Kinds of injustice

THE wide term injustice may be used to designate any violation of justice, whether it be legal, distributive, or commutative. Sins against legal justice are committed by doing anything against the common good of the society to which one belongs, or by neglecting to do what the common good requires to be performed. Such sins may be committed by rulers and by subjects, more frequently, however, by the former, inasmuch as the common good is specially entrusted to their care and guardianship. As the separate members of a society constitute that society, it is obvious that there is not a perfect and adequate distinction between a society and its members, In legal justice, therefore, which regulates the relations which ought to subsist between men and the society to which they belong, there is something wanting to the complete distinction of persons required in order that the obligations of strict justice may subsist between them. A violation, then, of legal justice is not a sin against justice in the strict and full sense.

Distributive justice prescribes that the ruler divide common burdens and emoluments among his subjects. according to their capacity and merits. Before they are assigned to each one, no one has a strict right to any determinate share of them, and so a distribution of burdens and favours which is not according to merit is not against strict justice. A ruler who in his distribution of offices and burdens shows undue favour to some to the detriment of others’ sins indeed against strict justice if he thereby cause damage to the community, for strict justice and the implicit agreement which he made on assuming his office forbid him to do that. If, however, no special injury accrues to the community through his showing undue preference for some of his subjects, he commits a sin which is called acceptation of persons, but he does not sin against strict justice. On the other hand, one who violates particular or commutative justice deprives another of his strict right. Such a sin is called an injury, which may be defined to be the violation of the strict right of another against his reasonable will.

Such an injury is formal if it is committed knowingly and - wilfully, otherwise it is material.

A personal injury is committed against rights which are intrinsic to the person, such as the right to life, liberty, good name, and honour. A real injury is committed against the property of another.

Personal injuries are treated of elsewhere under the Fifth and Eighth Commandments; here we consider more especially real injuries done to the property of another.

There are three different species of real injuries—robbery, theft, and simple damnification. Robbery, besides injury to property, includes also a personal injury, which consists in violence offered to another by forcibly depriving him of what is his. Simple damnification is the causing of damage to the property of another without taking away any of that property. Theft is the secret taking away of the property of another against his reasonable will. . No action is an injury unless it is against the reasonable will of the injured person, scienti et volenti non fit injuria, according to the twenty-seventh rule of law in the Sixth Book of the Decretals. The reason is obvious; because a person may as a rule renounce his rights, and then an action contrary to them ceases to be a violation of justice. It is no longer a depriving another of what is his; it has ceased to belong to him. There are, however, some rights which are inalienable, and actions against these will be contrary to justice even if the party wronged give his consent. No one can validly renounce his right to life, and so the private killing of another, even with his consent, except in lawful self-defence, is always murder. Similarly, marital rights of married people are inalienable, and, even if the husband consent, a wife’s adultery is always adultery. The maxim, then, must be understood of rights which the owner can validly forego, and it asserts that no injury is done by acting against rights which the possessor with full knowledge and with perfect freedom does forego.

One co-operates with another in injustice by counsel when, by giving advice or by urging motives, or by showing how it may be done, he causes that other to commit an act of injustice. Such a one is obviously the moral cause of the injury, and all the conditions required for imposing an obligation of making restitution are present. If the principal agent was already determined to commit the injury, this will in that case not be due to the counsellor, and he will not be bound to repair it. Nor will the counsellor be bound to make reparation to the principal agent for any loss which the latter suffered in consequence of inflicting the injury, unless he induced him to act by fraud or other unjust means. Moreover, if before the injustice was committed the counsellor efficaciously withdrew his advice, and proposed equally strong motives for desisting from the act, it would seem that he cannot be obliged to make restitution. If, however, he had showed the other how to commit the crime and thus made it possible, he must take means to prevent it being committed, otherwise he will be responsible. Confessors, lawyers, doctors, and others whose expert advice is asked are under a special obligation not to give advice which is injurious to their clients or to third parties. If they do this, they will be bound to make compensation to the injured party not only when they acted maliciously, but also when they gave injurious advice through gravely culpable ignorance or precipitancy. Others who do not specially hold themselves out as experts will not be bound to compensate those who ask their advice and suffer loss through following it. No injury was done by giving them what they asked for, no fraud was committed by the assumption of skill or knowledge which was not possessed; if they chose to follow the advice, they took the risk on themselves, and scienti et volenti non fit injuria.

He who follows unjust advice acts in his own behalf and in his own name, and so is the principal cause of the injury done. He is bound in the first place to make restitution, and if he fail to do so, the counsellor is bound.

I. Notion. Injustice, also called injury, is the violation of another's strict right. From this very definition it must be deduced in what sense Rule 27 of law in the Sext is to be understood: No injury is done to one who knows and consents, namely:

1. If someone freely consents, and there is question of a right which he can validly renounce, injury is absent.

2. If someone freely consents, and there is question of a right which he cannot validly renounce - suppose if someone consents to his own killing, or a husband consents to intercourse being had with his wife - it is disputed whether injustice is committed with respect to the one consenting.

But now, against many, it seems that this must be affirmed; since, while the right persists, the violation of the right, or injustice, persists. But in the hypothesis posited the right persists, because the renunciation is invalid. There is added proposition 50 condemned by Innocent XI: "Intercourse with a married woman, with the husband consenting, is not adultery; and therefore it suffices in confession to say that one has fornicated;"¹ this is explained with difficulty by the adversaries. They do indeed speak of an injury inflicted on the marital state, etc.; but the marital state is not a moral person which enjoys strict rights.

Objection. In order that injustice cease, it suffices that someone not oppose his own right.

Response. I deny the assertion, in the case in which the right persists, even if someone does not oppose his own right. But in our hypothesis the right persists, whether someone opposes his own right or does not oppose it.

Still, it must be said otherwise concerning rights which the one consenting can validly renounce, and which would be violated together with the right which he cannot renounce. Thus, for example, one who, with the husband consenting, committed adultery is not bound to restore to the husband damages that would follow from the adultery.

¹ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1200.

II. Division. Injustice is divided:

1. Into formal and material, according as another's right is violated with or without theological fault.

2. Into personal and real, according as someone is harmed in goods of the soul or body, or in external goods.

III. Morality. Injustice is a grave sin by its kind, that is, grave or light according as it regards grave or light matter. Injustice which regards grave matter is a grave sin, because it is simply or gravely opposed to the good of one's neighbor and of society, and therefore to charity (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 59, a. 4; q. 66, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, III, 700). Furthermore:

1. The gravity of the matter must be drawn both from damage that is relatively grave, or which is grave when the condition of him to whom it is inflicted has been considered, and from the relation which exists between the one causing damage and the one damaged, so that if, for example, there is question of a son of a family, a graver matter is required for mortal sin than if there is question of another.

2. A sign of grave matter is present when the damage inflicted, with attention paid to the common disposition of men, is apt to move great sorrow or indignation.

3. In doubt whether the thing or quantity to be taken away or consumed by you is grave, you are bound under grave obligation to abstain, because, once another's certain right to some thing or to a certain quantity has been posited, it is gravely illicit for you to expose yourself to the danger of inflicting grave damage on someone.

Injustice.—Just as the word “justice” is taken in a wide sense for holiness or the collection of all the virtues, and in a strict sense for a special cardinal virtue, so likewise the word “injustice” is taken widely as a synonym for any transgression, iniquity, or sin (“He sendeth rain upon the just and the unjust,” Matt., v. 45), but strictly for violation of the special virtue of justice (“Hear what the unjust judge saith,” Luke, xviii. 6). It is of this latter injustice that we now speak.

Species of Injustice.—Injustice is of two kinds. (a) Legal injustice is a special vice that moves one to despise the common good or to act against it intentionally. Thus, if one steals or overeats merely to gratify a passion for money or for food, there is a certain condition of legal injustice, inasmuch as one violates a law; but if one does these things also or solely to injure the common good, there is a special sin of legal injustice, to be declared in confession. (b) Particular injustice is a special vice against the private good of others that moves one to seek for more than is one’s share, or to desire more of the benefits and less of the burdens than equality appoints. Examples: To sell above the just price or buy below the just price (commutative injustice); to show favoritism in the distribution of public offices or burdens, as when a person in authority showers public benefits on his unworthy relatives or friends, and overburdens with taxes those who are not his friends (distributive injustice).

The Theological Species of Legal and Particular Injustice.—(a) From its nature injustice is a mortal sin, for it is an attack on a very great good, namely, the peace and security of society; the very foundations of orderly community life are shaken when injustice is done either to common or to private rights. Moreover, acts of injustice (unlike sins of mere passion), if the matter is serious, offend against charity, the life of the soul; for charity “envieth not, dealeth not perversely” (I Cor., xiii. 4); while injustice injures the neighbor and leads to hatred, quarrels, and separations. Hence, the Apostle says of injustice: “Do not err: neither adulterers, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor extortioners, shall possess the kingdom of God” (I Cor., vi. 10); and Our Lord, speaking of justice, says: “If you would enter into life, keep the commandments” (Matt, xix. 18).

(b) From want of sufficient advertence in the subject (see 173 sqq.), or from smallness of matter in the object (see 172), a sin of injustice may be only venial. Thus, if one takes money that belongs to another on account of vincible ignorance due to slight negligence, or if one takes only a small amount that does no serious injury, the injustice is venial.

Rule for Determining the Gravity of Sins of Injustice.—The rule for judging whether the matter of a sin of injustice is great or small, is the quantity of injury it inflicts, or the degree of reasonable unwillingness of the offended person to suffer the injustice; for sins against the neighbor are culpable precisely on account of and in proportion to the harm they do to others. Hence, since every injustice offends either the public or private good, or both, the following acts of injustice are gravely sinful:

(a) mortal sin is committed when injury is done to a private right in a matter of such great moment that the person offended is reasonably and gravely unwilling to sanction the injustice (e.g., cases of calumny, adultery, incendiarism). But if the injury itself is small and the party offended is nevertheless gravely unwilling to suffer it, only venial sin is committed against justice, but there may be a mortal sin done against charity, as when one steals a worthless trinket, knowing that the owner is so unreasonably attached to it that the loss will almost break his heart or will provoke in him violent anger, profanity, etc.;

(b) mortal sin is also committed when injury is done to a public right in a matter so important that the community is with good reason gravely averse to the commission of the injury. This happens when the common good is directly attacked, as when a citizen rebels against lawful government, or when the peace and security of the community is imperilled because of injury done to a private person, as when one steals a sum that is considerable from a wealthy person, even though the latter will not seriously feel the loss. Hence, an injury to a private person that does not seriously harm him may seriously harm the community, and be gravely sinful on account of the disastrous consequences to social order that would follow if such an injury were not gravely forbidden.

Moral Species of Legal and of Particular Injustice.—These are distinguished according to the main classes of objects or rights that are injured or offended (see 199). Hence, there are the following four kinds of injustice:

(a) injuries to spiritual rights or goods, whether natural or supernatural (e.g., superstition, idolatry, simony);

(b) injuries to internal goods of soul (e.g., lies) or of body (e.g., murder, mutilation);

(c) injuries to external goods, whether incorporeal (e.g., calumny) or corporeal (e.g., theft, fraud).

Accidental Forms of Injustice.—There are also many accidental forms of injustice, that is, variations that do not of themselves change the moral species (see 200).

(a) Thus, as to its manner, injustice is done either positively, by action (e.g., by stealing from an employer), or negatively, by omission (e.g., by allowing another to steal from one’s employer). In both cases the same kind of injustice is committed; for example, he who permits theft is just as much a thief as if he had stolen himself.

(b) As to its consequences for the injured person, injustice is either merely injurious or injurious and damaging, according as a strict right is violated without loss (e.g., adultery from which no child is born), or with loss to the injured party (e.g., adultery from which a child is born). The character of the sin is the same in both cases, but in the latter case restitution is due (cfr. 1199, 1200). The loss (damnum) that results from violation of a strict right (injuria) may be in internal goods (such as salvation, life, health, sanity of mind) or in external goods (such as reputation, money, property).

(c) As to its consequences for the party who does the injury, injustice is either profitable to him (as in the case of unjust taking) or unprofitable (as in the case of unjust damage). The moral species is the same in either case, for the fact that the unjust person gains by his injustice does not make the injury greater, and the fact that he does not gain does not make the injury less.

Injury is not suffered by one who knows and wills an act that is done contrary to his right (Rule 27 of the Decretals), for such a one cedes his right. Hence, if a man looks out with a smile while neighborhood boys take apples from his orchard and the latter take this as permission, no injustice, material or formal, is done. But the legal maxim needs interpretation, for the following two conditions are necessary in order that there be a surrender of right:

(a) the party who consents must be able to surrender his right, since, if he is not able to do so, his cession is invalid. Hence, one who kills a person asking for death is unjust to God and to the State; one who commits adultery with a woman whose husband gives permission is unjust to the marriage state and the lawful children; one who strikes a cleric who waived his privilege of canon (privilegium canonis) is unjust to the clerical state; one who takes property from a ward with the latter’s consent, is unjust to the estate, since the ward has no authority to alienate it. Many of the martyrs, it is true, wished to lose their lives at the hands of persecutors, but this meant only that they consented to the will of God, not that they consented to their own murder by the tyrants, for they had not the right to give the latter dominion over their lives;

(b) the party who consents must really will to yield his right, and hence, if there is error, fraud, fear or violence, the cession is of no effect. Thus, a buyer who through ignorance takes a defective article or pays an exorbitant price, a workman who through necessity accepts less than a living wage, or a man who yields his purse to a burglar at the point of the revolver, does not surrender his rights, since true consent is wanting. Similarly, when one follows the counsel of Christ not to resist spoliation (Matt., v. 40) or when a saintly person rejoices over injury done him (Heb., x. 34), the intention is not to surrender rights to the unjust, nor to approve their conduct, but to practise heroic virtue by patience, humility, forgiveness, etc.

Internal Injustice.—Does internal injustice (i.e., the intention of injuring another) make an external action unjust?

(a) If the intention makes the external act to be a violation of a strict right, it also makes the external act unjust. Thus, to take a book from another’s room is of itself an indifferent action, for there may be, no violation of right (e.g., when the intention is to borrow), or there may be such violation (e.g., when the intention is to steal).

