§ II. On Numerical Distinction

I. Notion. Numerical distinction is the distinction among several sins with respect to their individuality; or it is that by which several sins are distinct in the individual, for example, two fornications.

Now inquiry into numerical distinction has less regard to several malices distinct in species, which, according to what was said in n. 251, are sometimes contained in one act. It is rather commonly admitted that, where by some act several malices specifically distinct in themselves are involved, there are also in fact and formally several malices specifically diverse,¹ and consequently several sins in number. But the question is when sins which are of the same species are distinguished from one another in number. The difficulty of discerning this arises from the fact that sometimes several physical acts are only one sin in number, while sometimes one physical act contains several sins.

¹ Few deny this with respect to some acts, for example, with respect to adultery, incest, and carnal sacrilege, and think that in the stated acts only one species of sin is formally contained (cf. John of St. Thomas, on I-II, q. 18, disp. 9, a. 6). But the controversy is not practical, because the Council of Trent (session XIV, canon 7) teaches that both the species of sins and the circumstances changing the species must be confessed.

II. Roots of numerical distinction. Two roots of numerical distinction are distinguished, namely: 1. plurality of acts, as if someone fornicates twice; 2. plurality of objects, as if someone by one act kills several men. We shall speak of each.

III. Plurality of acts. The general rule is this: there are as many sins as there are morally distinct acts, or as there are physical acts not morally united into some one thing. "According to the unity of the will," says St. Thomas, "judgment is to be taken concerning the unity of that which is said to be in the moral genus" (In II Sent., dist. 42, q. 1, a. 1). Therefore where there is a morally diverse act of the will, there is a distinct sin. It remains to inquire when there is a morally diverse act; the particular rules will provide this, i.e., rules which regard diverse acts considered specifically. Now in relation to this matter acts are distinguished into internal acts, i.e., acts to be consummated in the will alone, and external acts.

Internal acts are divided into acts which do not tend toward another act, such as morose delectations, hatred, etc.; and acts which tend toward another act, such as the purpose of perpetrating an internal or external sin.

External acts are distinguished into complete and incomplete acts. Complete acts are those which by their nature are not ordered to another act of the same species, such as self-pollution, fornication, homicide. Incomplete acts are called acts which by their nature are ordered to another more principal act of the same species; thus an immodest touch is ordered to intercourse or to self-pollution. Sins of the mouth are equated with incomplete acts. There are added acts which, considered according to the notion handed down, are neither complete nor incomplete, namely acts indifferent by their nature, which are employed by the agent as means of arriving at a sinful act, such as taking the road in order to steal, preparing weapons in order to commit homicide. With these things noted, take the particular rules which follow:

1. Internal acts which do not tend toward another act constitute a new sin as often as they are repeated after a moral interruption; in other words, as often as they are repeated: 1. after formal revocation, i.e., a contrary act either of efficacious unwillingness or of simple displeasure; 2. after voluntary cessation, namely when someone indeed does not formally revoke the prior act, but nevertheless, reflecting upon it, either simply turns himself away from it, for example, from weariness, or turns himself to a work incompatible with the prior act, as if someone deliberately ceases from morose delectation and applies himself to study; 3. after indeliberate cessation, i.e., through natural inadvertence and distraction to other things, of such a delay that the repeated act cannot be said to proceed from the same impulse of passion, and so to be united with the prior act or acts in the same cause; practically, after a cessation of some delay. I say, of some delay, because these sins, since they do not tend toward a work and therefore are plainly consummated in themselves, commonly do not proceed from the same impulse of passion as long as purposes do (St. Alphonsus, V, 37; Homo Apostolicus, tract. III, n. 58).

2. Internal acts which tend toward another act constitute a new sin as often as they are repeated after a moral interruption; in other words, as often as they are repeated: 1. after formal revocation; 2. after voluntary cessation; 3. after indeliberate cessation, if this is of so great a delay that the repeated purpose cannot be said to proceed from the same impulse of passion, and the purpose does not remain virtually in some effect leading to the intended work. It is said:

a) If this is of so great a delay that the repeated purpose cannot be said to proceed from the same impulse of passion. But how great a delay or sufficiently long interval is required depends on the intensity and firmness of the purpose. Nevertheless, according to St. Alphonsus, commonly an interval of two or three days suffices, because the same impulse of passion is with difficulty prolonged longer. "Hence he who perseveres in an evil will beyond two or three days must explain the time, so that in this way the number of internal acts concerning external sins may be morally understood" (St. Alphonsus, V, 39).

b) And the purpose does not virtually remain in some effect leading to the intended end. If this happens, the first purpose, whatever interval has intervened, is not morally interrupted. "Hence it is inferred: 1. that if someone proposes to kill a man, and for that reason prepares weapons, takes the road, and kills the enemy, he commits one sin, although he has sought him for many days and has repeated the will several times... 2. If someone resolves not to restore another's property, and always remains in the same will, even for a year, he commits one sin, because in that retention never retracted the first will virtually remains, as Roncaglia probably says... Nevertheless Diana rightly thinks... with authors cited by him, that if the thief becomes unable to restore, and then, having become able, does not restore when the opportunity is given, he commits a new sin. The reason is that in that case, through that time of inability, the will of not restoring does not persevere in the effect" (St. Alphonsus, V, 40). Understand this if the thief adverts that on account of inability he is not held to restitution and repudiates the depraved will which he had; otherwise the will morally perseveres in the effect, and it suffices for the penitent to declare the time during which he persisted in such a will (St. Alphonsus, III, 683). Finally, observe that a purpose not morally interrupted constitutes one sin in number with the external act.

