Love of enemies

81. Declarations. 1. By the name of enemy are signified those who pursue us with hatred or have affected us with offense or injury. The doctrine concerning love of enemies is to be extended a fortiori to those whom for any motive whatever we naturally turn away from.

Offense is defined as a wound to the will of another; therefore through offense something is done which displeases another and therefore excites his indignation and aversion. Injury is defined as a wound to the right of another; through injury, something is done not only against the will but also against the right of another. Finally, if the injury inflicted is joined with damage of another, it is called damaging. Offense is compensated by friendly reconciliation; injury is compensated by satisfaction, by the fact that the offender undergoes something troublesome so that the wounded person may be reconciled to him; damaging is compensated by restitution, by the fact that the damage inflicted is repaired for the wounded person.

2. Common signs of love are called those which men of a certain condition and relation are accustomed to exhibit to one another to signify mutual love. But special signs are called those which, beyond the common signs, some men are accustomed to exhibit to one another to signify the friendship and familiarity flourishing between them.

a. These are generally reckoned common signs: to return greeting to one who greets, to respond to one asking or writing, to sell exposed merchandise to one wishing to buy, not to exclude from common prayers or alms, to provide common services, to avert damage threatening another if this can conveniently be done, etc. To common signs belong also those which are freely exhibited to some multitude, as if someone were to distribute alms to all the poor of some place. Special signs are generally reckoned these: to receive as a guest, to invite to a banquet, to console one who is sad, to visit the sick, to speak familiarly, to foster frequent exchange of letters, to greet first someone encountered, etc.

b. From this definition it is clear that these signs must be determined not absolutely, but relatively, namely with account taken of determinate state and condition, determinate relation, and also determinate region: for the common signs of love which cultivated men, and those which unformed men, brothers and sisters, more remote blood relatives, fellow citizens, or the altogether unknown exhibit to one another are different.

¹ M. Waldmann, Die Feindesliebe in der antiken Welt und im Christentume, Vienna: Mayer, 1902.

82. Precept. 1. There exists a special precept of charity of loving enemies: for although love of enemies is already implicitly contained in the general precept of charity toward the neighbor, nevertheless Christ the Lord added an explicit command both because of its great difficulty, and because of its eminent perfection, and finally because in the Old Testament this precept is not clearly contained in its whole amplitude and, besides this, had been obscured by the interpretation of the Pharisees: Love your enemies; do good to those who hate you, and pray for those persecuting and calumniating you.¹

a. The obligation of loving enemies is already contained in natural law: for an enemy also is our neighbor, whom the law of nature commands to be loved. Nevertheless ancient philosophers before Christ did not arrive at knowledge of the precept of loving enemies, although they praised the same love in certain cases. Finally, in the Christian age later Stoics, not without the influence of revealed truth, teach that enemies are to be loved.² In the Old Testament love of enemies was prescribed: You shall not hate your brother in your heart ... You shall not seek revenge nor remember the injury of citizens.³ If your enemy shall hunger, feed him; if he shall thirst, give him water to drink: for you shall heap coals upon his head, and the Lord will repay you.⁴ Although the Israelites taught that an enemy was to be loved as a neighbor, nevertheless they did not extend this love of enemy to all, but restricted it to enemies of their own race; indeed they pursued with hatred those whom they knew as adversaries of their nation and ancestral religion. Finally Christ clearly pronounces perfect love of enemies.⁵

b. This precept does not impose a special obligation distinct from the obligation of loving the neighbor. Insofar as it is negative, it prohibits us from ever having hatred for our enemies or fostering revenge or anger against them; but insofar as it is affirmative, it prescribes that we pursue even enemies with both internal and external love. The internal love owed to enemies does not require a special act of charity toward the person of the enemy, but only this, that we not exclude the enemy from the general love of neighbors, and that we have a ready will of assisting even enemies in necessity. Yet two things must be declared in particular: the obligation of exhibiting signs of love and the obligation of reconciling oneself with the offender.

2. From the precept of charity we are bound of itself to exhibit even to enemies common signs of love, but not special signs, unless accidentally.

The reason of the first is both because these signs are signs of general love, which is owed to all who are neighbors to us, therefore even to enemies; and because their omission is a sign of hatred, and therefore would confirm enemies in enmity. The reason of the second is both because these signs are signs of special friendship, which is owed to no one, therefore neither to an enemy, and because from their omission the enemy cannot presume an affection of hatred and revenge, but only lack of friendship and familiarity, which is not owed to him.

3. From a reasonable cause, even common signs of love can be denied to an enemy for a time, hatred nevertheless always being excluded; in like manner it can accidentally happen that sometimes even special signs are owed to him.

a. We are not bound to exhibit common signs of love to an enemy for a time in a threefold case: a. if there is hope that the enemy will thereby be corrected, or that his audacity and insolence will be blunted; b. for just punishment, as if a superior has been offended by an inferior; c. to show grief and displeasure concerning the injury inflicted upon us, especially if it was atrocious.

b. But special signs must be exhibited to an enemy: a. if their omission, since previously they were accustomed to be given, would be in others a cause of scandal, because from charity we are bound to prevent the neighbor from taking damage from our manner of acting, though not with grave inconvenience; b. if from these signs reconciliation of the enemy can be hoped for, because from charity we are bound to draw the neighbor back from sin if it can easily be done; c. if their denial would be a special sign of hatred and enmity, as if an enemy seeking reconciliation exhibited special signs of charity by greeting, speaking, etc., not to return these would be a sign of hatred.

¹ Matt. 5:43 ff. Cf. Luke 6:27 ff.

² Cf. Waldmann, loc. cit., p. 19 ff.

³ Lev. 19:17 s.

⁴ Prov. 25:21-22.

⁵ Matt. 5:44. The source prints "Matth. 35, 4."

83. Denial of common signs of charity can be a grave sin. a. For measuring the gravity of the sin which is committed by omission of signs of charity, attention must be paid to: a. whether the omission of these signs proceeds from internal hatred; b. whether it is a cause of offense with respect to the enemy or of scandal with respect to others. If neither has place, it is only venial sin.

b. To discern whether denial of the signs of charity proceeds from hatred, attention must be paid to the cause because of which they are omitted: for if it is grave, the omission of signs is judged to proceed from hatred.

a. He who, lest he meet an enemy, turns aside elsewhere, even without internal hatred, sins gravely if the enemy adverts that this is done on his account and therefore is gravely offended; it is no sin or only venial if he does not advert this or does not care, and if it happens from a reasonable cause.

b. Omission of greeting is not a sin unless from the circumstances it is a sign of internal hatred, as if previously greeting between them was accustomed as a common sign, or if among several who are greeted, the enemy alone is passed over.

c. A mistress does not sin who for a time neither looks at nor speaks to a maid discharged from service because of a grave injury, nor returns greeting to her when she meets her in the road and is greeted by her, provided these things are not done from hatred but from some honorable motive: from abhorrence of the offense, to show the gravity of the injury inflicted upon herself, or for just punishment. Yet she cannot for a longer time deny common signs of charity to her, but is bound to return greeting to one greeting, so that by an external sign she may show that she has already remitted the offense.¹

d. He who breaks off all dealings with another by whom he has been offended and neither wishes to speak with him nor greet him: a. does not sin if he does this for a few days in order to manifest just sadness or abhorrence against the depraved manner of acting of the other, or to correct the other; b. commits a light sin where the matter concerns persons among whom speech, greeting, exhibition of services, and things of this kind pertain to common signs, as when two neighbors of the same village or two pupils of the same seminary or two nuns do not wish to speak with one another nor greet one another, and if the cause of enmity is light, even if dealings were avoided and common signs denied for some time; c. commits a grave sin if those things proceed from hatred, as when a grave quarrel had preceded, or if they provoke hatred or offer scandal to others.²

¹ Cf. Ethel-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis, Paderborn: Typographia Bonifaciana, 1894, I, pars 2, n. 249 ff.

² Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 179.

84. On reconciliation. He who has been wounded in any way whatever is bound by the precept of charity to reconcile himself with an enemy seeking reconciliation. Therefore he is bound to remit offense or injury to the enemy and to show external signs of remission; yet not immediately after the offense has been inflicted. But he is not bound to remit reparation of injury or the damage inflicted, nor to restore the more intimate familiarity which perhaps had existed before.

a. To remit offense or injury, or to give pardon, is nothing other than to lay aside hatred and affection of revenge; but this is prescribed by divine law, as is established from the general precept of charity and from several places of Sacred Scripture, for example, if you do not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive your sins.¹

b. That remission ought to be manifested outwardly is gathered from the general precept of exhibiting common signs of charity even to an enemy. Not immediately: for it surpasses human frailty that the wounded person, immediately, while internal disturbance has not yet been quieted, be compelled to exhibit signs of reconciliation. Hence it suffices that meanwhile the internal affection of hatred and revenge be laid aside.

The offended person of himself is not bound to seek reconciliation; but accidentally he is sometimes bound to this, if it can easily be done, where namely the offender would otherwise persevere in the state of sin, or if scandal would arise because the cause is unknown on account of which common signs are denied.

Reconciliation, and therefore common signs of charity, can for a time be denied even to one seeking peace, with hatred and revenge laid aside, as a sign of sorrow; but scandal can easily be absent if the cause is known on account of which common signs are denied. But if they were denied for a longer time, even to one not seeking peace, their denial would rightly be judged a sign of enmity and revenge, and therefore would be a sin, except in the case in which the enemy would not respond to signs exhibited.

c. No one is bound of himself to remit to the neighbor a good owed to him; but satisfaction for injury and restitution for damage is a good which is owed to him who has suffered injury or damage. Therefore each one can of himself will that, the affection of hatred and revenge nevertheless being laid aside.

Wherefore, if the offender should refuse to compensate the debt, it is permitted to seek before a judge not only restitution for the damage inflicted, but also satisfaction for the injury done: for each one can demand what is justly owed to him.

Indeed, strictly speaking, even if the offender asks pardon, it is still permitted before a judge to demand vindication for the injury done, so that justice may be satisfied or that others may be restrained, with every malicious affection against the neighbor nevertheless laid aside. But in practice this must altogether be dissuaded, because it is very difficult to demand punishment of an enemy with every depraved affection of hatred and revenge excluded.

Yet accidentally it can happen that the wounded person is bound from charity also to forgive the enemy the reparation of injury, where namely he would have to undergo too great an inconvenience to repair the injury in comparison with the good which would come to the wounded person from it.

d. Once peace has been restored, more intimate familiarity is not owed to him who before was a friend. Therefore even all signs of friendship, except those which, considering the natural relation of blood relationship, living together, identity of state, etc., are common, can be omitted without sin.

¹ Matt. 6:15. Cf. Lev. 19:17.

85. On the manner of reconciliation. 1. He who offends another in any way whatever is bound, as soon as he morally can, to seek reconciliation with him, and indeed, if another means of reconciliation is not available, through petition of pardon: for he who has wounded charity is bound to repair it in that manner which is morally possible for him; but reparation of charity is ordinarily made through reconciliation. Whence Christ prescribes: if therefore you offer your gift ... go first to be reconciled to your brother.¹

Whether the offender ought to ask pardon. The petition of pardon is a means for obtaining the end of reconciliation; therefore when it is the only means, it must be called necessary, which generally happens if the offended person is a father, master, superior, etc. Accidentally it can be necessary if a superior or judge enjoins it. But ordinarily it is not necessary, since peace among enemies can also be restored by other means, through special signs of friendship, through services exhibited, through the intercession of friends, etc.

2. Of two persons who have mutually offended one another and have mutually become enemies, he who has offended the other more gravely ought first to procure reconciliation; and if the mutual offense is nearly equal, he who first offended. But in practice each should be persuaded that either by himself or through another he seek reconciliation.

¹ Matt. 5:23-24.

Anger is the inordinate appetite for revenge.

Revenge is the infliction of pain in satisfaction for an injury. As private individuals we are not allowed to avenge injuries which have been done us: “To no man rendering evil for evil. . . . Not revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath, for it is written: Revenge to me; I will repay, saith the Lord.¹ Sometimes, however, in trivial matters the immediate punishment of an injury is allowed to private persons, in order to prevent a recurrence of the injustice, or under circumstances in which such an action is really an act of self-defence. In other cases private revenge is not allowed, but belongs to those whose duty it is to correct delinquents and to avenge outraged justice. Anger, then, will be inordinate whenever revenge is sought without just cause, or more severe than the cause requires, or when private vengeance is indulged in, or when it is sought merely to satisfy hatred and spite. In these cases anger is of itself a grave sin because it is against justice and charity; if there be merely want of moderation in the manner of seeking or executing lawful vengeance, the sin will be venial.

¹ Rom. xii 17.

Nor even enemies and those who injure us are excluded from the law of charity; in spite of their ill will and malice they remain our neighbours, and our Lord expressly bade us love them: “I say to you: Love your enemies; do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that persecute and calumniate you.”¹ We are bound by this precept to put out of our hearts all ill feeling and desire of revenge against those who dislike and wrong us, and furthermore we are bound to show them those common marks of Christian charity which are due to all and may be refused to none. What those common marks of Christian charity are depends much on the usages of time and place, and of the society to which the parties belong. Those marks which are common to members of the same family are not due to outsiders; those which are mutually shown to neighbours of the same social standing are not due to utter strangers or to persons in a lower social position. Among the common signs of charity which may be refused to none are reckoned the following: general prayer for all which we offer up when we say the Our Father, answering a question or returning a salute, selling in open market to all comers, refraining from excluding individuals from general invitations or general benefactions, It is not of precept but of counsel to show one’s enemies unusual signs of forgiveness and charity. Such signs are to pray expressly for an enemy in particular, to visit him, to console him in affliction, to treat familiarly with him.

¹ Matt. v 44.

In certain circumstances, however, we are bound to show even these unusual signs of charity to our enemy, as when they cannot be refused without scandal to others who will think that they are refused through hatred, or when they are required to prevent our enemy from falling into serious sin as, for example, by conceiving a deeper hatred for us. If a former friend asks our pardon for an injury which he has done us, and if the friendship was not a freely accepted union between us, but was more or less required by our mutual relations, we must be ready to show him again unusual signs of charity. If the friendship depended merely on our mutual liking, there will be no obligation to show unusual marks of charity after receiving an offence; what was freely given may be freely withheld, always supposing that there is no ill will. We may for a time even refuse the common and ordinary signs of charity toward another for a good reason. A superior, for example, may do so in order to correct an inferior who has offended him. An equal may do so for a time immediately after receiving an offence while the injury is still rankling in his heart; to require not only repression of ill feeling, but the immediate exhibition of marks of charity for the offender, would be to lay too heavy a burden on poor human nature. It may also be lawful to refuse the ordinary signs of charity for a time toward one who has offended us in lighter matters as a suitable punishment, and as a means of preventing a repetition of such offences in future.

When one who has offended us apologizes and asks for pardon we are bound to forgive him and also at the proper time to show him the ordinary signs of charity. If, however, he has injured us, we have a right to compensation for the injustice, and charity does not compel us to forego our right. We may then require satisfaction for the injury and even bring an action in a court of law to recover it against the wrongdoer, without, of course, indulging any ill will.

With a view to reconciliation between enemies, it is the duty of him who gave the offence to apologize and to ask for pardon, unless a position of superiority makes this inadvisable. As a rule, it will not be necessary to make a formal request for pardon; satisfaction can usually be given to the offended party in a less formal way, and in a way that is less embarrassing to both parties. If both were in the wrong, the one who was most so, or the inferior, should be the first to seek reconciliation.

We sometimes find it difficult to associate with certain people; they try our temper; we can scarcely talk or think of them with patience. This is sinful, of course, if it is voluntary, and if it arises from ill will towards the person in question. It sometimes, however, comes not from ill will towards the person, but from incompatibility of characters and dispositions. We dislike in him some quality or mannerism, or something which we cannot precisely define. It is what theologians call the hatred of abomination, not of enmity, and it may be without fault, as when it leads us to fly his company not in order to wound his feelings, but to escape a trial of temper and probable unpleasantness.

To refuse the ordinary signs of charity so as not to speak to another, or to refuse to have anything to do with him out of ill feeling, and to foster this for a considerable time, is of itself a grave sin. But in estimating the gravity of such a sin in practice, the cause and the strength of the ill feeling should be considered. If the refusal to have anything to do with another come from serious ill will, it will be a grievous sin; otherwise it may be only venial, or if there be no ill will and a just cause, no sin at all,

II. Sins against charity toward God - besides omission of the act prescribed by reason of the precept of charity - are: hatred of God and sloth.

1. Hatred of God. Hatred taken generally is an act by which someone is badly affected toward someone.

Hatred is distinguished as twofold: hatred of abomination and hatred of enmity or malevolence, according as someone turns away from someone as an evil to himself, or wills evil to someone. Hatred of abomination is opposed to love of concupiscence; hatred of enmity to love of benevolence. Sadness over another's good belongs to hatred of enmity; likewise joy over his evil.

Hatred of abomination, to which every evil deliberate movement against someone is referred, is again twofold, namely of the person himself and of a quality, according as someone turns away from the person himself according to himself, or from an adhering quality of the person. These things noted, I say:

a) Hatred of abomination toward God is grave from its whole genus; for it is clear that he sins gravely who in whatever way whatsoever turns away from God.

b) Hatred of enmity toward God is grave from its whole genus, indeed even the gravest of all sins, because he who wishes evil to God most greatly injures the charity due to God.

2. Sloth; concerning this, see n. 327.

Somewhat akin to fraternal correction are: 1. instruction of one who through ignorance is about to transgress a grave law; 2. admonition of one who is in danger of sinning formally.

I. The instruction of which we speak obliges:

1. Of itself, if there is question of divine law, whether natural or positive: namely on account of the reverence due to a law of this kind. If there is question of human law, it quite probably does not oblige, because it is not sufficiently certain that the reverence due to such a law demands this (St. Alphonsus, II, 36).

2. As it were by accident, instruction, even if there is question of human law, can oblige: 1. on account of the harm of the one ignorant, as if he is ignorant of things to be known by necessity of means; if there is danger lest he contract a bad custom; if he is ignorant of a prohibition of civil law, and therefore is about to expose himself to the danger of a penalty; 2. on account of common harm or the harm of a third party, as if someone through ignorance were detaining another's property; 3. on account of scandal, as if an unknowing priest were to enter a brothel.

3. Superiors, confessors, parish priests, parents, and teachers are of themselves always bound to instruction, "because upon them it specially falls to teach subjects" (St. Alphonsus, II, 36).

Note, however, that a proportionate cause excuses from the obligations set out.

II. Admonition, as is clear, must of itself be made if one's neighbor is in grave danger of sinning formally; moreover apply to this matter what has been said about correction.

III. Finally, concerning the spiritual works of mercy, it helps to note these things:

1. Since the Church herself, especially through religious Orders and Congregations, endeavors to provide for the propagation of the faith, no one in particular is bound to go to the regions of unbelievers, unless legitimate authority imposes this upon him. Moreover, all should contribute to the intended end by alms or at least by prayers (St. Alphonsus, II, 27).

2. It is difficult to determine accurately how far the dead must be helped; but it is certain that the faithful who fulfill their Christian duties satisfy the obligation: for so often they are present at the Sacrifice of the Mass and at public prayers, which are made for the dead or even for them.¹

¹ Aertnys-Damen, I, n. 372, question 30.

Internal sins - besides omission of an internal act by reason of the precept of charity itself - are hatred and envy.

I. What hatred is and into how many kinds it is distinguished, see n. 520. But the morality of hatred toward one's neighbor is outlined in these points:

1. Hatred of abomination of the person is a grave sin, since it excludes one's neighbor from common charity. Hatred of abomination of a quality is good, evil, or (at least from the object) indifferent, according as the quality which someone turns away from is good or evil or indifferent (St. Alphonsus, II, 30; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 34, a. 3).

2. Hatred of enmity is a sin grave from its genus, that is, grave or light according as it regards a grave or light evil, or deprivation of a grave or light good (St. Alphonsus, II, 30).

