III. On Contumely

What is contumely, how manyfold is it, and what kind of sin is it? Contumely is: the unjust violation of the honor of a present person. Therefore contumely differs from detraction first in this, that detraction directly injures reputation, or the internal estimation which others have of neighbor; but contumely directly injures honor, or the external attestation of such estimation, whether it is done by words or deeds. Secondly, contumely differs from detraction in this, that detraction is done secretly and in the absence of the other; but contumely is done openly and in the presence of the other, through contempt of him, whether in himself, who is present, or in another, e.g., in his legate or statue; for contumely is so called from contemning. Nevertheless, as honor can be shown to an absent person, e.g., by a laudatory oration before many, so also contumely can be done to an absent person by an atrocious injury before many, because namely it is foreseen at least confusedly that the offended person will find it out. L. 1. 3, n. 334.

Contumely is done in three ways, namely by word, writing, and deed. Moreover, under contumely which is done by word are comprehended reviling, reproach, opprobrium, and curse. Under contumely which is done by writing from the mind of defaming another is comprehended a defamatory libel. And finally under contumely which is done by deed are comprehended mockery, derision, and scoffing. "Meanwhile, however, these species of contumely in the theological forum are only material; for formally all pertain to the unjust injury of another's honor." Struggl 33. But from St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 75, a. 1, "derision is a special sin." For "just as someone by reviling intends to depress the honor of the one reviled... so also by mocking someone intends that the one mocked blush." Hence derision, which is done by mouth, word, and laughter, and scoffing, which is done by wrinkled nose, "differ from contumely as shame differs from dishonoring: for shame is fear of dishonoring." St. Thomas ibid. ad 1. Indeed, "from a virtuous work someone merits among others both reverence and reputation, and within himself the glory of a good conscience; according to that saying, 2 Cor. 1:12, this is our glory, the testimony of our conscience." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 75, a. 1 ad 2. Hence conversely "from a base or vicious act, a man's honor and reputation are taken away among others; and to this end the contumelious man and the detractor say base things about another; but within himself, through the base things which are said, someone loses the glory of conscience through a certain confusion and shame, and to this end the mocker says base things." Now security of conscience and its quiet is a great good. "And therefore he who disquiets someone's conscience by confounding him inflicts on him some special harm." Injury of due honor is not only against charity, but also against justice; for individuals have a right to a certain honor, and not to be held in contempt. Yet greater honor and a certain quasi-worship is owed to Prelates and persons excellent in dignity, and to parents; which in the former belongs to observance, in the latter to piety. But any injury of honor, if only that is considered and not other extrinsic effects, is of the same lowest species, except that which is against parents and which also violates observance or piety. Lugo de Poenit., d. 16, n. 265.

St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 72, a. 1.; q. 73, a. 3.; q. 75.; q. 103, a. 1, 2.; L. 966.; Struggl 23-27.; Ithur. Cas. 30, n. 5.

What are reviling, reproach, opprobrium, mockery, scoffing, derision, imprecation? "Reviling, as if called a clashing of voices, properly signifies voices of several persons striking against each other, or a disordered clamor; and because reproaches are often hurled with contention employed, therefore in strictness it ought to be used for contumely done by several; yet usage bears that reviling be confused with contumely, as if it is an injury by which some crime, or also an evil either of punishment or of nature, is thrown in the face of someone present.... Reproach is an injury by which someone objects to another a benefit previously conferred upon him, upbraiding his ungrateful mind toward the benefactor.... Opprobrium in law means the same as reproach, L. Probrum ff. de Verbor. signific.; it is as though a reproach objected; hence, since reproach signifies dishonor or infamy from delict, opprobrium is an injury by which someone objects to another the dishonor with which he is affected on account of a crime.... Mockery and derision mean the same thing and are derived from deriding and mocking, which signify laughing with contempt of another. And according to St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 75, it happens when someone turns another's evil or defect into play and laughter so that the other may blush. If laughter or loud laughter is added to words, it is properly called derision; it should be called scoffing if a movement of the nose, head, or some other member of the body is added, indicating another's vice, so that he is suffused with shame; but if other deeds are added to words for this same end, derision will be called mockery. But it will be called irony if you then especially blame another when through derision you praise him.... To these add imprecation, that vice... by which someone calls down upon another some evil of fault, punishment, or nature." Ithur. Cas. 30, n. 5. A curse, made against an absent person, is repugnant only to charity; for through a curse evil is pronounced against someone either by commanding or by wishing. But made against a present person, it often is repugnant also to justice; namely when it injures the honor owed to another, and takes on the nature of contumely. Struggl tr. 4, q. 5, n. 13.; Lugo d. 14, n. 193.; St.

Thomas, 2. 2, q. 72, a. 1; q. 75, 76. "Reviling and reproach consist in words, as also contumely does, because through all these some defect of someone is represented to the detriment of his honor. But a defect of this kind is threefold: namely a defect of fault, which is represented through contumelious words; and a defect generally of fault and punishment, which is represented through reviling.... But sometimes someone represents to another a defect of diminution or indigence...; and this is done through the word of reproach, which properly is when someone injuriously recalls to another's memory the help which he conferred upon him while he was suffering necessity." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 72, a. 1 ad 3.

"It happens that a word of curse uttered is a venial sin either on account of the smallness of the evil which someone calls down upon another by cursing, or also on account of the affection of him who utters the words of cursing, while he utters such words from a slight movement, or from play, or from some surreption, because sins of words are weighed especially from affection." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 76, a. 3.

