Article II: On Numerical Distinction

St. Thomas, II Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 1; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, ad 12.

437. Principles. - Sins are multiplied in number, not indeed from many or diverse deformities or malices, and therefore that which is multiple in species is not necessarily multiple in number, because one and the same act can have several moral species, for example, theft of a sacred thing; but

1. from the moral multiplication of acts: for sin is not a simple privation but rather an act deprived of due order; also

2. from the moral multiplication of objects: for acts are distinguished according to objects, since an act is nothing but a tendency toward an object.

Whence a twofold practical rule is usually established.

438. The first rule is: There are as many sins as there are total moral objects, that is, objects not morally united but distinct, and not coalescing into one object. Hence:

a) External acts physically many are one sin when they are considered by reason and commanded by the will as coordinated parts, incomplete or integral, of one complete object, according as they are concerned with things of the same reason, as repeated acts for taking away several, even diverse, goods of the same person; several evil oaths or blasphemies or various contumelies or heresies uttered in one impulse; several immodest touches exercised upon the same person in the same impulse; several canonical hours of one day omitted; and probably diverse sacraments (for example, of the sick) administered sacrilegiously to one person, or several sacraments (for example, Eucharist or Penance) administered sacrilegiously to several without moral interruption, because they are one ministration. On the contrary, external acts complete in themselves are several sins, such as to steal Peter's horse and then Paul's money, to detract one person and immediately afterward another, three fornications had even one immediately after another, the office omitted on three days, three Masses celebrated sacrilegiously on the Nativity of the Lord, several sacrilegious ministrations of sacraments.

b) External acts physically many are one sin when they are intended as subordinated to one principal action as means to one end; for example, he who sacrilegiously consecrates and communicates in the same sacrifice; he who for fornication gives gifts, utters obscene words, exercises immodest touches, works the sin itself, and immediately afterward has complacency concerning it; he who, willing to kill an enemy, buys weapons, lays ambushes, and strikes. On the contrary, if they are not subordinated to a complete principal act: thus he who, without the intention of fornication, exercises immodest touches and finally comes to fornication commits two sins, just as he who, after fornication has been completed, after some interval again touches immodestly.

1. Just as things which are many in the genus of being are one house, so those acts distinct in the genus of being are one thing in the genus of morals, namely, one sin consummated by an external work, since all those acts are ordered to this as incomplete acts to the complete act.

c) Probably there is one sin when a physically one external act touches diverse persons or matters, as to kill or scandalize several by one action, to steal from several or detract from several before several by one act, to blaspheme several saints, to consecrate several hosts sacrilegiously in the same sacrifice, etc.: for the external act has unity in itself and therefore tends into several things by way of one; whence these are conceived and intended as one adequate object. On the contrary, if someone explicitly intended to touch them distinctly and singly, by way of several things, because then they are intended as several and distinct objects: namely, an act physically one will then be morally multiple.

2. Nor is it an obstacle that adultery of a married man with a married woman, or carnal sacrilege between two sacred persons, is a double sin. For there it is not double in number, but double in species: to injure the right of another and not to observe the contract with one's own spouse are diverse malices; or also unjustly or sacrilegiously to violate one's own promise and to cooperate in the injustice or sacrilege of another.

d) Probably an inefficacious will intending several objects of the same reason is one sin, for example, several external acts even complete, as morose delight concerning three women, hatred of three persons, the inefficacious desire of fornicating three times even with three women, of omitting the hours several times, fast, Mass through a week, month, or year, the inefficacious wish of diverse evils even to several persons: for then these are considered by way of one as one pleasing or displeasing object. On the contrary, if several complete acts are intended by an efficacious will or proposal, because then they are considered by way of several, as several effects to be obtained or caused.

Let it be noted that several acts, or several evil effects of one act, which constitute only one sin, are not therefore less evil than if they were several sins: for this one sin is graver in proportion as it contains more malices, and is as evil as several sins because in malice it is equivalent to several.