From hatred of enmity must be distinguished the act by which someone in an ordered way wishes evil to his neighbor; namely insofar as it yields to the good of the one wishing, or of the neighbor, or of a third party, or of the community. Hence it is lawful, for example, to desire temporal evil for one's neighbor, so that he may be amended from sins; likewise the penalty of a delict, insofar as it restores the violated order and turns the delinquent and others away from transgressions; likewise "to wish death for a heresiarch or a disturber of public peace, on account of the common good, and of many; according to that saying in Galatians 5:12: Would that... they be cut off. Likewise, to be saddened over the fact that dignities are conferred on the unworthy; or over the health of him who from it takes an occasion of sinning" (St. Alphonsus, II, 30; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 108, a. 1). Yet it is required that the evil of one's neighbor deservedly be postponed to the good that will follow. Hence there were condemned by Innocent XI, proposition 13: "If you do it with due moderation, you can, without mortal sin, be saddened over the life of someone, and rejoice over his natural death, and seek and desire it by an inefficacious affection: not indeed from displeasure with the person, but on account of some temporal advantage";¹ likewise proposition 14: "It is lawful by an absolute desire to wish the death of one's father; not indeed as the evil of the father, but as the good of the one wishing, because, namely, a rich inheritance will come to him";² likewise proposition 15: "It is lawful for a son to rejoice over the parricide of a parent, perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the immense riches obtained from the inheritance."³

Note 1. It is probable that "in confession it is enough if you say that you wished grave evil for your neighbor; nor is there need to explain the species of evil, for example death, infamy, etc., because all are comprehended under one aspect of evil" (St. Alphonsus, II, 30). The opposite must be said of a purpose of inflicting diverse evils (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., n. 297).

Note 2. Penitents rather often confuse illicit hatred with hatred of abomination of a quality, or even hatred with a certain natural and involuntary antipathy.

¹ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1163.

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1164.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1165.

II. Envy; about this see what has been said in n. 313.

What are the acts of the will which consist in the pursuit of good and in flight from evil? - These acts of the will can be distinguished according as the passions of the sensitive appetite, to which they correspond, are distinguished. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 22. Now the passions are: love, to which hatred is opposed; desire or concupiscence, to which flight or abomination is opposed; delight, to which sadness is opposed; hope, to which despair is opposed; daring, to which fear is opposed; finally anger, which has no opposite.

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. The first three are passions of the concupiscible; the four latter are passions of the irascible. Love is the simple complacency of good, which proceeds from the connaturality and coaptation of the one appetizing with regard to the thing suitable to him. Dilection adds to love a preceding election; charity adds to love a certain perfection, insofar as that which is loved is esteemed of great price. One love is of friendship, another of concupiscence. For to love is to will good to someone. Toward that good which someone wills to someone there is love of concupiscence. Toward that to which someone wills good there is love of friendship. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 26.

Hatred is the simple displeasure and detestation of evil, which arises from a certain dissonance of the appetite toward that which is apprehended as repugnant and harmful. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 29. One hatred is of abomination, another of enmity. The former is the detestation of some evil of a person; the latter is also the detestation of the person himself, to whom one wills evil. Concupiscence or desire is the movement of the appetite into an absent good. Flight or abomination is the detestation of an absent evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 30.

Delight is a certain repose of the appetite from the presence of a delighting good. Sadness is a certain pain from the presence of evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 31, 35. Hope is the movement of the appetite into a future good, arduous, possible to obtain, and according to this possibility or impossibility hope differs from despair. Hence it is that hope imports a certain approach to an arduous good; despair, on the contrary, imports withdrawal from it. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 40. a. 1, 4. "Fear flees future harm because of its victory over the one fearing; but daring attacks imminent danger because of its victory over the danger itself." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1. For fear "does not regard evil absolutely, but with a certain difficulty or arduousness, so that it can scarcely be resisted." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 41. a. 2 ad 3. "According to the opposition of good and evil, fear is contrary to hope; according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, daring is contrary to fear, but despair to hope." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1 ad 3.

Anger is the appetite of vengeance, as possible to itself. It seeks evil itself under the notion of vindictive justice. Hence it regards one object according to the notion of good, namely the vengeance which it seeks, and another according to the notion of evil, namely the harmful man, against whom it wills to be avenged through the infliction of punishment. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 46. a. 2, 6. It has no contrary either according to approach and withdrawal, or according to the opposition of good and evil. For it is a movement toward attacking the injurious evil already lying upon one. Hence neither can there be a movement toward fleeing evil; nor can there be a movement toward good: for when this has been obtained, there is repose and joy of the appetite. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. a. 3.

What is envy? Envy is sadness concerning the good of another, insofar as it is diminutive of one's own glory. - Moreover, in five ways can someone be saddened concerning the good of another: 1. When someone is saddened concerning the good of another absolutely, because it is the good of the neighbor; and properly this is hatred of enmity, or simply hatred or aversion of the person to whom we will evil, insofar as it is his evil; and this indeed from its genus is mortal. 2. When someone is saddened concerning the good of neighbor relatively, because he fears some evil from him; and properly this is fear, which will be licit unless it is inordinate, e.g., if he fears evil is to be inflicted on himself or on others unjustly. 3. When someone is saddened concerning the good of another because he thinks the same person unworthy of such good; and this is indignation or abomination, which is not a sin; nevertheless it will be a sin, and indeed mortal, if it either accuses God's providence, and is blasphemy, or if it so affects that it leads men to imitate evil. 4. When someone is saddened concerning the good of neighbor, not because the neighbor has it, but because he himself lacks the same, and this is not envy, but emulation or zeal, which, if it concerns honorable good, is praiseworthy; but if it concerns temporal goods, sometimes it is venial, as if the good is disproportionate to the one grieving, such as it would be if a peasant grieved that he is not a king. 5. If someone grieves that another equal to himself, or not greatly unequal, grows in glory and excellence, so that thereby he becomes superior to him, and he apprehends the very increase of glory and excellence as an impediment to his own good and as an evil to himself, insofar as it is diminutive of his own glory and excellence; and this is envy properly so called. For he is called envious because he is not seeing, since he cannot see the goods of another without sadness. Equal or not greatly unequal, because the good of those who greatly excel us is not usually apprehended as diminishing our excellence and glory. The goods of another, especially those in which there is glory, and in which men love to be honored and to be in good opinion.

Envy is mortal from its genus, Gal. 5:21. For it is directly against charity, which rejoices concerning the good of neighbor, which envy desires destroyed or grieves is not destroyed. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 36; L. 72. "Pride alone and envy are purely spiritual sins, which can belong to demons." S. Th. 1 p., q. 63, a. 2 ad 2.

What are the daughters of envy? - They are hatred of neighbor, whispering, detraction, exultation in the adversities of neighbor, and affliction in his prosperities. These are mortal from their genus, since directly against charity. Whispering is speech by which, without cause, something is reported to one person concerning another, which indeed of itself is apt to break the friendship of both; and the detractor is therefore bound to restore and reconcile that friendship. It is mortal from its genus both against charity and against justice. Detraction also is both against charity and against justice. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 36, a. 4 ad 3; q. 34, a. 6; q. 74; L. 72.

What are the sins opposed to hope? - By reason of love, the first act of hope, there is opposed to it the hatred of abomination of God, by which someone abominates God as hostile to himself because of vengeance for sins, or by which someone is turned away from God, eternal blessedness, and wishes to place his happiness in some other thing than in God. Hence it is also a mortal sin opposed to hope, to love earthly things more with a love of concupiscence than heavenly things; e.g., if someone is so disposed that he desires to remain perpetually in this life, and to leave heaven to God, if God leaves earth to him.

By reason of hope, the other act of the virtue of hope, there is opposed to it flight from God because of the labor and difficulty of attaining him, and despair and presumption. The former is voluntary diffidence of obtaining blessedness and the means necessary for attaining it. But the latter is an inordinate confidence of obtaining blessedness without the means ordained by God. Presumption is chiefly committed if you presume to obtain eternal life by the proper powers of nature without the help of grace; if you expect it without penance, without labor, from the mercy of God alone; if you expect it above your proper disposition, according to the order of divine providence, e.g., if you should wish to surpass the Blessed Virgin Mary in holiness and glory. Struggl, q. 3, nn. 11, 14-16; Suarez, d. 1, ss. 2, 3; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 20; q. 21; L. 20, 21.

Is there smallness of matter in sins against hope? - R. Negatively as to hatred of God and love of creatures, if the act is perfect, as is clear of itself. R. Negatively as to despair, if it is perfect and properly such; for it is most greatly injurious to the divine Mercy. Eph. 4:19. Otherwise, however, if it is imperfect and improperly such, as often happens in sadness and impatience. But here it must be noted that even devout souls are sometimes troubled by almost continuous temptations of despair. It is certainly not easily to be believed that they have sinned gravely, although they think they have given consent to them; just as excessive fear about the danger of salvation must not be confused with despair properly so called. - R. Affirmatively as to presumption, although it is grave from its genus. Bonacina, cited by La-Croix 128, teaches that he sins only venially who from presumption concerning the goodness of God would sin venially, or would defer doing penance concerning a mortal sin until the following day. - Suarez, d. 2, s. 3; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 20, aa. 1, 3; L. 20.

Resolves: It is a mortal and most grave sin, and admits no smallness of matter, since it is opposed to the infinite goodness of God, if someone formally hates God with the hatred of malevolence and enmity, e.g., if someone wishes God not to exist, and himself to be held in hatred by God. - Likewise he sins mortally if someone loves God with a love appreciatively less than creatures. Therefore "any act of mortal sin is contrary to charity." S. Th., 2. 2. q. 24, a. 12. Likewise he sins against the charity of God if someone does not love God on account of himself as the last end of all things, but only on account of something else, e.g., eternal life, or to avoid hell. This is mortal, because namely God would not be loved appreciatively above all things if something other than him were loved by actual intention as the principal end. Principal, because God can be loved on account of the recompense of eternal life, but less principally. By actual intention, because otherwise, by loving eternal life and other gifts of God, by the very fact that such an act is in itself right, eternal life or other gifts of God are always at least implicitly and in actu exercito ordered to God as to the supreme end. L. 23, 24; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 34, aa. 1, 2; Struggl, q. 5, n. 2; Sanch., l. 2, c. 35, n. 3.

What does charity toward neighbor import; is there given a precept of charity toward neighbor? - R. To the first. Charity toward neighbor commands love of oneself and of neighbor, but in an ordered way; for not every neighbor is neighbor to us in the same mode. Love of oneself embraces the due care to be had of soul and body. Sins committed against it are implicitly contained and accused in other sins committed and accused in confession. But since even an enemy is neighbor, it also commands love of enemies. Love, namely so that we will good to him. The chief good of man is God. Therefore by charity we will that man possess God, by association in full participation of blessedness. And this is to love neighbor as oneself. Besides interior love, since charity by its nature is not sterile, but active, it also commands exterior works. Therefore besides interior benevolence, charity also commands beneficence, which is the execution of benevolence. The matter concerns the precept of theological charity, which is evidently established from the very words of Christ. "But the second commandment is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Matt. 22:39; 1 John 4:21.

Among exterior works alms and fraternal correction hold a special place; these are works of mercy, the former corporal, the latter spiritual. For mercy is the virtue which inclines us to compassionating another's misery, and from compassion to assisting. The same charity, on the contrary, prohibits hatred of malevolence and enmity toward neighbor, which from its genus is mortal. For by it we will evil to the neighbor insofar as it is evil for him, which is always inordinate and repugnant to charity. Yet smallness of matter is given, since the evil which we will to neighbor can be great or small. Besides this internal act, it consequently prohibits that by our exterior actions we inflict spiritual harm upon his salvation through scandal, or do other harm to him either as to other goods of soul, or as to goods of body. Concerning this last there will be discussion in the precepts of the Decalogue; here we will speak only of the remaining things.

Benevolence, therefore, and beneficence are acts of charity; to the former belongs willing good, to the latter doing good, according to the common account of good. If the good which someone does to another is taken under a special account of good, beneficence will receive a special account and will pertain to some special virtue. If the good, for example, is owed, it will pertain to justice; if it is for relieving misery, it will pertain to mercy, etc. Therefore the conferring of a benefit in general pertains to charity. In order that the conferring of benefit and beneficence properly be had, it is necessary that there be had a liberal conferring of a gift. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 31, a. 1.

Charity, about which the speech is properly here, is theological charity, by which neighbor is loved on account of God. But there is also given another charity, a moral virtue, by which neighbor is loved on account of the very honorableness of this love, which per se is a natural virtue. The natural motive of this love does not impede this love also from being supernatural, if it is done from grace and informed by faith. And it is commanded by God: "All things whatsoever you wish that men should do to you, do you also to them." Matt. 7:12; Job 4:16. Nevertheless the precept of theological charity is not fulfilled by this love. It is indeed praiseworthy and very meritorious that the acts to be exercised toward neighbor be exercised from the motive of the charity of God; nevertheless per se it is not obligatory.

For as the charity of God commands that we observe his commands, but does not also command that we execute them from the motive of the charity of God, so also charity toward neighbor indeed commands that we exercise various acts of beneficence and mercy, but by no means that we effect them only from the motive of the charity of God.

R. To the second. There is given a precept of loving neighbor with a true and internal affection, as is established from John 15:12, 17, and from propositions 10 and 11 condemned by Innocent XI; and also with external love, 1 John 3:15 seqq.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 31, a. 2. But someone sufficiently satisfies this precept through a certain general love which excludes no one, and accordingly by reciting the Lord's Prayer, in which you have both an internal and external act. A precept of this sort obliges per se when the precept of charity toward God obliges per se. For it is like to this. Matt. 22:39. Hence he who fulfills the precept of charity toward God, by willing every good to God, at least implicitly fulfills the precept of charity toward neighbor, by desiring salvation for him. But it obliges per accidens: 1. If hatred toward neighbor cannot be repelled unless an act of love is elicited; for he who is bound to the end is obliged to the means. 2. When the neighbor is in necessity; otherwise the precept would be vain; if that necessity becomes known, for no one is bound to inquire whether someone is in need. - L. 8; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 25; q. 27, a. 8; q. 30; q. 31; q. 32, aa. 1, 2; q. 34, aa. 3, 4; q. 44; Struggl, q. 6, n. 4; Salm. 17; D'Annib., ed. 4, p. 2, n. 81; E. M. 282. Through a certain general love which excludes no one; for care concerning the salvation of neighbor is not incumbent on anyone, unless perhaps in a case of necessity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 5 ad 3. Nor indeed by reason of common charity is there an obligation of inquiring into the necessity of neighbor. For it regards only cases occurring to anyone. "That which is owed to some determinate and certain person... we must expend upon him, not waiting until he occurs to us, but having due solicitude that we seek him out.... But those benefits which are owed not to a certain person, but commonly to all neighbors... we need not seek those upon whom we may expend them, but it suffices that we expend them on those who occur to us." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 33, a. 2 ad 4.

What are the sins opposed to charity? - From the Angelic Doctor, 2. 2, they are: 1. Hatred of God and of neighbor, which is opposed to the very love of charity; hatred of God is virtually present in any lethal sin, q. 34. But charity toward neighbor is gravely injured by any grave displeasure caused to neighbor without just reason, which constitutes a grave offense against him. 2. Acedia, which is opposed to the joy of charity concerning divine good, q. 35. Cf. n. 343 seq. 3. Envy, which is opposed to joy concerning the good of neighbor, q. 36. Cf. n. 327 seq. 3. Discord, which is in the heart, and is opposed to the peace of charity, q. 37. Cf. n. 322. - 4. Contention, which is in the mouth, and is also opposed to peace, q. 38.

Cf. n. 322. 5. Schism, quarrel, war, sedition, which pertain to deed, and likewise are opposed to peace, qq. 39-42. Cf. n. 342, 380, 751. 6. Scandal, which is opposed to the beneficence of charity, q. 43. Omission of help, whether spiritual or temporal, when it is owed, attention being paid to the necessity of neighbor and the ability of the one helping, is properly against mercy, and consequently against charity. Injury of neighbor in his temporal goods is properly opposed to justice. But in all sins against justice toward neighbor, charity and justice are injured at the same time, although in sins against charity toward neighbor justice is not always injured.

What order generally is to be observed in charity toward neighbor?

In the order of charity each one is bound after God to love: 1. himself according to spiritual goods, insofar as he wills God, his end, i.e., the supreme and uniquely necessary good, more to himself than to another; then neighbor as to the same spiritual goods; 2. himself as to intrinsic bodily goods, such as life, health, etc.; then neighbor as to the same bodily goods; 3. himself, and then neighbor, as to external goods, such as reputation, honor, riches. The reason is that love of self is the rule of love of neighbor. But the rule is prior and preferable to what is ruled. Therefore love of self always precedes and is preferred to love of neighbor, where the matter concerns goods of the same order and equal necessity.

Of the same order: Supernatural goods are to be preferred to natural goods. Likewise the common good is to be preferred to private good, because the common good of many is more divine than the private good of one. Intrinsic natural goods, life, health, integrity of members, are to be preferred to extrinsic goods, reputation, honor, riches. But reputation and honor with respect to riches are of a higher order, because they are something spiritual and moral.

Necessity, whether temporal or spiritual, is distinguished as threefold: 1. Extreme, when danger of life, that is, of eternal damnation or death, or of another evil almost equal to death, so presses upon the neighbor that he, morally speaking, cannot escape it without another's help. And it is quasi-extreme if he can free himself, but only with the greatest difficulty; or if there is only probable danger of the aforesaid evil: of life, of integrity of principal members, of liberty, of a most grave disease, of infamy. 2. Grave, when someone suffers great danger to the salvation of the soul, or to the life of the body, or of another grave evil, which he cannot escape without great difficulty. Such is the necessity in which those things necessary for conserving one's state are lacking. 3. Common or middling, in which someone can provide for himself without great difficulty. In this, in the spiritual order, are vulgar sinners who, if they wished to apply some effort, would rise again from a depraved state; but in the temporal order poor beggars are generally in it, for whom life, according to their condition, is not too burdensome and miserable. Tambur., Expl. Dec., l. 5, c. 1, § 1, n. 4 seqq.; § 2, n. 5 seqq.; Suarez, de Carit., d. 9, s. 2, n. 4; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, aa. 4-6; q. 31, a. 3; q. 32, a. 3; q. 44, aa. 7, 8; L. 25, 27, 31; H. A. 18.

Must even enemies be loved? - It is certain that enemies must be loved in some way, since they are neighbors; and this is also established from the Gospel, Matt. 5:43 seqq. This precept, insofar as it is negative, prohibits that anyone ever pursue his enemy with hatred; but insofar as it is affirmative, it also obliges to positive benevolence and external beneficence according to the measure of the necessity in which he is placed. - Therefore the question is only about the mode of this positive love to be had from precept, which is explained in the following paragraphs.

Any man is bound per se to show to his neighbor, even an enemy, the common signs and benefits of love from precept; but special ones only from counsel, unless a reason of obligation accedes from elsewhere. Per se, because sometimes a reasonable cause is present for denying them for a time, e.g., by reason of due correction or punishment, of a good effect upon sons or inferiors, or because there is hope that from it he will be amended, or because of a prudent fear of quarrels from the sight or conversation of the enemy, or because of a prudent fear that the enemy will abuse those signs, even if common, for inflicting a new injury; likewise because of the expression of just sorrow conceived from injury, etc. Neighbor even an enemy: An enemy is not to be loved insofar as he is an enemy; thus rather he is to be hated; but insofar as he is neighbor. For by enemy is understood one who has offended or injured undeservedly, and pursues us with hatred. Common signs and benefits of love are those which by reason of general charity are owed to a Christian by any Christian in common, to a fellow citizen by a fellow citizen, to a relative by a relative, and so forth. - But special ones are those which are not owed by reason of general charity, but are shown to some person by reason of a more special friendship and familiarity. But since this is undertaken by free will, hence those special signs proceed not from the debt of charity, but from the liberality of charity. Unless a reason of obligation accedes from elsewhere, such as would be: 1. fear of scandal from omission; 2. hope of the salvation of the enemy; whence, if by one of these things you can, without your inconvenience, reconcile an enemy to yourself and to God, to omit it would be grave; 3. temporal or spiritual necessity; 4. request for pardon for fault and exhibition of special signs of love. But in this last case, as to special friendship and familiarity, its restoration is not necessarily always to be urged. For that special friendship is not owed even to a friend; therefore a fortiori it is not owed to an enemy, since it is altogether voluntary.

Proof of the first part: 1. from the most common opinion of theologians; 2. because to deny those common signs is a manifestation of hatred, which is opposed to charity. Proof of the second part: 1. likewise from the most common opinion of theologians; 2. because, since no other union remains for us with an enemy except the sole union of common charity, we are bound to show him only those signs which are common signs of charity. Struggl, q. 4, nn. 29-31; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 25, aa. 8, 9; q. 27, a. 7; q. 31, a. 3; 3, D. 30, q. 1, a. 2; de Carit., q. un., aa. 8, 9; L. 28.

Resolves: It is not licit to exclude an enemy from common prayers, e.g., the Lord's Prayer, and that which is instituted for the community; nor from common alms, the return of a greeting, an answer, the sale of goods exposed for sale, because these are common signs of love. But no one, speaking per se, is bound to loving an enemy by a positive and particular act, nor to greeting him, speaking to him, visiting him when sick, consoling him when sad, receiving him with hospitality, or dealing familiarly with him, etc., because these are special signs of love. Therefore, if any of these, attention being paid to circumstances of places and persons, were a common sign of love, it would no longer be licit to abstain from it, as could easily happen when lodging in the same family, community, college, by reason of consanguinity, common life in religion, common education and study. Struggl, q. 4, n. 36; Sporer, tr. 2, in 1 Pr., c. 6; L. 28.

