things and reproach much."³⁶⁵ Dishonoring of this kind is called reproach;³⁶⁶ 3. by deriding another with words and laughter, and then there is mockery³⁶⁷ or derision; 4. by manifesting contempt for another with ridiculous gestures, as the soldiers did when genuflecting before Christ crowned with thorns, and then there is derision with contempt.³⁶⁸ All these diverse modes are indeed diverse sins,³⁶⁹ but they are reduced to the same moral species of contumely, because their end is the same, namely, externally to manifest contempt toward the man to be dishonored. Hence it is not necessary to indicate in confession in what way the contumely was done.

³⁶³ Beschimpfung, outrage, insult. Rash judgment also and detraction wound honor, but concerning them there will be special discussion afterward.

³⁶⁴ Schmähung.

³⁶⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 72, a. 1 ad 3. The Angelic Doctor himself asserts in the same place: "Sometimes, however, one of these is put for another."

³⁶⁶ Vorwurf, opprobre.

³⁶⁷ Verspottung; if it is done jokingly: Fopperei, Hänselei, Spöttelei, "Aufziehen," raillerie.

³⁶⁸ Verhöhnung.

³⁶⁹ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 75, a. 1.

184. The malice of contumely. Contumely is from its genus a mortal sin against justice.

That contumely is from its genus a mortal sin is plain from the words of Christ: "Whoever shall say (to his brother), Fool, shall be liable to the fire of Gehenna."³⁷⁰ But St. Paul numbers the contumelious among those whom God handed over to a reprobate sense.³⁷¹

That contumely wounds justice is clear from the fact that any man has a strict right to honor; and this right indeed contumely violates. And certainly honor is a good more excellent than riches. But to steal the riches of another is from its genus a mortal sin against justice. Therefore, more strongly, to take away honor, which contumely does, is such a sin.

Honor, which is founded upon true virtue, obtains the first place among all the external goods of man. Hence not rarely men sacrifice riches, health, indeed even life itself, for acquiring or retaining honor. Concerning this matter St. Thomas teaches: "Things which come into the use of man are exterior things, among which simply the greatest is honor: both because it is nearest to virtue, as being a certain testification existing concerning someone's virtue; and also because it is shown to God and to the best; and also because men set aside all things for attaining honor and avoiding blame."³⁷² From these things it follows that unjust wounding of honor is a very grave sin against justice. Nor is that sin diminished from the fact that he who is dishonored does not always feel great damage, although this sometimes happens. For a very rich man upon whom notable damaging is inflicted does not even feel damage of this kind much, on account of abundant other riches; and nevertheless the damaging inflicted remains a great sin.

Contumely often has other malices joined to it, such as: irreligiosity, if, e.g., a cleric or religious is dishonored; wounded piety, if, e.g., the contumely is against parents; blasphemy, if it is against God or the saints; scandal, etc.

Contumely becomes a light sin:

1. from imperfection of the act, e.g., inadvertence, lack of deliberation, from sudden anger;

2. from the intention of not gravely wounding honor, e.g., if someone from jest or not so seriously says to another: You are an ass;

3. from the condition of the speaker and hearer. Hence Soto, Sylvius, and others deservedly teach that insults by which men of the lowest condition or quarrelsome women attack one another, crying that the other is a prostitute, an adulteress, a scoundrel, the devil himself, etc., are not mortal sins. The reason is that by these exclamations no great wounding of honor is caused to anyone. The same holds for contumelious words which are brought forth by parents against children, by teachers against pupils, etc.

Mockery, which, as was said above, is reduced to contumely, is often no sin; indeed, it is an act of the virtue of eutrapelia if it is done jokingly concerning another's small defect and with small embarrassment for him; for it pertains to honorable recreation.³⁷³ Yet let there be nothing excessive! For from jokes of this kind charity is sometimes wounded.

³⁷⁰ Matt. 5, 22.

³⁷¹ Cf. Rom. 1, 28-30.

³⁷² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 129, a. 1. Cf. also Aristotle, Ethic. l. 4, c. 8.

³⁷³ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 72, a. 2 ad 1.

185. Restitution of honor. He who has inflicted true contumely upon another is held to sufficient reparation of honor. Therefore he who publicly inflicted contumely is held also publicly to repair the honor taken away; but he who privately and secretly dishonored another ought at least privately to satisfy. This obligation of repairing honor is of itself grave and to be done as quickly as possible. For after Christ said: "Whoever shall say to his brother: Fool, shall be liable to the fire of Gehenna," He adds: "If therefore you offer your gift at the altar, and there remember that your brother has something against you, leave your gift there before the altar, and go first to be reconciled to your brother."³⁷⁴ Satisfaction, or restitution of wounded honor, must be made by a new exhibition of honor and reverence. But how this ought to be done in individual cases depends both on the person wounded and on the person who inflicted the contumely. Subjects and equals who have inflicted contumely are often held to ask pardon, especially if the person wounded by grave contumely demands this and does not wish to accept another satisfaction. Nevertheless, in some regions it is not the custom, and therefore there is no obligation of asking pardon. Superiors who have inflicted a not so grave contumely upon their subject are, generally speaking, not held to ask pardon, "lest," says St. Augustine,³⁷⁵ "among those whom it is necessary to be subject, while humility is observed too much, the authority of governing be broken." Therefore superiors can satisfy wounded subjects by exhibiting special signs of benevolence. - Wounded honor ought not to be repaired by payment of money.³⁷⁶ Sometimes nevertheless a monetary fine is imposed by the judge on the one who committed contumely, to be paid for the poor or for pious causes.

