Title III: The Numerical Distinction of Sins

The usefulness of this title chiefly regards the use of the sacrament of penance.

— I. Principles ¹. 1. From that from which a thing has being, it also has unity, since one and being are convertible. But the moral and sin is from the will. Therefore from the will it also has unity, at least in such a way that where there are several successive wills, for example because of retractions or interruptions of acts, several sins are necessarily had. Hence a certain first principle: when wills are multiplied, sins are multiplied.

2. Nevertheless, in forms which are distinguished by number alone, the principle of multiplication is the division itself of matter. Thus, since not only interior acts but also commanded acts are voluntary, we arrive at another principle: when sinful acts are multiplied, sins are multiplied of themselves.

3. Yet if those sinful acts come together into a certain moral unity, the second principle must be tempered by that third one: several acts which, commanded by the same deliberation of the will, morally effect one thing are one sin.

But several terms of one intention, as such (for example, several persons who suffer detraction, theft, homicide), do not multiply sins: whether they are apprehended under the confused notion of multitude, which then Lehmkuhl also concedes, or whether the evil intention and action are directed to individuals as distinct. Thus we say with Suarez, Paen. d. 22, s. 5, n. 34-36; Lugo, Paen. d. 16, n. 126 sq., against Vasquez, 1, 2, d. 74, 75, and in 3 p., q. 91, dub. 4 and 5; St. Alphonsus, l. 5, n. 45, 46; D'Annibale I, 284-288.

We bring forward this easy reason, because an act indeed takes its species from the object, but why it should take plurality from that exterior term is not seen. And this conclusion coheres so with the principle of St. Thomas concerning unity to be sought from the will, or principle, and specification from the object, or term, that, unless there were the authority of others, we would perhaps say that the diverse opinion is improbable.

Wherefore even diversity of total objects can indeed impede the moral unity of acts and supply us an indication of plurality; but, contrary to what is often done today, it cannot be proposed as the formal reason of multiplication. For the sake of greater clarity, the individual principles seem to have to be declared more fully.

¹ N.B. Here there is no question of the number of malices, of which several can exist in one sin, just as a man remains one although he is furnished with several qualities.

¹ Theol. I, 352, where he simply alleges for this Laymann, l. 1, tr. 2, c. 3, n. 2; Lugo; Suarez; Ballerini-Palmieri, I, n. 630 ff., who nevertheless virtually exclude the distinction which he uses. But rather they introduce another, since they require that the external act be single (cf. Ball.-Palm. l.c. n. 632 and 638), which squares with the things said by us here, n. 432, 2.

— II. Greater explanation of the first principle, concerning plurality of wills with applications.

1. As many renewals of the will as there have been after retraction, so many sins by number will be added to the first will. For by retraction the preceding will is necessarily ended.

2. The same must be said if, even without penance concerning the preceding act, there has voluntarily or formally been a cessation from it. Thus, without penance, a thief, an adulterer, because the occasion has passed, can lay down the will of stealing, of committing adultery. As often as, with the occasion returning, they have again assumed that will, so often they will necessarily sin.

3. Involuntary and natural cessation, for example by sleep, by distraction to other things, can also impose an end on the will or morally interrupt the act. This is had whenever the following act no longer arises from the force of the prior deliberation; but not if "return to a similar act occurs as if naturally without a new deliberation" ¹. And here it must be observed that a will is not judged new which, having become more remiss, on the occasion of a certain exterior presence of an exciting cause or of interior meditation, becomes again more intense, just as it is not a new fire to which new fuel is brought, and therefore from languid it is converted into ardent.

The question therefore arises, how long one will can morally persevere. One general rule is not at hand for us. To help moral estimation, there must be distinguished interior acts without an efficacious proposal; acts which contain an efficacious proposal or will of executing; and exterior acts.

Separated from the proposal of execution, interior acts cease rather easily, and Lugo thinks that regularly they cannot morally persevere beyond two or three hours (2): say interior blasphemies, delights concerning impure phantasms. Yet an unclean desire, hatred of neighbor, is preserved longer in the habit itself. Indeed voluntary aversion from a neighbor can persevere for months.