(b) If the intention does not make the external act a violation of strict right, even though that act be harmful to the other party, it does not make the external act unjust. Hence, if the other party has no strict right against the external act (e.g., Titus sees the house of Balbus on fire, but he is not hired to take care of Balbus’ property, and he gives no alarm in order that the house may burn down) or if the agent has a strict right to perform the external act (e.g., Claudius, a judge, condemns Sempronius, according to law, but his chief intention is the harm he will inflict on the latter), the unjust intention does not make the external act unjust. But in these cases sin, and even grave sin, is committed against charity.

Does Distributive Injustice Oblige to Restitution?—(a) If only distributive injustice is committed (e. g., if a parent gives his children all necessaries but shows special favor to those that are less deserving), there is no duty of restitution, for there is no strict claim to special favors. (b) If commutative injustice accompanies the distributive injustice (e.g., if a ruler acts against his agreement to give the best position to the person who passes the best examination), there is a duty of restitution, for there is a strict claim to rights under contract.

Cooperators and Restitution.—Restitution is owed for cooperation in injustice when the cooperator becomes at least partially an unjust and efficacious cause of damage to another. It should be noted that this cooperation may be of a limited kind, as when it extends only to the mode of the damage, or when it is not indispensable to the commission of the injury.

(a) Thus, he who cooperates only as to the mode of injury is probably liable only for that damage which he added to the substantial damage. Thus, if Balbus intended to steal $10, and Claudius persuaded him to steal $20, it seems that the influence of Claudius extended only to the amount of $10.

(b) He who cooperates, but whose assistance is not necessary, is bound to restitution as a cooperator, since he is an unjust and efficacious cause of damage. Thus, if Caius steals for Sempronius, knowing that, should he refuse, Mercurius would carry out the orders of Sempronius, the readiness to steal on the part of Mercurius does not excuse Caius or make his act any less harmful.

Positive cooperators in injury are bound to restitution when their act is the unjust and efficacious cause of the damage. The principal cases of positive cooperation are the following:

(a) a mandator is a superior who explicitly or implicitly commands an inferior subject to commit an act of injustice, as when a father bids his son to steal. The mandator bids another to act in his name, and therefore he is the principal and not the accessory or secondary cause of injury. He must indemnify both the victim and the agent for losses he caused them; but he is not liable if he effectively recalled his mandate before the damage was done;

(b) an advisor is one who through instruction or persuasion induces another person to commit an injury which is not done in the name of or for the benefit of the advisor himself. He must make restitution both to the person whose injury he recommended and to the person to whom he gave the advice for the damages he brought upon them. Those who give wrong advice in good faith, or who recall their advice before the damage is done, are generally excused from responsibility. Bad example does not seem to be equivalent to bad advice, and he who recommends a lesser evil only because he wishes to prevent a greater one is not an efficacious cause of the lesser evil (see 1502, 1503);

(c) an implicit advisor (palpo) is one who by flattery, excuse, blame, ridicule or other such indirect means leads another to commit injustice against a third party. The implicit advisor is bound to restitution for damages caused or reparation denied through his fault;

(d) a protector or encourager (receptans) is one who knowingly and willingly bestows upon a malefactor, as such, security or comfort, in order that the latter may do injury with greater confidence or omit restitution for evil already done. He is bound to restitution for the unjust damage or retention of property caused by him;

(e) a consenter is one who gives his vote, decision, or approval to injustice, or denies it to justice. He must recall his consent to iniquity before evil results from it, and he must make restitution for damages that depend on his conduct;

(f) a partaker in injustice is one who gives assistance in the commission of injustice, positively and physically, by sharing in the injury or in some previous or subsequent act naturally connected with it. If he is a cooperator in unjust damage, he must indemnify the injured party; if he is a cooperator in unjust retention of property, he must give back to the owner the stolen goods received by him (1774).

Bodily Injuries.-Injustice is done not only by destroying the life of a human being, but also by harming him in his rights to bodily integrity or well-being. The chief bodily injuries are the following:

(a) mutilation, which deprives a person of limbs or members, without inflicting death;

(b) wounding, which by an act of violence (such as a stab or blow) breaks the continuity of the body, or impairs its strength or beauty;

(c) enfeeblement, which impairs or destroys the health, strength, or comfort of the body in unlawful ways (e.g., by deprivation of necessary food, sleep, fresh air, by communication of infection, by beating, hazing, etc.);

(d) restraint, which hinders the lawful exercise of the bodily powers (e.g., by holding a person against his will, by chaining him to a post, by locking him in a room).

Judicial Injustice.—We pass now from injustices committed by deed to those committed by words, and shall consider first unjust words spoken in courts of law and next unjust words spoken in private or outside of legal processes. Judicial injustice will be treated under the following heads: (a) injustice in judges; (b) injustice in plaintiffs or accusers; (c) injustice in defendants; (d) injustice in witnesses; (e) injustice in lawyers.

Unjust Words.—We shall now take up the injustice that is done through words spoken outside of a judicial process, or the classes of verbal injustice that are not peculiar to courts, but are committed on all sorts of occasions, public and private. The principal sins here are distinguished according to the different injuries intended by the sinful speaker, and are as follows:

(a) sinful words that signify or effect in another person the evil of guilt, thereby depriving him of benefits that are connected with virtue. Some evil speakers deprive their neighbor of tributes that are paid to virtue by others, such as honor (injury by contumely), fame (injury by defamation), friendship (injury by whispering); while other evil speakers deprive a person of the tribute of virtue paid by his own conscience, namely, self-respect and peace of mind (injury by derision);

(b) sinful words that signify or effect against another person the evil of punishment. The words are known under the general name of cursing.

What sort of sin is opposed to justice? Up to this point we have treated justice; now we treat injustice, which is the vice opposed to the virtue of justice. Violation of legal justice is contained in transgression of laws, and it is a grave or light sin according as it gravely or lightly injures the common good. Transgression of distributive and vindicative justice is had by acceptance of persons, through which, in the distribution of common goods and burdens, rewards and punishments, regard is not had to the reason of the cause which makes the person worthy, or to the motive of justice, but to the reason of the person, namely of those qualities of his which do not pertain to the matter, e.g., blood relationship, friendship, flattery, etc. This is a grave or light sin according to the matter concerned; and thus the election of an unworthy person even to secular offices, e.g., of governor or judge, is a grave sin. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 63, a. 1. Finally, transgression of commutative justice is properly contained in injury. St. Thomas, Quod. 10, a. 12.

How is injustice repaired? Injustice or injury inflicted on another is repaired through restitution. Restitution is the rendering of another's thing, or the compensation of damage unjustly inflicted. This definition, as is clear, comprehends not only restitution of mutuum, commodatum, deposit, and pledge, where no violation of another's right preceded, but also restitution from actions in which violation of another's right preceded. - Therefore restitution differs from satisfaction in this: that satisfaction is compensation of offense or personal injury through some service, or request for pardon, or some other fine or penalty; but restitution is rendering of a real right, or compensation of real injury. C. A. 1323; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, aa. 1, 5; L. 547. Cf. here n. 1287.

599. • Definition. Injury is the violation of another's right.

Division. It is 1. formal or material, according as it is done knowingly and voluntarily, or without knowledge and consent.

2. Grave or light, according as from it the neighbor suffers grave damage or only light damage.

3. Direct or indirect, according as it is intended in itself, or only foreseen and permitted in the cause.

600. • Principles. I. There is a natural precept promulgated and sanctioned by God, forbidding that the strict right of another be injured; whence every injury is opposed to natural right. The reason is plain from what was said above, n. 523 and following. For since someone has been made the legitimate owner of certain goods, he necessarily must have an inviolable right in them; otherwise his right would be illusory, or would not be a right, which involves a contradiction.

II. Injury, or the wounding of another's right, is a grave sin from its kind. The reason is that it is gravely opposed to right reason, good order, and divine law.

III. Injury is not done to one knowing and willing; because one willing yields from his right, and therefore does not wish the right to be preserved. Hence it is of the essence of injury that it be exercised toward one unwilling, or against one who is unwilling.

Except some cases in which man cannot yield his right, however much he wills: thus a married man cannot by his consent prevent the violation of his wife from being adultery, because nature demands that conjugal right be entirely inalienable. Add for Christians the right of the Sacrament, which cannot be violated. Hence the following proposition was condemned by Innocent XI under n. 50: Copulation with a married woman, with the husband consenting, is not adultery, and therefore it suffices in confession to say that one has fornicated.

601. • Resolutions. 1. Injury is done to one consenting from deceit or fear unjustly introduced, because he either in fact provides no consent, or does not provide it freely, but only to redeem himself from unjust vexation.

2. He likewise sins against justice who kills another willing to be killed. The reason is that God has reserved to himself dominion of human life; but man is merely a usufructuary, who therefore cannot abdicate from himself a right in life. Whence, if not man's right, certainly God's right is violated.

3. A usurer does injury to the borrower paying usury, just as a seller does to a buyer conceding a price beyond the highest for merchandise ¹.

¹ Namely, neither of these is judged to wish to donate; therefore the title is lacking by which the dominion either of the exacted usury or of the excess in price may be transferred.

4. The torturers did injury to the martyrs, although the martyrs desired death and bore it gladly.

602. • Questions. Q. 1. What matter is judged grave or light in injury?

Resp. That matter is judged grave which from its nature, or from the estimation of men, is apt to cause another a sadness difficult to calm, or to dissolve mutual charity. Thus Lacroix, n. 979. - Reuter, n. 436, and others. The reason is that since the end of justice is to promote common peace, public tranquillity, and mutual love through the preservation of rights, that matter is deservedly judged grave which, from its nature or from the estimation of men, can dissolve mutual love with the loss of common peace, or cause sadness difficult to calm.

I said from its nature, etc.; because in establishing a general rule attention must be paid to that which commonly occurs in men using temperate judgment and affection, not to what the tumult and intemperance of passions suggests in those circumstances; for justice follows the guidance of reason and the dictate of prudence.

Q. 2. Whether injury can effectively be inflicted on another through a merely internal act?

Resp. Affirmatively. Because sometimes by an internal act alone the strict right of another can be injured. - This is plain by the example of rash judgment, by which, according to the common sentence, justice toward the neighbor is violated, since each one has a strict right to a good estimation of himself among individuals. - Recall what was said concerning the eighth precept of the Decalogue, n. 465. - Moreover, in this case there is no special difficulty; since, as a merely internal injury inflicts no external damage on the injured person, no exterior reparation is to be made, but only the imprudent judgment of the mind is to be cast aside.

603. • Q. 3. Whether an internal act can of itself bring it about that an external act becomes unjust?

Resp. 1. Negatively, if the external act of itself materially does not injure another's right, notwithstanding the wicked intention of harming in the agent. The reason is that where no right is injured, there can be no injury. Hence one refusing out of hatred to aid another does not sin against justice, unless he is held to do so from office. - Thus most commonly. - Lugo, d. 19, n. 180. - Vogler, n. 400, against a few.

Resp. 2. Likewise negatively, when the agent has the right of directly placing an external act which is harmful to another, even if he acts from the intention of harming. The reason is that a wicked intention cannot make unjust what of itself is just, since it cannot change the nature of the external act. Hence a judge does not sin by an external act against justice by condemning a murderer, out of hatred, to the death deserved; nor a merchant by selling his merchandise at the lowest price so as to deprive other merchants of profits. - Thus most commonly according to Vogler, n. 402, with Lugo, d. 8, n. 79, and d. 18, n. 98.

Resp. 3. But affirmatively, if the external work is indifferent to harming or not harming, apart from the direct right of the agent; for then often the wicked intention determines the external work, so that it becomes harmful. Therefore you do not indeed sin against justice by accepting a thing from the hands of a thief in order to restore it to the owner; but otherwise if you accept it in order to retain it. Nor do you do injury to a friend by taking his book so that you may run through it in passing; but otherwise if in order to steal it.

604. • Q. 4. What if an external work is indeed placed from a bad intention, but it is not truly probable that damage will follow?

Resp. It is disputed among very grave theologians. But the state of the question will be clearer from the following examples. 1. Someone places poison or a snare in a place in which his enemy very rarely passes, but with that intention, that he may be killed if perhaps he passes. 2. A physician uses all the diligence to which he is held, but does not wish to use greater diligence out of hatred, so that the death of the sick man may follow. It is asked whether they are the cause of an unjust death, if in fact it follows. There is a twofold opinion.

The first opinion, which seems the more common, denies. The reason is that on the one hand the external act is not unjust, since the mere possibility of another's damage ought not to be attended to in human affairs; on the other hand the internal act is not made injurious by reason of intention, since intention does not flow into the efficacy of the cause, or into the danger of damage. Wherefore it must be called a cause merely by accident, nor does a wicked intention change its nature. - Thus Lessius, lib. 2, c. 9, n. 133 ². Vogler, n. 404, and not a few others. The second opinion, however, affirms, resting on a foundation not weak. The reason is that in the aforesaid cases homicide is certainly against justice, and is not excused except insofar as it is involuntary. But the intention renders it voluntary. For, intention set aside, it is therefore not voluntary because the one placing the cause is not judged effectively to will the effect, since the effect is not probably connected with the cause; but intention supplies that connection and brings it about that the one operating is the true cause of it, since the intention of the one operating conduces much to the character of cause. Therefore, etc. - Thus Lugo, d. 8, n. 75. - The Salmanticenses. - Lugo moreover warns that in the aforesaid cases, for the character of injury, the foresight of the possibility of damage does not suffice, but the intention of procuring it is also required.

² Cardinal De Lugo (De Iust., disp. 11, n. 80) observes that Lessius, who very often taught that that diversity of intention by which someone does something out of hatred or so that damage may follow matters nothing, so that therefore the obligation of restitution follows, ... at last recurs to that diversity of intention in order to posit or deny the obligation of restoring for damages following from killing... Whence he admits that if one should kill to this end, that the damage of others would follow, he would indeed be held to restitution... He concedes the same thing... with respect to the creditors of the one killed, to whom, if, so that you might harm them, you killed their debtor, you are held to restore the debts which otherwise they could not recover.