³⁷⁴ Matt. 5, 22 sqq.

³⁷⁵ Regula ad servos Dei (Migne, Patr. lat. 32, 1383).

³⁷⁶ Cf. nevertheless below, n. 204.

186. Scholion. On contumely to be tolerated patiently. In a special article St. Thomas³⁷⁷ investigates whether and when someone ought patiently to tolerate contumelies inflicted upon himself. A man indeed is held with great patience to tolerate contumelies inflicted and not to exact satisfaction solely on account of desire for private honor. Nevertheless, sometimes it is necessary to repel the contumely inflicted, especially on account of two things: first, indeed, on account of the good of him who inflicts the contumely, namely, so that his audacity may be repressed and that he may not attempt such things afterward; ... in another way, on account of the good of many, whose progress is impeded on account of contumelies inflicted upon us. Hence Gregory says: "Those whose life has been placed as an example for imitation ought, if they can, to restrain the words of those detracting from them, lest those who could hear their preaching do not hear it, and thus, remaining in depraved morals, they contemn living well."

As to the manner of repelling contumely, the moderation of blameless defense must altogether be observed. Wherefore it is not lawful to provoke to a duel, nor to kill an aggressor of honor.³⁷⁸ Sometimes, however, it is lawful to retort contumelious words or blows upon the one committing contumely by the same words or blows, namely, if otherwise reparation of wounded honor cannot conveniently be obtained.

³⁷⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 72, a. 3.

³⁷⁸ Cf. proposition 30 condemned by Innocent XI.

B. Contumelies, namely those which unjustly harm honor:

1. among the rude are not always held grave;

2. if they are truly grave, especially if they concern secrets, they constitute mortal sin. Thus if they are false; if they are done against one who brought forth no injury; if by one offended, but in such a way that the limits of indignation are exceeded.

S. Th. II-II, q. 72; q. 73, a. 1; q. 75 and 76; q. 103, a. 1.

435. Notions. - Just as reputation is injured by detraction, so honor is injured by contumely (beleediging). Honor is the external testimony of another's excellence, made by words or equivalent signs. It can be done by laudatory words which pronounce another's excellence, by calling him, for example, lord, eminent, most wise, - by deeds or actions such as inclination, going to meet him, yielding place, - or by exterior things, such as gifts, the erection of a statue, the setting up of an image, etc.; all these are employed from the intention of the one honoring, to signify another's excellence or his superiority in regard to oneself, under some respect, or in regard to others.

The foundation of honor is qualities or gifts, of whatever kind, internal and external, natural or supernatural, by which someone excels, especially virtue, which is the true excellence of man.

Honor proceeds as from its first motive from reverence, insofar as someone, from the reverence which he has toward another, honors him; and at the same time it tends to reverence as to an end, insofar as he honors him so that he may be held in reverence by others. But its effect is glory, which is clear knowledge of excellence among others. It differs from good reputation: a) reputation chiefly consists in the internal opinion of many, honor in external testimony; b) reputation is borne concerning one absent, honor is shown to one present, either through himself, or through another which represents him, such as an ambassador or image; c) reputation concerns a certain perfection simply, but honor concerns excellence or superiority in perfection.

436. Definition of contumely. - Contumely is directly opposed to honor; whence it is the unjust dishonoring of a present person. It is said:

1° dishonoring, i.e., not only the negative absence of honor even when due, but a positive contrary act which expresses contempt, which is chiefly done by words uttered or written, also by deeds insofar as they are equivalent signs which have the force of words, for example, by a contemptuous look or gesture, by an infamous picture, by a slap inflicted, by the breaking of an image or defacing of a door. Whence the privative omission of due honor is not contumely, unless because of special circumstances it is equivalent to a positive act of contempt, as if, all being greeted, one is deliberately neglected;

2° unjust, because it could also be a just punishment of a delict;

3° of a present person, at least in some way, whether through himself, or in an ambassador or in an image, or in such a way that the injury is made known to him through a messenger or through letters. For "he who utters words against someone in secret, seems to fear him rather than to despise him, whence he does not directly bring detriment to honor" q. 73, a. 1. Hence for contumely it is not necessary that it be done before others; for "if someone says his defect to someone... to him alone, it can be contumely insofar as he who speaks acts unjustly against the reverence of the hearer" q. 72, a. 1, ad 1.