Although anyone is bound not only interiorly to remit an offense to an enemy legitimately asking pardon, but also to show external signs of remission, nevertheless he is not bound immediately after the offense itself has been inflicted. Nor indeed is he bound to remit satisfaction either for personal injury or for real harm, if he has been harmed. Indeed he is not even bound to accept it if it is offered; but he can also juridically ask for compensation, provided hatred is put aside.

Proof of the first part. As to the internal act: Matt. 5:44: But I say to you: Love your enemies. And ibid. 6:15: If you will not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive your sins. As to the external act: Because otherwise you would be judged to contemn the enemy, and to wish to persevere in hostility. "But if he (the enemy or offender) does not show fitting satisfaction, the offended person is not bound to speak to him, namely when he either does not wish to satisfy at all, or only halfway." S. Antonin., Summ., p. 2, tit. 8, c. 2, § 6. But here one must carefully note whether the offended person, while he refuses certain offices to the offender, inflicts or wishes some grave evil to him. For if this is absent, and no other grave inconveniences can be feared from these offices denied to the offender, someone ought not immediately to be accused of grave fault, so that on account of it the confessor would rightly deny absolution. Cf. 396, 397; Coninck, de Virt. theol., d. 29, n. 60. But the reason of the restriction made is that the matter seems too violent and above human frailty: to compel an injured person immediately to make reconciliation, the disturbance of soul not yet calmed. Whence an opportune time must be awaited, and meanwhile it suffices that the offended person put aside hatred. Indeed it is sometimes licit to omit common signs of love for a time, as was said at the beginning of n. 396. - Offense. A simple offense is the injury of another's will, by which someone causes annoyance to another against his rational will, and as it were gives a certain right to indignation and aversion. Cf. 400.

Proof of the second part. Because charity is not opposed to justice. For charity does not forbid exacting from an enemy fitting satisfaction either for an injury inflicted, or even for damage caused. Indeed this can also be useful for restraining the wickedness of a man. Sporer, l. c., n. 18. Proof of the third part. Because vengeance by public authority is licit. Therefore it is licit to wish public punishment for an enemy, and to seek it. - But the reason of the limitation is that "if his intention is borne principally toward the evil of him upon whom he takes vengeance, and rests there, it is altogether illicit; because to delight in the evil of another pertains to hatred, which repugns to charity, by which we ought to love all men. Nor is someone excused if he intends the evil of him who unjustly inflicted evil upon him, just as someone is not excused by the fact that he hates one hating him; for man ought not to sin against another because that person first sinned against him; for this is to be overcome by evil, which the Apostle prohibits in Rom. 12:21, saying: Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil in good. But if the intention of the one avenging is borne principally toward some good, which is reached through the punishment of the one sinning, for instance toward the amendment of the sinner, or at least toward restraining him and the peace of others, and toward the conservation of justice and the honor of God, vengeance can be licit, the other due circumstances being observed." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 108, a. 1.

These things indeed speculatively. Practically, it is certainly difficult for public vengeance from love of justice to be separated from inordinate love of private vengeance, which is illicit, Rom. 12:19 seqq., if the punishment is very grave, e.g., of death, mutilation, and no advantage comes to the injured person from it. Likewise, if the offender satisfies as much as he can, to urge him to that which he cannot do seems against charity. Struggl, q. 4, nn. 33, 34; L. 28.

To this therefore belongs vindication, which is a certain special virtue, a potential part of justice, through which force or injury, and altogether anything obscure or ignominious, is driven away by defending or avenging oneself. Virtue, and therefore the punishment to be rendered to the evildoer, for the injury inflicted, proportioned, and the order of reason observed, which is that in graver offenses punishment be imposed by public authority. But in lighter offenses it is impossible to have recourse to the judge. Hence by moderate displeasure or by another rational mode which is in our power, to take legitimate vengeance, so that the boldness of the offender may be repressed, peace conserved, or another good procured, is not illicit. - "Two vices are opposed to vindication: one indeed by excess, namely the sin of cruelty or savagery, which exceeds measure in punishing; but the other is a vice which consists in this, as when someone is too remiss in punishing." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 108, a. 2.

Although hatred of enmity, whether of the person according to himself and of the goods which he has in himself, namely by willing evil to him as such, or insofar as it is evil to him, from its genus is mortal, nevertheless hatred of abomination, or of quality, by which we are averse not to the man but to his malice, is licit. - This is clear of itself, and theologians commonly teach it. Hence a private person who, averse from another, flees him, if he does this so that he may deprive him of his conversation and consolation, and thus sadden him and that it may be ill with him, this is hatred of enmity and sin. But if, wishing no evil, he only flees because the person is discordant with his nature, or is accustomed to be troublesome to him, this is hatred of abomination and aversion, and sin if it is irrational; such it will not be if the person is in reality very harsh, provided contempt, scandal, and desire of vengeance are absent. - Struggl, q. 4, nn. 26, 28, 37; q. 5, n. 6; L. 30; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 24, a. 3.

Must the offender ask pardon from the injured person? - R. Affirmatively per se; for in the same way in which charity was destroyed, it ought to be repaired; unless nevertheless another means, or a more fitting mode of reconciliation, is available, by furnishing various offices or benefits, or unless asking pardon seems likely to profit nothing toward placating the offended person. They also except the case in which the offender is far superior to the offended person, unless perhaps such enormity of injury urged that it would require the petition of pardon even from a subject. Likewise the case is excepted in which the offended person is prudently judged to pardon it. But in reality other means of placating the offended person are not lacking. La-Croix, l. 2, n. 189; Struggl, q. 4, n. 35. Pardon. A simple offense is compensated by reconciliation; an injury by satisfaction. Therefore he who simply offends another, by causing displeasure to him, is simply bound himself to procuring restoration of friendship. But he who has injured not only the will of another, but also his right, is bound to undergo some punishment, humiliation, annoyance, for repairing the injury inflicted; and therefore he is bound to ask pardon.

How many are the sacraments of the New Testament? - There are seven: Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, Order, Matrimony. Namely, as in bodily life we are born, grow, are nourished, are healed when sick, are fortified against enemies, are governed, and are multiplied, so also in spiritual life. For through baptism we are spiritually reborn; through confirmation we are increased in grace and strengthened in faith; through the Eucharist we are nourished with divine food; through penance we are spiritually healed from the sickness of sin; through extreme unction we are strengthened in agony against the devil; through order the Church is governed; through matrimony it is multiplied. Florence, Decree for the Armenians; Trent s. 7, c. 1; St. Thomas 3 p., q. 65, a. 1-3.

Leocadia caught her husband shamefully associating with the maidservant. She, asking pardon, at once drives her from the house, and no longer deigns her with conversation or sight. Indeed, if at any time the maidservant meets her in the street and greets her, she turns her eyes in another direction and does not return the greeting. But she scarcely speaks to her husband for a month, and moreover has resolved that she will no longer render the debt to him.

Q. 1. Are enemies also to be loved? - 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 390 seqq. To the second: Leocadia could at once drive the maidservant from the house without wounding justice and charity, since she had so gravely wounded the right of the marriage bed, and more frequent relapses could deservedly be feared. Nor does it matter that, so suddenly cast out of the house, she perhaps undergoes danger to her reputation; for she ought to impute this to herself. Besides, Leocadia could also prosecute her before a judge, and by this very fact defame her before him. Therefore, all the more, she can cast her from the house and permit her defamation, if perhaps it follows. Nor indeed does Leocadia seem therefore to be disturbed, if she neither looks at nor greets in return the maidservant meeting her, provided nevertheless that she does not do this from hatred of enmity toward the person, but from abomination of the crime, or for her own amendment, or lest there be danger that she come into the house and return, or to show more fully the gravity of the injury inflicted on her, or even for a certain just punishment. For nothing prevents that, in things which merit punishment, yet not such that they be referred to the judge, someone, although a private person, by himself punish the person of another with such a punishment as pertains to the private commerce of persons. Therefore, all the more, if there is question of a graver offense, which could be referred to the judge, it will be licit to punish it by privation of conversation or greeting, which are not common but special signs of charity, to which otherwise one is not held. But otherwise it would have to be said, if Leocadia did this from hatred toward the person herself, and from an inordinate affection of revenge, willing and desiring evil to the maidservant. The same seems to have to be said concerning the privation of conversation of Leocadia with her husband. Since from the case it does not seem that she did this beyond a month, from this it can be gathered that she did this only to show her just displeasure, and also to soothe her sorrow, in so grave a matter. But because she resolved to deny the debt perpetually, she sinned nothing against justice. The reason is that the husband, by committing adultery, lost the right of asking the debt. I. M. V. 2, n. 981. But whether she sinned at least against charity, Elbel 253 affirms; since the husband is thus exposed to the danger of incontinence. But this is commonly denied. For charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience, and it is most grave for the wife that she be compelled to keep faith with a husband breaking faith. Besides, if the reason brought forward were valid, never again, neither by private nor by the judge's authority, could divorce be instituted, if not justice, then charity prohibiting it. St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 62. Nevertheless, Leocadia is to be counseled that she fully condone the offense to her husband, and then render the debt, lest she expose her husband to the danger of incontinence and of new adultery, and perpetual discords reign between herself and her husband. Elbel 249-253; G. 216, 217.

There is a precept also of loving enemies ². This is clear from the words of Christ, Matt. 5.44: But I say to you: love your enemies. And ibid. 6.15: If you will not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive you your sins.

¹ On the title above. An enemy is understood as one who has injured undeservedly, or pursues with hatred. But injury sometimes imports mere offense, when, namely, through an annoyance inflicted on the will of another, yet without violation of any right, his soul is irritated and deservedly provoked to displeasure, indignation, and anger: sometimes it also imports injustice, namely when something is done not only against the will, but also against the right of another. Through mere offense charity is violated; through injustice, justice.

Moreover, injustice either infers no damage, as, for example, if with no one else present you speak insult to someone, or it brings detriment in goods either of the person or of fortune. In the first case satisfaction is owed at least from vindictive justice, and in the external forum an action for injuries is given to him; in the other, restitution is also owed to the injured party, so that in the external forum both a civil action is given to him for recovering his own, and a criminal action for avenging the crime.

And indeed these things must be carefully and accurately distinguished, lest the Confessor indiscreetly demand from the penitent, as necessary, something more than the precept of charity toward enemies in reality requires.

² This precept does not say some special obligation toward enemies. Indeed, that enemies be loved insofar as they are enemies, this is perverse and repugnant to charity, because this is to love another's evil, as St. Thomas says (2. 2. q. 25. art. 1.), who adds (ibid. ad 2.): Insofar as they are enemies, ... this we ought to hate in them; for it ought to displease us that they are enemies to us. Therefore this precept imports only that someone loving God and the neighbor not exclude his enemies from that generality of love of neighbor, as the same St. Thomas says (ibid. o).

224. Rules. - First. Per se, the same signs of love are owed to enemies which are accustomed to be furnished to others of the same state ³; because their denial would be an act of revenge and a manifestation of hatred, which is opposed to Charity.

³ These are accustomed to be called common signs of love, which nevertheless are diverse, according as by a diverse reason of conjunction certain persons are bound among themselves. Hence some signs are common, for example, among brothers, or among students of the same monastery or college; others among fellow servants or fellow students; others among fellow citizens or fellow soldiers; finally others which a man owes from charity to any man. I have said from charity; for the other loves, which are owed by reason of other conjunctions, do not pertain to the virtue of theological charity, except insofar as their acts, no otherwise than the acts of other moral virtues, can be commanded by charity. See St. Thom. de Virt. q. 2. art. 9. 10.

But special signs are to be carefully distinguished from common signs of love, which by St. Thomas (3. Dist. 30. q. 1. art. 2. ad 1.) are called friendly benefits, and are exhibited particularly to some persons by reason of a certain conjunction or friendship or familiarity, which is not toward all otherwise of the same condition (St. Thom. l. c. in corp.). Thus not only among men otherwise bound by no other bond, but even among members of any community or group or college, it almost happens that someone is more friendly or familiar to one than to another.

But the difference which lies between common and special signs of love must be carefully noted. For since a conjunction of special friendship is undertaken by spontaneous and free will, thence friendly benefits proceed not from debt, but from liberality, as St. Thomas says (l. c. ad 1.): but on the contrary common signs of love proceed from debt, which is a necessary consequence of condition or state.

I said per se, because sometimes a reasonable cause is present for denying them for a time, for example, by reason of due correction, a good effect on children or inferiors, or on account of prudent fear of quarrels from the sight or conversation of an enemy, etc.; likewise on account of the expression of just sorrow conceived from injury, etc.

Second. Per se, special signs of love are not owed to enemies, for example, to visit them sick, to console them when sad, to receive them in hospitality or at a banquet, provided the reason of scandal is excluded, etc. ⁴.

⁴ Appositely St. Thomas (De virt. q. 2. art. 8. o): Since toward an enemy no other union remains to us except only the union of charity, from the necessity of precept we are bound to love them IN COMMON. And this he presently explains thus: We are bound by the affection and effect of charity, by which we love all neighbors and pray for all, not to exclude even those who are joined to us by no special bond, as, for example, those who are in India or Ethiopia.

From these things it is plain that only love in common is owed to an enemy; but this requires that he not be excluded from the common effects of love. Now by reason of state or condition and office it can happen that someone indiscriminately must visit the sick and serve them, or receive travelers with table and lodging, etc. Therefore in this hypothesis these would already be common signs of love, from which it would not be lawful to exclude an enemy. Otherwise one must say when these offices of charity are undertaken freely toward some. For then to furnish these to an enemy (unless perhaps he is in necessity) pertains not to the precept, but to the perfection of charity. For since (says St. Thom. 2. 2. q. 25. art. 8.) the neighbor is loved from charity on account of God, the more someone loves God, the more also he shows love toward the neighbor with no enmity impeding: just as if someone greatly loved some man, out of love for him he would love his children, even enemies to himself.

Third. Not only must the offense be forgiven the enemy in such a way that the desire of unjust revenge is cast away and the common signs of love are not denied; but to one asking pardon and exhibiting suitable satisfaction for the injury, if any occurred, certain particular signs also of special love, if any were previously accustomed to be given, generally speaking, are not to be altogether refused ⁵. - St. Thomas, 3. dist. 30. q. 1. art. 2. ad 5, and St. Antoninus, Part. 2. tit. 8. cap. 2. §. 6.

⁵ To deny to a man signs of familiarity, when necessity would require them, it would be revenge; or also when he would ask pardon, or when he who is regarded as an enemy thrusts himself into familiarity...; because then he loves, and is to be numbered among friends. St. Thomas (3. Dist. 30. q. 1. art. 2. ad 5.). Nevertheless, since it is a matter of special friendship or familiarity, which, just as it is freely admitted, so also is freely retained, Peter de Lorca is to the point (In 2. 2. q. 25. n. 27.): If the title (namely of furnishing signs of love) is only special friendship and familiarity, which some voluntarily contract among themselves, it is not owed to an enemy; for this is special love, and can be dissolved, not only if a friend becomes an enemy, but even if he does not become one: therefore no one is bound to preserve that friendship. Therefore the restoration of such former friendship and familiarity is not always necessarily to be exacted, nor must one deal harshly with him who wishes either to lessen or even to retain no special familiarity with him whom he has found to have failed in the office of friendship.

** And thus St. Alphonsus seems to be understood, who (Lib. 2. n. 28.) says that special signs of love are to be furnished if previously you were accustomed to exhibit peculiar signs to the enemy; as Tournely with Suarez, Bonacina, etc. And in reality Collet attributes this doctrine to Suarez, Bonacina, and Koninck: but less to the point, because those Doctors have nothing of the sort.

225. Questions. - Q. 1º Is it lawful to wish public punishment for an enemy, indeed also to seek it?

Resp. Affirm. per se, if every affection of revenge is absent ⁶; but in practice this is dangerous, and easily liable to deception, as St. Lig. notes, n. 29.

⁶ Thus St. Thomas (2. 2. q. 108. art. 1.): If his intention is borne principally toward the evil of him concerning whom he takes revenge, and rests there, it is altogether illicit.... But if the intention... is borne principally toward some good, at which one arrives through the punishment of the sinner, for instance toward the amendment of the sinner, or at least toward his restraint and the quiet of others, and toward the preservation of justice and the honor of God, vindication can be lawful, etc. Concerning this argument St. Alphonsus (Lib. 2. n. 29.) writes: Hence I adhere to Antoine, that practically speaking it is never lawful to seek the punishment of an enemy, even if just and to be done by legitimate authority. But Antoine himself does not speak so rigidly in reality, although otherwise most rigid. The words of Antoine are these (De Char. C. 2. q. 3.): It is never lawful to seek the punishment of an enemy, even if just and done by legitimate authority, insofar as it is his evil: for this is an act of hatred, never lawful. But on the contrary he had premised these things (ibid. q. 2.): Against him (an enemy) it is lawful to institute both a civil and a criminal action, provided this is not done from hatred, revenge, or another depraved end: the civil action indeed, so that he may compensate the damage inflicted, or make satisfaction for injury; the criminal, however, from love of public justice, lest he harm others, or lest crimes remain unpunished with damage to the republic.

Q. 2º What order ought to be observed in making reconciliation?

Resp. 1º He who has offended another ought first, per se, to employ means for reconciliation, as natural equity dictates.

2º If the offense is mutual and equal, let him who first offended first promote reconciliation; but if it is unequal, let him who offended more gravely go before. Moreover, absolute rules cannot be assigned, but the circumstances are to be considered. - Thus commonly.

Q. 3º Is there an obligation of greeting an enemy who is encountered?

Resp. Neg. per se, because greeting and conversation are not common signs owed to the neighbor ⁷. Yet one must say otherwise if circumstances of state, condition, or similar things require that all greet each other indiscriminately, or if it is a matter of a subject toward his Superior. - St. Lig. n. 28. - Sporer, etc.

⁷ St. Alphonsus (lib. 2. n. 28.) confesses according to the common opinion that you are not bound to greet an enemy. Nevertheless with others he admits some obligation, both of greeting and of exhibiting certain other special signs of love to an enemy even outside the case of either spiritual or bodily necessity, when this seems necessary 1º for avoiding scandal, lest namely the enemy be more provoked to anger and hatred; 2º for gaining the brother, namely for reconciling his soul to you and to God. Yet he adds that this obligation is not grave, which therefore would bind with grave inconvenience. And since acts of this kind in the offended person almost bring with them no small difficulty, this obligation does not seem to be very much urged. St. Alphonsus (l. c.) adds another exception, namely if the enemy is a Superior. But perhaps this does not pertain here; because greeting, when it is a matter of a Superior, is not a special sign.

Q. 4º Must an offender ask pardon from the offended person?

Resp. Affirm., per se, unless another means or manner of reconciliation more fitting is at hand, for example, by furnishing various offices or benefits, or unless the asking of pardon seems to profit nothing for placating the offended person. They also except if the offender is far superior to the offended, or if the offended is prudently judged to condone it. But other means of placating the offended are not lacking. - Thus commonly. - Lacroix, lib. 2. n. 189. - Tambur., etc.

Q. 5º Do you owe any signs of love to an offender not asking pardon?

Resp. Some affirm with St. Lig.; but others deny with St. Antoninus, Summa, part. 2. tit. 8. c. 2. §. 6. ⁸.

⁸ Thus St. Antoninus (Part. 2. Tit. 8. Cap. 2. §. 6.): Either the injurer exhibits fitting satisfaction, or he does not. If he exhibits it according to the quantity of the fault and his possibility, thus he is bound to receive him back into friendship and to speak to him.... But if he does not exhibit it, he is not bound to speak to him, namely when he either is wholly unwilling to satisfy, or satisfies by halves. And St. Thomas (3. Dist. 30. q. 1. art. 2. ad 5.): That someone of his own accord thrust himself into familiarity with an enemy, this belongs to perfection.

226. Resolves. - 1º It is not lawful to exclude enemies from prayers, for example, from the Lord's Prayer; indeed one would have to pray specifically for them, if this were the only means available to the offended person for extinguishing hatred ⁹.

⁹ Since it can scarcely happen that for restraining hatred no other means is at hand besides special prayer for the enemy, therefore it will scarcely ever be necessary that the Confessor prescribe this. For fulfilling the precept of praying for enemies, it is enough that they not be positively excluded, just as we do not exclude Indians or Ethiopians, as St. Thomas says, who also has these things (3. Dist. 30. q. 1. art. 2.): A man is bound (to cooperate) even with an enemy, at least by praying in common, so that he does not exclude him from his prayers, although perhaps he does not make special mention of him; just as it is not necessary that he make special prayer concerning all toward whom he has charity, but common prayer.

