Numerical distinction of sins

A threefold distinction of sins must be noted: theological, specific, and numerical. Sins differ theologically from a diverse relation to the ultimate end; specifically, from the moral object into which the human will is borne; numerically, from the moral multiplicity of acts and objects. But these things must now be explained more accurately.

304. State of the question. That several sins specifically distinct, e.g. blasphemy and theft, are also several in number is manifest; and if one sinful act injures several diverse virtues, by that very fact it also contains several malices which are equivalent to sins several in number. Indeed he who steals a sacred thing commits two sins distinct in species and virtually also in number, one against justice and the other against religion. But the question concerning the numerical distinction of sins consists in this: whether and when sins of the same species, e.g. several thefts, several desires of fornicating, are distinguished according to number.

The numerical distinction of sins is taken from a twofold source: a. from plurality of acts; b. from plurality of objects of the same act. Nevertheless there are not as many sins as there are numbered acts, nor does an act which turns about several objects in number contain as many sins as there are numbered objects of the same act. Rather: a. with respect to acts, there are as many sins distinct in number as there are acts morally distinct; b. with respect to objects, there are as many sins distinct in number as there are objects of the same act morally distinct. Therefore first it must be declared in how many ways it can happen that acts physically distinct are joined by moral union and must morally be considered as one act, and how several objects which are reached by one act are morally united; then the rules must be explained according to which one must discern concerning the numerical distinction of sins taken both from plurality of acts and from plurality of objects.

305. Several acts physically are morally united: 1. From the intention of the agent, by which several acts, whether internal or external, are ordered as means to one end: for various actions which are directed to the same act as to an end constitute one action according to moral estimation, even if there is a rather long interval of time between the individual acts.

a. He who proposes to kill an enemy and for this reason conceives acts of revenge, prepares weapons, takes the road, and finally kills him, commits one sin, even if for many days he sought the enemy and several times repeated the purpose of killing, because all these acts are morally united in the same end toward which they tend. Therefore in confession it suffices to say: I killed a man.

b. He who approaches a woman with the intention of fornicating, first places touches, kisses, and immodest conversations, and at last fornicates, commits one sin: for all those things are means for attaining the end and are morally united in the intended end. Indeed even touches, conversations, and things of this kind which are committed immediately after fornication without the intention of a new copula constitute one sin with the fornication itself (St. Alphonsus, n. 41). Therefore in confession he satisfies by saying: I committed fornication.

c. He who, from the intention of stealing one hundred florins, often renews the internal purpose and snatches them away in ten instances, commits one sin, because the individual acts are directed to the same end. Therefore he sufficiently accuses himself by saying: I stole one hundred florins.

d. If an external sin has been begun, but not consummated, whether because of retracted will or because of a supervening impediment, a distinction must be made thus: a. If the means applied for executing the purpose are indifferent, entering a house for fornicating, buying a sword for killing, it is not necessary that they be explained; for whatever evil is in them is already sufficiently declared in the purpose itself. b. If the means applied for executing the purpose are evil, prior touches for copula, blows, wounds, they certainly must be indicated; but it suffices if they are declared confusedly and indistinctly: I wished to fornicate and had already applied certain means, but I did not complete the act. For the individual acts do not lose the moral unity which they have on account of the intention of the agent because of the interruption of the work; therefore it is not necessary that they be distinctly declared. The same holds concerning this example: if someone intending to kill Titius strikes him and then wounds him, but does not kill him.¹

2. From the affection of the will, by which it happens that several sinful acts, both internal and external, which occur during the same impulse of passion, morally constitute one action, even if some interval intervenes between the individual acts.

He who from the same impulse of passion inflicts several wounds on an enemy, often blasphemes God, often curses a man, often dishonestly touches himself, several times falsely swears the same thing, morally commits one sin. He who remains for an hour in morose delectation concerning the same object, even if from time to time he thinks about another thing, commits only one sin morally. Therefore a brief interruption between one act and another does not prevent them from being judged morally one act.

3. From the work itself to be completed: namely, if the work either from its own nature or from human institution is so constituted that several distinct acts are required as integral parts for completing it, these acts in moral consideration constitute one action and therefore one sin.

a. The priest who proposes on one day to omit the whole office and in fact omits it commits one sin; nevertheless if he had first proposed to omit only Matins, but afterward also the remaining parts, he would have two sins.

b. He who in the same occasion distributes holy Communion to several persons in the state of sin commits one sin, according to some grave, according to others light, because the individual communions pertain to one ministry by which holy Communion is distributed to several persons, and because the individual communicants participate in the same banquet. Therefore in confession it suffices to say: I distributed Communion in the state of sin.

c. He who in the state of sin successively absolves several penitents likewise commits only one sin: for all absolutions which occur successively pertain morally to the same ministry of absolving, which by its nature is not restricted to one person but is extended to all who on the same occasion approach the sacred tribunal. Therefore in confession he satisfies by saying: once I heard confessions in the state of sin.

¹ Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 668.

306. 1. Concerning the distinction of sins taken from plurality of acts, three rules must be established: a. concerning merely internal acts, which are consummated interiorly, as acts of hatred; b. concerning internal acts to be consummated exteriorly, which have annexed to them a purpose of placing an external action, as the will of stealing, of fornicating; c. concerning external acts or acts consummated exteriorly, as theft, fornication. For moral interruption does not occur in the same mode in all these acts.

2. Yet first it must be declared in how many ways acts which have moral unity from the intention or passion of the agent are interrupted, or lose moral unity. Now acts of the will can be interrupted in three ways: a. through voluntary revocation, as if someone truly repents of the sinful act and afterward nevertheless resumes the same act; b. through voluntary cessation from the act, as if someone deliberately ceases from the evil act, turns himself to other things, and then returns to the same act; c. through involuntary cessation from the act, e.g. on account of sleep, distraction, occupation, etc., lasting for a rather long time. But how great a delay of time must intervene between one act and another for the acts to be judged truly interrupted in this way must be estimated by the judgment of the prudent according to the diverse nature of the acts.

307. 1. Merely internal acts concerning the same object, which have unity from the same affection of passion, are multiplied whenever they are interrupted through revocation, through voluntary cessation, and through involuntary cessation.

a. Merely internal acts of the will which turn about the same object and proceed from the same affection, even if they are several, are judged one continued act, which lasts so long as it is not interrupted. But acts of this kind are morally interrupted not only by revocation and voluntary cessation, but also by involuntary cessation: for the same affection of passion cannot last amid daily occupations and distractions except for a brief time, at most for two or three hours.

b. He who, seeing an enemy, interiorly imprecates evils upon him and after some time, seeing him again, imprecates upon him anew, commits two sins, because the imprecations have been morally interrupted. He who, thinking of base things with pleasure, exchanges a few words with a passer-by and immediately returns to thinking again about base things, commits one sin; but if he returned to thinking again about them after a longer conversation which had entirely drawn the mind away from these matters, he would have two sins, because the delectations in the latter case, but not in the former, are interrupted.

c. He who for a rather long time, e.g. for an entire day, fosters the same sinful act, commits more or fewer sins according to the diversity of circumstances. Therefore if a penitent does not know how to indicate the number of internal sins, he must be asked about the delay of time during which he persevered in the same sin; and with account taken of the matter, the character of the penitent, and the circumstances, especially the kind of daily occupation, the prudent confessor must judge from this rule the moral interruption of acts, and therefore the number of sins.¹

¹ Cf. Lugo, De poenitentia, disp. 16, n. 569.

308. 2. Internal acts to be completed exteriorly, which have unity from the passion and intention of the agent, are multiplied whenever they are interrupted through revocation or voluntary cessation.

a. These acts, which chiefly have moral unity from the intention of the agent, are interrupted through revocation or voluntary cessation, but not through involuntary cessation, unless the interval of time is long. And indeed an act which tends into an external work is judged to last virtually so long as the work has been placed, unless a notable delay is interposed between the purpose and its execution; and therefore internal acts often repeated are nothing other than a continuation of the first sinful act. But if the external work has already been begun, the depraved will in this exterior effect lasts virtually still more easily even for a longer time. For how much time the same act remains virtually must be determined by the judgment of the prudent according to the diversity of acts: for sometimes, e.g., the purpose of reading a bad book can persist without moral interruption for a few hours or at most for a day; on the contrary, the purpose of stealing for several days, indeed the purpose of revenge even for several weeks.

b. He who determines to commit theft commits one sin, even if for several days he thinks about the theft and often renews the purpose of stealing, until at an opportune time he finally executes the theft. But he who proposes to commit theft this night, and then, mindful of this purpose, remains at home, and tomorrow renews the same purpose, commits two sins, because through voluntary cessation from the iniquitous purpose the first will of stealing is interrupted.

c. He who for a long time does not restore, although he often remembers the obligation of restoring and renews the purpose of not restoring, commits one sin: for in the external effect, namely in the retention of another's thing, the depraved will virtually perseveres. Yet if he retracts the purpose of not restoring and fosters the will of restoring for some time and afterward returns to the prior purpose, he commits a new sin.

309. 3. External acts are multiplied whenever they are complete in themselves and independent of one another, unless they are ordered as parts or means to one consummated act.

a. Therefore he who twice sacrilegiously communicates, who pollutes himself twice, even if he does this within a brief time, commits two sins. Likewise he makes several sins who omits a prescribed fast for several days: for any omission is something complete in itself, independent of another omission. He commits several sins who strikes an enemy several times at diverse times without the intention of killing him; likewise he who several times takes something from the same heap of wheat without a prior intention of stealing the whole.

b. He who for several days reads a prohibited book places several external acts physically distinct, which nevertheless are morally united both on account of the intention of the agent reading the whole book and on account of the nature of the acts, which constitute integral parts of one whole, namely the reading of the whole book.

Note. Acts which have disparate objects, or external acts which are in themselves plainly complete and independent of one another, cannot be gathered into moral unity either through the intention of the agent or through the affection of the will: for the nature of these acts prevents them from being morally united. He, for example, who, seeing a virgin, basely desires her and a little afterward, seeing another, desires this one too, commits two sins, even if the base desire proceeds from the same ardor of lust. He who within a brief time pollutes himself twice from the same libidinous affection commits two sins. Likewise a priest omitting the office sins as often as he omits the office, even if he should wish to unite the individual omissions through intention. Similarly a prostitute having the intention of sinning with all who come commits as many sins as copulas she completes.

310. Several objects physically are morally united. Whether several physically distinct objects have moral unity and constitute one moral and total object depends on the nature of the object and on the apprehension of the agent. Namely, if several objects either from their nature have moral unity, as a family, a city, and therefore are apprehended by the agent as one whole, or if they are apprehended by the agent in the manner of one object, as my rivals, even if by their nature they do not have unity, they constitute one moral object and are reached by the will as one thing. But if several objects neither have unity from themselves nor are apprehended by the agent as one, but are distinctly apprehended, they constitute not one object but several objects and are reached by several distinct acts of the will.

He who detracts from or curses a family composed of five heads commits one sin, because he apprehends the whole family in the manner of one and reaches it by one intention of harming; nevertheless if he were thinking of the individuals and distinctly wished to harm them, he would commit five sins. He who steals a purse belonging to three owners, whom he confusedly apprehends in the manner of one owner, commits one sin; but by the same act of stealing he commits three sins if he distinctly apprehends them and intends to harm each individually.

Note. Disparate or specifically diverse objects cannot make one moral object, whether they are reached by a merely internal act or by an external act. He, for example, who desires three women of diverse condition, one unmarried, another married, a third a nun, and apprehends them as such, commits three sins distinct in species and number, because they are not apprehended by one act in the manner of one, but by several acts distinctly, and are reached by the will, nor can they be gathered into one object. He who burns a barn in order to kill his enemy sleeping there, or who by one blow kills a horse and its rider, commits two sins: of damage-infliction and of homicide.

311. Concerning the distinction of sins taken from plurality of objects, a twofold rule must be established: a. concerning internal acts; b. concerning external acts.

1. An internal act, consisting in a simple affection or purpose of the will, which is referred to several objects distinct in themselves, always contains one sin, because those several objects constitute one moral or total object: for since there is one act of the will, the several objects are apprehended by the intellect and reached by the will in the manner of one.

a. Therefore he who by one act of the will morosely delights in three women, or desires three women of the same condition, commits one sin.

b. He who proposes to omit the office for a whole month or not to fast for the whole of Lent commits one sin; yet if afterward he executes this will, he has as many sins as he omits offices or fasts, because the individual omissions are united by no bond.

c. He who wishes diverse evils upon an enemy, e.g. infamy, poverty, death, commits one sin, because he apprehends and wishes them in the manner of one evil.

d. He who by one act hates several men or desires to kill several men commits one sin, because he reaches them under the confused concept of plurality.

312. 2. An external act which is referred to several objects distinct in themselves constitutes one sin only when the physically several objects constitute one moral and total object, or are apprehended by the mind and reached by the will in the manner of one. But if several objects are apprehended individually, there are also several sins, because the individual objects are also reached by distinct acts of the will.

a. He who by one explosion wounds or kills ten men commits one sin, and it is enough if in confession he says: I wounded or killed several, if by confused apprehension and intention he reached all in the manner of one; but he commits several sins if he distinctly apprehended the individual men and intended to kill them.

b. If someone by one speech detracts from a family, house, religious community, whether it is numerous or small, he has one sin, and it is enough if he says: I detracted from a family or community, or only, I detracted gravely. Indeed even he commits one sin who by one speech detracts from several, e.g. his enemies, whom he apprehends and intends in the manner of one; yet if he distinctly apprehends the individuals and intends to injure the reputation of each, he commits several sins.

c. Not only he who injures goods which belong to a monastery or to a chapter, but also he who takes away a deposit belonging to ten diverse persons, commits one sin if he reaches the ten owners with confused apprehension and intention.

Note 1. Although he who by one act killed three, or by one act desired to approach three women, satisfies the obligation of confessing integrally by saying: I committed homicide, or I had a desire of fornicating, nevertheless he must confess with a term by which at least confusedly several persons are signified: by one act I killed several, or I wished to approach several unmarried persons, namely lest he lead the confessor into error. For these words, "I committed homicide," signify "I killed one man," and they are taken by the confessor in this sense; wherefore the killing of several would implicitly be denied and the confessor would be deceived, which would be a lie committed in confession. Therefore where deception of the confessor and an implicit lie are not contained in the words, it is not necessary to indicate the plurality of objects. He, for example, who by one act inflicted damage on several or gave scandal to several, satisfies if he says: I inflicted grave damage or I gave grave scandal.

Note 2. The theory just explained concerning the total object belongs to Cardinal de Lugo (De poenitentia, disp. 16, n. 104 ff.), who followed Suarez (De poenitentia, disp. 22, sect. 5, n. 34). There are indeed several and grave authors, among whom is also St. Alphonsus (n. 45), who, following the stricter sentence, establish that the number of the total object must be explained in confession. For according to them, he who a. by one act kills three men, b. by one act detracts from several, likewise c. by one theft injures the rights of several, commits several sins in number. Yet since this sentence does not rise beyond probability, in order to confession it must be said that the number of the total object indeed constitutes an aggravating circumstance, but not several sins necessarily to be declared in confession. And indeed their reason is that nothing prevents one and the same act from containing several malices against the same virtue. But it is not denied that one act can virtually and indistinctly contain several malices in number; rather, the question is whether these malices must be declared distinctly in confession. Now, in order to satisfy the divine precept of accusing all and individual sins, it is not necessary that all malices which are virtually present in one act be declared distinctly, unless they are either specifically diverse or formally distinct.

Note 3. Penitents are bound to declare in confession only those circumstances changing the species which they apprehend, because they are guilty only of those. Now, for someone to contract the malice of a circumstance changing the species, confused knowledge of it indeed suffices; yet since they judge concerning these matters only from common moral estimation, they do not have even confused knowledge of many species which theologians accurately distinguish. The same must be noted concerning the numerical distinction of sins. That number of sins must be declared in confession which is apprehended by the penitent while he sins; but the common judgment of men does not distinguish all those malices which authors are accustomed to indicate.

If a man steals five pounds from A on one day, and another five pounds from B the day after, he commits two distinct sins of theft. There is no difficulty about such cases. But how many sins does a man commit who, with the intention of seducing a woman, begins with bad talk, immodest looks and touches, and finally attains his end? Or how many sins are committed by one who is almost all day long occupied with bad desires, which are, however, interrupted by his taking his meals and by other occupations ? Or how many sins does he commit who sets fire to a building where a dozen people were asleep who all perished in the flames? In order to decide as far as possible such difficult questions as these, and enable penitents to confess the number of their sins according to the divine precept, theologians have drawn up the following rules:

Rule I.—There are as many sins as there are total objects in sinful actions. By total object is meant an object of the will which either in itself or by the intention of the agent forms a complete whole, and is not referred to another action as a part of the whole. Thus the theft of a sum of money is a complete whole in itself, and forms a total object of the will. Immodest touches may form a complete whole if the intention be restricted to them without an idea of going farther; but if immodest touches are intended as a means to commit further sin, they form one complete whole with the subsequent sin, and make one sin with it.

The reason of the rule is clear from what has been said before. The object specifies the act, and if there be one whole object from a moral point of view, there will be one complete moral action and one sin.

Rule II.—There are as many sins as there are moral interruptions in the sinful act. We say “‘ moral interruptions ” because the laws for confession are to be understood according to the common estimation of ordinary men, not according to the subtle distinctions of the philosopher. And so, if common sense tells us that on account of some interruption in the course of a bad desire, there are two human acts, and not one continuous action, there will be two sins and not one. However, the main difficulty in this question is to decide what moral interruption is sufficient and necessary to break the moral continuity in an action and to multiply the sin.

It is clear that if a person gives up his sinful design, and then returns to it again, there will be a break of continuity, and two distinct sins. Moreover, without explicitly relinquishing his evil design, there may be such an interruption in entertaining it that when it is taken up again there will be a new action and a distinct sin. The interval which is necessary for such an interruption will vary according to the nature of the act and the circumstances.

(a) In merely internal sins of thought, any complete cessation from the bad thought would seem to be sufficient to interrupt the moral continuity of the action and to multiply the sin. However, if the interval is short, and the thoughts proceed from the same impulse of passion, or one depends on another and issues from it, the moral unity will not be broken, and there will be only one sin.

(b) A determinate purpose to commit an external sin— murder, for example—is not multiplied by ordinary interruptions demanded by sleep, meals, or daily occupations. Such a purpose, persevered in for a week or so, would constitute only one sin. The same would hold for a longer period if the purpose were renewed at short intervals, and never retracted, If, however, it were not renewed within a short interval, mere lapse of time would eventually cause the purpose to evaporate and cease to exist, so that renewal of the purpose after a considerable interval would constitute a new and distinct sin, It is very difficult to define precisely what interval of time would be required to break the moral continuity of the act. Much depends upon circumstances; a longer interval would be required when the act was not renewed through forgetfulness, or because no occasion of renewal presented itself; a shorter would suffice if the ceasing to entertain the sinful purpose were voluntary. No better rule can be given than that the question of time must be left to the judgement of a prudent man.

(c) If the purpose to commit sin is from time to time externalized by the taking of some means to the end in view, the act remains one and the same for a long interval of time, and such a purpose entertained for months and years under those circumstances would constitute only one sin. Similarly a purpose persevered in for years not to pay a: debt that is owing constitutes only one sin, though, of course, it is more grievous the longer it is entertained.

It is a disputed point among theologians whether a sinful act which is directed to many distinct objects is only one or many sins. An example will illustrate the difficulty. If an anarchist throws a bomb into a crowd of people and kills a score of them, does he commit a score of distinct sins of murder which must be mentioned in confession if he goes to confession, or does he commit only one big sin, whose malice indeed equals twenty, but which is adequately confessed by saying, ‘I killed a number of people by throwing a bomb”? It will not suffice to say, “I committed homicide,” for that would mean the taking of one life only, which was not precisely what was done.

