Question Two: Concerning the Species of Injustice

S. Th. II-II, q. 59, a. 1.

241. By reason of object, injustice properly so called is divided into various moral species, according to the diverse species of justice, and according to the rights diverse in species to which it is opposed. And indeed: 1° there is illegal or general injustice, which injures legal right or the common good; and 2° particular injustice, which injures a particular right and is subdivided into a) injustice concerning distributions, which is the violation of distributive justice and is called acceptance of persons, and b) injustice concerning commutations, which is the violation of commutative justice and more properly and strictly is called injury.

Each one is a special vice, that is, specifically distinct from others, because it regards an object distinct in species, a diverse right.

242. Illegal injustice regards the common good, which it contemns and against which it acts intentionally. If someone without this intention injures the common good, so that he may satisfy his appetite, it is not a vice distinct in species, but is a general condition of every sin, because every sin harms the common good. But if someone sins, not only so that he may satisfy his appetite, but from contempt of the common good and from the intention of acting against it, thus it is a special vice of injustice because it has a special object specifically distinct from all others. And although, as to its essence, it is essentially a special vice, nevertheless it is causally general, as to intention, virtue, and command, because in every sin a man can act from contempt of the common good, and through contempt of the common good he can be led to every sin. "Just as it pertains to the proper account of legal justice to attend to the due of the precept, so it pertains to the proper account of transgression to attend to contempt of the precept," q. 79, a. 2.

243. Particular injustice regards inequality toward another in things, while a man wills to have more of goods, for example, of riches and honors, and less of evils, for example, of labors and damages, than he ought, for example, by selling more dearly, buying more cheaply: thus injustice has special matter and is a particular vice, opposed to particular justice.

Particular injustice, especially commutative injustice, is divided into several diverse species, according to the various goods diverse in species and the rights to which it is opposed and which it injures, such as internal goods of soul or body, goods of marriage, external goods, goods of reputation and honor; — and according to the diverse unjust modes by which those things are injured and which are more or less against the will and right of another: thus, for example, robbery is distinguished from theft and from fraudulence.

244. Diverse injustices are graver, some than others, according to the species of good and right which is injured, and of harm which is inflicted on another, which are greater, some than others; — and in the same species, according to the greater or lesser quality and quantity of the harm brought and of the damage caused, whether to a private person or to society.