2º It is not lawful to exclude enemies from common alms, re-greeting ¹⁰, response, sale of exposed merchandise, because these are common signs of love. - Thus commonly. Understand this with the matter considered per se, according to the things said above, n. 224.

¹⁰ Concerning greeting note the following from Peter de Lorca (2. 2. Disp. 25. n. 28.): 1º Greeting and address are owed to enemies in the same way as to others.... nor are they among the general signs of love which we owe to all men, but among special ones: yet they are among general signs among those very much joined, and therefore they are not owed except to those joined. 2º Anticipated greeting is owed to no one, except to certain persons excelling in dignity, for the sake of honor. 3º Re-greeting and response are owed to all men by virtue of affability, especially to fellow citizens. 3º The omission of address and greeting, even when it is owed, is not regularly a mortal sin: for it is opposed to affability, which is not of so great obligation, unless perhaps from the circumstance of the person and from other things it would yield to a great injury, or on account of scandal, which rarely occurs and must be decided by the judgment of a prudent man.

3º They sin who avoid an enemy wishing to be reconciled, especially when he notices and feels it gravely, or who, when invited, refuse to go with him, unless nevertheless they are excused by fear of quarrels, or of new rancor, or by another just cause. Likewise those who refuse pardon, or do not accept suitable satisfaction, or exact more than is fair, or who bring the matter into court from hatred and revenge; likewise those who do not aid an enemy in necessity ¹¹, or do not prevent a grave damage of the same, when they easily can, and a fortiori those who rejoice over his evil.

¹¹ In necessity even enemies must be aided. But this is more an effect of justice than of friendship. St. Thom. 3. Dist. 30. q. 1. art. 2. ad 1.

4º They are not to be absolved, at least ordinarily ¹², who, although they say that they condone, nevertheless refuse to address an enemy, unless this can be pardoned to the recollection and horror of the injury. A fortiori those who assert that they will never say even a word to him; for these deservedly cast suspicion of a depravedly disposed soul.

¹² Certainly he who adheres to mortal sin cannot be absolved. Therefore also A., while he tempers his opinion thus, supposes that grave fault can sometimes be absent in the case. And indeed 1º Besides the horror from the memory of a recent injury, and the other causes enumerated above at n. 224, which excuse from furnishing common signs for some time, we have already noted that no one is bound to preserve familiarity or friendship which could be admitted or not admitted at pleasure; indeed it happens daily that friendships of this sort cease, now gradually, now abruptly, and often without blame. 2º Even if a disordered spirit and some appetite of unjust revenge are not entirely absent, this person is not therefore at once to be condemned of grave fault. For just as the inflicting of evil, so also the desire of another's evil admits smallness of matter; and if this has force with those who have harmed us in nothing, a fortiori it ought to have force with an enemy, who by injuring unjustly has provoked just indignation. Therefore the question returns to this, whether the offended person (whether he says he forgives or not), while he refuses certain offices to the offender, inflicts or wishes some grave evil upon him. For if this is absent, and no other grave inconveniences can be feared from those offices denied to the offender, the Confessor is indeed bound to the office of exhorting according to his powers, but by no necessity of denying absolution.

** And with this tempering those words of St. Alphonsus (Lib. 2. n. 28.) seem to be understood: But a religious who had refused for a notable time, say after a week, to speak with an enemy, Sporer rightly says n. 34. is not to be absolved. For thus Sporer (l. c.): In a monastery of nuns, two of them after a quarrel professed..., for many years not to wish to speak with one another, and in fact they were not speaking for a long time. The Confessor doubted whether they were in a state of mortal sin, and therefore whether sacramental absolution... was to be denied to those obstinately persevering thus, or not? Resp. Altogether that it is so: at least when the cause of the quarrel, or the quarrel itself, was grave. Because in that case the cessation of speaking for so long a time or so many years is rightly presumed to proceed from grave hatred. But if the cause of the quarrel was itself light, as much as concerns this head of the signification of hatred and scandal, the omission of speaking could be excused from mortal sin and be reputed venial. Because then, especially in women, and those otherwise fearful of conscience, it is not presumed to arise from grave hatred, but from natural feminine passion. Although again from another head, namely that of scandal, it could be mortal. And so, I would not absolve one still refusing to speak after one and another week.

5º Penitents who accuse themselves of hatred are not immediately to be charged with sin, especially grave sin; for often they confuse hatred properly so called, or of enmity, with hatred of abomination, or of a quality or defect, or they even labor under only some natural and invincible aversion of soul. Yet one must beware lest abomination of quality, disposition, etc., gradually extend itself to hatred of the person. - St. Lig. n. 50. - Voit, n. 703.

780. State of the question. From the general precept of charity, n. 769, we are bound to love enemies with common dilection. But those are called enemies who pursue us with hatred, or have inflicted some offense or injury upon us, or even those whom, on account of some antipathy or other motive, we naturally turn away from. To love them seems very arduous to human infirmity, but by grace it becomes possible. We are not indeed commanded to love them because they are enemies, but although they are enemies; nor to love their vices or defects, but, notwithstanding these vices, to love them on account of the endowments which God has conferred upon them and intends to confer, and therefore for the sake of God and Christ. Nor is there question of sensible affection, which does not depend upon the will, but of true love by which we will good to them.

But the precept chiefly embraces three things: that hatred and vengeance be avoided, that injuries be forgiven and therefore common signs of dilection be shown, and that reconciliation be sought.

781. (A) Concerning hatred to be avoided. (a) Hatred of abomination, which is concerned not with the person himself, but with his endowments, is not always and of itself evil; but it is good or evil according as the quality itself which is hated is evil or good.

Thus it is licit to hate sin in a neighbor, for example, his pride, or envy, or lust. On the other hand, it is gravely illicit of itself to hate natural or supernatural endowments which are in the neighbor, for example, his wisdom, humility, chastity. For, as St. Thomas says,¹ "love is owed to the neighbor according to that which he has from God, that is, according to nature and grace; but love is not owed to him according to that which he has from himself and the devil, namely according to sin and defect of justice."

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 34, a. 3.

782. (b) Hatred of enmity toward the neighbor himself is a sin mortal from its kind; nevertheless it can be light, not only because of imperfect deliberation or volition, but also because of smallness of matter, for example, if someone wills only a slight evil to the neighbor.

John thus reproves hatred of this kind: "But he that hates his brother is in darkness, and walks in darkness, and knows not where he goes, because the darkness has blinded his eyes...² He that loves not abides in death. Whosoever hates his brother is a murderer; and you know that no murderer has eternal life abiding in himself."³ Indeed he establishes that it is impossible to love God unless the neighbor is loved:⁴ "If any man say, I love God, and hates his brother, he is a liar. For he who does not love his brother whom he sees, how can he love God, whom he does not see?"

² 1 John 2:11.

³ 1 John 3:14-15.

⁴ Ibid., 4:20.

The reason is that our enemies do not cease to be sons of God, called to heavenly beatitude, redeemed by the blood of Christ, and therefore members of the same body,⁵ and, even if perhaps they have sinned, they can be converted by grace and numbered among the saints. Therefore if we hate them, we not only fail to imitate our Father, who makes His sun rise upon the good and the evil, but we openly contradict Him, pursuing with hatred those whom He loves, and wishing evil to those to whom He does not cease to do good.

⁵ "We, being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another." (Rom. 12:5). Cf. Bossuet, Serm. sur la charite fraternelle, t. III, p. 181, ed. Lelarcq.

783. Corollaries. (a) Therefore it is not licit to wish some evil to a neighbor, even an enemy, except that a greater evil be avoided; for to wish an evil which is not compensated by a greater good is nothing other than to will evil to someone. But if the evil is wished only in order to avoid a greater evil, by that very fact we will good to someone.

Thus we cannot wish eternal damnation to anyone, not even to a persecutor of the Church, because this evil cannot be sufficiently compensated by any good. Nor can the death of some person be desired in order to seize his inheritance;⁶ for the order of charity demands that the life of the neighbor be preferred to one's own or another's temporal advantage. - But it is licit to wish some temporal evil to a wicked man, for example, tribulation, illness, loss of some goods, so that his spiritual good, or conversion, may be more easily promoted. Likewise we can rejoice concerning the death of a scandalous sinner, not insofar as it is an evil for him, but lest he further be a cause of the spiritual ruin of others. It is commonly also said that the death of a heresiarch or persecutor can licitly be desired on account of the common good, lest he lead others into error or sin. But it is better to ask for conversion, according to that saying:⁷ "I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live." Wherefore the death of the impious can be sought only conditionally, namely with the supposition that, according to God's knowledge, there is no other means of removing scandal.

⁶ To this belong propositions 12, 13, 14 condemned by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679 (Denzing., n. 1030-1032; Viva, on these propositions): "If you do it with due moderation, you can without mortal sin be saddened concerning the life of someone, and rejoice concerning his natural death, seek and desire it with inefficacious affection, not indeed from displeasure with the person, but on account of some temporal advantage. - It is licit with an absolute desire to desire the death of a father, not indeed as an evil of the father, but as a good of the one desiring, because namely a rich inheritance is going to come to him. - It is licit for a son to rejoice concerning the parricide of a parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the great riches thereafter obtained from the inheritance."

⁷ Ezek. 33:11.

Therefore the desire of private vengeance is illicit where civil authority has already been orderly constituted; but it is licit, from zeal for justice and public security, to wish that a punishment proportioned to the offense be inflicted upon the guilty by legitimate authority, after diligent and equitable judgment: for this is nothing other than to will that order be preserved in society.

784. (b) Cursing, by which we imprecate evil upon someone, is against the order of charity and is a grave sin from its kind; for it is nothing other than an external manifestation of some internal hatred. - Besides, cursing which is done before others can put on the malice of detraction; if it is done in the presence of the enemy himself, it is contumely (De Justitia, nn. 374, 397).

785. To be noted for practice. Although hatred is of itself a grave sin, nevertheless often penitents who accuse sins of hatred are not guilty of grave sin: for sometimes there is question of natural antipathy or aversion of mind, which is not fully voluntary; sometimes defects or depraved actions are hated, but not the person himself. If they consent to pray for the conversion or progress of those from whom they thus turn away, they are not to be made anxious. - Likewise curses, even those grave of themselves, are often excused from mortal sin, because they are uttered from vehement anger, without sufficient advertence or perfect consent, more for casting terror than with serious desire that evils of this kind truly happen.

786. (B) Concerning forgiveness of injuries and signs of dilection. (a) Regularly we are bound to forgive, from internal affection, injuries inflicted upon us by the neighbor, even an enemy, that we ourselves may be able to obtain pardon for our own offenses, according to that saying: "Forgive us our debts as we also forgive our debtors."

(b) Therefore we are bound to show enemies common signs and benefits of dilection, namely such as a Christian is accustomed to give to a Christian, a citizen to a fellow citizen, a priest to a priest, a blood-relation to a blood-relation; for to deny these would be a sign of hatred and vengeance. - Except, however, if there is a reasonable cause for denying these for a time, for example, for the correction of children or subjects, or on account of a founded fear lest the enemy become more obstinate in his malice, provided that the affection of charity is not lacking internally. - Denial of common signs of charity is of itself a grave sin when it proceeds from internal hatred, or is the cause of grave scandal; often, however, it is excused from mortal sin because of good faith, since many think that they are not bound to these signs when they have suffered injury.

But we can, as a sign of just sorrow, deny special signs of dilection to an enemy: for since these are not owed to all, we are by no means bound to show them to an enemy, who is not of better condition than the rest.

Yet they are worthy of all praise who, adhering to the footsteps of Christ and the saints, show special signs of dilection and benevolence to enemies: "But if thy enemy is hungry, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink. For doing this, thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head (that is, burning groans of penance, according to Augustine). Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good."⁸

⁸ Rom. 12:20-21.

Likewise it is licit to exact satisfaction for an injury inflicted, and restitution for damage caused, provided this is done not from hatred or vengeance, but from sincere love of justice. Litigants are to be warned concerning this prudently and opportunely; and if the matter can be composed peacefully through arbitrators, without recourse to a tribunal, this is much more consonant with Christian charity.⁹

⁹ "Does any one of you, having a matter against another, dare to be judged before the unjust, and not before the saints?... So is there not any wise man among you, who can judge between his brother?" (1 Cor. 6:1-5).

787. Practical conclusions. (a) Since we ought to pray in a general way for all, it is not licit to exclude enemies from common prayers. For Christ, in the Lord's prayer, taught us to pray for all, and, far from wishing enemies to be excluded, said elsewhere:¹⁰ "Pray for those persecuting and calumniating you." Although we are not bound to pray specifically for them, this is opportunely to be counseled whenever hatred otherwise cannot be laid aside.

¹⁰ Matt. 5:44.

(b) It is not licit to exclude enemies from common alms, - from the sale of goods exposed for sale, - or from other contracts which are entered into indiscriminately with all.

(c) We are not bound to greet an enemy unless perhaps in a place where the custom obtains of greeting all indiscriminately; but if he greets first, we ought to return his greeting: otherwise we are judged to contemn him. Nor are we strictly bound to visit a sick enemy, to console him when sad, or to receive him in hospitality, since these are special signs of love; but the true disciple of Christ will seize this opportunity of acting kindly with an enemy, that he may reconcile him to himself.

788. (C) Concerning reconciliation to be made. When friendship has been broken by hatred or by injury, reconciliation is to be sought, according to these words of the Savior: "If therefore thou offer thy gift at the altar, and there remember that thy brother has anything against thee (that is, a just complaint), leave there thy gift before the altar, and go first to be reconciled to thy brother: and then coming thou shalt offer thy gift."¹¹

¹¹ Matt. 5:23-24. Note the word there, at the very altar, at the time of the sacrifice begun; moreover "to leave a sacrifice imperfect was held to be a great sin," says Maldonatus on this place.

(a) As regards the order to be observed in reconciliation, regularly he who offended the other is bound to seek reconciliation first, either by himself or through a friend. If an offense has intervened on both sides, he ought first to seek reconciliation who offended the other more gravely, and, if the mutual offense is almost equal, he who offended first. But in practice, since not rarely each one is persuaded that he was offended first or more gravely, both are to be advised to begin reconciliation; and indeed as soon as morally possible, lest otherwise hatred grow; yet sometimes it is expedient to defer the matter a little while, so that anger may more easily be laid aside.

789. (b) Otherwise he who was injured is bound to forgive the injury to an enemy seeking reconciliation: "For if you forgive men their offenses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you your offenses; but if you do not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive you your sins."¹²

¹² Matt. 6:14-15.

(c) Reconciliation can be made by asking pardon, or by friendly conversation,¹³ by various duties or benefits mutually furnished, or by gradually restoring the former friendship. Yet it must be noted that a full reintegration of the old friendship is not strictly required: for familiar friendship is owed to no one, and, when it exists, it can be dissolved for a legitimate cause. - The mediation of a friend who is acceptable to both parties greatly conduces to true reconciliation; this office especially belongs to the priest, who, by force of his office, ought to be acceptable to all the faithful committed to him.

¹³ Often enmities arise from a false interpretation of words or deeds, which usually vanishes from an honorable and sincere conversation.

The dilection of enemies and the forgiveness of injuries seem to many something arduous, indeed even impossible. Let them think of blessed Stephen, who prayed for the enemies stoning him, and thus led Paul to the true faith; but especially of Christ hanging on the cross and praying for His persecutors: "Father, forgive them: for they know not what they do."¹⁴ And, if they have sinned, let them recall to memory that they say daily: "And forgive us our debts as we also forgive our debtors"; therefore unless they wish to be condemned, let them kindly forgive injuries to others.

¹⁴ Luke 23:34.

Utility. - Because the right estimation of cases depends so much on various circumstances that the very responses of approved authors must be adapted to the circumstances and cannot be observed literally, it is greatly necessary to determine the principles themselves from which, in this matter, we can prudently admonish sinners, exhort the timorous to better things, and at the same time free them from scruples.

Who Is an Enemy, and How Manifold. — He is someone's enemy by affection who pursues him with hatred or evil aversion; or by effect who has unjustly injured him in person, reputation, honor, or goods. Christ formally taught us that enemies are to be loved: "Love your enemies" (St. Matt. 5, 43 s.; Luke 6, 27 s.); and this is demonstrated by reason itself, since they are neighbors.

But an enemy who is actually such because of present hatred or offense is to be distinguished from one who was such. This latter again can be held by a present obligation of reparation, or have no office of this kind.

I. By that precept there is prohibited:

1. Hatred of enmity. Hatred says an aversion of soul which is contrary to the good of another (Cf. 1, 2, q. 29, art. 1 and 2). There is hatred of enmity when someone wills evil to another, in himself or in his goods, insofar as it is evil to him: and this is mortal from its genus. Hatred of abomination does not affect the person himself but his malice. By that hatred we turn away from a person not as such but insofar as he is blameworthy: thus, for example, the Psalmist praises himself because he has had hatred for the wicked, - or insofar as he is harmful to us. And often it signifies that sensible horror or repugnance which we experience when an enemy is seen or heard. Such hatred, conceived concerning enemies of religion or of the state, is plainly honorable; concerning those who are hostile to us, it is for the most part mixed with venial fault, just as it is also per se venial not to overcome or subdue that sensible horror.

2. Illicit vindication. This principally intends the evil of the offender and rests in that evil. Licit vindication, on the contrary, is that which, the due circumstances being observed, pursues through punishment either the amendment of the sinner, or his restraint and the quiet of others, or the preservation of justice and the honor of God. Much more is it right to demand satisfaction for damage. Indeed, strictly speaking, we are not forbidden not to accept an offered satisfaction and to pursue a juridical action for injuries. Yet this is dangerous: then one easily yields to evil vengeance, and if a very grave penalty awaits the enemy, without proportionate inconvenience of one's own or of others, the fault will easily have been grave against charity.

Therefore the confessor should instruct the penitent concerning licit and illicit vengeance; and propose to him that he be willing to ponder the matter as if it were not his own case but that of some third person.

3. The exclusion of an enemy from common prayers, for example, from the Lord's prayer; and also, at least if he has ceased from injury and is prepared to make due reparation, from the common signs of love, such as are common alms, returning a greeting, response to his words, sale of exposed merchandise. Wherefore they judge that it is mortal from its genus if someone invites all relatives, with only the enemy excepted; or greets all persons met from the neighborhood or college, only the enemy excluded. It is supposed, as is clear, that the enemy has ceased from injury.

Yet he to whom the right of punishing belongs, as to a father, can deny these for a time, for correction. A denial is also excused which does not manifest hatred, but rather just sorrow because of a recent or atrocious and infamous injury. Conversation from which you fear a greater evil can also be omitted, provided that interiorly you love, and decline or repair scandal among others. Nor are we forbidden, in lighter cases and for a just cause, for example, to blunt audacity, to take a legitimate vindication which can scarcely be sought from a judge.

The sin will be light if either a trifling cause shows that there is no question of grave hatred, as if two nuns, because of a moderate quarrel, break off communication for some days; - or if the distance of the persons removes the gravity of the matter: as if a much greater person does not greet an inferior.

In a few words, the denial of common signs is grave when it proceeds from grave hatred, or gravely offends the enemy, or is a scandal to others. Cf. Noldin, II, 83. And attention is to be given to this more than to material descriptions of the signs of charity which cannot be denied under grave obligation: if the matter bears another interpretation than that of hatred, it will not be grave; but that interpretation is one thing in one place and time, another elsewhere.

For it must be avoided that we pronounce too absolutely concerning concrete cases the responses even of most approved authors, who wrote in another time or region. We shall easily concede that their oracles were true for the customs and circumstances which they contemplated; but for that reason they cannot prudently be inculcated today without a new examination. Today, for example, in many places, he who merely has omitted signs of love, but at the same time abstains from injuries and detractions, and does not refuse to fulfill strict offices of charity, if any arise from necessity, seems for the most part to have to be excused from grave guilt.

For where they distinguish a certain alienation of affection or coldness from true mutual hatred, mortal enmities are rare. And the breaking off of commerce or association, whether because of a light cause of quarrel, or because of the permanent state of an insoluble controversy, or because of an unrepaired offense, or because of a relaxed family bond, by which it comes about that not even among those rather closely joined does a custom of frequent communication always exist, is explained otherwise than by grave hatred.