437. Contumely is made from the intention of dishonoring and by this differs from other sins. - Its end is externally to manifest contempt toward the man to be dishonored; therefore:

1. It differs really from detraction a) by reason of the object or end, because it directly injures honor, not reputation; b) by reason of the mode, because it is done to one present, while detraction of itself is done concerning one absent. But if contumely is done before others in such a way that a delict, whether false or unknown, is imputed to another while he himself is present, then it is joined with detraction but formally is contumely.

Let St. Thomas be heard, q. 73, a. 1: "Just as by deed someone harms another in two ways: openly indeed as in robbery,... but secretly as in theft...; so also by word someone injures another in two ways: in one way openly, and this is done by contumely,... in another way secretly, and this is done by detraction. But from this, that someone openly utters words against another, he seems to despise him; whence from this very fact he is dishonored, and therefore contumely brings detriment to the honor of him against whom it is uttered. But he who utters words against someone in secret seems to fear him rather than to despise him; whence he does not directly bring detriment to honor, but to reputation, insofar as one uttering such words secretly, as far as in him lies, makes those who hear have an evil opinion of him against whom he speaks: for the detractor seems to intend this, and strives for this, that credence be given to his words. Whence it is clear that detraction differs from contumely in two ways: in one way as to the mode of proposing words, because namely the contumelious man speaks openly against someone (i.e., to his face), but the detractor secretly; in another way as to the end, or as to the harm inflicted, because namely the contumelious man derogates from honor, the detractor from reputation."

2. It also differs really from mockery or jeering, by which the defects of one's neighbor are turned into laughter, whether by words, or by gestures such as with wrinkled nose, or by deeds, to his illegitimate blushing, disturbance, and confusion. Therefore mockery has an end diverse from contumely: to procure blushing, which is not dishonoring but fear of dishonoring (q. 75, a. 1).

3. It differs also under some respect from abusive speech and reproach (versmading), by which generally any vice whatsoever, or defect of fault or penalty or merely natural defect, is disgracefully objected to someone to the detriment of honor, or a lessening or need, while contumely strictly so called objects fault (q. 72, a. 1, ad 3).

438. Principle. Contumely is a sin against justice, grave from its genus. - For it takes away from one's neighbor a notable good which is usually esteemed more than riches, indeed in external goods it holds the first place, "both because it is very near to virtue, as being a certain testimony existing concerning someone's virtue; and also because it is shown to God and to the best; and also because men set aside all things for obtaining honor and avoiding blame" (q. 129, a. 1). But to take away such a good is against justice, because it is done while one's neighbor is unwilling, who has a right to it because of natural or supernatural qualities and gifts, especially because of honesty and virtue.

Whence Christ, Mt. V, 22: "But he who shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be liable to the council: but he who shall say, Thou fool (i.e., madman), shall be liable to the hell of fire." And the Apostle admonishes Christians that they be "anticipating one another with honor" (Rom. XII, 10), and "in humility judging one another superior to themselves" (Phil. II, 3).

Nevertheless it can be venial a) on the part of the agent, if it is done from inadvertence, lack of deliberation, sudden anger, or from an intention of not gravely injuring honor, as if someone speaks in jest or not so seriously;

b) on the part of the matter, if there is no grave injury of honor. Whence contumelious words which are uttered by parents against children, and abusive speeches by which men of the lowest condition or quarrelling women attack one another and vomit forth whatever occurs, are easily excused from grave sin, because they are usually considered as of lesser moment or are even not seriously uttered.

439. The gravity of the sin of contumely is to be weighed not only absolutely from the thing itself or the contumely uttered according to itself, but also respectively

1° to the dignity of the person offended: for injury is measured from the dignity of the person offended to whom it is terminated; whence the same contumely brought upon a father, bishop, or king is much graver than if it is brought upon an equal;

2° also to the offending person and his dispositions: thus an offense which arises from hatred, envy, or contempt is graver than that which arises from anger or lightness; greater if it is uttered by a person of great authority than by a man of lower condition;

3° to the effects to follow from it: the sin is greater if it is done before several persons or before those who from this receive scandal, or if quarrels, contentions, enmities are foreseen.

440. Mockery (beschimping, bespotting) agrees with contumely in matter; but it differs in mode and end, and consequently is of a diverse species; for it is had when someone objects to another a defect or fault in a joking manner, so that the other blushes or is ashamed (Mt. XXVII, 41-44; Lk. XXIII, 36). It is called jeering when someone is exposed to ridicule not by words but by gestures or movements of the body (Mt. XXVII, 40). It is called derision when the same is done by means of some deception (Mt. XXVI, 68; XXVII, 29; Lk. XXII, 63). Cf. St. Thomas, q. 75.

