Chapter — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
Chapter IV. On the Numerical Distinction of Sins
376. Preliminary note. Older authors before the Council of Trent are not accustomed to speak at greater length about the numerical distinction of sins, and among modern writers there is no consensus. The Church has thus far defined nothing about this matter. Hence some have said, not inconveniently, that here especially the prudent estimation of men must be attended to, and therefore those sins are judged numerically distinct which are held as such by timorous men. - It is clear of itself that sins specifically distinct are also distinguished numerically, although they are done by one act. Hence he who commits theft in order to fornicate perpetrates not only two sins specifically distinct, but also two numerically diverse sins; he who steals a sacred thing wounds the virtue of justice and of religion, and therefore his act contains a twofold malice and two sins. - In the present matter there is one question: in what way those sins are distinguished numerically which are of the same species, for example when several thefts, several fornications, several lascivious thoughts, etc., are distinguished numerically. That saying of St. Thomas106 for the numerical distinction of sins can be held as the following:
106 2, dist. 42, q. 1, a. 1.
377. General principle: "The judgment concerning the unity of that which is said in the genus of morals must be taken according to the unity of the will"; or in other words: There are as many sins as there are acts of evil will not morally united. This principle is customarily explained by these two rules:
378. Rule 1. There are as many sins as there are morally interrupted acts of the will concerning the same object.
An act of the will is morally interrupted when it perseveres neither formally nor at least virtually. But it is judged to persevere neither formally nor virtually:
1. By voluntary revocation. Hence if someone, for example, having lascivious thoughts, afterwards indeed rejects them, but after an interval admits them again, he has made two acts and therefore two sins.
2. By voluntary cessation from the act. For voluntary cessation is an implicit retraction.
If cessation is not voluntary but forced, then one must distinguish between a) acts merely internal, such as thoughts and morose delectations; b) acts mixedly internal, such as desires; c) external acts.
a) If the matter concerns acts merely internal, even involuntary cessation seems to interrupt morally the act begun; for example, while someone delights in obscene thoughts, his friend arrives, with whom he must converse for a quarter of an hour, and on that account he must turn his thoughts to other things; but after the friend has gone away, he again begins to think of obscene things. It seems to be a twofold sin, because the prior act is connected with the second by no bond.107 Yet in practice it is almost always impossible to find the determined number of merely internal acts of this kind, and therefore it suffices if the penitent accuses himself: I had depraved thoughts, which indeed lasted for so much time.
b) If the matter concerns acts mixedly internal, namely depraved desires (acts of doing), involuntary cessation does not interrupt the act, but that act is judged one which is done from one impulse of passion; and this impulse, according to St. Alphonsus,108 can last two to three days. Hence, for example, if someone proposes to commit theft and diligently seeks the means for execution, but in fact must desist from the execution of the theft until finally at the end of the third day the matter turns out according to his wishes, he commits only one sin. St. Thomas writes to the point:109 "It happens that there are several acts according as they are referred to the genus of nature, which nevertheless are one according as they are considered in the genus of morals, as is clear in him who steals: because all his acts which are ordered to the end of theft are sin, since they are done with an evil intention, and these can be very many; and nevertheless all are reckoned as one sin, because they do not have the notion of sin except according as they are ordered by one will to one perverse end."
Generally it must be said that depraved desires which are concerned with some work to be perpetrated or omitted unite into one sin all acts necessary for obtaining the intended end, and that desires do not multiply sins, unless they are explicitly or implicitly revoked. This indeed especially holds if the matter concerns not a work to be perpetrated, but one to be omitted. Hence, for example, he who proposes not to restore another's goods, and by force of that purpose omits restitution for two years, does not seem to commit more than one sin, although meanwhile he often renews that depraved purpose.110 But if at some time he retracted the purpose of not restoring, wishing to restore, and afterwards again renews the purpose of not restoring, then the sin is certainly multiplied.
c) If the matter concerns external acts, involuntary cessation, not lasting very long, does not interrupt acts which are as parts or means toward one consummated act. The matter is otherwise if there is question of acts morally complete and total in themselves, which will be treated in the second rule. Hence, for example, he who, intending to read through a depraved book, reads it over several days, does not commit more than one sin; likewise young men mutually mixing obscene words commit only one sin, even if because of the master's intervention they must cease for a quarter of an hour from obscene speech. On the contrary, a young man who twice pollutes himself, or a prostitute who twice fornicates within a quarter of an hour, commits two sins. The reason is that readings or obscene conversations in those cases are not consummated sins, but pollution and fornication are acts morally complete in themselves.
107 Cf. Billuart, De pecc. diss. 2, a. 4. St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 37) tempered this opinion somewhat, saying: "If several acts of this kind proceed from the same impulse of concupiscence, they constitute one mortal sin, even if some brief interval intervenes between the acts."
108 L. c. n. 39.
109 2, dist. 42, q. 1, a. 1.
110 Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 40.
