Article II. On Numerical Distinction

160. Rules. - Rule I. The numerical distinction of sins is taken from diversity of total objects, or morally diverse objects. - Thus commonly with St. Lig., no. 45.

The reason for the assertion is evident. For where there are objects formally and morally total, and distinct from others, there also are several distinct acts of the will, terminated and complete in themselves, and therefore several distinct malices, and consequently several sins.

Now that is called a total object which is wholly distinguished from other objects, and is completed in itself, so that by itself alone it effects a moral whole, and consequently is not part of another, nor by its nature referred to another. Thus in homicide one total object is had, although the homicide has sent ahead various previous acts, for example by seeking arms, laying snares, or striking several times; because all those previous acts are to be held as parts of the principal act, and are ordered to this. But if the homicide first intended only a striking, and afterward, with will changed, killed, there will be a twofold

161. • Rule II. The numerical distinction of sins is also taken from the multiplicity of acts morally interrupted. - St. Lig., no. 36, and others very commonly.

For when acts of the will are morally interrupted, the individual acts become complete in themselves, nor can the following act be called the continuation of the preceding one. Thus he who at several morally interrupted times strikes another, or steals, commits as many sins as there are blows or thefts, because these constitute so many diverse acts.

But acts of the will are interrupted in a threefold mode, namely 1. By retraction, or express revocation of the will, because this impedes the later act from being joined with the prior one, for example if someone retracts a depraved will of acting badly, and afterward resumes it. - 2. By voluntary cessation from the act, or by application of the mind to a diverse object, for example if someone freely ceases from an evil proposal, and then returns to it. - 3. By a delay sufficiently notable, with regard had to the nature of the act, so that by the judgment of prudent men the act of the will is judged to cease ¹.

¹ ** The Author suggests an interruption which happens involuntarily. For even then, when the act is resumed, there is present a new act of consenting will, because, as St. Alph. says (book 5, no. 37), with regard to such acts, one does not depend on another. But what the Holy Doctor adds (ibid.): Thus commonly... against Lugo, can be admitted with difficulty; because Lugo (On Penance, disp. 16, no. 565) concedes that there is indeed no interruption when the later wills have dependence on the first, and by force of the first will the second is placed, just as by force of the intention the choice toward the end is placed. But otherwise, he says, when the wills are so disposed that one will does not depend on another. Which is the very doctrine itself of St. Alphonsus.

162. • But what delay is judged sufficient for the multiplicity of acts? The following rules are commonly handed down:

1. Merely internal acts, which have no order among themselves, are completed as soon as they are interrupted, and therefore they are multiplied as often as they are interrupted. The reason is that in reality there are as many complete and distinct acts of the will. And indeed such acts are not morally continued, since one does not depend on another; nor do they coalesce into one, since they have nothing in themselves by which they may be united to one another. Hence the penitent ought in confession to express, if he can, how many times he adhered to an internal temptation; but if he cannot, let him say approximately; or at least whether very frequently, in the course of the day, he gave consent.

2. Internal acts with the proposal of placing an external action are multiplied as often as the depraved proposal is formally renewed, namely in such a way that the later proposal cannot morally be judged a continuation of the prior one. The reason is that then a new act of the will, formally distinct, intervenes. But if the proposal is not renewed, no new sin is made, because then the prior act of the will is judged to persevere in the effect itself, or in the work external, if this has been begun. But the same proposal endures for a greater or lesser time according to the various intensity and also according to the various circumstances of persons, age, sex, disposition, etc. - St. Lig., no. 39 ².

² ** St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 39), to the question whether an evil proposal is interrupted by common interruptions, such as by sleep, distraction, eating, etc., answers: Lugo denies it, and adheres to Tamburini, even if a great delay intervenes; but this opinion is against the common opinion, and deservedly is rejected, as Croix says, book 5, no. 178.

