§ I. On Necessity

Necessity is one thing extreme, another grave, and another common. Extreme is called that in which life itself is endangered, or a most grave evil threatens; grave, however, that in which life is led very burdensomely; common, however, that in which poor beggars commonly are situated.

704. Principles. - I. A man can in the extreme necessity of himself or of his own use another's goods, as much as is sufficient for freeing himself from such necessity, supposing that other means licit of themselves and morally possible are not present. The reason is that the division of goods, in whatever way it has happened, cannot derogate from the natural right which belongs to each one, that he provide for himself while he labors under extreme necessity. Therefore in such a case all things become common; and so one taking another's thing in order to help himself takes a thing truly common, which he makes his own, as happened before the division of goods. Therefore he does not commit theft. - S. Thom.,² S. Alph.³

II. In order that someone may be able to steal another's things, grave necessity does not suffice, nor a fortiori common necessity; for in these circumstances owners are reasonably unwilling, and otherwise an easy entrance would lie open to plunderings. It is confirmed from Prop. 36 among those proscribed by Innocent XI, p. XVI.

705. Resolutions. - 1° It is not licit for a poor man placed in extreme necessity to take more than is necessary for himself.⁴ Hence if the use alone of the thing suffices, for example of a horse, when the necessity ceases the obligation of restoring remains.

2° If one extremely in need has elsewhere, in reality or in probable hope, whence he can pay, he cannot take another's thing except with the burden of restitution; because necessity does not demand that he be relieved by the ownership of a thing, who can sufficiently be relieved by a thing received as a loan for consumption or for use.¹

3° But one who in extreme poverty consumed another's thing is bound to nothing after the use of the thing, if he had no probable hope that he would ever be able to restore, even if afterward he comes to a better condition.²

4° The things which are said concerning extreme necessity can also be said concerning necessity quasi-extreme or most grave. But such necessity is judged to be present when someone is in probable danger of incurring death, of losing some principal member, of falling into perpetual captivity or infamy, or of undergoing a very hard penalty or a most grave or perpetual illness. For in these cases extreme necessity is already morally present.³

5° A rich man hiding his things, or using other industry, lest he succor a poor man, when the poor man's necessity has ceased, is not bound to restitution, because on the one hand the rich man is bound from charity only in this case; on the other hand necessity, even extreme, confers upon the poor man a right to the use of another's thing only so long as the necessity itself presses.⁴

6° But one who by force would impede a poor man from taking some thing for himself in such a case would sin against justice, as will be clear from the things to be said below, and would be bound to compensate the damages thereby coming to necessary heirs; but if none have come to these, when the necessity has ceased, and thus the poor man's right, the burden of restitution also ceases.⁵

706. Questions. - Query 1° Can someone steal the thing of another not only for succoring his own necessity, but also another's?

Resp. Affirmatively, with S. Thom.⁶ and others commonly. The reason is that then he in some way bears the place of the needy person, and shows that he loves his neighbor as himself. Except, however, if he could have given his own thing; in which case he seems bound to restitution, if he gave another's thing, because then he could not determine another's thing for fulfilling the precept of almsgiving when his own was at hand.¹

707. • Query 2° Can he be said to be situated in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity who is to be killed by robbers unless he hands over such a sum of money, or he upon whom perpetual or most grave captivity threatens, or another similar misfortune?

Resp. Not a few affirm with S. Alph.² and Lugo.³ The reason is that that necessity consists in a most grave or extreme danger which threatens when someone has been reduced to the greatest misery, or is just now about to die, not only from want of food, but from any other cause. Hence in these cases it is licit to provide for oneself from another's goods.

Query 3° In what necessity is it licit for a wife and children of the family to receive food from a husband or father who is a thief?

Preliminary note. a) The necessity of the wife or of the children of the family can be either extreme, and that either temporal or spiritual, as for example if daughters are exposed to danger of prostitution, or sons to injustices, unless they are nourished by the father who is a thief; or quasi-extreme, suppose grave danger either of an illness morally certainly mortal, or of an unjust, grave, and morally irreparable infamy; or grave, that is, such in which the things necessary for a justly acquired state would be lacking.

b) That from which the family is nourished will be either that very thing which has been taken by theft, or the same in species, for example money of the same value, or something else.

c) The thief will be able to restore from goods already justly acquired, or not.

d) The wife and children of the family can be nourished from their own goods or not; and likewise they earn something for the family or nothing at all. These things having been noted beforehand:

Resp. 1° If the family is not nourished from the thing stolen or from a thing the same in species, and nevertheless the thief can restore from goods already justly acquired, it licitly receives from him even those things which are not necessary either for life or for state. The reason is that then neither is another's thing received, nor is impotence of restitution induced in the thief from what is received. - Resolve the same, although the thief cannot restore from goods already justly acquired, and although wife and children spare their own goods, provided that a) by their labor they earn for the family as much as is furnished to them in food by the thief, and b) they are not nourished from the stolen thing itself or from a species the same as it. The reason is that by receiving what they earn they do not induce in the thief a greater impotence of restitution.

Resp. 2° In necessity, whether temporal or spiritual, and whether extreme or quasi-extreme, if they do not have their own things, they can receive, even from the stolen thing, everything which is required for relieving that necessity. This is clear from principle I. n. 704.

Resp. 3° In grave necessity they can receive that which is necessary for state, provided a) they cannot provide for themselves from their own goods (and indeed the wife, even if she could); b) they receive nothing from the stolen thing or from a species the same as it; c) the creditors of the thief are not situated in the same necessity. The reason is that grave necessity of oneself or of one's own excuses from restitution, as will be said below. - It is said: they receive nothing, etc. For from money which is the price of the sale of a stolen thing, or from a thing bought by stolen money (n. 960. q. 2°), or from coins or things belonging to others which the thief has mixed with his own in the way I said n. 673. b). 2), they can receive, since those things are the thief's.¹