Moreover, this inconstancy of doctrine is seen not only in Lessius, but also in others, whom one may see in St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 633). And he indeed, in order to avoid this note, replies that in the aforesaid case not only is there a wicked internal intention, but this breaks forth into a force externally unjust, according as it is the homicide of the debtor, from which the intended damage of the creditors follows. But indeed the difficulty does not seem to be solved by these things, or Lugo's doctrine refuted. For the same killing of the debtor, as St. Alphonsus himself acknowledges, is judged or is not judged the cause of the creditors' damage, and therefore unjust toward them, solely according to the intention of harming or not harming; for otherwise the killer will be held to restitution even if that wicked intention is absent, because an action, if of itself it brings injury to another, imposes the burden of restitution, even if the intention of harming is absent, provided the damage was foreseen. Since, therefore, the exterior force itself becomes unjust toward the creditors only from internal intention, the foundation of the distinction which is assigned between this and the other cases collapses.

Aurelius, a bookkeeper for a certain merchant, writes the books of merchandise and commerce, recording daily in them what is given and received, expenses made, sales, and other contracts. Hence Aurelius knows well that the merchant, who before him and before others simulates by every art that he is an altogether honest man and merchant, proceeds, on the contrary, often with bad faith and fraud, deceives buyers and defrauds partners in commerce. It is indeed difficult for Aurelius to find another merchant, or anyone else, with whom he can exercise his office. But if he himself leaves the office, very many others are already prepared to undertake it.

Q. Can Aurelius continue in such an office?

R. The transcription of what is given and expended, and also of the various contracts, indeed of itself influences nothing in the merchant's frauds. For it supposes these as already done. Wherefore no cooperation in those frauds can be had from this. Nor indeed does the merchant become bolder from this, nor is he confirmed in his frauds, since he thinks that he is held by Aurelius and others as an honest man. Nor likewise, if Aurelius leaves his office, will the aforesaid frauds therefore be impeded. Finally, grave inconvenience is present for Aurelius if he leaves the office. Therefore Aurelius is not held to leave an office of bookkeeper of this sort.

"He does not sin," says La-Croix, l. 2, n. 268, "who assists a usurer in counting monies, in writing bare accounts, which do nothing toward demanding usuries, in carrying a pledge for the security of usury, in friendly demanding usuries, lest the other seem unfaithful. The reason is that these suppose the sin, or merely accompany it, nor is the borrower unwilling with respect to these things. Nevertheless a notary sins when writing a usurious contract, because although the usurer consents, he himself acts against his oath, by which he is held not to serve in unjust acts. And the same is true of witnesses signing such a contract." And St. Alph., l. 2, n. 78, says: "He who assists a usurer only in counting monies, writing accounts, or in carrying a pledge, can be excused from sin by the sole reason of service; but otherwise if he demands usuries, because the demand is cooperation more proximate to the sin of the usurer, even if he demands amicably. But if he were to demand by force or threats, he would not only sin, but besides would be held to restitution."

Another question could be raised in the case, namely whether Aurelius is held to warn buyers and partners of the merchant and others defrauded by him, that they may be on guard for themselves. It seems that one must respond affirmatively, if nevertheless he himself can effect this, due caution having been preserved, without grave inconvenience to himself, and without scandal being provoked from it. For then, from charity, he is held, as much as he can, to impede grave harm to neighbor.

1. Gastonius had made a testament in favor of Fabianus, his nephew. But Florianus, his other nephew, learning this, reports to Gastonius that Fabianus had often spoken badly of him. Gastonius, hearing these things, his testament having been torn up, instituted Florianus himself as his heir, and a little afterward departed from the living.

Q. 1. Does an obligation of restitution arise from unjust damage? — 2. What as to the Case?

R. To the 1st. Affirmatively. For whoever damages someone really takes away from him that in which he damages him. And therefore he is held to restitution of that thing taken away, whether this thing has come to the one causing damage or not. For restitution is not principally ordained to this, that he who has more than he ought should cease to have it, but to this, that to him who has less than he ought, it be supplied. S. Th. 2.2. q. 62. a. 4, 6 ad 1; I. M. 1357 seqq.

To the 2nd. Florianus must restore the inheritance to Fabianus, if, in reporting those evil words, he committed calumny or detraction. For then Florianus impeded Fabianus from certainly obtaining the inheritance by an illicit and unjust means. But otherwise it would have to be said, if Fabianus [printed: Fabianus; sense requires Florianus] with truth and from a reasonable and grave cause had manifested those grave sins of Fabianus, by which Gastonius then judged him unworthy of the inheritance. G. 635; I. M. 1367.

But what if Florianus had simply persuaded Gastonius, yet from hatred toward Fabianus, not to leave the inheritance to Fabianus? Probably then he would be held to nothing. For that persuasion without force, without lie, without deceit and fraud, although it would have been against charity by reason of hatred, nevertheless would not have been against justice. G. 638; I. M. 1368.

2. Ranulfus had instituted Laelius as universal heir. Lying in extreme illness, Ranulfus calls Laelius and asks him to summon a notary. Laelius, fearing that Ranulfus might wish to change his last will to his prejudice, answers Ranulfus that all things had been altogether well done by him; but that it would now be better if, rather than think about death and the testament, he thought about recovering health. Ranulfus acquiesced, and after three weeks he died.

Q. 1. How much must be restored from damage? — 2. What as to the Case?

R. To the 1st. “Someone is damaged in two ways: in one way, because that which he actually had is taken away from him; and such damage must always be restored according to an equal recompense, as if someone damages another by tearing down his house, he is held to as much as the house is worth. In another way, if he damages someone by impeding him from obtaining what was on the way to being had; and such damage need not be recompensed equally, because it is less to have something virtually than to have it actually. But he who is on the way to obtaining something has that only according to virtue or potency, and therefore, if it were rendered to him so that he would have this actually, there would be restored to him what was taken away, not simply, but multiplied; which is not of the necessity of restitution. Nevertheless he is held to make some recompense, according to the condition of persons and of affairs.” S. Th. 2.2. q. 62. a. 4.

For that which is not yet had actually, but only virtually, can still be impeded in many ways. Wherefore the value of each is not the same. But for determining this value, the conditions of persons and of affairs must be attended to; whence the hope of the thing to be had is not always established as the same, but as greater or less, as can be seen in relation to a future harvest, e.g., in him who has not yet scattered seed in the field, or has already scattered it, or the harvest is now near maturity, or the harvest is now mature and soon to be gathered. And therefore, consequently, the value of the aforesaid hope is not the same. I. M. 1359.

To the 2nd. It indeed does not appear from the Case that Laelius acted illicitly, whether against justice or even against charity. For he used no illicit and unjust means for averting Ranulfus from making any change. Nor truly did he act from any hatred against someone, but he wished only to consult his own good; and charity does not obligate someone to consult the good of others rather than his own, or to consult the good of others with notable detriment to himself. Besides, Ranulfus signified no will in particular why he wanted the notary to be called. And if in truth he had the will of changing something in the testament, he withdrew from that will, since he altogether acquiesced in the response of Laelius, nor during three whole weeks did he speak any more of calling the notary, or of making some change in the testament.

But what? if Ranulfus had signified the will of adding some legacy in the testament in favor of some determinate person, and Laelius had promised that he would soon call the notary with the intention of not calling him, and afterward did not in fact call him; or if he had said, lying, that it was impossible for the notary to come. In such a case Laelius would have impeded Ranulfus from making the legacy by fraud, by a feigned promise, and by a damaging lie. Wherefore he would be held on this head to restitution or reparation of the damage. But since there still would not be altogether certain evidence concerning the will of Ranulfus, restitution would have to be made only pro rata of the hope. For the legatee as yet had no right to the legacy itself; nevertheless he had a right not to be fraudulently impeded from obtaining the legacy. It would be very difficult in practice to assign the quantity, if Ranulfus himself had not declared the quantity of the legacy to be constituted. But if he had declared that quantity, it seems sufficient if he restore half the part. And if Ranulfus had signified the will of a legacy, and had also declared its quantity, but had not manifested the person, then the aforesaid restitution would have to be made to the poor, or to pious causes. G. 636, 637, 853.

3. “Whether a Christian faithful who knowingly and willingly destroys and ruins the walls, doors, and implements of a temple, and for that cause is captured by the pagans, ought or can repair the damage, at least under another title? — R. He is held to restitution, by title of justice.” S. I. C. 21 Sept. 1842.

4. Hircinus killed Beraldus. The family of Beraldus abounds in many riches. Nevertheless the confessor of Hircinus obligates him to restitution both toward the nearer connections of Beraldus and toward the more remote relatives.

For he says that Hircinus [is bound] in place of Beraldus to furnish support to this man’s blood-relatives.

5. Iacobus killed Marcus, who brought no help to his family, but on the contrary impoverished it by his vices. Nevertheless the confessor of Iacobus obligates him to restitution, because, he says, Iacobus could have returned to better fruit and helped his family.

6. Ubaldus challenged Sabianus to a duel; and, the duel having followed, he was unhappily killed by Sabianus, leaving in extreme misery his mother, wife, and children, whom he himself was sustaining.

Q. What as to the Cases?

R. 1. Since the family of Beraldus, and his nearer blood-relatives, namely his wife, parents, and children, can easily provide for themselves, Hircinus seems to be excused from restitution toward them. For the homicide is obligated to restitution toward nearer relatives only insofar as relatives of this sort are considered one and the same person with the deceased, and have the right, from strict piety, to be sustained by the deceased; and consequently the deceased in turn could and ought to have sustained them. Whence it also is that Hircinus is not held to restitution toward the other more remote relatives. For as to these, if they undergo any damage, the homicide is their cause only remotely and by accident. Therefore the reasoning of the confessor rather proves the contrary in the Case. G. 733, 734; I. M. 1373.

2. Iacobus does not seem, in the Case, to be held to any restitution: for in fact he inflicted no damage as to the goods of the family. Indeed, on the contrary, he prevented a greater damage of goods. But the hope of the conversion of Marcus appears altogether slight, since rather the presumption in itself is contrary, namely that Marcus would have continued, as he did before, in wasting the goods of the family. Wherefore no certain obligation of restitution can be imposed for damages so uncertain and remote. G. 735, 736; I. M. 1373.

3. Sabianus is probably not held to the compensation of damages. For first, Ubaldus by his own consent placed the whole necessary and sufficient cause of his own damages, namely by consenting that his adversary act against him as much as he can, even by killing him. Therefore he implicitly consents also to temporal damages, if any perhaps he himself is to suffer from the wound received, and consequently he is judged to remit the obligation of repairing these damages. No injury is done to one knowing and willing, when a right can be remitted. But a duelist can well remit temporal goods, and renounce his right in order that damages inflicted on him be repaired by the other.

Besides, for the same reason, because Ubaldus by his own consent placed the whole necessary and sufficient cause of the damages which were inflicted on his own relatives, neither is Sabianus probably held, as to them, to compensate the damages. For this consent of Ubaldus standing, every reason of injury and injustice done by Sabianus to the aforesaid relatives ceases; and so there will no longer be any obligation from justice to compensate the aforesaid damages.

For a killer is held to the compensation of damages in relation to the nearer relatives of the one killed because he himself, from his unjust action, by killing, e.g., the father, is the cause per se of those damages. Wherefore this right of the nearer relatives is not founded in the obligation which the father, e.g., had of feeding children and wife, but in the injury by which through force the killer impeded that which the children and wife would have had from the living father; which injury gives to the children a right of justice to having that which they would have had from the father without such obligation of justice, but from piety only. Whence the right to that compensation is not acquired by the one killed himself, nor is it derived from him into others, but is immediately acquired by those others, whose individual right has been injured, and to whom individually an injury has been inflicted. And thus the father cannot dispose of this injured right of others, nor remit the obligation of compensation. “You have a very good example of this doctrine when by force or deceit you impede Peter from conferring a benefice upon Paul, in which case afterward you are held to restore to Paul as much as that hope is worth; and this debt indeed cannot be condoned by Peter, whom you impeded, but by Paul, concerning whose damage there is question.” Lugo d. 11. n. 63, 64.

Hence in the case of a duel, the obligation of damages ceases also as to others. For in relation to these, the action of the killer is no longer unjust, that is, impeding by force their support or emoluments. For by this very fact, that the one killed himself consents to his own killing, the killer now does not impede by force the support or emoluments of others, but from the consent and will of him from whom they would have had the emoluments, and who consequently by his own consent places the whole necessary and sufficient cause of their damages, thus impeding by his own consent the reason of violence and injustice in the killer as to the damages that are to follow to the relatives. But when the reason of violence has been taken away, the root of the obligation of restitution of damages ceases, which is the violence by which the killer impedes the emoluments of others. Wherefore the killer then sins only insofar as he cooperates, e.g., with a father who, notwithstanding that debt of feeding his own, wishes to be killed with damage to them; and since this in the father is not against justice, neither is it in the cooperator, in order to them, but only against charity and piety. It would consequently be otherwise if the one killed were held toward others from justice, and not only from charity or piety. Lugo d. 11. n. 71, 72; G. 735, 736; I. M. 1373, 1375.

7. Carpophorus contracted very many debts because of extraordinary luxury and rather frequent banquets, to which Bertha his wife cooperated not a little. But behold, the husband being seized by sudden death, the creditors immediately came together from every side to the widow Bertha, who received nothing from her husband, since he left nothing after his death except debts. Wherefore, pressed by these straits, Bertha asks her confessor whether she is held from her own goods to pay the aforesaid debts.

