205*. Notions. To duties on one side correspond rights on the other side, and indeed in such a way that the right of one extends as broadly as the duty of the other.

1. Duties, according to the diversity of laws from which they arise, are:

a. affirmative duties, which arise from precepts, and negative duties, which arise from prohibitions;

b. absolute duties, which oblige simply and without exception, and hypothetical duties, which oblige only under certain suppositions;

c. natural duties, which are founded in the law of nature, and positive duties, which are founded in positive law, whether divine or human;

d. higher and lower duties, according as they refer to preserving greater or lesser goods, to averting greater or lesser evils;

e. duties of justice, from whose violation an obligation of restitution of itself arises, and duties of charity, from whose violation an obligation of restitution does not arise.

2. Since rights cohere with duties, they are distinguished in the same manner as duties; specifically these are to be noted:

a. connate rights, which are founded in the law of nature, and acquired rights, which are founded in positive law or in contracts.

b. inalienable rights, which can in no way be renounced, and alienable rights, which can be renounced: for what is necessary for man either for attaining the ultimate end or for fulfilling a moral obligation cannot be abdicated.

3. Collision of duties is the concurrence of several obligations which cannot be fulfilled at the same time.

Thus in the case of an unjust aggressor, two obligations collide: preserving one's own life and preserving the life of another. Since the obligation of preserving one's own life is more excellent, the other obligation loses its force.

a. So many and various are the relations of man, whether toward God or toward himself or toward other men, and consequently so manifold are the obligations which arise from them, that not rarely duties which are opposed to one another urge at the same time. But the collision of duties is only apparent, because of the colliding obligations only one in reality exists and requires that it be fulfilled; the rest lose their force or are suspended as long as the collision lasts: for their fulfillment is impossible; but no one is bound to the impossible. Certainly the supreme reason of all obligations is the will of God; but God, whose will is wisdom, cannot wish that at the same time we place actions of which one excludes the other.

b. Wherefore in a case in which duties collide, this is chiefly at issue: that the collision be solved, or that it be determined which obligation among the colliding ones, while the others cease, requires that it be fulfilled. Several rules are established for determining this.

205**. Rules for solving collision. The supreme principle in this matter is this: a higher obligation is to be preferred to a lower; but that obligation is judged higher which arises from a law which is of greater moment. Hence the following rules are inferred.

a. Precepts of the law of nature are to be preferred to precepts of positive divine law, these to precepts of positive human law; among these latter, precepts of ecclesiastical law prevail over precepts of civil law, which is drawn from the diverse end of these laws, one of which is nobler than the other.

The law which requires that we aid a needy neighbor is higher than the law of abstaining from servile works; the law of preserving health is to be preferred to the law of fasting or abstinence.

b. Negative precepts prevail over positive precepts; therefore in general the obligation of avoiding prohibited things is greater than that of doing prescribed things: for that which is prohibited is evil and pernicious in itself; but that which is prescribed is simply fitting and useful.

It is not lawful to lie nor to exercise a shameful business in order to aid one in need.

c. Precepts of justice in general prevail over precepts of charity.

If at the same time the obligation of paying a debt and of giving alms concur, the former, which is of justice, prevails over the latter obligation, which is of charity. Nevertheless, if someone must pay a debt by which, once paid, the debtor casts himself into grave necessity, he can defer payment, although it is an obligation of justice.

d. Precepts (negative and positive) which protect greater goods prevail over laws which protect lesser ones; therefore precepts which refer to spiritual goods, internal goods, common goods, are to be preferred to precepts which refer to bodily, external, private goods.

Thus a citizen is bound to serve as a soldier, even if his own life or his own family suffers damage. - A priest or physician is bound to help the sick, even if his own health or his own family is endangered. - It is not lawful to defect from the faith in order to preserve life; nor to deny the faith in order to avoid persecution. - A servant for whom service is an occasion of sin which can be removed by no means is bound to leave the service, even if the temporal damages would be most grave. - It is not lawful to expose life to danger on account of some slight temporal good.

e. But if in a case of colliding duties, after diligent examination, it cannot be determined which obligation prevails, and at the same time the necessity of acting urges, the choice can be made at will. An error which perhaps is committed in this case is involuntary and is not imputed to the agent.

357. Definition. Ownership is the legitimate faculty of disposing according to one's choice concerning some thing as one's own, unless the owner is prohibited from elsewhere.

a. To be owner of a thing signifies that the thing is one's own, and has such a connection with its owner that in having it and in its use he ought to be preferred to all others. Therefore, although he must render an account of its use to none of men, nevertheless he must render it to God.¹

b. Of disposing, that is, of possessing, using, selling, exchanging, giving, destroying, etc. According to one's choice: ownership gives to the owner the faculty of disposing of his own thing as it shall please him, without injuring justice; therefore by an arbitrary disposition, for example, by a prodigal donation or destruction of the thing, he can sin against another virtue, say liberality, charity, or piety, but he does not sin against justice. Concerning some thing is to be taken generically, insofar as it signifies corporeal and incorporeal things: for there is ownership not only of corporeal things, such as gold or a field, but also of incorporeal things, such as reputation, honor, right of inheritance. As one's own, so that ownership may be distinguished from a simple right to a thing, which does not give the faculty of disposing of the thing, from mere possession, even legitimate possession, which, for example, gives to a tenant the right of disposing of a thing, but not as his own, and finally from the power of a curator and procurator, who likewise dispose of a thing, but not as their own.

c. In various ways the owner can be impeded from disposing of his own thing according to his choice: alpha. by civil law, as if minors are prohibited from selling their own things; beta. by agreement, as if someone sells another his house with this pact, that it not be converted into an inn; gamma. by the will of a testator, as if someone transmits an estate by legacy to another on this condition, that it cannot be sold.

¹ Cf. Lugo, De iustit., disp. 1, n. 5.

358. Principles of right. From the nature of ownership these principles are deduced and explained, of which there is frequent use in law:

a. A thing cries out for its owner.

This principle exhibits the very right of ownership: for since by force of the right of ownership the thing itself is bound to the owner, it tends to return to the owner when it has escaped from his possession.

b. A thing bears fruit for its owner.

This follows immediately from the notion of ownership: for if the whole substance of a thing pertains to the owner and ought to serve for his advantage, the fruits also begotten from it fall to the owner.

c. A thing perishes for its owner, or more accurately: a thing which perishes by chance perishes for its owner; a thing which perishes by fault perishes for him who committed the fault.

This likewise follows immediately from the nature of ownership: for since the owner by force of ownership possesses a right in the thing itself, when the thing perishes the right in it also naturally perishes. But if the thing perishes by another's fault, the thing itself indeed perishes for the owner, but because he by whose fault it perishes is bound to render to the owner an equivalent price, it is said to perish for him who committed the fault.

d. It is not licit to grow rich from another's thing.

This follows from the second principle: for he who grows rich from another's thing turns the fruits of another's thing to his own utility, which is opposed to justice. But he who grows rich not from another's thing, but on the occasion of another's thing, injures neither another's right nor justice.

359. Divisions of ownership. 1. Ownership is divided into high and low: high ownership is the power which belongs to public authority of establishing concerning the goods of its subjects for the common utility; low ownership is the ownership which private men have in their own things and is called private right.

a. It is clear that high ownership is not ownership of property in the true name (for civil power has no property in the goods of subjects), but in reality is nothing except ownership of jurisdiction or the right of prescribing concerning the goods of citizens those things which the prince has judged expedient for the common good. Therefore the prince can transfer ownership from one to another, restrict the exercise of ownership in various ways, indeed he can even deprive subjects of their goods by the right of expropriation, or rather compel them to abdicate ownership of their goods.

b. A twofold condition is required that supreme power can use this ownership of its own: alpha. that a cause of necessity or of great public utility be present; beta. that, if it can be done, it make the subjects who are deprived of their goods by the right of expropriation unharmed.¹

2. Low ownership is divided into perfect or full and imperfect or semi-full: the former is the power of disposing according to one's choice concerning the substance and the utility of a thing; the latter is the power of disposing either concerning the substance of the thing or concerning its utility.

3. Imperfect ownership is divided into direct or radical ownership, which is power over the substance alone of a thing, and indirect ownership or useful ownership, which is power over the utility alone of a thing, and is defined: the power of receiving utility from another's thing while its substance is preserved. The chief species of indirect ownership are use, usufruct, and servitude.

Note. Recent codes reduce the diverse species of imperfect ownership to servitude, and therefore treat use and usufruct as species of servitude, as will be clear from the things to be said below concerning servitude.

¹ Cf. Van Gestel, l. c., n. 46 s.

360. On use. 1. Use is the right of using another's thing while its substance is preserved.

a. He to whom the use of some thing belongs is called a user, so that he may be distinguished from the proprietor of the same thing.

b. It is one thing to use some thing; it is another thing to enjoy some thing. He who can use a thing can receive for himself and his own from the thing that utility which necessity requires; but he who can enjoy a thing receives by right every utility from the thing which it can offer.

2. To use are usually referred: a. habitation or the right of using some part of another's house; b. gathering wood or the right of gathering wood in another's forest; c. pasture or the right of leading cattle into another's pastures; d. diverse species of loan for use, as the use of a horse, garment, etc.

3. Use, as it is taken here, is a right of using some thing which is not revocable at will. From this use there must be distinguished use revocable at will, of which sort is permission of using some thing, such as religious receive from their superior.

Formerly a sharp dispute arose whether there is true use of a thing when the substance of the thing is consumed by use, as happens in food and drink, or rather whether the use of a thing consumable by its first use contains ownership of it. Religious gave occasion to the question, who (as the Friars Minor) said that they had ownership of no thing, not even the least, but only use. Those who affirmed that the use of a thing which is consumed by use cannot be separated from its ownership argued in this way: he who can dispose concerning the substance of a thing has ownership of it; but he who can use a thing which is consumed by the very use disposes concerning its substance. But those who affirmed that the use of a thing consumable by the very use can be separated from the ownership of the same thing used this distinction: if use is understood as an irrevocable right and independent from the will of the one granting, the use of this thing contains ownership; but if the use of a thing is understood as a right revocable at will and fully dependent on the will of the one granting, the use of this thing does not contain ownership, even if the thing is consumed by the very use.¹

¹ Cf. Holzmann, Theologia moralis, IV, n. 166 ss.; Elbel-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis, II, pr. 5, n. 40 ss.

361. On usufruct. Usufruct is the right of using and enjoying another's thing while its substance is preserved. Usufruct is distinguished as legal and conventional, according as it is had from canonical or civil law, or from contract.

a. He to whom the usufruct of some thing belongs is called a usufructuary or fruituary, so that he may be distinguished from the owner or proprietor of the same thing.

b. Usufruct differs from use in this, that the fruituary has the right not only of using another's thing, but also of receiving the fruits which arise from it. Indeed he has perfect ownership in the fruits, so that he can receive not only the fruits necessary to himself, but all, and alienate them according to his choice.

c. By canonical law beneficiaries have the usufruct of their benefices; by civil law parents have the usufruct from the goods of minor children, and sometimes the husband from certain goods of his wife.

362. On servitude. a. Servitude (Dienstbarkeit) taken actively is the right which someone has, that another's thing may serve him or his own thing; taken passively it is a burden inhering in a thing, by force of which it ought to serve another for some advantage. Thus if a right of passing through another's field belongs to someone, he himself is the subject of active servitude, but the field is the subject of passive servitude.

b. Passive servitude is twofold: one personal, when some thing ought to furnish utility to another person, of which sort are use and usufruct, if they are taken passively; the other real or praedial, if some thing ought to furnish an advantage to another thing, as is the servitude of pasturing a flock in some forest.

c. For constituting a real servitude two things are required, of which one bears the burden and is called serving (the forest), the other receives the utility and is called dominant (the flock).

Note. 1. The law of servitudes is drawn up in modern codes with diligent study; and since it determines rights and conduces to preserving the mutual concord of citizens, it obliges in conscience.¹

2. Since the law of servitudes, especially real servitudes, is very intricate, it often gives occasion for disagreements among neighbors. Let the pastor take care either to forestall or to remove disputes of this kind, and for obtaining this end let him admonish the opposing parties that they should rather yield somewhat from their right than expose goods of fortune and mutual concord to danger.

¹ C. A., Section 472-530; C. G., Section 1018-1093.

363. Fruits of a thing. By the name fruits of a thing is understood everything which arises from the thing. Fruits are divided by reason of origin into spontaneous, industrial, and mixed, and by reason of collection into pending, to be received, and received.

1. a. Those are called spontaneous which the thing produces without special industry of men. Special is said because there will scarcely be a fruitful thing which bears fruits without any industry and labor of man.

Spontaneous fruits are either natural or civil, according as they are produced by nature itself, such as hay of a meadow, wood of a forest, offspring of animals, milk, wool, eggs, etc., or are received by force of a contract or another obligation, such as the price which is acquired for the rental of a house, interest which is acquired for money lent, a pension which is acquired for an office.

b. Those are called industrial which are acquired by the industry and labor of man alone, although by means of some thing or instrument, such as the works of artisans and workers, profit received from trading.

Profit received from simple sale can be considered as a fruit of industry; for that profit received can be called a fruit of industry, it is not required that singular and extraordinary industry have intervened, but true work and industry of the person suffices.

c. Those are called mixed which are produced partly by nature and are owed partly to human industry, such as crops, wine, oil, cheese, butter. And because even natural fruits require some industry, it is sometimes difficult to say whether some fruit ought to be reckoned among natural or mixed fruits.

2. a. Those are called pending which have not been separated from the thing, such as offspring of animals not yet brought forth into light, apples still hanging from the tree, crops not yet harvested.

b. Those are called to be received which the possessor could have received if he had wished, but did not receive, whether by negligence or by fraud.

c. Those are called received which have already been separated from the fruitful thing and collected by the possessor. These again are divided into consumed and extant.

Article Second. On the Object of Ownership

The object of ownership is that of which man can be owner. Those things of which man can be owner are usually called goods, and are distinguished into three kinds: internal, mixed, and external. Among internal goods are reckoned man's life, powers, members, and actions; mixed goods are reputation and honor, which are, as it were, midway between internal and external goods; external goods which fall under man's ownership are sublunar things.

364. On internal goods. 1. Of those internal goods which are not distinct from man himself, such as life, powers, and members, man does not have direct ownership, but only useful ownership, so that he receives every utility from them and is their administrator and guardian.

a. God has given no one the right over his own life and members, but has reserved it to Himself: "See that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me; I will kill and I will make alive."¹ And indeed no one can truly be lord of himself, because lord signifies superiority with respect to him whose lord he is. b. He ought to have the power of using them for obtaining his end, and he cannot be impeded by any man in this use, since in tending to his own end he is independent from any man and fully in his own right.

