Article — Marc, Institutiones Morales
ARTICLE I: On Commutative Justice
Since justice is concerned solely with right, the notion of right must necessarily be premised; then the notion of strict justice.
1. The Notion of Right
- Definition. Right is taken in a threefold way: 1. For law, which is the rule of what is just in general: in which sense we say natural right, divine positive right, canonical right, etc. Thus it is the foundation of right in the second sense. - 2. For a legitimate faculty which belongs to someone for doing something freely, or having something for his own convenience. It is active right, in which sense we are said to have a right to something. This is the foundation of right in the third sense. - 3. For that which is just, or owed to another, which therefore has a moral relation with another thing or person. It is passive right, which is the object of justice (Willems, Phil. mor., III, p. 207).
From these things you will gather: 1. Right in one supposes obligation in another, and conversely. Wherefore, in society, all rights depend on one another, to constitute order, nor are they ever really opposed to themselves. Right against right is not given.
The ultimate reason of every right is rooted in the obligation of attaining the ULTIMATE END. For by this very fact that some end is to be pursued and obtained, man has a right to those means without which this end cannot be obtained. But all ends are contained under the ultimate end as means to it.
Since this obligation of attaining the end is personal, it necessarily involves the faculty of using earthly things independently of another. For whatever is touched, apprehended, or changed by man receives as it were the seal of his person: from this comes the distinction between mine and thine. It will always belong to justice, the tendency toward the end being presupposed, to preserve those things by which mine and thine are distinguished from each other; but it belongs rather to charity, which considers itself in another, to join and unite.
Division. We can distinguish:
- Right CONCERNING PERSONS, that is, the right which belongs to one person over another; and it is defined: A legitimate power of governing subjects for THEIR convenience.
Of this kind is: a) dominative right of private authority, for example of father over children, husband over wife; - b) right of jurisdiction of public power, which is ordered especially to the common good. Concerning these there has already been discussion.
- Right CONCERNING GOODS, which is defined: A legitimate faculty of having or doing something for ONE'S OWN convenience. It is imperfect or perfect.
IMPERFECT right, not strict, right improperly such, is that which is not determined, whether in itself, or as regards persons, nor can be demanded by way of coercion. Such is, for example, the right of individuals to alms left by a testator to the poor in general; the right which the worthy have to obtaining functions or offices of the community, etc. (Carriere, de Just., n. 10).
PERFECT right, strict, coercible, right properly such, is that which is determined, both in itself and as regards persons, and can be demanded by way of coercion.1 Such is the right of defending one's life or reputation, of recovering one's own thing, etc. It is subdivided into right to a thing and right in a thing, as will be explained below (cf. n. 839). - Perfect right is the object of strict justice.
See other distinctions in Lessius, l. c., c. 2.
(1) Note: it can be demanded by way of coercion, and indeed the whole can be demanded, not only what remains to be furnished, but what in the past has been retained; for in this consists the notion of strict justice. But debts of piety, for example toward children, are of such a nature that they oblige only to the thing being ordered better in the future; as regards the past, they impose no restitution. See Lugo, disp. I, n. 5-6.
2. The Notion of Strict Justice
- STRICT or COMMUTATIVE justice is a moral virtue constantly inclining the will to render to each one his own strict right, according to equality of thing to thing.
It is said 1. To render to each one; that is, either positively, when between two persons some contract or quasi-contract has intervened, or some action by which the right of either one has at least materially been violated; or negatively, by harming no one: for as he who renders to another the thing owed, so he who does not take it away is judged to render to him his own right.
To each one, private or moral person, his own strict right, that is, right objectively and passively taken, and indeed rigorous, in the sense which will be declared below (n. 723, 724).
According to equality of thing to thing, that is, through commensuration of the thing which must be rendered with the right of another (cf. n. 383).
This virtue differs: a) from natural love of neighbor. For love wills the good of another as the good of the beloved, and from complacence in him; but justice wills that good as owed and from simple rectitude of the will; - b) from charity toward neighbor: both because the material object of charity is the person of neighbor, but of justice the right which belongs to neighbor; and especially because the formal object of charity is God Himself, but of justice that special honesty which shines forth in rendering to each one his own right, to equality. Cf. n. 478; - c) from legal and distributive justice, which do not regard strict right, as is plain from what was said n. 400.