Q. 1. Does an obligation of restitution arise from cooperation? — 2. What as to the Case?

R. To the 1st. Affirmatively. Since “to restore imports the rendering of that thing which has been unjustly taken away, for thus by its repeated presentation equality is repaired,” S. Th. 2.2. q. 62. a. 2, whoever is either directly or indirectly the cause of an unjust acceptance is held to restitution. “Directly indeed when someone induces another to accepting, and this indeed in three ways: first, from the side of the acceptance, by moving him to the acceptance itself, which indeed happens by commanding, counseling, expressly consenting, and praising someone as if strenuous because he accepted another’s things; in another way, from the side of the one accepting, namely because he receives him, or in whatever way bears help to him; in a third way, from the side of the thing accepted, namely because he is a participant in the theft or rapine, as a companion of the evil deed. But indirectly, when someone does not impede, although he can and ought to impede; either because he withholds a precept or counsel which would impede the theft or rapine; or because he withholds his help, by which he could oppose; or because he conceals after the deed; which things are comprised in these verses: Command, Counsel, Consent, Flatterer, Recourse, Participant, Silent, Not opposing, Not manifesting.” S. Th. 2.2. q. 62. a. 6.

To the 2nd. From the fact that Bertha merely cooperated with the extraordinary luxury by which her husband was living, and by which consequently he wanted the whole family to live, by complying with her husband, and also consequently by delighting herself and taking pleasure in the display of such luxury, Bertha does not seem obligated to restitution in place of her husband. For in this mode of acting there does not appear efficacious and unjust cooperation toward contracting those debts. In truth, the obligation of restoring is personal and real. Insofar as personal, it obligates the one causing damage himself, and his cooperators. But insofar as real, it affects the thing taken away by theft. But Bertha, just as she was not cooperating in cause with the debts contracted by her husband, so she accepted nothing from her husband. But if Bertha had induced her husband to contract those debts; or even if she herself had induced her husband to the aforesaid luxury, knowing well that his fortune did not suffice for such a manner of living, and consequently that he had to contract debts which he himself was unequal to paying, then indeed Bertha would have cooperated efficaciously and unjustly toward them, and so would be held to pay those debts from her own goods. G. 385; La-Croix l. 3. p. 2. n. 381.

Order of the Section. - As many as there are kinds of justice, so many are the opposed kinds of injustice. These must be treated in order. Therefore we shall assign two shorter titles to the injustice which is opposed to legal justice and to distributive justice; but we shall reserve the third title for violations of commutative justice and their consequences.

Usefulness. - In this title chiefly the error must be set aside which, having followed the "individualism" of the nineteenth century, almost dispenses citizens from offices toward the republic; and a right estimation concerning the obligation of taxes must be acquired by us.

In our work we have abstained from the name of social justice, lest we increase the confusion under which not a few labor, who practically equate legal justice with a particular virtue. For while for some social justice is the same as legal justice, others, by that word, better call together the complex of virtues which come into use in society.

Nature and Accusation of Sins. Every sin contains a material violation of legal justice. For every sin is forbidden by law at least divine. Yet that malice regularly is not to be declared, both because, when the sin has been indicated, it is already sufficiently understood, and because for the most part it will not be formal. For this requires an action done from contempt of the common good, which therefore is opposed to legal justice by a formal reason and, as such, is to be indicated. Since that virtue lacks a special matter, a material violation is not specified by it. Acts specially harmful to the common good, for example betrayal of the fatherland, will have to be indicated as such, as gravely opposed to piety and charity.

On Taxes to Be Paid. 1. In difficult circumstances of the republic, it belongs to a good citizen that he bring aid to his city even by monies liberally offered. How much more will he pay just taxes, according to his proportionate part, to the ruling treasury! Wherefore this rule must always be inculcated, that taxes be contributed according to the sufficiently general usage of upright persons; and today not a few republics labor under such manifest need that a reasonable contribution does not seem able to be denied without sin against piety. Yet, considering the quantity which could be subtracted, and considering the pecuniary penalties by which frauds are punished, grave sin will rarely be certain; but we do not deny that one can sin gravely.

2. But from the common opinion, there is no obligation of conscience positively to declare things subject to tax. Wherefore commutative justice is not violated by those who, in making instruments of sales, indicate a price below the true one, or do not manifest all movable goods which pertain to the inheritance. And where this practice has sufficiently prevailed, not even truth is offended by that lesser declaration. Yet he who uses false certificates of physicians, etc., to increase the debts of an inheritance, will be guilty of a lie. Moreover, observe that a notary has not been constituted to protect the rights of the treasury, so that, with justice uninjured, he can be a participant in fraud. But if an oath is requested, religion itself per se will oblige that you respond sincerely according to the just mind of the one asking.

Wherefore where an oath is requested merely to protect the rights of heirs, not at all to protect the rights of the public treasury, it can be sworn that nothing has been concealed by him who was conscious of no thing iniquitously concealed, so that the rights of the heirs have remained intact.

But if a sworn declaration is requested for the utility of the treasury, that obligation, today sufficiently odious, nevertheless cannot tend to this, that from it religious men be compelled to bear an unequal burden of taxes. Wherefore according to the reasonable mind of the one asking, and therefore without perjury, he will have responded who, under oath, declares accurate indications which have been made according to received usages.

3. Moreover, before the proportionate part to be paid by each has been defined by the officials set over this, no right seems to have been acquired for the treasury.

4. When that definition has been made, the question concerning the obligation of justice of paying just taxes is probably controverted. Certainly power is not lacking to the civil prince to oblige citizens to pay the just part of taxes. But already before our age, to many the mind of the legislator seemed to be no other than that of fining detected defrauders. Today the intention of obliging conscience becomes less probable. Therefore, unless the general persuasion of the region is different, and this must be trusted, we shall deny a strict obligation of justice. Yet those will violate justice who use unjust means.

Nor can those be excused who wish to exercise fraud as an art: both because, from the intention of using force against officials, they bear a mind contrary to justice; and because they expose themselves to dangers of ruin and penalties, and thus offend charity toward themselves and their family.

5. But those who, by corrupting officials set over taxes, have obtained immunity for themselves, are formal accomplices of those officials who violate the duties of their office, so that they are guilty of injury against the republic. Just taxes are supposed.

6. But insofar as by withdrawing their goods from the treasury they are an indirect cause why others are burdened more, they commit no injustice toward those persons: neither commutative nor distributive. Not commutative, because the greater burden of others, if any results from this, follows no unjust action toward others. Not distributive, since they do not themselves have the positive care of equal partition.

It is useful to add this. If they could be more secure concerning the reasonable use of public monies, upright and Catholic men would contribute monies more willingly and would act more scrupulously in this matter.

Today, the ease with which theologians excuse tax frauds from sin is not rarely presented as scandalous. But of what kind is that scandal: of the little ones, or Pharisaic? Let them observe first that by Catholic theologians those arts are condemned as strict injustice by which those who conduct purchases and agreements for the city assign to themselves part of the public monies; and every dilapidation of the common patrimony; indeed, already the very sloth by which public offices are conducted without true solicitude for the common utility; so that, if heed were paid to moral theology, the treasury would gain many more monies than it loses on account of the benignity of theologians. If besides you weigh the unjust place into which, in more than one state, Catholics are thrust down, so that they are in great part excluded from public offices, and that full liberty of conscience of living according to the precepts of the Catholic religion is denied to them, which is offered so liberally and rashly to the haters and disturbers of social peace; if you consider in your mind the laws which Catholics must tolerate, by which, for example, public monies, and therefore monies contributed by Catholics themselves, are destined for the scholastic propagation of irreligion: with what face will men who are witnesses, and perhaps authors, of such abuses accuse theologians of excessive indulgence, and demand that for laws often unjust, obligations of conscience be urged which they themselves generally repudiate?

— Yet to the State which exercises the business of transporting letters, goods, persons, a just price from commutative justice is owed by those who, for example by taking an ordinary place, tacitly enter with it into a contract of carriage. A just price, I say, not that which it seeks beyond this on account of monopoly, as it is accustomed to do in selling tobacco, etc.; that is to be paid as a tax.

Nor will he be accused of injustice who, contrary to "postal" laws, enclosed in customary letters certain things forbidden or specially to be taxed, nor he who, after paying the price of an inferior class, should make a journey in a coach of a superior class. For provided that the lowest price of carriage or journey is paid, those accidental frauds are judged to be urged only by penalties. Except if someone has used an unjust means. Cf. Prummer, II, 85.

On Military Service. The obligation of military service has the true nature of a tax. The laws by which it is imposed are commonly held as penal, the more so because they seem to recede sufficiently from the equality of justice. Where those are designated by lot who must earn stipends, those who by fraud evade service do not violate commutative justice, even if by accident, from the disposition of law, another must be substituted. For they are prohibited by no right of this person from taking thought for themselves. He who by agreement has obligated himself to occupy the place of another in the camps, if he has fled, per se is held for the whole damage which from this is suffered by those with whom he has agreed. Yet unforeseen conditions of intolerable cruelties or of very grave spiritual danger can furnish a just cause for deserting military service; and then, with the contract rescinded, only the price in proportion to the time which remains would have to be refunded. Indeed he is freed from this obligation if the other, for whom he is substituted, nevertheless remains exempt, since then he has truly furnished the promised immunity. Similarly, from commutative justice he is held to earn stipends who has bound himself to the State by free enlistment.

But in time of war, those who desert the military station are punished by a graver penalty; nor, in a just war, do they seem to us able to be excused from grave impiety toward the fatherland.

But the very grave penalties by which they would be punished if they returned will easily dispense them from the obligation which they would otherwise have of returning to the camp.

— 1. The material violation of legal justice which is contained in every sin need not be accused distinctly; the formal violation would have to be: this is committed by him who acted from an intention contrary to the common good. But acts specially harmful to the common good, such as betrayal of the fatherland, are to be noted as such, as gravely opposed to piety and charity.

2. On Taxes. By not paying taxes in that way in which they are customarily paid by good citizens, a sin against piety toward the fatherland is easily committed, besides the notion of scandal; yet the sin will rarely be grave, on account of the slight effect of an individual defraudation.

But the legislator, both civil and ecclesiastical, can urge the obligation of conscience by his precept; indeed, he can exact just taxes from commutative justice. Yet a positive obligation of declaring things liable to tax is generally not admitted; nor is a right judged to have been acquired for the treasury before it has been defined what each must pay. Indeed, when that determination has been made, the obligation of justice is not yet demonstrated. But justice itself forbids that you corrupt public officials; nor do those seem able to be excused from grave sin who wish to exercise fraud as an art.

3. To the State which exercises a business, for example of transporting letters, goods, persons, the just price, not that which besides it exacts in the manner of a tax, must be paid, commutative justice itself wills. Yet accidental frauds of using a coach of a superior class, etc., seem to be punished only by penalties.

4. A law which binds citizens to military service is held as penal. Yet those who, in a just war, desert the military station which had been committed to them gravely offend piety toward the fatherland.

Private persons who, by withdrawing themselves or their goods from the treasury, have been the cause per accidens why others are more burdened, do nothing which is injurious to these.

Usefulness. - The frequent omission of offices demonstrates how useful it is to recall, even in a few words, the duties in conferring offices and in exacting taxes.

On Acceptance of Persons. One sins by the vice of acceptance of persons when, in the distribution of common goods, in conferring public offices, attention is paid to those conditions of the person which, for the matter at issue, would plainly have to be neglected.

Here offices or public functions properly so called are to be distinguished, which are exercised in their proper name for the common utility by those who hold them; and certain secondary offices, by which officials properly such are merely helped, such as their secretaries or copyists attached to their persons.

1. The former offices today are in the private dominion of no one. They belong to the republic. Therefore in the first place they are to be conferred in that mode which the common good demands; then, with the common good saved, according to the rules of distributive justice. Wherefore strictly they are to be conferred on the more worthy, that is, on him whose nomination, all things considered, will more profit the republic. Although others think it suffices that they be attributed to the worthy: their opinion rests upon an antiquated regime in which all magistrates were judged to represent one Prince, who through others did what he could not do by himself, so that it sufficed for him to procure through others that moderate diligence by which he himself was held in acting. We do not deny extrinsic probability to that opinion.

2. As to the latter offices, it is enough to choose worthy persons, who do not harm the common good and truly merit the public stipends.

3. In either case, those who assume the unworthy where worthy persons are present sin against commutative justice toward the state, and they will have to repair the damages brought from this to the state or to private persons.

4. But no restitution is owed to those who are passed over, unless, from a competition having been announced, the victor acquired a right to nomination.

Moreover it must be noted that competitions can be made in two ways: so that the qualified may be discerned, from among whom then one may be freely chosen by the Superior; or in such a way that a strict right of obtaining the office is assigned to the victor. Only in the latter case is commutative justice violated toward competitors merely passed over. If the one elected is so unworthy that he receives a stipend without cause, that stipend will have to be restored to the republic.

— But by an inequitable distribution of burdens, for example of taxes, commutative justice itself is violated toward private persons; for citizens have a strict right not to be despoiled of their goods beyond what they must contribute.

— 1. One sins by the vice of acceptance of persons when, in conferring public offices or distributing common goods, attention is paid to those conditions of the person which, for the matter at issue, would plainly have to be neglected.

Today, offices which belong to the republic are, from distributive justice, to be conferred on the more worthy; this canonical law also expressly sanctions concerning parish priests. But secondary offices, by which the principal official is assisted, are to be conferred at least on the worthy.

For the republic has a strict right that, if they are present, worthy persons be assumed, and that public monies not be squandered.

Private persons who have been passed over cannot complain of injustice against commutative justice, unless the competition was announced in that manner which confers a strict right on the victor.

But by an inequitable exaction of taxes, commutative justice itself is violated. For this forbids that citizens be despoiled of their goods.

Notions. Just as the words right and justice are employed in various senses, so also injury and injustice. For first, injustice generally signifies the state of sin or even sin itself; then, everything which is opposed to the cardinal virtue of justice, whether general or particular. Hence transgressors of the law, judges who are acceptors of persons, thieves, robbers are called unjust. Here we do not treat of injustice in the first sense, but only of injustice insofar as it is directly opposed to the cardinal virtue of justice (whether general or particular). - Injustice and injury are sometimes, especially by modern authors, for example Waffelaert,¹ Tanquerey,² distinguished in such a way that injustice signifies the habit, but injury the act. The matter is of small moment.

¹ Tract. de iust. II, n. 2.

² Synopsis Theol. mor. de virt. iust. n. 264.