2. Of those internal goods which are distinct from man, such as actions both natural and supernatural and the goods effected by them, man has full ownership, and therefore can dispose concerning them at will. For since he can use his own faculties as his own, he has ownership both in their operations and in the goods arisen from the operations, which are the fruits of the operations.

¹ Deut. 32:39. Cf. Wis. 16:13 s.

365. On mixed goods. Man has full ownership of reputation and honor: for he has ownership of those goods which are the fruits of his own industry; but reputation and honor are acquired and increased by his own industry. Besides, by the consent of all, acts of ownership concerning reputation and honor belong to man: for by defaming himself he can cast them aside for seeking counsel, and he can condone restitution to a calumniator. Nevertheless this ownership is sometimes restricted by another and higher law.

366. On external goods. It will be said below that man can acquire full ownership in external goods; here it is helpful to set forth the various distinctions of external things of which man can have ownership.

1. Things placed in commerce are those which can be in the ownership of a private person; and things placed outside commerce are those which cannot be in the ownership of a private person. Of this kind are: a. public things of the Church, such as sacred places, temples, cemeteries; b. public things of civil society, such as public roads, squares, public bridges, city walls; c. common things, such as air, light, the sea, of which things the use is common to all, but ownership belongs to none.

2. Things are movable and immovable according as, with their substance preserved, they can be transferred from place to place, such as animals and furniture, or cannot be transferred, such as a house or forest. Some things are movable and immovable from their nature, others from the disposition of law, concerning which the civil codes must be consulted.

Civil law also counts fruits not yet collected and the "stocked estate," that is, those things which are necessary for carrying on domestic economy, among immovable goods in some cases.

3. Fungible things (vertretbare) are those of which one can perform the function of another in payment or restitution, in which therefore attention is given not to the species (that is, to the individual thing), but to the genus (to quantity and quality), such as oil, wine, wheat, money, in which not the substance of the coin but its value is considered. Non-fungible things are those of which one cannot perform the function of another, but which must be handed over in the individual, in which therefore attention is given to the species (that is, to the individual thing), not only to the genus, of which sort are animals, garments, etc.

4. Finally, things consumable by first use and things not consumable by first use: the former in their first natural use are destroyed or changed into another substance, such as bread, wine, wood for burning; the latter are indeed worn by use, but are not corrupted, but endure in their substance after use, such as a garment, house, furniture.

The division of external things into corporeal, which can be touched, such as a house, field, money, and incorporeal, which cannot be touched, such as diverse rights, for example, the right of hunting and the right of fishing, which was of great importance in Roman law, scarcely occurs any longer in recent codes.

367. On the subject itself. By the subject of ownership is understood the person to whom ownership belongs. A twofold person is distinguished who is capable of ownership: a physical person and a moral person.

1. From the law of nature the subject of ownership is every living man, even an infant not yet born and a man perpetually insane.¹

a. The foundation of ownership is rational nature: for through reason man has the power of disposing concerning his own things. Wherefore even infants and the perpetually insane are capable of acquiring ownership and habitually retaining it, but not of exercising ownership; for rational nature without any act of will suffices for acquiring and habitually retaining ownership, but the use of reason is required for the exercise of ownership.

b. After death man does not retain ownership of goods of fortune, although he retains ownership of reputation: for since goods of fortune have been granted by the author of nature to man for sustaining temporal life, the right in goods of fortune is extinguished by death itself.

c. Although every man using reason is capable, by the law of nature, of ownership and its exercise, nevertheless by positive law this capacity is restricted in various ways on account of the common good. These matters must be treated below.

2. Moral persons or societies are also capable of ownership. Any society which has been instituted for an honest end is, by the law of nature, capable of acquiring ownership of temporal things. But by civil law this right is recognized only in those which are constituted by it as juridical persons, namely persons capable of acquiring rights.

a. With respect to ecclesiastical societies, juridical persons are first the universal Church, which by natural and divine right is capable of ownership of temporal goods; then within the ambit of the Church: lesser societies, namely dioceses, parishes, church fabric funds, religious societies, seminaries, hospitals, pious institutes, etc.

b. With respect to profane societies, juridical persons are first the state itself or republic, which, since it is a perfect and independent society, has ownership of its goods by its nature; then within the ambit of the state: provinces, municipalities, colleges, universities, and several other lesser societies which are endowed with the privilege of juridical personality and thence are called privileged societies.

¹ Gal. 4:1. Cf. C. A., Section 22; C. G., Section 1, 1923.

368. Principles. Concerning the origin of ownership, from those things which natural right teaches expressly, only those principles are to be taken which are required for rightly understanding these questions.¹

1. God granted the ownership of temporal goods for the preservation of life at the beginning to the human race in such a way that the goods were common to all and proper to one no more than to another.

a. Temporal goods were made by the author of nature for this end, that man may provide for himself from them concerning the things necessary for the preservation of life. Therefore man has a right of acquiring for himself from temporal goods the things which are necessary for the sustenance of life; but this right is true ownership in temporal goods.

b. Twice God granted dominion of earthly things to man: first indeed soon after creation: "Have dominion over the fishes of the sea and the birds of the heaven and all living things that move upon the earth";² then again after the fall and the flood: "Increase and multiply and fill the earth, and let your terror and dread be upon all the animals of the earth," etc.³ By these words God granted created things to the human race as a common good.

2. The division of things initially common, and private ownership of them, both movable and immovable, is not only licit, but in the present state of fallen nature also necessary.

Socialists affirm that temporal goods are to be held and preserved as a good common to all, so that the division of goods and private ownership of them is illicit and altogether unjust. But by a manifold argument it is shown that private ownership in the present order of things is altogether necessary, and therefore must be derived from the will of God.⁴ From these things it is clear that the distinction between rich and poor will never cease in human society at any time: "The poor you have always with you."⁵

3. From the law of nature itself, and indeed by occupation, the division among men of things initially common and private ownership were introduced.

By what right the first division of things was made, and in what way private ownership was first introduced, is not established among the learned. Some think that it was made by paternal authority; others by a pact of men, whether explicit or implicit; others by human law; others finally by force and violence by which the stronger oppressed the weak. In general it cannot be denied that this was done by the law of nature. With the natural faculty of acquiring ownership of things there must be joined a free fact which is the reason and title of ownership in some determinate thing; but this fact is the occupation of a negatively common thing. Hence the principle: a thing belonging to no one becomes the thing of the first occupier.

4. Ownership obtained by legitimate occupation is not absolute, but restricted by its own limits. Namely, man cannot have his goods as his own in such a way that in no respect are they any longer common, or that he can always and under every condition exclude all others from their use; for private ownership, which is a secondary right, cannot take away a primary right. Now the primary end on account of which corporeal goods were created is this: that there be at hand for men means for preserving those goods which nature itself wills to be common to all. Therefore, even after the division of goods has been made, man retains the right implanted by nature itself to those things which are required for protecting and preserving these goods.⁶

a. This right of acquiring those things which are necessary for preserving life is diverse according to the diverse condition of men. alpha. He who can labor has a (strict) right to labor, that is, of acquiring for himself the necessaries of life by labor (n. 69). beta. He who is unfit for labor has a (moral or legal) right of receiving the necessaries of life from the superfluous goods of the rich. gamma. He who is in extreme necessity has a (strict) right of taking those things which are necessary for preserving life. For each right, as far as can be done, ought to be preserved uninjured; but if private ownership impedes the preservation of life, the secondary right ceases and the primary right prevails. This right is not to be understood in such a way that the rich man is bound to confer upon the one in extreme need those things which he needs, but in such a way that he is bound not to impede him who, in extreme danger, provides for himself concerning the necessaries. To these rights on the other side correspond just so many duties, which are connected with ownership of temporal things.

b. Goods which nature wills to be common to all must be distinguished from goods which nature itself does not intend for all, but which individuals acquire for themselves according to their condition. Goods of the former kind are life, health, liberty, reputation; goods of the latter kind are a noble state, riches, great dignity, office, and things of this sort.⁷

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, a. 2. Encyclical of Leo XIII, Rerum novarum, 16 May 1891. Walter, Das Eigentum nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas u. s. w. (Freiburg: Herder, 1895). F. Cathrein, Sozialismus^7 (Freiburg: Herder, 1903). F. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie^4 (Freiburg: Herder, 1902), II, p. 247 ff. H. Pesch, Liberalismus, Socialismus u. chr. Gesellschaftsordnung (Freiburg: Herder, 1901), p. 196 ff. Schaub, Die Eigentumslehre nach Thomas von Aquin und dem modernen Sozialismus (Freiburg: Herder, 1898). Th. Mayer, Institutiones iuris naturalis (Friburgi: Herder, 1900), II, n. 162 ss. A. Vermeersch, Quaestiones de iustitia^2 (Brugis: Beyaert, 1904), n. 194-245. Pottier, De iure et iustitia (Leodii: Ancion, 1900), p. 18-47. Diederlack, Die soziale Frage^6 (Innsbruck: Rauch, 1904), p. 131 ff.

² Gen. 1:28.

³ Gen. 9:1-2.

⁴ Diederlack briefly gathers the arguments, Die soziale Frage^6, n. 91 ff.; Cathrein, Das Privateigentum (Freiburg: Herder).

⁵ Matt. 26:11.

⁶ Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, a. 2; H. Pesch, l. c., Pflichten und Schranken des Eigentums, p. 390 ff.

⁷ Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 153 ss.

372. Declarations. A son under family power is called a legitimate son (or legitimated son) who is not yet in his own right, but is subject to paternal power.

a. Distinction of persons. An infant is called a man up to the completed seventh year of age; an impubes is called one who has not yet arrived at puberty, therefore up to the fourteenth year of age if he is a boy, and up to the twelfth if she is a girl; a minor or minor of age is called one already pubescent up to emancipation; an adult or one of full age exists after emancipation. The year of emancipation is different in different laws.¹ A ward is called an impubes who by the death of the father or by sentence of the judge (for example, on account of a physical or moral defect of the father) has gone out from paternal power; for him by force of law a tutor is constituted. For a minor who, already pubescent, has gone out from paternal power, a curator is constituted for the administration of goods.

b. Distinction of goods. From Roman law the goods of sons were distinguished into castrensian goods, which a son acquires for himself from military service or another public office; profectitious goods, which a son receives from his father or gains from the goods of the father; adventitious goods, which come to the son from elsewhere, for example, by inheritance, donation, special industry and labor.

Recent codes distinguish: alpha. free goods, which the son acquires by separated industry (while outside the paternal house he devotes himself to an office or labor, even if he lives at home) or by donation or a similar title; beta. non-free goods, which the son acquires by non-separated industry (laboring at home together with the father, or trading from paternal goods).

¹ According to several codes (C. G., Section 2), children are minors up to the completed twenty-first year; according to C. A., Section 21, up to the completed twenty-fourth year. Emancipation according to some laws happens by that very fact when the son has attained legitimate age, according to others only must happen if the son wishes; with the conditions prescribed by law observed, it can also happen before this age.

373. Rights of sons, in establishing which recent codes nearly agree.¹

a. Of goods which are called free, the son himself, even if he is a minor, has ownership; but their administration, and sometimes also usufruct, pertain to the father.²

alpha. Therefore where the son has not only direct ownership but also useful ownership of these goods, all their fruits pass into his ownership. And if the son dissipates these goods against the will of the parents, he sins against other virtues, but not against justice. - Although a minor son acquires for himself of himself those things which he acquires outside the paternal house by furnishing service or exercising his own art or trading with another's goods, nevertheless, since their administration belongs to the father, he ought to hand them over to the father; and if he secretly retains some things for himself without the father's knowledge, he acts illicitly by arrogating the administration to himself.

beta. If the son labors outside the paternal house, but lives and is fed at home, he ought to pay for his sustenance. For the father is not bound to feed a son who can provide for himself. Wherefore he ought to hand over the whole wage to his parents for paying the expenses of sustenance, unless perhaps he receives an extraordinarily great wage, or undertakes labor altogether extraordinary, or the parents consent that he retain some part of the wage for himself. But if, without the father's knowledge and against his will, he secretly retains part of the ordinary wage for himself, so that he does not pay the expenses of sustenance, of himself he sins against justice.

gamma. In a twofold case sons are not to be accused of sin because they withdraw something of the wage received from the father's administration, provided they have paid as much as is sufficient for sustenance: alpha. if they notice that the parents do not reserve those things which remain over after sustenance for the sons, but spend them for superfluous uses; beta. if sparing parents do not grant to sons, for honest recreations, those things which they can prudently expect from them.

b. Non-free goods of themselves pertain to the father, even if the son is of full age. For the fruits of the labor which the son exercises not in his own name but in the father's name fall to the father. Wherefore if the son withdraws or dissipates these goods against the will of the parents, he acts against justice.

¹ C. A., Section 140 ff.; C. G., Section 1627 ff.

² From C. A., Section 149, administration alone; from C. G., Section 1649 ss., partly also usufruct pertains to the father.

374. Whether a son can demand some wage by laboring in the paternal business.

a. A minor son constituted under paternal power cannot demand a wage for his labor: for as long as he is under paternal power, the parents can demand by right that he labor for preserving and increasing the domestic estate, and that he be content with the sustenance received at home.

b. A son of full age can demand nothing for owed labor. That labor is judged owed which, according to the condition of the father, is necessary for the decent and suitable sustenance of the family: for the father has the right of demanding from the son services which are necessary for the sustenance of the family. For example, a farmer can demand that he be helped by his son in agriculture; but for those things which are owed from piety no stipend can be demanded.¹

c. A son of full age can of himself demand a wage for labor not owed, unless he intended to labor gratuitously; for parents have no right of demanding from sons services which are not necessary to their state and condition. But the son cannot demand a greater wage than an outsider would receive for the same labor; profit received from the business and labor pertains to the father, yet the father can by right subtract the expenses of sustenance and therefore diminish the wage.

alpha. But the son cannot demand the owed wage immediately; rather it must be committed to the father at what time and in what way he wishes to pay the debt owed to the son.

Ordinarily parents are not accustomed to pay wages to sons laboring at home, nor to increase the inheritance on account of their labors. Nor by this way of acting is justice judged to be injured: for ordinary labors are nearly compensated by food, clothing, peculium, and other advantages received in the paternal house. But on the other side, if sons, especially those of full age, remaining and laboring at home, steal something from paternal goods for the labors undergone or secretly compensate themselves, after the fact they are not easily to be compelled to restitution.

beta. And this, namely that the son cannot demand or take for himself another compensation for ordinary labor furnished in the paternal house, is valid even if other brothers meanwhile have been idle or have given themselves to studies; for these circumstances, merely external, do not make the profit of the labor fall not to the family but to the son. Yet parents are accustomed, either by donations or by other ways, to see to it that the industry and diligence of sons has its reward.

d. Yet if the labor not owed is extraordinary, which notably exceeds the customary labors of others or is very useful to the family estate, the son can of himself demand a greater wage or part of the profit, with the expenses for food deducted, unless from the beginning he had the express intention of furnishing those labors gratuitously; for if he had such an intention, it is not licit for him afterward, with his will changed, to demand a stipend.