Whether contumely and mockery are grave sins? - Contumely is a mortal sin from its genus. For from the fact that someone openly utters words against another, he seems to make little of him; hence from this very thing he is dishonored, and therefore contumely brings detriment to the honor of him against whom it is uttered. Therefore from this it is per se a mortal sin no less than theft or robbery. For man does not love his honor less than a possessed thing. And it is a graver sin than detraction itself, as robbery is graver than theft. For it brings greater contempt of neighbor. This is clear besides from the words of Scripture, Matt. 5:22: But whoever shall say to his brother: Raca, shall be liable to the council; and whoever shall say: Fool, shall be liable to the gehenna of fire. From its genus; for it will be venial both from imperfection of the act, and "if it is a light reviling, not much dishonoring a man, and is uttered from some levity of mind, or from slight anger, without a firm purpose of dishonoring someone." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 72, a. 2.; q. 73, a. 1, 3.; L. 966.; E. M.

Mockery, or derision, or illusion is done only concerning some evil or defect which is turned into laughter or play, and therefore is taken as if small. For what is great is taken not for play, but seriously. Therefore when someone puts the evil or defect of another person into play or laughter, because according to itself it is a small evil, it is a sin according to itself venial. But if he puts the evil or defect into play or laughter as small by reason of the person, then to mock or deride someone in this way is to make altogether little of him, and to esteem him so vile that there is no need to care about his evil, but it is to be held as if for laughter and play. And thus derision and mockery are per se mortal sins, and graver than contumely; because the contumelious man takes another's evil seriously, but the mocker turns it into play and laughter; and therefore there is greater dishonoring and contempt. But the sin is so much graver as the reverence owed to the person who is mocked is greater. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 75, a. 2.

Whether an obligation of restitution arises from contumely? - Contumely of itself induces a strict obligation of restoring honor and repairing damages, if any have followed, at least if they were foreseen confusedly. The reason is that contumely contains injury, and any injury requires satisfaction, and if it is damaging, moreover compensation of damages. - Cf. 1506 seqq.; L. 966.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 2 ad 3.; C. A. 1330.

Resolutions: Honor publicly taken away through contumely is to be restored publicly before those who were witnesses of the dishonoring, or at least in such a way that the satisfaction can come to their knowledge. But it suffices that satisfaction be made through another person, who asks pardon in the name of the one dishonoring. L. 894. That restitution of honor is required which is judged sufficient for manifesting estimation according to the condition of the offended person. For if he who dishonored was a superior, it will regularly suffice if he greets the one dishonored, visits him at home, or shows benevolence to him.

But if he was an equal, or a fortiori an inferior, greater satisfaction is required, namely that he anticipate in greeting, yield place, ask pardon, etc., if he cannot sufficiently satisfy in another way. L. 986.; Lugo d. 15, n. 57. If the one dishonored has taken revenge, e.g., by striking, wounding the other, for the most part further satisfaction is not required for honor; because that one seems to accept revenge as satisfaction, and the other, by not resisting, seems to confess his fault and his estimation of the other. L. 989.

Likewise rustics are exempted from restitution of honor if equal revilings or reproaches have been mutually hurled among them, because by that very fact compensation is made. In practice many times it is expedient that the confessor omit admonishing a penitent existing in good faith concerning the obligation of satisfaction, especially if he foresees that admonition is not going to profit; or if he thinks that he who was dishonored will easily condone it, or will refuse reparation, especially public reparation, lest the memory of the injury return among others, or lest he himself be more affected with shame, etc. L. 988.

Whether, if the offender is publicly punished by a judge, he is still held in conscience to furnish satisfaction for the injury inflicted? Lugo, with the common opinion, most probably denies it. The reason is that the punishment itself inflicted for the honor taken away from you seems sufficiently to repair your honor. Thus also, if the offender, compelled by a judge, furnished due satisfaction to you; for then, although compelled, he has now truly furnished testimony of the estimation of your dignity. L. 990.

When contumely was hidden, is satisfaction owed? Molina, Laymann deny it. But it must altogether be affirmed with the common and true opinion, which Lessius, the Salmanticenses, etc., hold; because in every contumely, even still hidden, besides injury there is damage of honor unjustly injured, since each one has a right that due honor be preserved for him. L. 985.

Whether and when contumely is licit? - Contumely is licit in the following cases: 1. If for the sake of a joke, through suitable recreation, light defects are objected, it is urbanity, according to St. Thomas, provided the other is not saddened, nor moved to anger. 2. If it is done with the mind of correcting, humbling, or for another reason; thus Christ called the Apostles foolish; and the Apostle called the Galatians senseless. Thus St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 72, a. 2 ad 2, who says "that just as it is licit to strike someone for the sake of discipline, so also someone can say to another whom he ought to correct some reviling word." L. 966.

How ought one affected by contumely to conduct himself? - "We are all held to tolerate contumelies, casting away the mind of revenge. Yet sometimes it will be expedient to repel contumelies, namely when tolerance is foreseen to be ascribed to inability to resist, or to foolishness; or if it can harm the common good, as if a prelate by tolerating would be rendered contemptible, and thus the insolence of subjects would be increased." L. 966.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 72, a. 3.; q. 108, a. 1 ad 4.; Quodl. 5, a. 26.; Quodl. 10, a. 13.