But in reality Lugo is in no way mentioned there by Croix. How then did the name of De Lugo creep into the text of St. Alphonsus? Moreover St. Alphonsus (ibid.) praises as more probable the opinion of the Salmanticenses, treat. 20, ch. 12, no. 38. But the Salmanticenses in this place have these things: Therefore an intention of stealing or fornicating remains virtually in moral estimation, even if it is discontinued by sleep, eating... and similar interruptions; whence, although after these things you again repeat this depraved proposal, you commit one sin: because since the first will remains virtually, it is united and continued with the second. Now you would say these things were transcribed from Lugo, who in the same place which St. Alphonsus indicates (On Penance, disp. 16, no. 567) observes that a proposal is not interrupted by sleep or similar common and ordinary interruptions; and otherwise he has not even a word concerning that great delay of which St. Alphonsus speaks; indeed in the same place he proves what Salas excepts, unless much time intervenes between the acts of the will, because then a moral interruption is judged; and, what the Salmanticenses omitted, he adds: Yet perhaps merely internal wills are more easily interrupted morally, when the work has not begun to be placed externally; because that external placing or beginning, since it is sensible, more easily joins the parts in order to making one human and moral thing. Finally also that which the Salmanticenses (ibid.) add concerning moral interruption, when after a month the prior proposal is resumed, is taken from Lugo, who (l. c., no. 545) writes: I have said that these brief and common interruptions, through sleep and similar things, do not take away the unity of sin: for another thing must be said about an extraordinary interruption, which indeed takes away the moral unity of a human action. For if from an intention of killing Peter you seek him, and know that he has gone elsewhere and will return after a month, and you determine to kill him when he returns: then certainly, although you do not revoke the intention, still the killing after a month will not make one sin with the past will: just as neither will a dinner be one, however much you do not revoke the intention, but rather have the intention of returning after two hours to the table, because the unity of these actions asks not only an intention not revoked, but also lack of interruption, not of any interruption whatsoever, but of a human and moral one.

Let us come to Tamburini. And 1. observe that Tamburini, in the places cited by St. Alphonsus (Method of Confession, book 2, ch. 1, nos. 35, 36), does not treat of a merely internal proposal, but of a proposal led forth into work. Now concerning this case even St. Alph. (book 5, no. 40) writes: Acts of the will, if they proceed from the first will and morally remain in some effect which conduces to consummating the external sin, for whatever time the depraved will endures, constitute only one sin. Indeed Tamburini (no. 36) adds that which is not read there in St. Alphonsus, namely he explicitly excepts the interruption about which above the Salmanticenses with Lugo speak: and for that reason he refers the reader to the preceding no. 34.

2. But when Tamburini treats of an internal proposal, he has it thus (ibid. no. 32): Although the opinion asserting that by any interruption whatsoever the aforesaid acts are multiplied in number is speculatively more probable, whence also they ought, if they are held in memory, to be disclosed; nevertheless the contrary opinion, which teaches that they by no means ought to be disclosed, is also probable... Therefore it is enough if the time is explained, when it is notable... and thus it is enough if it is said: I, for example, for one day gravely hating Peter, imprecated grave evils upon him. But take care to attend well to those things which he immediately appends: For it is understood in the human manner, that is, that such acts were interrupted by various human actions.

3. What of the fact that Tamburini proposes absolutely the same doctrine which St. Alphonsus calls more probable? For St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 39) writes: But it seems more probable that it must be said that if a brief time intervenes, the act is not discontinued; otherwise, if a long time intervenes. But Tamburini (l. c., no. 47): The universal rule is of this kind: If much time intervenes between acts..., it will be judged a distinct act, and a sin distinct in number; but if a brief time is interposed, it will be judged to make one with the prior act.

