Article Third. On Numerical Distinction.

304. State of the question. That several sins specifically distinct, e.g. blasphemy and theft, are also several in number is manifest; and if one sinful act injures several diverse virtues, by that very fact it also contains several malices which are equivalent to sins several in number. Indeed he who steals a sacred thing commits two sins distinct in species and virtually also in number, one against justice and the other against religion. But the question concerning the numerical distinction of sins consists in this: whether and when sins of the same species, e.g. several thefts, several desires of fornicating, are distinguished according to number.

The numerical distinction of sins is taken from a twofold source: a. from plurality of acts; b. from plurality of objects of the same act. Nevertheless there are not as many sins as there are numbered acts, nor does an act which turns about several objects in number contain as many sins as there are numbered objects of the same act. Rather: a. with respect to acts, there are as many sins distinct in number as there are acts morally distinct; b. with respect to objects, there are as many sins distinct in number as there are objects of the same act morally distinct. Therefore first it must be declared in how many ways it can happen that acts physically distinct are joined by moral union and must morally be considered as one act, and how several objects which are reached by one act are morally united; then the rules must be explained according to which one must discern concerning the numerical distinction of sins taken both from plurality of acts and from plurality of objects.

305. Several acts physically are morally united: 1. From the intention of the agent, by which several acts, whether internal or external, are ordered as means to one end: for various actions which are directed to the same act as to an end constitute one action according to moral estimation, even if there is a rather long interval of time between the individual acts.

a. He who proposes to kill an enemy and for this reason conceives acts of revenge, prepares weapons, takes the road, and finally kills him, commits one sin, even if for many days he sought the enemy and several times repeated the purpose of killing, because all these acts are morally united in the same end toward which they tend. Therefore in confession it suffices to say: I killed a man.

b. He who approaches a woman with the intention of fornicating, first places touches, kisses, and immodest conversations, and at last fornicates, commits one sin: for all those things are means for attaining the end and are morally united in the intended end. Indeed even touches, conversations, and things of this kind which are committed immediately after fornication without the intention of a new copula constitute one sin with the fornication itself (St. Alphonsus, n. 41). Therefore in confession he satisfies by saying: I committed fornication.

c. He who, from the intention of stealing one hundred florins, often renews the internal purpose and snatches them away in ten instances, commits one sin, because the individual acts are directed to the same end. Therefore he sufficiently accuses himself by saying: I stole one hundred florins.

d. If an external sin has been begun, but not consummated, whether because of retracted will or because of a supervening impediment, a distinction must be made thus: a. If the means applied for executing the purpose are indifferent, entering a house for fornicating, buying a sword for killing, it is not necessary that they be explained; for whatever evil is in them is already sufficiently declared in the purpose itself. b. If the means applied for executing the purpose are evil, prior touches for copula, blows, wounds, they certainly must be indicated; but it suffices if they are declared confusedly and indistinctly: I wished to fornicate and had already applied certain means, but I did not complete the act. For the individual acts do not lose the moral unity which they have on account of the intention of the agent because of the interruption of the work; therefore it is not necessary that they be distinctly declared. The same holds concerning this example: if someone intending to kill Titius strikes him and then wounds him, but does not kill him.¹

2. From the affection of the will, by which it happens that several sinful acts, both internal and external, which occur during the same impulse of passion, morally constitute one action, even if some interval intervenes between the individual acts.

He who from the same impulse of passion inflicts several wounds on an enemy, often blasphemes God, often curses a man, often dishonestly touches himself, several times falsely swears the same thing, morally commits one sin. He who remains for an hour in morose delectation concerning the same object, even if from time to time he thinks about another thing, commits only one sin morally. Therefore a brief interruption between one act and another does not prevent them from being judged morally one act.