In this controverted question it would seem better to distinguish, and say that if the objects were capable of being grouped together and actually were conceived as one object by the mind, there was one act and one sin. If, however, the criminal distinctly thought of the several objects and intended to kill each and all, there will be as many sins as there are distinct objects. A priest who, when starting for a fortnight’s holiday, intends to omit his breviary during the whole time, commits one big sin; but if he executes his design, he commits a new sin every day that he neglects his duty, for the Office of each day forms one total object, and the precept of saying the divine Office is virtually multiple, and falls on each and every day.

If the means used to commit a sin are themselves evil and of the same species as the sin, and if they can be regarded as parts of one total object, as, for example, immodest talk and touches with a view to fornication, such means need not be distinctly confessed, as we saw above. If, however, the evil means are of a different species from the sinful end, as, for example, lying in order to commit a theft, the evil means are a separate sin, and must be distinctly confessed. If the means used to commit a sin are not in themselves sinful, they need not be confessed, unless the end was not attained, and in that case it will be sufficient to express in general terms in confession the use of means to give effect to a sinful purpose, by saying, for example, ‘“‘ I tried to commit theft,” if the intending thief merely entered a house, but failed to effect his design.

I. Notion. Numerical distinction is the distinction among several sins with respect to their individuality; or it is that by which several sins are distinct in the individual, for example, two fornications.

Now inquiry into numerical distinction has less regard to several malices distinct in species, which, according to what was said in n. 251, are sometimes contained in one act. It is rather commonly admitted that, where by some act several malices specifically distinct in themselves are involved, there are also in fact and formally several malices specifically diverse,¹ and consequently several sins in number. But the question is when sins which are of the same species are distinguished from one another in number. The difficulty of discerning this arises from the fact that sometimes several physical acts are only one sin in number, while sometimes one physical act contains several sins.

¹ Few deny this with respect to some acts, for example, with respect to adultery, incest, and carnal sacrilege, and think that in the stated acts only one species of sin is formally contained (cf. John of St. Thomas, on I-II, q. 18, disp. 9, a. 6). But the controversy is not practical, because the Council of Trent (session XIV, canon 7) teaches that both the species of sins and the circumstances changing the species must be confessed.

II. Roots of numerical distinction. Two roots of numerical distinction are distinguished, namely: 1. plurality of acts, as if someone fornicates twice; 2. plurality of objects, as if someone by one act kills several men. We shall speak of each.

III. Plurality of acts. The general rule is this: there are as many sins as there are morally distinct acts, or as there are physical acts not morally united into some one thing. "According to the unity of the will," says St. Thomas, "judgment is to be taken concerning the unity of that which is said to be in the moral genus" (In II Sent., dist. 42, q. 1, a. 1). Therefore where there is a morally diverse act of the will, there is a distinct sin. It remains to inquire when there is a morally diverse act; the particular rules will provide this, i.e., rules which regard diverse acts considered specifically. Now in relation to this matter acts are distinguished into internal acts, i.e., acts to be consummated in the will alone, and external acts.

Internal acts are divided into acts which do not tend toward another act, such as morose delectations, hatred, etc.; and acts which tend toward another act, such as the purpose of perpetrating an internal or external sin.

External acts are distinguished into complete and incomplete acts. Complete acts are those which by their nature are not ordered to another act of the same species, such as self-pollution, fornication, homicide. Incomplete acts are called acts which by their nature are ordered to another more principal act of the same species; thus an immodest touch is ordered to intercourse or to self-pollution. Sins of the mouth are equated with incomplete acts. There are added acts which, considered according to the notion handed down, are neither complete nor incomplete, namely acts indifferent by their nature, which are employed by the agent as means of arriving at a sinful act, such as taking the road in order to steal, preparing weapons in order to commit homicide. With these things noted, take the particular rules which follow:

1. Internal acts which do not tend toward another act constitute a new sin as often as they are repeated after a moral interruption; in other words, as often as they are repeated: 1. after formal revocation, i.e., a contrary act either of efficacious unwillingness or of simple displeasure; 2. after voluntary cessation, namely when someone indeed does not formally revoke the prior act, but nevertheless, reflecting upon it, either simply turns himself away from it, for example, from weariness, or turns himself to a work incompatible with the prior act, as if someone deliberately ceases from morose delectation and applies himself to study; 3. after indeliberate cessation, i.e., through natural inadvertence and distraction to other things, of such a delay that the repeated act cannot be said to proceed from the same impulse of passion, and so to be united with the prior act or acts in the same cause; practically, after a cessation of some delay. I say, of some delay, because these sins, since they do not tend toward a work and therefore are plainly consummated in themselves, commonly do not proceed from the same impulse of passion as long as purposes do (St. Alphonsus, V, 37; Homo Apostolicus, tract. III, n. 58).

2. Internal acts which tend toward another act constitute a new sin as often as they are repeated after a moral interruption; in other words, as often as they are repeated: 1. after formal revocation; 2. after voluntary cessation; 3. after indeliberate cessation, if this is of so great a delay that the repeated purpose cannot be said to proceed from the same impulse of passion, and the purpose does not remain virtually in some effect leading to the intended work. It is said:

a) If this is of so great a delay that the repeated purpose cannot be said to proceed from the same impulse of passion. But how great a delay or sufficiently long interval is required depends on the intensity and firmness of the purpose. Nevertheless, according to St. Alphonsus, commonly an interval of two or three days suffices, because the same impulse of passion is with difficulty prolonged longer. "Hence he who perseveres in an evil will beyond two or three days must explain the time, so that in this way the number of internal acts concerning external sins may be morally understood" (St. Alphonsus, V, 39).

b) And the purpose does not virtually remain in some effect leading to the intended end. If this happens, the first purpose, whatever interval has intervened, is not morally interrupted. "Hence it is inferred: 1. that if someone proposes to kill a man, and for that reason prepares weapons, takes the road, and kills the enemy, he commits one sin, although he has sought him for many days and has repeated the will several times... 2. If someone resolves not to restore another's property, and always remains in the same will, even for a year, he commits one sin, because in that retention never retracted the first will virtually remains, as Roncaglia probably says... Nevertheless Diana rightly thinks... with authors cited by him, that if the thief becomes unable to restore, and then, having become able, does not restore when the opportunity is given, he commits a new sin. The reason is that in that case, through that time of inability, the will of not restoring does not persevere in the effect" (St. Alphonsus, V, 40). Understand this if the thief adverts that on account of inability he is not held to restitution and repudiates the depraved will which he had; otherwise the will morally perseveres in the effect, and it suffices for the penitent to declare the time during which he persisted in such a will (St. Alphonsus, III, 683). Finally, observe that a purpose not morally interrupted constitutes one sin in number with the external act.

3. Complete external acts constitute a new sin as often as they are repeated. Except if the acts, although complete in themselves, nevertheless constitute one whole with others and are not morally interrupted.

Corollary I. He commits several sins in number who twice defiles himself, twice fornicates, twice neglects Mass, etc.

Corollary II. Much more probably he commits several sins who successively absolves several persons. The reason is that each confecting of a sacrament constitutes an action complete in itself, nor do the diverse absolutions, although they may be done on the occasion of one session, constitute one whole. Thus, against several, St. Alphonsus (V, 50, q. 6), Billuart,¹ De Smet,² Pesch,³ Prummer,⁴ and others.

Corollary III. It is more doubtful how many sins are committed by one who celebrates in the state of mortal sin. Some think that only one is committed, because all these actions constitute or integrate one sacrifice. Others admit two sins, one of unworthy consecration, the other of unworthy communion. Others add a third, namely of ministration to an unworthy person. But with St. Alphonsus (V, 44; VI, 35) it seems it must be said that four sacrileges are committed by a celebrant of this kind, namely: being unworthy, he consecrates; being unworthy, he receives communion; being unworthy, he ministers; and he ministers to one unworthy. The reason is that the aforesaid acts, for example the reception, confecting, etc., of a sacrament, seem so disparate that it is scarcely admitted that they coalesce into one sin in number, although they integrate one sacrifice. There is added that, for example, unworthy consecration and unworthy reception are so diverse that they seem to constitute sins of diverse species and therefore also distinct in number.

Corollary IV. Sufficiently probably he commits only one sin who, in the state of mortal sin, distributes the Eucharist once to several persons. The reason is that all the administrations constitute one banquet (St. Alphonsus, V, cited place).

Corollary V. He who from one intention omits all the canonical hours commits one sin, because the different hours constitute one whole, i.e., the Office of the day (St. Alphonsus, IV, 148).

Corollary VI. He who, from the intention of stealing 100 florins, commits several successive thefts, or, having taken the purpose of reading a bad book, completes the reading over several times, seems to commit only one sin, because the stated acts by force of the intention seem sufficiently to constitute one whole, namely the theft of 100 florins, or the reading of the whole book. Except if in the cases brought forward the acts are morally interrupted, for instance through a rather long delay.

4. Incomplete external acts multiply sins in this way:

a) If they are ordered by the agent to a complete act, and the complete act follows, they constitute one sin in number with the complete act, unless they are morally interrupted. The reason is that on the part of the matter they form one moral whole with the complete act, and by reason of the intention they are placed as such. The same must be said of incomplete acts which immediately follow a complete act, because they can be regarded as the complement of the complete act (St. Alphonsus, V, 41). If in the case the complete act does not follow, the incomplete acts constitute one sin among themselves, unless they are morally interrupted.

Incomplete acts, however, are morally interrupted: 1. by formal revocation; 2. by voluntary cessation; 3. by indeliberate cessation, if this is of so great a delay that the incomplete acts cannot be said to proceed from the same impulse of passion, and the purpose of arriving at the complete act does not remain virtually in some effect (p. 200).

Concerning the manner of confessing the aforesaid incomplete acts not morally interrupted, it must be said as follows: 1. if the intended complete act followed, it suffices to confess: I committed fornication; or: I committed adultery; etc. (St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 42, q. 1, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, V, 41); 2. if the intended complete act did not follow, one can say, for example: From the intention of fornication, adultery, etc., I acted shamefully by kisses and touches (St. Alphonsus, V, 42).

b) If they are not ordered by the agent to a complete act, they constitute a new sin as often as they are repeated after a moral interruption; in other words, as often as they are repeated: 1. after formal revocation; 2. after voluntary cessation; 3. after indeliberate cessation of such a delay that the repeated act cannot be said to proceed from the same impulse of passion; practically, after an indeliberate cessation of a longer interval. Hence he commits one sin in number who "from the same impulse strikes several times, touches dishonestly several times, blasphemes the same saint or several holy days, reviles or detracts from someone several times in the same matter" (St. Alphonsus, V, 41).⁵

Concerning the manner of confessing the aforesaid incomplete acts not morally interrupted, it suffices to confess, for example: I acted shamefully with a girl by kisses and touches.

The things which have been said about incomplete acts not ordered to a complete act are valid even if, after those acts have been perpetrated, with lust boiling over, someone proceeds to the complete act. Hence "if someone, having kisses, touches, etc., had not from the beginning willed intercourse, but afterward, because lust had increased, completed intercourse, it does not suffice if he confesses only intercourse" (St. Alphonsus, V, 43); but he is held to declare that, independently of intercourse, he acted shamefully with a girl by kisses, touches, etc.

¹ De peccatis, diss. 2, art. 4.

² Collationes Brugenses, 1905, p. 555.

³ Tractatus dogmaticus, VI, n. 261.

⁴ Manuale Theologiae Moralis, I, n. 380.

⁵ Cf. p. 199, where we said that sins of the mouth are equated with incomplete acts.

5. Acts indifferent by their nature, which, considered according to the notion handed down above, are neither complete nor incomplete, but are employed by the agent as means of arriving at a sinful act - these acts, I say, are sinful, as having the malice of the intended end; but, like incomplete acts, they also form one sin with the intended and subsequently placed sinful act, unless they are morally interrupted. If the intended sinful act does not follow, they constitute one sin among themselves, unless again they are morally interrupted. Now they are morally interrupted by the same reason by which incomplete acts ordered by the agent to a complete act are interrupted. "Hence if someone, in order to commit homicide, buys weapons, takes the road, seeks his enemy, and kills him, he commits one sin" (St. Alphonsus, V, 41); and this is valid even if he has sought the enemy for many days. I said concerning acts indifferent by their nature; for otherwise it must be said concerning acts which involve a malice diverse from the sinful act, as if you use sorcery in order to be able to kill someone; in which case certainly a new sin, and indeed one of another species, is added.

Concerning the manner of confessing the aforesaid acts not morally interrupted, it must be said as follows: 1. if the intended sinful act follows, it suffices to confess the stated act; if it does not follow, it suffices to say: From the intention, for example, of theft, I employed means (St. Alphonsus, V, 42).

IV. Plurality of objects, i.e., of objects which are numerically distinguished and cannot coalesce into one object. Thus, for example, the lives of two men. Now an evil act which regards numerically distinct objects not coalescing into one object - as an act by which someone kills three men - contains as many sins as there are objects of this kind regarded. The reason is that that from which sin is caused must also, if it is multiplied, multiply sins. But sin is caused from an evil object. The major is confirmed from the fact that, as the adversaries concede, a married man who has intercourse with a married woman commits a double malice in number, i.e., injustice - one with respect to his own wife, the other with respect to the husband of the other woman - and consequently, as it seems, a double sin in number. The reason for this must be that the act placed regards two objects or injures two numerically distinct rights. Thus teach, against several, St. Alphonsus (V, 45; VII, 28), Billuart, Prummer, Sweens. Nevertheless, distinct objects are not so rarely conceived and reached by the agent in the manner of one thing, namely under the concept of a multitude or of harm inflicted upon a multitude; in which case I do not deny that there is only one sin in number (St. Alphonsus, V, 50, q. 5, the third opinion, however, etc.). But from this some undeservedly conclude that the opinion of St. Alphonsus is false; since the question is whether there are several sins in number if the thing is conceived and reached as it objectively stands.

Corollary I. In themselves, several sins are committed:

1. By him who by one act kills several persons, defames several, gives scandal to several, or wishes evil upon several; likewise by him who proposes to kill several, defame several, etc.

2. By him who in one speech detracts from someone in diverse matters or affects someone with diverse insults. For the right that I not be detracted from in one matter is distinguished from the right that I not be detracted from in another; likewise the right that I not be affected with this insult differs from the right that I not be affected with another (St. Alphonsus, V, 48).

"Nevertheless, here it is well to observe that... little women and common people, who while quarreling together load one another with diverse insults from the same impulse, commit one sin. The reason is that according to common estimation these do not injure reputation and honor; because, on the one hand, insults among persons of this kind are not apprehended as grave, and on the other hand, hearers place no trust in them, thinking that they proceed rather from the impulse of anger than from the mind and truth of the matter. And therefore such quarrelers are for the most part excused from mortal sin, unless perhaps they reproach the adversary about some particular fact" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

3. By him who by one act, or by acts not morally interrupted, wishes diverse evils upon someone. For the right that one evil not be wished upon someone differs from the right that another not be wished upon him.

4. By him who in one speech defames an entire family, because each member has a distinct right to reputation; likewise by him who injures goods belonging by distinct ownership to several owners. It is otherwise "if someone were to injure goods which a city, monastery, or chapter possesses in common; for then the right does not belong to the individuals in particular, but only to the whole community; hence one right is injured" (St. Alphonsus, V, 46).

I said that in the cases set forth several sins are committed in themselves; for in practice, as has already been noted, distinct objects are often conceived and reached in the manner of one thing, so that commonly there is no obligation of asking penitents, for example, before how many persons they had immodest conversations, etc.

Corollary II. One sin is committed:

1. By him who denies several articles of faith, because the right of God that I assent to one truth revealed by him is one with his right that I assent to others (St. Alphonsus, V, 50).

2. By him who blasphemes, for example, against the twelve Apostles, because the right of God, to whose dishonor the blasphemy tends, is one (St. Alphonsus, V, 47).

3. By him who detracts from someone before several persons, "since the right to reputation is single before all, and not multiple" (St. Alphonsus, V, 49).

Concerning the practice of asking penitents about the species and number of sins, cf. the treatise on Penance.

Whence is the numerical distinction of sins to be taken? It is to be taken: 1. from the diversity of total objects; 2. from the multiplicity of acts morally interrupted. Here that is called a total object which, either from its intrinsic nature or from the extrinsic intention of the agent, is completed in itself, and is not referred to another as a part. Thus in homicide there is had one total object, although the homicide has placed beforehand various previous acts, e.g., by seeking weapons, laying ambushes, and striking several times; because all those previous acts are to be held as parts of the principal act, and are ordered to it.

But if the homicide first intended only a striking, and afterward, with the will changed, killed, there will be a double total object; because from the intention of the agent one is not ordered to the other, but is intended separately in itself. - Morally interrupted; because, although any interruption physically suffices for the numerical distinction of acts, nevertheless in order to confession they are not multiplied unless they are morally many; because, just as a moral act is to be attended to in confession, so also moral multiplication and distinction must be attended to. Proof of the first part. Because the object, as St. Thomas teaches, 2. 2. q. 18, a. 2, is in a certain way the form of the act.

Therefore the act is such as the object is. Therefore where there are several objects in number in the genus of morals, there are several acts in number in the same genus; where there is one object, there is reputed to be one act. Therefore there are as many sins as there are total objects. - Proof of the second part. For when acts of the will are morally interrupted, they become complete in number, and each is constituted in its own malice; since the following act cannot be called the continuation of the preceding one. Therefore those acts by moral interruption become diverse; therefore by repetition they are multiplied. Thus he who, on several occasions morally interrupted, strikes another or steals, commits as many sins as there are those strikes or those thefts, because these constitute so many diverse acts. L. 35, 36; Lugo, d. 16, s. 14.

Is there one sin or several when there are several objects materially and physically total, but they are referred together to one act of the will? - It is disputed. There are two opinions, and for each many and grave theologians stand. The first opinion, which St. Alphonsus follows, 45, teaches that diversity of objects materially and physically total constitutes in one and the same act different sins in number. The reason is that sin is the motion of the will into its term, or object. Therefore, just as by specific diversity of objects it is distinguished in species, so by their numerical distinction it is distinguished in number. Ioann. De Dicastillo, De Poenit., d. 9, dub. 4, n. 216 ff.; La-Croix 150. "Hence it is inferred that the following commit sins diverse in number: 1. He who by one blow kills several men, or detracts from several... And the same must be said if someone intends to kill or defame a whole family.... But otherwise, if someone were to injure goods which some city, monastery, or chapter possesses in common; for then the right does not belong to individuals in particular, but only to the whole community, whence one right is injured. 2. He who by one act desires to approach several women, or several times the same woman; much more, he who in the same night several times knows the same woman... for each fornication has its own completed term. 3. He who steals from several. 4. He who on one occasion gives scandal to several. 5. He who by one act wills through several days to omit the canonical hours or fast. 6. He who by one act desires evil to three persons." L. 46.

The second opinion holds that diversity of objects materially and physically total, in one and the same act, constitutes only one sin in number. The reason is that those objects, materially and physically several, are attained by one act after the manner of one adequate object, and therefore constitute one total formal and moral object. In one and the same act, namely one and the same interior act of the will; and if there is question of an efficacious act of the will, also one and the same exterior act. For if the exterior act is not one and the same, but there are several, since each is terminated and completed at an object total in itself, it can no longer be united with another. - Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 126 ff.; Suarez, de Poenit., d. 22, s. 5, n. 34. Hence resolves: He commits one sin who by one blow kills several men. But he would not sufficiently explain his sin by saying, "I committed homicide," which signifies the killing of one man; but it ought at least to be explained under some confused generality signifying plurality, e.g., by one blow I killed several, or many. Lugo, l. c., n. 141. The same must be said of him "who by one act of the will wills to approach, for example, ten women of the same condition, or wills to approach the same woman several times. For it is enough if he says: I willed to approach several times an unmarried woman, or unmarried women, or married women, without necessity of expressing the number of objects of such a single volition." Tambur., Meth. Conf., l. 2, c. 1, § 9, n. 59; Dicastillus, de Poenit., d. 9, dub. 4, n. 256, 257. "He who by one act of detraction has injured many at the same time, for the same reason, need not open the number of persons injured.... If someone detracts from a family or house or religion, whether it is numerous or small, it is enough if he says: I detracted from a certain family, etc." Tambur., l. c., n. 63; Lugo, l. c., n. 135. It is also one sin if someone detracts from another before many, since the right to reputation is not multiple, but one among all. Likewise it is one sin if someone by one act gives scandal to several. Lugo, l. c., n. 112, 164; L. 49. Likewise it is one sin if someone by the same act denies several articles of faith, because the formal object of faith is not multiple, but one, namely the authority of God revealing. L. 50; Lugo, l. c., n. 288 ff. He who by the same impulse of passion wishes several diverse evils to an enemy, for instance infamy, death, poverty, commits one sin in number and species, namely if all are sought under the generic aspect of evil. Lugo, l. c., n. 260; L. 50. Besides, it is one sin if someone steals a purse belonging to several, or a thing which exceeds grave matter several times. Lugo, l. c., n. 137; Diana, tom. 1, tr. 7, r. 18, n. 8. "I infer that one willing not to recite the office through the whole year, and afterward executing this, commits several sins.... Similarly, he who wills to practice robberies and slaughters on the road through his whole life, does not afterward commit one sin, but several." Lugo, l. c., 546; L. l. 4, n. 149. The same must be said of sin committed with three women: it is triple, not one, etc.