4. But what of the fact that St. Alphonsus can seem more liberal than Tamburini himself? Namely the Holy Doctor appends (ibid.) the question: What time is to be judged long, namely which intervenes between one act and another, so that two acts are to be held as discontinued between themselves? Now let it be passed over for the present that the response of the Holy Doctor perhaps can seem partly to the point, partly away from the matter. For the opinions of Viva (On Penance, q. V, art. 6, no. 6, at the end) and Concina (On Sin, diss. 1, ch. 6, q. 4, no. 16) seem there to be brought away from the matter, since they do not treat of length of time which runs between one and another act, but of the time in which one act can be judged morally to persevere. But the opinions of the Salmanticenses (treat. 20, ch. 12, no. 38) and Roncaglia (treat. 2, q. 1, ch. 2, q. 2, resp. 1), which are brought there, are to the matter; they certainly speak of the distance of time running between one act and another. Let this also be passed over, that the proper response of the Holy Doctor is less to the matter, because it responds not to the question proposed concerning the time which runs between act and act, but to the question concerning the duration of one moral act. As regards the present point, the Holy Doctor (l. c.) replies: But I think that the impulse of one act can with difficulty be prolonged (speaking ordinarily) beyond two, or three days at most. Hence he who perseveres in an evil will beyond two or three days ought to explain the time, so that thus the number of internal acts concerning external sins may be understood morally. Thus St. Alphonsus. But Tamburini is much more moderate, and almost, I would say, more severe. For where St. Alphonsus does not impose the obligation of expressing the time unless where the act is prolonged to two or three days, six or ten hours suffice for Tamburini for this. For thus he (l. c., no. 49), to the question whether you ought to explain that you lasted so many hours in one act of concupiscence, for example, or of a desire of gravely harming an enemy, answers: I say: when in some one of these acts, by one heat of concupiscence and one impulse, you persist in the same thought, you sin once morally; and therefore the time will not have to be explained. But because when acts of this kind persevere, for example, through six or ten hours, it is morally impossible that this happen by one and the same impulse, therefore then it will be necessary and sufficient to say: Through six hours, or through ten, I desired, etc. For thus also the interruptions which in the human manner are accustomed to intervene, etc., will be explained.

These things will be able to serve the excellent VV., who are preparing a most accurate edition of the Theology of St. Alphonsus, so that notes of this kind, branded undeservedly upon writers, may be removed from the eminent work of the Holy Doctor.

3. External acts, or acts consummated externally, are multiplied as often as the object is disparate, or terminated in itself; but they are not multiplied, even with a notable interval of time interposed, when they are as it were parts of a more principal act, or when they tend to a single end. The reason is that then they effect one moral thing, which is not completed unless the act principally intended has been consummated. Thus he who has determined to perpetrate a theft commits one sin, although through several days he has thought about it, has rather often renewed the depraved proposal, has undertaken a journey for this, has sought the opportune time, etc.; for the prior act of the will is judged virtually to persevere in that very effect or external work ³.

³ ** Thus St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 40): If someone proposes to kill a man, and for this reason prepares arms, takes the road, and kills the enemy, he commits one sin, although through several days he has sought him, and has repeated the will several times. Thus commonly St. Bonaventure... and St. Thomas, etc.

It will be useful here to observe that St. Alphonsus, for this thesis, also alleged Vasquez after the Salmanticenses (treat. 20, ch. 12, no. 36); but the opinion of Vasquez is far different. For (On 1.2, disp. 75, ch. 2, no. 7, and On Penance, to q. 91, art. 1, dub. 5, no. 12, and elsewhere) he admits that it is one sin only insofar as the usurpation of the means, for example preparing arms, participates in one and the same malice which is proper to the end. For the rest, he contends that sin is multiplied not only by the interruption of sleep happening on the journey while he seeks the enemy (disp. 75, ch. 3, no. 11), but even by natural inconsideration, when a man considers neither expressly nor confusedly the end to which he tends in the very work which he does: as when someone makes a journey in order to kill an enemy, and meanwhile the mind is so distracted that he remembers neither the homicide, nor the place to which he tends, nor the journey itself (ibid. no. 12). Indeed he is carried so far that he says sin is multiplied by interruption if, meanwhile, when one is thinking about the work, consideration of the malice is lacking. Thus he (ibid. no. 13): When we say that sin is interrupted by inconsideration, this ought not be understood by inconsideration of the work itself or of the end, but also by inconsideration of the malice, when it is such that although a man adverts that he is going, for example, to Toledo, whither in the beginning he determined to betake himself with the mind of killing an enemy, but on the journey itself he entirely forgets the malice of the end not only specifically, but also confusedly, then sin is no longer said to be continued. These things indeed, wholly singular, deviate too much from the sense and premise of St. Alphonsus, as also from the common doctrine of others.

163. Resolves from what has been said. - 1. He commits one sin who, intending fornication, basely touches a woman, kisses her, entices her with base conversations, and finally fornicates; the reason is that all those previous acts by their nature are ordered to the consummated act. But if from the beginning he had wished only to touch the woman, and afterward, induced by lust, completed intercourse, there will be a twofold sin, and therefore it will not be enough if he confesses the intercourse. - St. Lig., no. 43.

