Section III. On the Injury of Honor, or on Insult

(St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 72, 75, 105; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, book III, nn. 966, 984-990; Homo Apostolicus, tract 11, nn. 3-6.)

Honor is a testimony concerning someone's excellence, in his presence (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 103, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, III, 966). It is said:

1. Testimony; namely, either through words, or through actions, for example genuflection, etc., or through honorific things, for example through the erection of a statue, etc.

2. Concerning excellence, i.e. concerning superiority in some perfection, whether with respect to the one honoring, or with respect to others (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 103, a. 2). Moreover, "in anyone there is found something from which someone can reckon him superior, according to that saying in Philippians 2: in humility, considering others superior; and according to this also all ought to anticipate one another with honor" (St. Thomas, loc. cit., ad 3).

3. In his presence; these things will be clearer from the notion of the opposite, or insult, about which something must now be said.

I. Notion. Insult is an undue dishonoring of someone, or an undue testimony concerning someone's baseness, in his presence. It is said:

1. Undue; i.e. one which is made without a just cause.

2. Testimony; this can be made both by words and by deeds, insofar as they are signs or have the force of signifying words (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 72, a. 1), as if you strike someone with a slap, thereby signifying that he is base.

3. Concerning someone's baseness, or concerning this, that someone is unworthy of honor and worthy of contempt.

4. In his presence. "The insulting person," says St. Thomas, "speaks to a man to his face; whence if someone speaks badly about another before many people, with him absent, it is detraction; but if with him alone present, it is insult (II-II, q. 73, a. 1, ad 2); if with others present together with him, it is detraction and insult." But it suffices that someone be present through a representative; likewise, that someone should write injurious things to another.

Insult differs from that disordering which is called negative insult, and which consists in this, that someone merely omits to furnish due honor; this is opposed to observance. But the omission of due honor accidentally rather often contains true insult, namely if, considering the circumstances, it involves a signification of contempt, as if someone, meeting several equal superiors, shows honor only to one.

II. Morality. 1. Insult is a grave sin from its kind, and indeed against justice. It is said to be grave from its kind; this is clear both from Sacred Scripture¹ and from the fact that it contains a sin of injustice, which is grave from its kind (n. 978). It is opposed to justice; for everyone has the right that another not illegitimately signify to him that he is unworthy of honor and worthy of contempt (St. Alphonsus, III, 966).

The gravity of matter depends: 1° on the matter considered in itself, with attention both to the native signification of the words and to the affection from which they proceed, since this can temper the signification not a little. "Signification," says Aquinas, "proceeds from the interior affection; and therefore in sins of words it seems especially to be considered from what affection someone utters the words" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 72, a. 2). The gravity of matter depends 2° on the condition of the person injuring and the person injured; 3° on the common judgment of men in that region concerning the injury. Hence, for example, men of the lowest condition, who affect one another with insults, ordinarily do not sin gravely (St. Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, n. 37).

2. The diverse modes by which insult is inflicted, as such, seem to be of the same species, because, insofar as they are injurious to honor, they are not morally diverse, but differ only according to more and less.

3. The mere omission of due honor, or negative insult, which I have added because of the affinity of the matter, is opposed to observance, as we have already noted, and per se and for the most part is venial; yet accidentally, as was likewise noted, it rather often is equivalent to true insult.

Corollary I. "Since the sin of abusive speech or insult depends on the mind of the one speaking, it can happen that it is a venial sin, if it is a slight abusive speech, not greatly dishonoring the man, and is uttered from some levity of mind or from slight anger, without a firm purpose of dishonoring someone; for example, when someone intends to sadden someone slightly through a word of this sort" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 72, a. 2, ad 3).

Corollary II. "Just as it is lawful to strike someone, or to damage him in his things, for the sake of discipline, so also for the sake of discipline someone can say some abusive word to another whom he ought to correct; and in this way the Lord called the disciples fools, and the Apostle called the Galatians senseless. Yet, as Augustine says in book 2 On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount (ch. 19), 'rebukes are to be employed rarely and from great necessity'" (St. Thomas, loc. cit., ad 2).

Corollary III. "To eutrapelia it pertains to say some slight abusive speech, not for the dishonoring or saddening of him against whom it is said, but rather for the sake of delight and jest; and this can be without sin, if due circumstances are observed" (St. Thomas, loc. cit., ad 1).

¹ Matt. V, 22; Rom. I, 30.

III. Restitution on account of insult. Insult always injures the honor of him against whom it is inflicted. Besides, if it is inflicted before others or afterwards becomes known to others, it can also have other connected damages, namely both a diminution of good estimation and the omission of due honor on the part of others. Now:

1. The insulting person is held to furnish satisfaction for the injured honor; but the damages perhaps connected with the insult, and at least confusedly foreseen, he is held to repair or avert.

2. With respect to the mode of making satisfaction and restoring, there is required such a mode as, considering the circumstances of the person injured and the person injuring, the gravity of the injury, the custom of the place, etc., suffices for repairing honor (St. Alphonsus, III, 986). Hence:

a) If the one dishonoring was a superior, it will suffice if he honorably greets the dishonored person, invites him home, shows benevolence, etc. The contrary holds if he was an equal or inferior; then greater satisfaction is required, namely that he anticipate him in greeting, yield place, ask pardon. This mode indeed is more apt for compensating insult. Besides, such a request for pardon is not necessary except when satisfaction cannot be made otherwise; hence a prelate is not held to ask pardon from a subject, a master from a servant, or a husband from a wife (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

b) If honor has been taken away publicly through insult, it must also be restored publicly before those who were present at the dishonoring, or at least in a mode by which the satisfaction can easily come to their knowledge (St. Alphonsus, III, 984). But if the dishonored person is judged rather to refuse than to desire that public satisfaction, lest the memory of the injury received return among others, or lest he himself be affected with more shame, another way of making satisfaction should be sought, for example by honoring the dishonored person with extraordinary actions (St. Alphonsus, III, 988).

3. The same things which excuse from restitution of reputation exempt from restitution of honor (n. 1074). Moreover, many times it will happen to be expedient that the confessor omit warning a penitent existing in good faith, who has dishonored another, about furnishing satisfaction, for example: 1° if he foresees that the warning will not be profitable; for experience establishes that penitents easily promise such satisfactions, but with difficulty actually fulfill them, on account of the shame which they afterwards feel or apprehend in this; 2° if there is danger lest, in the act of satisfaction, hatreds between the offended person and the offender be renewed (St. Alphonsus, III, 988).