3. From the work itself to be completed: namely, if the work either from its own nature or from human institution is so constituted that several distinct acts are required as integral parts for completing it, these acts in moral consideration constitute one action and therefore one sin.

a. The priest who proposes on one day to omit the whole office and in fact omits it commits one sin; nevertheless if he had first proposed to omit only Matins, but afterward also the remaining parts, he would have two sins.

b. He who in the same occasion distributes holy Communion to several persons in the state of sin commits one sin, according to some grave, according to others light, because the individual communions pertain to one ministry by which holy Communion is distributed to several persons, and because the individual communicants participate in the same banquet. Therefore in confession it suffices to say: I distributed Communion in the state of sin.

c. He who in the state of sin successively absolves several penitents likewise commits only one sin: for all absolutions which occur successively pertain morally to the same ministry of absolving, which by its nature is not restricted to one person but is extended to all who on the same occasion approach the sacred tribunal. Therefore in confession he satisfies by saying: once I heard confessions in the state of sin.

¹ Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 668.

306. 1. Concerning the distinction of sins taken from plurality of acts, three rules must be established: a. concerning merely internal acts, which are consummated interiorly, as acts of hatred; b. concerning internal acts to be consummated exteriorly, which have annexed to them a purpose of placing an external action, as the will of stealing, of fornicating; c. concerning external acts or acts consummated exteriorly, as theft, fornication. For moral interruption does not occur in the same mode in all these acts.

2. Yet first it must be declared in how many ways acts which have moral unity from the intention or passion of the agent are interrupted, or lose moral unity. Now acts of the will can be interrupted in three ways: a. through voluntary revocation, as if someone truly repents of the sinful act and afterward nevertheless resumes the same act; b. through voluntary cessation from the act, as if someone deliberately ceases from the evil act, turns himself to other things, and then returns to the same act; c. through involuntary cessation from the act, e.g. on account of sleep, distraction, occupation, etc., lasting for a rather long time. But how great a delay of time must intervene between one act and another for the acts to be judged truly interrupted in this way must be estimated by the judgment of the prudent according to the diverse nature of the acts.

307. 1. Merely internal acts concerning the same object, which have unity from the same affection of passion, are multiplied whenever they are interrupted through revocation, through voluntary cessation, and through involuntary cessation.

a. Merely internal acts of the will which turn about the same object and proceed from the same affection, even if they are several, are judged one continued act, which lasts so long as it is not interrupted. But acts of this kind are morally interrupted not only by revocation and voluntary cessation, but also by involuntary cessation: for the same affection of passion cannot last amid daily occupations and distractions except for a brief time, at most for two or three hours.

b. He who, seeing an enemy, interiorly imprecates evils upon him and after some time, seeing him again, imprecates upon him anew, commits two sins, because the imprecations have been morally interrupted. He who, thinking of base things with pleasure, exchanges a few words with a passer-by and immediately returns to thinking again about base things, commits one sin; but if he returned to thinking again about them after a longer conversation which had entirely drawn the mind away from these matters, he would have two sins, because the delectations in the latter case, but not in the former, are interrupted.

c. He who for a rather long time, e.g. for an entire day, fosters the same sinful act, commits more or fewer sins according to the diversity of circumstances. Therefore if a penitent does not know how to indicate the number of internal sins, he must be asked about the delay of time during which he persevered in the same sin; and with account taken of the matter, the character of the penitent, and the circumstances, especially the kind of daily occupation, the prudent confessor must judge from this rule the moral interruption of acts, and therefore the number of sins.¹

¹ Cf. Lugo, De poenitentia, disp. 16, n. 569.

308. 2. Internal acts to be completed exteriorly, which have unity from the passion and intention of the agent, are multiplied whenever they are interrupted through revocation or voluntary cessation.

a. These acts, which chiefly have moral unity from the intention of the agent, are interrupted through revocation or voluntary cessation, but not through involuntary cessation, unless the interval of time is long. And indeed an act which tends into an external work is judged to last virtually so long as the work has been placed, unless a notable delay is interposed between the purpose and its execution; and therefore internal acts often repeated are nothing other than a continuation of the first sinful act. But if the external work has already been begun, the depraved will in this exterior effect lasts virtually still more easily even for a longer time. For how much time the same act remains virtually must be determined by the judgment of the prudent according to the diversity of acts: for sometimes, e.g., the purpose of reading a bad book can persist without moral interruption for a few hours or at most for a day; on the contrary, the purpose of stealing for several days, indeed the purpose of revenge even for several weeks.