Does he commit diverse sins who detracts from someone in several matters, or affects him with diverse insults? St. Alphonsus, 48, more probably affirms. But the common opinion of grave doctors denies it. For reputation and honor are always of the same species, whatever the matter concerned may be. Whence this is not necessarily to be explained in confession. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 265; Diana, tom. 1, tr. 7, r. 14, n. 2, 3; Elbel 552.

Note: If someone married sins with a married woman, or one having a vow of chastity sins with one also having a vow of chastity, he admits a double sin, by reason of marriage and vow. "For the prior malice is against the fidelity which he owes to his wife.... But the latter is insofar as he is the cause, by his cooperation, that his accomplice violates the laws of marriage." Likewise "one species of malice is contracted from the violation of one's own vow; but another from cooperation in the violation of the vow of someone to whose observance I am not held by vow, as is established." Lugo, l. c., n. 140, 141; L. l. 2, n. 46; l. 3, n. 456.

When is there had a moral interruption of acts? - An act of the will is interrupted in three ways, namely: 1. By retraction or express revocation of the will, because this prevents the later act from being joined with the prior one, e.g., if someone retracts a depraved will of acting evilly, and afterward resumes it, unless a very brief delay intervened. 2. By voluntary cessation from the act, or by application of the mind to diverse objects, e.g., if someone freely ceases from an evil purpose, and then returns to it; unless there is present the purpose immediately of continuing the same sins, as if someone conversing shamefully with a woman, when another arrives, ceases meanwhile, but with the intention of continuing when he departs. 3. By involuntary cessation sufficiently notable, account being taken of the nature of the act, according to the judgment of prudent persons, e.g., by sleep, distraction, etc. Sufficiently notable; for if a sufficiently brief time intervenes, the acts, morally speaking, are not discontinued. These three things can easily be applied to a threefold class of acts, namely merely internal acts, internal acts with the purpose of placing an external action, and external acts, or acts externally consummated. L. 35, 38; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 551; Struggl, q. 1, 41.

Merely internal acts, which are altogether perfected inwardly, e.g., hatreds, heresies, morose delectations, shameful inefficacious desires, rash judgments, etc., speaking in themselves, are multiplied as soon as they are retracted or abandoned by free will, or involuntarily deserted. The reason is that such acts, since they have an object complete in itself and are ordered to no external effect by reason of which they could be continued with one another, are acts altogether complete in themselves. And therefore the penitent must explain, if he can, how many times he consented by internal will to a depraved thing; but if he cannot, because, e.g., the depraved mind was long-lasting, then it suffices to say approximately, or at least to confess the time in which he persevered with such a mind, and whether very frequently or rarely. For thus the confessor will sufficiently understand that ordinary interruptions intervened, or, on the contrary, more rare ones. Speaking in themselves, for if several acts of this sort proceed from the same impulse of passion, they constitute one mortal sin, even if some brief interval intervenes between the acts. Likewise one mortal sin is had if the depraved wills have order among themselves, so that one depends on another. For then the later wills, without new deliberation or consultation, are placed by force of the first will. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 562 ff.; Suarez, de Poenit., d. 22, s. 5, n. 11; Struggl, q. 1, n. 36; Tambur., Meth. Confess., l. 2, c. 1, § 5, n. 30 ff.; L. 35, 37.

Internal acts with the purpose of placing an external action are likewise multiplied: 1. By retraction of the will. For then, if someone returns to an evil will, there will be a new sin, since the later act does not proceed from the first. 2. By voluntary cessation, namely if someone voluntarily and freely ceases from a depraved purpose, with a notable delay interposed; for then also it is verified that the later act is a new sin, since it does not proceed from the first. 3. By involuntary cessation, if a long time intervenes; for if a brief time intervenes, the acts are not morally discontinued. - L. 35, 38, 39. Difficulty is present here as regards defining the aforesaid notable delay and long time. Now a double hypothesis can be made: the first, that the internal acts are ordered immediately to several external acts, directed and subordinated to some one and common end; the second, that the internal acts are ordered to one external act. In the first hypothesis the first thing which St. Alphonsus has, 40, holds: "Acts of the will, if they proceed from the first will, and morally remain in some effect, through whatever time the depraved will lasts, constitute only one sin. Hence it is inferred that if someone proposes to kill a man, and for this reason prepares weapons, takes the road, and kills the enemy, he commits one sin, although through many days he has sought him, and several times repeated the will." But in the first and the other hypothesis, if no exterior effect is yet had, what is to be judged a brief time or a long one, so that the aforesaid acts are judged to be continued or discontinued, no certain rule can be assigned. That brief or long interval can be defined in particular cases by the judgment of prudent persons alone. For the same purpose endures for a greater or lesser time according to its varying intensity, and also according to the varying circumstances of persons, age, sex, character, etc. A purpose of committing theft can be continued for several days; a purpose of reading a prohibited book ordinarily scarcely endures for one or two hours. Generally speaking, however, the aforesaid acts are not discontinued by brief and common, or ordinary, interruptions, which occur through sleep, a meal, conversation with a friend, etc. Therefore, suppose that after these you again repeat the depraved purpose of killing an enemy, fornicating, etc.; you commit one sin, because, since the first will remains virtually, it is united and continued with the second. Salmant., tr. 20, c. 12, n. 38. But something else must be said concerning an extraordinary interruption, which indeed removes the moral unity of the human action. For then the prior will no longer persists. If someone, for example, wills to kill an enemy, so that for a month he continues this will, notwithstanding brief and ordinary interruptions, but afterward for a year, for several months, or for a month he is ill, and by this change of circumstances he no longer thinks about killing the enemy, that prior will growing cold, indeed entirely vanishing, if after he has recovered he again resumes that prior will, this later will can no longer make one with that prior one, since wills so distant cannot any longer be joined among themselves even by moral estimation. Tambur., Meth. Confess., l. 2, c. 1, § 5, n. 34; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 545.

External acts, or acts externally consummated, are multiplied as often as the object is disparate, or terminated in itself; but they are not multiplied, even with a notable interval of time interposed, when they are like parts of a more principal act, or tend to one end, because they effect something morally one, which is not completed except when the principally intended act has been consummated; or when, although those partial acts are not ordered to the principal act, they nevertheless proceed from the same impulse of passion. Understand that all preceding acts effect something morally one with the more principal and intended consummated act, unless by themselves they introduce a new species, which of itself does not tend to the completion of the sin. Let the example be one who, wishing to kill a man, burns his house so that he may perish by the fire. For since these things are disparate, they cannot effect one thing. Therefore he commits one sin who, intending fornication, shamefully touches a woman, kisses her, entices her by shameful conversations, and finally fornicates; because all the preceding acts by their nature are ordered to the consummated act. But if from the beginning he had wished only to touch the woman, and afterward, induced by lust, completed copulation, there will be a double sin, and therefore it will not be enough if he confesses the copulation.

A priest commits one sin who wills to omit the whole office on one day, because the individual hours are ordered to completing one office. But he would commit two sins who had wished only to omit Matins, and afterward did not wish to recite the remaining hours, because there would be a twofold distinct act of evil will, having an object terminated in itself. He perpetrates one sin who from the same impulse of passion repeats an evil act many times, e.g., one who several times shamefully touches himself or another, even with some interruption; one who several times strikes an enemy, or imprecates very many evils upon him, etc.; because there is one depraved affection of the will, and those various actions are morally united. Likewise he probably commits one sin who blasphemes against God in several matters, as, for instance, if he said that God is false, unjust, cruel; and he who by the same continued act blasphemes against several Saints, e.g., against the twelve Apostles, since all blasphemies against the Saints derive their malice from one relation to God.

He commits one sin who, intending to steal some definite sum of money, takes it away at several times, morally not interrupted, lest he be discovered, because there is one depraved act of the will, which is consummated in the last theft. On the contrary, he commits several sins who at several times steals something from the same money without having decided from the beginning to carry off the whole, because the individual thefts effect a total object in themselves. He commits several sins who fornicates successively several times with the same woman, although on the same night. Likewise he commits several sins who omits a prescribed fast through several days, although those fornications and omissions arise from one and the same will; for any fornication and omission successively made is terminated in itself, and constitutes a total object. Nevertheless, if someone in mortal sin hears several confessions successively but continuously, one after another, there are theologians who affirm that one sin is present because of moral union. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, nn. 135, 546, 556, 557, 561; Tambur., Meth. Confess., l. 2, c. 1, n. 52; Struggl, q. 1, n. 43; L. 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 50; l. 3, n. 538.

Resolves: If someone consents in mind to heresy, and then, while reading a book about religion, or hearing a sermon about religion, positively does not wish to amend the sin, he sins as often as he again positively does not will it; since individual acts of this sort of the will are independent among themselves, and stand perfectly by themselves. If someone, on the contrary, decides not to restore another's thing, and always remains in the same will, even for a year, he commits one sin, although he also often renews this purpose of his. The reason is that in that retention, never retracted, the first will virtually remains, and the later wills are morally united. Elbel 551; L. 40, l. 3, n. 683; Diana, tom. 1, tr. 7, r. 158, nn. 3, 4. Moreover, as D'Annibale well observes, p. 1, n. 288, ed. 4, in practice the conscience alone of those sinning numbers sins; for such persons commonly do not know these subtle and refined distinctions. This also must be attended to in practice concerning the various species of sins. Indeed, as the praised author notes, ibid., n. 290, note 14, many things are most certainly lethal for theologians which to rude or unlearned persons seem scarcely reprehensible.

Are touches which immediately follow fornicatory copulation a new sin? All these acts, as also complacency concerning the copulation had, are not a new sin if they are had immediately after copulation, and are in no way directed to a new copulation, because they are very probably employed as the complement of the copulation obtained. L. 41; Tamb., l. c., 72.

Must the means used for sinning be explained in confession, if the sin afterward was not consummated? - R. It seems that it must be denied altogether, if those means are not evil in themselves, for then they constitute no special sin; but it suffices to say generally, in order to explain the external action of the sin: I tried, for example, to kill an enemy; I prepared the means for killing him, etc. - But it must be affirmed if those means are evil in themselves; and then they must be indicated, and indeed all of them according to species, if they are diverse in species, such as touches had with oneself, or obscene words used for soliciting. And the reason is that, the sin not having been consummated, those various means, evil in themselves, can no longer be referred to the end and constitute something one in the consummation of the sin, whence they would take their ultimate species.

Therefore those individual acts are to be considered with their own proper malice. Therefore they are to be accused separately in confession. - But if those means, evil in themselves, repeated several times in the same way, or diverse among themselves, are of the same species, all must also be explained according to number, if they have not coalesced morally into one act; for the sin not having been consummated, from which they receive moral unity, they remain acts distinct and many in themselves. Otherwise, however, if they constituted morally one act, for instance because they proceeded from the same impulse of passion, or because one was ordered to another and was continued by it. - Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 240; Tambur. 66 seqq.; L. 42.

1. Lupinus, making a confession, says that for a year he retained another's property and did not wish to restore it; likewise for a year he nourished hatred in his mind against his brother; but for a month he had the desire of fornicating, and afterwards renounced it; but then for a month he was delighted with lingering thoughts of fornication.

2. Vulpinus efficaciously proposed to himself to corrupt a virgin. For this end over several days, weeks, and months he flatters her, kisses her, and touches her, and at last completes the work itself. Then he confesses, saying that he once fornicated. At another time, wishing also to seduce a girl, he employed various means for this end, namely words not very chaste and flattering, amatory letters, shameful looks, dishonest touches; but, being about to complete the sin of fornication, by a fortuitous event supervening, he could not consummate it. Then he confesses, saying that he wished to fornicate and tried to do it, but could not because of an involuntary obstacle supervening.

Q. 1. How are sins numerically distinguished? 2. What as to the cases?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 303 seqq. To the second: Lupinus, precisely from this, that he delayed restitution for a whole year, even if he could have restored sooner, committed only one sin. The reason is that, morally speaking, there is judged to be one unjust detention of another's property. Granted even that it be supposed that he repeated this his purpose more often, nevertheless all those repetitions, as united in the same real omission, do not integrate anything except one sin in number; in the same way as an intention, for example, of stealing or killing, although often repeated, does not make many sins, but one sin in number with the theft that finally followed by force of the same intention. It would have to be said otherwise in the case in which he had often interrupted the malicious purpose, or had even retracted it, and then had reassumed it anew; for then purposes of this sort of not restoring would remain sins numerically distinct among themselves, and necessarily to be expressed in the act of confession. In such a case, since for the most part it is at least morally impossible to express the number of internal acts, therefore ordinarily it suffices to express the delay of time, by saying, for example, for a whole year I persisted in the malicious purpose of not restoring, which I renewed often. And in a similar case confessors ought not to be too anxious in themselves, too troublesome to penitents, in investigating the number of interruptions, since it is morally impossible to know it exactly. Elbel 551.

As regards the remaining cases of hatred, desire of fornication, and lingering delectation in evil thoughts, Lupinus did not satisfy the integrity of confession. For here there is question of merely internal sins, which are multiplied more easily by interruption; and perhaps a multiple interruption was present. But again, since the exact number of sins in these matters for the most part cannot be obtained, it will be enough to say whether he renewed sinful acts frequently, whether several times in the day, etc. G. 151.

Vulpinus satisfied the integrity of confession in the first case; for all those acts, as by their nature tending to the same end and repugnant to the same virtue, are judged to be in some way united in the same end, and morally completed. Elbel 555. But in the second case he did not satisfy the integrity of confession; for generally he made as many sins as there are evil means by their nature, and as many as are different in species, which he used. Therefore Vulpinus had to accuse separately the shameful words, the amatory letters written for seducing the girl, the shameful looks, and the dishonest touches. The reason is that, the sin not being consummated, those various means evil in themselves can no longer be referred to the end, and constitute one thing in the consummation of the sin. Wherefore those individual acts must be regarded with their own proper malice, and accused separately in confession. G. 156; Elbel 637, 640; I. M. 310, 783.

160. Rules. - Rule I. The numerical distinction of sins is taken from diversity of total objects, or morally diverse objects. - Thus commonly with St. Lig., no. 45.

The reason for the assertion is evident. For where there are objects formally and morally total, and distinct from others, there also are several distinct acts of the will, terminated and complete in themselves, and therefore several distinct malices, and consequently several sins.

Now that is called a total object which is wholly distinguished from other objects, and is completed in itself, so that by itself alone it effects a moral whole, and consequently is not part of another, nor by its nature referred to another. Thus in homicide one total object is had, although the homicide has sent ahead various previous acts, for example by seeking arms, laying snares, or striking several times; because all those previous acts are to be held as parts of the principal act, and are ordered to this. But if the homicide first intended only a striking, and afterward, with will changed, killed, there will be a twofold

161. • Rule II. The numerical distinction of sins is also taken from the multiplicity of acts morally interrupted. - St. Lig., no. 36, and others very commonly.

For when acts of the will are morally interrupted, the individual acts become complete in themselves, nor can the following act be called the continuation of the preceding one. Thus he who at several morally interrupted times strikes another, or steals, commits as many sins as there are blows or thefts, because these constitute so many diverse acts.

But acts of the will are interrupted in a threefold mode, namely 1. By retraction, or express revocation of the will, because this impedes the later act from being joined with the prior one, for example if someone retracts a depraved will of acting badly, and afterward resumes it. - 2. By voluntary cessation from the act, or by application of the mind to a diverse object, for example if someone freely ceases from an evil proposal, and then returns to it. - 3. By a delay sufficiently notable, with regard had to the nature of the act, so that by the judgment of prudent men the act of the will is judged to cease ¹.

¹ ** The Author suggests an interruption which happens involuntarily. For even then, when the act is resumed, there is present a new act of consenting will, because, as St. Alph. says (book 5, no. 37), with regard to such acts, one does not depend on another. But what the Holy Doctor adds (ibid.): Thus commonly... against Lugo, can be admitted with difficulty; because Lugo (On Penance, disp. 16, no. 565) concedes that there is indeed no interruption when the later wills have dependence on the first, and by force of the first will the second is placed, just as by force of the intention the choice toward the end is placed. But otherwise, he says, when the wills are so disposed that one will does not depend on another. Which is the very doctrine itself of St. Alphonsus.

162. • But what delay is judged sufficient for the multiplicity of acts? The following rules are commonly handed down:

1. Merely internal acts, which have no order among themselves, are completed as soon as they are interrupted, and therefore they are multiplied as often as they are interrupted. The reason is that in reality there are as many complete and distinct acts of the will. And indeed such acts are not morally continued, since one does not depend on another; nor do they coalesce into one, since they have nothing in themselves by which they may be united to one another. Hence the penitent ought in confession to express, if he can, how many times he adhered to an internal temptation; but if he cannot, let him say approximately; or at least whether very frequently, in the course of the day, he gave consent.

2. Internal acts with the proposal of placing an external action are multiplied as often as the depraved proposal is formally renewed, namely in such a way that the later proposal cannot morally be judged a continuation of the prior one. The reason is that then a new act of the will, formally distinct, intervenes. But if the proposal is not renewed, no new sin is made, because then the prior act of the will is judged to persevere in the effect itself, or in the work external, if this has been begun. But the same proposal endures for a greater or lesser time according to the various intensity and also according to the various circumstances of persons, age, sex, disposition, etc. - St. Lig., no. 39 ².

² ** St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 39), to the question whether an evil proposal is interrupted by common interruptions, such as by sleep, distraction, eating, etc., answers: Lugo denies it, and adheres to Tamburini, even if a great delay intervenes; but this opinion is against the common opinion, and deservedly is rejected, as Croix says, book 5, no. 178.

But in reality Lugo is in no way mentioned there by Croix. How then did the name of De Lugo creep into the text of St. Alphonsus? Moreover St. Alphonsus (ibid.) praises as more probable the opinion of the Salmanticenses, treat. 20, ch. 12, no. 38. But the Salmanticenses in this place have these things: Therefore an intention of stealing or fornicating remains virtually in moral estimation, even if it is discontinued by sleep, eating... and similar interruptions; whence, although after these things you again repeat this depraved proposal, you commit one sin: because since the first will remains virtually, it is united and continued with the second. Now you would say these things were transcribed from Lugo, who in the same place which St. Alphonsus indicates (On Penance, disp. 16, no. 567) observes that a proposal is not interrupted by sleep or similar common and ordinary interruptions; and otherwise he has not even a word concerning that great delay of which St. Alphonsus speaks; indeed in the same place he proves what Salas excepts, unless much time intervenes between the acts of the will, because then a moral interruption is judged; and, what the Salmanticenses omitted, he adds: Yet perhaps merely internal wills are more easily interrupted morally, when the work has not begun to be placed externally; because that external placing or beginning, since it is sensible, more easily joins the parts in order to making one human and moral thing. Finally also that which the Salmanticenses (ibid.) add concerning moral interruption, when after a month the prior proposal is resumed, is taken from Lugo, who (l. c., no. 545) writes: I have said that these brief and common interruptions, through sleep and similar things, do not take away the unity of sin: for another thing must be said about an extraordinary interruption, which indeed takes away the moral unity of a human action. For if from an intention of killing Peter you seek him, and know that he has gone elsewhere and will return after a month, and you determine to kill him when he returns: then certainly, although you do not revoke the intention, still the killing after a month will not make one sin with the past will: just as neither will a dinner be one, however much you do not revoke the intention, but rather have the intention of returning after two hours to the table, because the unity of these actions asks not only an intention not revoked, but also lack of interruption, not of any interruption whatsoever, but of a human and moral one.