379. Resolves: 1. If someone wishes to steal 100 francs, but, fearing lest he be caught, takes away this sum by parts and with many intervals interposed, for example by taking 5 francs each week, he commits only one sin, even if he renewed the purpose twenty times and twenty times took away 5 francs. The reason is that all those acts have moral union as tending to one end.111
He who approaches a woman with the intention of fornicating, but first says many obscene words, performs touches, and finally after an hour completes fornication, commits only one sin, which he sufficiently accuses in confession by saying: I committed fornication once. But if from the beginning he had no determined intention, and then did all those immodest acts, he is bound to declare the individual acts in confession. The same holds more probably concerning the means employed, if someone had the intention of fornicating,111a but afterwards did not execute it either because of retraction or because an impediment arose. The reason is that, as St. Alphonsus says,112 then the sin does not remain only internal, but is externalized in those actions, all of which become evil, since all are informed by an evil end. Other theologians, however, think otherwise. Nor should someone say: Therefore in the second and third case the penitent committed more sins than in the first, where perhaps he perpetrated many more obscene acts; which seems inconvenient. For the response is: Certainly more sins were present in the second and third case, but that one sin in the first case is more culpable before God than the number of sins in the second and third case.
A priest who proposes to omit the whole Divine Office on one day, and in fact omits it, commits one mortal sin. But if previously he had intended only to omit Matins and Lauds, and after an interval additionally proposed to omit another Hour, he committed two mortal sins. Yet those two sins are certainly as grave together as one sin committed by omission of the whole Office. A priest who proposes to omit the Divine Office for ten days seems to commit ten mortal sins, just as also a priest who in fact did not recite this Office for ten days.
111 So Gury, Comp. Theol. mor. I, n. 163; Noldin, De principiis n. 305.
111a Yet he must explicitly accuse this sinful intention of fornicating in confession.
112 L. c. n. 42.
380. Rule 2. There are as many sins as there are objects numerically distinct in moral being or morally total, although they are reached by the same act of the will, indeed even by the same external act.
Objects are judged to be numerically distinguished in moral being when they do not hold themselves morally after the manner of one: either because one is not part of another, or because they are not ordered to the same end. The reason is a) because, just as sins are specifically distinguished and multiplied by objects distinct in species, so a fortiori they are multiplied numerically by objects numerically distinct and complete in themselves;113 b) because the same act can include not only several malices diverse in species, but also in number. So teach Billuart, Concina, Wigandt, St. Alphonsus,114 all the Redemptorists, Muller, etc., against Suarez, Lugo, Laymann, Noldin, Vermeersch, Merkelbach, Gopfert, and others.
Resolves: 1. He who by one explosion kills ten men commits ten homicides and ten mortal sins, not one, as Noldin115 and others wish. The reason is that one man is not part of another, and therefore is a total object and has a special right to life, which the killer wounds. Thus at least if the killer intended and foresaw ten homicides. - Here it can be asked, for the sake of an example, how many sins he commits who causes a whole stretch of railway, in which several men are being carried, to perish. The response is: This depends on his intention and foresight. If he intended and foresaw that 50 men would die in the stretch, he commits 50 homicides besides other sins of causing damage, wounding, etc.
He who in one speech detracts from several determined persons commits as many sins as there are persons knowingly calumniated by him. The reason is that each person has his own right not to have detraction committed against him. But I say "from several determined persons"; for if someone detracts from some community of men in general, for example from some army of soldiers, he does not commit as many sins as there are soldiers, because then the right of the whole community rather than of the individual members is wounded. On the contrary, he who detracts from one person before several persons seems to commit one sin;116 indeed also he who detracts from one person in diverse matters. For each of these pluralities is only an aggravating circumstance of one and the same sin.
A priest who, in the state of mortal sin, successively either hears several confessions or solemnly baptizes several persons more probably commits as many mortal sins as the confessions he heard or the baptisms he conferred. The reason is that each confession or each baptism is a total object.117 For the same reason, a priest existing in the state of mortal sin who on the day of the Nativity of the Lord says three Masses successively commits three numerically distinct sins. But a sinful priest who administers the holy eucharist at the same time to 200 persons does not seem to commit 200 mortal sins, but one, because there seems to be one table and one administration. Moreover, it is not so certain that a priest commits mortal sin when he administers the holy eucharist while he himself exists in the state of mortal sin.118
He who by one immodest speech induces five boys to sin commits five mortal sins. The reason is that each boy is a total moral object having a special right that his soul not suffer detriment.
113 Cf. Billuart l. c.
114 Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 45.
115 De principiis n. 312.
116 St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 49; cf. also below II, n. 190.
117 Cf. below III in the treatise on the sacraments in general 58. Noldin (l. c. n. 305) and others teach the contrary.
118 Ib. 59.
381. Admonition. Certainly the confessor is bound to investigate the species and number of mortal sins, since the Council of Trent has prescribed this. Nevertheless, let there be nothing excessive! Not a few penitents, especially those who have not made confession for a rather long time, cannot, morally speaking, declare all mortal sins according to species and number. Therefore it suffices both for the penitent and for the confessor if, serious diligence having been employed, sins are declared in that way in which it is possible; because then sufficient integrity of confession is furnished, and the confessor sufficiently knows the state of the penitent's conscience. But if the confessor insists too much in inquiring about the ultimate species and exact number of sins, he uselessly torments both himself and the penitents, and will deter penitents from making confession.