Question One: Concerning Injustice Itself in Itself

S. Th. II-II, q. 59.

236. Injustice, etymologically, is the privation or violation of justice, just as injury is the violation of right, which is the object of justice. Hence according to the various significations of the word justice, various kinds of injustice are spoken of:

1. improperly and metaphorically so called, it is the complex of vices and every transgression of law, in which sense every sin and every violation of virtue is called injustice or iniquity (I John, III, 4 in the Vulg.), because it injures the right or law of God;

2. properly so called, it is the violation of the special virtue of justice strictly so called, and in this sense it is taken in the present treatise, and indeed

a) either actually, and then it is the violation of another's right, which is strictly due to him according to perfect equality;

b) or habitually, and it is the depraved habit which is opposed contrarily to justice and inclines the will to injuring the right of another.

Among more recent authors, however, injustice is usually distinguished from injury: the former more indicates a habit inclining one to act unjustly; the latter rather the act by which the right of another, properly so called, is violated, although it is also quite often taken in a restricted sense for insult alone, or an unjust injury to honor.

237. Injury, or actual injustice, is defined: the voluntary and efficacious violation or injury of another's right properly so called. It is said:

a) of another's right properly so called, because where there is not right simply so called, there cannot be injury strictly so called, although there can be sin against charity or also against another virtue; and thus it is distinguished from simple offense, by which the reasonable will or good pleasure of another is violated, so that there is for him a motive of displeasure or indignation, without violation of right; for example, if you refuse to point out the way to one who asks politely;

b) violation or injury, and not necessarily the infliction of damage, because there can be injury without damage, as an insult inflicted on someone with no one else present, or adultery committed secretly with no offspring conceived; and, on the contrary, not every infliction of damage is always unjust, when we are not held to abstain from damage and do not use an unjust means: thus, for example, to plant trees next to the field of a neighbor, to open a well, to condemn justly to death.

Moreover violation is an action by which violence is brought to bear and a right is injured against the will of the person; this can be done by a positive unjust deed, or by omission of that which from justice is due to be furnished to another. Everyone is judged to will to preserve what is his, and to be unwilling and to resist lest his right be injured by another. But if he consents, injury will no longer be present, because he renounces his right or the use of it; and therefore that ceases and can no longer be violated;

c) voluntary: for if it is voluntary neither in itself and directly, nor in its cause or indirectly, there can be merely material injury, by which an unjust thing is done; there is not formal injustice, by which something is done unjustly;

d) efficacious: for injury it is not sufficient to have the intention of injuring a right, or an unjust affection, nor from such an intention to posit a condition or mere occasion of injuring the rights of others; but it is necessary effectively to injure the right and to posit a cause which truly influences such injury. Injustice is in external things, not in mere intention.

238. Division of injury. — 1. By reason of morality, one injury is formal, by which someone knowingly and willingly injures the right of another; another is material, by which a right is violated involuntarily, for example, from invincible ignorance or by chance event.

2. By reason of effect, it is divided into mere injury and damaging injury, according as a right is injured without damage, or also damage is inflicted on him whose right is injured: thus secret adultery without offspring conceived is mere injury, but public adultery, or secret adultery by which offspring is introduced among legitimate children, is damaging.

3. By reason of the goods which are injured, it is divided into real and personal injury, according as the right of another is directly violated in external goods, or in his person, namely, in the internal goods of soul or body.

4. By reason of the act or mode by which it is done, it is divided into mental, verbal, and real injury, according as it is done by a merely internal mental act, by word or writing, or by deed and work.

239. Principle. Injustice is a mortal sin from its genus. — For it consists in harm inflicted on another, which is against charity, which moves one to will good to another. But through charity there is the supernatural life of the soul. Hence injustice of itself takes away charity, and thus brings death to the soul. For:

a) It is repugnant to the primary precept of the natural law, commanding one to preserve the right of each one uninjured, and forbidding one to cause to another the detriment which we do not will to be done to ourselves.

b) In the decalogue itself it is forbidden, in which only grave matters are set forth (Exod. XX, 13-17), which must be observed in order to have eternal life (Mt. XIX, 17-18); hence the unjust will not possess the kingdom of God (I Cor. VI, 8-10).

It is nevertheless venial, both from indeliberation or imperfection of the act, and from the quantity of the matter in slight things, or where the owner is known not to be much unwilling, at least reasonably.

For order is not gravely disturbed if right is injured in a slight matter. Therefore attention must be paid

a) to the private person whose right is injured, whether a right of great moment is injured, the sign of which is that he himself is much saddened or indignant, gravely unwilling; — or whether grave harm or damage is inflicted on him, whether material or spiritual, which by its nature disturbs the liberty, security, or peace of men, dissolves public tranquility, the mutual union of men, or friendship;

b) to society itself, or to the damage which is inflicted on the public good: damage not only actual, but also virtual, which would be done to society if such an injury were committed with impunity or multiplied. For the common good, other things being equal, is preferable to private good. And therefore an injury is grave which, although it inflicts slight damage on some private person, gravely harms the republic, or is of a nature to harm it unless it is prohibited under grave obligation. Thus one who steals a horse, or an ox, or a hundred gold coins from a very rich man brings only slight harm upon him; and nevertheless he commits a grave injury, because such an action much harms the public good, since it is of a nature to overturn the order of society.

240. Observation. — St. Thomas notes, in art. 2, that someone is not properly called unjust from the fact that he does an unjust thing, but if he does it from a habitual and deliberate choice of committing injustice. He who does an unjust thing is not unjust 1) if this is done beyond intention and by accident, while he does not intend to do an unjust thing, for example, if he does it through ignorance, not thinking that he is doing an unjust thing: then the injustice is only material, because per se and formally he does not do an unjust thing; 2) even if knowingly and from intention he does an unjust thing, yet not from the end of injustice, but is enticed by some passion, such as anger, cupidity, or hatred, and wills the unjust thing: for then he acts unjustly and commits formal injustice, but he is not unjust, because he does not act from a habit of injustice by which with a habitual and deliberate will he seeks injustice. But he who from intention and from choice does an unjust thing, not on account of something else but on account of itself, namely, because injustice is pleasing to him per se, he is unjust, because he has the habit of injustice. Hence although acts of injustice are very frequent, the vice of injustice is rare.