74. Principle 1. a) Injustice or injury, which is opposed to the cardinal virtue of justice, is a mortal sin from its genus; b) but it can be a light sin either from imperfection of act (i.e. from inadvertence or imperfect consent), or from smallness of matter.

a) Thus all teach. Sacred Scripture itself testifies that at least some acts of injustice are mortal sin; for example: "Do not err: ... Neither thieves ... nor the rapacious shall possess the kingdom of God."³ Moreover if some acts of a vice, without any other moral species added, are mortal sins, it follows that such a vice from its genus is a mortal sin. - The same is clear from reason; for justice is exceedingly necessary for social life, so that it can deservedly be called the foundation of the good and peace of the community, and without it the peaceful cohabitation of men is wholly impossible. Therefore he who gravely violates justice commits great damage and consequently grave sin. Besides, charity can be gravely violated through acts of injustice, which are accustomed to cause sadness, quarrels, hatreds, damages, etc., to one's neighbor. But a violation of charity from its genus is a mortal sin.

b) Therefore injustice from its genus is a mortal sin. But it is most difficult to determine in particular when its individual acts are mortal or venial sins from gravity or lightness of matter. On the contrary, it is not so difficult to determine when there is imperfection of act from inadvertence or from imperfect consent.

As a general rule concerning gravity of matter it can be held: injustice is a grave sin if from it notable damage has arisen either to one's neighbor or to the common good, or, as St. Thomas says:⁴ "Sins which are committed against one's neighbor are to be weighed, in themselves indeed, according to the harms which are inflicted on one's neighbor, because from this they have the ratio of fault." This rule is explained: every injustice causes damage, and indeed ordinarily a twofold damage, namely to one's neighbor and to the common good; for example, a thief taking away a sum of 100 francs causes damage: 1. to the legitimate proprietor, as is clear of itself; 2. to the common good, because he disturbs common peace, public tranquillity, and the mutual conjunction of men. - The same rule can also be expressed in this way: injustice is a grave sin as often as both he who suffers the damage and the governor of the community are reasonably gravely unwilling. Whence, for example, if someone takes 2 francs from a poor workman, that workman himself and the governor are reasonably and seriously unwilling; but if someone takes 100 francs from a very rich man, perhaps great injurious damage is not caused to that man, nevertheless the superior of the community must be gravely unwilling that such thefts be committed in his territory. - If the proprietor is gravely unwilling not on account of the objective value of the thing injured, but on account of a subjective and excessively exaggerated affection for the thing, for example for a beloved little bird, then the voluntary injury of such a thing can indeed be a grave sin against charity, but not against justice.

³ 1 Cor. 6, 10.

⁴ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 73, a. 3.

75. Principle 2. All injuries indeed are opposed to the virtue of justice, but nevertheless they are not of the same lowest moral species, and they are distinguished according to formally diverse objects.

Hence the injustice committed in theft is one thing, that in homicide another, that in detraction another, etc. But the reason is that diverse vices can be opposed to one and the same virtue. Especially two great categories of injustice are customarily distinguished, namely the unjust taking away of another's thing and the unjust damaging of one's neighbor in his diverse goods. Whence we shall treat each category individually below.

76. Principle 3. The unjust, speaking per se and formally, a) no one can do except one willing, b) nor suffer except one unwilling.

Thus St. Thomas writes most truly and in pregnant style.⁵ The first part of this saying is clear of itself, because no one can sin except willingly. But formal injustice is always sin. For formal injustice, which someone knowingly and willingly commits, must be distinguished from material injustice, which indeed objectively violates the right of another, but without fault of the agent. Formal injustice, which is opposed to commutative justice and efficiently and really causes damage to one's neighbor, induces an obligation of restitution, but material injustice does not - at least not always - as will be said below.

The other part of the above-mentioned sentence is also expressed in Rule of Law 27 in VI: "To one knowing and consenting, neither injury nor deceit is done"; nevertheless it needs some explanation, because it is not true unless consent has the following conditions: a) that it be free. Whence, for example, if someone compelled by a robber consents that money be taken away from him, he nevertheless suffers injury and can reclaim the money taken away; b) that it be lawful. For in many cases a man cannot lawfully consent, because namely he does not have perfect dominion, or because there is question of inalienable rights; for example, he who kills one consenting sins and commits injustice; likewise he who commits adultery with a wife while the husband consents;⁶ likewise he who strikes a cleric renouncing the privilege of the canon, etc. But when someone has perfect dominion of some thing, then no injury is done to him when he wills it; for example, no injury is done to a rich man having apples in his garden, and not unwilling that neighboring boys usurp those apples, if the boys really take away the apples.

Since, therefore, formal injustice does not proceed except from one knowing and willing it, the question arises how this knowledge and will influence the external act, especially with respect to the obligation of restitution; or more briefly: whether the intention of harming always renders the external act unjust. To this question I answer thus: if someone has the intention of harming another, he indeed sins, for he commits mental injustice, but he is not bound to restitution unless the external act placed from this evil intention is also by itself alone against justice. For example, if a private man, from hatred toward an enemy, does not save his house burning, although he can easily do this, he indeed commits grave sin, but he is not bound to restitution, because the external act of saving the house is prescribed to him not from justice, but from charity alone. The judge who, according to the laws indeed, but chiefly from an intention of harming, condemns the guilty person, sins! But he is not bound to restitution, because his external action is not unjust. But the reason for this response is taken from the character of commutative justice, in which above all the "mean of the thing" must be observed. But there is never an obligation of restitution unless the mean of the thing has in reality been injured.

⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 59, a. 3.

⁶ Cf. proposition 50 condemned by Innocent XI: "Copulation with a married woman, with the husband consenting, is not adultery; and therefore it suffices in confession to say that one has fornicated" (Denz. n. 1200).

Here there is treatment of commutative justice alone, to which injury and injustice are properly opposed. As regards other things, see n. 398.

Since justice is concerned solely with right, the notion of right must necessarily be premised; then the notion of strict justice.

720. Definition. Right is taken in a threefold way: 1. For law, which is the rule of what is just in general: in which sense we say natural right, divine positive right, canonical right, etc. Thus it is the foundation of right in the second sense. - 2. For a legitimate faculty which belongs to someone for doing something freely, or having something for his own convenience. It is active right, in which sense we are said to have a right to something. This is the foundation of right in the third sense. - 3. For that which is just, or owed to another, which therefore has a moral relation with another thing or person. It is passive right, which is the object of justice (Willems, Phil. mor., III, p. 207).

From these things you will gather: 1. Right in one supposes obligation in another, and conversely. Wherefore, in society, all rights depend on one another, to constitute order, nor are they ever really opposed to themselves. Right against right is not given.

2. The ultimate reason of every right is rooted in the obligation of attaining the ULTIMATE END. For by this very fact that some end is to be pursued and obtained, man has a right to those means without which this end cannot be obtained. But all ends are contained under the ultimate end as means to it.

3. Since this obligation of attaining the end is personal, it necessarily involves the faculty of using earthly things independently of another. For whatever is touched, apprehended, or changed by man receives as it were the seal of his person: from this comes the distinction between mine and thine. It will always belong to justice, the tendency toward the end being presupposed, to preserve those things by which mine and thine are distinguished from each other; but it belongs rather to charity, which considers itself in another, to join and unite.

Division. We can distinguish:

1. Right CONCERNING PERSONS, that is, the right which belongs to one person over another; and it is defined: A legitimate power of governing subjects for THEIR convenience.

Of this kind is: a) dominative right of private authority, for example of father over children, husband over wife; - b) right of jurisdiction of public power, which is ordered especially to the common good. Concerning these there has already been discussion.

2. Right CONCERNING GOODS, which is defined: A legitimate faculty of having or doing something for ONE'S OWN convenience. It is imperfect or perfect.

IMPERFECT right, not strict, right improperly such, is that which is not determined, whether in itself, or as regards persons, nor can be demanded by way of coercion. Such is, for example, the right of individuals to alms left by a testator to the poor in general; the right which the worthy have to obtaining functions or offices of the community, etc. (Carriere, de Just., n. 10).

PERFECT right, strict, coercible, right properly such, is that which is determined, both in itself and as regards persons, and can be demanded by way of coercion.¹ Such is the right of defending one's life or reputation, of recovering one's own thing, etc. It is subdivided into right to a thing and right in a thing, as will be explained below (cf. n. 839). - Perfect right is the object of strict justice.

See other distinctions in Lessius, l. c., c. 2.

721. • STRICT or COMMUTATIVE justice is a moral virtue constantly inclining the will to render to each one his own strict right, according to equality of thing to thing.

It is said 1. To render to each one; that is, either positively, when between two persons some contract or quasi-contract has intervened, or some action by which the right of either one has at least materially been violated; or negatively, by harming no one: for as he who renders to another the thing owed, so he who does not take it away is judged to render to him his own right.

2. To each one, private or moral person, his own strict right, that is, right objectively and passively taken, and indeed rigorous, in the sense which will be declared below (n. 723, 724).

3. According to equality of thing to thing, that is, through commensuration of the thing which must be rendered with the right of another (cf. n. 383).

This virtue differs: a) from natural love of neighbor. For love wills the good of another as the good of the beloved, and from complacence in him; but justice wills that good as owed and from simple rectitude of the will; - b) from charity toward neighbor: both because the material object of charity is the person of neighbor, but of justice the right which belongs to neighbor; and especially because the formal object of charity is God Himself, but of justice that special honesty which shines forth in rendering to each one his own right, to equality. Cf. n. 478; - c) from legal and distributive justice, which do not regard strict right, as is plain from what was said n. 400.

722. Definition. Injury is the violation of another's right. - Strictly taken, as in this article, it is the violation of another's perfect right. But injury contains offense and damage. Offense is repaired by satisfaction; damage by restitution.

INJUSTICE has itself toward injury as a habit toward an act, and is an inclination to not rendering to each one his own right.

Division. Injury is: 1. By reason of the act itself, merely internal, or external. Merely internal, intentional, if by thought or purpose the right of neighbor is harmed, for example if someone judges rashly concerning neighbor, or adds to an act which can be good, for example taking away a book in jest, an evil intention, the mind of stealing. It is external, if by an external harmful action the strict right of neighbor is violated, for example by burning a house, and similar things. See n. 726 and 727.

2. By reason of the mode of acting, positive or negative, according as someone inflicts it either by commission, by acting against another's right, or by omission, by omitting to do what is owed to another by strict right.

3. By reason of imputability, material or formal. MATERIAL injury is an involuntary harming of another's right. FORMAL injury is an unjust action or omission, with the mind of harming directly or indirectly: directly, if the harm is intended; indirectly, if it is foreseen when the cause is posited, and permitted.

723. Principles. I. For the notion of injury, whether material or formal, it is required that it be involuntary on the part of the one suffering, that is, against his right will. Rule 27 of law in the Sixth agrees: "To one knowing and consenting no injury is done." The reason is that he who can and wishes to yield his right does not retain it, and therefore no injury is inflicted on him. Besides, no one receives injury from himself; therefore if someone assents that another harm him, it is just as if he himself inflicted harm on himself (St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 59, a. 3).

Hence: 1. Injury is done to him who consents to his own damage not freely, but from force, fraud, or fear unjustly struck in; as also to him who cannot validly renounce his right, because some law or the right of another stands in the way; for in this case at least the higher right is truly violated.

2. Notwithstanding the consent of the one suffering, injury is done: to the traveler who from fear of death hands money to a robber; to the buyer paying for merchandise beyond the highest price; to the worker who in necessity accepts a lesser salary; to the one giving money to him who fraudulently asserts that he is his blood relative, etc.; for none of these is judged to give freely. See however n. 1051.

3. Likewise, injury is done to the cleric who is struck, even if he consents; to the ward who consents that he be deprived of his right; to the husband of a woman committing adultery, even if he approves her adulteries; to martyrs, even if they gladly bear slaughter; indeed also to men themselves who ask to be killed, as unhappy Saul asked; because in all these the right is inalienable, nor can it ever be yielded without injury to others.

724. • II. For the notion of formal injury, it is required besides that it be voluntary on the part of the agent. For the primary reason of formal injury is the mind of harming, since injury without such a mind is only material (Lugo, disp. 8, n. 58; St. Alph., III, n. 551, 556).

Hence, formal injury does not extend more widely than the mind of harming. This again does not extend more widely than knowledge of the damage, because the will cannot choose what is thoroughly and invincibly unknown.

Therefore formal injury is not to be estimated from the damage which followed, but from knowledge of the damage, at least foreseen confusedly; and thus it can happen that it exists as less than the damage: for example, he who destroys a gem of the price of ten gold coins, which he thinks to be worth only five, inflicts an injury of five gold coins only, and the other five are to be referred only to material injury (cf. n. 950).

725. III. Injury is a grave sin from its genus. For it is gravely opposed to right reason and divine law.

We have said: from its genus; whence smallness of matter is admitted in this matter. Moreover, that matter is judged grave which from its nature, or from the common estimation of men, is apt to cause another sadness difficult to quiet, or great damage, or to dissolve mutual charity (Reuter, de Just., P. III, n. 294).

726. IV. Formal injury, the effect having followed, induces the obligation of restitution. Commutative justice regards equality of thing to thing. Whence it must demand the reparation of the harming of rights, if any has been made, and indeed by restitution; because otherwise equality is not had. In other words: as long as inequality remains, so long remains the obligation of reducing equality. Hence, he who does not restore, when he can, sins by preserving inequality, as he sinned by inducing it (cf. n. 924).

It is said: the effect having followed; for injurious acts merely internal do not oblige to external reparation.

727. A fuller explanation of certain things. I. THE SENSE OF THE AXIOMS: To one knowing and consenting no injury is done; to one unwilling unreasonably no injury is done.

Note. The axiom He who is silent seems to consent was explained above (n. 272).

a) The sense of the first is: To him who is not deceived, provided he freely, force and madness being excluded, positively, validly, perseveringly grants the harmful action, as remitting something from his own right, injury is not done, that is, a harmful action containing the formal notion of violated right is not committed against him. From this it does not follow that the action becomes licit, and that the other acquires certain rights; it follows only that the action lacks the guilt of formal injustice. Thus St. Thomas, Lessius, and others. Cf. Vermeersch, de Just., n. 142-155.

b) The sense of the second is: No formal injustice is present if neighbor, from strict justice, is held to yield his right, and does not wish to. But formal injustice is given if neighbor, from motives only of charity, gratitude, and the like, is held to yield, and refuses to do this. - In doubt, consent is presumed, since someone is always supposed to wish to act according to right reason.

