Section — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
§ 2. On the extension of the precept of charity to enemies
On the extension of the precept of charity to enemies.9
Notion. By the name enemy are signified: 1. all who have actually inflicted some injury upon us and have not repaired it; 2. those who have hatred for us; 3. those from whom we turn away on account of a just antipathy or some other just motive. - Enmity is directly opposed to the love of benevolence and is accustomed to arise from hatred and envy.
9 On the dilection of enemies several have written special little works, e.g. Mich. Waldmann, Die Feindesliebe in der antiken Welt u. im Christentum (Vienna 1902, Mayer); Steph. Randlinger, Die Feindesliebe nach natürlichem und positivem Sittengesetz (Paderborn 1906, Schoningh); J. Neeb, De dilectione inimicorum tentamen historico-morale, Mainz 1791.
571. Proposition. Enemies are to be loved from charity, not indeed insofar as they are enemies, but insofar as they are men.
Thus positive divine law establishes, and it is founded upon natural law.
That from natural law itself we are bound in some way to love our enemies is drawn from this, that an enemy is a creature and image of God just as we are, belonging to human society. But natural law commands that the members of the same society love one another, because otherwise the good of society is harmed by quarrels and acts of revenge arising. But since the obligation of loving enemies does not pertain to the first principles of natural law, and moreover in some cases can be so difficult to observe, it is easily understood why ancient and modern pagans scarcely knew and exercised true love of enemies.10
Positive divine law already in the Old Testament prescribed the dilection of enemies: "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart, but publicly reprove him, lest thou have sin upon him. Thou shalt not seek revenge, nor shalt thou remember the injury of thy citizens."11 "If thy enemy shall hunger, feed him; if he shall thirst, give him water to drink; for thou shalt heap coals upon his head, and the Lord will repay thee."12 But in the New Testament the precept of loving enemies is more clearly expressed and explained: "You have heard that it was said: Thou shalt love thy neighbor and shalt have hatred for thy enemy. But I say to you: Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who persecute and calumniate you."13 According to the false interpretation of the Pharisees it was licit to have hatred for an enemy and also by private authority to exercise the right of retaliation; but Christ, expressly rejecting this interpretation, commanded (and not merely counseled) sincere love toward enemies. The same Savior taught us to pray: "Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors";14 and He Himself, hanging on the cross, prayed for His enemies.
10 Among the ancient philosophers who not only taught but also exercised the dilection of enemies, Socrates is easily the chief, whose aorgesia (meekness) is praised and truly heroic (cf. Plato, Crito 49). His axiom was: It is better to suffer injury than to do injury. Cicero (De Offic. 1, 25, 88) says: "Nor indeed are those to be heard who will think that one must be gravely angry at enemies and will judge this to belong to a magnanimous and brave man; for nothing is more praiseworthy, nothing more worthy of a great and distinguished man, than placability and clemency." Yet elsewhere he says: "It is fine to hate someone freely" (Ad Att. 13, 49, 2). Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius Antoninus spoke well about the dilection of enemies, but perhaps were already under the influence of Christian truth. See Randlinger, l.c. 428 sqq.
11 Lev. 19, 17 sq.
12 Prov. 25, 21 sq. Cf. Tob. 4, 16; Job 31, 29 sq. Beautiful examples of the dilection of enemies are provided by Joseph, sold by his brothers and afterward doing good to them; David in the cave of Engaddi toward Saul and toward his wicked son Absalom. Likewise Job, Moses, Aaron, Samuel. In the Old Testament hatred of enemies seems not once, in appearance, to have been commanded or at least permitted. Thus in many Psalms (e.g. 34, 4-8; 54, 10, 16-24; 68, 23-29; 108, 6-20; 136, 7-9) many evils are wished to enemies; but all these things are easily explained if we observe that the Israelites wished these evils, or even inflicted them, upon enemies as a just punishment for crimes committed against God (cf. Randlinger, l.c. 90 sqq.).