If the son, without the father's knowledge, receives profit by trading from his goods, it must be distinguished in this way:

alpha. If the son acted in the father's name from the presumed permission of the father, he committed no sin, but the whole profit is the father's.

beta. If the son acted in his own name with money which he had made his own, the profit is the son's, but he committed sin because he took the money, and he ought to repair damage to the father if any arose in the father's business from the lack of money.

gamma. If the son acted in his own name with money which remained in the father's ownership, he can retain half the profit: for the matter can be considered as a partnership business, to which the father contributed the money, and the son the industry. Whether the son in this case committed sin depends on whether he acted against the father's will or from the presumed permission of the father.²

¹ Cf. Lugo, De iustitia, disp. 5, n. 42.

² Cf. Lehmkuhl, Casus consc., I, n. 565 ss.

375. Whether a minor son has ownership in goods given to him. - To determine the ownership which a minor son living outside the family has in goods given to him by parents or relatives, attention must be given to the will of those giving, whether expressed or reasonably presumed.

a. If goods are given absolutely, the son acquires full ownership of them, and therefore can dispose of them at will. In this way things consumable by their very use, money destined for recreation, and things which are given not by parents but by relatives, are usually given. Therefore if the son spends these things for vain uses, he sins by prodigality, but not by injustice.

b. If goods are given exclusively for a determined end, for example, money for buying books, garments, paying room and board, etc., the son does not acquire full ownership, and therefore he acts against justice and of himself is bound to restitution if he spends them for other ends, especially vain or dishonest ends. Yet he is often excused from restitution, because condonation by the parents can be supposed.

c. If things are given generally for occurring necessities, with no condition attached, the parents are judged to transfer full ownership of them to the son; wherefore he can spend some part of them, according to the state and condition of the parents, even on honest recreations. But if the son spends them against the will of the parents for vain uses, he sins against obedience, but not against justice.

d. If goods are given by the parents for use, as it is said, which are not consumable by first use, such as garments, books, etc., the son indeed has perfect ownership of them;¹ nevertheless he ought to use them according to the intention of the giver, to whom he owes obedience. Hence if, for example, he were to sell books and dissipate the money received from them, he would not indeed sin against justice, but nevertheless, besides prodigality, also against obedience.

Note. Of itself it is not to be advised that agreements be made between parents and sons who live together and labor in the paternal house; much less are secret compensations to be promoted. Rather, the piety of sons toward parents and of parents toward sons is to be fostered and inculcated. But parents are to be exhorted to grant a just peculium and an equitable wage to sons remaining and laboring with them.

¹ C. A., Section 151.

We may divide the species of justice into individual or commutative and social justice.

Commutative justice regards the relations between man and man in their private and individual capacity. It supposes a perfect distinction of rights between them, and prescribes that these should be duly observed and respected. It exists between physical and moral persons alike, or between a physical and a moral person, provided that their rights are perfectly distinct from each other.

Social justice regulates the mutual relations between the individual and the society or State to which he belongs. As a member of society the individual has certain duties toward it; he must contribute his share to the common burdens; he must be ready to defend the common weal at the call of authority; he must obey just and equitable laws. This duty of rendering to the State what is its due is called legal justice. On the other hand, the State has its obligations toward its subjects; it must distribute burdens, honours, and rewards equitably without showing favour to particular classes and persons; not indeed with absolute arithmetical equality all round, but according to respective merits. The virtue which should regulate the distribution of burdens and rewards among its subjects by the State is called distributive justice. To such as have committed crime and injured the common weal the State metes out condign punishment according as vindictive justice demands.

There is a difference of opinion among Catholic writers as to whether legal, distributive, and vindictive justice, which we have grouped together under the name of social justice, are really subordinate species of the virtue, or whether commutative justice is the only species that may in strictness be so called. Whatever view be taken we must allow that in commutative justice alone is there a perfect distinction between debtor and creditor; it alone observes arithmetical equality in satisfying its obligations; it alone binds to restitution after being violated. In social justice, on the contrary, there is no perfect distinction between the State and its subjects; social justice does not prescribe the observance of arithmetical equality, nor does its violation bind to restitution, except when by the same act commutative justice has also been infringed.

That which in justice is due to me is my right, as it is called. I have a right to my life, to my good name, to my property; and anyone who deprives me of these rights is guilty of injustice. Rights, then, are the subject-matter of justice, and in this, its strict sense, a right may be defined as a moral power of having, doing, or exacting something.

It is said to be a moral power to distinguish it from the mere physical capacity of brute force, which confers no rights of itself. It is a moral power which may not without injustice be interfered with. It is the power of having and possessing as one’s own something which man values and which serves his convenience and wants; or of doing something, of giving scope to his bodily or mental activity; or of exacting some service as due to him from another.

A right is in re or ad rem. A right in re is a right which one has to something determined and already his own. In order that one may have a right in re the object must already exist; it must not be merely possible or future; it must be determined and separate; it must belong to the person by a title of justice so that it is his. If one of these conditions is wanting but notwithstanding someone has a claim in justice that something should become his property, he has a right ad rem to it. Thus a farmer has a right in re to his harvest after he has gathered it; before it has grown he has only a right ad rem. 'The right of a servant to his wages is ad rem until they are paid; after they are paid his right is in re.

A right in re seems to be practically equivalent to ownership (dominium). Ownership is absolute or qualified. Absolute ownership is the unlimited power of disposing of a thing for one’s own benefit. The absolute owner of a horse may use him, sell him, give him away, or kill him, without violating justice; he may do what he likes with his own. If ownership is limited in some way so that the owner has not a right to all the uses to which the object may be put, the ownership is qualified. Qualified ownership of the thing while its use belongs to someone else is called direct; qualified ownership of the use of what belongs to someone else is called indirect ownership.

According to English law, a subject is incapable of absolute ownership of realty; he is only capable of a qualified ownership therein, although to all intents and purposes an estate in fee simple is equivalent to absolute ownership. A qualified property of many different kinds may be had in realty, and both an absolute and qualified property of many different sorts may be had in movables. The various kinds of property, especially in immovables, are recognized and determined by law, which enforces the rights and obligations annexed thereto. In different systems of law there will be different kinds of property recognized. It will be sufficient for our purpose merely to mention ususfructus, usus, habitatio, servitus, of the Roman and canon law.

In. English law the quantity of interest which a man has in lands and tenements is called an estate, of which there is a great variety: equitable and legal estates; estates of inheritance and not of inheritance; estates of freehold interest and less than freehold, such as estates for years, estates at will, and estates at sufferance.

Personal injuries are treated of elsewhere under the Fifth and Eighth Commandments; here we consider more especially real injuries done to the property of another.

There are three different species of real injuries—robbery, theft, and simple damnification. Robbery, besides injury to property, includes also a personal injury, which consists in violence offered to another by forcibly depriving him of what is his. Simple damnification is the causing of damage to the property of another without taking away any of that property. Theft is the secret taking away of the property of another against his reasonable will. . No action is an injury unless it is against the reasonable will of the injured person, scienti et volenti non fit injuria, according to the twenty-seventh rule of law in the Sixth Book of the Decretals. The reason is obvious; because a person may as a rule renounce his rights, and then an action contrary to them ceases to be a violation of justice. It is no longer a depriving another of what is his; it has ceased to belong to him. There are, however, some rights which are inalienable, and actions against these will be contrary to justice even if the party wronged give his consent. No one can validly renounce his right to life, and so the private killing of another, even with his consent, except in lawful self-defence, is always murder. Similarly, marital rights of married people are inalienable, and, even if the husband consent, a wife’s adultery is always adultery. The maxim, then, must be understood of rights which the owner can validly forego, and it asserts that no injury is done by acting against rights which the possessor with full knowledge and with perfect freedom does forego.

I. Ecclesiastical law strictly so called is the complex of canons or laws which have been made by ecclesiastical authority.

II. Ecclesiastical laws are distinguished:

1. By reason of the legislator, into papal, episcopal, and synodal laws.

2. By reason of matter, into dogmatic and disciplinary canons. The former propose truths pertaining to faith and morals; the latter regard the external government of the Church.

3. By reason of the mode in which they were made, into written and unwritten law. Unwritten law is divided into handed-down and customary law, according as it has been established orally or by the consent of the legislator in custom.

4. By reason of territory, into universal and particular laws, according as they bind the universal Church or only certain regions.

5. By reason of time, into: 1. ancient law, from the beginning of the Church until Gratian around 1150; 2. the law of the Middle Ages, from Gratian until the Council of Trent, 1545; 3. new law, from the Council of Trent until the Vatican Council, or rather until the new Code; 4. newest law, from the new Code.

III. Ecclesiastical laws, as they formerly were in force, are found for the greater part in the Corpus Iuris Canonici, as it is called; as they now are in force, in the Codex Iuris Canonici.

1. The Corpus Iuris Canonici consists of five parts, which are: 1. the Decretum Gratiani; 2. the Decretals of Gregory IX; 3. the Liber Sextus of Boniface VIII; 4. the Clementines; 5. the Extravagantes of John XXII and the Extravagantes Communes.¹

2. The Codex Iuris Canonici, arranged by order of Pius X, promulgated by the authority of Benedict XV in the year 1917, on May 27, and in force from May 19, 1918, consists of five books, of which the first treats general norms, the second persons, the third things, the fourth processes, and the fifth delicts and penalties.

¹ They are generally cited thus:

1. Decretum Gratiani. First part of the decree: c. 9 "Palam est" 11 = c. 9, D. 11 = c. 9, D. XI = canon 9 of distinction XI. Second part: c. 24, C. II, q. 7 = canon 24 of cause II, question 7. The treatise De poenitentia is cited in this way: c. 26, D. I de poenit. = canon 26 of the first distinction concerning penance. Third part: c. 15, D. III de consecr. = canon 15 of distinction III concerning consecration. Summaries written by Gratian are cited by the expression "dictum Gratiani" = dict. Gratiani. The cited dictum is determined by distinction or by cause and question.

2. The Decretals of Gregory IX are cited by the characteristic letter X = extra, for example c. 5 X de praebendis (III, 5) = c. 5 X 3.5 = the fifth chapter of the Decretals of Gregory IX concerning prebends and dignities, book III, title 5.

3. The Liber Sextus of Boniface VIII: c. "ut animarum" 2 de constit. in VIto (I, 2) = c. 2 de constit. in VIto (I, 2) = c. 2 in VIto (I, 2).

4. The Clementines: for example Clem. 1 de celebratione miss. (III, 14), or c. 1 III, 14 in Clem. = Clementina 1 de celebr. miss. = c. 1 III, 14 in Clementinis.

5. The Extravagantes of John XXII: c. un. de praebendis extrav. Ioann. XXII (tit. 3) = c. un. extr. Ioan. (3). The Extravagantes Communes: c. 1 de electione, extrav. com. (I, 3) = c. 1 Xvag. co. I, 3.

I. Civil law is the complex of laws made by civil authority.

II. Civil law is distinguished:

1. By reason of time, into old and modern law.

a) Old law, by which Roman Law is understood, consists of four parts, which are: 1. the Institutes; 2. the Digest or Pandects (pan and dechomai, as if things which contain all); 3. the Code; 4. the Novellae, as if newly issued.⁴

b) Modern law is the law which each kingdom has established for itself, especially from the time of the upheaval of the republic in France, that is, at the end of the eighteenth century.

2. By reason of scope, civil law is distinguished into international and national law.

a) International law is that which is established by express pacts entered into among the rulers of nations. It is called public or private according as it moderates the relation of state to state, or of the citizen of one state to the citizen of another state.

b) National law is that which has been established for a determinate state, such as Dutch law.

¹ Cf. Marcellus a Puero Jesu, Ethica moralis et socialis, pp. 336-340.

² Cf. Lijdsman, Introductio in Ius Canonicum, n. 64 sq.

³ Cf. Lijdsman, Introductio in Ius Canonicum, n. 52 sq.

⁴ They are usually cited in this way: Institutes: § 1 Instit. de adoptionibus lib. I, tit. 11 = § 1, I. I, 11. Digest: the beginning of law, or fragment, 4, Digest, or Pandects, ff., de pactis, book II, title 14 = l. 4 pr. D. II, 14 (fr. 4 pr. ff. II, 14) = l. 4, § 1, D. II, 14. Code: law 7, § 1, Cod. de diversis rescriptis, book I, title 23 = l. 7, § 1, C. I, 23. Novellae: Nov. VII praef. = Nov. VII, cap. 1.

IV. Fuller exposition; this is especially set forth by a fuller exposition both of the object of justice, that is, as is clear from the definition handed down, right,¹ and of its subject.

1. Notion of right. The word right is taken in different senses, for example for a moral and inviolable faculty in regard to something, that is, in regard to some thing or some action, whether one's own or another's; for a law granting some moral faculty in regard to something; for a body of laws, as when someone is said to study law; for the sentence of a judge, who therefore is said to declare the law; for the place in which sentence is pronounced, whence someone is said to appear in court.

Now right, insofar as it is the object of justice, is a thing due to someone according to some equality; namely the material object is the thing due, and the formal object is the character of debt. Moreover, under the name of thing we also comprehend an action or omission.

2. Source of right. The remote source of every right is law, whether natural or positive, and ultimately the eternal law, which is the origin of all laws according to these words of St. Alphonsus: "The will of God alone, as being most holy, most wise, most upright, is the one source of every law, of every rule, and of the measure of honesty" (Dichiarazione del sistema, n. 18). The proximate source of right is the moral faculty itself, on account of which some thing is due to someone. I said moral faculty, by which is understood some power with respect to some thing.

3. Division of right. Right, insofar as it is the object of justice, is divided:

a) By reason of origin, into natural right and positive right, according as it flows from natural law (n. 82) or from positive law (n. 89).

b) By reason of subject, into individual right and social right, according as it belongs to man as an individual, or as part of a whole, or as a member of society.

c) By reason of the title in which it is proximately founded, into right founded in the title of devinction or quasi-devinction² of a thing to some person, and this is the object of commutative justice; into right founded in the title of capacity, dignity, merit, or necessity, on account of which some good, for example an office, ought to be granted by the whole, that is, by the prince, to some member of society, and this is the object of distributive justice; into right founded in the ordination of subjects and of the prince to society, and this is the object of legal justice.

d) By reason of efficacy, into strict right and less strict right, according as it is founded in the title of devinction or quasi-devinction of a thing to some person, or in another of the titles just assigned.