Thus indeed the authors commonly. Nevertheless, as Vermeersch says, l. c., they also commonly admit certain exceptions, for example in the case in which someone defers restitution because of fear of danger for himself or his own, see below n. 1018. Therefore there are circumstances in which, from charity only or from epikeia, the owner ought to be willing and consenting; and yet no injury is present if one does not comply with him refusing (cf. n. 987).

II. CONCERNING AN ACTION WITH HARMFUL INTENTION. There is not one mind of authors concerning the question: Whether intention added to an external act makes this act become unjust.

What things are commonly admitted we shall indicate here.

a) If the action does not of itself harm the undoubted right of another, it does not become unjust from the intention of harming. If the intention is conceived from hatred, or from vengeance, anger, etc., it indeed adds sin, but not formal injury. Hence, they do not act unjustly: the lustful master who dismisses a modest maidservant, we suppose the conditions of the pact to have been observed; a judge condemning a homicide from hatred; a fellow citizen who from hatred refuses to succor another, except if by office he were held to this. Cf. Lugo, disp. 19, n. 110. See what is to be said n. 949.

b) If the action is indifferent, it can become unjust through intention, namely insofar as precisely the intention gives the species and nature of injury to the action. Thus to take a thing from the hands of a thief, with the intention of restoring it, is something good; but with the intention of retaining it, is something unjust.

c) If the action includes force or fraud in itself, a special intention directed against someone can effect that also with respect to this person it become unjust. Thus he who kills a man precisely so that creditors may be deprived of the obtaining of a just good acts unjustly also toward the creditors. Thus St. Alphonsus, III, n. 633, 634; ed. G., II, p. 111, with Lugo, Salmant.

As regards the last, there is disagreement of authors; see in Lehmkuhl, I, n. 1180, note. They rely on this reason, that intention cannot render unjust what from its nature does not harm strict right.

GENERAL DIVISION. There are as many species of injuries as there are goods or rights in which neighbor can be harmed. But four goods of man are numbered: 1. goods of one's own life, namely of body and soul, concerning which now; - 2. goods of modesty and of the life of the species, concerning which in the sixth precept; - 3. goods of fortune, concerning which in the seventh precept; - 4. finally goods of reputation and honor, concerning which discussion must be instituted in the eighth precept (cf. n. 324, 528).

688. Definition. - Injury is the violation of strict right.

Division. - It is 1° formal or material, according as it is done knowingly and voluntarily, or without knowledge or consent.

2° Grave or light, according as from it damage absolutely or relatively grave, or altogether light, is caused.

3° Direct or indirect, according as it is intended in itself, or only foreseen and permitted in the cause (n. 6. 8).

689. Principles. - I. There is a natural precept promulgated and sanctioned by God, forbidding that the strict right of another be injured; hence every injury is opposed to natural right. For since someone has been made the legitimate owner of certain goods, necessarily he ought to have an inviolable right in them; otherwise his right would be illusory, or would not be a right, which involves a contradiction.

II. Injury, or the wounding of another's right, is a grave sin from its kind. The reason is that it is gravely opposed to right reason, to good order, and to the divine law.

III. No injury is done to one knowing and willing; because one who wills yields from his right, and therefore does not wish the right to be observed. Understand this, provided it is a question of a right from which one can yield; and hence:

Except those cases in which a man cannot yield his right, however willing he may be, either because it is of itself inalienable, or because it cannot be yielded without injury to others. Thus a married man cannot by his own consent prevent the violation of his wife from being adultery, because nature demands that conjugal right be altogether inalienable. Add, for Christians, the right of the Sacrament, which cannot be violated. Cf. prop. 50 among those condemned by Innocent XI, p. XVI.

690. Resolutions. - 1° Injury is done to one consenting because of fraud or fear unjustly struck into him, because in reality he either gives no consent, or does not give it freely, but only in order to redeem himself from an unjust vexation.

2° He likewise sins against justice who kills another asking it; the reason is that God has reserved to Himself dominion over human life. Man, however, is merely a usufructuary, who therefore cannot abdicate from himself the right to life; hence if not a man's right, certainly God's right is violated.

3° A usurer does injury to the borrower paying usury, just as a seller does to the buyer conceding a price above the highest for the merchandise; for neither of these is judged to wish to make a gift. Therefore there is lacking a title by which dominion either of the exacted usury or of the excess in the price is transferred.

4° The torturers did injury to the martyrs, even if the martyrs desired death and bore it gladly.

691. Questions. - Query 1° What matter is judged grave or light in injury?

Resp. That matter is judged grave which, from its own nature or from the estimation of men, is apt to cause in another a sadness difficult to settle, or to dissolve mutual charity. - Thus Lacroix,² and others. The reason is that, since the end of justice is to promote common peace, public tranquillity, and mutual love by the conservation of rights, that matter is deservedly judged grave which, from its own nature or from the estimation of men, can dissolve mutual love with loss of common peace, or can cause a sadness difficult to settle.

I said: from its own nature, etc.; because in establishing a general rule that must be attended to which commonly happens among men using a temperate judgment and affection, and not what the tumult and intemperance of the affections suggests in those circumstances; for justice follows the guidance of reason and the dictate of prudence.

Query 2° Can injury be inflicted effectively upon another by a merely internal act?

Resp. Affirmatively. Because sometimes by an internal act alone the strict right of another can be injured. - This is clear from the example of rash judgment, by which, according to the common opinion, justice toward one's neighbor is violated, since each one has a strict right to the good estimation of himself among individuals. - Recall what was said n. 537. - Moreover, in this case there is no special difficulty; since, when merely internal injury inflicts no external damage upon the injured party, no exterior reparation is to be made, but only the imprudent judgment of the mind must be rejected.

692. • Query 3° Can an internal act of itself effect that an external act become unjust?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if the external act of itself does not injure the strict right of another, notwithstanding a depraved intention of harming in the agent. The reason is that where no right is injured, there can be no injury. Hence one refusing through hatred to succor another does not sin against justice, unless he is bound by office. - Thus most commonly. - Lugo¹ against a few.

Resp. 2° Likewise negatively, when the agent has a right directly to place the external act which is harmful to another, even if he acts from the intention of harming. The reason is that a depraved intention cannot make unjust what of itself is just, since it cannot change the nature of the external act. Hence a judge condemning from hatred a murderer to the death merited does not sin by an external act against justice; nor a merchant selling his wares at the lowest price, in order to deprive other merchants of profits; nor one who dismisses a maidservant, the conditions of the agreement made with her being kept, although he acts with an unjust mind, for example in order to punish her because she did not wish to consent to his lust. Thus Lugo.

Resp. 3° Also negatively, if the external act is only an accidental or occasional cause, but not the per se cause of the neighbor's damage. Thus the intention of a murderer killing another for this reason, that his crime may be imputed to an innocent man, will not effect that his action is the cause of the innocent man's damage.² (n. 746. 2°.)

Resp. 4° Affirmatively, however, if the external work is indifferent to harming or not harming, the direct right of the agent being set aside; for then the intention of harming determines the external work, so that it becomes damaging. Therefore you do not indeed sin against justice by receiving a thing from the hands of a thief, so that you may restore it to the owner; otherwise, however, if you receive it in order to keep it. Resolve the same concerning a servant receiving the master's money: for he will not be unjust if he receives it in order to buy something for the use of the family; but he will be, if he steals it in order to spend it for his own uses. Nor do you do injury to a friend by taking his book in order to run through it in passing; otherwise, however, if in order to steal it. Nor will he be called a thief who takes another's money, without damage to that other, for his own uses, with a mind firmly determined to restore it as soon as possible; although that manner of acting, by which he exposes himself to danger of injustice and usurps the thing without the owner having been informed, must be disapproved.

From this head very many bankers have sinned, usurping money entrusted to them, even with the intention of returning it; which, nevertheless, being frustrated in hope, they were not able to accomplish.³

Resp. 5° Affirmatively also, if the intention comes forth into an unjust means by which someone is deprived of a good probably to be obtained (n. 757. q. 15°), as if someone intending to harm a creditor were to kill this creditor's debtor.⁴

Here only injuries in goods of fortune are to be treated, namely theft and its species. - For enough has been said concerning other injuries, namely in goods of the body, of honor, and of reputation, in the Treatise on the Fifth and Eighth Precepts of the Decalogue.

It must be treated 1° concerning the nature and gravity of theft; 2° concerning the causes on account of which theft ceases to be such.

693. Definition. - Theft, taken generically, is the taking away of another's thing while the owner is reasonably unwilling.

Division. - Theft is thus distinguished:

1° Theft simply, if it is done secretly. - 2° Robbery, if it is done while the owner is positively resisting (morally or physically). - 3° Sacrilege, if it is done concerning a sacred thing.

694. Principles. - I. Theft, by whatever name it is called, is a grave sin from its kind, because of itself it is gravely opposed both to charity and to justice, and in Sacred Scripture it is numbered among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of heaven. For thus the Apostle Paul says:¹ Neither thieves, ... nor the rapacious shall possess the kingdom of God.

II. Sacrilegious theft and robbery constitute a species of malice diverse from theft: the former because besides justice it violates religion; the latter because to the unjust taking away of another's thing it adds injury inflicted upon the person. But the other modes, or the other objects of theft, do not change the species, because through them the nature of the damaging is not changed.

695. Questions. - A. Concerning theft grave of itself. - Query 1° What matter is judged grave in thefts of outsiders?

Resp. 1° According to the common opinion, this matter is not to be looked at absolutely in itself, but relatively to the various conditions and necessities of men, so that a graver matter is required for grave sin in theft against a rich man than against a poor man. The reason is that the gravity of theft, like the gravity of any injury, depends especially upon the greater or lesser privation, pain, and reluctance of the will which he from whom it is stolen suffers; but now no one fails to see that the same matter causes sadness now light, now grave, according as the owner from whom it is taken is rich or poor. - Thus commonly with S. Alph.² against some, who contend that matter, whether grave or light, must be looked at absolutely in itself, and that it consists in that which is required for the daily support of an honorable man or of one moderately rich.

Yet some absolute matter must be determined, which it is never licit to pass beyond without grave fault; otherwise, if complete proportion had to be preserved among all conditions, surely the greatest quantity would be required for grave matter when someone steals from a very rich man. But this would certainly yield to the harm of society. - Hence:

Resp. 2° According to S. Alph.,¹ and with attention to the circumstances of this region and of our times, it will be grave approximately - relatively 1) to beggars, $0.50, and less if some poor man would not collect so much daily; 2) to diggers and similar laborers, $1.00; to artisans and merchants of slender fortune, $1.25; 3) to those moderately rich or living from their own incomes, $2.00, but less if from their own they live wretchedly; but relatively to the absolutely rich, for example merchants sufficiently wealthy, $2.50 or $3.00; 4) to a wealthy community, $5.00, or even, if it is very wealthy, $7.50; 5) to the very rich, $10.00, which sum indeed can be judged absolutely grave.

In practical doubt, generally that which does not reach $2.50 or $3.00 is not to be reputed grave.

Resp. 3° The value of a sacred thing, as to the physical species estimable by price, for example of a chalice, is the same as that of a profane thing; otherwise, as in Relics, its dignity and rarity must be considered,² or the special prohibition of the Church (n. 1730).

696. • Query 2° What matter is required, so that thefts of wives, children, and servants become grave?

Resp. 1° It is certain that in thefts of a wife and of children more is required than in thefts of outsiders; because the father of the family is less unwilling, or at least less reasonably unwilling, in the former case than in the latter, and often he is unwilling more as to the mode (that it is taken secretly) than as to the substance;³ but no general rule can be assigned. For the matter must generally be defined from the various circumstances of persons or conditions. Thus S. Alph.⁴ with others resolves that a son does not sin gravely who steals two or three scuta from a rich father (today and among us, I think, he would say $10 or 15).

Resp. 2° For servants it depends also upon the greater or lesser liberality of the masters, upon the quality or situation of the thing stolen, for example if it is edible or not, guarded or open, etc. According to the common opinion, through small thefts committed by servants in foods and edible things which are not usually kept carefully, generally one does not arrive at mortal sin, provided these things are not sold or carried out of the house, or taken in extraordinary quantity, or are of extraordinary price.¹ But if servants steal money or things carefully guarded, a greater quantity is not required for grave sin, because masters then are not less unwilling toward them than toward others.

Query 3° Must the circumstance be explained by a son, that he stole from his father?

Resp. Negatively, because theft regularly is not directly and gravely opposed to piety, as for example hatred is. I say: regularly; for it is otherwise if the father would suffer much from it concerning his state. Scav.²

697. Questions. - B. Concerning theft grave by accident. - Query 4° In how many ways does theft of matter light of itself become grave by accident?

Resp. 1° By the intention of arriving at grave matter (n. 703. 2°); 2° by conspiracy, where many conspire among themselves and the little thefts of individuals gathered together constitute grave matter (n. 701. 702); 3° on account of grave damage coming to the owner from a light theft (n. 703. 3°); 4° by multiplication, concerning which in the questions n. 697-700.

Query 5° Do multiplied small thefts suffice to constitute grave matter?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively - whether it is a question of thefts committed against the same person, because united they can easily bring grave damage upon the owner; or it is a question of thefts committed to the damage of diverse persons, because, if not to individuals taken singly, certainly they bring grave damage to the community. Cf. prop. 38 condemned by Pius V.

Resp. 2° By multiplication they coalesce into grave matter either physically or morally. Physically, if they are conserved and the heap becomes grave; for then another's property is retained in a notable quantity. Morally, if indeed they are consumed, but between them there intervenes an interval which is morally or proportionately estimated as brief. - S. Alph.,³ Lugo.⁴

698. • Query 6° Do small thefts also coalesce if a great interval is placed between them?