— Flight by which someone avoids an enemy in order to sadden him must also be well distinguished from flight which is commanded by some remaining aversion without desire of vengeance. The former alone demonstrates hatred of enmity; the latter, if it happens without reason, will indeed be sinful, but, scandal being excluded, does not seem gravely culpable. Antipathy is one thing, hatred another; voluntary hatred is one thing, horror and anger which some experience when the offender is seen or remembered is another, whence they say that they indeed wish to forgive but cannot forget the matter, speak to the man, etc. Such persons, although they are not always to be believed when they say that they lack hatred, can be absolved if the confessor detects that those movements of anger proceed from no deliberate malevolence (Ballerini-Palmieri, II, 180).

— In confession, he who, not by a merely verbal imprecation, which often is nothing but anger, but truly from hatred has willed a grave evil to an enemy, for the most part will not have to declare the species of the evil wished, because he wished it under the confused and common notion of evil, without a special affection flowing down to this or that evil. Lugo, Poen., 16,260.

II. Not to hate an enemy does not suffice for charity; but by the precept of charity we are ordered to love an enemy with interior and exterior love, yet common, not special, unless the spiritual necessity of the enemy or scandal which cannot otherwise be avoided (for example, by a declaration) demands more. But common love is to be estimated with consideration given to the quality and necessity of persons, so that what is common among brothers would be special among strangers. Therefore there must be preserved in the heart the affection which we ought to have commonly toward every neighbor (cf. n. 80) and particularly toward those joined by a greater bond of necessity, together with a soul prompt for reconciliation, if those things are offered by the other which are justly demanded from him; that affection also must be sufficiently manifested, yet prudently, unless just causes dispense; and the offices of charity must be performed which either nearness or necessity imposes.

— To one asking pardon, this is per se to be given; and, lest you betray hatred, you must manifest this even by external signs: you are not bound to grant pardon immediately after the offense has been inflicted, because that thing is violent and above human frailty. Nor, after reconciliation, is the more intimate and spontaneous familiarity which previously existed to be restored. Yet to him who exhibits the offices of peculiar friendship, it is fitting to return similar ones. St. Thomas, in 1. 2 Sent., d. 30, q. 1, art. 2, ad 5.

— The offender must be the first to attempt reconciliation; or, if the offense has been mutual, he who has offended more gravely, or who has offended first. But, unless the matter has been manifest, it is better, yet prudently, to inculcate to each that he procure reconciliation, which otherwise would never be, because of the blinded mind of both, by which one ascribes the fault to the other.

Reconciliation requires that pardon be sought, and indeed per se formally. The one offended sometimes reasonably demands this. Yet often an implicit, virtual petition supplies, which is contained in a gift, an undue service. This is admitted if the offender far surpasses the other in dignity or state; if the one offended does not care for a formal petition for pardon; if full satisfaction has been given in another way. Yet not rarely a Superior who is not ashamed to ask pardon gains for himself confidence and love, nor does he derogate from his authority.

Lest matters become worse, if the injured person does not seem likely to grant pardon, a more opportune time for seeking pardon can prudently be awaited.

Let the confessor beware lest ever, because of an occult delict which would thus be manifested, he impose a formal petition for pardon; and even where the obligation is certain, often he will prudently be silent, lest, without hope of fruit, he disturb good faith. He can merely declare that obligation, but not impose it as a penance, lest he violate the sacramental seal.

Evangelical Persuasion. — Thus far we have tried to declare what minimum must be held in this matter. But the evangelical spirit will persuade both the ministers of Christ and the faithful to a more perfect manner of acting. Grieving over the lawsuits of the Corinthians, the Apostle, from St. Matthew 5, 39; St. Luke 6, 29, wrote these things without hesitation (1 Cor. 6, 7): "Now indeed there is plainly a fault among you, that you have lawsuits among yourselves. Why do you not rather take wrong? Why do you not rather suffer fraud?" In the Epistle to the Romans 12, 17; and to the Hebrews 12, 14, he commended these things: "If it can be, as much as is in you, having peace with all men..."; "Follow peace with all men." Indeed he wished that, by his beneficent action, the disciple of Christ should heap "coals of fire" "upon the head of" his enemy, that is, should so overcome evil in good that the enemy, suffused with shame, as if impatient of delay, could not deny love.

Instructed by these documents, the preacher of the Gospel both openly and privately will disapprove those Catholic families which, because of a contention over inheritance, so easily give a little edifying example of division and separation; he will also demonstrate the temporal detriments of discords; he will admonish how the first victim of hatred is the very one who fosters hatred: for that affection indeed nourishes pride, but takes peace and happiness from the heart.

But the faithful also will be skillful in avoiding dissensions, little solicitous about vain honor; ready and prompt in forgiving injuries, so that they may be among the peacemakers who, with the greatest edification of all, will be called sons of God.

They will also be stimulated by this consideration: that, since no exercise is seen to be more free from self-love, there is none which is shown more certainly to pertain to the theological virtue of charity. We love relatives, benefactors, and friends even on account of our own advantage or solace; we love enemies only on account of God.

— 1. Someone's enemy by affection is he who pursues him with hatred or evil aversion; by effect, he who has injured him unjustly. He can actually be such or have been such, whether an obligation of reparation remains, or only evil aversion survives.

2. We must love enemies: Christ openly taught this, and they are neighbors. Wherefore we are prohibited from every hatred of enmity, by which we will another's evil as such; from illicit vindication, and from positive exclusion of an enemy from common prayers; indeed, unless a just cause excuses, from common signs of love. The sin is grave in its genus, but admits lightness of matter; and the mere omission of the signification of love will rarely today be able to be condemned as grave. Besides, both by common affection and by effect, the positive offices of charity toward an enemy are to be fulfilled.

Hatred of abomination is to be distinguished from hatred of enmity: the former does not affect the person but his malice; a certain aversion which is observed in sense is also to be separated from hatred.

3. The species of evil which someone has truly wished for an enemy will often not have to be declared, since it rather was willed under the generic account of evil.

4. To one asking pardon, pardon is per se to be given, at least after no excessive delay; although more intimate familiarity per se, if it was spontaneous, is not to be restored.

He who alone, or more gravely, or first, has offended must be the first to attempt reconciliation through pardon sought formally or at least virtually. Often the attempt will have to be inculcated to both; yet sometimes it is prudently deferred, and is to be imposed by the confessor only cautiously.

5. The evangelical spirit will persuade a more perfect manner of acting both to Christ's ministers and to the faithful.

On the extension of the precept of charity to enemies.⁹

Notion. By the name enemy are signified: 1. all who have actually inflicted some injury upon us and have not repaired it; 2. those who have hatred for us; 3. those from whom we turn away on account of a just antipathy or some other just motive. - Enmity is directly opposed to the love of benevolence and is accustomed to arise from hatred and envy.

⁹ On the dilection of enemies several have written special little works, e.g. Mich. Waldmann, Die Feindesliebe in der antiken Welt u. im Christentum (Vienna 1902, Mayer); Steph. Randlinger, Die Feindesliebe nach natürlichem und positivem Sittengesetz (Paderborn 1906, Schoningh); J. Neeb, De dilectione inimicorum tentamen historico-morale, Mainz 1791.

571. Proposition. Enemies are to be loved from charity, not indeed insofar as they are enemies, but insofar as they are men.

Thus positive divine law establishes, and it is founded upon natural law.

That from natural law itself we are bound in some way to love our enemies is drawn from this, that an enemy is a creature and image of God just as we are, belonging to human society. But natural law commands that the members of the same society love one another, because otherwise the good of society is harmed by quarrels and acts of revenge arising. But since the obligation of loving enemies does not pertain to the first principles of natural law, and moreover in some cases can be so difficult to observe, it is easily understood why ancient and modern pagans scarcely knew and exercised true love of enemies.¹⁰

Positive divine law already in the Old Testament prescribed the dilection of enemies: "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart, but publicly reprove him, lest thou have sin upon him. Thou shalt not seek revenge, nor shalt thou remember the injury of thy citizens."¹¹ "If thy enemy shall hunger, feed him; if he shall thirst, give him water to drink; for thou shalt heap coals upon his head, and the Lord will repay thee."¹² But in the New Testament the precept of loving enemies is more clearly expressed and explained: "You have heard that it was said: Thou shalt love thy neighbor and shalt have hatred for thy enemy. But I say to you: Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who persecute and calumniate you."¹³ According to the false interpretation of the Pharisees it was licit to have hatred for an enemy and also by private authority to exercise the right of retaliation; but Christ, expressly rejecting this interpretation, commanded (and not merely counseled) sincere love toward enemies. The same Savior taught us to pray: "Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors";¹⁴ and He Himself, hanging on the cross, prayed for His enemies.

¹⁰ Among the ancient philosophers who not only taught but also exercised the dilection of enemies, Socrates is easily the chief, whose aorgesia (meekness) is praised and truly heroic (cf. Plato, Crito 49). His axiom was: It is better to suffer injury than to do injury. Cicero (De Offic. 1, 25, 88) says: "Nor indeed are those to be heard who will think that one must be gravely angry at enemies and will judge this to belong to a magnanimous and brave man; for nothing is more praiseworthy, nothing more worthy of a great and distinguished man, than placability and clemency." Yet elsewhere he says: "It is fine to hate someone freely" (Ad Att. 13, 49, 2). Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius Antoninus spoke well about the dilection of enemies, but perhaps were already under the influence of Christian truth. See Randlinger, l.c. 428 sqq.

¹¹ Lev. 19, 17 sq.

¹² Prov. 25, 21 sq. Cf. Tob. 4, 16; Job 31, 29 sq. Beautiful examples of the dilection of enemies are provided by Joseph, sold by his brothers and afterward doing good to them; David in the cave of Engaddi toward Saul and toward his wicked son Absalom. Likewise Job, Moses, Aaron, Samuel. In the Old Testament hatred of enemies seems not once, in appearance, to have been commanded or at least permitted. Thus in many Psalms (e.g. 34, 4-8; 54, 10, 16-24; 68, 23-29; 108, 6-20; 136, 7-9) many evils are wished to enemies; but all these things are easily explained if we observe that the Israelites wished these evils, or even inflicted them, upon enemies as a just punishment for crimes committed against God (cf. Randlinger, l.c. 90 sqq.).

¹³ Matth. 5, 43 sq.

¹⁴ Matth. 6, 12.

572. Note. a) We are not indeed commanded to love enemies because they are enemies, but although they are enemies; b) Next, we are neither bound nor can we licitly love the vices and defects of an enemy, because this would be to approve some evil; c) Finally, we are not bound to love enemies with sensible affection, as we love a friend, because this charity toward enemies is supernatural and spiritual, and consequently is not perceived in such a way by our sensitive part. The Angelic Doctor writes to the point: "Dilection of enemies can be considered in three ways: in one way indeed, that enemies be loved insofar as they are enemies; and this is perverse and repugnant to charity, because this is to love the evil of another. In another way the dilection of enemies can be taken as to nature, but in the universal; and thus the dilection of enemies is of the necessity of charity, namely, that someone loving God and neighbor not exclude his enemies from that generality of the dilection of neighbor. In a third way the dilection of enemies can be considered in the particular, namely, that someone be moved in the particular by a movement of dilection toward an enemy; and this is not of the necessity of charity absolutely, because neither is to be moved by a movement of dilection in the particular toward any individual men whatsoever of the necessity of charity, since this would be impossible. Yet it is of the necessity of charity according to preparation of soul, namely, that man have his soul prepared for this, that he would love an enemy in the particular if necessity occurred."¹⁵

From what has been said it clearly appears that there exists a grave precept of loving enemies with true charity; and this precept indeed embraces the following particular obligations:

1. Every hatred of enmity and every desire of revenge must be put away;

2. At least common signs of dilection are to be shown to an enemy;

3. Reconciliation is to be sought.

¹⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 25, a. 8.

573. 1. Every hatred of enmity and every desire of revenge must be put away, since such hatred is directly opposed to the virtue of charity, and consequently is a mortal sin from its genus. Hatred of enmity becomes a light sin not only on account of the imperfection of the act, i.e. on account of semi-full knowledge and volition, but also from smallness of matter, e.g. if someone wishes some small evil to another. St. John vehemently reprehends hatred, saying: "But he who hates his brother is in darkness, and walks in darkness, and does not know where he is going, because the darkness has blinded his eyes."¹⁶ It is remarkable in what destructive manner hatred blinds the mind, so that an equitable judgment is almost impossible. The same apostle says: "He who does not love remains in death. Everyone who hates his brother is a murderer, and you know that no murderer has eternal life remaining in himself."¹⁷

Corollaries. a) Because hatred of enmity is intrinsically evil, it is not licit to wish some evil to neighbor as it is evil; but it is licit to wish some temporal evil (not spiritual) to someone, whether on account of his amendment, or on account of the good of the community, or even on account of the good of another person deservedly more loved.¹⁸ Care must be taken, however, lest the order of charity be harmed. Thus, e.g., it is licit to wish the death of a heresiarch who perverts many; it is licit to wish illness to an unmanageable young man, so that he may recover his senses from his vices; it is licit to desire grave temporal punishment for parents who educate their children very badly.¹⁹

b) If it is not licit to wish evil to an enemy, a fortiori it is not licit to imprecate evil upon him, or to curse him. Cursing (Verfluchung) is from its genus a mortal sin, as directly opposed to the virtue of charity. Yet in practice it is often a venial sin, not only on account of smallness of matter, but chiefly on account of the imperfection of the act. For such imprecations and curses often do not proceed from a serious soul, but are signs of momentary anger. Nevertheless they are to be carefully avoided on account of scandal and other depraved consequences.

¹⁶ 1 Jo. 2, 11.

¹⁷ 1 Jo. 3, 14 sq.

¹⁸ Cf. St. Thomas, Comm. in Rom. 12, lect. 5; Quaest. disp. de carit. a. 8 ad 2.

¹⁹ Cf. what was said above, n. 405, concerning desire of evil on account of a good effect.

574. c) To take revenge (Rache, vengeance) upon an enemy is never licit, unless it is a just punishment of the delinquent and a licit protection of oneself. The reason is that revenge is usually accustomed to arise from hatred, and fraternal charity is thereby harmed. But if "the intention of the one taking vengeance is borne principally toward some good which is reached through the punishment of the one sinning, for example, toward the amendment of the one sinning, or at least toward his restraint and the quiet of others, and toward the preservation of justice and the honor of God, vindication can be licit, if the other due circumstances are observed."²⁰ The almost only case in which in practice it is licit to take revenge by private authority is moderate punishment of a delinquent caught in the very act. Thus, e.g., if someone catches in his garden a boy secretly taking away apples, he could licitly give him a few slaps as punishment for the theft, provided, however, that this punishment is not immoderate, nor prohibited by civil law. The reason is that revenge of this sort serves both the good of the boy and the licit defense of one's own goods. But I say: it is licit to take revenge upon a delinquent caught in the very act; for if the offense has already been committed for some time, then a private man cannot by his own authority inflict punishment, unless nevertheless the legitimate judge cannot or will not establish due satisfaction.

You ask: Is it licit to seek public punishment of an enemy from zeal for justice from a legitimate judge? St. Alphonsus²¹ responds: "In practice I have never dared to absolve any of those who said that they had spared their enemies, but had wished justice to have its place by taking notice of the wicked; for I could never persuade myself that persons of this sort, who sometimes come burdened with sins, love the common good and justice so much (not indeed against other delinquents, but against their own offender), that they are cleansed from every stain of revenge; hence the Doctors say in these persons: it is very easy for their love toward justice to be a colored pretext for covering their own desire of revenge." This opinion seems to be rather strict, if it is understood in the sense that sacramental absolution may never be given to him who wills reparation of injury through the aid of a legitimate judge. Certainly ordinarily it is a mark of more perfect virtue to forgive an enemy the injury inflicted; but if the desire of disordered revenge and every hatred of enmity is absent, then it does not seem to be sinful to go to a judge to seek reparation for an injury endured, whether real or personal. For if such injuries always remained unpunished, arrogant men would grow still more insolent; but peaceful and just men would be despised as cowards. Nevertheless, it is rather rarely expedient to go to a judge on account of offenses received, because quarrels and endless enmities are accustomed to arise from this. But especially let clerics guard as far as they can, lest they bring laymen, or, what is worse, other clerics, before a civil tribunal on account of reparation for an offense. For almost always from such a mode of acting there arises great scandal among the people. Moreover, in this way the privilege of forum granted to clerics is harmed, which still in our times is in force, unless in some regions it has been abolished on account of concordats or legitimate customs.²² The almost only exception is if the honor of a cleric is gravely harmed in public newspapers; for then silence observed by a cleric could easily be thought by the common people to be as it were a tacit confession of the crime; and consequently the cleric would be bound, in order to save his own honor and that of his clerical state, to summon the calumniator into court, after first consulting the bishop or another competent superior.

²⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 108, a. 1.

²¹ Homo Ap. tract. 4, 27. De dilectione inimicorum.

²² On the penalties imposed against those who violate the privilege of forum, see Cod. iur. can. c. 2341.

575. 2. At least common signs of dilection are to be shown to an enemy. And this indeed not only externally, but also with internal affection. But per se no obligation exists of showing even special signs of dilection to an enemy. Thus all theologians teach.²³

A) Common signs of dilection are those which we are accustomed to show to all men in similar circumstances, e.g. to return a greeting to one greeting, to answer one asking, not to exclude from common benefits, etc.; but special signs are those which we show only to friends or to those joined to us by some necessity, e.g. to converse familiarly, to visit the sick, etc. As a practical and rather easy rule for discerning common signs from special signs, this can be held: As often as from the denial of some sign or benefit any prudent and equitable man would at once conclude that enmity is present, then such a sign is common and is to be shown even to an enemy. Otherwise sin arises, whose gravity is to be measured: a) from the gravity of the hatred of the one denying this sign of charity; b) from the gravity of the scandal arising. But if common signs of dilection are denied not from hatred and enmity, but either as a just punishment or for the amendment of the delinquent, then it is not sin, but a good work and just vindication.

²³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 25, a. 9.

576. Resolves. a) A father does not sin, but acts well, if, on account of a grave offense committed, for some time he neither looks at nor speaks to his son, in order to show the gravity of the offense inflicted upon him, or to inflict a just punishment, or to procure the amendment of the guilty one.

b) On the contrary, ordinarily it is sin if two students of the same seminary, or two religious of the same convent, who until now have conversed familiarly, now no longer wish to speak to or greet one another, since this is usually from hatred or from enmity and causes scandal.

c) Likewise it is sin if someone excludes an enemy from common alms, from common commerce, etc. As to prayer for enemies, St. Thomas notes:²⁴ "In the same way in which we are bound to love enemies, we are bound to pray for enemies.... It is of necessity that in our common prayers, which we make for others, we not exclude enemies. But that we pray specially for them is of perfection, not of necessity, except in some special case [of grave necessity]." It belongs to a prudent confessor sometimes also to enjoin a special prayer for an enemy, in order to end an existing enmity more quickly.

d) It is specially asked whether it is necessary to greet an enemy coming toward one. I answer: 1. Anticipated greeting is owed to no one except certain persons constituted in greater dignity. Hence if an enemy is of equal condition as I am, I am not bound to greet him first. 2. Greeting is necessary if scandal would arise from its denial, or any prudent man would at once conclude that this denial arises solely from hatred or enmity. Hence in those places where there is a custom of greeting all who come toward one, even an enemy is to be greeted; but not in other places where such a custom does not exist. 3. The return of a greeting is owed to all men from affability, and consequently even to an enemy.

B) Special signs of dilection are not owed per se to an enemy. The reason is that otherwise the enemy would be of better condition and would have greater rights toward us than other common neighbors (to whom we also do not owe special signs of dilection); which indeed is absurd. Hence we are not bound, e.g., to invite an enemy to table, to receive him as a guest, etc. Per accidens even special signs of dilection are to be shown to an enemy, namely, when he is in necessity. But one would more rightly say that then those signs are no longer special, but common, i.e. owed to all neighbors. Thus, e.g., if a sick enemy would incur danger of death unless he were received as a guest by us, then certainly he would have to be received, although to receive someone as a guest in ordinary cases is a special and not a common sign of dilection, as was said above. A Christian man acts rightly toward an enemy if he treats him as another non-enemy neighbor who is of the same state and condition. - It is not indeed necessary, but very meritorious, to show even special signs of dilection to an enemy; for thus burning coals are heaped upon his head.

²⁴ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 83, a. 8; cf. 3, dist. 30, q. 1, a. 2.

577. 3. Reconciliation with an enemy is not only not to be impeded, but also, according to one's powers, to be facilitated.