3. Complete external acts constitute a new sin as often as they are repeated. Except if the acts, although complete in themselves, nevertheless constitute one whole with others and are not morally interrupted.

Corollary I. He commits several sins in number who twice defiles himself, twice fornicates, twice neglects Mass, etc.

Corollary II. Much more probably he commits several sins who successively absolves several persons. The reason is that each confecting of a sacrament constitutes an action complete in itself, nor do the diverse absolutions, although they may be done on the occasion of one session, constitute one whole. Thus, against several, St. Alphonsus (V, 50, q. 6), Billuart,¹ De Smet,² Pesch,³ Prummer,⁴ and others.

Corollary III. It is more doubtful how many sins are committed by one who celebrates in the state of mortal sin. Some think that only one is committed, because all these actions constitute or integrate one sacrifice. Others admit two sins, one of unworthy consecration, the other of unworthy communion. Others add a third, namely of ministration to an unworthy person. But with St. Alphonsus (V, 44; VI, 35) it seems it must be said that four sacrileges are committed by a celebrant of this kind, namely: being unworthy, he consecrates; being unworthy, he receives communion; being unworthy, he ministers; and he ministers to one unworthy. The reason is that the aforesaid acts, for example the reception, confecting, etc., of a sacrament, seem so disparate that it is scarcely admitted that they coalesce into one sin in number, although they integrate one sacrifice. There is added that, for example, unworthy consecration and unworthy reception are so diverse that they seem to constitute sins of diverse species and therefore also distinct in number.

Corollary IV. Sufficiently probably he commits only one sin who, in the state of mortal sin, distributes the Eucharist once to several persons. The reason is that all the administrations constitute one banquet (St. Alphonsus, V, cited place).

Corollary V. He who from one intention omits all the canonical hours commits one sin, because the different hours constitute one whole, i.e., the Office of the day (St. Alphonsus, IV, 148).

Corollary VI. He who, from the intention of stealing 100 florins, commits several successive thefts, or, having taken the purpose of reading a bad book, completes the reading over several times, seems to commit only one sin, because the stated acts by force of the intention seem sufficiently to constitute one whole, namely the theft of 100 florins, or the reading of the whole book. Except if in the cases brought forward the acts are morally interrupted, for instance through a rather long delay.

4. Incomplete external acts multiply sins in this way:

a) If they are ordered by the agent to a complete act, and the complete act follows, they constitute one sin in number with the complete act, unless they are morally interrupted. The reason is that on the part of the matter they form one moral whole with the complete act, and by reason of the intention they are placed as such. The same must be said of incomplete acts which immediately follow a complete act, because they can be regarded as the complement of the complete act (St. Alphonsus, V, 41). If in the case the complete act does not follow, the incomplete acts constitute one sin among themselves, unless they are morally interrupted.

Incomplete acts, however, are morally interrupted: 1. by formal revocation; 2. by voluntary cessation; 3. by indeliberate cessation, if this is of so great a delay that the incomplete acts cannot be said to proceed from the same impulse of passion, and the purpose of arriving at the complete act does not remain virtually in some effect (p. 200).

Concerning the manner of confessing the aforesaid incomplete acts not morally interrupted, it must be said as follows: 1. if the intended complete act followed, it suffices to confess: I committed fornication; or: I committed adultery; etc. (St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 42, q. 1, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, V, 41); 2. if the intended complete act did not follow, one can say, for example: From the intention of fornication, adultery, etc., I acted shamefully by kisses and touches (St. Alphonsus, V, 42).

b) If they are not ordered by the agent to a complete act, they constitute a new sin as often as they are repeated after a moral interruption; in other words, as often as they are repeated: 1. after formal revocation; 2. after voluntary cessation; 3. after indeliberate cessation of such a delay that the repeated act cannot be said to proceed from the same impulse of passion; practically, after an indeliberate cessation of a longer interval. Hence he commits one sin in number who "from the same impulse strikes several times, touches dishonestly several times, blasphemes the same saint or several holy days, reviles or detracts from someone several times in the same matter" (St. Alphonsus, V, 41).⁵

Concerning the manner of confessing the aforesaid incomplete acts not morally interrupted, it suffices to confess, for example: I acted shamefully with a girl by kisses and touches.

The things which have been said about incomplete acts not ordered to a complete act are valid even if, after those acts have been perpetrated, with lust boiling over, someone proceeds to the complete act. Hence "if someone, having kisses, touches, etc., had not from the beginning willed intercourse, but afterward, because lust had increased, completed intercourse, it does not suffice if he confesses only intercourse" (St. Alphonsus, V, 43); but he is held to declare that, independently of intercourse, he acted shamefully with a girl by kisses, touches, etc.