The gravest sin is mockery of God and of those things which are of God (Is. XXXVII, 23), because it is also blasphemy against religion; the second place is held by mockery of parents because it is also against piety (Prov. XXX, 17); in the third place derision of the just is grave insofar as the virtue and simplicity of the just man is derided (Job XII, 4), which derision is very harmful because through this men are impeded from acting well. Besides, derision will be a grave sin against justice if it notably offends and shames one's neighbor, or causes grave damages and sins (Prov. XXII, 10).

But derision concerning a light evil or defect, or one not sufficiently deliberate, is a venial sin, indeed none, if it is done moderately and with a just cause, for example, so that the one derided may abstain from a defect or sin, or that honest recreation may be fostered. Nevertheless, even friends should deride soberly, prudently, and not too long, especially if the neighbor is foreseen to be not lightly moved by this; wherefore St. Thomas wisely admonishes (q. 72, a. 2, ad 1): "It pertains to eutrapelia to say some light abusive speech, not for the dishonoring or saddening of him against whom it is said, but rather for the sake of delight and jest; this can be without sin, if due circumstances are observed. But if someone does not fear to sadden him against whom a joking abusive speech of this kind is uttered, provided he excites laughter in others, this is vicious."

441. Cursing, concerning which St. Thomas treats after derision (q. 76), can be understood in three ways:

1° one is merely enunciative, by which someone reports the evil of another, and this is nothing but detraction;

2° another is causative or imperative, by which someone moves others by command to bringing evil upon another; and this is the first of the nine modes of cooperation, concerning which we spoke above (n. 309);

3° another is optative, by which someone expresses an evil affection or desire and wishes evil to another (verwensching). This can be defined: a dishonoring by which someone imprecates evil upon someone insofar as it is evil, and thus it is against justice; besides, it contains the sin of hatred against charity, if evil is wished from the heart.

Optative cursing, just like imperative cursing, is a sin if someone intends the evil of another insofar as it is evil; but it is not a sin if someone intends the evil of another under the aspect of good, because then the intention of the one speaking is not referred to evil but to good, whether because it is just (for example, to desire just punishment), or because it is useful (for example, for correction). This however is to be understood, provided it is done according to the order of charity: thus he would sin who wished the death of his father because of the inheritance.

Cursing is a mortal sin from its genus, because it is against charity; nevertheless it can be venial either because of the smallness of the evil which one wishes to another, or because of the imperfection of the affection, because it is not done from the heart but from lack of deliberation or without the mind of one desiring, for example, from a sudden movement of anger or from custom. And nevertheless curses even light of themselves can from circumstances be mortal, whether by reason of the person against whom they are made, for example, if they are made against God, against parents, against superiors especially present, or by reason of scandal.

It is a sin so much graver according as we ought more to love and reverence the person whom we curse and according as we wish graver evils. Whence

1. it is gravest to curse God, which is also blasphemy against religion;

2. then to curse parents, which is also against piety;

3. then to curse superiors, which is also against observance;

4. then against other neighbors according to the gravity of the evil wished; but if by a simple evil affection diverse things are also wished under the general aspect of evil, because they are evil, the sin is against charity insofar as evil is desired, and against justice insofar as, by uttering it, one's neighbor is dishonored; but if by an efficacious desire someone desires to inflict diverse evils upon another, the sins are diverse in species against justice according to the diverse evils wished;

5. to curse irrational creatures: a) if they are regarded according to themselves, it is not a mortal sin, because they are not a subject of right and injury, but it is idle and vain, and therefore venial; b) insofar as they have a relation to evil, there is no sin because it is to curse evil itself; c) insofar as they are creatures of God, it is blasphemy against God; d) insofar as they are useful to man, it is the same as to curse man.

Concerning the comparative gravity of detraction and cursing, St. Thomas teaches, q. 76, a. 4 [Original misprint: q. 77]: "The enunciation of fault is a sin, insofar as some harm is thereby brought upon one's neighbor; but to bring harm is graver than to desire harm, other things being equal. Whence detraction according to the common account is a graver sin than cursing expressing simple desire. - But cursing which is done by way of command, since it has the account of a cause, can be graver than detraction, if it brings greater harm than the denigration of reputation; or lighter, if less."

442. Remark: On patience in tolerating contumelies. - From patience we are bound to endure contumelies in preparation of soul, but not always to do this in act. As St. Thomas clearly explains, q. 72, a. 3: "It is the precept of the Lord: if someone has struck you on one cheek, offer him also the other, namely, so that a man be prepared to do this if there is need; nevertheless he is not always bound to do this in act, because neither did the Lord himself do this, but when he had received a slap, he said: Why do you strike me?... Sometimes it is necessary that we repel an inflicted contumely, especially for two reasons: 1) because of the good of him who brings the contumely, so that his audacity may be repressed, and he may not attempt such things thereafter; 2) in another way because of the good of many, whose progress is impeded because of contumelies inflicted upon us. Whence Gregory says: those whose life has been placed as an example for imitation ought, if they can, to restrain the words of those detracting from them."

