CHAPTER IV: ON RASH JUDGMENT, SUSPICION, AND RASH DOUBT

536. • 1° Rash judgment is firm assent, conceived from light indications, concerning some sin or defect of one's neighbor: it must be distinguished from opinion, which is assent less firm and with fear concerning the opposite.

2° Rash suspicion is a certain inclination to assent concerning the evil of one's neighbor from an insufficient reason.

3° Doubt is a suspension of the mind determining itself toward neither part.

537. Principles. - I. Rash judgment concerning the fault of one's neighbor is a mortal sin from its own genus against justice; for each one has a right to a good estimation of himself before individuals, nor should anyone be presumed evil until he is proved: consequently he inflicts grave injury on the neighbor who judges rashly against him in a grave matter. Yet more often it is venial because of smallness of matter or imperfection of the act.

II. For the gravity of rash judgment it is required 1° that it be firm, or without doubt; 2° that it be fully deliberate and voluntary; 3° that it be in a grave matter concerning a determined and known person; 4° that it rests upon indications which are known as light and inept for judging. The reason for these things is that otherwise it would not be a true judgment, nor truly rash, nor gravely injurious to the neighbor. But often it is slight because of the defect of some one of the conditions commemorated.²

III. Rash suspicion, opinion, and doubt concerning the stain of a neighbor are venial from their own genus. The reason is that on account of weak and easily movable adherence they ordinarily bring only slight damage to the neighbor, since they do not remove reputation, but only diminish it and render it doubtful.³ - But doubt concerning an extraordinary sin is grave, because it inflicts a greater injury than certain judgment concerning an ordinary one.¹

538. You will resolve. - 1° He does not sin gravely who judges sinisterly about a neighbor if the judgment rests on indications sufficient for prudent probability, because moral certainty and true probability are not so distant that it is judged a grave injury to hold as almost certain that which is very probable.²

2° He does not sin gravely who, in judging, does not advert fully to the insufficiency of the motives, or to the grave matter of rash judgment, or admits only slight negligence in repelling the judgment.³

3° He does not sin gravely who rashly judges concerning someone indeterminate among several, for example of some assembly or community, or even concerning a determined person whom, for example, he sees from afar but does not know.⁴

4° You would not judge rashly if, hearing something from an upright and trustworthy man against a neighbor, you believed it. Much less if you only suspected or doubted, since much less is required for prudent suspicion or doubt than for prudent judgment; but otherwise if you heard something from a perverse man or one badly affected toward another.

5° Doubtful things are to be interpreted in the better part in this sense: that if in doubt about someone you wish to make a firm judgment, you are bound to make it in the better part, since in doubt he cannot be despoiled of his right; but not in this sense, that, a founded doubt having been left, you ought to conceive a firm judgment concerning him in the better part: for you are not bound to expose yourself to the danger of erring.⁵ Hence:

6° It is licit to guard against damages from fear not altogether imprudent; and so, for example, you can keep your things under guard, lest they be stolen by a stranger staying in your house; because, although you cannot judge positively that this or that man is a thief, nevertheless you can consult for yourself excellently, since you know for certain that there are sometimes thieves among men. Wherefore Superiors also deservedly observe subjects.