Chapter II: Corollaries on the Love of Enemies

Utility. - Because the right estimation of cases depends so much on various circumstances that the very responses of approved authors must be adapted to the circumstances and cannot be observed literally, it is greatly necessary to determine the principles themselves from which, in this matter, we can prudently admonish sinners, exhort the timorous to better things, and at the same time free them from scruples.

Who Is an Enemy, and How Manifold. — He is someone's enemy by affection who pursues him with hatred or evil aversion; or by effect who has unjustly injured him in person, reputation, honor, or goods. Christ formally taught us that enemies are to be loved: "Love your enemies" (St. Matt. 5, 43 s.; Luke 6, 27 s.); and this is demonstrated by reason itself, since they are neighbors.

But an enemy who is actually such because of present hatred or offense is to be distinguished from one who was such. This latter again can be held by a present obligation of reparation, or have no office of this kind.

I. By that precept there is prohibited:

1. Hatred of enmity. Hatred says an aversion of soul which is contrary to the good of another (Cf. 1, 2, q. 29, art. 1 and 2). There is hatred of enmity when someone wills evil to another, in himself or in his goods, insofar as it is evil to him: and this is mortal from its genus. Hatred of abomination does not affect the person himself but his malice. By that hatred we turn away from a person not as such but insofar as he is blameworthy: thus, for example, the Psalmist praises himself because he has had hatred for the wicked, - or insofar as he is harmful to us. And often it signifies that sensible horror or repugnance which we experience when an enemy is seen or heard. Such hatred, conceived concerning enemies of religion or of the state, is plainly honorable; concerning those who are hostile to us, it is for the most part mixed with venial fault, just as it is also per se venial not to overcome or subdue that sensible horror.

2. Illicit vindication. This principally intends the evil of the offender and rests in that evil. Licit vindication, on the contrary, is that which, the due circumstances being observed, pursues through punishment either the amendment of the sinner, or his restraint and the quiet of others, or the preservation of justice and the honor of God. Much more is it right to demand satisfaction for damage. Indeed, strictly speaking, we are not forbidden not to accept an offered satisfaction and to pursue a juridical action for injuries. Yet this is dangerous: then one easily yields to evil vengeance, and if a very grave penalty awaits the enemy, without proportionate inconvenience of one's own or of others, the fault will easily have been grave against charity.

Therefore the confessor should instruct the penitent concerning licit and illicit vengeance; and propose to him that he be willing to ponder the matter as if it were not his own case but that of some third person.

3. The exclusion of an enemy from common prayers, for example, from the Lord's prayer; and also, at least if he has ceased from injury and is prepared to make due reparation, from the common signs of love, such as are common alms, returning a greeting, response to his words, sale of exposed merchandise. Wherefore they judge that it is mortal from its genus if someone invites all relatives, with only the enemy excepted; or greets all persons met from the neighborhood or college, only the enemy excluded. It is supposed, as is clear, that the enemy has ceased from injury.

Yet he to whom the right of punishing belongs, as to a father, can deny these for a time, for correction. A denial is also excused which does not manifest hatred, but rather just sorrow because of a recent or atrocious and infamous injury. Conversation from which you fear a greater evil can also be omitted, provided that interiorly you love, and decline or repair scandal among others. Nor are we forbidden, in lighter cases and for a just cause, for example, to blunt audacity, to take a legitimate vindication which can scarcely be sought from a judge.

The sin will be light if either a trifling cause shows that there is no question of grave hatred, as if two nuns, because of a moderate quarrel, break off communication for some days; - or if the distance of the persons removes the gravity of the matter: as if a much greater person does not greet an inferior.

In a few words, the denial of common signs is grave when it proceeds from grave hatred, or gravely offends the enemy, or is a scandal to others. Cf. Noldin, II, 83. And attention is to be given to this more than to material descriptions of the signs of charity which cannot be denied under grave obligation: if the matter bears another interpretation than that of hatred, it will not be grave; but that interpretation is one thing in one place and time, another elsewhere.

For it must be avoided that we pronounce too absolutely concerning concrete cases the responses even of most approved authors, who wrote in another time or region. We shall easily concede that their oracles were true for the customs and circumstances which they contemplated; but for that reason they cannot prudently be inculcated today without a new examination. Today, for example, in many places, he who merely has omitted signs of love, but at the same time abstains from injuries and detractions, and does not refuse to fulfill strict offices of charity, if any arise from necessity, seems for the most part to have to be excused from grave guilt.

For where they distinguish a certain alienation of affection or coldness from true mutual hatred, mortal enmities are rare. And the breaking off of commerce or association, whether because of a light cause of quarrel, or because of the permanent state of an insoluble controversy, or because of an unrepaired offense, or because of a relaxed family bond, by which it comes about that not even among those rather closely joined does a custom of frequent communication always exist, is explained otherwise than by grave hatred.

— Flight by which someone avoids an enemy in order to sadden him must also be well distinguished from flight which is commanded by some remaining aversion without desire of vengeance. The former alone demonstrates hatred of enmity; the latter, if it happens without reason, will indeed be sinful, but, scandal being excluded, does not seem gravely culpable. Antipathy is one thing, hatred another; voluntary hatred is one thing, horror and anger which some experience when the offender is seen or remembered is another, whence they say that they indeed wish to forgive but cannot forget the matter, speak to the man, etc. Such persons, although they are not always to be believed when they say that they lack hatred, can be absolved if the confessor detects that those movements of anger proceed from no deliberate malevolence (Ballerini-Palmieri, II, 180).

— In confession, he who, not by a merely verbal imprecation, which often is nothing but anger, but truly from hatred has willed a grave evil to an enemy, for the most part will not have to declare the species of the evil wished, because he wished it under the confused and common notion of evil, without a special affection flowing down to this or that evil. Lugo, Poen., 16,260.