Let us come to Tamburini. And 1. observe that Tamburini, in the places cited by St. Alphonsus (Method of Confession, book 2, ch. 1, nos. 35, 36), does not treat of a merely internal proposal, but of a proposal led forth into work. Now concerning this case even St. Alph. (book 5, no. 40) writes: Acts of the will, if they proceed from the first will and morally remain in some effect which conduces to consummating the external sin, for whatever time the depraved will endures, constitute only one sin. Indeed Tamburini (no. 36) adds that which is not read there in St. Alphonsus, namely he explicitly excepts the interruption about which above the Salmanticenses with Lugo speak: and for that reason he refers the reader to the preceding no. 34.

2. But when Tamburini treats of an internal proposal, he has it thus (ibid. no. 32): Although the opinion asserting that by any interruption whatsoever the aforesaid acts are multiplied in number is speculatively more probable, whence also they ought, if they are held in memory, to be disclosed; nevertheless the contrary opinion, which teaches that they by no means ought to be disclosed, is also probable... Therefore it is enough if the time is explained, when it is notable... and thus it is enough if it is said: I, for example, for one day gravely hating Peter, imprecated grave evils upon him. But take care to attend well to those things which he immediately appends: For it is understood in the human manner, that is, that such acts were interrupted by various human actions.

3. What of the fact that Tamburini proposes absolutely the same doctrine which St. Alphonsus calls more probable? For St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 39) writes: But it seems more probable that it must be said that if a brief time intervenes, the act is not discontinued; otherwise, if a long time intervenes. But Tamburini (l. c., no. 47): The universal rule is of this kind: If much time intervenes between acts..., it will be judged a distinct act, and a sin distinct in number; but if a brief time is interposed, it will be judged to make one with the prior act.

4. But what of the fact that St. Alphonsus can seem more liberal than Tamburini himself? Namely the Holy Doctor appends (ibid.) the question: What time is to be judged long, namely which intervenes between one act and another, so that two acts are to be held as discontinued between themselves? Now let it be passed over for the present that the response of the Holy Doctor perhaps can seem partly to the point, partly away from the matter. For the opinions of Viva (On Penance, q. V, art. 6, no. 6, at the end) and Concina (On Sin, diss. 1, ch. 6, q. 4, no. 16) seem there to be brought away from the matter, since they do not treat of length of time which runs between one and another act, but of the time in which one act can be judged morally to persevere. But the opinions of the Salmanticenses (treat. 20, ch. 12, no. 38) and Roncaglia (treat. 2, q. 1, ch. 2, q. 2, resp. 1), which are brought there, are to the matter; they certainly speak of the distance of time running between one act and another. Let this also be passed over, that the proper response of the Holy Doctor is less to the matter, because it responds not to the question proposed concerning the time which runs between act and act, but to the question concerning the duration of one moral act. As regards the present point, the Holy Doctor (l. c.) replies: But I think that the impulse of one act can with difficulty be prolonged (speaking ordinarily) beyond two, or three days at most. Hence he who perseveres in an evil will beyond two or three days ought to explain the time, so that thus the number of internal acts concerning external sins may be understood morally. Thus St. Alphonsus. But Tamburini is much more moderate, and almost, I would say, more severe. For where St. Alphonsus does not impose the obligation of expressing the time unless where the act is prolonged to two or three days, six or ten hours suffice for Tamburini for this. For thus he (l. c., no. 49), to the question whether you ought to explain that you lasted so many hours in one act of concupiscence, for example, or of a desire of gravely harming an enemy, answers: I say: when in some one of these acts, by one heat of concupiscence and one impulse, you persist in the same thought, you sin once morally; and therefore the time will not have to be explained. But because when acts of this kind persevere, for example, through six or ten hours, it is morally impossible that this happen by one and the same impulse, therefore then it will be necessary and sufficient to say: Through six hours, or through ten, I desired, etc. For thus also the interruptions which in the human manner are accustomed to intervene, etc., will be explained.

These things will be able to serve the excellent VV., who are preparing a most accurate edition of the Theology of St. Alphonsus, so that notes of this kind, branded undeservedly upon writers, may be removed from the eminent work of the Holy Doctor.

3. External acts, or acts consummated externally, are multiplied as often as the object is disparate, or terminated in itself; but they are not multiplied, even with a notable interval of time interposed, when they are as it were parts of a more principal act, or when they tend to a single end. The reason is that then they effect one moral thing, which is not completed unless the act principally intended has been consummated. Thus he who has determined to perpetrate a theft commits one sin, although through several days he has thought about it, has rather often renewed the depraved proposal, has undertaken a journey for this, has sought the opportune time, etc.; for the prior act of the will is judged virtually to persevere in that very effect or external work ³.

³ ** Thus St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 40): If someone proposes to kill a man, and for this reason prepares arms, takes the road, and kills the enemy, he commits one sin, although through several days he has sought him, and has repeated the will several times. Thus commonly St. Bonaventure... and St. Thomas, etc.

It will be useful here to observe that St. Alphonsus, for this thesis, also alleged Vasquez after the Salmanticenses (treat. 20, ch. 12, no. 36); but the opinion of Vasquez is far different. For (On 1.2, disp. 75, ch. 2, no. 7, and On Penance, to q. 91, art. 1, dub. 5, no. 12, and elsewhere) he admits that it is one sin only insofar as the usurpation of the means, for example preparing arms, participates in one and the same malice which is proper to the end. For the rest, he contends that sin is multiplied not only by the interruption of sleep happening on the journey while he seeks the enemy (disp. 75, ch. 3, no. 11), but even by natural inconsideration, when a man considers neither expressly nor confusedly the end to which he tends in the very work which he does: as when someone makes a journey in order to kill an enemy, and meanwhile the mind is so distracted that he remembers neither the homicide, nor the place to which he tends, nor the journey itself (ibid. no. 12). Indeed he is carried so far that he says sin is multiplied by interruption if, meanwhile, when one is thinking about the work, consideration of the malice is lacking. Thus he (ibid. no. 13): When we say that sin is interrupted by inconsideration, this ought not be understood by inconsideration of the work itself or of the end, but also by inconsideration of the malice, when it is such that although a man adverts that he is going, for example, to Toledo, whither in the beginning he determined to betake himself with the mind of killing an enemy, but on the journey itself he entirely forgets the malice of the end not only specifically, but also confusedly, then sin is no longer said to be continued. These things indeed, wholly singular, deviate too much from the sense and premise of St. Alphonsus, as also from the common doctrine of others.

163. Resolves from what has been said. - 1. He commits one sin who, intending fornication, basely touches a woman, kisses her, entices her with base conversations, and finally fornicates; the reason is that all those previous acts by their nature are ordered to the consummated act. But if from the beginning he had wished only to touch the woman, and afterward, induced by lust, completed intercourse, there will be a twofold sin, and therefore it will not be enough if he confesses the intercourse. - St. Lig., no. 43.

2. A Priest who wills to omit the entire Office on one day makes one sin, because the individual Hours are ordered to completing one Office. But he would make two sins who first wished only to omit Matins, and afterward refused to recite the remaining Hours, because there would be a twofold act of evil will plainly distinct.

3. He perpetrates one sin who from the same impulse of passion repeats an evil act many times, for example several times basely touches himself or another, even with some interruption; strikes an enemy several times, or imprecates very many evils upon him, etc.; the reason is that there is one depraved affection of the will, and those various actions are morally united. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig., no. 50.

4. He makes one sin who by one act denies several articles of Faith at once, because the motive of Faith is one; consequently he is equally an infidel who denies one article, and he who denies all. - Thus commonly. - Likewise he probably makes one sin who by the same act blasphemes the twelve Apostles; because all blasphemies against the Saints take their malice from one relation to God. - St. Lig., no. 47.

5. He makes one sin who, intending to steal some determinate sum of money, carries it off at several times lest he be detected, because there is one depraved act of the will, which is consummated in the last theft ⁴. On the contrary, he perpetrates several sins who steals at several times from the same mass of money, without having resolved from the beginning to take away the whole, because the individual thefts effect an object total in itself.

⁴ ** The VV. oppose to this resolution that St. Alph. (book 5, no. 44) judges that then one hundred sins are committed, because the individual (one hundred) acts have consummated malice in themselves.

I answer: St. Alphonsus discusses him who carries them off a hundred times with moral interruptions; but Gury does not discuss morally interrupted acts.

Croix (book 5, no. 170), whom Mazzotta then copied (vol. 1, disp. 1, ch. 2, final prop.), contends that the acts are morally interrupted, because the individual acts of themselves are not ordered to one another, and because, as Mazzotta says, the individual acts are not ordered to the consummation of one work.

I answer: I deny that there is need for the acts to be ordered of themselves to one another; for as St. Alphonsus says (l. c., no. 41), external acts are morally united if they are directed to the consummation of the same sin. And in reality what ordering to one another is there between buying arms and taking the road for killing? What ordering to one another, to use examples brought by St. Alphonsus, is there between conversations and kisses and touches? Therefore it is not the ordering of these among themselves to one another, but their ordering from the intention of the agent to the consummation of one work, which constitutes one moral work; so that when that ordering intention has been taken away, all those acts which, no less than the little thefts in the case, have in themselves consummated malice, must be explained as distinct sins, as the Holy Doctor says (ibid. no. 43). But that Mazzotta did not see that the individual takings are ordered to the consummation of the whole theft will seem strange; yet nothing ought to seem strange if sometimes one writer merely transcribes from another.

6. He makes several sins who fornicates successively several times with the same woman; for each fornication is terminated in itself, or constitutes a total object. - St. Lig., no. 46.

7. He commits several sins who determines to omit the prescribed fast through several days; for although those omissions arise from one and the same will, still they are several sins to be confessed as distinct, because they have no unity among themselves. - Lugo, On Penance, disp. 16, no. 539. - St. Lig., no. 46.

8. But whether one or several sins are to be said to exist when objects materially and physically distinct in number are referred to one act, and therefore whether it is necessary to express the number of these objects in confession, is controverted ⁵. Some with Suarez, Filiucc., Lugo, say that it is one sin; but others with St. Alphonsus wish that there are several sins. Probability favors each opinion. Hence he probably makes one sin who by one act desires several women, intends to kill several men, or snatches a purse belonging to several associates ⁶.

⁵ There are those who propose this question thus: Whether sins are multiplied from the diversity or multiplicity of total objects. But not sufficiently aptly. For neither do those who deny that sins are multiplied suppose several total objects, but they say that objects materially several are conceived by mode of one adequate object.

Then, since those several objects conceived by mode of one must have a relation to one act of the one operating, the same authors distinguish whether it is an efficacious act of the will, as a proposal, or rather inefficacious, as, for example, a simple affection or complacency. For in the latter case, since the will does not regard those several things as an effect to be achieved, but merely as the object of complacency, they hold that one malice and therefore one sin is had; even several of those who otherwise follow the opinion of St. Alphonsus hold this. See Dicastillus, On Penance, disp. IX, dub. 4, no. 256.

But if the discourse is about an efficacious act of the will, they do not wish the unity or multiplicity of sin to be taken from the single interior act of the will, but also from the nature of the exterior act, namely whether those several objects are reached by one or by several external acts. See De Lugo, On Penance, disp. 16, no. 539. Hence they indeed find one sin in one detraction, which otherwise harms the reputation of several persons, for example of one family or College (Lugo, ibid., no. 135), or in an act which turns to the scandal of several; but they do not so define concerning a proposal by which someone determines, for example, to approach several women, or several times the same woman, or to omit fasting or canonical hours for three days (Lugo, ibid., no. 546).

Moreover, if someone, wishing to judge this question from the weight of authority, should undertake himself to inquire with his own eyes into the genuine opinions of the Doctors rather than with blind faith to trust others alleging them, he will find that far more, and indeed from the weightier ones, stood for that opinion which exempts the penitent from the obligation of expressing the number of objects, and moreover that most of the older authors who held that this number had to be expressed were led to this, not because they recognized several sins according to the number of objects, but because they thought that aggravating circumstances, of which sort they thought the multiplicity of objects, had to be expressed in confession.

** The VV. note (page 912) that here those far more numerous Authors are not seen indicated, who exempt from the obligation of expressing the number of objects.

I answer: 1. The work seemed superfluous. For did not St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 45) report twelve, and indeed not of the lowest note? Do not the Salmanticenses (treat. 20, ch. 12, no. 59) add five others? Does not Diana (vol. 1, treat. 7, res. 24 and 26) add three others? Does not Mendo (Balance of Opinions, disp. 2, nos. 2-4) add fifteen others to these? Do not four others appear in that charming Dialogue of Caramuel with Diana (Fundamental Theology XXIX, year 729)? Could there not be added Stoz (apud Croix, book 5, no. 150), and Struggl (treat. 2, q. 1, art. 4, nos. 42, 43), and the cited Mendo (l. c.), and Catalani (On Sin, q. 12, ch. 10, no. 12), and Roncaglia (treat. 2, q. 1, ch. 2, q. 2, resp. 2), and Wagemann (Synopsis of Moral Theology, part I, no. 45), and apud him Antonius Mayr, and (apud Lugo, On Penance, disp. 16, no. 135) Emmanuel Rodriguez, and Illsung (apud Reuter, vol. 1, treat. 5, no. 352), etc.?

2. To render the reason for the remaining part of that note it would then have had to be shown that most of the older authors affirmed for another reason that the number of objects must be confessed. Moreover it would have had to be indicated who on this side and on that are not alleged with full right. For as Croix excellently observes (book 5, no. 156), Authors very often propose resolutions which do not seem to cohere with the principles laid down, whence it happens that they are alleged for each diverse theory. Now work of this sort does not fit the brevity of a Compendium.

3. Nor only does the work not fit the brevity of a Compendium, but it scarcely carries any utility besides some knowledge of light moment for the Author's purpose. For can it be denied that probability belongs to each opinion, which even the adversaries concede? But this already suffices for defining the question. For in the controversy whether there is an obligation of expressing in confession the number of objects, on the one side probability does not suffice for imposing an obligation, but on the other side it suffices for denying it. Why then a further vain labor with useless expenditure of time?

4. But what happens now and then in alleging Authors, see an example apud the VV. They cite (l. c.) also Zacharia, book 5, no. 149. But do they think the Theology of Claudius La Croix was written by Zacharia, because the front of the book in certain editions, for example Venice, year 1755, carries the name of Zacharia in the more noble place, and below the name of Croix? But if, as is more likely, they thought that Zacharia approved all the opinions of Claudius La Croix, did he therefore approve also the opposite opinion of Laymann, whose work Zacharia likewise published illustrated with his notes?

⁶ Take the first of these cases as concerning inefficacious complacency; but the second as concerning several to be killed by one blow. As to the third example, De Lugo completes the matter thus by an argument from parity (On Penance, disp. 16, no. 139): Our doctrine of inference can be proved from another example, which Vasquez himself admits..., namely that some sin against two precepts of two superiors does not have two malices, nor must that circumstance be explained in confession, if the precepts are of the same nature; for each is a malice of disobedience, and therefore a sin against a divine and human precept does not have a double malice of disobedience... From which one can argue to our case. For that sin is also committed against the right of each superior, and harms the right which each has that he be obeyed; which rights are diverse, and therefore the harm inflicted seems to be diverse, as when the double right of two persons to reputation or to life is harmed; and nevertheless that double harming of jurisdiction must not be explained in confession; therefore neither in our case.

164. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Whether the means employed for sinning must be explained in confession, if the sin afterward was not consummated?

I answer: Some affirm this, even if those means were not evil in themselves, such as to undertake a journey, to carry a ladder for theft, etc. The reason is that the sin then does not remain merely internal, but becomes external by those means. For those actions, although indifferent in themselves, nevertheless become evil from the evil end. But others probably deny this ⁷, unless those means are evil in themselves, and then they must be indicated, and indeed all of them, if they are diverse in species, such as touches or obscene words employed for soliciting.

⁷ ** Here the VV. warn (page 912) that Viva apud St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 42) said that these means must very probably be explained, even if they are indifferent.

I answer: The probability of the negative opinion suffices so that the obligation of explaining means of this kind is denied. But the probability of the affirmative opinion so much does not suffice for asserting the obligation that it would be wrong for a Confessor to impose it. See the Authors apud Diana (vol. 1, treat. 7, res. 59).

165. • QUESTION 2. Whether he makes several sins who by one act detracts from several, or before several?

I answer to the first: It is controverted, and a twofold probable opinion is given, as was said above in resolution 8.

I answer to the second: It is controverted. Probably he makes only one sin; because to detract before several persons is only an aggravating circumstance: for the right to reputation is one among all, not multiple. Consequently there is probably no obligation of explaining in confession the number of persons before whom someone has detracted, but it suffices to say: I detracted before several persons. - St. Lig. (as probable), no. 49 ⁸. - Lugo. - Azor, etc., against Lacroix and others.

⁸ ** Thus St. Alph. (book 5, no. 49): It is probable that there is not an obligation of explaining the number of persons before whom the detraction was made.

Yet the VV. object (page 913, no. 19) that according to St. Alphonsus (Practice of Confessors, no. 43) it is the office of the Confessor to question the penitent about this.

I answer: I deny the consequence. For the Confessor can question about several things also so that he may aid the penitent merely by counsels, for example in a case how there can be place for restoring reputation. But as to what the VV. add concerning the obligation of explaining the number, let them show where St. Alphonsus taught that detraction has a necessary connection with scandal.

QUESTION 3. Whether he commits several sins who wishes several diverse evils to an enemy?

I answer: 1. Yes, of itself, if the intention of the one imprecating is determinately carried to evils of diverse species, for example disgrace and death; because desire takes its species from the object desired, as will be said below, no. 167. - St. Lig., no. 50, and more clearly, Apostolic Man, no. 65, and others commonly against some.

I answer: 2. No, by accident, because namely these diverse evils are almost apprehended under the general aspect of evil, as means to ruin; which is accustomed to happen when imprecations proceed from the impulse of anger. - St. Lig., ibid.

166. • QUESTION 4. Whether he makes several sins who long defers restitution?

I answer: No, if he perseveres habitually in the will of retaining another's thing, because the evil will perseveres by mode of a continuum with the thing unjustly retained. Yet if the unjust possessor has forgotten for a notable time about making restitution, and afterward has renewed the depraved proposal, he will commit a new sin, because his evil will is judged morally interrupted. - St. Lig., no. 40, and others commonly, against others, who say that the unjust possessor of another's thing sins as often as he attends to the obligation of restoring ⁹. - See Cases, no. 150 and following.

⁹ Since the doctrine of St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 40) can be safely held, namely that if someone resolved not to restore another's thing, and remains always in the same will, even for a year, he commits one sin; which doctrine he himself (book 3, no. 683) judges more probable; it follows that there is no need to express in confession whether the thing of another was retained for a short or long time. And indeed there is no need for this by reason of length of time, because length of time is a merely aggravating circumstance; concerning which matter Diana aptly says (vol. 1, treat. 7, res. 157): Aggravating circumstances are not necessarily to be confessed; but said length of time is only an aggravating circumstance. Therefore. But neither is it necessary by reason of multiple sin. Whence Diana (l. c., no. 4): Let the Confessor note this, and he will be free from many scruples: for the penitent satisfies in confession by accusing himself only of not having restored another's thing; nor is he to be questioned about the time and the length of retention, or about the number of sins which some think are committed in such length of time; provided he had not proposed to restore, and afterward, with mind changed, determined no longer to make restitution.