b. He who determines to commit theft commits one sin, even if for several days he thinks about the theft and often renews the purpose of stealing, until at an opportune time he finally executes the theft. But he who proposes to commit theft this night, and then, mindful of this purpose, remains at home, and tomorrow renews the same purpose, commits two sins, because through voluntary cessation from the iniquitous purpose the first will of stealing is interrupted.

c. He who for a long time does not restore, although he often remembers the obligation of restoring and renews the purpose of not restoring, commits one sin: for in the external effect, namely in the retention of another's thing, the depraved will virtually perseveres. Yet if he retracts the purpose of not restoring and fosters the will of restoring for some time and afterward returns to the prior purpose, he commits a new sin.

309. 3. External acts are multiplied whenever they are complete in themselves and independent of one another, unless they are ordered as parts or means to one consummated act.

a. Therefore he who twice sacrilegiously communicates, who pollutes himself twice, even if he does this within a brief time, commits two sins. Likewise he makes several sins who omits a prescribed fast for several days: for any omission is something complete in itself, independent of another omission. He commits several sins who strikes an enemy several times at diverse times without the intention of killing him; likewise he who several times takes something from the same heap of wheat without a prior intention of stealing the whole.

b. He who for several days reads a prohibited book places several external acts physically distinct, which nevertheless are morally united both on account of the intention of the agent reading the whole book and on account of the nature of the acts, which constitute integral parts of one whole, namely the reading of the whole book.

Note. Acts which have disparate objects, or external acts which are in themselves plainly complete and independent of one another, cannot be gathered into moral unity either through the intention of the agent or through the affection of the will: for the nature of these acts prevents them from being morally united. He, for example, who, seeing a virgin, basely desires her and a little afterward, seeing another, desires this one too, commits two sins, even if the base desire proceeds from the same ardor of lust. He who within a brief time pollutes himself twice from the same libidinous affection commits two sins. Likewise a priest omitting the office sins as often as he omits the office, even if he should wish to unite the individual omissions through intention. Similarly a prostitute having the intention of sinning with all who come commits as many sins as copulas she completes.

310. Several objects physically are morally united. Whether several physically distinct objects have moral unity and constitute one moral and total object depends on the nature of the object and on the apprehension of the agent. Namely, if several objects either from their nature have moral unity, as a family, a city, and therefore are apprehended by the agent as one whole, or if they are apprehended by the agent in the manner of one object, as my rivals, even if by their nature they do not have unity, they constitute one moral object and are reached by the will as one thing. But if several objects neither have unity from themselves nor are apprehended by the agent as one, but are distinctly apprehended, they constitute not one object but several objects and are reached by several distinct acts of the will.

He who detracts from or curses a family composed of five heads commits one sin, because he apprehends the whole family in the manner of one and reaches it by one intention of harming; nevertheless if he were thinking of the individuals and distinctly wished to harm them, he would commit five sins. He who steals a purse belonging to three owners, whom he confusedly apprehends in the manner of one owner, commits one sin; but by the same act of stealing he commits three sins if he distinctly apprehends them and intends to harm each individually.

Note. Disparate or specifically diverse objects cannot make one moral object, whether they are reached by a merely internal act or by an external act. He, for example, who desires three women of diverse condition, one unmarried, another married, a third a nun, and apprehends them as such, commits three sins distinct in species and number, because they are not apprehended by one act in the manner of one, but by several acts distinctly, and are reached by the will, nor can they be gathered into one object. He who burns a barn in order to kill his enemy sleeping there, or who by one blow kills a horse and its rider, commits two sins: of damage-infliction and of homicide.

311. Concerning the distinction of sins taken from plurality of objects, a twofold rule must be established: a. concerning internal acts; b. concerning external acts.