Resp. Negatively, according to the more common opinion. The reason is that, when a great interval has been posited, small thefts are not judged to be morally united by the common estimation of men, nor therefore do they constitute one object in the genus of morals. Moreover, then grave damage inflicted upon the owner does not appear, since he can scarcely perceive it; and thus he is not judged gravely unwilling.²

Query 7° When is the interval judged great?

Resp. To S. Alphonsus³ the opinion teaching that thefts no longer coalesce beyond the space of two months is more pleasing, even if they were approaching matter as it were grave. But if it is a question of little thefts whose matter each time is very small, he considers a month or even a fortnight as a great interval. - Except, as I said above n. 697. q. 4° and 5°, if an accumulation is made or there is the intention of arriving at a grave sum.⁴

699. • Query 8° When does matter become grave in small thefts?

Resp. 1° If small thefts are made from the same person at diverse times, or by diverse persons at the same time, the matter will be grave when this exceeds by half the sum commonly required for grave theft. - Thus commonly.

Resp. 2° If small thefts are made from diverse persons, and discontinuously, grave matter of itself will be judged present when it is double the sum commonly required for grave theft.⁴

Query 9° Does retraction of the will prevent following little thefts from being united with preceding ones?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if the retraction was efficacious, that is, if in fact the things previously taken have been restored, because once separated they now no longer exist here and now. - Thus commonly.

Resp. 2° Again affirmatively, if the subsequent theft were done from some particular motive; for then it would not seem efficaciously to destroy the preceding will of restoring. Or even if the thief expressly and seriously proposes again at the same time to restore the things previously stolen; which, nevertheless, can scarcely be admitted in practice, since one who seriously proposes restitution does not here and now repeat thefts. - Negatively, however, where this will seems in some way to be revoked by a new theft; for in this case nothing prevents a notable sum from being retained, and the thefts coalescing into one.

700. • Query 10° Does he sin gravely who, after grave matter has been completed, still steals some light thing?

Resp. It is disputed. An opinion, very probable, denies it, the intention of arriving at a new grave sum being set aside. The reason is that that little theft does not seem to be referred to the grave sum already completed, but rather to a new one, which the thief then begins and pursues. - Thus S. Alph.¹

701. • Query 11° Does he sin gravely who by a light theft completes grave matter begun by others with the same person?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if he did not know that little thefts had been committed by others, because he is not conscious of grave damage inflicted upon the owner. - Thus all.

Resp. 2° Negatively, at least more probably, even if he knew that nearly grave damage had been perpetrated by others, nevertheless with the case of conspiracy set aside. The reason is that this man taking a little thing neither is per se the cause of grave harm, nor is he the cause that the others accepted other things. Therefore the grave damage which the owner suffers ought in no way to be imputed to him. - Nor say that such a thief sins as gravely as a murderer inflicting death by a light blow upon a man already struck by others with innumerable light wounds; for death is owed to this last wound, which otherwise would not have followed. But the matter is otherwise in the case of theft; for by the last little theft no notable calamity or damaging is added. - Lugo,² and others commonly, against Bonacina and others.

702. • Query 12° If many, without common counsel but by example, commit light thefts, so that the total damage is grave, do individuals sin gravely?

Resp. More probably negatively by reason of justice, although they can sin against charity. The reason is that example is not a per se cause, but only an occasional cause, of the damage. - Thus S. Alph.³ and others more commonly against some.

703. Resolutions. - 1° "Probably," says S. Alphonsus,¹ "those who would eat fruits in others' vineyards" or orchards, "provided they are not rare and of great price, can be excused at least from grave sin, if they do not carry them out in great quantity; for in this kind of things, which are too exposed, a greater quantity is required for constituting grave matter."

2° If a thief, intending to arrive by little thefts at a grave sum, renews this intention as often as he steals, as often as he steals he sins gravely. The reason is that the external act derives its malice from the internal act, which is gravely sinful.² Say the same of him who steals a small quantity with the intention of taking a notable quantity. Recall what was said n. 225. 8°. a).

3° He who takes from an owner a trifling thing very dear to him, for example a rare and singular flower, the first fruits from a tree destined to honor some special man, and foresees at the same time that the owner is to be gravely afflicted by such a loss, sins gravely against charity; but against justice lightly, unless perhaps grave damage seems likely to follow from it.

4° Merchants using false weights sin gravely, although each time they defraud in small matter; because they intend to arrive at grave matter, or certainly know that they will arrive at it.

5° Tailors and their servants sin lethally against justice, when by retaining for themselves or selling fragments of cloth which remain over, otherwise still useful to the owners, they have arrived at grave matter. Except unless in some place a custom prevails that less be paid and the fragments remain to the tailors; or unless it is established that wealthy owners do not wish the fragments to be restored to them, or care little about them.

6° They must be accused of theft who by deceitful beggary (not those who truly beg with exaggeration), or by going about with fabricated reasons, draw money from citizens. Yet those are not to be condemned who have a certain modest amount of money placed in a savings bank, in order to provide for old age and infirmity, lest they be forced to withdraw into a public poorhouse, or so that funeral expenses may be paid, meanwhile collecting alms from private persons whoever they may be, or from pious societies.

collecting alms, so that provision may be made for daily necessities. Indeed, that little money which they keep saved would shortly be spent, and they themselves would be a burden either to pious societies or to hospices. It must be said otherwise if they have money which is sufficient for the support of life. These things likewise can be understood of those who deposit a modest sum of money with a friend, when they betake themselves to a hospice, so that, if afterward it happens that they leave it, they may not lack every aid, or, if they die, their bodies may be committed to burial.¹

7° Concerning youths educated gratis in seminaries, or at the expense of private persons, with that hope that they will serve the ecclesiastical ministry, it must be held that they commit fraud if they enter seminaries without the intention of dedicating themselves to sacred duties, and with this purpose only, that they may be imbued with letters or indulge leisure; and therefore that they are bound to repair the damage. It is not necessary, however, that they be altogether certain of their vocation; for holy leisure is conceded to them for this reason, that they may have more mature counsel concerning so great an undertaking. But they ought neither rashly to enter nor to remain in sacred buildings after they have cast off hope and purpose. But if by their own fault they bring it about that they are held unworthy, they do not seem for that reason bound to make restitution, whenever the mind of defrauding was lacking; for donors are not to be judged to have placed the condition of restitution on account of sluggishness or other customary faults.²

8° Those who dig out coals are prohibited from carrying them away for their own use, unless a certain price has been paid; nevertheless, from the convenience of the thing, it easily happens that each one takes the coals necessary for his family. That custom indeed must be reprehended, but restitution does not seem to be exacted, since there is so great an abundance of coals there, and the owners are scarcely to be judged altogether unwilling; for they do not use solicitude to detect thieves. Those who carry away some coals for their own use from the banks of canals and rivers, where coals are deposited from boats, sin, and indeed gravely if they take a great abundance; not so if a few, especially those which lie scattered here and there. Moreover those who have been accustomed through the whole winter, or another long time, thus to take coals for themselves are guilty of grave theft, and ought to make satisfaction according to an equitable estimation of the damage. But often it is very difficult to send the price safely to the owners. The same must be said concerning those collecting wood which another cut for his own use, or carrying away what another procured for himself; for it is a grave fault of theirs to take an abundance for themselves without the owner's permission.¹

A twofold cause is assigned: 1° necessity; 2° hidden compensation.

Necessity is one thing extreme, another grave, and another common. Extreme is called that in which life itself is endangered, or a most grave evil threatens; grave, however, that in which life is led very burdensomely; common, however, that in which poor beggars commonly are situated.

704. Principles. - I. A man can in the extreme necessity of himself or of his own use another's goods, as much as is sufficient for freeing himself from such necessity, supposing that other means licit of themselves and morally possible are not present. The reason is that the division of goods, in whatever way it has happened, cannot derogate from the natural right which belongs to each one, that he provide for himself while he labors under extreme necessity. Therefore in such a case all things become common; and so one taking another's thing in order to help himself takes a thing truly common, which he makes his own, as happened before the division of goods. Therefore he does not commit theft. - S. Thom.,² S. Alph.³

II. In order that someone may be able to steal another's things, grave necessity does not suffice, nor a fortiori common necessity; for in these circumstances owners are reasonably unwilling, and otherwise an easy entrance would lie open to plunderings. It is confirmed from Prop. 36 among those proscribed by Innocent XI, p. XVI.

705. Resolutions. - 1° It is not licit for a poor man placed in extreme necessity to take more than is necessary for himself.⁴ Hence if the use alone of the thing suffices, for example of a horse, when the necessity ceases the obligation of restoring remains.

2° If one extremely in need has elsewhere, in reality or in probable hope, whence he can pay, he cannot take another's thing except with the burden of restitution; because necessity does not demand that he be relieved by the ownership of a thing, who can sufficiently be relieved by a thing received as a loan for consumption or for use.¹

3° But one who in extreme poverty consumed another's thing is bound to nothing after the use of the thing, if he had no probable hope that he would ever be able to restore, even if afterward he comes to a better condition.²

4° The things which are said concerning extreme necessity can also be said concerning necessity quasi-extreme or most grave. But such necessity is judged to be present when someone is in probable danger of incurring death, of losing some principal member, of falling into perpetual captivity or infamy, or of undergoing a very hard penalty or a most grave or perpetual illness. For in these cases extreme necessity is already morally present.³

5° A rich man hiding his things, or using other industry, lest he succor a poor man, when the poor man's necessity has ceased, is not bound to restitution, because on the one hand the rich man is bound from charity only in this case; on the other hand necessity, even extreme, confers upon the poor man a right to the use of another's thing only so long as the necessity itself presses.⁴

6° But one who by force would impede a poor man from taking some thing for himself in such a case would sin against justice, as will be clear from the things to be said below, and would be bound to compensate the damages thereby coming to necessary heirs; but if none have come to these, when the necessity has ceased, and thus the poor man's right, the burden of restitution also ceases.⁵

706. Questions. - Query 1° Can someone steal the thing of another not only for succoring his own necessity, but also another's?

Resp. Affirmatively, with S. Thom.⁶ and others commonly. The reason is that then he in some way bears the place of the needy person, and shows that he loves his neighbor as himself. Except, however, if he could have given his own thing; in which case he seems bound to restitution, if he gave another's thing, because then he could not determine another's thing for fulfilling the precept of almsgiving when his own was at hand.¹

707. • Query 2° Can he be said to be situated in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity who is to be killed by robbers unless he hands over such a sum of money, or he upon whom perpetual or most grave captivity threatens, or another similar misfortune?

Resp. Not a few affirm with S. Alph.² and Lugo.³ The reason is that that necessity consists in a most grave or extreme danger which threatens when someone has been reduced to the greatest misery, or is just now about to die, not only from want of food, but from any other cause. Hence in these cases it is licit to provide for oneself from another's goods.

Query 3° In what necessity is it licit for a wife and children of the family to receive food from a husband or father who is a thief?

Preliminary note. a) The necessity of the wife or of the children of the family can be either extreme, and that either temporal or spiritual, as for example if daughters are exposed to danger of prostitution, or sons to injustices, unless they are nourished by the father who is a thief; or quasi-extreme, suppose grave danger either of an illness morally certainly mortal, or of an unjust, grave, and morally irreparable infamy; or grave, that is, such in which the things necessary for a justly acquired state would be lacking.

b) That from which the family is nourished will be either that very thing which has been taken by theft, or the same in species, for example money of the same value, or something else.

c) The thief will be able to restore from goods already justly acquired, or not.

d) The wife and children of the family can be nourished from their own goods or not; and likewise they earn something for the family or nothing at all. These things having been noted beforehand:

Resp. 1° If the family is not nourished from the thing stolen or from a thing the same in species, and nevertheless the thief can restore from goods already justly acquired, it licitly receives from him even those things which are not necessary either for life or for state. The reason is that then neither is another's thing received, nor is impotence of restitution induced in the thief from what is received. - Resolve the same, although the thief cannot restore from goods already justly acquired, and although wife and children spare their own goods, provided that a) by their labor they earn for the family as much as is furnished to them in food by the thief, and b) they are not nourished from the stolen thing itself or from a species the same as it. The reason is that by receiving what they earn they do not induce in the thief a greater impotence of restitution.

Resp. 2° In necessity, whether temporal or spiritual, and whether extreme or quasi-extreme, if they do not have their own things, they can receive, even from the stolen thing, everything which is required for relieving that necessity. This is clear from principle I. n. 704.

Resp. 3° In grave necessity they can receive that which is necessary for state, provided a) they cannot provide for themselves from their own goods (and indeed the wife, even if she could); b) they receive nothing from the stolen thing or from a species the same as it; c) the creditors of the thief are not situated in the same necessity. The reason is that grave necessity of oneself or of one's own excuses from restitution, as will be said below. - It is said: they receive nothing, etc. For from money which is the price of the sale of a stolen thing, or from a thing bought by stolen money (n. 960. q. 2°), or from coins or things belonging to others which the thief has mixed with his own in the way I said n. 673. b). 2), they can receive, since those things are the thief's.¹

Hidden compensation is the recovery of a thing owed to me through occupation of a thing of the debtor, done without this debtor's knowledge.

708. Principles. - I. Hidden compensation can sometimes be just and licit, if it does not lack the required conditions, that is, if no injury is done to the debtor, nor any disturbance of the order of right follows, nor of the Republic. But these three can be present. And 1° No injury is done to the debtor; for by hypothesis in such compensation you receive only that which is certainly yours, or what is owed to you from strict justice. - 2° There is no disturbance of the order of right, since it is supposed either that the judge cannot be approached, at least not without notable inconvenience, or that he cannot restore his right to the injured party. For that is not said to be omitted which would be sought in vain. - 3° There is no disturbance or damage of the Republic; for enough is provided for it by the cautions to be placed in the conditions. - Thus S. Alph.,¹ Lacroix,² etc.

709. • II. But the required conditions are the following: 1° That the debt be from justice, morally certain, demandable. From justice, not from charity alone or gratitude. - Certain; for in doubt the principle is valid: The condition of the possessor is better. Therefore in doubt compensation is illicit and unjust. - Demandable ("due").