St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 72; St. Alphonsus, III, 984; ed. G., II, p. 372; Lugo, disp. 14, n. 189; Soto, l. 5, q. 9; Lehmkuhl, 1, n. 1415; Berardi, Theol. mor., II, n. 128.

1210. Reputation and honor differ from one another. REPUTATION, as we have seen, is the estimation of many concerning someone's excellence; but honor is the testimony of this estimation. Hence, just as concerning the reputation of neighbor, so also concerning his honor there is a twofold obligation: one negative, namely the obligation of not injuring it, which is done through contumely; the other affirmative, namely the obligation of restoring it, if it has been unjustly taken away. Therefore we shall speak: 1. concerning contumely; 2. concerning restitution of honor.

1211. DEFINITION. Contumely is the unjust violation of honor brought upon one present and knowing. But someone can be present either personally or physically, or morally through an image or another thing in which he is represented. For constituting contumely, it is not required that there be present formally an intention of injuring neighbor.

Contumely can be brought: 1. BY WORD: Namely by reproach, by which a crime is objected to someone; by upbraiding, by which poverty or any other defect with disgrace is reproached to someone; by malediction, by which evil is wished to someone. 2. BY DEED: to which looks mockery, by which someone is contemned by laughter; illusion, by which someone is handed over to derision or deception; derision, by which he is mocked by ridiculous gestures; an infamous libel, a derisive picture (caricature), trampling of an image, etc. 3. BY OMISSION, if, for example, honor owed to a Superior is denied, provided it is done from contempt; otherwise, mere defect of observance would be present, whence a sin against the fourth precept.

Yet all contumelies, since they are against the same good of honor, are of the same species; although one can be graver than another, and have another malice joined to itself, for example of sin against piety, if the contumely is made against a Superior, or against charity, if imprecation is added.

1212. PRINCIPLES. I. Contumely is a mortal sin from its genus. It is established from the words of Christ (Matt., 5, 22): He who shall say to his brother: raca, shall be liable to the council; but he who shall say: fool, shall be liable to the gehenna of fire. Under the word raca is understood a light man, blameworthy, worthy of spittle; and one uttering it is said to be liable to the council, to which only grave crimes were brought. By the word fool are signified reproaches bringing grave injury; but one uttering it is said to be liable to the gehenna of fire. The reason is that contumely of this kind brings grave harm in goods of great moment, which per se are esteemed more than goods of fortune (III, 966).

Yet not rarely contumely is only venial fault from the circumstances of the person, of inadvertence, or of a soul unwilling to injure gravely. Thus parents are often excused from mortal sin when they call children donkeys, beasts, etc. Likewise women, boys, and men of lowest lot loading themselves with reproaches; because, since faith is not applied to them, honor is not gravely injured (V, 81; Praxis, 37).

Indeed, there is no sin: a) If reproach is made for due correction, in which way the Lord called the disciples foolish, and the Apostle called the Galatians senseless. b) If a light reproach is uttered for the sake of joke and recreation: "for to object light defects for the sake of recreation is urbanity," says St. Thomas (2. 2, q. 72, a. 2), provided the other is not saddened, nor moved to anger.

1213. II. We ought patiently to tolerate contumelies. The reason, because vengeance is the Lord's. "Yet sometimes (by the example of Christ saying: 'Why do you strike me?') it will be expedient to repel contumelies, namely when tolerance is foreseen to be ascribed to inability to resist or to stupidity, or if it can harm the common good, as if a prelate, by tolerating, would be rendered contemptible, and thus the petulance of subjects would be increased" (III, 966). See also the things said above n. 737.

1214. PRINCIPLES. I. He who has brought contumely upon someone is held to restore honor to him, and to repair other damages thence following and foreseen at least in a confused way. This is plain from the notion of justice.

Yet the one dishonoring is excused from restitution of honor: a) if the one offended is prudently presumed to have now remitted the offense; b) if he refuses public satisfaction, lest he be suffused with new shame: in which case it suffices to honor him in another mode; c) if he has already avenged the injury brought upon him; likewise, if sufficient penalty for repairing honor has already publicly been inflicted by a judge on the offender (III, 988 ff.; H. Ap., XI, 4).

1215. II. But the mode of restoring honor depends both on the character of the injury and on the condition of the one injuring and the one injured.

1. Honor taken away publicly must also be repaired publicly, for example by asking pardon from him before others who were witnesses of the contumely, or at least in such a way that the satisfaction becomes known to others. Yet it suffices if satisfaction is made through another person, who in the name of the one dishonoring asks pardon.

Honor injured through occult contumely must also be repaired according to the common and true opinion; but it can, or even must, be repaired occultly (III, 985; 1. El. qq. ref., 41).