2. A Priest who wills to omit the entire Office on one day makes one sin, because the individual Hours are ordered to completing one Office. But he would make two sins who first wished only to omit Matins, and afterward refused to recite the remaining Hours, because there would be a twofold act of evil will plainly distinct.

3. He perpetrates one sin who from the same impulse of passion repeats an evil act many times, for example several times basely touches himself or another, even with some interruption; strikes an enemy several times, or imprecates very many evils upon him, etc.; the reason is that there is one depraved affection of the will, and those various actions are morally united. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig., no. 50.

4. He makes one sin who by one act denies several articles of Faith at once, because the motive of Faith is one; consequently he is equally an infidel who denies one article, and he who denies all. - Thus commonly. - Likewise he probably makes one sin who by the same act blasphemes the twelve Apostles; because all blasphemies against the Saints take their malice from one relation to God. - St. Lig., no. 47.

5. He makes one sin who, intending to steal some determinate sum of money, carries it off at several times lest he be detected, because there is one depraved act of the will, which is consummated in the last theft ⁴. On the contrary, he perpetrates several sins who steals at several times from the same mass of money, without having resolved from the beginning to take away the whole, because the individual thefts effect an object total in itself.

⁴ ** The VV. oppose to this resolution that St. Alph. (book 5, no. 44) judges that then one hundred sins are committed, because the individual (one hundred) acts have consummated malice in themselves.

I answer: St. Alphonsus discusses him who carries them off a hundred times with moral interruptions; but Gury does not discuss morally interrupted acts.

Croix (book 5, no. 170), whom Mazzotta then copied (vol. 1, disp. 1, ch. 2, final prop.), contends that the acts are morally interrupted, because the individual acts of themselves are not ordered to one another, and because, as Mazzotta says, the individual acts are not ordered to the consummation of one work.

I answer: I deny that there is need for the acts to be ordered of themselves to one another; for as St. Alphonsus says (l. c., no. 41), external acts are morally united if they are directed to the consummation of the same sin. And in reality what ordering to one another is there between buying arms and taking the road for killing? What ordering to one another, to use examples brought by St. Alphonsus, is there between conversations and kisses and touches? Therefore it is not the ordering of these among themselves to one another, but their ordering from the intention of the agent to the consummation of one work, which constitutes one moral work; so that when that ordering intention has been taken away, all those acts which, no less than the little thefts in the case, have in themselves consummated malice, must be explained as distinct sins, as the Holy Doctor says (ibid. no. 43). But that Mazzotta did not see that the individual takings are ordered to the consummation of the whole theft will seem strange; yet nothing ought to seem strange if sometimes one writer merely transcribes from another.

6. He makes several sins who fornicates successively several times with the same woman; for each fornication is terminated in itself, or constitutes a total object. - St. Lig., no. 46.

7. He commits several sins who determines to omit the prescribed fast through several days; for although those omissions arise from one and the same will, still they are several sins to be confessed as distinct, because they have no unity among themselves. - Lugo, On Penance, disp. 16, no. 539. - St. Lig., no. 46.

8. But whether one or several sins are to be said to exist when objects materially and physically distinct in number are referred to one act, and therefore whether it is necessary to express the number of these objects in confession, is controverted ⁵. Some with Suarez, Filiucc., Lugo, say that it is one sin; but others with St. Alphonsus wish that there are several sins. Probability favors each opinion. Hence he probably makes one sin who by one act desires several women, intends to kill several men, or snatches a purse belonging to several associates ⁶.

⁵ There are those who propose this question thus: Whether sins are multiplied from the diversity or multiplicity of total objects. But not sufficiently aptly. For neither do those who deny that sins are multiplied suppose several total objects, but they say that objects materially several are conceived by mode of one adequate object.

Then, since those several objects conceived by mode of one must have a relation to one act of the one operating, the same authors distinguish whether it is an efficacious act of the will, as a proposal, or rather inefficacious, as, for example, a simple affection or complacency. For in the latter case, since the will does not regard those several things as an effect to be achieved, but merely as the object of complacency, they hold that one malice and therefore one sin is had; even several of those who otherwise follow the opinion of St. Alphonsus hold this. See Dicastillus, On Penance, disp. IX, dub. 4, no. 256.

