Article — Marc, Institutiones Morales
ARTICLE II: On Injury and Injustice
- Definition. Injury is the violation of another's right. - Strictly taken, as in this article, it is the violation of another's perfect right. But injury contains offense and damage. Offense is repaired by satisfaction; damage by restitution.
INJUSTICE has itself toward injury as a habit toward an act, and is an inclination to not rendering to each one his own right.
Division. Injury is: 1. By reason of the act itself, merely internal, or external. Merely internal, intentional, if by thought or purpose the right of neighbor is harmed, for example if someone judges rashly concerning neighbor, or adds to an act which can be good, for example taking away a book in jest, an evil intention, the mind of stealing. It is external, if by an external harmful action the strict right of neighbor is violated, for example by burning a house, and similar things. See n. 726 and 727.
By reason of the mode of acting, positive or negative, according as someone inflicts it either by commission, by acting against another's right, or by omission, by omitting to do what is owed to another by strict right.
By reason of imputability, material or formal. MATERIAL injury is an involuntary harming of another's right. FORMAL injury is an unjust action or omission, with the mind of harming directly or indirectly: directly, if the harm is intended; indirectly, if it is foreseen when the cause is posited, and permitted.
- Principles. I. For the notion of injury, whether material or formal, it is required that it be involuntary on the part of the one suffering, that is, against his right will. Rule 27 of law in the Sixth agrees: "To one knowing and consenting no injury is done." The reason is that he who can and wishes to yield his right does not retain it, and therefore no injury is inflicted on him. Besides, no one receives injury from himself; therefore if someone assents that another harm him, it is just as if he himself inflicted harm on himself (St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 59, a. 3).
Hence: 1. Injury is done to him who consents to his own damage not freely, but from force, fraud, or fear unjustly struck in; as also to him who cannot validly renounce his right, because some law or the right of another stands in the way; for in this case at least the higher right is truly violated.
Notwithstanding the consent of the one suffering, injury is done: to the traveler who from fear of death hands money to a robber; to the buyer paying for merchandise beyond the highest price; to the worker who in necessity accepts a lesser salary; to the one giving money to him who fraudulently asserts that he is his blood relative, etc.; for none of these is judged to give freely. See however n. 1051.
Likewise, injury is done to the cleric who is struck, even if he consents; to the ward who consents that he be deprived of his right; to the husband of a woman committing adultery, even if he approves her adulteries; to martyrs, even if they gladly bear slaughter; indeed also to men themselves who ask to be killed, as unhappy Saul asked; because in all these the right is inalienable, nor can it ever be yielded without injury to others.
- II. For the notion of formal injury, it is required besides that it be voluntary on the part of the agent. For the primary reason of formal injury is the mind of harming, since injury without such a mind is only material (Lugo, disp. 8, n. 58; St. Alph., III, n. 551, 556).
Hence, formal injury does not extend more widely than the mind of harming. This again does not extend more widely than knowledge of the damage, because the will cannot choose what is thoroughly and invincibly unknown.
Therefore formal injury is not to be estimated from the damage which followed, but from knowledge of the damage, at least foreseen confusedly; and thus it can happen that it exists as less than the damage: for example, he who destroys a gem of the price of ten gold coins, which he thinks to be worth only five, inflicts an injury of five gold coins only, and the other five are to be referred only to material injury (cf. n. 950).
- III. Injury is a grave sin from its genus. For it is gravely opposed to right reason and divine law.
We have said: from its genus; whence smallness of matter is admitted in this matter. Moreover, that matter is judged grave which from its nature, or from the common estimation of men, is apt to cause another sadness difficult to quiet, or great damage, or to dissolve mutual charity (Reuter, de Just., P. III, n. 294).
- IV. Formal injury, the effect having followed, induces the obligation of restitution. Commutative justice regards equality of thing to thing. Whence it must demand the reparation of the harming of rights, if any has been made, and indeed by restitution; because otherwise equality is not had. In other words: as long as inequality remains, so long remains the obligation of reducing equality. Hence, he who does not restore, when he can, sins by preserving inequality, as he sinned by inducing it (cf. n. 924).
It is said: the effect having followed; for injurious acts merely internal do not oblige to external reparation.
- A fuller explanation of certain things. I. THE SENSE OF THE AXIOMS: To one knowing and consenting no injury is done; to one unwilling unreasonably no injury is done.
Note. The axiom He who is silent seems to consent was explained above (n. 272).
a) The sense of the first is: To him who is not deceived, provided he freely, force and madness being excluded, positively, validly, perseveringly grants the harmful action, as remitting something from his own right, injury is not done, that is, a harmful action containing the formal notion of violated right is not committed against him. From this it does not follow that the action becomes licit, and that the other acquires certain rights; it follows only that the action lacks the guilt of formal injustice. Thus St. Thomas, Lessius, and others. Cf. Vermeersch, de Just., n. 142-155.
b) The sense of the second is: No formal injustice is present if neighbor, from strict justice, is held to yield his right, and does not wish to. But formal injustice is given if neighbor, from motives only of charity, gratitude, and the like, is held to yield, and refuses to do this. - In doubt, consent is presumed, since someone is always supposed to wish to act according to right reason.
Thus indeed the authors commonly. Nevertheless, as Vermeersch says, l. c., they also commonly admit certain exceptions, for example in the case in which someone defers restitution because of fear of danger for himself or his own, see below n. 1018. Therefore there are circumstances in which, from charity only or from epikeia, the owner ought to be willing and consenting; and yet no injury is present if one does not comply with him refusing (cf. n. 987).
II. CONCERNING AN ACTION WITH HARMFUL INTENTION. There is not one mind of authors concerning the question: Whether intention added to an external act makes this act become unjust.
What things are commonly admitted we shall indicate here.
a) If the action does not of itself harm the undoubted right of another, it does not become unjust from the intention of harming. If the intention is conceived from hatred, or from vengeance, anger, etc., it indeed adds sin, but not formal injury. Hence, they do not act unjustly: the lustful master who dismisses a modest maidservant, we suppose the conditions of the pact to have been observed; a judge condemning a homicide from hatred; a fellow citizen who from hatred refuses to succor another, except if by office he were held to this. Cf. Lugo, disp. 19, n. 110. See what is to be said n. 949.
b) If the action is indifferent, it can become unjust through intention, namely insofar as precisely the intention gives the species and nature of injury to the action. Thus to take a thing from the hands of a thief, with the intention of restoring it, is something good; but with the intention of retaining it, is something unjust.
c) If the action includes force or fraud in itself, a special intention directed against someone can effect that also with respect to this person it become unjust. Thus he who kills a man precisely so that creditors may be deprived of the obtaining of a just good acts unjustly also toward the creditors. Thus St. Alphonsus, III, n. 633, 634; ed. G., II, p. 111, with Lugo, Salmant.
As regards the last, there is disagreement of authors; see in Lehmkuhl, I, n. 1180, note. They rely on this reason, that intention cannot render unjust what from its nature does not harm strict right.
GENERAL DIVISION. There are as many species of injuries as there are goods or rights in which neighbor can be harmed. But four goods of man are numbered: 1. goods of one's own life, namely of body and soul, concerning which now; - 2. goods of modesty and of the life of the species, concerning which in the sixth precept; - 3. goods of fortune, concerning which in the seventh precept; - 4. finally goods of reputation and honor, concerning which discussion must be instituted in the eighth precept (cf. n. 324, 528).