13 Matth. 5, 43 sq.
14 Matth. 6, 12.
572. Note. a) We are not indeed commanded to love enemies because they are enemies, but although they are enemies; b) Next, we are neither bound nor can we licitly love the vices and defects of an enemy, because this would be to approve some evil; c) Finally, we are not bound to love enemies with sensible affection, as we love a friend, because this charity toward enemies is supernatural and spiritual, and consequently is not perceived in such a way by our sensitive part. The Angelic Doctor writes to the point: "Dilection of enemies can be considered in three ways: in one way indeed, that enemies be loved insofar as they are enemies; and this is perverse and repugnant to charity, because this is to love the evil of another. In another way the dilection of enemies can be taken as to nature, but in the universal; and thus the dilection of enemies is of the necessity of charity, namely, that someone loving God and neighbor not exclude his enemies from that generality of the dilection of neighbor. In a third way the dilection of enemies can be considered in the particular, namely, that someone be moved in the particular by a movement of dilection toward an enemy; and this is not of the necessity of charity absolutely, because neither is to be moved by a movement of dilection in the particular toward any individual men whatsoever of the necessity of charity, since this would be impossible. Yet it is of the necessity of charity according to preparation of soul, namely, that man have his soul prepared for this, that he would love an enemy in the particular if necessity occurred."15
From what has been said it clearly appears that there exists a grave precept of loving enemies with true charity; and this precept indeed embraces the following particular obligations:
Every hatred of enmity and every desire of revenge must be put away;
At least common signs of dilection are to be shown to an enemy;
Reconciliation is to be sought.
15 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 25, a. 8.
573. 1. Every hatred of enmity and every desire of revenge must be put away, since such hatred is directly opposed to the virtue of charity, and consequently is a mortal sin from its genus. Hatred of enmity becomes a light sin not only on account of the imperfection of the act, i.e. on account of semi-full knowledge and volition, but also from smallness of matter, e.g. if someone wishes some small evil to another. St. John vehemently reprehends hatred, saying: "But he who hates his brother is in darkness, and walks in darkness, and does not know where he is going, because the darkness has blinded his eyes."16 It is remarkable in what destructive manner hatred blinds the mind, so that an equitable judgment is almost impossible. The same apostle says: "He who does not love remains in death. Everyone who hates his brother is a murderer, and you know that no murderer has eternal life remaining in himself."17
Corollaries. a) Because hatred of enmity is intrinsically evil, it is not licit to wish some evil to neighbor as it is evil; but it is licit to wish some temporal evil (not spiritual) to someone, whether on account of his amendment, or on account of the good of the community, or even on account of the good of another person deservedly more loved.18 Care must be taken, however, lest the order of charity be harmed. Thus, e.g., it is licit to wish the death of a heresiarch who perverts many; it is licit to wish illness to an unmanageable young man, so that he may recover his senses from his vices; it is licit to desire grave temporal punishment for parents who educate their children very badly.19
b) If it is not licit to wish evil to an enemy, a fortiori it is not licit to imprecate evil upon him, or to curse him. Cursing (Verfluchung) is from its genus a mortal sin, as directly opposed to the virtue of charity. Yet in practice it is often a venial sin, not only on account of smallness of matter, but chiefly on account of the imperfection of the act. For such imprecations and curses often do not proceed from a serious soul, but are signs of momentary anger. Nevertheless they are to be carefully avoided on account of scandal and other depraved consequences.
16 1 Jo. 2, 11.
17 1 Jo. 3, 14 sq.
18 Cf. St. Thomas, Comm. in Rom. 12, lect. 5; Quaest. disp. de carit. a. 8 ad 2.
19 Cf. what was said above, n. 405, concerning desire of evil on account of a good effect.
574. c) To take revenge (Rache, vengeance) upon an enemy is never licit, unless it is a just punishment of the delinquent and a licit protection of oneself. The reason is that revenge is usually accustomed to arise from hatred, and fraternal charity is thereby harmed. But if "the intention of the one taking vengeance is borne principally toward some good which is reached through the punishment of the one sinning, for example, toward the amendment of the one sinning, or at least toward his restraint and the quiet of others, and toward the preservation of justice and the honor of God, vindication can be licit, if the other due circumstances are observed."20 The almost only case in which in practice it is licit to take revenge by private authority is moderate punishment of a delinquent caught in the very act. Thus, e.g., if someone catches in his garden a boy secretly taking away apples, he could licitly give him a few slaps as punishment for the theft, provided, however, that this punishment is not immoderate, nor prohibited by civil law. The reason is that revenge of this sort serves both the good of the boy and the licit defense of one's own goods. But I say: it is licit to take revenge upon a delinquent caught in the very act; for if the offense has already been committed for some time, then a private man cannot by his own authority inflict punishment, unless nevertheless the legitimate judge cannot or will not establish due satisfaction.