In a proposal of executing, the will can be sustained for a long time. Nevertheless persons and also matters are to be distinguished. Thus a sought vengeance, a sought woman, a sought occasion of stealing, as it were lie hidden the same in conscience, even after sleep, after distracting occupations; while, on the contrary, a proposal of easier execution will be interrupted more quickly. Thus Ballerini-Palmieri judge that the proposal of reading a depraved book is for the most part interrupted after an hour ¹. We think this is true if it concerns a book which is at hand, because for a proposal of this sort a weaker will, which is extinguished more quickly (2), suffices.

In an external execution begun, the same internal will easily endures until completed execution, for example in him who repeats external attempts toward homicide, who intends by several partial thefts to steal one grave sum, who, after he has determined to read one prohibited book, completes the reading by several physically interrupted times.

¹ Suarez, Paenit., d. 22, s. 5, n. 11. - (2) Paenit., d. 16, n. 670.

¹ Op. theol. I, tr. 4, n. 657. - (2) Lugo, op. c. d. 16, n. 590.

— III. Greater explanation of the other principle taken from the plurality of exterior acts.

Of itself, as many as are the distinct exterior consummations, so many sins must be numbered. But exterior consummations are distinct when exterior acts are not united among themselves. Therefore he commits several sins who, although in the same conversation, now detracts from one person, now from another; who several times completes solitary sin or fornication.

— IV. Greater explanation of the third principle, concerning the moral unity of several acts, even exterior ones.

1. Exterior acts subordinated among themselves are morally united as directed to one end or complete object. Thus all exterior acts ordered to one end of theft ³, likewise imperfect acts (kisses, looks, touches) directed to one copulation.

2. Exterior acts of the same notion are morally united, which are repeated in the same heat of passion, or are known and intended or chosen under a certain common apprehension. Thus imperfect acts of luxury which are added as a certain complement to fornication, thus several insults, contumelies, imprecations pronounced in the same anger, several slaps morally struck at the same time, indeed several wounds inflicted at the same time in the same way. For the will was not indeed of saying such an injurious word, giving such a slap, inflicting such a wound, but more generically, of humiliating, striking, wounding. For the same reason, he who, in a state of sin, approaches to hear confessions, wills on that occasion to administer the sacrament sacrilegiously, in which one object the several absolutions given agree. The very notion of sacrilege is the solemn administration of the sacrament in a state of sin.

Yet of itself, he will commit a distinct sin who immediately boasts of fornication, both because of scandal and because this boasting is not the natural complement of fornication (Suarez, Paen. d. 22, 15, n. 27).

³ St. Thomas, In 1 Sent. d. 12, q. 1, art. 1.

— Corollary. Because terms do not multiply sins, he sins once who by one act of hatred or detraction hates several persons, detracts concerning several even before several; who by one act carnally covets several persons; who by one act kills two or brings harm to several; who by the same act blasphemes against the twelve apostles or denies several articles of faith.

— Concerning the plurality of omissions. You ask whether or not he necessarily commits several sins who for a month does not hear Mass, does not recite the office, or through Lent observes no fast, no abstinence?

From the things just said it is clear that the internal proposal concerning that long-lasting omission would be one sin. But the question is made concerning the omission itself which follows. First, as irrelevant, we must exclude the question concerning those sins which in reality consist in committing, although in species they are sometimes shown negatively. Thus by positive eating the precept of fast and abstinence is violated. Wherefore as often as an act is done which contains a substantial violation of this sort, so often it must not be doubted that sin is committed.

True omissions are had in merely positive precepts, by which no act according to itself is prohibited: for example, in the precept of hearing the sacred service, of reciting the breviary.

The received opinion has it that as many days as there have been on which the sacred service or breviary was omitted advertently, so many sins are numbered: and this whether the will itself of the omissions was one or multiple. For individual omissions are distinct sins because concerning individual ones there are diverse precepts; nevertheless he does not sin several times who has omitted the whole office of one day, which is customarily recited by parts, because there is one precept terminated to the whole office of the day ¹. These reasons seem difficult. For it is not repugnant that diverse precepts be violated by one single action. Cf. n. 430. In order that several sins be present, it is necessary that we find several wills, or at least sinful acts, to which the evil will gives as it were the form of sin. But omission as such says no act.