Strict right, that is, the object of commutative justice, is distinguished into ius in re, or real right, and ius ad rem, according as a thing has already been bound to someone, or someone has a right that a thing, still bound to another, be bound to himself. This right is sometimes called ius in personam, insofar, namely, as some person, from commutative justice, is obliged to render some thing to someone (St. Alphonsus, III, 486).

4. Subject of right. A rational being, and it alone, is the subject of right. For right is a thing due to someone according to some equality. But something can be due only to a rational being.

The Minor is proved. Something can be due only to him who has a moral faculty in regard to something. But a moral faculty in regard to something belongs to a rational being, and to it alone.

The subsumed Minor is proved. A moral faculty belongs to him, and to him alone, who can and ought to direct himself to the ultimate end; for such a one and such a one alone enjoys the faculty of choosing means to the ultimate end, a faculty, I say, of which others ought to take account. But a rational being, as free, and it alone can and ought to direct itself to the ultimate end; irrational beings, as lacking liberty, cannot direct themselves. Therefore a moral faculty belongs to a rational being, and to it alone.

Corollary I. Even infants and the insane are capable of rights. This is clear: 1. from Sacred Scripture: "For as long as the heir is a little child, he differs nothing from a servant, although he is lord of all; but he is under tutors and governors until the time predetermined by the father";³ 2. from the consent of all nations and laws; 3. from the fact that nothing prevents some thing from being destined to the special utility of someone and therefore owed to him, even if in the use of the thing he must be directed by the reason and will of another.

Corollary II. Not only physical persons, but also moral persons, can be the subject of right, or at least be regarded as if they were the subject of right;⁴ concerning these we shall speak specifically later.

Corollary III. The capacity of acquiring a right can be restricted by authority, both civil and ecclesiastical, and this both directly, for example if someone is deprived of the usufruct of his own thing (n. 764), or is rendered incapable by reason of a solemn vow of poverty; and indirectly, insofar as certain things are placed outside commerce. The state in which someone exists deprived of the capacity of right is called civil death.

And with these things having been premised concerning justice taken more generally, let us proceed to the treatment of commutative justice, speaking, as we have already noted, first of commutative justice itself, then of injustice and restitution. We shall add a double appendix, the former on distributive justice, the latter on legal justice.

¹ Cf. Lijdsman, C.SS.R., Introductio in Ius Canonicum, vol. I, n. 1.

² By quasi-devinction I understand the power which belongs to a private person, so that some thing may be bound to him (ius ad rem).

³ Gal. 4:1-2.

⁴ It is disputed: 1. whether and 2. in what precise sense a moral person can be called the subject of right. Cf. Brinz, Pandekten, III, § 432-454; Ihering, Der Geist des Romischen Rechts; Vermeersch, Quaestiones de Iustitia, XIV; F. C. von Savigny, System des heutigen Romischen Rechts, II, § 85-103; d'Annibale, Summula Theologiae Moralis, I, n. 43; Waffelaert, Etude de theologie morale sur l'obligation en conscience des lois civiles, p. 157-184; Cathrein, Moralphilosophie, II, p. 394-395; Gierke, Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, cited by Duynstee, n. 22.

All strict real rights involve something of ownership; most, however, involve only limited ownership. So that these may be explained completely and in order, we shall treat first of ownership generally, then of limited ownerships.

Since rights and duties are correlative—there being a duty that corresponds to every right, and vice versa—and since both are regulated by law, the principles given for the apparent collision of laws can be applied to the apparent collision of rights.

(a) Rights of a higher kind have preference over rights of a lower kind. Therefore, the rights that arise from birth itself, or from the fact that one is a human being (e.g., the right to life), are superior to the rights that are acquired through some condition, such as inheritance or contract (e.g., the right to property, etc.). Example: Titus must get his child, who is in danger of death, to a hospital without delay. Balbus is getting ready for a pleasure ride, but Titus takes his car since there is no other ready means of getting to the hospital. Titus acts within his natural rights, if the car is returned safely and as soon as possible to the owner. According to civil law his act would be technical larceny, but in view of the necessity courts and juries would certainly not insist on the letter of the law.

(b) Inalienable rights (i.e., those which one may not renounce, because they are also duties), such as the right to serve God, the right to live, etc., are superior to alienable rights (i.e., those which one may renounce), such as the right to marry, the right to own property, etc. Example: One may surrender the right to drink intoxicants in order to serve God or preserve one’s life.

Can there be an invincibly erroneous conscience concerning the precepts of natural law? - "It is certain that in the first principles of natural law, as also in the proximate conclusions and certain obligations of one's own state, invincible ignorance is not given, because by the very light of nature such things are known to all, except to him who closes his eyes lest he see them.... On the contrary, however, the unanimous opinion of theologians is... that in mediated and obscure conclusions, or those remote from the principles, invincible ignorance is indeed given and must be admitted." L. 1. 1. n. 8. 170 seq.; Struggl tr. 3. q. 1. n. 10-13; S. Th. Quodl. 3. a. 36, De Verit. q. 17. a. 2; De Malo q. 3. a. 8; Rom. 2:14. 15. In the first principles of natural law, for example: good is to be done, evil avoided; the highest good is to be loved, evil detested; what you do not wish for yourself, do not do to another; thanks are to be given to benefactors, etc. In proximate conclusions, for example: God is to be worshiped, parents are to be honored, theft is not to be committed, etc. In remote conclusions, for example: private revenge is not to be exercised, abortion is not to be procured, etc. Eternal law, existing in the divine mind, most perfectly exhibits the order of things. Natural law, which is the application of eternal law, exists in the human mind. Therefore natural law, by the very fact that it is manifested through human reason, falls short of the highest perfection of eternal law.

Hence it happens that not always what we think and judge, in more difficult matters, corresponds to the rules of the divine mind, and remains obscure and unknown to us. Whence that thing, although materially and in itself it pertains to natural law, nevertheless does not pertain formally and as regards us, since it has not been sufficiently promulgated to us by the natural light. - Wirceburg. De Actib. hum. c. 1. a. 3.

Who generally can make laws? - Since God is Lord of all, and has ordered obedience to superiors not only ecclesiastical but also civil, not only he himself, but they also can make laws. L. 140. Hence several laws are distinguished:

Eternal law, which is: The eternal reason and will of God commanding the natural order to be preserved and forbidding it to be disturbed. S. Aug. l. 22 Contra Faustum c. 27. It is the beginning and foundation of every law; for from it flows natural law, and from natural law the remaining laws take their force and norm. Cf. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 91. a. 1, q. 93, q. 95 a. 2, q. 96. a. 4; Wirceburg. De Legib. c. 1. a. 2.

Natural law, which is the eternal law of God promulgated to men through right reason, by which we discern what is good and what evil, the good to be done and evil to be avoided. Therefore the object of this law is that which is per se and intrinsically good or evil. In it are distinguished the first principles of morals, immediate conclusions, and mediated conclusions. Cf. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 91. a. 2. 6, q. 94; L. 102; Wirceburg. l. c. a. 3. 4. 6.

Divine law, which is law given by God through revelation. It is twofold; for one is contained in the Old Testament, the other in the New Testament. The Old Testament contained ceremonial, judicial, and moral precepts. Only the moral precepts remain to be observed today, the rest having been abrogated by the New Law. Matt. 19:17; 1 Cor. 7:19. The New Testament, besides counsels, contains precepts of catholic faith, morals, sacraments, sacrifice, and ecclesiastical hierarchy. The moral precepts are those very things which stand by natural right, and the law of the unity and indissolubility of marriage is that which, enacted from the beginning of the world, was confirmed by Christ. Matt. 19:4 seq. Cf. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 91. a. 4. 5, q. 98-108; L. 103. - The legal precepts of the Old Testament, or ceremonies, sacred things, sacrifices, sacraments of the Mosaic Law, all ceased after the Gospel was promulgated, nor can they be observed without sin. Eugene IV, B. Cantate Domino. - Wirceburg. l. c. c. 2.

Canon and civil law. The former is from ecclesiastical power, and it touches those things in the Church which regard the salvation of souls. The latter is from civil power, and moderates rights and obligations between citizens and citizens; between citizens and society and its Prince; between nation and nation. Whence private, public, and international or law of nations arises. C. 1. 13 de Const., C. 2 e. t. in 6; Inst. l. 1. t. 1. 2, l. 2. t. 1. § 11; L. 2 de Origine Iuris etc. §§; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 91. a. 3, q. 95, 2. 2. q. 57; Wirceburg. l. c. c. 3; E. M.

But the law of nations can be taken otherwise, namely insofar as it is distinguished from civil law. Appositely S. Th. 1. 2. q. 95. a. 4 says: "It belongs to the notion of human law that it be derived from the law of nature, and according to this positive law is divided into the law of nations and civil law. For to the law of nations pertain those things which are derived from the law of nature as conclusions from principles, such as just purchases, sales, and other things of this kind, without which men cannot live together with one another; which is of the law of nature, because man is naturally a sociable animal. But those things which are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination (of certain common things, a. 2) pertain to civil law, according as any city determines something suitably to itself." And thus likewise that one must not kill pertains to the law of nations; for it is derived as a conclusion from the fact that evil must be done to no one. To punish the criminal with such or such a penalty pertains to civil law; for it is a determination of the common law of nature, that he who sins be punished. S. Th. ib. a. 2. "And therefore Caius the jurist says, L. 9 ff. De Iust. et iure: What natural reason has constituted among all men, that is preserved equally among all, and is called the law of nations." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 57. a. 3. Hence the law of nations embraces not only those things which are imposed by the very necessity of nature, as the division of goods, but also those things which flow from a certain highest suitability of nature, and which therefore are preserved by all through use and custom, by a certain implicit compact, or, when doubts arise, by an explicit compact, such as to enter a foreign region, unless danger arises from it for that region; free navigation of every sea; mutual commerce among peoples; transmission of letters; abolition of servitude, etc. - But positive law more determinately defining the various relations to be observed among nations will be able better to be called international law.

180 bis. Note: Natural law is altogether immutable, since it regards those things which by their nature are good and by their nature are evil. Against this immutability, as is clear, certain things permitted by God have no force, which because of peculiar circumstances were no longer opposed to the right order, as, for example, polygamy permitted to the patriarchs, dissolution of marriage, etc.; or were not opposed to that order because the matter is subject to divine dominion, as theft once permitted to the Hebrews. But change is not had as regards the precepts of natural law which are called primary, without which the order of things cannot exist, as, for example, the honor due to God, subjection in man of the lower part to the higher, etc.; but only as regards those precepts which are called secondary, and which regard not the very being of the order, but the perfection of the order, as, for example, the marriage of brothers and sisters permitted to the first parents. - S. Th. 1. 2. q. 100. a. 5; Wirceburg. De Legib. c. 1. a. 5.

Canon Law: The collection of canonical laws constitutes Canon Law. Yet some canonical laws are contained in the Corpus Iuris, others are outside it. The Corpus Iuris contains three Parts. The first part contains the Decree of Gratian, a Benedictine monk, around the year 1150, in which, in a threefold part, under the title on Distinctions, on Causes, on Consecration, there is treated successively of ecclesiastical persons, ecclesiastical judgments, and sacred things. This collection is not authentic; therefore the individual texts have and retain their force from themselves, not from the collection. The second part contains the Decretals by S. Raymond of Pennafort, of the Order of Preachers, in the year 1234, in which likewise, in five books, there is treated successively of persons, judgments, things, marriage, and penalties. This collection, completed and published by order of Gregory IX, is authentic, and therefore the laws contained in it have the force of universal laws from the very fact of insertion into it. The third part contains the sixth book of the Decretals, so called because it was added to the five books of the Decretals of Gregory IX. It was published by the authority of Boniface VIII in 1298; therefore the collection is authentic, and proceeds in the same order as the Decretals of Gregory. This third part also contains the Clementines and Extravagantes. The Clementines are so called from Clement V, who after the Council of Vienne, over which he himself presided in 1311, ordered the Constitutions issued by himself and by the same Council of Vienne to be collected. Therefore this too is an authentic Collection. It is divided into five books. This same third part contains the Extravagantes of John XXII and the Common Extravagantes. The former are constitutions issued in the earlier years of the pontificate of the aforesaid Pontiff. The latter are other Constitutions issued by John XXII and by other Pontiffs, divided into five books. Although all those Constitutions are genuine, nevertheless they do not constitute an authentic Collection. The other Constitutions that are present, besides these, of the Council of Constance, of Trent, and of the Vatican, and also of the Supreme Pontiffs, issued afterward, were not collected into the Corpus Iuris.

Civil Law: Roman Law is contained in the Corpus of Civil Law issued by order of Justinian in the 6th century. It embraces four parts: the Institutes of Justinian, divided into four books, which are subdivided into titles and paragraphs; the Pandects, which comprehend selected responses of jurists, to which the force of law was attributed, also called the Digest or Digests, because they contain legislation arranged in order, and are divided into fifty books, which are subdivided into titles and laws; the New Code, or repeated lectures, that is, in a second edition or publication, C. Cordi nobis, Nov. 16, 534, which contains twelve books, subdivided into titles and laws, and embraces the constitutions of Princes; the Novels, or Constitutions issued after the Code, which are not all of Justinian himself, and are genuine, although their Collection is not authentic as the three preceding parts are. Modern law is contained in modern Codes, which are divided into books, titles, and articles.

What is justice? - Justice is so called from iustari, or from two things being made equal to each other. Justice taken broadly imports all virtues; hence a man is customarily called simply just if he preserves every honesty in every matter. Taken strictly, insofar as it is the special virtue with which we are here dealing, it is defined: the constant and perpetual will of rendering to each one his own right. Inst. 1. 1. t. 1. "Constant and perpetual will," because there must be a firm disposition not only for one or another day, but always, of rendering to each one his own right; for otherwise it is not a perfect virtue, just as penance is not a perfect virtue unless it includes the firm purpose of never sinning. The virtue is defined from the act. Therefore it can be said otherwise that "justice is a habit according to which someone, by a constant and perpetual will, renders to each one his own right." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 58. a. 1. "Right" here is not understood as right broadly so called, which is the exigency of right reason toward something as honorable, that is, toward something to be done because of its honesty, or omitted because of its dishonesty; but right strictly so called is understood, which is a moral power toward something as one's own, that is, toward something to be done, omitted, had, retained, demanded as one's own, that is, as subject to one's own liberty, with others excluded, namely so that it may fall to one's own advantage and utility. This right is founded in the very nature of man, who by reason of his liberty must move himself toward the end and apply the means necessary for obtaining that end. C. L. 359 ff., 2167 ff., 2287, 2339, 2354; C. He. 641; C. I. 438; C. A. 362, 366; C. B. 903; Lugo d. 1. n. 6.