You ask: Is it licit to seek public punishment of an enemy from zeal for justice from a legitimate judge? St. Alphonsus21 responds: "In practice I have never dared to absolve any of those who said that they had spared their enemies, but had wished justice to have its place by taking notice of the wicked; for I could never persuade myself that persons of this sort, who sometimes come burdened with sins, love the common good and justice so much (not indeed against other delinquents, but against their own offender), that they are cleansed from every stain of revenge; hence the Doctors say in these persons: it is very easy for their love toward justice to be a colored pretext for covering their own desire of revenge." This opinion seems to be rather strict, if it is understood in the sense that sacramental absolution may never be given to him who wills reparation of injury through the aid of a legitimate judge. Certainly ordinarily it is a mark of more perfect virtue to forgive an enemy the injury inflicted; but if the desire of disordered revenge and every hatred of enmity is absent, then it does not seem to be sinful to go to a judge to seek reparation for an injury endured, whether real or personal. For if such injuries always remained unpunished, arrogant men would grow still more insolent; but peaceful and just men would be despised as cowards. Nevertheless, it is rather rarely expedient to go to a judge on account of offenses received, because quarrels and endless enmities are accustomed to arise from this. But especially let clerics guard as far as they can, lest they bring laymen, or, what is worse, other clerics, before a civil tribunal on account of reparation for an offense. For almost always from such a mode of acting there arises great scandal among the people. Moreover, in this way the privilege of forum granted to clerics is harmed, which still in our times is in force, unless in some regions it has been abolished on account of concordats or legitimate customs.22 The almost only exception is if the honor of a cleric is gravely harmed in public newspapers; for then silence observed by a cleric could easily be thought by the common people to be as it were a tacit confession of the crime; and consequently the cleric would be bound, in order to save his own honor and that of his clerical state, to summon the calumniator into court, after first consulting the bishop or another competent superior.
20 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 108, a. 1.
21 Homo Ap. tract. 4, 27. De dilectione inimicorum.
22 On the penalties imposed against those who violate the privilege of forum, see Cod. iur. can. c. 2341.
575. 2. At least common signs of dilection are to be shown to an enemy. And this indeed not only externally, but also with internal affection. But per se no obligation exists of showing even special signs of dilection to an enemy. Thus all theologians teach.23
A) Common signs of dilection are those which we are accustomed to show to all men in similar circumstances, e.g. to return a greeting to one greeting, to answer one asking, not to exclude from common benefits, etc.; but special signs are those which we show only to friends or to those joined to us by some necessity, e.g. to converse familiarly, to visit the sick, etc. As a practical and rather easy rule for discerning common signs from special signs, this can be held: As often as from the denial of some sign or benefit any prudent and equitable man would at once conclude that enmity is present, then such a sign is common and is to be shown even to an enemy. Otherwise sin arises, whose gravity is to be measured: a) from the gravity of the hatred of the one denying this sign of charity; b) from the gravity of the scandal arising. But if common signs of dilection are denied not from hatred and enmity, but either as a just punishment or for the amendment of the delinquent, then it is not sin, but a good work and just vindication.
23 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 25, a. 9.
576. Resolves. a) A father does not sin, but acts well, if, on account of a grave offense committed, for some time he neither looks at nor speaks to his son, in order to show the gravity of the offense inflicted upon him, or to inflict a just punishment, or to procure the amendment of the guilty one.
b) On the contrary, ordinarily it is sin if two students of the same seminary, or two religious of the same convent, who until now have conversed familiarly, now no longer wish to speak to or greet one another, since this is usually from hatred or from enmity and causes scandal.
c) Likewise it is sin if someone excludes an enemy from common alms, from common commerce, etc. As to prayer for enemies, St. Thomas notes:24 "In the same way in which we are bound to love enemies, we are bound to pray for enemies.... It is of necessity that in our common prayers, which we make for others, we not exclude enemies. But that we pray specially for them is of perfection, not of necessity, except in some special case [of grave necessity]." It belongs to a prudent confessor sometimes also to enjoin a special prayer for an enemy, in order to end an existing enmity more quickly.
d) It is specially asked whether it is necessary to greet an enemy coming toward one. I answer: 1. Anticipated greeting is owed to no one except certain persons constituted in greater dignity. Hence if an enemy is of equal condition as I am, I am not bound to greet him first. 2. Greeting is necessary if scandal would arise from its denial, or any prudent man would at once conclude that this denial arises solely from hatred or enmity. Hence in those places where there is a custom of greeting all who come toward one, even an enemy is to be greeted; but not in other places where such a custom does not exist. 3. The return of a greeting is owed to all men from affability, and consequently even to an enemy.