2. That restitution of honor is required "which is judged sufficient for manifesting esteem, according to the condition of the person offended. For if the one dishonoring was a Superior, it will suffice if he honorably greets the dishonored one, invites him to the house, shows benevolence, etc.; otherwise, if he was equal or inferior: then greater satisfaction is required, namely that he anticipate in greeting, yield place, ask pardon, etc.," if he cannot satisfy sufficiently in another way.

And when the injury was very grave toward a Superior, it does not suffice if the subject simply asks pardon; but he is held to ask it with bent knees, or to show another similar humiliation: "which opinion indeed," says St. Alphonsus, "is more probable" (III, 986, 987).

1216. Note. In practice it is often expedient that the confessor omit to warn a penitent existing in good faith concerning the obligation of repairing honor, namely: 1. if he foresees that the warning is not going to be useful, indeed rather harmful (because many promise, and afterward do not fulfill); 2. if he probably thinks that the dishonored one more refuses than desires that public reparation, lest the memory of the injury return among others, or lest he himself be more affected with shame; 3. if it is probably to be feared that in the act of satisfaction hatreds between the offended and the offender be renewed; 4. if from signs remission made by the one offended plainly appears, namely if he of his own accord approaches the offender and treats with him very familiarly and jocularly. But otherwise, if he acts familiarly for avoiding disgrace, or another damage (III, 988).

533. • Contumely is the unjust injury of honor inflicted on one present and knowing. But honor is the external attestation of the estimation which is held internally concerning someone's excellence. But someone can be present either personally or physically, or morally through an image, and through another thing in which he is in some way represented.

But contumely can be done 1° negatively, through omission of honor due here and now; 2° positively, both by words and by deeds or signs of contempt.

To contumely are referred 1° derision,³ by which someone is contemned by words and laughter; 2° mockery, by which someone is ridiculed by ridiculous gestures; 3° reproach, by which indigence, defects, or obscurity of birth is objected to someone.

534. • I say I. Contumely is a mortal sin from its own genus. For it is something graver than detraction, which of itself is grave. Besides, this is clear from the words of Scripture:⁴ But he who shall say to his brother: Raca, shall be guilty of the council; but he who shall say: Fool, shall be guilty of the hell of fire.

I say II. Contumely of itself induces the strict obligation of restoring honor and of repairing damages, if any have followed, at least if they have been foreseen in a confused way, as is clear from what was said about restitution of reputation.

But although we are bound to tolerate contumelies - by casting aside the spirit of vengeance - nevertheless sometimes it will be expedient to repel contumelies, namely when tolerance could harm the common good, for example if a Prelate by tolerating were rendered contemptible, and thus the petulance of subjects were increased, etc.

535. You will resolve. - 1° Honor publicly taken away through contumely is to be restored publicly before those who were witnesses of the dishonoring, or at least in such a way that the satisfaction can come to their knowledge. But it suffices that satisfaction be made through another person, who in the name of the one dishonoring seeks pardon.¹

2° Honor harmed through hidden contumely must likewise be restored, because a true damage of honor has been inflicted on the neighbor; yet reparation can be made secretly.²

3° That restitution of honor is required which is judged sufficient for manifesting estimation according to the condition of the person offended. For if he who dishonored was a Superior, it will suffice if he greets the dishonored man, visits him at home, or shows him benevolence. But if he was an equal, or a fortiori an inferior, greater satisfaction is required, namely that he anticipate in greeting, yield place, ask pardon, etc., if he cannot satisfy sufficiently in another way.⁴

4° If the dishonored man has taken vengeance, for example by striking the other, wounding, ... for the most part further satisfaction is not required for honor; because he seems to accept vengeance for satisfaction, and the other by not resisting seems to confess his own fault and estimation concerning the other.⁵ - Likewise rustics are exempt from restitution of honor if equal insults or reproaches have mutually been hurled between them, because by that very fact compensation is made.

5° In practice it is often expedient that the confessor omit admonishing a penitent existing in good faith concerning the obligation of satisfaction, especially if he foresees that the admonition will not be profitable; or if he thinks that he who has been dishonored will easily condone it, or will refuse reparation especially public, lest the memory of the injury return among others, or lest he himself be affected by more shame, etc.¹

Contumely is an unjust injury of honor inflicted upon one present and aware. But honor is the external testimony of estimation which is had internally concerning someone's excellence. But someone can be present either personally or physically, or morally through an image and through something else in which he is represented in some way. Contumely can be done either negatively, through omission of honor due here and now; or positively, namely by words, deeds, or signs of contempt. When it is done by words, it receives various names, which often are used indiscriminately, yet differ somewhat among themselves. For it is called reviling if it casts up natural defects; contumely simply so called, if moral defects; reproach, if it objects neediness, baseness of lineage or condition. - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 72, art. 1, ad 3.

To contumely are referred: 1st. mockery, by which someone is contemned by words and laughter; 2nd. derision, by which someone is ridiculed by ridiculous gestures; they differ from it because contumely intends to depress honor, but these intend to cause shame and embarrassment. Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 75, art. 1.