439. The second rule is: There are as many sins as there are morally interrupted and repeated acts, even concerning the same object. But acts are morally interrupted when they are not judged to remain virtually or in effect. This happens in three ways:

1. by retraction or a contrary will, whether explicit or equivalent, by placing an act incompossible with the prior act;

2. by voluntary and free cessation from the act, without the proposal of proceeding further, for example, by ceasing from an attempt which is not ordered to another attempt, by turning aside to other things because of weariness or fatigue;

1. It is said: "without the proposal of proceeding further," for if such a proposal of proceeding were present and those acts were otherwise able to be united among themselves for constituting one complete act, cessation from the act would not make a moral interruption, and thus neither would it multiply sin in number; for example, if someone had begun to exercise with a woman filthy things disposing to copulation, but meanwhile, because another person intervened, ceased for some time, yet in his soul did not revoke that sinful proposal, in that case, that is, after the other departed, he would again pursue the former most filthy acts; there would not be judged to intervene between these and the preceding acts a moral interruption, but one sin in number, morally continued by force of that evil proposal, would be committed, notwithstanding that voluntary cessation." Reiffenstuel, Theologia Moralis, treatise on Sins, q. 5, n. 53.

3. by involuntary or natural cessation, which is had from involuntary distraction, forgetfulness, occupation, etc., for example, by reading a letter, sleep, drunkenness, and the like, when the prior will does not remain virtually and cannot be judged the cause of the later act concerning the same object. But the sign on account of which the prior will is deservedly judged to remain virtually is that the will returns to the same object as if spontaneously and without new deliberation; on the contrary, if new deliberation was necessary. Whence brief involuntary cessation ordinarily is not a moral interruption; but precisely how much delay is required for moral interruption cannot be defined by a general rule, but must be left to the determination of prudent judgment, with attention to the intensity of the act and the nature of the distraction. Hence:

a) Merely internal acts (morose delights, desires or inefficacious hatreds, envies, rash judgments, doubts concerning faith, desperations) do not persevere for a long time, so that a physical interruption, if it is notable, is judged moral: for the same affection cannot endure amid diverse occupations and distractions except for a short time, regularly certainly not beyond two or three hours; indeed this seems much.

b) Internal acts to be completed exteriorly, as being ordered to an external work, remain longer, especially if they have begun to be fulfilled; otherwise they are judged to persevere only for some days: for the same internal impulse, even vehement, does not last longer, at least generally; for certain acts, such as efficacious hatreds, desires for a base thing or for revenge, often persevere for a long time because of vehemence, also the will of not restoring, because it is ordered to an effect of itself perpetual.

c) External acts are interrupted if they are absolute and complete, that is, if they are not subordinated to a principal action nor occur by the same impulse, as was said in the first rule under a) and b).

440. Practical corollaries. - 1) He who has committed one sin which is concerned with several objects is not bound per se to declare the number of objects in confession; but he is bound to declare plurality, saying, for example: I scandalized several or many, I inefficaciously desired several women, I absolved several sacrilegiously, I detracted from a family, etc.; otherwise he would lead the confessor into error, who would rightly think that the act was concerned with only one object, and thus in fact another sin would be accused, as he who would say: I stole one gold coin, instead of twenty.

2. In acts subordinated to one principal action, this alone, but not the means, is to be declared, unless they contain mortal malice distinct in species, for example, theft for fornication. But if the principal action did not follow, the intention of committing it must be declared. The means employed are not to be declared if in themselves they are indifferent (for example, buying weapons, a walk), because they are not evil except by the malice of the intention; they are to be declared if in themselves they are evil, for example, if they manifest the internal intention, but in a general and confused mode, for example: I employed immodest means toward fornication, or I attempted to procure it; they are to be declared in a distinct mode if they contain mortal malice distinct in species, for example, sorcery or the cooperation of another for inflicting damage.

3. A penitent who cannot determine how many interrupted times he consented to an internal temptation should declare the time through which he persevered in the evil will, for example, through the day I had hatred, through the month I desired a girl, adding as far as possible whether the interruptions were rare or frequent. For from the time, with attention to the disposition of the person, the nature of the thing, and the circumstances, the confessor will be able in some way to conjecture the interruptions.

4. He who by one impulse places several acts of the same reason should declare one, saying, for example, I touched a woman, I blasphemed, I swore, I detracted, etc.: for it is one act morally.

5. Lest the sacrament of penance be rendered burdensome and odious, and lest the faithful and the confessor be tortured by scruples, questions concerning the species and number of sins are not to be made unless grave motives are present. But the penitent is bound to confess the species and number according to the knowledge which he had of these at least confusedly at the moment at which he committed the sin, but not according to theological science if he did not have it: for nothing is willed unless foreknown.