492. Sins specifically diverse by that very fact are numerically distinct. But the question is when sins are numerically distinct in the same species. Nothing concerning this matter has been defined by the Church; and therefore the question must be resolved from the moral estimation of prudent persons, with attention also to the psychological dispositions of the penitent. The things which are more commonly taught can be recalled to two principles; concerning a third principle there is much dispute.

493. 1. First principle. There are as many sins numerically distinct as there are evil acts of the will really distinct. It is said acts of the will, because sin is primarily in the will; really distinct, because if evil acts are at the same time gathered together to effect something morally one, there is only one sin, as will be declared below, n. 494. But if the evil acts of the will are truly and really distinct, each one of them has its own malice and is truly a sin. Thus he who by several acts steals from distinct persons commits as many thefts as he elicits diverse acts; he who by three acts harms the reputation of three persons commits a threefold sin of detraction.

494. 2. Second principle. There are as many sins numerically distinct as there are acts morally interrupted. For as often as acts are morally interrupted, each is complete, and therefore constitutes a sin.

But acts are morally interrupted in a twofold way: (a) by retraction, whether explicit, or even implicit, namely when the will deliberately ceases from the act without the purpose of returning to it, or is turned toward something incompatible with it; (b) by mere cessation, even involuntary, from the act (for example, through sleep, or through another occupation), so long that, in the judgment of prudent persons, the subsequent act does not morally coalesce with the former.

But in order that the matter may be better understood, it is helpful to apply the principles to various kinds of acts, namely to acts merely internal, to internal acts to be consummated externally, and to external acts.

Applications. (A) Acts merely internal, which are consummated in the will itself, such as acts of complacency or morose delectation in depraved thoughts, are multiplied as often as, after retraction or long cessation, they are renewed.

Thus he who voluntarily consents to evil delectation arising from a depraved thought, afterward devotes himself to study for a long time, and then voluntarily returns to the evil delectation, commits two sins; say the same of him who, seeing an enemy, inwardly curses him, afterward plays for a notable time, and again thinking about the enemy, curses him terribly. But if someone perseveres for an hour in morose delectation, from the same impulse of passion, although for a brief time he thinks about another matter, he commits only one sin, because a brief interruption does not prevent the act from being judged morally one. Yet he who for a whole day turns over the same depraved imaginations, and anew consents to them after a notable interruption, commits several sins, since the sinful acts are interrupted by various occupations. In this case, it is difficult to recount the number of sins accurately; but it suffices that the penitent say that for one or another day he frequently gave consent to these imaginations occurring to him: for from this a prudent confessor, with account taken of all the circumstances, will be able to judge about how many sins were committed, as we explain in the Treatise on Penance, n. 157.

495. (B) Internal acts elicited with the intention of consummating them externally, namely purposes or desires of doing some evil, for example, stealing, killing, are multiplied as often as after revocation, or very long cessation, they are renewed. For moral interruption a longer interval is required for desires than for complacencies in thoughts; for desires, by that very fact that they tend into an external act, are judged to endure virtually until the work is externally completed, unless nevertheless a very long delay is placed between the purpose and its execution.

But what interval is to be held as notable can be determined only from the judgment of prudent persons, according to the diversity of acts. Thus the purpose of reading a depraved book which is at hand is judged to be interrupted by an interval of several hours or at least one day, while the purpose of stealing or taking vengeance can persist through several days or weeks, namely if the opportune time is awaited for carrying out the purpose: for then all the internal acts form something morally one, because they are referred to the same act to be executed externally. But it must be said otherwise if, when the occasion presented itself, the agent did not wish to use it, because, by voluntary cessation from the iniquitous purpose, the first volition was morally interrupted.

496. (C) External acts are multiplied as often as they are repeated, provided they are complete and independent from each other; but they are not multiplied if, as incomplete acts or means, they are ordered to completing one principal act. Whence these acts are not morally interrupted by cessation alone, although long, but only by explicit or implicit retraction.

(a) Therefore he commits several sins who communicates sacrilegiously ten times, even within a brief time, - who omits prescribed fasting through several days, - who successively strikes an enemy several times, without the intention of killing him, - or steals a thousand coins from the same rich man on several occasions, without the prior intention of stealing this whole sum; for these are complete and independent acts.

(b) But he perpetrates one sin who, wishing to kill an enemy, conceives an act of vengeance, thinks about the means for executing it, buys and prepares weapons, takes the road, renews the perverse will of killing several times, wounds the enemy, and finally kills him; - who, wishing to steal a thousand coins from the same person, renews this intention hundreds of times, and at various intervals takes away now more, now less, until he has completed the sum; for all these acts are directed to the same end and constitute one homicide or theft. - The same must be said of him who, from the same impulse of anger, spews out several blasphemies, or afflicts the same person with several contumelies, because these acts are morally united by the same movement of passion.

497. 3. Controversy concerning the distinction of sins from the diversity of objects. When by one and the same act objects numerically distinct are reached, the question arises whether several sins are committed or only one.

(A) According to St. Alphonsus (n. 45) and many others, there are as many sins as there are distinct objects, even if they are apprehended by one act. The reason is because the malice of sin is drawn from the object formally taken, and therefore is multiplied according to diverse objects truly distinct.

Therefore he commits several sins who knowingly and willingly kills several men by one blow, - by one act wishes evil to several or detracts from various persons, - by one purpose wishes to omit prescribed fasting through several days, - by one action steals from several, unless the goods belong to the same community, etc.

498. (B) Suarez, Lugo, Laymann, and others¹ contend that a single act which is referred to several distinct objects, provided they are not specifically diverse, and are apprehended by the mind after the manner of one, constitutes only one sin.

¹ Suarez, in 3 p. St. Thomas, disp. XXII, sect. 5, n. 34; Lugo, De paenitent., disp. XVI, n. 104 seq.; Laymann, l. I, tr. 3, c. 3, n. 2; Noldin, n. 284, 285.

Thus he who by a single explosion wounds and kills several men, whom he apprehends only confusedly after the manner of one multitude, commits one sin; otherwise, if he distinctly apprehends each and wills to kill them. He who in one speech detracts from a family or community, whose members he perceives after the manner of one, perpetrates one sin; otherwise, if he wishes to harm the individual members or some of them distinctly. He who hates ten men by one act commits one sin, because under the confused concept of plurality he reaches them. He who by one desire covets three women sins once; but if he covets three under a diverse notion, an unmarried woman, a married woman, a nun, he perpetrates three sins specifically distinct.

In our judgment, it can be said that in this case there is one sin, but bearing before itself a special malice, which must be declared in confession. Certainly there is a difference, morally speaking, between the killing of one and the killing of several; whence if someone, by one explosion, knowingly and willingly killed and wounded several, it is not sufficient in confession to say: I perpetrated homicide once; but it is necessary to add: by one blow I killed several and wounded others; otherwise the confessor would plainly be deceived. Likewise if someone scandalized several, he ought to confess this, nor is it enough to say: I offered scandal once. When the number was apprehended only confusedly, it can likewise be accused confusedly, even if afterward the number of those who were wounded or scandalized were accurately known.

The usefulness of this title chiefly regards the use of the sacrament of penance.

— I. Principles ¹. 1. From that from which a thing has being, it also has unity, since one and being are convertible. But the moral and sin is from the will. Therefore from the will it also has unity, at least in such a way that where there are several successive wills, for example because of retractions or interruptions of acts, several sins are necessarily had. Hence a certain first principle: when wills are multiplied, sins are multiplied.

2. Nevertheless, in forms which are distinguished by number alone, the principle of multiplication is the division itself of matter. Thus, since not only interior acts but also commanded acts are voluntary, we arrive at another principle: when sinful acts are multiplied, sins are multiplied of themselves.

3. Yet if those sinful acts come together into a certain moral unity, the second principle must be tempered by that third one: several acts which, commanded by the same deliberation of the will, morally effect one thing are one sin.

But several terms of one intention, as such (for example, several persons who suffer detraction, theft, homicide), do not multiply sins: whether they are apprehended under the confused notion of multitude, which then Lehmkuhl also concedes, or whether the evil intention and action are directed to individuals as distinct. Thus we say with Suarez, Paen. d. 22, s. 5, n. 34-36; Lugo, Paen. d. 16, n. 126 sq., against Vasquez, 1, 2, d. 74, 75, and in 3 p., q. 91, dub. 4 and 5; St. Alphonsus, l. 5, n. 45, 46; D'Annibale I, 284-288.

We bring forward this easy reason, because an act indeed takes its species from the object, but why it should take plurality from that exterior term is not seen. And this conclusion coheres so with the principle of St. Thomas concerning unity to be sought from the will, or principle, and specification from the object, or term, that, unless there were the authority of others, we would perhaps say that the diverse opinion is improbable.

Wherefore even diversity of total objects can indeed impede the moral unity of acts and supply us an indication of plurality; but, contrary to what is often done today, it cannot be proposed as the formal reason of multiplication. For the sake of greater clarity, the individual principles seem to have to be declared more fully.

¹ N.B. Here there is no question of the number of malices, of which several can exist in one sin, just as a man remains one although he is furnished with several qualities.

¹ Theol. I, 352, where he simply alleges for this Laymann, l. 1, tr. 2, c. 3, n. 2; Lugo; Suarez; Ballerini-Palmieri, I, n. 630 ff., who nevertheless virtually exclude the distinction which he uses. But rather they introduce another, since they require that the external act be single (cf. Ball.-Palm. l.c. n. 632 and 638), which squares with the things said by us here, n. 432, 2.

— II. Greater explanation of the first principle, concerning plurality of wills with applications.

1. As many renewals of the will as there have been after retraction, so many sins by number will be added to the first will. For by retraction the preceding will is necessarily ended.

2. The same must be said if, even without penance concerning the preceding act, there has voluntarily or formally been a cessation from it. Thus, without penance, a thief, an adulterer, because the occasion has passed, can lay down the will of stealing, of committing adultery. As often as, with the occasion returning, they have again assumed that will, so often they will necessarily sin.

3. Involuntary and natural cessation, for example by sleep, by distraction to other things, can also impose an end on the will or morally interrupt the act. This is had whenever the following act no longer arises from the force of the prior deliberation; but not if "return to a similar act occurs as if naturally without a new deliberation" ¹. And here it must be observed that a will is not judged new which, having become more remiss, on the occasion of a certain exterior presence of an exciting cause or of interior meditation, becomes again more intense, just as it is not a new fire to which new fuel is brought, and therefore from languid it is converted into ardent.

The question therefore arises, how long one will can morally persevere. One general rule is not at hand for us. To help moral estimation, there must be distinguished interior acts without an efficacious proposal; acts which contain an efficacious proposal or will of executing; and exterior acts.

Separated from the proposal of execution, interior acts cease rather easily, and Lugo thinks that regularly they cannot morally persevere beyond two or three hours (2): say interior blasphemies, delights concerning impure phantasms. Yet an unclean desire, hatred of neighbor, is preserved longer in the habit itself. Indeed voluntary aversion from a neighbor can persevere for months.

In a proposal of executing, the will can be sustained for a long time. Nevertheless persons and also matters are to be distinguished. Thus a sought vengeance, a sought woman, a sought occasion of stealing, as it were lie hidden the same in conscience, even after sleep, after distracting occupations; while, on the contrary, a proposal of easier execution will be interrupted more quickly. Thus Ballerini-Palmieri judge that the proposal of reading a depraved book is for the most part interrupted after an hour ¹. We think this is true if it concerns a book which is at hand, because for a proposal of this sort a weaker will, which is extinguished more quickly (2), suffices.

In an external execution begun, the same internal will easily endures until completed execution, for example in him who repeats external attempts toward homicide, who intends by several partial thefts to steal one grave sum, who, after he has determined to read one prohibited book, completes the reading by several physically interrupted times.

¹ Suarez, Paenit., d. 22, s. 5, n. 11. - (2) Paenit., d. 16, n. 670.

¹ Op. theol. I, tr. 4, n. 657. - (2) Lugo, op. c. d. 16, n. 590.

— III. Greater explanation of the other principle taken from the plurality of exterior acts.

Of itself, as many as are the distinct exterior consummations, so many sins must be numbered. But exterior consummations are distinct when exterior acts are not united among themselves. Therefore he commits several sins who, although in the same conversation, now detracts from one person, now from another; who several times completes solitary sin or fornication.

— IV. Greater explanation of the third principle, concerning the moral unity of several acts, even exterior ones.

1. Exterior acts subordinated among themselves are morally united as directed to one end or complete object. Thus all exterior acts ordered to one end of theft ³, likewise imperfect acts (kisses, looks, touches) directed to one copulation.

2. Exterior acts of the same notion are morally united, which are repeated in the same heat of passion, or are known and intended or chosen under a certain common apprehension. Thus imperfect acts of luxury which are added as a certain complement to fornication, thus several insults, contumelies, imprecations pronounced in the same anger, several slaps morally struck at the same time, indeed several wounds inflicted at the same time in the same way. For the will was not indeed of saying such an injurious word, giving such a slap, inflicting such a wound, but more generically, of humiliating, striking, wounding. For the same reason, he who, in a state of sin, approaches to hear confessions, wills on that occasion to administer the sacrament sacrilegiously, in which one object the several absolutions given agree. The very notion of sacrilege is the solemn administration of the sacrament in a state of sin.

Yet of itself, he will commit a distinct sin who immediately boasts of fornication, both because of scandal and because this boasting is not the natural complement of fornication (Suarez, Paen. d. 22, 15, n. 27).

³ St. Thomas, In 1 Sent. d. 12, q. 1, art. 1.

— Corollary. Because terms do not multiply sins, he sins once who by one act of hatred or detraction hates several persons, detracts concerning several even before several; who by one act carnally covets several persons; who by one act kills two or brings harm to several; who by the same act blasphemes against the twelve apostles or denies several articles of faith.

— Concerning the plurality of omissions. You ask whether or not he necessarily commits several sins who for a month does not hear Mass, does not recite the office, or through Lent observes no fast, no abstinence?

From the things just said it is clear that the internal proposal concerning that long-lasting omission would be one sin. But the question is made concerning the omission itself which follows. First, as irrelevant, we must exclude the question concerning those sins which in reality consist in committing, although in species they are sometimes shown negatively. Thus by positive eating the precept of fast and abstinence is violated. Wherefore as often as an act is done which contains a substantial violation of this sort, so often it must not be doubted that sin is committed.

True omissions are had in merely positive precepts, by which no act according to itself is prohibited: for example, in the precept of hearing the sacred service, of reciting the breviary.

The received opinion has it that as many days as there have been on which the sacred service or breviary was omitted advertently, so many sins are numbered: and this whether the will itself of the omissions was one or multiple. For individual omissions are distinct sins because concerning individual ones there are diverse precepts; nevertheless he does not sin several times who has omitted the whole office of one day, which is customarily recited by parts, because there is one precept terminated to the whole office of the day ¹. These reasons seem difficult. For it is not repugnant that diverse precepts be violated by one single action. Cf. n. 430. In order that several sins be present, it is necessary that we find several wills, or at least sinful acts, to which the evil will gives as it were the form of sin. But omission as such says no act.

But from St. Thomas we know that a blameworthy omission can be commanded by a twofold will: by a will which directly intends the omission itself, or by a will which directly wills some good, for example, a game with which the omission is necessarily joined. In the latter case, when the game is repeated, there is repeated the act which, as the cause why Mass or the breviary is omitted, is gravely blameworthy. And thus there is place for the rule which says that there are several sins where there are several sinful acts.

The difficulty is graver where no inordinate affection for a positive thing joined with the omission, but impiety or unbelief, directly rejects the obligation of Mass or breviary. Unless the concordant opinion of doctors multiplied those sins indistinctly, we would incline to the opposite side. Now we shall hand down this explanation of the received opinion. The precept of hearing the sacred service, of saying the breviary, so urges us that at least the last Mass which is celebrated on a feast day must be heard, and that at least in the last hour of the day the breviary must be recited. Therefore, while the last Mass, the last hour of the day stands, any other action is prohibited, just as the game was prohibited because of affection for which someone had determined to omit the sacred service. The reason alleged also shows well why he who omits the whole burden of the breviary sins only once; for the substance of the precept is preserved if the whole breviary is recited at once in the last hour of the day.

What if he is physically impeded? It must be said otherwise concerning him who by a voluntary throwing away of the breviary now for some time cannot recite the breviary. He incorporated his evil will into one single throwing away. Wherefore he sinned once only, of itself. The act of one omitting restitution for a long time is also diverse. For this obligation excludes no other act morally and of itself, and urges perpetually. Wherefore, the same will remaining, one sin remains. Cf. Lugo, d. 16, num. 548 and 549.

Hence we come to this conclusion: exterior omissions do not multiply sins, except insofar as they exclude or prohibit several positive acts.

N.B. - Indeed, an easier reasoning is ready at hand by which we would be led to the same conclusions in this way: privation is reduced to habit, omission to act. Therefore as many sins as there would be by action, so many there will be by omission. But as often as prohibitions recur, so often sin is committed by the prohibited action. Therefore as many as are the prescribed actions, so many are the omissions. And in this way it is perceived why the daily precept of the breviary produces a daily sin of omission, whereas a long omission of restitution does not multiply sins, because restitution must be made only once.

This easier reasoning would be efficacious if the numerical notion of sin were taken from the object. Then, just as happens for specification, omission would be conceived after the manner of being. But number is estimated according to acts of the will which can be terminated to omission as to action. Therefore there is no place for that interchange of omissions with actions; no cause is indicated why more acts of the will are to be numbered than there truly were.

¹ Lugo, Paen. d. 16, n. 540, 547.

— You ask how often he sins who grows hardened in some grave sin?

As often as he voluntarily, conscious, omits the precept of penance, which urges of itself or per accidens; and as often as positively (by morally distant acts) he refuses to amend himself. But he does not sin gravely when he bears himself negatively, or refuses not absolutely but here and now. Cf. D'Annibale I, 268. We are speaking of grave sin. For at least a venial obligation exists, from charity toward oneself, of rising morally at once from sin.

— What if the principal action, for example fornication or theft, to which the others expressed order, could not happen by chance?

Not a few then think that, the principle of unity being lacking, several sins are made, and therefore require that all the means be explained ¹ (for example, a ladder placed against a wall for stealing); or at least those which are evil in themselves ² (for example, harmful acts, shameful touches). But how that which because of intention was one becomes subjectively multiple, we do not see. Wherefore, with others (3), we think it is enough that the guilty person indicate his intention of the completed sin, execution truly begun, and this incomplete. For externally he is truly guilty of attempted theft or fornication.

¹ St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 42, from Viva, Paen. q. 5, art. 6, n. 6, Notandum 2.

² Ballerini-Palmieri, Op. th. I, tr. 4, n. 668. - (3) D'Annibale I, 287 (15); Van der Velden-Piat I, p. 150 note; Genicot-Salsmans I, 167.

— Accusation of sins. 1. A penitent who spontaneously or when asked accuses the number is regularly not to be questioned concerning the duration of his action, since duration of itself is a merely aggravating circumstance. It is otherwise if he manifestly errs. For not rarely the number of sins must be conjectured from the long duration of an evil will.

2. Often it will also be more difficult for the penitent distinctly to define delays, interruptions, etc. Then let him state the long time through which the evil affection endured (for example, through the whole day I shamefully desired; for a month I bore hatred). And the confessor himself, attending to the character of the person, the nature of the thing, and the circumstances, for example, of occupations, will morally conjecture how many interruptions there were. Yet where it can be done, let the penitent himself add whether the interruptions were notably rare or frequent. This especially has place if the interruption endured for days, weeks, or a month.

And because the will is more easily interrupted when physical inability stands in the way of execution, let him who for a long time omitted restitution or thought of perpetrating a crime indicate the times during which no opportunity of execution was being given.

3. This mode of indicating frequency will not rarely be more expedient: that the penitent indicate the accustomed frequency of sins by week or month.