But from St. Thomas we know that a blameworthy omission can be commanded by a twofold will: by a will which directly intends the omission itself, or by a will which directly wills some good, for example, a game with which the omission is necessarily joined. In the latter case, when the game is repeated, there is repeated the act which, as the cause why Mass or the breviary is omitted, is gravely blameworthy. And thus there is place for the rule which says that there are several sins where there are several sinful acts.

The difficulty is graver where no inordinate affection for a positive thing joined with the omission, but impiety or unbelief, directly rejects the obligation of Mass or breviary. Unless the concordant opinion of doctors multiplied those sins indistinctly, we would incline to the opposite side. Now we shall hand down this explanation of the received opinion. The precept of hearing the sacred service, of saying the breviary, so urges us that at least the last Mass which is celebrated on a feast day must be heard, and that at least in the last hour of the day the breviary must be recited. Therefore, while the last Mass, the last hour of the day stands, any other action is prohibited, just as the game was prohibited because of affection for which someone had determined to omit the sacred service. The reason alleged also shows well why he who omits the whole burden of the breviary sins only once; for the substance of the precept is preserved if the whole breviary is recited at once in the last hour of the day.

What if he is physically impeded? It must be said otherwise concerning him who by a voluntary throwing away of the breviary now for some time cannot recite the breviary. He incorporated his evil will into one single throwing away. Wherefore he sinned once only, of itself. The act of one omitting restitution for a long time is also diverse. For this obligation excludes no other act morally and of itself, and urges perpetually. Wherefore, the same will remaining, one sin remains. Cf. Lugo, d. 16, num. 548 and 549.

Hence we come to this conclusion: exterior omissions do not multiply sins, except insofar as they exclude or prohibit several positive acts.

N.B. - Indeed, an easier reasoning is ready at hand by which we would be led to the same conclusions in this way: privation is reduced to habit, omission to act. Therefore as many sins as there would be by action, so many there will be by omission. But as often as prohibitions recur, so often sin is committed by the prohibited action. Therefore as many as are the prescribed actions, so many are the omissions. And in this way it is perceived why the daily precept of the breviary produces a daily sin of omission, whereas a long omission of restitution does not multiply sins, because restitution must be made only once.

This easier reasoning would be efficacious if the numerical notion of sin were taken from the object. Then, just as happens for specification, omission would be conceived after the manner of being. But number is estimated according to acts of the will which can be terminated to omission as to action. Therefore there is no place for that interchange of omissions with actions; no cause is indicated why more acts of the will are to be numbered than there truly were.

¹ Lugo, Paen. d. 16, n. 540, 547.

— You ask how often he sins who grows hardened in some grave sin?

As often as he voluntarily, conscious, omits the precept of penance, which urges of itself or per accidens; and as often as positively (by morally distant acts) he refuses to amend himself. But he does not sin gravely when he bears himself negatively, or refuses not absolutely but here and now. Cf. D'Annibale I, 268. We are speaking of grave sin. For at least a venial obligation exists, from charity toward oneself, of rising morally at once from sin.

— What if the principal action, for example fornication or theft, to which the others expressed order, could not happen by chance?

Not a few then think that, the principle of unity being lacking, several sins are made, and therefore require that all the means be explained ¹ (for example, a ladder placed against a wall for stealing); or at least those which are evil in themselves ² (for example, harmful acts, shameful touches). But how that which because of intention was one becomes subjectively multiple, we do not see. Wherefore, with others (3), we think it is enough that the guilty person indicate his intention of the completed sin, execution truly begun, and this incomplete. For externally he is truly guilty of attempted theft or fornication.

¹ St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 42, from Viva, Paen. q. 5, art. 6, n. 6, Notandum 2.

² Ballerini-Palmieri, Op. th. I, tr. 4, n. 668. - (3) D'Annibale I, 287 (15); Van der Velden-Piat I, p. 150 note; Genicot-Salsmans I, 167.