I say. Contumely is a mortal sin from its genus, and induces a strict obligation of reparation. The reason for the first is both because in the estimation of men honor is often reputed more than reputation, and accordingly contumely is a graver sin than detraction, and because it is said, Matth. v, 22: "Whoever shall say to his brother ... Fool, shall be guilty of Gehenna of fire." But the reason for the second is that an injured and reparable right ought to be repaired. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 966.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. Honor publicly taken away by contumely must be restored publicly before those who were witnesses of the dishonoring, or at least in such a way that satisfaction can come to their knowledge. But it suffices that satisfaction be made through another person, who asks pardon in the name of the dishonorer. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 984.

2nd. That restitution of honor is required which is judged sufficient for manifesting estimation according to the condition of the offended person, and accordingly if the one who dishonored was a superior, it will suffice if he greets the dishonored person or shows benevolence to him. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 986.

3rd. If the dishonored person has taken vengeance, e.g., by striking, wounding the other, etc., for the most part no further satisfaction is required for honor; because the former seems to accept vengeance as satisfaction, while the latter, by not resisting, seems to confess his own fault and his estimation concerning the other. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 989.

4th. In practice it is many times expedient that the confessor omit warning a penitent existing in good faith concerning the obligation of satisfaction, especially if he foresees that the warning will not be profitable; or if he thinks that the one who was dishonored will easily condone it, or will refuse reparation, especially public reparation, lest the memory of the injury return among others, or lest he himself be affected with greater shame, etc. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 988.

Hitherto I have discussed the various ways in which the neighbor is wounded in the goods of the body, and by which the injurer is bound to repair the damage inflicted; now I shall treat of some things which pertain to damage to the soul, reputation, or honor; among which contumely first presents itself, whose nature, after I have described it, I shall then explain how a Christian man ought rather to bear it than to return it.

IT IS CERTAIN that a Christian is bound to have his soul prepared for bearing insults.

It is PROVED by D. Bonaventure, first sermon 3. on the Holy Apostles, from that axiom of D. Gregory, l. 1. of the Dialogues, chapter 5: Of what sort each one lies hidden within himself, the insult offered proves. Hence also those Politicians, in order to test whether Christ was just, used to say, Wis. 2: Let us examine him by insult: Hebraeus Lapide Lydio. For thus gold is proved by fire, and the just man by insults, as the Holy Doctor elegantly expounds in his 2. on Wisdom, on the passage cited.

It is PROVED especially by D. Bonaventure on 22. Luke, on those words: And he that hath no sword, let him sell his cloak and buy one. And on 19. John, on those words: Why strikest thou me? For this preparation of soul is necessary, according to the exposition of D. Augustine, epistle 5. to Marcellinus, and tractate 113. on John, on those words of Matthew 5: If anyone strike thee on one cheek, turn to him also the other. And according to the exposition of D. Ambrose, l. 10. on Luke, on those words of Luke 22., where he says: O Lord, why dost thou command me to buy a sword, which thou forbiddest to be drawn? Put up thy sword into its sheath. If one strike thee on one cheek, offer him the other? so that defense may be ready, not vengeance necessary, and it may be seen that he could have avenged the injury, but would not.

This preparation of soul is commanded by Christ under an affirmative precept; but an affirmative precept does not bind for always: therefore one is not always bound in fact to endure, but when reason requires it; and hence we may at times lawfully repel insults for our just defense. The Holy Doctor proves this by the example of Christ, who did not offer the other cheek, but answered: If I have spoken ill, give testimony of the evil: but if well, why strikest thou me? He confirms it by the example of Paul, Acts 23., who, struck on the cheek, answered: God shall strike thee, thou whited wall.

And with the Seraphic Doctor concur D. Thomas, question 72. article 4. Sotus, loc. cit. article 3. Sayrus, l. 4. chapter 4. number 11. Filliucius, tom. 2. tract. 40. on the eighth commandment, chapter 3. number 55. Fagundez, l. 8. chapter 2. on the eighth Commandment, Valencia, disp. 5. question 16. part 3. and others.

Here indeed many open ample ways for presumptuous defenses, against the Christian profession; against whom I have said something in my disputation on Homicide. And so the opinion of Diana, p. 1. tract. 15. resolution 15. Navarrus in his Manual, chapter 14. Peter Navarrus, de restitutione l. 2. chapter 5. number 83. Victoria, on the law of war, question 2. number 5. Henriquez, l. 14. chapter 10. number 3. in the Gloss, letter T., where he cites Corduba, Mantius, Pegna, and finally Fernandez in his Exam. p. 1. chapter 9. §. 1. number 16., that one may, gravely provoked in his feelings, pursue a fleeing man and kill him, if the killing is apt for reparation of the insult — is in no way proved to me. But more displeasing still is the opinion of the same Diana, who says there that the same may be done even before the insult is received, while it impends; against whom Megala, p. 2. l. 3. chapter 1. number 12. Lopez in his Instruct. p. 1. chapter 62., which opinion Azorius did not wholly reject, p. 3. l. 2. chapter 1. question 13.