1. An internal act, consisting in a simple affection or purpose of the will, which is referred to several objects distinct in themselves, always contains one sin, because those several objects constitute one moral or total object: for since there is one act of the will, the several objects are apprehended by the intellect and reached by the will in the manner of one.

a. Therefore he who by one act of the will morosely delights in three women, or desires three women of the same condition, commits one sin.

b. He who proposes to omit the office for a whole month or not to fast for the whole of Lent commits one sin; yet if afterward he executes this will, he has as many sins as he omits offices or fasts, because the individual omissions are united by no bond.

c. He who wishes diverse evils upon an enemy, e.g. infamy, poverty, death, commits one sin, because he apprehends and wishes them in the manner of one evil.

d. He who by one act hates several men or desires to kill several men commits one sin, because he reaches them under the confused concept of plurality.

312. 2. An external act which is referred to several objects distinct in themselves constitutes one sin only when the physically several objects constitute one moral and total object, or are apprehended by the mind and reached by the will in the manner of one. But if several objects are apprehended individually, there are also several sins, because the individual objects are also reached by distinct acts of the will.

a. He who by one explosion wounds or kills ten men commits one sin, and it is enough if in confession he says: I wounded or killed several, if by confused apprehension and intention he reached all in the manner of one; but he commits several sins if he distinctly apprehended the individual men and intended to kill them.

b. If someone by one speech detracts from a family, house, religious community, whether it is numerous or small, he has one sin, and it is enough if he says: I detracted from a family or community, or only, I detracted gravely. Indeed even he commits one sin who by one speech detracts from several, e.g. his enemies, whom he apprehends and intends in the manner of one; yet if he distinctly apprehends the individuals and intends to injure the reputation of each, he commits several sins.

c. Not only he who injures goods which belong to a monastery or to a chapter, but also he who takes away a deposit belonging to ten diverse persons, commits one sin if he reaches the ten owners with confused apprehension and intention.

Note 1. Although he who by one act killed three, or by one act desired to approach three women, satisfies the obligation of confessing integrally by saying: I committed homicide, or I had a desire of fornicating, nevertheless he must confess with a term by which at least confusedly several persons are signified: by one act I killed several, or I wished to approach several unmarried persons, namely lest he lead the confessor into error. For these words, "I committed homicide," signify "I killed one man," and they are taken by the confessor in this sense; wherefore the killing of several would implicitly be denied and the confessor would be deceived, which would be a lie committed in confession. Therefore where deception of the confessor and an implicit lie are not contained in the words, it is not necessary to indicate the plurality of objects. He, for example, who by one act inflicted damage on several or gave scandal to several, satisfies if he says: I inflicted grave damage or I gave grave scandal.

Note 2. The theory just explained concerning the total object belongs to Cardinal de Lugo (De poenitentia, disp. 16, n. 104 ff.), who followed Suarez (De poenitentia, disp. 22, sect. 5, n. 34). There are indeed several and grave authors, among whom is also St. Alphonsus (n. 45), who, following the stricter sentence, establish that the number of the total object must be explained in confession. For according to them, he who a. by one act kills three men, b. by one act detracts from several, likewise c. by one theft injures the rights of several, commits several sins in number. Yet since this sentence does not rise beyond probability, in order to confession it must be said that the number of the total object indeed constitutes an aggravating circumstance, but not several sins necessarily to be declared in confession. And indeed their reason is that nothing prevents one and the same act from containing several malices against the same virtue. But it is not denied that one act can virtually and indistinctly contain several malices in number; rather, the question is whether these malices must be declared distinctly in confession. Now, in order to satisfy the divine precept of accusing all and individual sins, it is not necessary that all malices which are virtually present in one act be declared distinctly, unless they are either specifically diverse or formally distinct.

Note 3. Penitents are bound to declare in confession only those circumstances changing the species which they apprehend, because they are guilty only of those. Now, for someone to contract the malice of a circumstance changing the species, confused knowledge of it indeed suffices; yet since they judge concerning these matters only from common moral estimation, they do not have even confused knowledge of many species which theologians accurately distinguish. The same must be noted concerning the numerical distinction of sins. That number of sins must be declared in confession which is apprehended by the penitent while he sins; but the common judgment of men does not distinguish all those malices which authors are accustomed to indicate.