§ I. On Specific Distinction

I. The notion of specific distinction. Specific distinction is the distinction by which one mortal sin differs from another, or one venial sin from another, in a morally diverse mode.

II. The root of specific distinction. 1. Sins of omission are distinguished by the omitted acts specifically distinct in moral being. For they are mere privations of a due act. Now privations are distinguished specifically by the forms specifically distinct of which they deprive. Therefore those sins of omission are of diverse species by which due acts of diverse moral species are omitted, for example, the omission of Mass and the omission of due alms (St. Alphonsus, III, 32).

2. With regard to sins of commission it is disputed whence their specific distinction is to be taken. Some, with Scotus,¹ take it from the specific distinction of the virtues to which they are opposed, or from the diversity of honorableness of which they deprive; others, with Vasquez,² from the specific distinction of the laws or precepts to which they are opposed; others, with St. Thomas (I-II, q. 72, a. 1), from moral objects diverse in species, because every act of commission is specified by the terminus ad quem, and not by the terminus a quo. Besides, the opinions set forth do not seem to differ very greatly among themselves, and in the end seem to return to the same thing; since virtues and precepts are distinguished in species according to objects (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 72, a. 1, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 32).

¹ In II Sent., dist. 37, q. 1, n. 9.

² I-II, disp. 98, c. 2.

III. Norms determining specific distinction. Once it is posited that specific distinction is taken from the specific distinction of objects, the norms which determine the specific distinction of objects also assign the specific distinction of sins. Now objects, and consequently sins, are specifically diverse when they contain a special repugnance with the eternal law; this has place:

1. When they are opposed to diverse virtues. For just as any virtue has distinct goodness, so the object opposed to it contains distinct malice. Hence, for example, fornication, which is opposed to chastity, and theft, which is opposed to justice, are specifically distinguished (St. Alphonsus, III, 31).

2. When they are opposed to the same virtue, but according to a diverse reason (St. Alphonsus, cited place). Now objects can be opposed to the same virtue according to a diverse reason in two ways:

a) In a contrary mode, i.e., through excess and through defect. Thus, for example, prodigality through excess, and avarice through defect, are opposed to liberality.

b) In a mode not indeed contrary, but nevertheless morally diverse. Thus, for example, superstition, blasphemy, perjury, and sacrilege are opposed to religion in a diverse mode.

3. When they are opposed to laws or precepts morally diverse, i.e., issued from a diverse formal motive (n. 148). Thus, for example, violation of a fast imposed by law of the Church is opposed to temperance; violation of a fast obliging from a vow is repugnant to religion. Since in this case diverse virtues, or diverse offices of the same virtue, are injured, this rule is to be reduced to the preceding ones (St. Alphonsus, V, 33).

Sins specifically distinct are not had if someone injures several laws distinguished only materially, for instance, issued by different legislators, but from the same formal motive. Hence he is guilty of only one sin who commits theft prohibited by both divine and human law. The same must be said of him who "culpably omits Mass on a feast day occurring on a Sunday, because for both cases the hearing of Mass is prescribed on account of the formal motive of religion" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).¹

Corollary I. One act can contain several malices diverse in species. Thus, for example, he commits three sins specifically diverse who breaks a fast to which he is held by ecclesiastical law, by vow, and by the precept of a confessor. For he violates temperance, which the Church intends; religion, which commands the observance of a vow; and penance, from the motive of which the confessor imposes satisfaction (St. Alphonsus, V, 33). Likewise "a beneficed cleric, if he omits the Office and is unwilling to restore the fruits, will sin not only against religion, but also against justice" (St. Alphonsus, IV, 145).

Corollary II. Common estimation does not indeed found specific distinction, as is clear, but nevertheless it is an argument for it. Moreover, since sins diverse in species are usually indicated by diverse names, commonly from diversity of name one can conclude to diversity of sin.

Corollary III. Sins which are not repugnant to a determinate virtue, but to honorableness in common, such as the will of living badly, are said to be of an unnamed species.

¹ Resp. Buscod., 1873, p. 403.