¹ De peccatis, diss. 2, art. 4.

² Collationes Brugenses, 1905, p. 555.

³ Tractatus dogmaticus, VI, n. 261.

⁴ Manuale Theologiae Moralis, I, n. 380.

⁵ Cf. p. 199, where we said that sins of the mouth are equated with incomplete acts.

5. Acts indifferent by their nature, which, considered according to the notion handed down above, are neither complete nor incomplete, but are employed by the agent as means of arriving at a sinful act - these acts, I say, are sinful, as having the malice of the intended end; but, like incomplete acts, they also form one sin with the intended and subsequently placed sinful act, unless they are morally interrupted. If the intended sinful act does not follow, they constitute one sin among themselves, unless again they are morally interrupted. Now they are morally interrupted by the same reason by which incomplete acts ordered by the agent to a complete act are interrupted. "Hence if someone, in order to commit homicide, buys weapons, takes the road, seeks his enemy, and kills him, he commits one sin" (St. Alphonsus, V, 41); and this is valid even if he has sought the enemy for many days. I said concerning acts indifferent by their nature; for otherwise it must be said concerning acts which involve a malice diverse from the sinful act, as if you use sorcery in order to be able to kill someone; in which case certainly a new sin, and indeed one of another species, is added.

Concerning the manner of confessing the aforesaid acts not morally interrupted, it must be said as follows: 1. if the intended sinful act follows, it suffices to confess the stated act; if it does not follow, it suffices to say: From the intention, for example, of theft, I employed means (St. Alphonsus, V, 42).

IV. Plurality of objects, i.e., of objects which are numerically distinguished and cannot coalesce into one object. Thus, for example, the lives of two men. Now an evil act which regards numerically distinct objects not coalescing into one object - as an act by which someone kills three men - contains as many sins as there are objects of this kind regarded. The reason is that that from which sin is caused must also, if it is multiplied, multiply sins. But sin is caused from an evil object. The major is confirmed from the fact that, as the adversaries concede, a married man who has intercourse with a married woman commits a double malice in number, i.e., injustice - one with respect to his own wife, the other with respect to the husband of the other woman - and consequently, as it seems, a double sin in number. The reason for this must be that the act placed regards two objects or injures two numerically distinct rights. Thus teach, against several, St. Alphonsus (V, 45; VII, 28), Billuart, Prummer, Sweens. Nevertheless, distinct objects are not so rarely conceived and reached by the agent in the manner of one thing, namely under the concept of a multitude or of harm inflicted upon a multitude; in which case I do not deny that there is only one sin in number (St. Alphonsus, V, 50, q. 5, the third opinion, however, etc.). But from this some undeservedly conclude that the opinion of St. Alphonsus is false; since the question is whether there are several sins in number if the thing is conceived and reached as it objectively stands.

Corollary I. In themselves, several sins are committed:

1. By him who by one act kills several persons, defames several, gives scandal to several, or wishes evil upon several; likewise by him who proposes to kill several, defame several, etc.

2. By him who in one speech detracts from someone in diverse matters or affects someone with diverse insults. For the right that I not be detracted from in one matter is distinguished from the right that I not be detracted from in another; likewise the right that I not be affected with this insult differs from the right that I not be affected with another (St. Alphonsus, V, 48).

"Nevertheless, here it is well to observe that... little women and common people, who while quarreling together load one another with diverse insults from the same impulse, commit one sin. The reason is that according to common estimation these do not injure reputation and honor; because, on the one hand, insults among persons of this kind are not apprehended as grave, and on the other hand, hearers place no trust in them, thinking that they proceed rather from the impulse of anger than from the mind and truth of the matter. And therefore such quarrelers are for the most part excused from mortal sin, unless perhaps they reproach the adversary about some particular fact" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

3. By him who by one act, or by acts not morally interrupted, wishes diverse evils upon someone. For the right that one evil not be wished upon someone differs from the right that another not be wished upon him.

4. By him who in one speech defames an entire family, because each member has a distinct right to reputation; likewise by him who injures goods belonging by distinct ownership to several owners. It is otherwise "if someone were to injure goods which a city, monastery, or chapter possesses in common; for then the right does not belong to the individuals in particular, but only to the whole community; hence one right is injured" (St. Alphonsus, V, 46).

I said that in the cases set forth several sins are committed in themselves; for in practice, as has already been noted, distinct objects are often conceived and reached in the manner of one thing, so that commonly there is no obligation of asking penitents, for example, before how many persons they had immodest conversations, etc.

Corollary II. One sin is committed:

1. By him who denies several articles of faith, because the right of God that I assent to one truth revealed by him is one with his right that I assent to others (St. Alphonsus, V, 50).

2. By him who blasphemes, for example, against the twelve Apostles, because the right of God, to whose dishonor the blasphemy tends, is one (St. Alphonsus, V, 47).

3. By him who detracts from someone before several persons, "since the right to reputation is single before all, and not multiple" (St. Alphonsus, V, 49).

Concerning the practice of asking penitents about the species and number of sins, cf. the treatise on Penance.