This right, however, is one thing as right of jurisdiction, another as right of property. The first is the legitimate power of a superior to command or prohibit something to subjects for their own good, or for the good of the whole community. The necessity and utility of administering the community is the measure of this right as to its acts. The other is the legitimate power of any private person to dispose of some thing for the advantage of his own liberty, or as his own. Hence in the right of property the thing exists for the proprietor; in the right of jurisdiction neither the Prince exists for the people, nor the people for the Prince, but each exists for the common good.

The right of property is one thing in the thing, another to the thing. The first is that by which someone has the thing itself immediately bound and juridically obligated to himself as his own. Hence a thing obligated to someone by such a right carries its obligation with it, and wherever it may come, it can be sought back by its owner and juridically claimed. The second, however, is that by which someone does not have the thing itself immediately bound and juridically obligated to himself, but rather has another person bound to hand over some thing to him. Therefore a right in the thing makes the thing already his own; a right to the thing makes the thing become his own. A right in the thing gives an immediate real action against the thing itself, so that you may take it to yourself. A right to the thing gives an immediate personal action against the person himself, so that you may compel him to hand the thing over to you, for example by the sentence of a judge. By a right to the thing someone has a just title to having it, for example by title of legacy, but he does not yet have possession of the thing. By a right in the thing someone has possession of the thing itself. For a right in the thing, therefore, there is required a title transferring ownership, of a thing determined in the individual, and its possession, at least regularly. For a right to the thing a just title for having it suffices. And thus the owner of a farm has a right in the thing as regards the existing fruits of that farm; he has a right to the thing as regards the rent of a leased farm. C. A. 307, 308; Inst. 1. 4. t. 6. Whenever a thing is sought by force of an obligation by which someone has not yet acquired ownership of the thing, the action is personal; but if a thing is sought of which he has full ownership, the action is real. Finally, an action is mixed, personal and real, and, as is said, the action is personal written upon the thing, if by the petition of the thing someone acquires ownership of the thing, and then the lawsuit instituted over it begins with a personal action and is concluded by a real action, as in the case in which, by the office of the judge, the sale made of a thing is dissolved, and the thing returns to the seller as his own. A personal action is from some personal fact, that is, from contract or from delict. A real action is from the defect of another's right. Inst. 1. 4. t. 6. section 1. Cf. Troplong, On Sale, article 1654, nn. 624-630; on article 1659, n. 698; on article 1664, nn. 728, 729; on article 1674, nn. 806, 807. "His own"; a thing can be one's own in three ways, if the person is considered in society as its member. Hence right also is distinguished in three ways: into high right, low right, and right of property. High right is that which the Prince, the republic, or the community has over the goods of the members, which it can demand as its own for the common good, by the "ownness" of the community, since whatever the part is belongs to the whole and exists for the whole. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 64. a. 2; q. 65. a. 1. Low right is in the member of the community, as such, to common goods, which the member can demand in their distribution as his own by the "ownness" of a member. The right of property, however, is in the member of the community, as such, to proper goods, which one member can demand from another as his own, by the "ownness" of property. "Of rendering to each one his own right," that is, of equating the right of another by the rendering of what is owed; for to right, as to a certain moral exigency, debt correspondingly responds. Therefore, as is clear, justice is not a virtue toward oneself, but toward another. And as charity has its foundation in the conjunction of men among themselves, so justice rests upon the distinction of one man from another. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 57, 58; Gousset 670, 674.

You will resolve: The Prince can indeed, if at some time this is required for the common good, take a thing from a subject, because right to the end necessarily imports right to the means without which the end cannot be obtained. But the public good sometimes requires that someone be deprived of his own thing, for example of a field for the construction of a public road, etc. But then the Prince, in so far as can be done, is bound to just compensation, because it is not equitable that one person be despoiled while others remain untouched, as is clear from natural and positive law. C. I. 438; C. G. 545; C. H. 349; C. A. 365; C. L. 2360.

But in no way can he, without a grave cause of the public good, but for his own convenience, take away by law from a subject some notable thing of his, or an acquired right, because he has no power over the goods of private persons unless the reason of the common good altogether demands it. Therefore he is then bound to restitution. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66. a. 8.

Equity is distinguished from justice. First, equity is justice itself. And thus in L. 14. de Condict. indeb. it is said: "It is equitable by nature that no one be enriched with the loss of another." But equity proceeds further, by constituting a certain fitting measure in justice itself, and generally in all laws, namely by tempering according to various circumstances the rigor and subtlety of right and laws. Rigor, for example: "It is of the highest equity that one who has promised money, or something else, by reason of donation, should not owe interest because of delay in payment of the money." L. 22. de Donat. Subtlety, for example: "If a surety, though freed by lapse of time alone, nevertheless pays the creditor, he will rightly have an action of mandate against the principal debtor; for although he paid when already freed, nevertheless he fulfilled his pledge and freed the debtor. Therefore, if he is prepared to defend the principal debtor against the creditor, it is most equitable that by the judgment of mandate he recover what he paid." L. 29. section 6. Mandati. Cf. also L. 17. de Iniu. rupto irr. f. testam.; L. 85. de R. I.

Equity, taken in this way, is the same as epicheia, which is a part of justice commonly so called, and is a subjective part of justice; and justice is said of it prior to legal justice, for legal justice is directed according to epicheia. For legal justice follows the words of the law; equity or epicheia follows the intention of the legislator. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 120. a. 2. Equity is to be observed in interpreting laws and acts, and also in onerous contracts.

It is altogether unlawful to exercise one's right when an exercise of this sort has no other end than to inflict damage on another. Likewise it is unlawful to exercise that right against the prescription of the laws. C. B. 226, 826, 907, 908, 909, 912. Likewise it is unlawful to exercise one's right excessively, with damage to others. C. He. 679, 684. But it is not unlawful to violate the property of another in order to avoid one's own greater damage, compensation afterward being made to the other for the damage inflicted on him. C. He. 701.

What is occupation? 1. Occupation is: the real apprehension of a corporeal thing with the intention of having it as one's own. Apprehension, namely, in that way which the thing permits and usage bears, for example by hand, feet, snare, net, inflicted wound; and not only by sight or view. Corporeal, for incorporeal things, such as rights, cannot be apprehended corporally.

2. It is a legitimate mode of acquiring ownership, provided that: 1. The thing is capable of private ownership and is no one's; or if it belongs to someone, the owner willingly yields his right, for instance by contract; or if he is unwilling, he is legitimately despoiled of his right, for instance by military occupation. 2. The occupier wills to make the thing his own when in fact he apprehends it. 3. That the thing has not already been occupied, as it were, by some law which has reserved it to a certain owner, for example to the state.

The reason is that man is master of things in first act from the very nature of external things and from divine institution. But in second act he does not become master of things except by some fact; and the most original fact of all is occupation. It is impossible to assign another. Hence all men and all laws hold this fact of occupation as a legitimate title of ownership. Occupation of this kind by man contains in itself industry and labor, which naturally bears fruit for the industrious and laborious man himself. A thing bears fruit for its owner.

3. The species of occupation are: finding, hunting, fishing, concerning which something particular must soon be said. C. I. 711, 758; C. H. 610, 956; C. G. 539, 713, 714, 768; C. A. 382, 760; C. B. 958; C. He. 658, 659; L. 493; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66. a. 5 ad 2.

What is the right of accretion? The right of accretion is that right by which the parts of failing heirs or failing legatees in the same inheritance or in the same thing bequeathed are added to other coheirs or other colegatees. C. I. 879, 884; C. A. 560; C. H. 981; C. B. 2094, 2158. The right of accretion has place in an inheritance when, in the same testament and by one and the same disposition, the testator called heirs jointly to the inheritance, without making a distribution of parts among them by expressly indicating the quota of each. But when the right of accretion cannot have place among coheirs, the portion of the failing heir is devolved upon the legitimate heirs ab intestato.

C. I. 880, 881, 883; C. G. 1044; C. A. 560 ff.; C. H. 982 ff. The right of accretion also has place in succession ab intestato, for the part of him who renounces accrues to the coheirs, C. I. 940. The right of accretion is likewise had in a legacy, when one of the legatees dies before the testator, or renounces the legacy, or is incapable, or the condition under which the thing was bequeathed to him fails; indeed also when one and the same thing in the same testament has been bequeathed to several, although by distinct disposition. C. I. 884; C. G. 1045; C. A. 689. Heirs and legatees receiving the portions of others take on the burdens and obligations annexed to them. C. I. 882, 887; C. A. 563; C. B. 1935, 2095, 2159.

As regards usufruct specifically, the right of accretion is given even if the legatee has accepted it and then fails, if namely it has been left to several persons in such a way that, according to the general rule, the right of accretion is given among them. C. I. 885. - When by the will of the testator the right of accretion is excluded, the part of the failing heir pertains to intestate succession with the same burdens imposed by the testator. C. I. 883; C. A. 562, 563. - If the legatee fails, the creditor failing, the thing bequeathed accrues to the heirs, who consequently are bound to fulfill the burdens enjoined upon the legatee according to their hereditary portions. C. I. 886; C. L. 1852 ff.

What things can be sold? Sacred things cannot be sold. Cf. 508 ff. Things of public right also, such as public roads and a public forum, cannot be sold. Inst. 1. 3. t. 24. § 4. But by the very Natural Law, the sale of those things is prohibited which by their nature can serve only for evil, e.g., defamatory pamphlets, lascivious pictures, etc. Nevertheless, the sale of these things, although prohibited, is not for that reason null; whence the seller is not bound to restitution. Gousset 836. By Roman Law anyone can sell all his own goods, both present and future, even together, even those which are had in hope, such as future fruits of a field. The things of another can also be sold, e.g., by reason of pledge, mortgage, etc. But no one validly buys his own thing, unless the seller has some right in it. L. Suae rei, L. Si in emptione § rei suae Dig. de Contrah. empt.

By the more recent Laws whatever is in commerce, that is, in the patrimony of individuals or of moral bodies, can be sold; for commerce is the reciprocal right of alienating and acquiring; provided that a particular law has not prohibited alienation of some thing. C. G. 1598. Future things also, such as fruits, grains, offspring, can be sold; whether the right to them is sold, and the sale is aleatory, which is at once valid; or the body, or fruits to be born, are sold, and the sale is under condition, which then will be valid when the fruits are born. Nevertheless the succession of a person still living cannot be sold, even with that person consenting.

C. I. 954, 1460; C. G. 1600. Purchase and sale also is prohibited of the goods of minors, wives, absentees, and interdicted persons, when the formalities prescribed by law have not been observed. Gousset on a. 1598. But incorporeal rights can be sold by Positive Law itself, or also transmitted by any other title, such as promissory notes, credits, servitude, usufruct, right to an opened inheritance; delivery of these is made by remitting the promissory notes or other authentic writings. But if litigated rights are sold, it is lawful for the debtor to redeem them from the buyer, with the price expended restored to him with interest. C. I. 1538 ff.; C. G. 1689 ff.; C. B. 433. Finally an inheritance already devolved to an heir can be sold; and for a sale of this kind there are special positive laws to be observed. Already devolved to an heir; for there is no inheritance of a living person. C. B. 2371 ff. Cf. here 1337. - C. I. 426, 427, 430, 433, 435, 2113, 2114; C. G. 538, 2226, 2227; C. L. 1553 ff.; L. 7 de Haered. vel act. vend. Ecclesiastical goods, as has already been said, cannot be sold without Apostolic beneplacitum. E. M.

Whether names of debts or credits can be bought more cheaply because of certain and anticipated payment? Resp. Negatively as regards "promissory notes, which are commonly called fides crediti, for which no moral danger is present, provided that, because of distance, collection would not be inconvenient or dangerous for oneself, on account of him who must be sent to collect." L. H.

A. tr. 10. n. 179. - Resp. Affirmatively, if the credit is uncertain or of difficult collection, "even if it is easy for the buyer to collect it whole; because price is taken from common estimation, not from the circumstance of the particular buyer." If the credit is liquid, it is disputed. The first opinion denies. The reason: "because an action to a liquid credit, in reality, when no danger or expense for recovering it is present, is worth as much as the money owed itself." The second opinion affirms. The reason is that, since in practice these credits are commonly liable to dangers and inconveniences of this kind, they decrease in price according to common estimation. "But in purchase, only the estimation of men constitutes the just price of things, and here provides the title of buying for less." L. 829, 830. Moreover, "because they are equivalent to money lent, therefore from the same reason as in mutuum, it is lawful to perceive moderate profit, according to the legal rate."

Gur. 894. This sale is perfected as soon as buyer and seller have agreed concerning it as regards the credit, or any other right whatsoever, and as regards the price. But, so that it may be valid with respect to third parties, it must be announced to the debtor, or accepted by him by authentic act. Therefore the debtor is freed if before this he has paid the prior creditor. C. I. 1538-1540; C. G. 1689-1691; C. H. 1327; Lugo Resp. Mor. 1. 6. d. 18.

Whether someone can compensate himself with only a right to a thing? Resp. Affirmatively. For by a right to a thing, from a strict obligation of justice in another, although immediately and directly the person is obliged, nevertheless mediately and indirectly the thing itself is obliged to you. Wherefore, as you can licitly compel the person to pay you by recurring to a judge, so also you can licitly compel him to pay you by taking the thing which is owed to you, when recourse to a judge is impossible. And indeed the matter is evident, that there is no injury of commutative justice if you take for yourself what another from the same justice owes and does not wish to give. - L. 614.; Lugo d. 16, n. 97.

Whether occult compensation can licitly be made when only probability of right stands? Ithur. Cas. 3, n. 11, has this: "Whenever the opinion has been equally probable for each party, or, as frequently happens, one's own is more probable to each, compensation is made justly not in the whole, but certainly in half of the debt." The 1st reason is because in such a case "a judge can adjudicate the whole to neither, but ought to divide the thing between the litigants....

But it is licit for no one through occult compensation to acquire more than what could be adjudicated to him by a judge after allegations and proofs." The 2nd reason is because "whenever the right to the same thing is equal, the advantage of each party ought to be equal, justice so requiring, whose office it is to consult equality." But Cardinal Lugo, after reporting the common opinion which requires a certain right for compensation, then adds these things: "This doctrine, if it is understood as it sounds, is difficult, nor does it seem to be constantly retained by its own authors....