2° That the debt cannot be recovered otherwise, at least not without grave inconvenience. For if the creditor can by mere petition or recourse to a judge obtain what is owed to him, by compensating himself he does injury to the public power, and therefore sins against legal justice (n. 712).

3° That the thing be taken in the same species, if it can be done. Otherwise the debtor's thing is exchanged without his consent, and therefore unjustly.

4° That it be done from a thing of the debtor. Otherwise it would be done with damage to a third party, as would happen if it were done from a thing deposited with the debtor or lent to him for use.

5° That damage to the debtor be guarded against, namely by taking care that the debtor or his heirs not be exposed to the danger of paying twice, if perhaps they are going to restore. Hence if that case is in some way foreseen, they must be warned in some manner, for example through a fictitious renunciation or condonation, etc. But if, after the compensation has been made, they restore, it will have to be restored to them again.³

710. Questions. - Query 1° Can servants, workers, officials of the government, municipality, etc., judging that the salary is below the work furnished by themselves, use hidden compensation?

Resp. Negatively, at least speaking generally, with the common opinion. It is established 1° from proposition 37 condemned by Innocent XI, p. XVI. 2° From reason; for they would act against the agreement, since they consented to the lesser price, and from elsewhere nothing is owed to them except the price concerning which agreement was made. Besides, if that were licit, the way would be opened to innumerable thefts; for servants would easily persuade themselves that wages are less than just, and thus no security would remain for masters. - The same must also be said, from parity of reason, concerning all workers, artisans, and merchants who would wish to recur to compensation under the pretext of the cheaper price for which they hired out their works or sold their wares.

I said: at least speaking generally; because a servant can compensate himself up to the lowest price. 1° If he is compelled by force or fear to consent to an unequal price. 2° If compelled by necessity he consented to it, provided nevertheless that the master would not have found other servants already justly, that is, within the limits of a just price, at least the lowest, at the same cheap price, or did not receive this one asking from mercy. 3° If unwillingly he is burdened with works not owed. 4° If the master is judged to consent to compensation, as for example can happen in the case of those who among us are called "horse-car conductors"; namely, it is supposed that by most masters those men are hired below the lowest price for this reason, that they know that they are to be defrauded by most, and that the masters are not willing (which besides they would will unreasonably) to deprive honest conductors of due salary because they protect themselves from dishonest ones. But in determining their salary, "conductors" should especially attend to the number of hours which they spend in the service of their masters, and to the salary which is given by the hour to workers of their condition. Meanwhile they must be exhorted to seek another trade, on account of the danger of injustice to which they expose themselves.

Query 2° At least can a servant who increases the works owed compensate himself?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if he acts thus by his own choice, because then he is judged to condone his work in order to conciliate the favor of the master to himself.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, if he increases the works from the will of the master, whether express or tacit, because then the worker is judged worthy of his wage by right.¹ - But what compensation is just can sometimes be left also to the judgment of the servant, if he is fearful of God and prudent, and the danger of self-love is absent; which nevertheless will happen very rarely.²

711. • Query 3° Can he use hidden compensation who is condemned by a judge to pay a debt which he certainly did not contract, or to which he certainly has already made satisfaction?

Resp. Affirmatively, because the sentence of the judge is unjust, as being founded upon a false presumption of fact, and therefore cannot bind in conscience. For although one must always stand by the sentence of the judge in matter of law, unless it is a question of a law or sentence evidently unjust, it is otherwise, scandal being set aside, if the judge certainly errs concerning a fact which from error he thinks true. From another source, moreover, the judge does not have the faculty of transferring dominion; nor can one who has obtained a favorable sentence, even after the error has been detected, keep the thing adjudged to him. - Thus commonly.

712. • Query 4° Does he sin gravely, and against justice, who compensates himself without first having recourse to the judge?

Resp. 1° He does not sin of itself against justice, provided he takes only as much as is owed to him; nor therefore is he bound to restitution. The reason is clear, because, this compensation having been made, equality is restored between him and the debtor. I said: of itself; because sometimes detriment could follow for the debtor from deprivation of some determinate thing, for example a horse, a precious thing, etc. - Lugo,² and others.

Resp. 2° Nor does he sin gravely, speaking generally; because ordinarily from this inversion of order neither grave scandal nor grave disturbance of the Republic follows. - Lugo.³

Resp. 3° He does not sin in any way if recourse to the judge is difficult, if there is danger of scandal, or extraordinary expenses, etc., because then recourse is morally impossible.

Admonition. - Confessors should not easily advise compensation, and should rarely even permit it. But to compensation already made, to which none of the necessary conditions is lacking, it is licit so far to connive, that the penitent not be bound to restitution.

To recover one's own thing, even by employing moderate force, is licit, whether when the unjust robber is caught in the very delict, or when the thing has not yet been put in safety; indeed it is licit if it has been put in safety by the robber, provided it is movable and still exists in species. For in the former hypothesis you use the right of defense (n. 471. 1°); in the other, neither is the right of the robber injured nor is the order of right passed over. Mar. p. 333. n. 185.

S. Th. II-II, q. 59.

236. Injustice, etymologically, is the privation or violation of justice, just as injury is the violation of right, which is the object of justice. Hence according to the various significations of the word justice, various kinds of injustice are spoken of:

1. improperly and metaphorically so called, it is the complex of vices and every transgression of law, in which sense every sin and every violation of virtue is called injustice or iniquity (I John, III, 4 in the Vulg.), because it injures the right or law of God;

2. properly so called, it is the violation of the special virtue of justice strictly so called, and in this sense it is taken in the present treatise, and indeed

a) either actually, and then it is the violation of another's right, which is strictly due to him according to perfect equality;

b) or habitually, and it is the depraved habit which is opposed contrarily to justice and inclines the will to injuring the right of another.

Among more recent authors, however, injustice is usually distinguished from injury: the former more indicates a habit inclining one to act unjustly; the latter rather the act by which the right of another, properly so called, is violated, although it is also quite often taken in a restricted sense for insult alone, or an unjust injury to honor.

237. Injury, or actual injustice, is defined: the voluntary and efficacious violation or injury of another's right properly so called. It is said:

a) of another's right properly so called, because where there is not right simply so called, there cannot be injury strictly so called, although there can be sin against charity or also against another virtue; and thus it is distinguished from simple offense, by which the reasonable will or good pleasure of another is violated, so that there is for him a motive of displeasure or indignation, without violation of right; for example, if you refuse to point out the way to one who asks politely;

b) violation or injury, and not necessarily the infliction of damage, because there can be injury without damage, as an insult inflicted on someone with no one else present, or adultery committed secretly with no offspring conceived; and, on the contrary, not every infliction of damage is always unjust, when we are not held to abstain from damage and do not use an unjust means: thus, for example, to plant trees next to the field of a neighbor, to open a well, to condemn justly to death.

Moreover violation is an action by which violence is brought to bear and a right is injured against the will of the person; this can be done by a positive unjust deed, or by omission of that which from justice is due to be furnished to another. Everyone is judged to will to preserve what is his, and to be unwilling and to resist lest his right be injured by another. But if he consents, injury will no longer be present, because he renounces his right or the use of it; and therefore that ceases and can no longer be violated;

c) voluntary: for if it is voluntary neither in itself and directly, nor in its cause or indirectly, there can be merely material injury, by which an unjust thing is done; there is not formal injustice, by which something is done unjustly;

d) efficacious: for injury it is not sufficient to have the intention of injuring a right, or an unjust affection, nor from such an intention to posit a condition or mere occasion of injuring the rights of others; but it is necessary effectively to injure the right and to posit a cause which truly influences such injury. Injustice is in external things, not in mere intention.

238. Division of injury. — 1. By reason of morality, one injury is formal, by which someone knowingly and willingly injures the right of another; another is material, by which a right is violated involuntarily, for example, from invincible ignorance or by chance event.

2. By reason of effect, it is divided into mere injury and damaging injury, according as a right is injured without damage, or also damage is inflicted on him whose right is injured: thus secret adultery without offspring conceived is mere injury, but public adultery, or secret adultery by which offspring is introduced among legitimate children, is damaging.

3. By reason of the goods which are injured, it is divided into real and personal injury, according as the right of another is directly violated in external goods, or in his person, namely, in the internal goods of soul or body.

4. By reason of the act or mode by which it is done, it is divided into mental, verbal, and real injury, according as it is done by a merely internal mental act, by word or writing, or by deed and work.

239. Principle. Injustice is a mortal sin from its genus. — For it consists in harm inflicted on another, which is against charity, which moves one to will good to another. But through charity there is the supernatural life of the soul. Hence injustice of itself takes away charity, and thus brings death to the soul. For:

a) It is repugnant to the primary precept of the natural law, commanding one to preserve the right of each one uninjured, and forbidding one to cause to another the detriment which we do not will to be done to ourselves.

b) In the decalogue itself it is forbidden, in which only grave matters are set forth (Exod. XX, 13-17), which must be observed in order to have eternal life (Mt. XIX, 17-18); hence the unjust will not possess the kingdom of God (I Cor. VI, 8-10).

It is nevertheless venial, both from indeliberation or imperfection of the act, and from the quantity of the matter in slight things, or where the owner is known not to be much unwilling, at least reasonably.

For order is not gravely disturbed if right is injured in a slight matter. Therefore attention must be paid

a) to the private person whose right is injured, whether a right of great moment is injured, the sign of which is that he himself is much saddened or indignant, gravely unwilling; — or whether grave harm or damage is inflicted on him, whether material or spiritual, which by its nature disturbs the liberty, security, or peace of men, dissolves public tranquility, the mutual union of men, or friendship;

b) to society itself, or to the damage which is inflicted on the public good: damage not only actual, but also virtual, which would be done to society if such an injury were committed with impunity or multiplied. For the common good, other things being equal, is preferable to private good. And therefore an injury is grave which, although it inflicts slight damage on some private person, gravely harms the republic, or is of a nature to harm it unless it is prohibited under grave obligation. Thus one who steals a horse, or an ox, or a hundred gold coins from a very rich man brings only slight harm upon him; and nevertheless he commits a grave injury, because such an action much harms the public good, since it is of a nature to overturn the order of society.

240. Observation. — St. Thomas notes, in art. 2, that someone is not properly called unjust from the fact that he does an unjust thing, but if he does it from a habitual and deliberate choice of committing injustice. He who does an unjust thing is not unjust 1) if this is done beyond intention and by accident, while he does not intend to do an unjust thing, for example, if he does it through ignorance, not thinking that he is doing an unjust thing: then the injustice is only material, because per se and formally he does not do an unjust thing; 2) even if knowingly and from intention he does an unjust thing, yet not from the end of injustice, but is enticed by some passion, such as anger, cupidity, or hatred, and wills the unjust thing: for then he acts unjustly and commits formal injustice, but he is not unjust, because he does not act from a habit of injustice by which with a habitual and deliberate will he seeks injustice. But he who from intention and from choice does an unjust thing, not on account of something else but on account of itself, namely, because injustice is pleasing to him per se, he is unjust, because he has the habit of injustice. Hence although acts of injustice are very frequent, the vice of injustice is rare.

S. Th. II-II, q. 59, a. 1.

241. By reason of object, injustice properly so called is divided into various moral species, according to the diverse species of justice, and according to the rights diverse in species to which it is opposed. And indeed: 1° there is illegal or general injustice, which injures legal right or the common good; and 2° particular injustice, which injures a particular right and is subdivided into a) injustice concerning distributions, which is the violation of distributive justice and is called acceptance of persons, and b) injustice concerning commutations, which is the violation of commutative justice and more properly and strictly is called injury.

Each one is a special vice, that is, specifically distinct from others, because it regards an object distinct in species, a diverse right.

242. Illegal injustice regards the common good, which it contemns and against which it acts intentionally. If someone without this intention injures the common good, so that he may satisfy his appetite, it is not a vice distinct in species, but is a general condition of every sin, because every sin harms the common good. But if someone sins, not only so that he may satisfy his appetite, but from contempt of the common good and from the intention of acting against it, thus it is a special vice of injustice because it has a special object specifically distinct from all others. And although, as to its essence, it is essentially a special vice, nevertheless it is causally general, as to intention, virtue, and command, because in every sin a man can act from contempt of the common good, and through contempt of the common good he can be led to every sin. "Just as it pertains to the proper account of legal justice to attend to the due of the precept, so it pertains to the proper account of transgression to attend to contempt of the precept," q. 79, a. 2.

243. Particular injustice regards inequality toward another in things, while a man wills to have more of goods, for example, of riches and honors, and less of evils, for example, of labors and damages, than he ought, for example, by selling more dearly, buying more cheaply: thus injustice has special matter and is a particular vice, opposed to particular justice.

Particular injustice, especially commutative injustice, is divided into several diverse species, according to the various goods diverse in species and the rights to which it is opposed and which it injures, such as internal goods of soul or body, goods of marriage, external goods, goods of reputation and honor; — and according to the diverse unjust modes by which those things are injured and which are more or less against the will and right of another: thus, for example, robbery is distinguished from theft and from fraudulence.

244. Diverse injustices are graver, some than others, according to the species of good and right which is injured, and of harm which is inflicted on another, which are greater, some than others; — and in the same species, according to the greater or lesser quality and quantity of the harm brought and of the damage caused, whether to a private person or to society.

Cooperation toward the damage of the neighbor can happen in nine ways. What those are was said above, n. 194; but here note that the first six ways are positive and the last three negative. Something will be said briefly concerning each.

A receiver, or one providing refuge, is he who knowingly and freely provides security to a robber or another damager. Concerning him these things must be established:

1st. One receiving is held for damages coming from his manner of acting. For one providing security efficaciously and unjustly determines the will of the thief, or makes it firmer, in the purpose either of stealing or of not restoring or of stealing again.

2nd. Likewise merchants and especially innkeepers are held to restitution who accept stolen goods of sons of families, servants, etc., or hide them, or even claim them for themselves as the price of merchandise, drinking-bouts, etc.

3rd. Among those receiving are not to be reckoned those who receive at home friends or blood-relatives who are evildoers; nor those who hide them under hope of amendment, or show them the way by which they can flee, when they are sought for prison or for death. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 568.