As to the order to be followed in making reconciliation, regularly the one who offended another, or, if there are offenses on each side (as commonly happens), he who offended first or more gravely, is bound first to seek reconciliation. For Christ says: "If therefore thou offerest thy gift at the altar, and there shalt remember that thy brother has something against thee [i.e. a just complaint], leave thy gift there before the altar, and go first to be reconciled to thy brother; and then, coming, thou shalt offer thy gift."²⁵ Therefore the offender is bound either to seek pardon²⁶ or in another suitable way to make peace with the offended person, insofar, however, as this is morally possible; for the offender is not bound to satisfy the offended person a) if from this he must suffer a much graver inconvenience than the offense inflicted was, b) if he foresees that the other will not consent to the offered reconciliation or satisfaction. But in practice, since not rarely each person is persuaded that he was first or more gravely harmed, the confessor ought to persuade each one to begin the reconciliation.

Even he who certainly was first and more gravely harmed ought to forgive the enemy the offense received, i.e. to put away aversion, indignation, and hatred, but he is not bound freely to remit the injury and perhaps the damage received; for he can demand suitable satisfaction and restitution for damage. If before the offense there existed a special friendship between the offender and the offended person, it is not required that even this friendship be restored through reconciliation, unless nevertheless some scandal would arise otherwise. For to avoid scandal, or if the enemy is in necessity, not only common signs but also special signs of love are to be shown to him, as was already said.

²⁵ Matth. 5, 23 sq.

²⁶ It is not strictly necessary to seek pardon from the offended person, unless this is the only means for obtaining full reconciliation. This indeed is accustomed to happen: a) if the offense was very grave, b) if the offended person is a legitimate superior.

578. Scholion. On the manner of treating sins of hatred in the confessional. A penitent who refuses to put away grave hatred of neighbor is not worthy of absolution. This is clear of itself, for he refuses to fulfill a grave obligation. But even if there is question of light hatred (especially if it is found in religious or pious persons), the confessor should insist strongly and at the same time prudently that such hatred be put away. For almost nothing harms the spiritual life and the influence of grace so gravely as hatred of neighbor, or even the mere defect of love toward neighbor. But let the confessor use great prudence if the penitent confesses hatred against an enemy. Before all things let him bring forward motives of forgiveness ("Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors"; the examples of Christ in the passion, St. Stephen in martyrdom, St. John Gualbert, etc.); but external reconciliation, or explicit prayer for the enemy, is not always to be strictly required, since the penitent, otherwise disposed to forgive interiorly, not rarely refuses exterior and manifest reconciliation on account of its great difficulties. In these cases it suffices that the confessor require a) interior and sincere forgiveness, b) removal of every scandal.

S. Th. II-II, q. 25, aa. 8 and 9; de Virt., q. 2, a. 8.

891. Enemies are to be loved. - Enemies are those who hate us or ours, or have offended us, or have affected us with injury, or at least are apprehended as such.¹

¹ Offense is only a wounding of another's will, by which we bring annoyance to another and provide a sufficient motive of displeasure and indignation without violation of right properly so called, and it is against charity alone and human peace, or affability, etc.; as if, when a friend asks from you a service which he greatly needs and which you can provide, you deny it: this requires reconciliation. Injury is also a wounding of right properly so called, and is against justice; this is either damaging when in fact it harms neighbor in goods, and this requires restitution, or simple if it does not harm, for example, if you inflict an insult upon someone alone, and this requires simple satisfaction.

Enemies are not to be loved as enemies, that is, their enmity must not be loved, because that is an evil. But enemies according to nature, insofar as they are men capable of eternal beatitude, are to be loved from charity. - It is proved:

a) From the words of Christ, Mt. V, 44: "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you... pray for those persecuting and calumniating you, that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven"; and VI, 12: "Forgive us our debts as we also forgive our debtors," where dilection of enemies is indicated as a condition required for the remission of sins, for v. 15: "But if you do not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive you your sins."

b) From the Old Testament: Lev. XIX, 17-18; Exod. XXIII, 4, 5; Prov. XXV, 21, compared with Rom. XII, 20-21.

c) Reason dictates the principle: What you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another; but no one wills to be held in hatred, but everyone desires to be loved. - Besides, it is against reason, on account of fault, to hate someone not only according to fault, but also according to nature, insofar as there is good in him.

892. Enemies by precept are to be loved in common, that is, as other men even unknown are loved, insofar as we cannot exclude them from dilection of neighbor; whence we are bound in itself and generally to offer them, from internal affection, the common signs and benefits of dilection: for to deny these generally is held as a sign of hatred, and easily causes scandal, both with respect to the enemy who is thereby confirmed in enmity, and also with respect to those seeing.

But in particular, by exercising a special act of dilection toward the person of an enemy, it is not of precept but of perfection and counsel; and therefore generally to exhibit special signs of dilection is not of precept. Nevertheless this is in the precept according to preparation of soul, namely, that man be prepared to love an enemy in particular, and to do good to him, and to exhibit to him special signs of dilection, if necessity should require it (Prov. XXV, 21).

893. Common signs and benefits of dilection are those which, by reason of general charity, either are exhibited to all men or to all of some condition (for example, when someone prays for all, or gives alms to all the poor of the same city), or are customarily exhibited mutually by all men of such a state or condition (for example, by a neighbor to neighbors, by a relative to relatives, by a father to sons, by a student to fellow students, etc.). But what these are must be judged from the estimation of the prudent and from received custom: for there is great diversity according to region, state, and time. Hence, says St. Alphonsus, n. 28: "It is not permitted to exclude an enemy from common prayers, for example, the Lord's prayer, which is instituted for the community, nor from common alms, returning a greeting, response (even by letters), sale of displayed merchandise; because these are common signs of dilection, and therefore to act against these, for example, to invite all relatives, to greet all those met from the neighborhood or college according to custom, with the enemy alone excluded" is in itself and regularly evil.

894. Special signs and benefits of dilection are those which are owed to no one, nor are required by the condition of the person and the custom of the region, but from mere liberality are specially exhibited to some persons, by reason of special friendship which is not toward all of the same condition: these, just as they are freely assumed, are freely omitted. Hence in itself and generally we are not bound to visit sick enemies, to console the sorrowful, to receive them with hospitality or at a banquet, to pray specially for them, to have frequent intercourse with them, for example, by letters, indeed not even to speak to or greet them first, unless there were question of a superior or of those very closely joined, or unless greeting or speaking were a common sign of charity toward those met (for example, in small places, at a banquet, in communities, etc.), from which to abstain longer would be held as a sign of hatred.

895. To omit common signs and benefits of dilection sometimes is permitted, but accidentally and extraordinarily, for a time, on account of a just cause:

a) from justice, namely, 1) if a superior offended by an inferior thus hopes to amend him (provided the hope is founded), or intends to correct him, or to give an example to others: for a superior has the right of punishing;²

² Parents can cast out children for a time, on account of a crime committed, or on account of an unworthy marriage, namely, for amendment or chastisement; but they cannot deny reconciliation perpetually.

b) from charity: 2) if it is done without hatred, even by a non-superior, so that the boldness and insolence of the offender may be restrained, or so that he may be amended;³ 3) if someone, from the exhibited signs, prudently fears greater obstinacy of the enemy, remembrance of injuries, new disturbance or quarrel;

³ Some, such as Ballerini and Genicot, say that this is permitted for taking vengeance concerning a lighter injury: for what can be sought from judges in graver injuries seems able to be assumed by each one on account of the same ends in lighter offenses, for avenging which one is not accustomed to have recourse to judges. - Nevertheless this does not seem to be approved, because in all Catholic theology the principle has always been solemn that private vengeance is illicit, both because it is permitted to no one to render right to himself and to vindicate his own rights for himself, but this belongs to judges, and because in practice it will be difficult to seek vengeance solely from love of justice without any malevolent mind; but the principle of Ballerini is new and unheard of. Hence this mode of acting is to be admitted only not as vengeance for a past injury, but as a restraint upon a further injury. Nevertheless Prummer notes, Th. M. II, n. 119, that this is permitted practically, if the superior is judged to delegate a private person; for example, by the presumed permission of parents a small correction can be administered to children, such as a light beating.

c) from another reasonable cause: 4) if it is done as a sign of just sorrow from an actual or recent injury, especially if this was atrocious; 5) if it is done on account of an injury gravely defaming, lest that injury seem to be little esteemed; 6) if, without scandal, it is done because someone knows certainly that the enemy will not respond to the signs exhibited, for example, because he has experienced this; but if he doubts, he is bound to try at least once.

896. We must exhibit special signs of dilection accidentally and extraordinarily; which then are already common signs owed to all:

a) in grave spiritual or temporal necessity (of life, reputation, fortune) of neighbor, for then to deny them would rightly be held as a sign of hatred;

b) when an enemy asks pardon, or exhibits special signs for obtaining it, in which case to deny special signs ordinarily is a sign of hatred; yet sometimes someone will licitly deny them (for a time), for example, a superior for amendment, punishment, or example, and anyone for expressing just sorrow if pardon is sought immediately after the offense;

c) for resisting hatred to which you feel yourself prone;

d) for avoiding scandal, which nevertheless generally can be avoided otherwise, for example, by a declaration or admonition of those seeing;

e) if there is founded hope that the enemy will then put aside grave hatred, from which obligation nevertheless a grave inconvenience excuses (cf. below, p. 3, q. 3, a. 2).

897. To deny to an enemy owed signs of charity is a mortal sin from its genus. - It is mortal because it is against charity;⁴ this happens 1) from internal intention, when it proceeds from hatred or an appetite of vengeance mortally evil, 2) on account of external signification, when it is considered by the enemy as a grave offense, or when it causes grave scandal, or when it would be held by others as a sign of grave hatred or of an appetite of vengeance mortally evil. To judge this last, one must attend to the cause on account of which the signs are omitted; for example, if it is done on account of a preceding grave quarrel, it will more easily be held as a sign of grave hatred than if it is done on account of trifles. Hence it seems too general, what some say without restriction, that a religious who after ten days does not wish to speak to a confrere is not to be absolved: for it is not always held as a sign of grave hatred.

⁴ St. Thomas proves the matter, Q. D. de Virt., q. 2, a. 8: "In him who exercises enmity against us, there are two things to be found: one which is the reason of dilection, namely, that he pertains to God, and another which is the reason of hatred, namely, that he is opposed to us. But in whomever the reason of dilection and the reason of hatred are found, if, with dilection passed over, we are turned into hatred, it is manifest that that which is the reason of hatred preponderates in our heart over that which is the reason of dilection. Therefore if someone hates his enemy, that one's enmity preponderates in his heart over divine love. Therefore he hates that one's enmity more than he loves God. But we hate something as much as we love the good which is taken away from us by the enemy. It remains therefore that whoever hates an enemy loves some created good more than God, which is against the precept of charity. Therefore to have an enemy in hatred is contrary to charity."

It is mortal from its genus; therefore it admits lightness of matter: thus if a person much greater does not return the greeting of an inferior, for example, a nobleman of a rustic, a father of a son, it does not seem mortal; and otherwise in our regions the omission of greeting or of returning a greeting once or twice is often a venial sin: for in itself it is opposed only to affability, nor among us is it always a sign or effect of grave hatred, or cause of grave scandal.

898. We are bound interiorly to remit the offense to an enemy (Mt. VI, 15; XVIII, 35), yet not to renew with him the former special friendship, if this was freely assumed. Nor are we bound in itself, even if he asks pardon, to remit restitution for damage caused, or satisfaction for injury inflicted (for no one is bound in itself to remit a good owed to him), indeed not even to accept them if he offers them; but we can seek them by juridical action, provided that we do not principally intend the evil of the enemy, but the good which such an action procures, namely, the amendment of the enemy, or restraint, the quiet of others, or the conservation of justice.

In practice, however: 1) Generally we must accept sufficient satisfaction spontaneously offered, nor can we pursue it juridically, especially if there is question of seeking a grave penalty against the enemy without advantage for us, or of urging a greater satisfaction than he can provide. The reason is that in seeking such things, a spirit of vengeance is with difficulty absent: for it is difficult that someone seek public vengeance from a judge from pure love of justice, without a disordered love of private vengeance which is illicit, and to which man is very prone; whence also common estimation holds this as a sign of vengeance.

2. Sometimes we must remit reparation for a merely personal injury, when the burden which the enemy would undergo in repairing it would be too great with respect to the good which would come to us from it.

3. It is never permitted to remit it, if a superior needed his reputation not so much for himself, but more for the good and salvation of others, or if it is an injury which would create infamy for the whole family or community, unless it were repaired by juridical satisfaction.

899. On the order and mode of reconciliation. - The offender must begin reconciliation (Mt. V, 23-24) as soon as he morally can: for from charity he is bound, just as not to place an offense, so also to remove it; but if the offense is mutual, he who offended more gravely; if it is nearly equal, he who offended first. An exception is if it is certainly foreseen that pardon will be denied by the other, or if the offender greatly surpasses him in dignity or state, unless perhaps the injury is enormous.

Reconciliation generally is sought sufficiently in an indirect mode through a special sign of dilection: by sending a gift [the original prints dotium], by providing deference, a service or benefit, by anticipating in honor, by friendly conversation, etc., or by the intercession of others. Nevertheless, when the offense was grave, and no other means of reconciliation is present (or if a superior or judge imposes it), the offender also must directly ask pardon, because just as from charity he was bound not to place the offense, so from charity he is bound to remove it. But in practice, a formal petition of pardon admits many excuses, for example, if it is not in use among persons of such a condition, if the offended person demands an unaccustomed humiliation, or does not care about the petition, or if satisfaction can be made fully otherwise, for example, by money or by an indirect means, through a sign of special dilection or honor, as was said above.

900. Practical warning. - Since each one easily persuades himself that he has suffered the graver injury, let the confessor exhort each one to seek reconciliation. Nevertheless, let him not easily impose the obligation of directly asking pardon, because this is almost never present; indeed even if it is certainly present, prudence often advises that he leave the penitent in good faith, if the admonition is not hoped to be profitable.

IV. Rules to be observed in reconciliation. - They are the following:

1. If injuries intervened on one side only, the one offending is bound to seek reconciliation by himself or through another, and to repair damages if there are any; likewise if between two offenders one has offended more gravely or first. Exception is made if a legitimate reason excuses, for example if the offense was not grave, or the offended person is absent, or does not care for the petition of pardon, or does not accept it, or for another reason he is judged to have been satisfied.

2. If injuries from both sides were morally equal and simultaneous, each is bound, when occasion is given, to begin reconciliation by greeting, conversation, benefit, etc., according to the case, for example that one first who passes before the other or comes upon him.

3. An opportune time is to be sought; for although the offended person is bound from the beginning to condone the offense, nevertheless he is not bound, at least under grave obligation, to suffer it with such calm spirit that he is immediately prepared for reconciliation. That seems as it were violent and above human frailty.

V. Practical observations for confessors. - 1. Unworthy of absolution is he who positively does not wish to put away deliberate and gravely sinful hatred, i.e., who deliberately wishes grave evil to another under the aspect of evil and by resting in the evil itself; likewise he who negatively does not wish to love as the law of God commands, for example to wish the good of one's own beatitude, to forgive a personal injury, to furnish the common and necessary signs of love, in those circumstances in which denial is held as a sign of grave hatred or causes grave scandal: for he injures charity in a grave matter.

But a) penitents who accuse themselves of hatred are not at once to be charged with sin, especially grave sin: for often they confuse hatred properly so called, of malevolence, with horror and recollection of a true or apparent offense committed by the neighbor, or with the wishing of evil from an honorable end, or also with natural and invincible antipathy toward the person of the neighbor, so that they cannot see him without vehement disturbance. These do not sin gravely, provided that they do not desire notable evil nor refuse the ordinary signs of love; but then there is danger that a passage may easily be made to true hatred, concerning which danger the confessor should warn them.

b) Therefore when someone accuses himself of hatred against the neighbor, let the confessor diligently inquire whether the discourse is about true hatred. For there are those who accuse themselves of hatred, and nevertheless do not labor under hatred; there are also those who foster hatred and nevertheless say that they desire every good to those by whom they have been offended. Therefore those accusing themselves of this are to be examined. If the one examined has none of those things by which hatred is expressed, although he complains that he experiences aversion against someone and that his blood is moved when he meets the other, or that he cannot forget, look at, or speak to him, he is not detected as laboring under voluntary hatred: for there can be a movement of the sensitive appetite which precedes reason, although the free will does not consent. Nevertheless the penitent is to be warned that he pray for the other, seek speech with him, speak well of him among others, excuse his defects, etc.; for thus the aversion or displeasure, which, if secretly preserved, is fostered and remains, will soon be dissipated.

c) Those who on the contrary say that they condone, but refuse to speak to the enemy and to furnish other common and owed signs and offices of charity, cast suspicion of hatred upon themselves: with them let the confessor proceed cautiously lest he absolve unduly. Likewise, those who before promised to seek reconciliation and to exhibit common signs of charity to the adversary and did not do this, ordinarily ought not to be absolved, but absolution generally is to be deferred for them.

2. Men implicated in hatred and enmity are wont to be hard in spirit. In treating a penitent of this kind, much patience and prudence are needed.

Therefore first of all let the confessor beware of every austerity of words; rather let him strive kindly to sympathize with the penitent on account of the injury received, let him permit him to complain, exaggerate, etc., lest the penitent be exasperated; let him beware lest he seem to act as advocate of the adversary, but rather let him show that he seeks the good of the offended person.

3. The obligations of one guilty of hatred are to be declared to him, once the cause is well known from responses to these or similar questions: from what time he has fostered hatred, whether he has wished evils, whether he has wished to inflict them, what ones, whether he has not rejoiced concerning the evils of the other, whether he has not grieved concerning goods, whether he has denied the common signs of charity: whether he has spoken to the adversary, whether he has responded to one greeting him, etc.

Let the confessor warn the penitent that satisfaction can be exacted, that it is not lawful to will evil to the neighbor so that it may be evil to him, that the common signs of love are to be exhibited, and that every sign of enmity is to be taken away.

4. The penitent is to be induced to perform this by various reasons, such as: the necessity for salvation, the Lord's Prayer, the example of God forgiving sin and especially of Christ forgiving on the cross, the good which follows from forgiveness, namely peace of conscience and consequent joy, glory before God and men in such an exercise of virtue, utility, because it opens the door of divine mercy, the consideration of human frailty and of the disposition of divine providence which permits such things to happen for our good, forgiveness to be made to Christ asking this, who took all sins upon Himself and said: What you have done to one, you have done to me (Mt. XXV, 40).

Briefly: a) the necessity of forgiving and of satisfying charity, according to what we ask in the Lord's Prayer: forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors (Mt. XVIII, 35); b) how glorious it is to forgive, for it is the greatest victory and a sacrifice most pleasing to God (Mk. XII, 33); c) the utility of forgiveness and the consequent delightfulness (Mt. V, 7; 44, 45); d) the example of God forgiving our sins and desiring that we forgive our enemies, likewise of Christ praying for His adversaries on the cross.

But if the penitent does not yield to these, let it be said that he cannot be absolved nor hope for pardon from God unless he forgives.

5. Let the confessor indicate the means for putting away hatred, namely prayer for the enemy and for grace for himself, and services of charity.

VI. Concerning vengeance Berardi asks, Praxis confessariorum, n. 195: "When, whether in desire or in joy concerning the evil of the neighbor, or in avenging injuries received, will sin be present?

Resp. In practice the more common cases are the following.

1. If this is done from a cause not honorable or not at all reasonable, for example from envy, as Cain acted against innocent Abel..., or from impatience, weariness, and anger, as those act who wish death to their own querulous, tedious, sick relatives, etc.

2. If vengeance is... excessive: namely if between the injury received and the quantity of punishment inflicted or desired there is no proportion, for example by extending signs of indignation too long; by exceeding too much in rebukes, in blows, or in other deeds having the character of vengeance; by from the heart imprecating most grave evils, for example death, hell, etc., against him who has inflicted on you a damage not so grave.⁴

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, a. 2; q. 159, a. 1.

3. If vengeance is indeed just, but induces scandal of the little ones: for in this case care will have to be taken that, at least by explaining the matter, scandal be removed.

4. If one wishes vengeance to be done by private authority, even in those cases in which this is altogether not lawful, namely a) if it can be obtained by means of tribunals; b) if it is too great; c) if it is useless, namely if it is no longer apt to protect our rights, but rather to provoke new injuries and to effect that discords and suits never have an end, as too frequently happens in practice.

5. If vengeance is done or sought either from profound hatred, or from an end not so much of obtaining reparation and protection of one's own rights, as of delighting oneself concerning the punishment of the neighbor. Moreover this is wicked. St. Thomas said⁵ that vengeance indeed is lawful, but not with the intention of harming; truly, with the intention of removing harms. It is also to be noted that delight concerning the punishment of the neighbor can degenerate into cruelty and savagery."⁶

⁵ II-II, q. 108, a. 3.

⁶ Ibid., q. 159, a. 2.