II. Not to hate an enemy does not suffice for charity; but by the precept of charity we are ordered to love an enemy with interior and exterior love, yet common, not special, unless the spiritual necessity of the enemy or scandal which cannot otherwise be avoided (for example, by a declaration) demands more. But common love is to be estimated with consideration given to the quality and necessity of persons, so that what is common among brothers would be special among strangers. Therefore there must be preserved in the heart the affection which we ought to have commonly toward every neighbor (cf. n. 80) and particularly toward those joined by a greater bond of necessity, together with a soul prompt for reconciliation, if those things are offered by the other which are justly demanded from him; that affection also must be sufficiently manifested, yet prudently, unless just causes dispense; and the offices of charity must be performed which either nearness or necessity imposes.

— To one asking pardon, this is per se to be given; and, lest you betray hatred, you must manifest this even by external signs: you are not bound to grant pardon immediately after the offense has been inflicted, because that thing is violent and above human frailty. Nor, after reconciliation, is the more intimate and spontaneous familiarity which previously existed to be restored. Yet to him who exhibits the offices of peculiar friendship, it is fitting to return similar ones. St. Thomas, in 1. 2 Sent., d. 30, q. 1, art. 2, ad 5.

— The offender must be the first to attempt reconciliation; or, if the offense has been mutual, he who has offended more gravely, or who has offended first. But, unless the matter has been manifest, it is better, yet prudently, to inculcate to each that he procure reconciliation, which otherwise would never be, because of the blinded mind of both, by which one ascribes the fault to the other.

Reconciliation requires that pardon be sought, and indeed per se formally. The one offended sometimes reasonably demands this. Yet often an implicit, virtual petition supplies, which is contained in a gift, an undue service. This is admitted if the offender far surpasses the other in dignity or state; if the one offended does not care for a formal petition for pardon; if full satisfaction has been given in another way. Yet not rarely a Superior who is not ashamed to ask pardon gains for himself confidence and love, nor does he derogate from his authority.

Lest matters become worse, if the injured person does not seem likely to grant pardon, a more opportune time for seeking pardon can prudently be awaited.

Let the confessor beware lest ever, because of an occult delict which would thus be manifested, he impose a formal petition for pardon; and even where the obligation is certain, often he will prudently be silent, lest, without hope of fruit, he disturb good faith. He can merely declare that obligation, but not impose it as a penance, lest he violate the sacramental seal.

Evangelical Persuasion. — Thus far we have tried to declare what minimum must be held in this matter. But the evangelical spirit will persuade both the ministers of Christ and the faithful to a more perfect manner of acting. Grieving over the lawsuits of the Corinthians, the Apostle, from St. Matthew 5, 39; St. Luke 6, 29, wrote these things without hesitation (1 Cor. 6, 7): "Now indeed there is plainly a fault among you, that you have lawsuits among yourselves. Why do you not rather take wrong? Why do you not rather suffer fraud?" In the Epistle to the Romans 12, 17; and to the Hebrews 12, 14, he commended these things: "If it can be, as much as is in you, having peace with all men..."; "Follow peace with all men." Indeed he wished that, by his beneficent action, the disciple of Christ should heap "coals of fire" "upon the head of" his enemy, that is, should so overcome evil in good that the enemy, suffused with shame, as if impatient of delay, could not deny love.

Instructed by these documents, the preacher of the Gospel both openly and privately will disapprove those Catholic families which, because of a contention over inheritance, so easily give a little edifying example of division and separation; he will also demonstrate the temporal detriments of discords; he will admonish how the first victim of hatred is the very one who fosters hatred: for that affection indeed nourishes pride, but takes peace and happiness from the heart.

But the faithful also will be skillful in avoiding dissensions, little solicitous about vain honor; ready and prompt in forgiving injuries, so that they may be among the peacemakers who, with the greatest edification of all, will be called sons of God.

They will also be stimulated by this consideration: that, since no exercise is seen to be more free from self-love, there is none which is shown more certainly to pertain to the theological virtue of charity. We love relatives, benefactors, and friends even on account of our own advantage or solace; we love enemies only on account of God.

— 1. Someone's enemy by affection is he who pursues him with hatred or evil aversion; by effect, he who has injured him unjustly. He can actually be such or have been such, whether an obligation of reparation remains, or only evil aversion survives.

2. We must love enemies: Christ openly taught this, and they are neighbors. Wherefore we are prohibited from every hatred of enmity, by which we will another's evil as such; from illicit vindication, and from positive exclusion of an enemy from common prayers; indeed, unless a just cause excuses, from common signs of love. The sin is grave in its genus, but admits lightness of matter; and the mere omission of the signification of love will rarely today be able to be condemned as grave. Besides, both by common affection and by effect, the positive offices of charity toward an enemy are to be fulfilled.

Hatred of abomination is to be distinguished from hatred of enmity: the former does not affect the person but his malice; a certain aversion which is observed in sense is also to be separated from hatred.

3. The species of evil which someone has truly wished for an enemy will often not have to be declared, since it rather was willed under the generic account of evil.

4. To one asking pardon, pardon is per se to be given, at least after no excessive delay; although more intimate familiarity per se, if it was spontaneous, is not to be restored.

He who alone, or more gravely, or first, has offended must be the first to attempt reconciliation through pardon sought formally or at least virtually. Often the attempt will have to be inculcated to both; yet sometimes it is prudently deferred, and is to be imposed by the confessor only cautiously.

5. The evangelical spirit will persuade a more perfect manner of acting both to Christ's ministers and to the faithful.