— Accusation of sins. 1. A penitent who spontaneously or when asked accuses the number is regularly not to be questioned concerning the duration of his action, since duration of itself is a merely aggravating circumstance. It is otherwise if he manifestly errs. For not rarely the number of sins must be conjectured from the long duration of an evil will.

2. Often it will also be more difficult for the penitent distinctly to define delays, interruptions, etc. Then let him state the long time through which the evil affection endured (for example, through the whole day I shamefully desired; for a month I bore hatred). And the confessor himself, attending to the character of the person, the nature of the thing, and the circumstances, for example, of occupations, will morally conjecture how many interruptions there were. Yet where it can be done, let the penitent himself add whether the interruptions were notably rare or frequent. This especially has place if the interruption endured for days, weeks, or a month.

And because the will is more easily interrupted when physical inability stands in the way of execution, let him who for a long time omitted restitution or thought of perpetrating a crime indicate the times during which no opportunity of execution was being given.

3. This mode of indicating frequency will not rarely be more expedient: that the penitent indicate the accustomed frequency of sins by week or month.

By this reason, one arrives at a better knowledge of the state of the penitent, on account of which knowledge, after all, distinct accusation is demanded, than by mathematical indications in which there is silence concerning the habitual state of the soul.

4. Finally, observe that several moral species which can be had in one act must always be accused, nor can the confessor be positively deceived. Certainly, if one accuses detraction, the confessor will well understand that it could easily have been made before several or before one; but he who betrays himself as a homicide will be judged guilty of one homicide, unless he at least confusedly indicates the plurality of persons killed. Cf. Lugo, Paen. d. 16, n. 140.

Thus far the things which it seemed good to say concerning the most complicated question, where disagreements of opinions, which sometimes mix specific reasons with numerical ones, induce wonderful confusion.

— I. Sin has its unity from the will which is its cause. Wherefore when wills are multiplied, sins are multiplied. Then the very division of matter is a principle of multiplication. Wherefore, when sinful acts are multiplied, sins are multiplied of themselves. Except, however, if those acts come together into a certain moral unity.

Plurality of terms as such does not multiply sins, provided they are reached by one intention. Therefore:

II. - 1. Wills are multiplied necessarily after retraction and after formal cessation or interruption. Therefore this rule can be established:

As many as are the new deliberations of sinning, so many are the sins. But the force of one deliberation can persevere even after sleep. Under the aspect of moral perseverance it is useful to distinguish interior acts without an efficacious proposal, acts of efficacious proposal, and external executions begun.

Of itself, the more the will is fixed externally, the longer the same will be able to endure. Yet certain interior affections, for example of hatred, can remain for a long time.

2. As many as are the distinct exterior consummations, so many are the sins. Nevertheless exterior acts subordinated among themselves are morally united as directed to one end, for example, to one theft or to one fornication. Exterior acts are also morally united when they are repeated in the same heat of passion, or chosen or intended under a certain common apprehension, at least when they are of the same notion.

III. A proposal of omitting Mass for a month is one sin. The concordant opinion of doctors wills that there are as many sins as there are Masses truly omitted, unless assistance at Mass has become impossible. This reason can be: that while the hour of the last Mass stands, every action or mode of bearing oneself which cannot be composed with assistance is now prohibited. Then the rule would be: by omissions sins are multiplied insofar as they exclude or prohibit several positive acts, which nevertheless have been effected.

He who grows hardened in grave sin sins as often as, conscious, he omits the grave precept of doing penance, and as often as he positively is unwilling to amend himself.

Although the principal action to which several secondary actions were ordered has been made impossible, nevertheless these probably remain one sin, because they were joined in the efficacious intention.

IV. Accusation of sins. 1. He who accuses the number is not to be questioned about duration, unless he manifestly errs. 2. If it is difficult for the penitent distinctly to define delays, interruptions, etc., it will be enough that he indicate the long time through which the evil affection endured. Let him add, if he can, the times through which execution was impossible, because then the will is more easily interrupted.

And often it will be useful that he indicate the accustomed frequency by month or week.

V. Yet several moral species which occur in one sin must always be accused. Nor can the confessor be positively deceived. Therefore, one guilty of several killings will have to indicate the plurality at least confusedly.