To me indeed that sentence is most certain which holds this not lawful, even though, with metaphysical abstractions of intention, they would lick into shape that bloody and Turkish defense of one intending defense, not vengeance.

Therefore I assert, with Juan de la Cruz in his direct. p. 1. precept 5. doubt 6. Tanner, disp. 4. question 8. number 73. Toledo, l. 2. chapter 6. number 16. Rodriguez, l. 1. chapter 135. number 11. Tutriano, 2. 2. T. 2. disp. 27. dub. 3. Bass., s.v. Contumelia, number 8. who cite Bannes, Atag[ue], Sotus, Sal[on]io, 2. 2. question 64. article 7. controversy 1. Malderus, 2. 2. tract. 5. chapter 1. dub. 14., that this is in no way lawful. Nor do I admit even a speculative probability, granted by Lessius, l. 2. chapter 9. disp. 12. number 8. Reginaldus, T. 2. l. 21. chapter 5. number 63. Filliucius, tome 2. tract. 29. chapter 3. number 51. Bonacina, de contractibus disp. 2. last question, sect. 1. p. 10. number 8.

The reason is, because the command of the Lord, Matthew 5., obliges us at least to abstain from vengeance; but to pursue a fleeing man would not be defense, since he had already ceased from offense, but is evident vengeance.

Next, private vengeance is not lawful; otherwise judges would be cast down from their tribunals; the tribunals would be overturned. But who will believe that you sought to restore your honor in a Christian manner by mere defense, if you kill a man while he flees? You say that honor still remains with you, which in the act he takes away; just as one may pursue and kill a thief, if he carries off my goods, so also this man.

I should like to know how he takes away honor in act, while he withdraws from offense — nay, even if he does not flee, while he ceases from insults? That doctrine is indeed pernicious, not only for the Christian, but for the Political commonwealth also, as Megala deeply cries out. To this also recur the arguments adduced for this opinion in tom. 4. disp. 17. question 10. sect. 2., where whatever the adversaries bring forward for themselves is refuted by the decree of Alexander VII. in the year 1665.

And so neither is it lawful for a man of honor to kill an assailant who endeavors to thrust at him a stick, or a slap, that dishonor may be inflicted, if it cannot otherwise be avoided. So Tanner, number 74, against Lessius, chapter 9. number 12., who alleged others. He adds that neither is it lawful to kill one striking with a stick.

But I take up the reasoning of Diana: Defense is to check the aggressor and to prevent an imminent damage, or, if it has been inflicted, it remains in suspense. Now it remains as long as there is an incontinent return of the blow, but not after the enemy has withdrawn to his house. I should like to see the principles neatly established for the coming-to-be of this restoration of honor, lasting only through incontinence; for the privation of honor arises from the injury received, and always remains: therefore even after the offender has withdrawn into his house, it still remains, and consequently can be recovered.

I do not, however, hold with Fagundez, number 2., that one may repel an insult by due moderation, as if one who calls me a robber may call him a liar; yet he may not on that account cry out with "Ass" epithets¹, and to strike back one striking is not lawful; nor to strike one reviling, for this would already be to avenge an injury, not to repel it, as the learned Sotus also duly notes, l. 5. on Justice, question 9. article 3. §. Hoc tamen. By similar reasoning it is lawful to say to the insolent one: thou liest, as Aragon. asserts, 2. 2. question 70. article 3. Sà, s.v. infamare Clavis Reg. l. 12. chapter 4. Bassaeus, s.v. Contum. 8. For the insult must be rejected as false out of malice; therefore it does not suffice to say: thou deceivest, as Pasqualigo says, decis. 437. Diana, p. 6. tract. 6. Resol. 16. Pasqualigo adds, decis. 439. and Hurtado, t. 2. disp. 170 sect. 3., and Bannes, as cited by Bassaeus, that it may be so said, even though a true crime is objected. ¹ N. Editor's note: the print reads 'non licebit tamen eum alioqui Assaffinum reclamare'; 'Assaffinum' is a print/OCR corruption, rendered as 'cry out with "Ass" epithets' (probably 'Assassinum', 'call him an assassin'). 'licetbit' in the first transcription is 'licebit' in the print.

That it is not lawful to object crimes, say Sotus, l. 5. question 9. article 3. Hurtado, sect. 14. §. 120. Pasqualigo, disp. 438.

Know finally that the insolent one is bound to restore honor, as all teach, in a proportionate manner, whether by retracting and begging pardon before the hearers, or by some other fitting way. And if he has objected something hidden and grave, he is bound to say that he lied; Pasqualigo adds, decif. 443. and Bass., number 6., that if it be necessary that he be believed, an oath must be added. Milder ways of saluting, of calling a man friend, of inviting him to dinner, avail in lighter cases.