I will add some examples: first, concerning him who has been defamed by Peter, it is asked whether for the reputation which Peter does not wish or is not able to repair for him, it is licit for the defamed person to make compensation by denying monies which he owed to the same Peter. Lessius responds that he can, because the opinion is probable which teaches that infamy must be compensated by money when it cannot be restored in its own genus... although the truer opinion denies this.... Secondly, when two have mutually defamed each other, they can, when the damage is equal, compensate for themselves, so that neither is held to restore as long as the other does not wish to restore.... Which compensation in that case is founded only on a probable opinion, since the contrary is also very probable. Thirdly, he who ought to have a legacy from a less solemn testament, since it is a probable opinion that those legacies are owed in the forum of conscience, although the contrary opinion is sufficiently common and probable, can nevertheless retain the legacy, or accept it anew, or secretly compensate himself." Hence Lugo generally concludes: "it seems probable that a creditor, before the matter is brought to judgment... can secretly compensate his debt to himself.... Reason also seems to prove this, because, notwithstanding the possession of the debtor, the judge would pronounce sentence, or certainly could pronounce it for the creditor, by embracing the probable or more probable opinion which favors him.... Why therefore will the creditor himself, when he cannot recur to a judge without grave inconvenience, not be able to embrace the same opinion which the judge ought or could have embraced, and compensate the debt to himself?"

But the same Lugo notes that although a judge in judging is held to follow the more probable opinion, nevertheless the creditor in occult compensation does not seem to be obliged to this, because the reason on account of which especially a judge cannot do this is that "from office and from an implicit pact toward the Republic he seems to be held to inquiring into the truth as much as he can, which reason does not militate in the creditor, who is held by no such pact toward the Republic. Yet concerning this I wish to assert nothing; indeed I willingly abstain from final judgment concerning this whole point about compensation to be licitly made with an opinion only probable." d. 16, n. 94 seqq.; L. 521, 544, 700, 817, 928.; l. 1, n. 30. But the reason of the common opinion is: 1.

The danger in this matter of easy deception; hence, practically speaking, there is present a grave danger of injuring another's rights. 2. Because if the other truly possesses the thing in good faith and by a title at least reasonably presumed, he now has a certain right at least of detention of the thing, and consequently he cannot be despoiled of the thing until there is certainty concerning another's right and dominion of the thing. - Hence, as is clear, when there stands only probability of fact from which a right arises, it is in no way licit to despoil the peaceful possessor of his thing.

Must a judge judge according to written laws? - R. Affirmatively. "Augustine says: In these temporal laws, although men judge concerning them when they institute them, nevertheless when they have been instituted and confirmed, it will not be lawful for judges to judge concerning them, but according to them.... Judgment is nothing other than a certain definition or determination of that which is just. But something becomes just in two ways. In one way from the very nature of the thing, which is called natural right; in another way from a certain agreement among men, which is called positive right.... But laws are written for the declaration of each right, yet in different ways. For the writing of law indeed contains natural right, but does not institute it; for it does not have force from law, but from nature. But the writing of law both contains and institutes positive right, giving to it the force of authority. And therefore it is necessary that judgment be made according to the writing of law; otherwise judgment would fall short either of the naturally just or of the positively just." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 60. a. 5; Inst. l. 3, t. 17; L. Rem non novam C. de Iudiciis; C. 1 de Sent. et de re iudic.

What is the right of patronage; how is it acquired; what are the obligations and rights of the patron? - The right of patronage is the faculty or right, first of all, of presenting a cleric so that a benefice may be conferred on him. Namely presentation gives right to the thing. The one presented, however, must be suitable and not unworthy. Therefore it is necessary that he be examined by the Ordinary. He who has this faculty of exhibiting a cleric to the Bishop is called patron.

It has certainly been received by the most ancient discipline of the Church that those who would either erect, endow, or restore temples or benefices would be permitted to choose clerics acceptable to themselves for those same benefices and to present them to Bishops. By the law itself, moreover, the right of patronage passes to heirs. The right of patronage can likewise be acquired from the concession of the Supreme Pontiff alone.

The patron is held to keep the church, chapel, or altar of the patronage in good repair and to provide their protection. But he also has the right of honor, seat, incense, prayers, burial, and support from the surplus revenues of the church or benefice, if he tends toward want. Trent s. 7, c. 13 de R.; s. 14, c. 12, 13 de R.; s. 24, c. 3 de R.; s. 25, c. 9 de R.; L. 87; l. 3, n. 71; Wernz, Ius Decret. t. 2, title 19.

519. • Definition. By the name of right, taken precisely and as concerns the present matter, there is understood either that which is owed to another, and is customarily called the just or the equal ¹, and thus it is the object which justice intends, and which it gives to each one; or it is taken for the title which justice regards on the part of another, or on account of which it wills to give to each one his own, and thus it is the power of obtaining or possessing something. Since these two significations are correlative, for this reason among some they have obtained the name of passive right and active right: by the former form signifying what is owed, but by the latter the reason or title of debt or claim ².

¹ Concerning this matter Soto (De Iust. et Iur., lib. 3, q. 1, art. 1): "I would believe that by apocope, that is, by cutting off a syllable at the end of the word, iustum was called ius... Whence in Greek dikaion indifferently signifies the same thing as the just and right." Whatever anyone may finally think of this conjecture of Soto, nevertheless this is plainly established: right (dikaion), according to Aristotle's opinion, is so called on account of the equality of thing with thing; he says that an equality of this sort in some way arises between two parts of some thing divided in two ways; indeed, from this division into two equal parts he draws the origin or etymon of the word dikaion, that is, of right or of the just. For thus he himself says (Ethic., lib. 5, chap. 7): "The equal is the mean between the greater and the less according to arithmetic proportion; for this reason it is also called the just or right, because it is in two, just as if someone were to say divided into two equal parts, and the judge as if a divider into two parts," namely one who divides into two equal parts.

² Card. De Lugo must certainly be seen (De Iust., disp. 1, n. 5), where he gives fully the reason why that right which justice regards, and which we signify when we say mine and yours, must be placed in a certain moral prelation, by which this man is morally preferred to others in the use of such a thing on account of the peculiar connection which the thing has with him, and on account of which the whole thing ought to be referred and ordered to his utility. And this seems to concern what the Author added in the definition of right by those words, "for one's own advantage."

520. • But in a broader sense the word right is taken: 1. for skill in law, or jurisprudence; 2. for law, or the rule of the just ³, and thus one says natural, positive, divine, human, civil, canonical right, the right of nations, etc.; 3. for the sentence of a judge, and from this the word judge, as if one saying right; 4. for the thing which is owed to another from any title whatever, and then it is passive right, or the object of right; 5. for the very title of the thing owed: thus, for example, jurisdiction is called the right of a Superior to obedience ⁴.

³ There are some to whom it is less pleasing that law is signified by the name right in a certain broader sense; for they think rather that ius is said from commanding, as iussum diminished by apocope, and therefore that in the most proper sense ius is taken for law. This question is of very slight importance. But the Author has followed the common opinion of the Doctors, which St. Thomas (2. 2, q. 57, art. 1, ad 2) explains thus: "Just as of those things which are done exteriorly through art, a certain reason preexists in the mind of the artisan, which is called the rule of the art; so also of that just work which reason determines, a certain reason preexists in the mind, as a certain rule of prudence: and this, if it is reduced to writing, is called law. For law, according to Isidore, is a written constitution; and therefore law is not right itself, properly speaking, but some reason of right."

⁴ Gregory Valentia (Comment. Theol., tom. III, disp. V, q. I, punct. 1) enumerates nine senses in which the word right is found used by jurists; yet all these have kinship with the primary sense, that it is the object of justice. And therefore among them you will by no means find the right of a superior to the obedience of subjects; for obedience does not pertain at all to justice, but is counted among the parts of justice which they call potential or potestative. See St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 80, a. 1.

521. • Division. Right is chiefly divided into right in a thing and right to a thing.

1. Right in a thing is that which someone has in a thing already his and possessed ⁵, that is, which is so bound to him that he can dispose of it at will. Such is the right of the buyer in a thing bought under French Law, and in a thing bought and delivered under Roman Law. This right confers a real action, which directly touches the thing itself: wherefore whoever enjoys this right can reclaim his own thing wherever it has gone.

⁵ Possession is not necessary for right in a thing, which endures even if a thief has carried off the thing and actually possesses it. Hence also the Author adds that the owner can reclaim his own thing. Moreover, when the Author here names "his own thing," understand that "his own" both as to full dominion and also as to semi-full, whether this is direct, or of property, or merely useful.

2. Right to a thing is that which someone has so that the thing may become his. For it gives a personal action, that is, it directly touches the person, which gives another the faculty ⁶ of demanding from him the thing contracted, and of pursuing him in judgment if he does not wish to do or give what he owes: whence it is called a personal right, because it immediately touches the person.

⁶ Those words are a little obscure, and in some way narrow the sense too much. For, for example, a personal action is given against one causing damage who destroyed the thing; but you would less properly say that the one causing damage gives the faculty of demanding from himself, etc.

Others more clearly: Right in a thing is present when the thing itself is had as obligated to oneself, and therefore it gives vindication of the thing, or an action against the thing itself. But right to a thing is had when to someone there has been acquired a right or power of obligating the thing to himself, and therefore it gives only a personal action against those refusing or impeding the acquisition of the thing itself.

The contract ⁷ of promise confers only right to a thing. Likewise the title of purchase under Roman Law before delivery of the thing confers only right to a thing. Under the new French Law the consent alone of the parties completes the contract of sale, the delivery of the thing being excluded, and consequently gives right in the thing. Civil Code, art. 1583. Except the particular case in which a movable thing, sold and not delivered, had been handed over to a second buyer in good faith; for then only a right to the thing would be had. - Civil Code, art. 1144.

⁷ Concerning these things prematurely noted here, it will be treated better in its own place.

The principal species of right are dominion, use, usufruct, and servitude.

1. Titus, Sempronius, and Caius possess a house, of which the lowest part is Titus's, the middle Sempronius's, the upper Caius's. The roofs having been destroyed by the force of hail, a controversy arises among them, and Titus and Sempronius compel Caius to repair it, since he himself is the owner of the upper part of the house. Caius then begins not to repair the roof, but to construct another story, piano; but again Titus and Sempronius rise up against Caius.

Q. 1. What is co-ownership of things, and by what laws is it governed? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 1241, 1242. - To the second. If there are various owners of different parts of the same house, the repair of the great walls, muri maestri, and of the roofs is common, according to the proportion of the value of the story of each owner. The same is true for halls, anditi, gates, wells, cisterns, aqueducts, and other things common to all the owners. But latrines are common, as to repair, according to the proportion of the number of openings, aperture, of immission. The owner of each story is held to repair the pavements on which he walks and the vaults, volte, by which he is covered, and also the ceilings and panels, soffitti, which cover places pertaining to him. - Stairs are to be built by the owner of the story which they serve, according to the value of each story. Wherefore, if the same story is common to several, each is held according to the value of his part. And the repair of those stairs which provide access to the first stories is to be made proportionately by all; but the repair of those which provide access to the higher stories is to be made only by the owners of those stories. - Underground cells, cantine, floors, palchi morti, rooms, soffitte o camere a tetto, are considered as stories of the house. - The same is to be observed for the repair of terraces and roofs. If their use is not common to all, he who has their exclusive use contributes for a fourth part of the expenses, and the other three parts are to be furnished by him and by the other owners according to the value of each part. The owner of the last upper story cannot raise it higher without the consent of the others. He can construct only the coping of the terrace, parapetto, if it harms the others in nothing. C. I. 562-564. Cf. C. G. 664.

Hence it is clear that the repair of the roofs in the case does not pertain to Caius alone, but to Titus, to Sempronius, and to Caius according to the value of each part. But Caius cannot raise his apartments, appartamento, higher without the consent of the others, since this can well harm the others.

2. Amelius constructs a cabinet in the common wall of his house, since that wall is very deep. Likewise he places an aqueduct within it, since that wall is much nearer the public road through which the public water canal passes. Is this by right?

R. A wall between two houses, gardens, or courtyards, cortili, is presumed common, C. I. 546; C. G. 653; C. A. 854. - In a common wall no one can open windows, C. I. 583; C. G. 675, nor build against it an oven or chimney, C. I. 574; C. G. 674, nor make a hollow, incavo, in it, C. I. 557; C. G. 662, nor, generally, do anything which harms the common wall itself or the co-owner; yet it is permitted to insert beams in it. C. I. 551, 552, 558, 573; C. G. 657, 674.

Someone can raise a common wall higher, provided he does this at his own expense, does not harm the co-owner, and repays him damages, if he has brought any upon him; and the latter can compel him to cede to himself a part of the wall superimposed.

And generally the owner of any estate contiguous to a wall can make that wall common to himself, provided he does this over its whole extension, public buildings excepted. C. I. 553-556; C. G. 658-661. Someone can demand the communion even of a wall which has been built within a half-meter. C. I. 571.

Finally, someone can compel the co-owner to repair the common wall at common expense. C. I. 559, 561; C. G. 663.

It is clear from these dispositions of the law that Amelius could have done neither thing without the order of the other co-owner; and if he refuses, the necessary means are to be defined by experts, lest the work harm the rights of the other. C. I. 557; C. G. 662.

3. Sedulus and Sedulius move a dispute between themselves concerning the ownership of trees which are placed on the common boundary of their own fields. Sedulus says they are his, because they are nearer his own field. Sedulius contends they are his, because the hedge in which they are situated is his.

Q. What as to the case?

R. A hedge between two estates is presumed common and is preserved at common expense, unless one estate alone is enclosed by it, or there is a boundary marker, or proof to the contrary. C. I. 568; C. G. 670; C. A. 854. Trees which arise in a common hedge are common; and each of the two owners can always demand that they be cut down. Always, because division of a common thing is never prescribed. Trees arising on the boundary of two estates are presumed common when there is no title or proof to the contrary. Of them there belongs to each a part as great as he has in the land. Trees which mark the limits of fields cannot be cut down except by common consent, or with judicial authority approving. C. 569; C. G. 673; C. A. 421; L. 83, Pro socio.

Therefore the trees placed on the boundary of the two fields of Sedulus and Sedulius are common; namely those which are in the hedges are so in equal parts, although they are nearer Sedulus's estate. Hence the fruits belong to each from the region of each one's estate; trees uprooted or cut or torn away are common and are equally to be divided between the two owners. Wherefore what Sedulus says, that the trees are nearer his own estate, has no value, just as what Sedulius says, that the hedges are his, has no value, unless he proves this positively. For unless this is shown by some title, the hedge is presumed common and the trees situated in it are presumed common.

4. From a certain mountain water is flowing forth most abundantly, which until now was being dissipated, since all the surrounding fields were uncultivated. The owner of one of those fields, deciding to cultivate his field and to establish in it a large workshop, constructed a new course of the water at his own expense, and directed all the water to his own field and workshop. But the other owners of the neighboring fields, seeing this and wishing now also themselves to cultivate their fields and to build other workshops, bring suit concerning the aforesaid derivation of the water.