But if the discourse is about an efficacious act of the will, they do not wish the unity or multiplicity of sin to be taken from the single interior act of the will, but also from the nature of the exterior act, namely whether those several objects are reached by one or by several external acts. See De Lugo, On Penance, disp. 16, no. 539. Hence they indeed find one sin in one detraction, which otherwise harms the reputation of several persons, for example of one family or College (Lugo, ibid., no. 135), or in an act which turns to the scandal of several; but they do not so define concerning a proposal by which someone determines, for example, to approach several women, or several times the same woman, or to omit fasting or canonical hours for three days (Lugo, ibid., no. 546).

Moreover, if someone, wishing to judge this question from the weight of authority, should undertake himself to inquire with his own eyes into the genuine opinions of the Doctors rather than with blind faith to trust others alleging them, he will find that far more, and indeed from the weightier ones, stood for that opinion which exempts the penitent from the obligation of expressing the number of objects, and moreover that most of the older authors who held that this number had to be expressed were led to this, not because they recognized several sins according to the number of objects, but because they thought that aggravating circumstances, of which sort they thought the multiplicity of objects, had to be expressed in confession.

** The VV. note (page 912) that here those far more numerous Authors are not seen indicated, who exempt from the obligation of expressing the number of objects.

I answer: 1. The work seemed superfluous. For did not St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 45) report twelve, and indeed not of the lowest note? Do not the Salmanticenses (treat. 20, ch. 12, no. 59) add five others? Does not Diana (vol. 1, treat. 7, res. 24 and 26) add three others? Does not Mendo (Balance of Opinions, disp. 2, nos. 2-4) add fifteen others to these? Do not four others appear in that charming Dialogue of Caramuel with Diana (Fundamental Theology XXIX, year 729)? Could there not be added Stoz (apud Croix, book 5, no. 150), and Struggl (treat. 2, q. 1, art. 4, nos. 42, 43), and the cited Mendo (l. c.), and Catalani (On Sin, q. 12, ch. 10, no. 12), and Roncaglia (treat. 2, q. 1, ch. 2, q. 2, resp. 2), and Wagemann (Synopsis of Moral Theology, part I, no. 45), and apud him Antonius Mayr, and (apud Lugo, On Penance, disp. 16, no. 135) Emmanuel Rodriguez, and Illsung (apud Reuter, vol. 1, treat. 5, no. 352), etc.?

2. To render the reason for the remaining part of that note it would then have had to be shown that most of the older authors affirmed for another reason that the number of objects must be confessed. Moreover it would have had to be indicated who on this side and on that are not alleged with full right. For as Croix excellently observes (book 5, no. 156), Authors very often propose resolutions which do not seem to cohere with the principles laid down, whence it happens that they are alleged for each diverse theory. Now work of this sort does not fit the brevity of a Compendium.

3. Nor only does the work not fit the brevity of a Compendium, but it scarcely carries any utility besides some knowledge of light moment for the Author's purpose. For can it be denied that probability belongs to each opinion, which even the adversaries concede? But this already suffices for defining the question. For in the controversy whether there is an obligation of expressing in confession the number of objects, on the one side probability does not suffice for imposing an obligation, but on the other side it suffices for denying it. Why then a further vain labor with useless expenditure of time?

4. But what happens now and then in alleging Authors, see an example apud the VV. They cite (l. c.) also Zacharia, book 5, no. 149. But do they think the Theology of Claudius La Croix was written by Zacharia, because the front of the book in certain editions, for example Venice, year 1755, carries the name of Zacharia in the more noble place, and below the name of Croix? But if, as is more likely, they thought that Zacharia approved all the opinions of Claudius La Croix, did he therefore approve also the opposite opinion of Laymann, whose work Zacharia likewise published illustrated with his notes?

⁶ Take the first of these cases as concerning inefficacious complacency; but the second as concerning several to be killed by one blow. As to the third example, De Lugo completes the matter thus by an argument from parity (On Penance, disp. 16, no. 139): Our doctrine of inference can be proved from another example, which Vasquez himself admits..., namely that some sin against two precepts of two superiors does not have two malices, nor must that circumstance be explained in confession, if the precepts are of the same nature; for each is a malice of disobedience, and therefore a sin against a divine and human precept does not have a double malice of disobedience... From which one can argue to our case. For that sin is also committed against the right of each superior, and harms the right which each has that he be obeyed; which rights are diverse, and therefore the harm inflicted seems to be diverse, as when the double right of two persons to reputation or to life is harmed; and nevertheless that double harming of jurisdiction must not be explained in confession; therefore neither in our case.

164. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Whether the means employed for sinning must be explained in confession, if the sin afterward was not consummated?

I answer: Some affirm this, even if those means were not evil in themselves, such as to undertake a journey, to carry a ladder for theft, etc. The reason is that the sin then does not remain merely internal, but becomes external by those means. For those actions, although indifferent in themselves, nevertheless become evil from the evil end. But others probably deny this ⁷, unless those means are evil in themselves, and then they must be indicated, and indeed all of them, if they are diverse in species, such as touches or obscene words employed for soliciting.

⁷ ** Here the VV. warn (page 912) that Viva apud St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 42) said that these means must very probably be explained, even if they are indifferent.

I answer: The probability of the negative opinion suffices so that the obligation of explaining means of this kind is denied. But the probability of the affirmative opinion so much does not suffice for asserting the obligation that it would be wrong for a Confessor to impose it. See the Authors apud Diana (vol. 1, treat. 7, res. 59).

165. • QUESTION 2. Whether he makes several sins who by one act detracts from several, or before several?

I answer to the first: It is controverted, and a twofold probable opinion is given, as was said above in resolution 8.

I answer to the second: It is controverted. Probably he makes only one sin; because to detract before several persons is only an aggravating circumstance: for the right to reputation is one among all, not multiple. Consequently there is probably no obligation of explaining in confession the number of persons before whom someone has detracted, but it suffices to say: I detracted before several persons. - St. Lig. (as probable), no. 49 ⁸. - Lugo. - Azor, etc., against Lacroix and others.

⁸ ** Thus St. Alph. (book 5, no. 49): It is probable that there is not an obligation of explaining the number of persons before whom the detraction was made.

Yet the VV. object (page 913, no. 19) that according to St. Alphonsus (Practice of Confessors, no. 43) it is the office of the Confessor to question the penitent about this.

I answer: I deny the consequence. For the Confessor can question about several things also so that he may aid the penitent merely by counsels, for example in a case how there can be place for restoring reputation. But as to what the VV. add concerning the obligation of explaining the number, let them show where St. Alphonsus taught that detraction has a necessary connection with scandal.

QUESTION 3. Whether he commits several sins who wishes several diverse evils to an enemy?

I answer: 1. Yes, of itself, if the intention of the one imprecating is determinately carried to evils of diverse species, for example disgrace and death; because desire takes its species from the object desired, as will be said below, no. 167. - St. Lig., no. 50, and more clearly, Apostolic Man, no. 65, and others commonly against some.

I answer: 2. No, by accident, because namely these diverse evils are almost apprehended under the general aspect of evil, as means to ruin; which is accustomed to happen when imprecations proceed from the impulse of anger. - St. Lig., ibid.

166. • QUESTION 4. Whether he makes several sins who long defers restitution?

I answer: No, if he perseveres habitually in the will of retaining another's thing, because the evil will perseveres by mode of a continuum with the thing unjustly retained. Yet if the unjust possessor has forgotten for a notable time about making restitution, and afterward has renewed the depraved proposal, he will commit a new sin, because his evil will is judged morally interrupted. - St. Lig., no. 40, and others commonly, against others, who say that the unjust possessor of another's thing sins as often as he attends to the obligation of restoring ⁹. - See Cases, no. 150 and following.

⁹ Since the doctrine of St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 40) can be safely held, namely that if someone resolved not to restore another's thing, and remains always in the same will, even for a year, he commits one sin; which doctrine he himself (book 3, no. 683) judges more probable; it follows that there is no need to express in confession whether the thing of another was retained for a short or long time. And indeed there is no need for this by reason of length of time, because length of time is a merely aggravating circumstance; concerning which matter Diana aptly says (vol. 1, treat. 7, res. 157): Aggravating circumstances are not necessarily to be confessed; but said length of time is only an aggravating circumstance. Therefore. But neither is it necessary by reason of multiple sin. Whence Diana (l. c., no. 4): Let the Confessor note this, and he will be free from many scruples: for the penitent satisfies in confession by accusing himself only of not having restored another's thing; nor is he to be questioned about the time and the length of retention, or about the number of sins which some think are committed in such length of time; provided he had not proposed to restore, and afterward, with mind changed, determined no longer to make restitution.