Title II: On Injustice Opposed to Distributive Justice

Usefulness. - The frequent omission of offices demonstrates how useful it is to recall, even in a few words, the duties in conferring offices and in exacting taxes.

On Acceptance of Persons. One sins by the vice of acceptance of persons when, in the distribution of common goods, in conferring public offices, attention is paid to those conditions of the person which, for the matter at issue, would plainly have to be neglected.

Here offices or public functions properly so called are to be distinguished, which are exercised in their proper name for the common utility by those who hold them; and certain secondary offices, by which officials properly such are merely helped, such as their secretaries or copyists attached to their persons.

1. The former offices today are in the private dominion of no one. They belong to the republic. Therefore in the first place they are to be conferred in that mode which the common good demands; then, with the common good saved, according to the rules of distributive justice. Wherefore strictly they are to be conferred on the more worthy, that is, on him whose nomination, all things considered, will more profit the republic. Although others think it suffices that they be attributed to the worthy: their opinion rests upon an antiquated regime in which all magistrates were judged to represent one Prince, who through others did what he could not do by himself, so that it sufficed for him to procure through others that moderate diligence by which he himself was held in acting. We do not deny extrinsic probability to that opinion.

2. As to the latter offices, it is enough to choose worthy persons, who do not harm the common good and truly merit the public stipends.

3. In either case, those who assume the unworthy where worthy persons are present sin against commutative justice toward the state, and they will have to repair the damages brought from this to the state or to private persons.

4. But no restitution is owed to those who are passed over, unless, from a competition having been announced, the victor acquired a right to nomination.

Moreover it must be noted that competitions can be made in two ways: so that the qualified may be discerned, from among whom then one may be freely chosen by the Superior; or in such a way that a strict right of obtaining the office is assigned to the victor. Only in the latter case is commutative justice violated toward competitors merely passed over. If the one elected is so unworthy that he receives a stipend without cause, that stipend will have to be restored to the republic.

— But by an inequitable distribution of burdens, for example of taxes, commutative justice itself is violated toward private persons; for citizens have a strict right not to be despoiled of their goods beyond what they must contribute.

— 1. One sins by the vice of acceptance of persons when, in conferring public offices or distributing common goods, attention is paid to those conditions of the person which, for the matter at issue, would plainly have to be neglected.

Today, offices which belong to the republic are, from distributive justice, to be conferred on the more worthy; this canonical law also expressly sanctions concerning parish priests. But secondary offices, by which the principal official is assisted, are to be conferred at least on the worthy.

For the republic has a strict right that, if they are present, worthy persons be assumed, and that public monies not be squandered.

Private persons who have been passed over cannot complain of injustice against commutative justice, unless the competition was announced in that manner which confers a strict right on the victor.

But by an inequitable exaction of taxes, commutative justice itself is violated. For this forbids that citizens be despoiled of their goods.