Q. What as to the case?

Water flowing naturally, and without manufactured works, except that which belongs to public right or to the right of some private person, can be used by him who possesses an estate near its bank, whether for irrigating his own estate or for exercising his own industry; but he must restore the remaining water to its ordinary course, which accordingly cannot be disturbed. And, if the water passes through the estate itself, likewise the owner of the estate can use it, but he also must restore it to its ordinary course when it leaves his estate; and therefore its course can be disturbed on one's own estate. C. I. 543; C. G. 644. Where a controversy arises, the water is to be divided by the judge, equity being preserved, according to the measure of the possessions and at the same time of the utility of agriculture and industry. C. I. 544; C. G. 645. If someone having a right to divert to his own estate the water of a river, torrent, stream, canal, lake, or water deposit must use a manufactured work, he is held to pay the expenses of this, and to repay all damages of other estates. C. I. 613.

It is clear from what has been said that the aforesaid owner altogether exceeded in appropriating all the water to himself and in changing its course, neither of which he could do. Hence by right the other owners of the neighboring fields protest. The water, its natural course having been changed, is to be divided among them according to the ownership of each one's estate, and then that which is left over, when it leaves one's own estate, must be restored to its ordinary course. Namely, just as the owners of lower fields receive the inconveniences, so also they should receive the advantages of waters flowing nearby.

1. Ioannes Iacobus, without any scruple, carries off the goods of another, saying that God alone is the Lord of all things, and that God created other things on account of man, namely on account of all men. Wherefore there is no property, but all things are common.

Q. What as to the case?

R. 1. Exterior things can be considered in two ways: in one way as to their nature, which is not subject to human power, but only to divine power, to which all things obey at a nod. In another way as to the use of the thing itself; and thus man has natural dominion of exterior things, because through reason and will he can use exterior things for his own utility, as if made on account of himself. For the more imperfect are always on account of the more perfect. And thus it is plain that, although God is the Lord of all things, nevertheless this does not exclude dominion and property of things in man. For thence it follows only that God alone has dominion over exterior things as to their natures, that God alone has principal dominion of all things. But God himself ordered, according to his providence, certain things to the bodily sustenance of man; and on account of this man has natural dominion of things as to the power of using them. For this is dominion, and nothing else: The right or faculty of using one's own thing for any use permitted by law, and this for one's own advantage. S. Th. 2.2. q. 66. a. 1; I. M. 838, 866, 867.

2. But although exterior things were created on account of man, from this nevertheless it does not follow that man also does not have dominion of things; indeed, the contrary follows. For if they are on account of man, these goods are man's, although they are not principally his, as is gathered from what has just been said. Moreover, although exterior things were created on account of man, from this nevertheless it does not follow that all things are to be possessed in common, and that nothing is to be possessed as proper; but from this it follows only that the distinction of possessions was not made naturally, but was naturally superadded to natural law, rational nature itself inclining and impelling toward that division and individual appropriation. First indeed, because each one is naturally more solicitous in procuring something which pertains to himself alone, than that which is common to all or to many, because each one, fleeing labor, leaves to others that which pertains to others. Secondly, because human affairs are treated in a more ordered way, if each has his own care of procuring some thing incumbent on him. But there would be confusion if anyone indiscriminately procured anything. Thirdly, because by this the state of men is preserved more peacefully, while each one is content with his own thing. S. Th. 2.2. q. 66. a. 2.

3. Ioannes Iacobus, therefore, a communist, is a true thief, and is held to restitution of all the things which he carried off. For to restore what has been unjustly taken away is of necessity of salvation, since to preserve justice is of necessity of salvation, and to restore what has been unjustly taken away is an act of commutative justice. S. Th. 2.2. q. 62. a. 1, 2.

44. Since the right of private property is today attacked by many, namely by communists, socialists, and collectivists, we shall: 1. briefly outline the history of these errors; 2. propose the Catholic thesis; 3. solve the principal arguments of adversaries; 4. suggest certain means for preventing socialism.

144. 1. Notion. Children under paternal power are called legitimate, or legitimated,² children who are still under paternal power, and who therefore are neither emancipated nor of age.

¹ Lessius, l.c., n. 7-12; Lugo, disp. V; St. Alphonsus, n. 488; Carriere, n. 226-245; Ball. P., n. 43-50; Marres, l. I, n. 28-39.

² Legitimate are those who have arisen from a marriage contracted according to the laws; legitimated are those who, although not born from a legitimate marriage, nevertheless afterward by the authority of the Prince acquired the rights of legitimate children.

Now they become of age at the age determined by law, i.e., in France when the twenty-first year has been completed. - But they are emancipated either explicitly, by a special juridical act, or implicitly, by contracting marriage.

145. 2. Principles. (A) The right of possessing, which naturally belongs to minors, is restricted by various limits according to various laws, especially with regard to the administration of goods; and rightly so: for although they are capable of dominion as soon as they have acquired the use of reason, they are judged not mature enough to administer their own affairs prudently;¹ moreover certain burdens are incumbent upon them in relation to parents, as is explained in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States, n. 972-973.

¹ By Roman law, which the older authors follow, the goods of children were of a fourfold kind: military, which children acquired by reason or occasion of military service; quasi-military, acquired by reason of some public office; profectitious, acquired from the things of the father, or in view of the father; adventitious, which came from elsewhere. Cf. Ball. P., n. 44-45.

146. (B) By French law, (a) children, even minors, retain direct dominion over all goods legitimately coming to them; (b) but they do not have usufruct before the eighteenth year of age, or before they are emancipated; unless there is question of goods acquired by separate industry, - or given under the express condition that neither father nor mother enjoy them, - or coming from a succession in which the parents have been declared unworthy. - Outside these cases, the usufruct yields to the father, or, when he is dead, to the mother if she has not entered a new marriage; this was established by way of compensation for the education of the children; (c) but the administration of goods is in the hands of the parents or tutor, until the children become of age or emancipated.²

² Civil Code, a. 371-396; a. 476-487; a. 730; Planiol, I, n. 2105-2238; Allegre, I, p. 256 sq.; Supplement for France, p. 21*-24*.

147. 3. Corollaries. (A) When there is question of the right which children have in small goods given by parents, attention must be paid to the intention of the parents, whether express or reasonably presumed: (a) if they have been given absolutely, the children have full dominion over them, and can enjoy them for every legitimate use; (b) if for a determined use, e.g., for acquiring books, or carrying out studies, those act unjustly who expend the money received on another use, say on immoderate recreations or pleasures; (c) if the express intention has not been given, it can be discerned from the circumstances, especially from the nature of the thing itself; e.g., if there is question of a thing consumable by first use, it is judged to have been given in an absolute manner; if of a non-consumable thing, e.g., books, clothing, it is judged to have been given for a determined use, and therefore it cannot be sold so that the money may be employed for another use. - When money is given not by parents, but by relatives or friends, it is judged to be given absolutely, unless the contrary is said.

148. (B) When children, laboring either within or outside the paternal house, make profits, these things seem to be established:

(a) If they labor outside the father's house, and acquire something by their own industry, they can retain the profit for themselves, because this is implicitly granted by the parents by the very fact that permission to work outside the paternal house was given to them. - Yet except if they receive food and clothing from the parents: for then, since the father is not bound to support a son having his own goods, expenses of this kind must be compensated; - or if the parents labor under need: for then children ought to relieve their necessities, as is explained in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States, n. 972-973.

149. (b) If within the house and from the goods or industry of the father the children gain profit, more probably they have a right to a stipend proportioned to their labor, which they can retain, after expenses for food and other things of this kind have been deducted, and with the obligation remaining of helping needy parents. The reason is that whoever labors has a right to obtaining wages, after expenses made for his sake have been deducted; nor is there any reason why minors should be deprived of this right. - I said more probably, because some think that nothing is strictly owed to minor children who labor at home, since the father can use their labor for administering domestic affairs, by way of compensation for the education given to them.¹ - Yet according to all it is expedient that children be allowed to gain something for themselves, so that they may be incited more efficaciously to labor.

¹ Thus Laymann, l. III, tr. 4, c. 8, n. 11; Antoine, Part III, c. V, quest. 13; Billuart, diss. IV, a. 4. But most theologians, both older and recent, favor our opinion. Since by French civil law, also flourishing in certain other regions, the usufruct of a thing acquired by common industry with the father belongs to the father until the minor son has reached the eighteenth year, he cannot occupy profit of this kind without the explicit or tacit consent of the father.

(c) When among several children some labor at home, and others can labor outside the house and gain something for themselves, it is equitable that the former obtain some stipend, after expenses for food, clothing, etc., have been deducted. - This especially holds if the children are already of age.

150. (d) So that all difficulties may be more easily removed, it is altogether expedient that an agreement be made between father and son when this son begins to gain something either at home or elsewhere; and this agreement must be observed. - If no contract has intervened, in practice it can be discerned from the circumstances, the customs flourishing in the place, and the presumed intention of the parents what the rights of the children are. If some doubt remains, before the fact hidden compensation is by no means to be counseled, by which namely the son would take something secretly from the parents as a reward of labor; - for this is full of dangers, as will be said below; - after the fact, those are not to be compelled to restitution unless they have morally certainly violated the rights of the parents.

If we study the nature of the sins thus characterized as crying to Heaven for vengeance, we find that they form a category separate and distinct from the capital sins. For whereas the latter spring from an inordinate craving of the natural appetites, and are sinful only when they involve a lack of rational self-control, the distinguishing note of the so-called peccata clamantia is violent suppression of certain natural instincts and conscious frustration of their ends and objects. In other words, besides a transgression of the moral order, they entail a violation of the laws of nature, thus provoking divine wrath in a special manner. This fact is well expressed in the phrase, "sins that cry to Heaven for vengeance."

1. From the duty of labor flows the right of property or ownership, i. e., the right to acquire, hold, and dispose freely of the material fruits of labor, that is to say, the goods which are the result of man's individual and personal endeavor.

The right to acquire and possess property is by no means, as the Communists and Socialists maintain, a fictitious claim based on robbery and injustice,¹ but corresponds to the natural duty of labor from which it arises, and therefore is a natural right.

¹ Cfr. V. Cathrein, S.J., Socialism: Its Theoretical Basis and Practical Application, tr. and adapted to conditions in the United States by V. Gettelmann, S.J., New York 1904.

Under certain conditions the acquisition of a limited amount of earthly goods even becomes a duty.² The supreme, though not the sole, title of ownership is labor.

² Gen. III, 19; Eccles. V, 17; 2 Thess. III, 10. —Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 2: “With respect to an external thing, two powers belong to man, one of which is the power of procuring and administering it; and with respect to this it is lawful for man to possess things as his own. It is also necessary for human life for three reasons: first, because each person is more solicitous in procuring something that belongs to him alone than something common to all or to many, since each person, fleeing labor, leaves to another what pertains to the common good, as happens in a multitude of servants; secondly, because human affairs are handled in a more orderly way if the proper care of procuring some particular thing falls upon individuals, whereas there would be confusion if everyone indiscriminately procured everything; thirdly, because by this means a more peaceful condition of men is preserved, while each is content with his own thing. Hence we see that quarrels arise more frequently among those who possess something in common and undivided.” —Father J. Kelleher, in what is probably the best modern treatise on the subject (Private Ownership, Dublin 1911) points out (p. 149) that the classical theologians almost unanimously taught that the division of private property does not depend directly upon the natural law, but is derived from the ius gentium. (Cfr. Ross, Christian Ethics, pp. 278 sqq.)

Private ownership is a wonderful institution, to which humanity owes the development of trade, commerce, and industry, nay whatever determines the differences between civilized man and the savage. Without it labor would languish because the laborer would no longer be sure of the product of his industry. The surer he feels that he is toiling for himself and his own, rather than for strangers, the greater the persistency and diligence which he will bestow upon his work. Private ownership safeguards the future, as far as this is humanly possible, and without it diligence and thrift would never increase the movable capital that lends so powerful an impetus to production, nor would the constantly renewed and always laborious work of cultivating the soil insure to the earth that increase of fertility without which society would be condemned to endless misery.³

³ Chas. Perm, Les Lois de la Societe Chretienne, 2 vols., Paris 1876, especially Vol. I; F. Walter, Naturrecht und Politik, Bonn 1863, pp. 145 sqq.

Barely touching the traditional arguments as developed, e. g., by St. Thomas, Pope Leo XIII, in his famous Encyclical "Rerum Novarum," bases private ownership on the rational nature of man.

"Every man," he says, "has by nature the right to possess property as his own. This is one of the chief points of distinction between man and the animal creation, for the brute has no power of self-direction, but is governed by two main instincts, which keep its powers on the alert, impel it to develop them in a fitting manner, and stimulate and determine it to action without any power of choice. One of these instincts is self-preservation, the other, the propagation of the species. Both can attain their purpose by means of things which lie within range; beyond their verge the brute creation cannot go, for beasts are moved to action by their senses only, and in the special direction which these suggest. But with man it is wholly different. He possesses, on the one hand, the full perfection of the animal being, and hence enjoys, at least as much as the rest of the animal kind, the fruition of things material. But animal nature, however perfect, is far from representing the human being in its completeness, and is in truth but humanity's humble handmaid, made to serve and to obey. It is the mind or reason which is the predominant element in us who are human creatures; it is this which renders a man human, and distinguishes him essentially and generically from the brute. And on this very account —that man alone among the animal creation is endowed with reason —it must be within his right to possess things not merely for temporary and momentary use, as other living beings do, but to have and to hold them in stable and permanent possession; he must have not only things that perish in the use, but those also which, though they have been reduced to use, continue for further use in after time. This becomes still more clearly evident if man's nature be considered a little more deeply. For man, fathoming by his faculty of reason matters without number, and linking the future with the present, becoming, furthermore, by enlightened forethought, master of his own acts, guides his ways under the eternal law and the power of God, whose providence governs all things. Wherefore it is in his power to exercise his choice not only as to matters that regard his present welfare, but also about those which he deems may be for his advantage in time yet to come. Hence man not only can possess the fruits of the earth, but also the very soil, inasmuch as from the produce of the earth he has to lay by provision for the future. Man's needs do not die out, but recur; although satisfied to-day, they demand fresh supplies for to-morrow."⁴

⁴ English tr. from The Pope and the People, London 1912, pp. 181 sq. A better tr. in Bolshevism — The Remedy, New Haven, Conn., 1919, pp. 5 sq.