I Say 1st. There is a precept of loving one's neighbor with a true and internal affection. This is clear both from the natural law, because also in one's neighbor there exists the same formal motive of love, namely the participated goodness of God; for all men have been created to his image, and are capable of the friendship of God and of eternal beatitude; and from proposition 10 condemned by Innocent XI, which is thus stated: "We are not bound to love our neighbor by an internal and formal act."

But he who lives as a Christian satisfies this precept sufficiently, as to the internal act, by praying in general for his neighbor or by reciting the Lord's Prayer. But as to external acts he satisfies it by succoring the necessities of his neighbor, whether temporal or spiritual, according to the rules to be established below.

I Say 2nd. Some order of charity is to be observed in the love of neighbor. The reason is that the persons to be loved are joined to us more or less closely, and the goods to be desired for them are of different kinds and of different necessity. I said 1st, of different kinds; for some are spiritual, and others temporal; and these again are distinguished into goods of life, goods of reputation and honor, and goods of fortune. - I said 2nd, of different necessity; for this is either temporal or spiritual, and each can be 1st, extreme, when the danger of eternal damnation, or of death, or of another evil nearly equal to death, so presses upon one's neighbor that he, morally speaking, cannot escape it without the help of another; 2nd, grave, when from the circumstances eternal salvation is rendered very difficult, or temporal life very burdensome; 3rd, common, in which one can provide for himself without great difficulty. In this, in the spiritual order, are ordinary sinners, who, if they wished to apply some effort, would rise again from their evil state; but in the temporal order generally mendicant poor persons suffer it, for whom life, according to their condition, is not too burdensome and miserable.

For the practical application of this precept, the following rules are very useful.

Rule I. Each person is bound to love himself simply and absolutely more than his neighbor. The reason is that each person is nearer to himself than any other. This is clear besides from the natural and invincible inclination to love oneself more than one's neighbor; hence the common axiom: Well-ordered charity begins from oneself. Moreover love of self is the rule of love of neighbor according to that saying: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." But the rule is prior and more excellent than the thing ruled.

Rule II. Yet we must succor our neighbor, even with our own advantages placed after his, according to the following order:

1st. In extreme spiritual necessity one's neighbor must be succored even with certain danger of life, provided there is certain hope of helping him, and there is no other by whom he may be relieved, nor does a graver evil threaten from it; because the eternal life of one's neighbor is a good more excellent than our own temporal life.

2nd. In extreme temporal necessity one's neighbor must ordinarily be succored with a great inconvenience indeed, but not with the greatest, such as the donation of a great sum of money would be even for a rich man. The reason is that, on the one hand, the life of one's neighbor is a good more excellent than some good of ours; and, on the other hand, since love of self precedes in order, no one is obliged to undergo so great an inconvenience for others.

3rd. In grave necessity of either order no one is bound to succor his neighbor with his own grave inconvenience, while excluding, however, a title of justice, piety, or office. For from what has been said it follows that we are bound to furnish some help, but not with grave loss of one's own good.

4th. In common necessity of either order one's neighbor is to be succored with some inconvenience indeed, because love of neighbor requires this, but only with a slight one; for there can be only a slight obligation of charity when one's neighbor can rather easily extricate himself from that necessity, or when it is not too burdensome to him. But we are not bound to help all who are placed in common necessity, both because this would be impossible, and because, if at some time it could be done, it would then no longer be a slight inconvenience.

Rule III. Among the various persons to be loved, other things being equal, those are to be preferred who are more closely joined to us by blood, friendship, office, religion, common life, etc., since God has bound them to us by stricter bonds. Hence, outside extreme necessity, first of all a wife is to be succored, because she is one flesh with her husband; 2nd, children; 3rd, parents, and indeed the father before the mother; 4th, brothers, sisters, then relatives, domestics, and intimates. I said outside extreme necessity, because in this, parents, by reason of the fact that they gave life, are more probably to be preferred even to wife and children. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 27 and following; and Hom. Ap., nn. 15 and following.

Question 1. Is it contrary to the charity due to oneself to wish for death on account of the misfortunes of life?

Response. Negatively, if it is done from desire for a better life or eternal happiness, as is evident; but the answer is otherwise if it is done from weariness of life, or from dejection of soul. Yet they do not sin who desire death when life is so burdensome that it is judged harder than death itself. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 30.

Question 2. Is it contrary to charity to desire temporal evil for one's neighbor, or to rejoice over it, on account of a good end?

Response. Negatively, if the due order of charity is observed, that is, if it is done on account of a greater good, or for a lesser evil. Hence this is licit: 1st, on account of the spiritual good of the neighbor himself; 2nd, on account of the common good, whether spiritual or temporal; 3rd, on account also of the good of many persons, of much greater moment, for example, of a family, a community, etc. - But otherwise one must speak when the order of charity is perverted, as is clear from proposition 14 condemned by Innocent XI, which is as follows: "It is licit by an absolute desire to wish for the death of one's father, not indeed as an evil of the father, but as a good of the one wishing, because namely a rich inheritance will come to him." - But we know from Fr. Viva that this was the cause of the condemnation. Hence a wife cannot desire the death of her husband from the fact that she is unjustly badly treated by him, nor the death of her daughter because on account of deformity she cannot marry. - Cf. Baller., note (c), p. 186.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. A mother is not bound to undergo danger of life so that her offspring may be baptized, when it is uncertain whether it will survive for baptism. A pastor is bound in time of plague to succor his own and administer the necessary sacraments either by himself or by an equally suitable substitute.

2nd. He sins against charity toward himself, gravely or lightly, who neglects due care of soul or body. Yet it is licit to deprive oneself of non-necessary spiritual goods for the temporal or spiritual good of one's neighbor, for example, to omit Mass on a weekday. Indeed someone can desire and procure for his neighbor greater non-necessary spiritual goods than for himself, excluding contempt of them.

3rd. It is never licit to commit any sin for procuring the good of one's neighbor, whether spiritual or temporal; nor is it licit to expose oneself to proximate danger of sinning when a fall appears morally certain. Yet it is licit to expose oneself to remote danger. Indeed, as St. Alphonsus teaches, l. 6, n. 453, sometimes someone will even be bound to a work of charity when a fall is otherwise very probable, if one's neighbor is placed in extreme spiritual necessity; provided one forearms himself with opportune means, because one can certainly and justly hope for the help of God. - Baller., note (a), p. 186.

Only he is called an enemy who has injured another either by mere offense or by injury. - Besides, it must be noted that signs of love are of a twofold kind; namely, some common, and others special. The former are owed, and in fact are mutually given, by those who belong to the same state or social condition. The latter, which are called by St. Thomas friendly benefits, and proceed from familiarity, are freely exhibited to certain particular persons by reason of friendship. Both these signs are diverse according to diversity of customs and regions. Cf. Baller., note (a) and (c), p. 188.

I Say. There exists a precept of loving enemies. It is clear both from the words of Christ, Matt. v, 44: "But I say to you, love your enemies"; and because even in enemies the divine goodness shines forth, not insofar as they are enemies, but insofar as they are rational creatures. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 25, art. 8.

St. Thomas teaches in this article: 1st, enemies as such are not to be loved from charity, because "this is perverse, repugnant to charity"; 2nd, but according to their nature, that is, in the universal, "love of enemies is of the necessity of charity: namely so that someone loving God and neighbor does not exclude his enemies from that generality of love of neighbor"; 3rd, "love of enemies can be considered in the special, namely so that someone in the special is moved by a movement of love toward an enemy: and this is not of the necessity of charity absolutely, because neither is it of the necessity of charity to be moved by a movement of love in the special toward each and every man individually: because this is impossible. Yet it is of the necessity of charity according to preparation of soul, namely so that a man have his soul prepared for this, that he would love an enemy in the singular if necessity occurred," namely not only by interior love, which does little toward necessity, but also by exterior love by which he may assist one suffering necessity: and therefore not only in affection, but in effect. But that without an article of necessity a man should fulfill even this act, so that he loves an enemy on account of God, this pertains to the perfection of charity.

But so that the practical application of this precept may be seen more easily, attention must be given to the following rules:

Rule I. Of themselves the common signs of love are owed to enemies, because denial of them would be an act of vengeance and a manifestation of hatred, which is repugnant to charity. I said of themselves, because sometimes a reasonable cause is present for denying them for a time, for example, by reason of due correction, of a good effect in children or inferiors, or on account of prudent fear of quarrels from the sight or conversation of an enemy, etc., likewise on account of the expression of just sorrow conceived from injury, etc.

Rule II. Of themselves special signs of love are not owed to enemies, because friendship is owed to no one. Hence you are not bound, for example, to visit them when sick, console them when sad, receive them with hospitality or at a banquet, in those circumstances indeed in which actions of this kind are not regarded as common signs of love. I said of themselves, for by reason of avoiding scandal, or if by a particular and obvious sign of benevolence you can without grave inconvenience placate an enemy and bring it about that he lay aside hatred, you are sometimes bound to furnish this sign for his salvation. - Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 189.

Rule III. Indeed sometimes even those special signs of benevolence must be exhibited, and if they were omitted, someone would morally show and conduct himself as an enemy. Hence to one seeking pardon and offering a satisfaction congruent to the injury, if any intervened, particular signs also of special love, if any previously used to be given, generally speaking, are not to be refused, although there is not an obligation afterward to repeat those signs and preserve the former friendship. - Cf. St. Thom. in 3, dist. 30, q. 1, art. 2, ad 5. - Baller., note (b), p. 189.

Question 1. What order must be observed in making reconciliation?

Response. He who offended another ought, of himself, first to employ the means toward reconciliation, as natural equity dictates. But if the offense is mutual and equal, let him who first offended first promote reconciliation; but if it is unequal, let him go first who offended more gravely. For the rest, absolute rules cannot be assigned, but the circumstances must be considered.

Question 2. Must an offender seek pardon from the one injured?

Response. Affirmatively, unless some other means or more fitting mode of reconciliation is available, for example, by furnishing various duties or benefits; or unless a petition for pardon seems to profit nothing toward placating the offended person. They also except the case if the offender is far superior to the offended, or if the offended is prudently judged to condone it. Cf. Lacroix, lib. 2, n. 189.

Question 3. Is there an obligation to greet an enemy encountered on the way?

Response. Affirmatively, if circumstances of state, condition, or other similar things demand that all greet one another indiscriminately, or if it is a question of a subject toward his superior, or if the enemy greeted you first. But otherwise, if greeting and conversation are regarded as special signs, excluding however the case in which these are required to avoid scandal or to gain one's brother; but then the obligation, according to St. Alphonsus, is not grave, nor does it seem to be urged strongly, because acts of this kind bring no small difficulty in the offended person. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 28. Baller., note (b), p. 190.

Question 4. Are penitents who accuse themselves of hatred immediately to be reproved concerning sin, especially grave sin?

Response. Negatively, because penitents often confuse hatred properly so called, or enmity, with hatred of abomination, or of a quality or defect. Often also, especially the ruder, or those who are of a more ardent nature, labor only under some natural and invincible aversion of soul, or suffer a certain indignation. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 30. - Voit, n. 703.

Question 5. Are those to be absolved who, although they say that they have no hatred properly so called, nevertheless refuse to speak to an enemy?

Response. A distinction must be made; for either that speaking, from the circumstances, is reckoned only a special sign of love, and besides no reason is present, from those which were assigned above, by force of which, by accident, this sign, although special, ought to be given to an enemy, or not. If the first, the penitent who refuses to speak to an enemy can and must be absolved; if the other, it will be necessary to weigh whether hatred of this kind properly so called is or is not a mortal sin. For just as the inflicting of evil, so also the desire of another's evil admits smallness of matter; and if this holds with those who have injured us in nothing, a fortiori it ought to hold with an enemy, who through an unjust injury has provoked one to just indignation. - Cf. Baller., note (b), p. 192.

I. Question I. Did the precept of loving enemies press in the old law? Answer. St. Thomas affirms it, on the third book, distinction 30 [recte], question 1, article 1; and before St. Thomas, St. Augustine, book 19 against Faustus, chapter 24. Wherefore Maldonatus blurted out too inconsiderately that the following interpretation of the Angelic Doctor came forth from the workshop of the Heretics. The Angelic Doctor says, then: In the old law also men were bound to the love of enemies, as is plain from the authority. Whence what is said — Thou shalt hate thy enemy — was not taken from the law, because this is nowhere found in the letter; but was added from the depraved interpretation of the Jews, who, from the fact that the love of the neighbor was commanded, concluded that enemies were to be hated. The very law of nature, still more the divine positive law, commands this mutual love.

II. This precept Christ the Lord set forth more luminously in the Gospel, saying: But I say to you: Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that persecute and calumniate you, that you may be the children of your Father who is in heaven: Matthew 5. These are the reasons of that love: the necessity of society, which cannot subsist without mutual love; the authority of God, supreme Lord, Benefactor, Creator, Preserver, Redeemer, Father, and Master, who commands it; the reward of the remission of faults, of divine sonship, of an eternal inheritance.

III. Enemies are to be loved with a love both affective and effective. Do good to them that hate you. The precept is twofold: the negative prohibits hatred and vengeance, and this presses always and for always; the affirmative commands interior love and exterior beneficence. The love of enemies is included in the universal love by which we are bound to love our Neighbor for God's sake. For from this universal love it is not lawful to exclude an enemy. Then a promptitude of soul is necessary for loving an enemy in particular, when grave necessity presses.

IV. Question II. What signs of benevolence are to be exhibited to enemies? Answer. Of two kinds. Some are general, which are exhibited to all, and these are always due by force of the precept. Others are special, which do not always, but only sometimes, fall under the precept. To greet an enemy met on the way, where the custom of greeting prevails, falls under the precept. Wherefore, if before the enmities and dissensions a greeting passed between them, after the quarrel or the enmities the common signs of benevolence ought to persevere. And although in some places greeting and address are not common signs of benevolence, they are nevertheless such among friends, kinsmen, blood-relations, companions, and associates of the same body, college, and community. And then, if enmity arises, the said common signs are not to be suspended. Yet those who omit these signs are not straightway to be condemned of grave fault; but the circumstances must be regarded, especially if scandal arise from it, and if the omission of the signs proceed from internal hatred. For often greeting and other signs of benevolence are omitted not for the sake of hatred, but from a certain shamefacedness or from meanness of spirit. Sometimes neither party has that fortitude of soul as to be willing to be the first to exhibit such signs. These signs fall under the precept when they are opportune for placating an enemy and reconciling minds boiling with hatred. To return the greeting of one who greets you is a duty, which cannot be neglected with deliberate mind without grave fault. Everyone desirous of his own salvation ought to be liberal in rendering these signs. Never is the omission of greeting and of address licit for the sake of hatred. But that such signs can be omitted by a Superior for the sake of punishment, the Theologians commonly teach — when such an omission is judged opportune for the amendment of the enemy, or when the offense is public and very enormous, as a sign of detestation. Fathers, Superiors, and masters can rightly suspend these signs in punishment of offending members of their household, provided hatred be absent. Many circumstances also excuse from grave fault the omission of such signs — for instance, inadvertence, brevity of time, parvity of matter, gravity of grief, and things of that sort. Hence they excuse a noble Matron if she does not return the greeting of her husband's murderer, on account of the bitterness of her grief. Yet the circumstances must be regarded.

V. Question III. Is one who has been offended bound to exhibit signs of love to the offender who asks for peace? Answer. A Christian man cannot deny signs of love to an offender asking pardon — common signs, I say; but special signs of benevolence, just as no one is bound to exhibit them even to those who are not enemies, much less does he owe them to enemies. The circumstances must nevertheless be regarded — of avoiding scandal, or of procuring spiritual salvation, or of laying aside hatred: for if these testimonies of benevolence were fitting means for gaining a brother's soul, then they would have to be exhibited.

VI. He who has unjustly injured another is bound, by the title of justice, to ask pardon and to exhibit satisfaction to the one offended. A manner, however, must be observed. When a quarrel and dissension happen between two equals, he who injured first ought first to ask pardon and to offer signs of reconciliation. If they be of unequal condition, there is need of prudence. Sometimes the reconciliation can be deferred — namely, when the offended party, stricken with excessive grief, is foreseen to be less apt for granting pardon. Sometimes also the reconciliation must be deferred until the fury cools; sometimes, finally, it must be solicited — the diversity of persons and circumstances being regarded.

VII. Question IV. Is the offended party bound not only to lay aside hatred, but also to remit satisfaction and compensation? Answer. Hatred must be laid aside forthwith — nay, must be repressed before it is kindled. But temporal damage inflicted by the offender the offended party is not bound to remit without compensation. The matter is nevertheless full of danger. Under the title of just recompense the appetite of vengeance often lies hidden. Absolutely, it is wiser to remit all things. Yet cases can occur in which it would by no means be expedient to condone satisfaction: as if the offended party be poor and suffer grave detriment; if he be a member of a community or of a family whose temporal losses cannot be repaired unless the guilty party make satisfaction; if the offender be hostile to the community. If the offender spontaneously exhibits fitting satisfaction, the offended party cannot reject it in order to exact it before a judge, as not a few contend: since, the injury being repaired and the damage compensated by the offender himself, full satisfaction has been made to all justice. Therefore, when the offended party appeals to the tribunal, he does not seek to have his injured right repaired, but to indulge vengeance and hatred.

VIII. Question V. Is it licit to rejoice over the evil of our neighbor on account of the good which thence accrues to us? Answer. Castropalao, Tamburini, Moya, and others affirm it; whose opinion has been condemned by the Church. Fr. Viva, in his commentaries on thesis 13 of Innocent XI, whittles down the proscription of the condemnation more laxly than is fair, as it seems to me. Read Tome I on the Decalogue, book 1, dissertation 5, chapter 8, number 6. Never, then, is it licit either to rejoice over, or to wish, evil to one's neighbor — and much less to oneself. Wherefore false is the doctrine of Juan de la Cruz and of Tamburini, who teach that anyone can wish death for himself, that he may escape the hardships of this life. But to sinners it is licit to desire some temporal evil, that they may come to their senses from their sins, as St. Thomas teaches on the third book, distinction 30, article 1, ad 4. Which doctrine the holy Scriptures confirm: Let all my enemies be ashamed, and be very much troubled: let them be converted and be ashamed very speedily. Psalm 6. Care must nevertheless be taken lest hatred lie hidden, and lest, under the pretext of the conversion of sinners, vengeance be fostered.

By the name of enemy is understood one who hates iniquitously, as S. Thomas notes; for one who troubles us for a just cause is not to be reckoned an enemy, even if he is so reckoned according to the opinion of the vulgar, as the Apostle said, Galat. 4: Am I become your enemy, because I tell you the truth?

The first opinion with the Master, which D. Bonaventure also reports, is that enemies are indeed necessarily to be loved when begging pardon, penitent, and prompt to make satisfaction; but that enemies formally reduplicatively are not to be loved, and that to love these is only of perfection.

Yet the true opinion is, and the common one, that enemies, as enemies, or the impious, are not to be loved; nevertheless in the state of enmity they are not to be excluded from the neighbor, loved by the elicited acts of Charity, by which we should will them the supernatural good of beatitude; not however that by imperated acts we should will them transient temporal goods, but it suffices not to rejoice in their evils, according to that, Proverb. 24: Rejoice not when thy enemy shall fall, and Eccles. 8: Be not glad over thy dead enemy. So the Holy Doctors with the Holy Fathers and Theologians commonly, as Valencia reports disp. 3. quaest. 3. p. 2. Caspensis disp. 3. sect. 2. Tannerus disp. 2 quaest. 3. dub. 1.

I assert first, that it cannot be denied without prejudice to the Faith that the precept of loving enemies exists in the Evangelical Law.

IT IS PROVED by S. Thomas, first from those places where we are commanded to love the neighbor, Deuter. 6. Matth. 22; for so S. August. notes in Psal. 118. and on Christian discipline, and serm. 59. de Tempore, and 221.

SECONDLY it is proved by S. Thomas, from the reason that Christ adduces for loving enemies: For if you love them that love you, what reward shall you have, where the Gloss: None from heaven. Then thus: Charity cannot be without reward in the heavens; but those loving friends, and not enemies, will not be rewarded in heaven: Therefore they do not have Charity. Where note that that proof has force not only as regards the love of friends and the exclusion of enemies, as if they were to be rewarded for other works, and for the state of grace, in the way that the just are to be rewarded with eternal life for saying an idle word, even if not for that word; but the force is that no reward is simply to be expected from that exclusion of enemies; for if you take only the love of friends without the exclusion of enemies, it is a meritorious act, as I shall show in the following quaest.

THEREFORE it is proved thirdly by S. Thomas, from the precept of Christ, Matth. 5: But I say to you, love your enemies. Where the Interlinear Gloss: It does not suffice not to hate.