By this reason, one arrives at a better knowledge of the state of the penitent, on account of which knowledge, after all, distinct accusation is demanded, than by mathematical indications in which there is silence concerning the habitual state of the soul.

4. Finally, observe that several moral species which can be had in one act must always be accused, nor can the confessor be positively deceived. Certainly, if one accuses detraction, the confessor will well understand that it could easily have been made before several or before one; but he who betrays himself as a homicide will be judged guilty of one homicide, unless he at least confusedly indicates the plurality of persons killed. Cf. Lugo, Paen. d. 16, n. 140.

Thus far the things which it seemed good to say concerning the most complicated question, where disagreements of opinions, which sometimes mix specific reasons with numerical ones, induce wonderful confusion.

— I. Sin has its unity from the will which is its cause. Wherefore when wills are multiplied, sins are multiplied. Then the very division of matter is a principle of multiplication. Wherefore, when sinful acts are multiplied, sins are multiplied of themselves. Except, however, if those acts come together into a certain moral unity.

Plurality of terms as such does not multiply sins, provided they are reached by one intention. Therefore:

II. - 1. Wills are multiplied necessarily after retraction and after formal cessation or interruption. Therefore this rule can be established:

As many as are the new deliberations of sinning, so many are the sins. But the force of one deliberation can persevere even after sleep. Under the aspect of moral perseverance it is useful to distinguish interior acts without an efficacious proposal, acts of efficacious proposal, and external executions begun.

Of itself, the more the will is fixed externally, the longer the same will be able to endure. Yet certain interior affections, for example of hatred, can remain for a long time.

2. As many as are the distinct exterior consummations, so many are the sins. Nevertheless exterior acts subordinated among themselves are morally united as directed to one end, for example, to one theft or to one fornication. Exterior acts are also morally united when they are repeated in the same heat of passion, or chosen or intended under a certain common apprehension, at least when they are of the same notion.

III. A proposal of omitting Mass for a month is one sin. The concordant opinion of doctors wills that there are as many sins as there are Masses truly omitted, unless assistance at Mass has become impossible. This reason can be: that while the hour of the last Mass stands, every action or mode of bearing oneself which cannot be composed with assistance is now prohibited. Then the rule would be: by omissions sins are multiplied insofar as they exclude or prohibit several positive acts, which nevertheless have been effected.

He who grows hardened in grave sin sins as often as, conscious, he omits the grave precept of doing penance, and as often as he positively is unwilling to amend himself.

Although the principal action to which several secondary actions were ordered has been made impossible, nevertheless these probably remain one sin, because they were joined in the efficacious intention.

IV. Accusation of sins. 1. He who accuses the number is not to be questioned about duration, unless he manifestly errs. 2. If it is difficult for the penitent distinctly to define delays, interruptions, etc., it will be enough that he indicate the long time through which the evil affection endured. Let him add, if he can, the times through which execution was impossible, because then the will is more easily interrupted.

And often it will be useful that he indicate the accustomed frequency by month or week.

V. Yet several moral species which occur in one sin must always be accused. Nor can the confessor be positively deceived. Therefore, one guilty of several killings will have to indicate the plurality at least confusedly.

376. Preliminary note. Older authors before the Council of Trent are not accustomed to speak at greater length about the numerical distinction of sins, and among modern writers there is no consensus. The Church has thus far defined nothing about this matter. Hence some have said, not inconveniently, that here especially the prudent estimation of men must be attended to, and therefore those sins are judged numerically distinct which are held as such by timorous men. - It is clear of itself that sins specifically distinct are also distinguished numerically, although they are done by one act. Hence he who commits theft in order to fornicate perpetrates not only two sins specifically distinct, but also two numerically diverse sins; he who steals a sacred thing wounds the virtue of justice and of religion, and therefore his act contains a twofold malice and two sins. - In the present matter there is one question: in what way those sins are distinguished numerically which are of the same species, for example when several thefts, several fornications, several lascivious thoughts, etc., are distinguished numerically. That saying of St. Thomas¹⁰⁶ for the numerical distinction of sins can be held as the following:

¹⁰⁶ 2, dist. 42, q. 1, a. 1.

377. General principle: "The judgment concerning the unity of that which is said in the genus of morals must be taken according to the unity of the will"; or in other words: There are as many sins as there are acts of evil will not morally united. This principle is customarily explained by these two rules:

378. Rule 1. There are as many sins as there are morally interrupted acts of the will concerning the same object.

An act of the will is morally interrupted when it perseveres neither formally nor at least virtually. But it is judged to persevere neither formally nor virtually:

1. By voluntary revocation. Hence if someone, for example, having lascivious thoughts, afterwards indeed rejects them, but after an interval admits them again, he has made two acts and therefore two sins.

2. By voluntary cessation from the act. For voluntary cessation is an implicit retraction.

If cessation is not voluntary but forced, then one must distinguish between a) acts merely internal, such as thoughts and morose delectations; b) acts mixedly internal, such as desires; c) external acts.

a) If the matter concerns acts merely internal, even involuntary cessation seems to interrupt morally the act begun; for example, while someone delights in obscene thoughts, his friend arrives, with whom he must converse for a quarter of an hour, and on that account he must turn his thoughts to other things; but after the friend has gone away, he again begins to think of obscene things. It seems to be a twofold sin, because the prior act is connected with the second by no bond.¹⁰⁷ Yet in practice it is almost always impossible to find the determined number of merely internal acts of this kind, and therefore it suffices if the penitent accuses himself: I had depraved thoughts, which indeed lasted for so much time.

b) If the matter concerns acts mixedly internal, namely depraved desires (acts of doing), involuntary cessation does not interrupt the act, but that act is judged one which is done from one impulse of passion; and this impulse, according to St. Alphonsus,¹⁰⁸ can last two to three days. Hence, for example, if someone proposes to commit theft and diligently seeks the means for execution, but in fact must desist from the execution of the theft until finally at the end of the third day the matter turns out according to his wishes, he commits only one sin. St. Thomas writes to the point:¹⁰⁹ "It happens that there are several acts according as they are referred to the genus of nature, which nevertheless are one according as they are considered in the genus of morals, as is clear in him who steals: because all his acts which are ordered to the end of theft are sin, since they are done with an evil intention, and these can be very many; and nevertheless all are reckoned as one sin, because they do not have the notion of sin except according as they are ordered by one will to one perverse end."

Generally it must be said that depraved desires which are concerned with some work to be perpetrated or omitted unite into one sin all acts necessary for obtaining the intended end, and that desires do not multiply sins, unless they are explicitly or implicitly revoked. This indeed especially holds if the matter concerns not a work to be perpetrated, but one to be omitted. Hence, for example, he who proposes not to restore another's goods, and by force of that purpose omits restitution for two years, does not seem to commit more than one sin, although meanwhile he often renews that depraved purpose.¹¹⁰ But if at some time he retracted the purpose of not restoring, wishing to restore, and afterwards again renews the purpose of not restoring, then the sin is certainly multiplied.

c) If the matter concerns external acts, involuntary cessation, not lasting very long, does not interrupt acts which are as parts or means toward one consummated act. The matter is otherwise if there is question of acts morally complete and total in themselves, which will be treated in the second rule. Hence, for example, he who, intending to read through a depraved book, reads it over several days, does not commit more than one sin; likewise young men mutually mixing obscene words commit only one sin, even if because of the master's intervention they must cease for a quarter of an hour from obscene speech. On the contrary, a young man who twice pollutes himself, or a prostitute who twice fornicates within a quarter of an hour, commits two sins. The reason is that readings or obscene conversations in those cases are not consummated sins, but pollution and fornication are acts morally complete in themselves.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Billuart, De pecc. diss. 2, a. 4. St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 37) tempered this opinion somewhat, saying: "If several acts of this kind proceed from the same impulse of concupiscence, they constitute one mortal sin, even if some brief interval intervenes between the acts."

¹⁰⁸ L. c. n. 39.

¹⁰⁹ 2, dist. 42, q. 1, a. 1.

¹¹⁰ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 40.

379. Resolves: 1. If someone wishes to steal 100 francs, but, fearing lest he be caught, takes away this sum by parts and with many intervals interposed, for example by taking 5 francs each week, he commits only one sin, even if he renewed the purpose twenty times and twenty times took away 5 francs. The reason is that all those acts have moral union as tending to one end.¹¹¹

2. He who approaches a woman with the intention of fornicating, but first says many obscene words, performs touches, and finally after an hour completes fornication, commits only one sin, which he sufficiently accuses in confession by saying: I committed fornication once. But if from the beginning he had no determined intention, and then did all those immodest acts, he is bound to declare the individual acts in confession. The same holds more probably concerning the means employed, if someone had the intention of fornicating,^111a but afterwards did not execute it either because of retraction or because an impediment arose. The reason is that, as St. Alphonsus says,¹¹² then the sin does not remain only internal, but is externalized in those actions, all of which become evil, since all are informed by an evil end. Other theologians, however, think otherwise. Nor should someone say: Therefore in the second and third case the penitent committed more sins than in the first, where perhaps he perpetrated many more obscene acts; which seems inconvenient. For the response is: Certainly more sins were present in the second and third case, but that one sin in the first case is more culpable before God than the number of sins in the second and third case.

3. A priest who proposes to omit the whole Divine Office on one day, and in fact omits it, commits one mortal sin. But if previously he had intended only to omit Matins and Lauds, and after an interval additionally proposed to omit another Hour, he committed two mortal sins. Yet those two sins are certainly as grave together as one sin committed by omission of the whole Office. A priest who proposes to omit the Divine Office for ten days seems to commit ten mortal sins, just as also a priest who in fact did not recite this Office for ten days.

¹¹¹ So Gury, Comp. Theol. mor. I, n. 163; Noldin, De principiis n. 305.

^111a Yet he must explicitly accuse this sinful intention of fornicating in confession.

¹¹² L. c. n. 42.

380. Rule 2. There are as many sins as there are objects numerically distinct in moral being or morally total, although they are reached by the same act of the will, indeed even by the same external act.

Objects are judged to be numerically distinguished in moral being when they do not hold themselves morally after the manner of one: either because one is not part of another, or because they are not ordered to the same end. The reason is a) because, just as sins are specifically distinguished and multiplied by objects distinct in species, so a fortiori they are multiplied numerically by objects numerically distinct and complete in themselves;¹¹³ b) because the same act can include not only several malices diverse in species, but also in number. So teach Billuart, Concina, Wigandt, St. Alphonsus,¹¹⁴ all the Redemptorists, Muller, etc., against Suarez, Lugo, Laymann, Noldin, Vermeersch, Merkelbach, Gopfert, and others.

Resolves: 1. He who by one explosion kills ten men commits ten homicides and ten mortal sins, not one, as Noldin¹¹⁵ and others wish. The reason is that one man is not part of another, and therefore is a total object and has a special right to life, which the killer wounds. Thus at least if the killer intended and foresaw ten homicides. - Here it can be asked, for the sake of an example, how many sins he commits who causes a whole stretch of railway, in which several men are being carried, to perish. The response is: This depends on his intention and foresight. If he intended and foresaw that 50 men would die in the stretch, he commits 50 homicides besides other sins of causing damage, wounding, etc.

2. He who in one speech detracts from several determined persons commits as many sins as there are persons knowingly calumniated by him. The reason is that each person has his own right not to have detraction committed against him. But I say "from several determined persons"; for if someone detracts from some community of men in general, for example from some army of soldiers, he does not commit as many sins as there are soldiers, because then the right of the whole community rather than of the individual members is wounded. On the contrary, he who detracts from one person before several persons seems to commit one sin;¹¹⁶ indeed also he who detracts from one person in diverse matters. For each of these pluralities is only an aggravating circumstance of one and the same sin.

3. A priest who, in the state of mortal sin, successively either hears several confessions or solemnly baptizes several persons more probably commits as many mortal sins as the confessions he heard or the baptisms he conferred. The reason is that each confession or each baptism is a total object.¹¹⁷ For the same reason, a priest existing in the state of mortal sin who on the day of the Nativity of the Lord says three Masses successively commits three numerically distinct sins. But a sinful priest who administers the holy eucharist at the same time to 200 persons does not seem to commit 200 mortal sins, but one, because there seems to be one table and one administration. Moreover, it is not so certain that a priest commits mortal sin when he administers the holy eucharist while he himself exists in the state of mortal sin.¹¹⁸

4. He who by one immodest speech induces five boys to sin commits five mortal sins. The reason is that each boy is a total moral object having a special right that his soul not suffer detriment.

¹¹³ Cf. Billuart l. c.

¹¹⁴ Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 45.

¹¹⁵ De principiis n. 312.

¹¹⁶ St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 49; cf. also below II, n. 190.

¹¹⁷ Cf. below III in the treatise on the sacraments in general 58. Noldin (l. c. n. 305) and others teach the contrary.

¹¹⁸ Ib. 59.

381. Admonition. Certainly the confessor is bound to investigate the species and number of mortal sins, since the Council of Trent has prescribed this. Nevertheless, let there be nothing excessive! Not a few penitents, especially those who have not made confession for a rather long time, cannot, morally speaking, declare all mortal sins according to species and number. Therefore it suffices both for the penitent and for the confessor if, serious diligence having been employed, sins are declared in that way in which it is possible; because then sufficient integrity of confession is furnished, and the confessor sufficiently knows the state of the penitent's conscience. But if the confessor insists too much in inquiring about the ultimate species and exact number of sins, he uselessly torments both himself and the penitents, and will deter penitents from making confession.

216. Preliminary Note. - The dissertation now to be undertaken on the numerical distinction of sins claims for itself no less attention than the inquiry of the preceding article on their specific distinction; since, from the Council of Trent,¹ all and each mortal sins committed after Baptism, of which memory is had after diligent examination of conscience, must be declared in Sacramental Confession, not only according to species, but also according to number. - But sins are said to be distinct according to number, or numerically distinct, if they are several in number, for example two homicides, three thefts, etc.; and hence the whole argument of the present article can be reduced to this one general question: When must sins be judged to be several in number? or, what comes to the same thing: whence must their numerical distinction be sought? Yet observe that in this question the discussion concerns only sins diverse in number alone, that is, sins of the same species which are several in number; for if the discussion concerns sins distinct in species, it is of itself clear that they are also distinct in number; for things which differ in species by that very fact are not one, but several, and therefore numerically diverse.

This being noted beforehand, concerning the numerical distinction of sins of the same species let there be three sections.

§ I. Whence The Numerical Distinction Of Sins Of The Same Species Is To Be Sought.

217. • According to the mind of St. Alphonsus,² this distinction is to be taken from a twofold root, namely 1° from the multiplicity of acts of the same species which do not coalesce into one act of sin, and 2° from the multiplicity of objects of the same species which do not coalesce into one object; and therefore, with the same Saint as guide, these two general principles can rightly be established.

Principles. - I. Several acts of the same species, which do not coalesce into one act of sin, constitute as many sins as there are acts.

II. One act, having several objects of the same species which do not coalesce into one object, contains as many sins as there are objects.

That these principles may be better understood and made accommodated to practical use, in the two following sections we shall investigate: 1° with respect to the first principle, when several acts must be judged not to coalesce into one act of sin; 2° with respect to the second principle, when several objects must be judged not to coalesce into one object.

§ II. Which Acts Do Not Coalesce Into One Act.

218. • The following are judged not to coalesce: a) acts which are disparate among themselves, and b) acts between which there intervenes a moral interruption.

Those acts are called disparate which do not concur as means, beginnings, or complements toward the same work to be consummated in its own species. Wherefore:

1° Among themselves all acts complete in themselves, that is, consummated in their own species, are disparate.

2° Likewise preliminary acts, that is, not consummated, which are posited without the intention of arriving at the consummated act, are judged to be disparate from the consummated act, if the latter afterwards follows, with the will changed and increased.

3° Similarly acts not consummated, which indeed are posited with the intention of arriving at the consummated act, but by accident do not attain to it, are again rightly held as disparate from this act, intended to be consummated but by accident not consummated.

4° On the contrary, as often as such acts not consummated are posited with the intention of arriving at the same consummated work, and actually attain to this also, so often they are not disparate from the consummated work, but coalesce with it into one act of sin, provided nevertheless that between them there does not intervene a moral interruption, concerning which below in the second Point.

219. Resolves from 1°. - Therefore two fornications, two homicides, etc., are disparate acts, and therefore numerically two sins, because individual fornications, individual homicides, are complete acts. Hence acts of this sort, complete or consummated in their own species, must always be set forth in Sacramental Confession according to their number, even if perhaps they proceed from the same intention or from the same impulse of the will; for instance, if someone from the same impulse of the will successively kills several persons, or from the same heat of lust fornicates several times, etc. Likewise if a priest in the state of mortal sin celebrates three Masses successively on the day of the Nativity of the Lord; for individual Celebrations, in moral estimation, are acts complete in themselves, and therefore disparate among themselves. Likewise, from the truer opinion of St. Alphonsus and one whose opposite must wholly be denied,¹ if a priest, in mortal sin, successively absolves several persons; because individual absolutions are individual Sacraments, and therefore actions disparate among themselves. Yet the same Saint thinks otherwise² concerning a priest who, in the state of mortal sin, in one successive course distributes Holy Communion to several persons. Indeed such a priest, in distributing the Most Holy Eucharist, according to the opinion which Alphonsus defends against Lugo, sins mortally by the sin of sacrilege, but does not commit numerically several sins, because such a distribution, made to several in one course, is judged in moral estimation to be one action, one banquet, although it consists of many guests, and therefore the individual distributions, in the case, will not be actions disparate among themselves.

220. Resolves from 2°. - Therefore obscene words, touches, kisses, etc., had with another person, without the intention of arriving at the consummated act of lust, for instance at fornication, are acts disparate from the fornication itself, if this afterwards follows because lust has been increased; and therefore kisses of this sort, etc., separately from the fornication afterwards following, must be declared in Confession. Likewise grave woundings inflicted on someone, without the will of killing him, are disparate from the killing itself, if afterwards it happens because anger has become more inflamed; and as such they must be explained in Confession. Cf. St. Alphonsus.³

Note. - If you ask here whether those very acts not consummated, as kisses, etc., in the first case, and woundings in the second case, are also disparate among themselves mutually, so that in Confession it is necessary to say how many times they took place? I answer affirmatively; because these acts, as is supposed, are by no means ordered from the intention of the sinner to the consummated act, but are done solely on account of their own delectation; and hence it is the common opinion of the Doctors that in Confession it must be declared how many times. - Nevertheless one exception must be admitted, namely: if these acts proceed from the same impulse, even with a certain brief interval; for then they can morally be estimated as one continued act, and therefore then it will suffice that in confession there be simply set forth what was done, for example: I acted dishonestly with another person by touches and kisses; I injured my neighbor by gravely wounding him. - The same you will rightly judge concerning locutions which, while remaining in the same matter and person, are uttered several times in one course from the same vehemence of affection, and thus morally become as it were one continued locution; for instance, if someone in the same matter, from the same impulse, several times curses the same person, several times blasphemes or perjures himself, etc.

221. Resolves from 3°. - Therefore depraved conversations, touches, kisses, etc., had with another person from the intention of arriving at the consummated act of fornication, are disparate from this very intended fornication, if by accident it is not consummated, and consequently must be opened separately from it in Confession. - Wherefore St. Alphonsus rightly notes altogether¹ that, separately from the intended sin, as sins numerically distinct from it, there must be explained the acts not consummated which were posited as means toward consummating the sin, if afterwards the sin is not consummated, as Viva teaches, asserting that the common opinion so holds. And this not only if the aforesaid acts are evil of themselves, as touches and dishonest conversations are; but also, according to a very probable opinion, if they are indifferent of themselves, as to take the road, prepare arms for homicide, etc.: "because then the sin does not remain merely internal, but is externalized in those actions, which all become evil, since they are informed by the malice of the depraved end."