B) Special signs of dilection are not owed per se to an enemy. The reason is that otherwise the enemy would be of better condition and would have greater rights toward us than other common neighbors (to whom we also do not owe special signs of dilection); which indeed is absurd. Hence we are not bound, e.g., to invite an enemy to table, to receive him as a guest, etc. Per accidens even special signs of dilection are to be shown to an enemy, namely, when he is in necessity. But one would more rightly say that then those signs are no longer special, but common, i.e. owed to all neighbors. Thus, e.g., if a sick enemy would incur danger of death unless he were received as a guest by us, then certainly he would have to be received, although to receive someone as a guest in ordinary cases is a special and not a common sign of dilection, as was said above. A Christian man acts rightly toward an enemy if he treats him as another non-enemy neighbor who is of the same state and condition. - It is not indeed necessary, but very meritorious, to show even special signs of dilection to an enemy; for thus burning coals are heaped upon his head.
24 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 83, a. 8; cf. 3, dist. 30, q. 1, a. 2.
577. 3. Reconciliation with an enemy is not only not to be impeded, but also, according to one's powers, to be facilitated.
As to the order to be followed in making reconciliation, regularly the one who offended another, or, if there are offenses on each side (as commonly happens), he who offended first or more gravely, is bound first to seek reconciliation. For Christ says: "If therefore thou offerest thy gift at the altar, and there shalt remember that thy brother has something against thee [i.e. a just complaint], leave thy gift there before the altar, and go first to be reconciled to thy brother; and then, coming, thou shalt offer thy gift."25 Therefore the offender is bound either to seek pardon26 or in another suitable way to make peace with the offended person, insofar, however, as this is morally possible; for the offender is not bound to satisfy the offended person a) if from this he must suffer a much graver inconvenience than the offense inflicted was, b) if he foresees that the other will not consent to the offered reconciliation or satisfaction. But in practice, since not rarely each person is persuaded that he was first or more gravely harmed, the confessor ought to persuade each one to begin the reconciliation.
Even he who certainly was first and more gravely harmed ought to forgive the enemy the offense received, i.e. to put away aversion, indignation, and hatred, but he is not bound freely to remit the injury and perhaps the damage received; for he can demand suitable satisfaction and restitution for damage. If before the offense there existed a special friendship between the offender and the offended person, it is not required that even this friendship be restored through reconciliation, unless nevertheless some scandal would arise otherwise. For to avoid scandal, or if the enemy is in necessity, not only common signs but also special signs of love are to be shown to him, as was already said.
25 Matth. 5, 23 sq.
26 It is not strictly necessary to seek pardon from the offended person, unless this is the only means for obtaining full reconciliation. This indeed is accustomed to happen: a) if the offense was very grave, b) if the offended person is a legitimate superior.
578. Scholion. On the manner of treating sins of hatred in the confessional. A penitent who refuses to put away grave hatred of neighbor is not worthy of absolution. This is clear of itself, for he refuses to fulfill a grave obligation. But even if there is question of light hatred (especially if it is found in religious or pious persons), the confessor should insist strongly and at the same time prudently that such hatred be put away. For almost nothing harms the spiritual life and the influence of grace so gravely as hatred of neighbor, or even the mere defect of love toward neighbor. But let the confessor use great prudence if the penitent confesses hatred against an enemy. Before all things let him bring forward motives of forgiveness ("Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors"; the examples of Christ in the passion, St. Stephen in martyrdom, St. John Gualbert, etc.); but external reconciliation, or explicit prayer for the enemy, is not always to be strictly required, since the penitent, otherwise disposed to forgive interiorly, not rarely refuses exterior and manifest reconciliation on account of its great difficulties. In these cases it suffices that the confessor require a) interior and sincere forgiveness, b) removal of every scandal.