It is PROVED fourthly by S. Thom. that what is necessary for the remission of sins is a precept; but to spare enemies, and not exclude them from the object of Charity, is so necessary: Therefore. The major is evident. The minor is proved by S. Thomas from Matth. 6: If you will forgive men their offences: your heavenly Father will also forgive you your offences. But if you will not forgive men: neither will your Father forgive you your offences. And in Matth. 18. he commands us to forgive injuries unto seventy times seven, that is, always, as D. Augustine observes; for the septenary number is the sign of universality, because in seven days the universe was created; the eleventh number is the sign of transgression, because it transgresses the tenth, in which the Decalogue, the law of Charity, is described; but seven times eleven makes seventy-seven, which is the number of universality, removing the imperfection of the former number. He infers here also a most powerful motive; for Lamech is marked out seventy-seven times of malediction in Genesi 4. Lamech signifies the humbled one; but the sin of Lamech is the sin of the whole human race; and after the fall there run out 77 generations unto the Advent of Christ, as is had in Lucae 3. Therefore he means to say that it is commanded us to remit all sins committed against us; just as Christ remitted all our sins committed against his majesty, nay more, expiated them with the blood of the Son. Whence he infers the word of the Apostle, 250: And be ye kind one to another; forgiving one another, as God hath forgiven you in Christ. D. Augustine observes this. Hence in the same cap. 18. Matth. is brought the parable of the servant, who, unwilling to forgive a small debt to his fellow-servant, when nevertheless a debt of ten thousand talents had been forgiven him — which sums to a hundred and twenty millions of gold, in the Persian reckoning — was condemned to perpetual prison.

It is PROVED fifthly by S. Thomas. The flesh is more an enemy to man than any enemy whatsoever; but no man ever hated his own flesh. Ephes. 5. Therefore.

It is PROVED sixthly by S. Thomas. Where there is the reason of the object of Charity, there also the act of Charity is to be terminated; but the object of Charity is the neighbor, insofar as he is communicable of eternal life with us, and in this all our enemies also concur; and for that reason they are neighbors, as Valencia also teaches, loco cit. Therefore.

From these many deduce that this is a precept of nature, which pressed also in the time of the old law. Therefore Exodi 23: If thou meet thy enemy's ox or his ass going astray, bring it back to him; if thou see the ass of him that hateth thee lie under a burden, thou shalt not pass by, but shalt lift him up with him; Levit. 19: Seek not revenge, nor be mindful of the injury of thy citizens.

The RATIO is taken from what is said by D. Bonaventure; for we are bound by the law of nature to love the neighbor, as is had in Deuter. 6. Matth. 22. But the enemy is also a neighbor.

However, this PRECEPT does not bind to having an act of Charity singularly toward enemies; but only generally toward all, and enemies are not to be excluded from it; so the Priest prays: memento, Domine, and of all those present; may he not exclude the enemy assisting. Similarly not from common benefits in necessity, spiritual or temporal. Moreover, to benefit enemies outside necessity is a work of counsel and of signal perfection, as D. Augustine teaches, in Enchir, cap. 73, as Caspensis notes, and I shall say in quaest. 25.

QUOAD the act, indeed, or the affect of love, it is a precept, as the same S. Augustine teaches, Lib. 1. de doctrina Christiana, cap. 22, and Tract. 8. in primam Ioan., and other Fathers with Valencia. Therefore Christ says: love your enemies, etc. that you may be the children of your Father who is in heaven; Therefore this is necessary for the filiation of adoption, without which no one enters into the inheritance of the kingdom of heaven. Whence Christ says, Matth. 5: Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. And among the doctrines and false traditions of the Pharisees was this: Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and shalt hate thy enemy. Therefore, that we may be able to enter into the kingdom of heaven, he says: Love your enemies, that you may be the children of your Father. From which it is deduced that this is necessary, and consequently a precept, as S. Thomas argues, on the second and 4th foundation. Therefore the Apostle says, Rom. 12: If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat: if he thirst, give him to drink: for, doing this, thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head — coals of Charity, surely, according to Ambrose, Augustine, Bede, and D. Thomas, not of eternal punishment, according to Chrysostom with Tannerus, disput. 2. quaest. 3. dub. 1.

You will OBJECT first, Matth. 5: You have heard that it was said to them of old: Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and shalt hate thy enemy: Therefore the ancient Law of God is kept whole, even if the enemy were hated. It is confirmed, because the moral Law is contained in the ten precepts, and in it there is no mention of loving the enemy. Therefore the Gloss on 3. Reg. 7: Hiram made a molten sea of ten cubits. The Gloss there: By the ten precepts in the law, the Lord expressed all things that we ought to do.

S. Thomas answers first that the law did not command this, but that the Pharisees deduced it by way of opposition, because in Leuit. 19. it was said: Thou shalt love thy neighbour, or as our version has it: friend; for the Hebrew רֵעַ rea signifies companion or friend; but by friend they understood a companion from the stock of Abraham and Jacob, as if the other nations were to be hated and destroyed, because it is said, Deutet. 25: Thou shalt blot out his name under heaven. Beware thou forget not, as Maldonatus glosses: But they were deceived, because, although it said certain nations were to be destroyed, yet not all; nay rather, to be loved, since they were to be joined in one wall by the corner stone, as is said in Isaie 28. Ephes. 2. Prima Petri 2. Psalm. 117. See Molanus on that place, Cornelius a Lapide, and other expositors. And so the place is interpreted in this way by the Imperfect homil. 13. in Matth., ascribed to Chrysostom, and others, whom Tostatus follows, quaest. 344. S. Thom. 3. dist. 30. art. 1. Valencia disp. 3. quaest. 3. puncto 2, where he calls it the perverse tradition of the Pharisees; and Cornelius a Lapide, observing that in the ancient law it was only permitted to kill for justice, but not to hate. For thus also the Judge kills the guilty. Therefore Caspensis num. 11. calls it the wicked interpretation of the Pharisees. So also Tannerus disp. 2. quaest. 3. dub. 1.

THEN S. Thomas answers, and with him Tannerus, that hatred was conceded, or permitted, of old to the law as regards its effects, as has been said; but not the affect of hatred; and indeed as to effect he conceded it not toward private adversaries, but toward the idolatrous Chanaanites, the warring enemies of the Church. And so those who are said to be enemies above in Exodi 23. Leuit 19. were private enemies, but friends as regards the Republic. From which it follows that it was so conceded by the law; but that Christ corrected that law and issued the new precept of the Gospel, as Legislator, and that indeed a perfect one. So with an incredible consensus nearly the ancient Fathers: Irenaeus Lib. 4. cap. 22. Tertullianus Lib. de Patientia, Clemens Alex. lib. 6. strom. Hilarius can. in Matth. 4. Epiph. in Ptolemaitas, haeresi 31. Basil. homil. in Psalm. 14. Chrysostomus homil. 16. in Matth. Auctor imperf. homil. 11. Ambrosius serm. 5. in Psalm. 118. Hieronymus epist. ad Heroniam, de Monogamia, Theophylac. and Euthym. on this place, whom Maldonatus adduces and follows, in cap. 5. Matth. num. 21. But this exposition fits better for proving that Christ came in the Gospel not only as a good messenger, but also enacted Laws as Legislator, against the heretical Pelagians, of whom Hieronymus Lib. primo, and against the sectaries of our time. Therefore he corrects the law, and wills that the name of neighbor be extended to all, since they communicate in the capacity for God and Beatitude, as Hieronymus, Augustinus, Theophylac. and others expound, with Cornelius a Lapide.

And this is the first fundamental reason of D. Bonav., by which he shows that enemies are to be loved, because according to the Law and interpretation of Christ, enemies also are included in the neighbor.

You will OBJECT secondly from the Gloss on Lucae 6: Love your enemies, which says it belongs to the perfect.

S. Thomas answers that to love with elicited affect is a precept; but with imperated works of affect, outside necessity, it belongs to perfection, and thus the Gloss speaks.

You will OBJECT thirdly. To love enemies is a thing of wonder, as the Gloss says on Psalm. 118: Reuela oculos meos; et considerabo mirabilia de lege tua.

S. Thomas answers that to love enemies belongs among the marvels which the world admires as most arduous to be commanded by Divine law; yet they can be done with the aid of grace and Charity, and with these marvels the Gloss includes loving enemies, but not with miracles, which are of grace freely given.

You will OBJECT fourthly from D. Ambrose with the Master dist. 29: it suffices not to hate the enemy.

S. Thomas answers that that authority is truncated, for he says: it suffices, if we love simply, and do not hate.

S. Thomas hands down remedies for hatred, de profectu religiosi, cap. 29, namely, to fear the vengeance of God, who does not remit the sins of him who hates, Matth. 18. To overcome evil by good, Rom. 12. See S. Thomas.

The Seraphic Doctor admonishes that these two loves can be taken in two ways. First as they proceed from different habits, of which one renders one capable only of loving friends; the other, however, is extended also to enemies. In this way this second habit is more perfect, as Augustine says in the Enchiridion, chapter 73. But if we compare these acts, as proceeding from the same Charity, thus in a certain way they are equal as to substantial merit; as to the vigor of the acts, however, and the accidental reward, the motion of love toward friends exceeds the other as to fervor and frequency. As to difficulty, however, the motion of love toward enemies is purer and more difficult.

SIMPLY speaking, however, the motion of love toward friends is probably better, by reason of the object, which is better and more closely joined to oneself and to God; whence it is a greater sin to hate a friend, as D. Thomas also teaches, article 7, and the Theologians commonly, as Valencia relates, disp. 3, question 5, point 3, against Durandus, disp. 30, question 2.

I ASSERT first, probably, with this opinion, that the love of friends is more perfect.

IT IS PROVED by the Seraphic Doctor, first, from D. Ambrose, as related, question 30. He answers, however, that Ambrose is not speaking of degrees of perfection, but of obligation.

SECOND, because the love of friends is more like the love of God, who loves those who love him, as is had in Prov. 8. Nevertheless he answers that the Charity of God toward us is commended more [toward us] as enemies, Rom. 5.

THIRD, because it is more fervent and more frequent. He answers, however, that it is true, given an equality of difficulty.

FOURTH, because it has more of equity. He answers, however, that it is more equitable by the exigency of merits, not on the part of the one loving.

FIFTH, because thus a man ought to exercise himself more in the love of an enemy, if this were more perfect. He answers, however, that this is true as to exercise, not by reason of duty.

He asserts second, that it is probable that love of enemies is also more perfect.

IT IS PROVED by the Seraphic Doctor, first, from Matt.: If you love those who love you, what reward shall you have? He answers, however, that this is true with enemies excluded, who are commanded to be loved.

SECOND. To love enemies is a precept of the Gospel, Matt. 7: But I say to you: love your enemies: Therefore it is of greater perfection. He answers that this is true as to difficulty; by reason, however, of the good, it is better to love a friend.

THIRD, where there is greater victory, there is greater virtue, which is concerned with difficult things. He answers that this is true, other things being equal; but love of friends is better from the subject.

FOURTH: Where love is purer, separated from the flesh, there is greater perfection. The Seraphic Doctor answers in the same way, if other things are equal, which here they are not. From these things this opinion is left probable on either side.

John Smith, a wealthy and prominent Catholic, accuses himself in Confession of being on very bad terms with one of his children. It appears that one of Mr. Smith's sons, a young man of rather unsteady habits, married, over a year ago, a vaudeville actress, anon-Catholic, and from all accounts a young woman of Bohemian antecedents and proclivities. As Mr. Smith and his whole family were very much opposed to this marriage, and did all in their power to stop it, but to no purpose, they feel very much grieved by it, and refuse to have anything to do with the young man or his wife. Mr. Smith has cut the young man off in his will, has forbidden him his house, recently refused to allow him to be present at the parents' golden wedding, although all the other relatives were present; refuses to recognize the young man either in public or in private, to return his salutations or to permit any advances to be made toward a reconciliation, either by the young man himself, or by his friends.

Quaeritur: Is Mr. Smith's conduct justifiable before God, or is it sinful?

Principles: This case comes under the heading "de amore inimicorum." The law of charity imposes a twofold obligation on us in regard to our enemy. First, we must not wish him evil; second, we must wish him well.

First: We must not wish our enemy evil; that is, we must not repay evil with evil, nor cherish a spirit of revenge toward him. We must pardon the personal offense when requested, not always immediately. Sometimes there may be just cause for deferring pardon in order to manifest the pain we suffer by reason of the offense. Sometimes, even, we may be obliged to make the first advance toward a reconciliation, to prevent scandal or to save our enemy from sin, when we can do so without much trouble to ourselves.

Second: We must wish our enemy well; that is, we must include him in our prayers. We must succor him in his needs, as we would any one else. And if we exercise charity indiscriminately toward a large number, we must not exclude our enemy, for this would be a mark of revenge; and if special ties of blood, etc., unite us, we are bound to give such evidence of good will toward our enemy as we give to others who are bound to us by the same ties. But special marks of friendship that we owe to no one in particular, either by reason of their personal condition or the customs of the country, we are not obliged to show to our enemy.

Here we must remark that it is one thing to harbor a spirit of revenge, and quite another thing to desire the reparation of outraged rights. It is perfectly legitimate to desire the restoration of our good name, or the restitution of our stolen property, and to take action at law to obtain them; yes, even to take criminal proceedings against the offender to have him punished. If this is done out of love for justice, it is quite in keeping with the law of charity. If it is done from a spirit of revenge, it is, of course, sinful. Once satisfaction has been made, we must forgive the personal offense. Until satisfaction has been made, this is not required of us.

Regarding the question of saluting those who have grievously offended us, the doctrine of St. Ligouri, Tamburini, Mazotta, and others may be summed up as follows: We are not obliged to salute those who have wrongly offended us, unless they make the first advances, unless it be question of a superior, or unless to refrain from saluting our enemy for a long time could be interpreted as a mark of hatred. But if our enemy greets us first, we are bound to greet him in return, except once or again we might be justified in refusing to recognize a greeting in order to show our feelings have been hurt. In a word, the omission of the ordinary greetings and marks of good will that pass among men must be taken, sometimes on account of circumstances, not as a sign of hatred or revenge, but as a "manifestatio justi moeroris tantum." If, therefore, on account of the circumstances, the denial for a time of the ordinary salutations and greetings must be interpreted as a manifestation of wounded feelings, and if in fact the denial proceeds from no spirit of hatred or ill will, such denial is not sinful. If, however, under the circumstances, the denial of the ordinary marks of good will must be interpreted as a sign of hatred or revenge, "pro manifestatione vindictae et inimicitiae," then such denial is sinful, even though it do not arise from feelings of hatred or revenge.

Application of principles: Mr. Smith's son had become his enemy. He had given his father just cause for feeling hurt and outraged. He had done his father and his family a grievous wrong. Although an enemy, we must not forget the special ties of blood that unite them. Was Mr. Smith's conduct toward his son justified in every instance? We must take each separate count by itself.

First, Mr. Smith cuts off his son in his will. Is this act "contra justitiam," or only "contra charitatem," or wholly blameless? Whether this cutting off of children by parents in their wills be contrary to the virtue of strict justice does not appear. Some theologians think it is; others that it is not. Fr. Genicot thinks that it is not. Fr. Lehmkuhl thinks that it is. Genicot says: “Nor would I think that a parent who without just cause favored one son over the others would sin gravely, as Lehmkuhl thinks.” (I. n. 677).

“If anyone out of hatred wished to leave his children only their lawful portion, or altogether to pass over brothers who were not in need, he would be bound under grave obligation to put aside this hatred, but only urged to leave them something more; for he is using his right” (ibid.).

Lehmkuhl thinks that where there is no "clara et justa causa," parents sin against justice in preferring some children to others (I. n. 1155).

De Lugo thinks that it is not against justice: “Therefore, a confessor ought to compel a dying person who is unwilling to leave anything to his brothers, or anything but the lawful portion to his children, to put aside hatred if perhaps he is moved by hatred or revenge, and also to urge him to provide for them; nevertheless, he ought not on that account to deny absolution to one who is unwilling, unless the need is of such a degree that he ought to assist persons so closely joined to him.”

(disp. 24. n. 175).

Mr. Smith's action, therefore, in cutting off his son, is not evidently against justice. Is it against charity? If it is prompted by hatred or revenge, it is and grievously so. If it is not prompted by hatred, but by the fear that the son may abuse his inheritance, it is not. The laws of this country leave the father free in bequeathing his goods to his children. In this case the evidence favors the father. The son's past history promises poorly for the future. The son will, in all likelihood, be the better for being disinherited. The father's act, therefore, can hardly be interpreted as evidently against charity. Still it were much wiser if the father made some provision for his son, an annual allowance that could not be abused. In regard to forbidding the young man his house, we must distinguish. If the young man has reformed or is trying to reform, Mr. Smith may forbid him his house for a time, to give expression to his outraged feelings. But a year is certainly a safe limit. The young man has a home of his own now, and no longer the same claim on his father's house. Still, to continue to refuse him admission savors of hatred and revenge, and the father must desist under pain of being denied absolution. As long as the son refuses to reform, the father is not obliged to receive him.

That Mr. Smith refused to invite the son to his golden wedding may have been simply a measure of prudence. The son's presence would very likely have caused trouble, recriminations, and perhaps a general scandal; certainly if his wife were to attend.

If, however, the young man and his wife had both turned over a new leaf, this would have been an excellent occasion for bringing about a good understanding, and unless serious difficulties were apprehended, Mr. Smith could hardly have refused them an invitation without committing sin.

The same is to be said about Mr. Smith's refusal to recognize his son in public or in private. If the son continues in an evil course, Mr. Smith may continue to give expression to his sorrow by refusing to recognize him. If the son has reformed, Mr. Smith is obliged in conscience to recognize him. He may refrain for a time, say for a few months, from recognizing the son, but to continue to do so must be interpreted in the light of hatred or revenge. And his continued refusal to return his son's greetings or to open the way for a reconciliation renders Mr. Smith unworthy of absolution. It seems evident from the case that Mr. Smith is of a stern character, and no more should be required of him than is absolutely necessary. But what is required by the law of God should be insisted on with great firmness, because a man of this character easily deceives himself by believing his conduct to be prompted by a love of righteousness and justice, whereas it is prompted by a spirit of animosity and revenge.

Case.—Margaret, a rich maiden aunt, had a special predilection for Robert, one of five nephews. She was accustomed to show this feeling in various ways, particularly by many extraordinary gifts showered upon her favorite. Recently Robert incurred the displeasure of his aunt by contracting marriage against her expressed wish. Since then she has not given any gifts, she has refused him admittance to her house, and has told his brothers that she would leave him no inheritance in her will. She has persevered in this conduct despite the efforts of her confessor. He intends to refuse her absolution in future.

Question.—Is he justified?

Answer.—All Christians are well aware of the law of charity as imposed by Christ and know its binding force. It obliges us to succor our neighbor in his necessities when we can do so—it likewise obliges us to help our enemies under the same conditions. Moreover, we are bound to show even our enemies the common signs of charity, though these may vary, and do vary with time, country, custom, etc. To neglect these common signs of charity would be a violation of the law which compels us to love our enemies. This would be a mortal or a venial sin, according to circumstances, i. e., if the matter is not serious or if some grave cause tempers the action, the sin committed would not be a grievous one. We must, therefore, examine the motive of Margaret’s aversion. If she objected to the marriage because it brought disgrace upon her family, by reason of the condition or of the lax morality of Robert’s bride, she cannot be said to have violated the law of charity. The grief that would be caused by her nephew’s miserable action would fully justify her in refusing even the common ordinary signs of affection, at least for the time being. Even if such treatment were to persist for a very long time, we do not think that under such provocation an affectionate aunt could be held to be guilty of sin. But if the motive in the case is hatred based on disobedience, then, of course, Margaret cannot justify her conduct, there would then be a clear violation of God’s great law of charity. We must add to this that her attitude would be scandalous. No obedience was due in the matter, and in the supposition no injury was done either to herself or her family, consequently no reason exists for the hatred which in the given instance is exceedingly sinful. She does no wrong in ceasing to bestow her gifts; these were gratuitous and depended on the good will of the giver; but she must show her nephew the common signs of charity. Unless she rids herself of her hatred she proves herself unworthy of absolution. However, she may have been moved by disappointment or by sentimental sensitiveness, rather than by hatred, she may have wished him to marry a bride of her own selection, or to have remained with her during her old age. Here she is free to deprive him of the customary extraordinary signs of affection. But she must give him what he is entitled to, viz., the ordinary signs, the same as she gives to his brothers, or his cousins, etc. Her attitude is unreasonable and reflects her own selfishness, giving evidence of wounded pride. Time will effect a cure, and therefore the confessor need not worry. Excluding real theological odium and scandal, he may in this last instance continue to give absolution.