Note. - If here again you ask whether these acts not consummated, in the supposed case, are also disparate among themselves mutually, and as such must be declared in Confession according to the number of each? I answer negatively; because from the intention of the sinner they are ordered to the same work to be consummated in its own species; and hence for confession it will suffice that, separately from the intended sin, you say: I posited several acts for the purpose of committing this or that sin, which I nevertheless did not consummate. So St. Alphonsus.²

222. Resolves from 4°. - Depraved conversations, touches, kisses, etc., had with another person from the intention of fornicating, and actually also attaining to fornication, are not disparate from the fornication itself, and therefore do not constitute new sins, but morally coalesce into one complete work, one numerically consummated sin; because according to the common course such acts are as a certain introduction, a proximate disposition, a remote inchoation, or complement of the consummated work itself. Wherefore there is no obligation of explaining them separately in Confession; but it will suffice if it is said: I committed fornication with such and such a person; since actions preceding this are understood from common occurrence. So St. Alphonsus³ with the common opinion. - Moreover let it be well noted that actions of this sort preceding, as also complacency concerning fornication consummated, when they are had immediately after the fornication and are by no means intended toward a new fornication, probably are not new sins to be explained in Confession; because then they seem to be employed as a complement of the obtained fornication.

223. • Acts in the same species of evil, and conversant about the same object, are called morally interrupted when between them there intervenes a breaking off of the evil will, so that the subsequent acts proceed from a new decree of the will. - But that it may be determined more accurately in which acts moral interruption actually has place, with attention to the distinction between internal and external acts:

Quaer. 1° When are INTERNAL ACTS morally interrupted?

Resp. They are morally interrupted:

1° If the first will is expressly revoked by a contrary will; for this prevents the posterior act from being able to be called a continuation of the prior, since in reality it proceeds from a new decree of the will. Hence, if you take complacency in an evil delectation, and then elicit an act of displeasure; or if you will to kill your enemy, and then retract that will by putting away the hatred, or also by an act of charity toward the enemy; if afterwards you return to the evil will, you commit a new sin, numerically distinct from the prior one.

2° If the first will is virtually or tacitly revoked, namely by voluntary advertence to matters with which the evil will is incompatible; or even by taking up a state incompatible with the first evil will. Thus St. Alphonsus,¹ after the common opinion, teaches. Hence he who turns his soul to pious thought, for example by attending to a sermon, by reciting prayers, etc., tacitly revokes the preceding evil will, and therefore, if afterwards he resumes that evil will, he sins anew. Likewise he who resolves to steal something, and in the meantime, before the execution of the theft, becomes gravely ill, so that during the time of the infirmity he is incapable of carrying out the theft; if afterwards, after recovering health, he returns to the same purpose, he commits a new sin, because through such impotence the first purpose was morally interrupted.

3° If the first will ceases naturally, that is, through a cessation not freely chosen, but caused by natural distraction, inadvertence, or oblivion, lasting for a more or less notable time according to the nature of the diverse acts. But, concerning this third mode of moral interruption, Theologians greatly disagree. Some think that internal acts are not morally interrupted at all by natural cessation alone, at least ordinary cessation, for instance by common distractions, by sleep, etc. Others on the contrary opine that any internal acts whatever are morally interrupted by any natural cessation whatever, even ordinary. But among these St. Alphonsus held a middle way; his opinion, safe in practice, seems capable of being explained briefly thus:

224. Opinion of St. Alphonsus. - In this controversy concerning the moral interruption of internal acts through natural cessation, first, according to the holy Doctor, a distinction must be made between merely internal sins, that is, those which either are wholly consummated internally in their own species, as hatred, heresy, envy (sins of the heart strictly so called), or at least are committed internally only, without effectively tending to an external sin, as morose delectation and inefficacious desire; - and sins not merely internal, that is, those which effectively tend to an external sin of mouth or deed, as an efficacious desire or purpose of blaspheming or stealing. But after this distinction has been premised, according to the mind of the same holy Doctor one may establish thus:

A. Merely internal sins are morally interrupted by natural cessation, even ordinary cessation, for instance by common distractions, by sleep, etc., so that they are numerically distinct as often as they are repeated after such cessation. - Yet here attention must be given to the vehemence of the affection by which the will is borne into the object; for the given resolution is understood with this limitation: unless several acts of this sort proceed from the same vehemence of affection, or from the same impulse of passion; for then they constitute only one sin, even if a certain brief distraction intervenes between the acts. - From these things it is inferred, for Confession, that he who recalls that he took delight many times in the same object, and especially if this happened on the same day, must say how many times he yielded to this evil will, if he can remember this, at least confusedly; that is, if he is able to estimate how often the evil will, either not interrupted or interrupted and then reassumed, lasted through a notable time. But if he cannot - as ordinarily happens, when the depraved disposition was long-lasting - let him say through how much time he persevered in that disposition and whether the interruptions were notably rare or frequent.¹ Cf. nevertheless n. 1424, Principle III, 1°, c), § Some Doctors.

B. Sins not merely internal, namely efficacious desires or firm evil purposes concerning an external sin of mouth or deed, more probably are not morally interrupted by ordinary natural cessation alone, whether by common distractions or sleep; but only by the intervention of a long time, which long time, ordinarily speaking, is judged by the holy Doctor to be present as often as more than two or at most three days intervene between the purposes, since such force does not seem to be present in one single act of the will that it can efficaciously endure beyond that time. Therefore, if the penitent has persevered beyond two or three days in an evil purpose, in Confession he must explain the time, saying for example: for the whole month or week I remained in the purpose of stealing, which I renewed about so many times before the consummation of the theft; so that thus the number of internal sins concerning external sins may be understood by the confessor.² Yet it must carefully be observed here whether perhaps by force of the evil purpose some external effect has already been produced, conducing to the consummated external sin; for then the first purpose is judged not to be morally interrupted, but to persevere, so long as that external effect lasts; and hence the aforesaid resolution - that an evil purpose is morally interrupted by the intervention of a long time - must be received with this limitation: unless nevertheless the efficacy of the first purpose virtually perseveres in some external effect; for then the evil purposes, through whatever time they last, constitute one sin only. Hence, if someone proposes to kill a man, and therefore prepares arms, takes the road, and finally kills him, he commits one sin in number, although he sought him for many days, and meanwhile also thought about other things, renewed the purpose a hundred times, etc. Similarly, if someone proposes not to restore another's property, and remains in this purpose - even for a year - he commits one sin only; because in the very retention of the other's property the efficacy of the first purpose virtually perseveres. Yet where the thief becomes incapable of restoring, and afterwards again becomes capable and does not restore, he commits a new sin; because during the time of that incapacity there is nothing in which the efficacy of the first purpose virtually persevered.

225. • Quaer. 2° When are EXTERNAL SINS morally interrupted?

Resp. There is no need here for discourse about external sins which are disparate, which of themselves are morally disjoined and therefore numerically distinct, as was explained more broadly in Point I, n. 218 sqq. Hence the question proposed in this sense is to be understood of external sins which, according to themselves, are not disparate, for example kisses or touches which of themselves and from the intention of the agent tend and attain to fornication. But external sins of this sort are morally interrupted in three cases, namely:

1° When between them there intervenes an express or tacit revocation of the evil purpose; concerning which case see the things handed down before at n. 223.

2° When between them there intervenes a simple cessation of the evil purpose beyond two or three days, without some external effect having been produced in which the purpose is judged morally to persevere; concerning which case see the notes above at n. 224, B.

3° They are still morally interrupted, or, to speak more accurately, in a certain broader sense they become disparate and numerically several, when between them, even while the same purpose remains physically, there intervenes such an interval of time that the external acts themselves can no longer be called concatenated, that is, so that the preceding act is no longer the proximate disposition or as it were an inchoation of the subsequent act, although it remotely tends to it. But when such concatenation, because of an interval of time, is actually absent must be judged from the nature and circumstances of the acts themselves, especially with regard to common sense and the natural estimation of men. - Generally I would think it can be said: that it is rather easily lacking in sins of the mouth, especially if they are done from levity or custom, for instance in curses, blasphemies, perjuries, not uttered from the same impulse; - and then that it is lacking in sins of deed when the intervening delay of time is in no way customarily apprehended as brief. But if commonly it is apprehended as brief, sins of deed, notwithstanding such interval of time, still seem to be concatenated and morally united. - Hence I resolve: a) He who, from the intention of stealing a heap of wheat, which he cannot carry off wholly at one time, repeatedly on the same night steals part, commits one sin only; but he who from the same intention on alternate nights does this, seems to commit as many sins as there are acts. L. II. 44 at the beginning. b) Youths sin by several sins who, from the intention of fornicating, at times notably distant according to common sense, approach another person, with libidinous acts, and thus finally arrive at fornication; because those external acts, in the case, are no longer concatenated, since they are not the proximate disposition or a certain quasi-inchoation of the subsequent fornicary intercourse. On the contrary, they would sin by one sin only if, in the same morally continuous approach, some delay intervened between the libidinous acts, for example because of conversation with a third person. c) Similarly, if someone, laboring servilely on Sunday, wishes to rest a little and therefore is occupied by sleep; but then, awakened, begins again to work, he commits one sin only. - Likewise he sins by one sin who interrupts the eating of meat on a fast day for a little while, for example to receive a guest, etc.

§ III. Which Objects Of The Same Species Do Not Coalesce Into One Object.

226. • Several objects in the same species of evil, about which one and the same act is conversant, are judged not to coalesce when one object is not part of another, or, in other words, when those several objects do not constitute, as parts, one total object. Such especially are: the lives of several men, whether of body or of soul; - and the honors, reputations, or temporal goods of several men, unless perhaps they are possessed by common dominion.

Resolves with St. Alphonsus.¹ Therefore he commits sins several in number: 1° Who by one act kills several men; or gives scandal to several; or affects several with contumely. 2° Who in one discourse detracts from several, even of the same family or community; except perhaps, according to Dens, in the case where the reputation were proper to some community precisely as such; as if someone should unjustly say of some monastery that regular discipline is not observed in it. 3° Who by one act imprecates some evil on several; or also steals from several, unless nevertheless the goods carried off by theft are possessed by those several with common dominion, for instance by reason of undivided inheritance, by reason of community, etc. 4° Who by one act desires to commit several fornications, whether with diverse persons or with the same one. - From these things the resolution for other similar cases will easily be clear.

227. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Does he who detracts from someone before several commit as many sins as there are persons among whom the other is defamed?

Resp. Probably he does not commit several sins of detraction; because he does not seem to injure several objects or rights, since the right to reputation, which chiefly consists in the opinion of the multitude, is one and not multiple, both among all and among individuals. Hence by reason of such detraction it will suffice that in confession it be said: I detracted from someone before several.² Nevertheless the same detractor, in the case, commits several sins of scandal; and by reason of this, the number of persons must be set forth.³

Quaer. 2° Does he who in one discourse detracts from another in distinct matters, saying for example that he is unjust, lustful, and a man without religion, commit as many sins as the matters are diverse?

Resp. More probably affirmatively, at least of itself; because such a detractor violates a multiple right to diverse reputations which do not coalesce into one reputation; for he who has been defamed in one crime is not for that reason defamed in another. Yet by accident detraction of this sort not rarely constitutes one sin only, namely: when the circumstances in which those diverse insults are uttered are such that the hearers easily understand them to be uttered from anger, and therefore do not attribute faith to them. Hence women of the lower class and common people who, quarreling together, from the same impulse load one another with diverse contumelies, commit one sin only. Indeed those quarreling in this way, for the most part, are excused from mortal sin, unless perhaps they reproach the adversary with some particular fact.¹

Quaer. 3° What must be said concerning him who by one continuous act wishes diverse evils to another, as infamy, poverty, etc.?

Resp. According to a sufficiently probable opinion, he commits one sin in species and number, as often as, as more frequently happens, those evils are apprehended under the reason of evil in general. But otherwise, if the will is borne advertently to wishing those diverse evils to him, as they are distinct; and otherwise also a fortiori, if he desires actually to inflict those diverse evils on another.²

Quaer. 4° Of how many sins is he guilty who by one act denies several articles of faith?

Resp. Of one only; because the formal object of faith is not multiple, but one, namely: the veracity of God revealing; and hence he who denies several articles of faith is no more an unbeliever than he who denies one.³

St. Thomas, II Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 1; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, ad 12.

437. Principles. - Sins are multiplied in number, not indeed from many or diverse deformities or malices, and therefore that which is multiple in species is not necessarily multiple in number, because one and the same act can have several moral species, for example, theft of a sacred thing; but

1. from the moral multiplication of acts: for sin is not a simple privation but rather an act deprived of due order; also

2. from the moral multiplication of objects: for acts are distinguished according to objects, since an act is nothing but a tendency toward an object.

Whence a twofold practical rule is usually established.

438. The first rule is: There are as many sins as there are total moral objects, that is, objects not morally united but distinct, and not coalescing into one object. Hence:

a) External acts physically many are one sin when they are considered by reason and commanded by the will as coordinated parts, incomplete or integral, of one complete object, according as they are concerned with things of the same reason, as repeated acts for taking away several, even diverse, goods of the same person; several evil oaths or blasphemies or various contumelies or heresies uttered in one impulse; several immodest touches exercised upon the same person in the same impulse; several canonical hours of one day omitted; and probably diverse sacraments (for example, of the sick) administered sacrilegiously to one person, or several sacraments (for example, Eucharist or Penance) administered sacrilegiously to several without moral interruption, because they are one ministration. On the contrary, external acts complete in themselves are several sins, such as to steal Peter's horse and then Paul's money, to detract one person and immediately afterward another, three fornications had even one immediately after another, the office omitted on three days, three Masses celebrated sacrilegiously on the Nativity of the Lord, several sacrilegious ministrations of sacraments.

b) External acts physically many are one sin when they are intended as subordinated to one principal action as means to one end; for example, he who sacrilegiously consecrates and communicates in the same sacrifice; he who for fornication gives gifts, utters obscene words, exercises immodest touches, works the sin itself, and immediately afterward has complacency concerning it; he who, willing to kill an enemy, buys weapons, lays ambushes, and strikes. On the contrary, if they are not subordinated to a complete principal act: thus he who, without the intention of fornication, exercises immodest touches and finally comes to fornication commits two sins, just as he who, after fornication has been completed, after some interval again touches immodestly.

1. Just as things which are many in the genus of being are one house, so those acts distinct in the genus of being are one thing in the genus of morals, namely, one sin consummated by an external work, since all those acts are ordered to this as incomplete acts to the complete act.

c) Probably there is one sin when a physically one external act touches diverse persons or matters, as to kill or scandalize several by one action, to steal from several or detract from several before several by one act, to blaspheme several saints, to consecrate several hosts sacrilegiously in the same sacrifice, etc.: for the external act has unity in itself and therefore tends into several things by way of one; whence these are conceived and intended as one adequate object. On the contrary, if someone explicitly intended to touch them distinctly and singly, by way of several things, because then they are intended as several and distinct objects: namely, an act physically one will then be morally multiple.

2. Nor is it an obstacle that adultery of a married man with a married woman, or carnal sacrilege between two sacred persons, is a double sin. For there it is not double in number, but double in species: to injure the right of another and not to observe the contract with one's own spouse are diverse malices; or also unjustly or sacrilegiously to violate one's own promise and to cooperate in the injustice or sacrilege of another.

d) Probably an inefficacious will intending several objects of the same reason is one sin, for example, several external acts even complete, as morose delight concerning three women, hatred of three persons, the inefficacious desire of fornicating three times even with three women, of omitting the hours several times, fast, Mass through a week, month, or year, the inefficacious wish of diverse evils even to several persons: for then these are considered by way of one as one pleasing or displeasing object. On the contrary, if several complete acts are intended by an efficacious will or proposal, because then they are considered by way of several, as several effects to be obtained or caused.

Let it be noted that several acts, or several evil effects of one act, which constitute only one sin, are not therefore less evil than if they were several sins: for this one sin is graver in proportion as it contains more malices, and is as evil as several sins because in malice it is equivalent to several.

439. The second rule is: There are as many sins as there are morally interrupted and repeated acts, even concerning the same object. But acts are morally interrupted when they are not judged to remain virtually or in effect. This happens in three ways:

1. by retraction or a contrary will, whether explicit or equivalent, by placing an act incompossible with the prior act;

2. by voluntary and free cessation from the act, without the proposal of proceeding further, for example, by ceasing from an attempt which is not ordered to another attempt, by turning aside to other things because of weariness or fatigue;

1. It is said: "without the proposal of proceeding further," for if such a proposal of proceeding were present and those acts were otherwise able to be united among themselves for constituting one complete act, cessation from the act would not make a moral interruption, and thus neither would it multiply sin in number; for example, if someone had begun to exercise with a woman filthy things disposing to copulation, but meanwhile, because another person intervened, ceased for some time, yet in his soul did not revoke that sinful proposal, in that case, that is, after the other departed, he would again pursue the former most filthy acts; there would not be judged to intervene between these and the preceding acts a moral interruption, but one sin in number, morally continued by force of that evil proposal, would be committed, notwithstanding that voluntary cessation." Reiffenstuel, Theologia Moralis, treatise on Sins, q. 5, n. 53.

3. by involuntary or natural cessation, which is had from involuntary distraction, forgetfulness, occupation, etc., for example, by reading a letter, sleep, drunkenness, and the like, when the prior will does not remain virtually and cannot be judged the cause of the later act concerning the same object. But the sign on account of which the prior will is deservedly judged to remain virtually is that the will returns to the same object as if spontaneously and without new deliberation; on the contrary, if new deliberation was necessary. Whence brief involuntary cessation ordinarily is not a moral interruption; but precisely how much delay is required for moral interruption cannot be defined by a general rule, but must be left to the determination of prudent judgment, with attention to the intensity of the act and the nature of the distraction. Hence:

a) Merely internal acts (morose delights, desires or inefficacious hatreds, envies, rash judgments, doubts concerning faith, desperations) do not persevere for a long time, so that a physical interruption, if it is notable, is judged moral: for the same affection cannot endure amid diverse occupations and distractions except for a short time, regularly certainly not beyond two or three hours; indeed this seems much.

b) Internal acts to be completed exteriorly, as being ordered to an external work, remain longer, especially if they have begun to be fulfilled; otherwise they are judged to persevere only for some days: for the same internal impulse, even vehement, does not last longer, at least generally; for certain acts, such as efficacious hatreds, desires for a base thing or for revenge, often persevere for a long time because of vehemence, also the will of not restoring, because it is ordered to an effect of itself perpetual.

c) External acts are interrupted if they are absolute and complete, that is, if they are not subordinated to a principal action nor occur by the same impulse, as was said in the first rule under a) and b).

440. Practical corollaries. - 1) He who has committed one sin which is concerned with several objects is not bound per se to declare the number of objects in confession; but he is bound to declare plurality, saying, for example: I scandalized several or many, I inefficaciously desired several women, I absolved several sacrilegiously, I detracted from a family, etc.; otherwise he would lead the confessor into error, who would rightly think that the act was concerned with only one object, and thus in fact another sin would be accused, as he who would say: I stole one gold coin, instead of twenty.

2. In acts subordinated to one principal action, this alone, but not the means, is to be declared, unless they contain mortal malice distinct in species, for example, theft for fornication. But if the principal action did not follow, the intention of committing it must be declared. The means employed are not to be declared if in themselves they are indifferent (for example, buying weapons, a walk), because they are not evil except by the malice of the intention; they are to be declared if in themselves they are evil, for example, if they manifest the internal intention, but in a general and confused mode, for example: I employed immodest means toward fornication, or I attempted to procure it; they are to be declared in a distinct mode if they contain mortal malice distinct in species, for example, sorcery or the cooperation of another for inflicting damage.

3. A penitent who cannot determine how many interrupted times he consented to an internal temptation should declare the time through which he persevered in the evil will, for example, through the day I had hatred, through the month I desired a girl, adding as far as possible whether the interruptions were rare or frequent. For from the time, with attention to the disposition of the person, the nature of the thing, and the circumstances, the confessor will be able in some way to conjecture the interruptions.

4. He who by one impulse places several acts of the same reason should declare one, saying, for example, I touched a woman, I blasphemed, I swore, I detracted, etc.: for it is one act morally.

5. Lest the sacrament of penance be rendered burdensome and odious, and lest the faithful and the confessor be tortured by scruples, questions concerning the species and number of sins are not to be made unless grave motives are present. But the penitent is bound to confess the species and number according to the knowledge which he had of these at least confusedly at the moment at which he committed the sin, but not according to theological science if he did not have it: for nothing is willed unless foreknown.

It is certain that sins which are distinguished specifically are much more still distinguished in number; wherefore here it is asked only in what way the numerical distinction of sins within the same species is known.

Rule I. The numerical distinction of sins is taken from the diversity of total objects, or objects morally diverse. The reason is that the object, as St. Thomas teaches, is in some way the form of the act; and therefore it necessarily brings it about that the act is such as the object itself is. Therefore where there are several objects in number in the genus of morals, there are several acts in number in the same genus; where there is one object, the act is reputed to be one. Therefore there are as many sins as there are total objects. Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, q. 18, art. 2. - St. Alphonsus, n. 36. - But in the present matter we call that object total which either by its own nature so effects one moral thing that it is neither a part of another, nor is referred to another which completes it; or, if it can be referred to another as a part or complement, is not so intended by the one acting. Thus one total object is had in completed copulation, one likewise in a wound inflicted with the intention only of wounding; and therefore one and the same object, when by its nature it is not total, can be or not be total according to the varied manner in which it is intended.

Rule II. The numerical distinction of sins is also taken from the multiplicity of acts morally interrupted. For when acts of the will are morally interrupted, the individual acts become complete in themselves, nor can the following act be called a continuation of the preceding. Thus he who, on several occasions morally interrupted, strikes another or steals, commits as many sins as there are strikes or thefts, because these constitute so many diverse acts. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 36.

But acts of the will are interrupted in a threefold way, namely: 1st. By retraction or express revocation of the will, because this prevents the later act from being joined with the former, for example, if someone retracts an evil will of acting badly, and afterward resumes it. 2nd. By voluntary cessation from the act, or by application of the mind to a diverse object, for example, if someone freely ceases from an evil purpose, and then returns to it. 3rd. By a sufficiently notable involuntary cessation, regard being had to the nature of the act, according to the judgment of prudent persons, for example, through sleep, distraction, occupation, etc.

But in order that these principles may be applied more easily, the following things must be kept before the eyes.

1st. Merely internal acts, which have no order to an exterior effect, for the most part are morally completed as soon as they are physically interrupted, and therefore of themselves are multiplied as many times as they are physically interrupted. The reason is that such acts, because of their simplicity both on the part of the object and on the part of the will itself, and because of the lack of any exterior effect in which they agree, speaking of themselves, are not morally continued, nor do they coalesce into one, since they have nothing, neither in themselves nor in another, by which they may be united with each other. Hence the penitent ought in confession to express, if he can, how many times he adhered to an internal temptation; but if he cannot, let him say approximately; or at least whether he gave consent very frequently during the course of the day. - I said of itself or for the most part that the matter is so, because if sometimes several acts of this kind proceed from the same impulse of passion, they will constitute one mortal sin, although some brief interval may have intervened between the acts. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 37.

2nd. Internal acts with the purpose of placing an external action are multiplied as many times as the evil purpose is formally renewed, that is, as many times as through retraction or voluntary cessation it ceases to be, and afterward is assumed anew: for then the later act cannot be judged morally a continuation of the prior, and a new act of the will formally distinct intervenes. But if it ceases through involuntary cessation, it is judged to persevere virtually for some time, but not always and indefinitely, and therefore, when it is again assumed, it is not held as morally interrupted, provided that too long an interval of time has not intervened. But what such an interval ought to be can be defined only by the judgment of wise persons. For the same purpose endures for a greater or lesser time according to the varying intensity, and also according to the varying circumstances of persons, age, sex, disposition, etc. St. Alphonsus thinks that the impulse of one act, ordinarily speaking, can with difficulty be prolonged for more than two or three days. Hence, he says, one who so perseveres virtually in an evil will beyond two or three days ought in confession to explain the time, so that thus the number of internal acts concerning external sins may be understood morally. - Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 138.

3rd. External acts, or acts externally consummated, are multiplied as many times as the object is disparate, or terminated in itself; but they are not multiplied, even when a notable interval of time has been interposed, when they are as it were parts of a more principal act, or when they tend to one end. The reason is that then they effect one moral thing, which is not completed unless the principally intended act has been consummated. Thus he who has determined to perpetrate theft commits one sin, although through several days he has thought about it, has renewed the evil purpose more often, has undertaken a way to this, has sought an opportune time, etc.; for the prior act of the will is judged to persevere virtually in that very effect or external work. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 40.

You Will Resolve. 1st. He commits one sin who, intending fornication, touches a woman basely, kisses her, entices her by base conversations, and at last fornicates; for all those previous acts are ordered to consummating the act. But if from the beginning he had willed only to touch the woman, and afterward, induced by lust, completed copulation, there will be a twofold sin, and therefore it will not be enough if he confesses only the copulation. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 43.

2nd. A priest who wills to omit the whole Office on one day makes one sin, because the individual Hours on one side bespeak an order to completing one Office, and on the other their omissions are intended after the manner of one thing. But he would make two sins who first had willed only to omit Matins, and afterward refused to recite the remaining Hours, because there would be a twofold act of evil will plainly distinct.

3rd. He perpetrates one sin who, from the same impulse of passion, repeats an evil act many times, for example, several times basely touches himself or another, even with some interruption; several times strikes an enemy, or imprecates very many evils upon him, etc.; for there is one evil affection of the will, and those various actions are morally united. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 50.

4th. He makes one sin who denies several articles of faith at the same time, because the motive of faith is one; therefore he is equally an unbeliever who denies one article and he who denies all. - Likewise probably he makes one sin who by the same act blasphemes the twelve Apostles; because all blasphemies against the Saints take their malice from one relation to God. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 47.

5th. He makes one sin who, intending to steal some determined sum of money, takes it away on several occasions lest he be detected, because there is one evil act of the will, which is consummated in the last theft. On the contrary, he perpetrates several sins who on several occasions steals from the same mass of money, without having determined from the beginning to carry off the whole, because the individual thefts effect an object total in itself. - Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 141.

6th. He makes several sins who fornicates several times with the same woman; for each fornication is terminated in itself, or constitutes a total object by its own nature. - The same must be said concerning diverse pollutions. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 46.

Question 1. Whether one sin or several sins are committed by one who by one act detracts from an entire religious community, or by one blow kills several men, or snatches a purse belonging to several associates?

Response. It is greatly controverted: according to St. Alphonsus and many others, several sins are committed in these cases, both because the rights of several are violated, and because detraction, a blow, or theft of this kind is virtually multiple in the judgment of prudent persons. - But many others, and theologians of great note, probably hold that only one sin is committed, because there is one act of the will, one account by which that multiple object is apprehended, and one external manifestation of the malice of the will. But to the reason taken from the violation of the rights of several, they respond that when someone does not obey different superiors commanding the same thing, he certainly commits one sin, although he violates the rights of several. - A fortiori the same Doctors teach that one sin is committed when, by one act of the will, one tends ineffectively to several objects apprehended after the manner of one thing, for example, if someone by one act should desire several women by simple affection or complacency. But in the case of an efficacious purpose of perpetrating something which would have to be reached by diverse external acts, there would be several sins; and therefore he would sin several times who efficaciously willed to omit several fasts, to approach several women, or the same woman several times. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 45. - Lacroix, n. 149. - Baller., note (b), p. 141.

Question 2. Does he make several sins who detracts before several persons?

Response. Probably he makes only one sin, because to detract before several persons is only an aggravating circumstance: for the right to reputation is one among all, not multiple. Wherefore, practically speaking, there is no obligation of explaining in confession the number of persons before whom someone has detracted, but it suffices to say: I detracted before several persons. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 49.

Question 3. Must the means employed for sinning be explained in confession, if the sin afterward was not consummated?

Response. Some affirm this, even if those means were not evil in themselves, as to undertake the journey, to carry a ladder for theft, etc., and their reason is that the sin then does not remain only internal, but becomes external by those means. For those actions, although they are indifferent in themselves, nevertheless become evil from the evil end.

But others probably deny it, unless those means are evil in themselves; in which case they ought to be indicated, and indeed all of them if they are diverse in species, as touches or obscene words employed for soliciting. Indeed others say that the means are not necessarily to be explained even when they are evil in themselves and diverse in species; but that it suffices if the sinner accuses himself thus, for example, I willed to commit fornication, but although I employed certain means, I could not. - Cf. D'Annibale, 1, n. 287, n. 15. - De Lugo, De Poenit., n. 566. - Varceno, vol. 1, p. 259. - Baller., note (b), p. 143.

Question 4. Does he commit several sins who wishes several diverse evils upon an enemy?

Response. Affirmatively, of itself, if the intention of the one imprecating is borne determinately to evils of diverse species, for example, infamy and death; because desire takes its species from the desired object, as will be said below. But by accident there would be one sin, namely when these diverse evils are apprehended almost under the general account of evil, as means to ruin; which is accustomed to happen when imprecations proceed from an impulse of anger. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 50; and Hom. Ap., n. 65.

I say 1°: The numerical distinction of sins is sought from the moral interruption of the acts of the will; because human acts have that they are sins from the act of the will. Whence St. Thomas, in II Sentent., dist. 42, a. 1, says: « According to the unity of the will must be taken the judgment concerning the unity of what is said in the genus of morals. » Therefore, where the act of the will is diverse and morally interrupted, there is a distinct sin.

The act of the will is then held to be morally interrupted when it perseveres neither formally nor virtually. Now it is held not to persevere formally or virtually from three headings: 1° When it is expressly revoked by a contrary act: as if anyone revoke his prior will of stealing, and immediately after it take it up again, there will be two sins numerically distinct; because these two volitions, although interpolated within the briefest time, are in no way connected with each other, nor can the second be called a continuation of the former formally and expressly revoked.

2° By voluntary cessation from the act of the will: as if anyone, seeing a woman, take morose delight, and spontaneously abandon that delight by turning himself to other things, but immediately, seeing the same or another woman, again take morose delight, he sins twice, for the reason already given; because these two voluntary delights are in no way connected with each other, nor can the second be called a continuation of the first voluntarily interrupted and interpretatively revoked. In these two theologians sufficiently agree, but about the third they dispute. Therefore

A third mode, according to which the same act of the will perseveres neither formally nor virtually, is assigned by several as involuntary cessation from the internal act of the will, for instance through natural distraction or forgetfulness, through sleep or drunkenness: because, say they, the act repeated after such an involuntary interruption is not continuous with the preceding, but diverse; but where acts are diverse, there are diverse sins.

I judge this true of sins merely internal, that is, which are consummated in the will itself, and do not tend efficaciously to external acts, such as heresy, hatred, envy, velleities, complacency, morose delights, etc.; for as often as they are repeated after cessation, even involuntary, so often are they perfectly consummated; nor does the prior act imply order to the second, nor are they in any way connected, continued, or dependent upon one another.

It is otherwise with internal acts tending efficaciously to an external work, at least when these reiterated acts of the will are connected with some external effect of the prior act: as if, from the purpose of killing your enemy, you hold a dagger ready, or lay snares, or set out on the way to seek him, etc. These or similar effects standing, although you often repeat the bad will, now thinking of it, now voluntarily thinking of other things or doing them, you commit not several sins but continue the first; because the prior act morally perseveres in the external effect placed by its force, and in it as in a bond all the following are connected with the prior.

I said: « At least when these reiterated acts of the will are connected with some external effect; » because many, not improbably, hold the same even if they are not connected with any external effect, as if you now firmly propose to kill your enemy, or to fornicate tomorrow, and waking in the morning renew this proposal, and as often as you reflect upon it you persist in it — they hold it one sin; because the prior act has been neither consummated nor voluntarily revoked, but perseveres, and by its force the second and following are elicited, which are held a continuation of the prior.

I say 2° : The will remaining the same, indeed also the same external act, sins are multiplied numerically from objects numerically distinct in moral being. But objects are held to be numerically distinguished in moral being when they do not stand toward each other morally after the manner of one thing, either because one is not part of the other, or because they are not parts integrating some one whole, or because they are not ordered to the same end and the same work to be consummated; for then, although there be one act physically, it is nevertheless held in the genus of morals virtually multiple, and to have as many malices numerically distinct as there are objects of this kind.

The reason is, because, as sins are multiplied and distinguished in species by objects distinct in species, so are they multiplied and distinguished in number by objects numerically distinct. Hence he who with one and the same bad will wills to kill, or de facto kills, three men, whether by one act or by several immediately succeeding, commits three sins numerically distinct; because since three men do not stand morally after the manner of one thing, they are three objects numerically distinct.

You will say : He who steals in one act a flock of sheep commits one sin, not as many as there are sheep. Therefore also he who kills many men in one act.

I answer. I deny the consequence. The disparity is that all the sheep of the flock stand after the manner of one thing, since they have no distinct rights which are violated, nor therefore are capable of distinct and peculiar injury. But three men, even if of the same family, do not stand after the manner of one thing, but each has his own distinct right which is violated, and thence is capable of particular and distinct injury. Nor does it matter that a family is reputed one person by a fiction of law. It is indeed so feigned, but so it is not, especially with respect to injury.

By which reason I judge it more probable that, if the flock belonged to three men, there would be three sins: although not a few deny this; because, say they, all the sheep are morally one whole, which is the proximate object of theft.

Consequences

From what has been said you will gather 1° that he who sets out from home with the will of stealing carries the ladder, climbs up, opens the chest, takes away the money, whether all at once or successively by portions; likewise he who with mind of fornicating seeks the girl, kisses her, looks at her, touches her impudently, and at last fornicates; likewise he who from the purpose of killing his enemy prepares dagger or gun, meets his enemy, provokes him, strikes, wounds, kills him: these men, I say, and others in similar cases, even if amid these preliminaries they repeat their evil will of stealing, fornicating, killing a hundred times, commit only one sin; because these reiterated wills are connected with the first in the effects, and those preceding effects are ordered to the theft, fornication, homicide, as to one end, and therefore are had after the manner of one thing, and are understood in the accusation of the completed work, so that it suffices to say in confession : « I have committed fornication, I have committed murder, etc. » Otherwise however, if means were employed toward those ends which would have special malice, as if one used magic arts to steal, love philters to fornicate, etc. It must be observed too that, if the impudicities preceding copula be done without intention of copula, although afterwards, the intention being changed, copula follow, they are distinct sins and to be accused separately, since then they are not united after the manner of one thing in the intended end; for the intention of copula set aside, they do not of themselves tend more toward fornication than toward pollution or sodomitical copula. Say the same, if they were done indeed from intention of copula, but which, some cause intervening, would not be perfected.

But whether the same must be said of impudicities, namely complacency, morose delight, touches, looks and kisses immediately following copula, and of the dispositions toward it, is doubtful. Some affirm, because they say they are appendages of copula which connaturally and regularly follow it. Others deny, because they hold they are dispositions toward another copula. Moreover, as to practice, if it be true, as the first opinion says, that those impudicities regularly follow toward copula, I do not see why it should be necessary to confess them distinctly, since on this hypothesis they are sufficiently understood by the confessor in the accusation of the copula.

You will gather 2º that he who, the same bad will remaining, during the same motion of concupiscence or hatred, pollutes himself thrice, fornicates thrice with the same woman or with several, kills three men successively, commits three sins; because three pollutions, three fornications, three homicides do not stand morally after the manner of one thing, but are three total actions complete in themselves, nor unifiable by their nature in some third in which they would be perfected and consummated.

Nor does the unity of the will stand in the way; for although it be one physically, it is morally multiple numerically, just as it would be multiple in species if in these acts there were objects specifically distinct, for instance if he fornicated once with his mother, afterwards with a married woman, then with a nun; or if among the slain were counted a father or a cleric. In all cases, notwithstanding its physical unity, it is morally multiple in species; so in our case it is morally multiple in number.

For the same reason, he who with one continued intention of stealing, twenty times with moral interruption, should filch twenty thousand florins, would sin mortally twenty times; because the individual thefts do not stand morally after the manner of one thing, since of themselves they are not ordered to each other, but each separately is a consummation of the internal will. So at least common sense apprehends.

Likewise a priest existing in mortal sin commits, more probably, as many sins as he absolves penitents without interruption; because each absolution is a total action and complete judgment, joined by no nexus with other absolutions and judgments. Say the same of him who baptizes several successively, for the same reason: otherwise, at least more probably to us, if with the same continued action he administer communion to several; because it seems to be the administration of one banquet, and therefore morally one action. Likewise a priest celebrating in mortal sin seems to commit only one sin; because, although the oblation, consecration and communion are actions physically distinct, they nevertheless constitute one mystery in which they are united.

You will gather 3° that he who with one continued motion of concupiscence acts impudently with a girl, often, though with some interruption, kissing her, touching her, etc., commits one sin; likewise he who with one rush of anger strikes his enemy several times, blasphemies several times, hurls several insults of the same kind at him, for instance calling him three or four times a thief, commits even so one sin, so that it suffices to say in confession : « Once I acted impudently by touches and kisses with a girl, once I blasphemed, once I quarreled with my companion, when I called him thief, when I struck him; » because these acts, notwithstanding physical interruption, are held, according to the common sense of men, one action, one conversation, one quarrel, one speech, as one eating is held while one successively eats several courses. Nor is the reason the same of these as of several fornications, pollutions, or killings, of which in the preceding corollary; for the disparity is that several killings, several fornications or pollutions are total actions complete in themselves, having a definite term in which they are consummated, so that they cannot be unified in some third in which they are consummated, and consequently neither among themselves. But those several acts here in question, namely several touches, several blows, etc., are not total and consummated actions, but apt of themselves to make one with one consummated external act, in which they are unifiable, and therefore unifiable among themselves, like the eatings of several dishes. So at least the common sense of men apprehends, which ought especially to be attended to as regards the multiplication or numerical unity of sins.

But whether, if one quarreling assail another with injuries of distinct kind, calling him now thief, now adulterer, now sorcerer, etc., he commit several sins? A distinction must be made: If these diverse insults are held

Caius, a young Catholic and a member of a certain secret society, receives a command from its head to kill Tullius, a traitor to the society. In order to do this, he seeks the place where Tullius lives, attaches himself to him as a companion, and investigates everything about his manner of life so that he may perpetrate the crime more easily and safely. Nevertheless, more than once, led by remorse of conscience, he determines to leave the business unfinished and, in order to provide for his own life, to flee the country. Nonetheless, he prepares weapons and at length, some weeks after undertaking the purpose, especially because of a deed discovered by him which renders Tullius exceedingly hateful to him, he provokes Tullius to a quarrel in a secret place and kills him. Hence it is asked:

1. How do sins acquire various species?

2. How are sins distinguished with regard to number?

3. What things must Caius mention in order to confess integrally?

1. See the answer to this question in Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 141.

2. The answer to this question is in Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 143.

3. What particulars of his crime must Caius mention so as to make a full confession ?

Caius, a young Catholic who belongs to a secret society, received orders from its head to kill Tullius, who had betrayed its secrets. To execute the mandate Caius found out where Tullius lived, made his acquaintance, and studied his manner of life, in order to be able to kill him with greater security and ease. More than once he determined not to commit the crime and to fly the country. However, he bought weapons, and at length after some weeks, especially on account of having found out something about Tullius which made him an object of great hatred to him, Caius provoked him to a quarrel in a lonely place and killed him. Caius must, of course, confess that he has committed homicide, and he must say as far as he can how often he changed his mind about committing the crime, for such changes of resolution will break up the sin into as many smaller ones as there are changes. He need not mention any other circumstance, for the means which he took to commit the crime were indifferent in themselves and only gave unity to the internal intention. The grave hatred, too, is sufficiently confessed by confessing the murder itself, which is a mortal sin against charity, unless before the murder was committed and on other occasions the hatred was manifested in ways which had nothing to do with the crime which followed, for then there would be as many different sins of hatred as there were different manifestations of it. The quarreling which immediately preceded the murder formed part of the final crime and need not be distinctly and separately confessed.