The Pontiff goes on to show that private ownership was established through individual efforts before the existence of the State, and that it is recognized by history, by civil law, and by divine law.⁵

⁵ Cfr. A. C. Breig, Papal Program of Social Reform, Milwaukee 1913, pp. 14 sqq.

It is frequently asserted that the first Christians, especially those at Jerusalem, practiced Communism.⁶ Learned scholars who have investigated the question with great care deny that there was Communism in the primitive Church. The early Christians were allowed to keep their property, and if some of them sold it, they did so voluntarily, for the purpose of assisting the poor.⁷ The most that can be said is that in some sections of the great congregation of Jerusalem there existed a sort of religious community of goods.⁸

⁶ Cfr. Acts II, 44 sq.; IV, 32-37; V, 1-4.

⁷ Cfr. E. Baumgartner, "Der Kommunismus im Urchristentum," in the Innsbruck Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie, 1909, pp. 625 sqq.

⁸ O. Schilling, Reichtum und Eigentum in der altkirchlichen Literatur, Freiburg 1908, pp. 16 sq.

Those Church Fathers who are represented as having preached Communism, did not oppose private ownership, but merely its abuse. The passages quoted from their writings by Socialist authors are largely spurious, and those which are genuine prove nothing more than that God did not distribute temporal goods directly among individual men, but gave the earth with its resources to the race at large for the common use of all, so that no one may claim anything as his own as if he had the right to exclude all others absolutely and for ever from its use.⁹ The Fathers simply wished to express the same truth which St. Thomas in the thirteenth century set forth as follows: "Man may not have exterior things for his own, but as the common property of all, namely in such a way that one readily shares them with others in case of need."¹⁰ There are many Patristic texts which unmistakably assert the right of private ownership.¹¹ Lactantius defends it with great scientific acumen. St. Ambrose, who frequently censures the wealthy, teaches that the condemnation pronounced by Christ does not affect all who have wealth, but only those who abuse it, and adds that every man is allowed perfect freedom in giving alms.¹²

⁹ Cfr. J. Biederlack, S. J., Die soziale Frage, 7th ed., p. 134, n. 1.

¹⁰ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 2: “A man ought not to hold external things as his own, but as common, so that, namely, he may readily share them in the necessity of others.”

¹¹ See G. Ratzinger, Die Volkswirtschaft, 2nd ed., pp. 82 sqq.; A. Vermeersch, S. J., Quaestiones de Iustitia, 2nd ed., pp. 266 sqq.: V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphiloso- phie, 4th ed., Vol. II, pp. 313 sqq.; J. Seipel, Die wirtschafts-ethischen Lehren der Kirchenvater, Vienna 1907, pp. 49 sqq., 120 sqq., 190 sqq.; J. A. Ryan Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers, St. Louis 1913.

¹² St. Ambrose, Expos. Evangel, sec. Luc., 1. V, n. 69: “Although in abundant wealth there are many enticements to sins, nevertheless there are also very many incentives to virtues. Although virtue does not require assistance, and the contribution of a poor man is more praiseworthy than the liberality of a rich man, nevertheless the heavenly sentence condemns by its authority not those who possess riches, but those who do not know how to use them.” (Migne, P. L., XV, 1654).—IDEM, De Nabuthe Iezrael, c. 13, n. 55: “He who has been able to be proved faithful amid riches is truly perfect and worthy of glory.” (P. L., XIV, 748).—IDEM, De Officiis, l. I, c. 30, n. 14: “It is in your power to bestow what you wish.” (P. L., XVI, 66). —On the teaching of St. Ambrose consult O. Schilling, Reichtum und Armut, (see note 8, supra) pp. 134 sqq., and J. A. Ryan, Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers, St. Louis 1913, pp. 52-66. "What St. Ambrose teaches is not communism in any correct sense of the word," says Dr. Ryan (op. cit., p. 57 sq.). "It is rather a first principle of the natural law, namely that the earth belongs to all the children of men, and not to a few only. He tells the rich to restore their excessive wealth to the poor, while a communist would order them to turn it over to the community. It is true that he calls these donations of the rich by the name of restitution, but this is because the rich have accumulated so much that the poor have been deprived of their birth-right. Hence, he commands them to give back their unjust gains. Any one who will read the history of the oppression of the poor in Italy in the fourth century, will know that St. Ambrose was right when he told the rich that they had robbed the poor, and were consequently bound to make reparation. The most zealous defender of individual ownership could speak the same way in the same circumstances. What St. Ambrose demands, therefore, is not a return to common property, but a recognition of common rights."

The phrase, "Omnis dives aut iniquus aut iniqui heres,"¹³ which occurs repeatedly in the writings of St. Jerome, has led to his being classed as a Socialist. But the fact that St. Jerome makes this sentiment his own and quotes it with approval, does not prove that he looked upon every property holder as a thief. "Iniquus—from in + aequus—refers literally to a want of equality or want of proportion. Taken figuratively, it has about the same meaning as iniustus, for which it was often used as a synonym by the best authors. Now St. Jerome's style, as well as his own confession, assures us that he was well acquainted with classical Latin. We may safely infer then that he uses this word in the specific sense of iniustus, and not in the more general sense of peccator. This inference is confirmed by his manner of speaking in a sentence where he distinguishes between an impius on the one hand, and an iniquus and a peccator on the other. Even if he meant merely 'wrong doer' when he wrote iniquus, the specific wrong doing referred to must have been an act of injustice, since it was committed in acquiring riches. When a man gets possession by wrong-doing, the greater part of the wrong will fall under the head of injustice, violation of personal rights. St. Jerome, therefore, subscribed to the opinion that every dives was an unjust man, and by dives he meant, not a man of some property, but a man of much property. All the synonyms of dives and its use by the best authors show that it refers to an abundance of goods, and not to mere ownership, as some would have us believe."¹⁴

¹³ This remarkable saying, which seems to have been of pagan origin, was evidently current in St. Jerome's day, for he quotes it in three distinct passages of his writings. For an analysis of these passages see J. A. Ryan, Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers, pp. 67 sqq.

¹⁴ Ryan, op. cit., pp. 70 sq. Further on in his booklet (p. 74) Dr. Ryan shows that Herbert Spencer spoke in much the same way of the present titles to landed property as St. Jerome did of those of his time. "It can never be pretended that the existing titles to such property are legitimate... Violence, fraud, the prerogative of force, the claims of superior cunning, these are the sources to which these titles may be traced." The passage occurs in Spencer's Social Statics and was omitted in later editions, but, as Dr. Ryan correctly says, "the question is one of fact, not of opinion." W. S. Lilly declares: "I say, without shadow of doubt, that to much property the saying of Proudhon [namely, that property is theft] is strictly ap- plicable." Charles S. Devas says: "As a matter of fact, much of the wealth of the rich classes in modern Europe has been gathered together, and is still kept up, by dreadful deeds of cruelty, injustice, and fraud." —"Mr. Lilly," comments Dr. Ryan, "is neither a Socialist nor a radical, but above all a pleader for law, while Mr. Devas was an unimaginative student of economics. If men of this character can write thus of titles to property in modern times, is it any wonder that St. Jerome used similar language in his day?" (Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers, pp. 74 sq.)

The proposition, "No Christian should be engaged in commercial pursuits, and those who persist in them, should be expelled from the Church,"¹⁵ which is frequently ascribed to St. Chrysostom, does not occur in his genuine writings, but in the Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum of an Arian writer falsely attributed to the Saint.¹⁶ Certain communistic ideas that occur in the genuine works of St. Chrysostom must be interpreted as the product of a sort of ideal Communism, resembling that of Plato, which marked a reaction against the dominating power of wealth, the materialism and egotism of certain rich people, and the exaggerated esteem in which worldly possessions were generally held at that time and which manifested itself in an insane pursuit of wealth similar to that which we behold all around us to-day. In attacking these flagrant and serious abuses St. Chrysostom occasionally employed expressions which, when read through modern glasses, seem to stamp him as an opponent of the principle of private ownership.¹⁷

¹⁵ “No Christian ought to be a merchant; or, if he wishes to be one, let him be cast out of the Church of God.”

¹⁶ Cfr. F. X. Funk's paper, "Ueber Reichtum und Handel im christlichen Altertum," in his Kirchengeschichtliche Abhandlungen und Untersuchungen, Paderborn 1917, Vol. III, pp. 150 sqq.

¹⁷ On the teaching of St. Chrysostom, see O. Schilling, Reichtum und Armut, (note 8, supra), p. 123 and J. A. Ryan, Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers, pp. 1-7; on the teaching of St. Basil, ibid., pp. 7 sqq., 17 sqq.; of St. Gregory of Nyssa, pp. 10 sq.; of Clement of Alexandria, p. 11; of St. Augustine, pp. 12 sq.; of St. Gregory the Great, pp. 15 sq.

2. In all that regards wealth and earthly possessions (bona fortunae) Catholics must be guided by the following principles.

a) Broadly speaking, every man is in duty bound to acquire the means which are necessary to support himself and his dependents and to fulfil the obligations that rest upon him as a member of society. He may, moreover, acquire a superfluity of earthly possessions, but if he does so, he incurs the additional obligation of making good use of his surplus; in other words, he must not acquire or cherish wealth for its own sake, but in order to share it with the needy.¹⁸

¹⁸ Eph. IV, 28; I Tim. VI, 18. —Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 187, art. 3.

b) The possession of wealth is no sin in itself, but involves great danger because a rich man is constantly tempted to seek his happiness in this world and to neglect his soul.¹⁹ It is in this sense that Christ speaks of "the care of this world and the deceitfulness of riches,”²⁰ and warns His disciples that "a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven."²¹

¹⁹ Cfr. I Tim. VI, 9 sq., 17. — Seneca says (Epist., XVII, 3): “Riches have hindered many from philosophizing; poverty is unencumbered and secure.” And in another place (Ep., XVII, 5): “If you wish to be at leisure for the soul, you must either be poor or like a poor man.” —Cfr. G. Ratzinger, Die Volkswirtschaft, 2nd ed., pp. 43 sqq.

²⁰ Matth. XIII, 22.

²¹ Matth. XIX, 23 sq.; cfr. Mark X, 23 sqq.; Luke XII, 16 sqq.; Jas. V, 1 sqq.

Neither is poverty in itself a virtue, or a source of virtue, though apt to become such. That it is no disgrace to be poor, appears from the example of Christ and His disciples, who were all poor laboring-men. "Jesus saith to him: The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air nests: but the Son of man hath not where to lay his head.”²² “Being rich," says St. Paul, "He [Jesus] became poor for your sakes, that through his poverty you might be rich."²³

²² Matth. VIII, 20; X, 9 sq.

²³ 2 Cor. VIII, 9; IX, 1 sqq.

When poverty is the result of sloth and shiftlessness, it easily leads to immorality and is in itself a sin if it makes a man discontented and covetous of the possessions of others. We read in Sacred Scripture: "Give me neither beggary nor riches: give me only the necessaries of life, lest perhaps being filled, I should be tempted to deny and say: Who is the Lord? or being compelled by poverty, I should steal and forswear the name of God."²⁴ Poverty becomes a virtue if borne humbly and with resignation to the will of God. "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven."²⁵ St. Ambrose explains this text as follows: "Not all the poor are blessed, for poverty is merely a means: both good men and bad may be poor, unless perhaps that poor man is to be considered blessed of whom the prophet says, 'Better is the poor man that walketh in his simplicity than a rich man that is perverse.’²⁶... Blessed the poor man who cried to the Lord and was heard: poor in crime, poor in vice, a poor man in whom the prince of this world finds nothing, who imitates Him who, being rich, was made poor for our sake.²⁷ St. Matthew unfolded the full truth when he said: 'Blessed are the poor in spirit,'²⁸ for he who is poor in spirit does not become puffed up and proud in his conceit."²⁹

²⁴ Prov. XXX, 8-9.—St. Leo the Great says (Serm., 49 [al. 48], c. 1): “There are snares in the abundance of riches and snares in the straits of poverty. The former raise one up to pride; the latter incite one to complaint.” (Migne, P. L., LIV, 302).

²⁵ Matth. V, 3; cfr. Jas. II, 5.

²⁶ Prov. XIX, 1.

²⁷ 2 Cor. VIII, 9.

²⁸ Matth. V, 3.

²⁹ St. Ambrose, Expos. Evangel. in Lucam, l. V, n. 53: “Not all the poor are blessed, for poverty is an intermediate thing: both good and evil men can be poor. Unless perhaps that blessed poor man is to be understood whom the prophet described, saying: ‘A just poor man is better than a lying rich man.’ Blessed is the poor man who cried out and the Lord heard him: poor in crime, poor in vices, a poor man in whom the prince of this world found nothing, an imitator of that Poor Man who, though He was rich, was made poor for us. Hence Matthew disclosed the matter fully, saying: ‘Blessed are the poor in spirit’; for the poor man in spirit is not puffed up and is not exalted in the mind of his flesh.” (Migne, P. L., XV, 1650). —Cfr. A. Winterstein, Die christl. Lehre vom Erdengut, pp. 173 sqq.

"Cheerful poverty is an honorable thing," says Epicurus,³⁰ and Seneca, who quotes this sentiment with approval, adds: "Not he is poor who has little, but he who attempts to gain more by dishonest means."³¹ In another place the great Roman philosopher says: "Great is the man who remains poor [i. e., in spirit] amid riches, but safer is he who does without them."³²

³⁰ “Cheerful poverty is an honorable thing”; quoted by Seneca, Ep., II, 5.

³¹ Ep., II, 6: “Not he who has little, but he who desires more, is poor.”

³² Ep., XX, 10: “Great is he who is poor amid riches, but safer is he who lacks riches.”

c) Those who devote themselves entirely to intellectual or mental labor, have a just claim to such material goods as they require, not merely to satisfy their necessities, but to enable them to live according to their rank or station. St. Paul's dictum that "they who serve at the altar share with the altar,"³³ applies in a wider sense to all who devote themselves to spiritual and intellec- tual labor for the benefit of their fellowmen, and includes pre-eminently the members of contemplative orders. d) As the individual, so also each social group (the family, the Church, the State, etc.) has the right and the duty to acquire property. But the group no less than the individual is exposed to the dangers that arise from wealth. History furnishes abundant examples of the truth of the Apostle's saying: "They that will become rich, fall into temptation and into the snare of the devil, and into many unprofitable and hurtful desires, which drown men into destruction and perdition."³⁴

³³ 1 Cor. IX, 13.

³⁴ 1 Tim. VI, 9; cfr. Ps. XXXIII, 11; Luke XII, 15-21.

Man is not the absolute owner, but rather the steward of his possessions, and as such must give a strict account to God. Material wealth should never be the ultimate aim either of the individual or of society, but should be regarded and employed merely as the basis and foundation of a higher life. "Charge the rich of this world," says St. Paul, "not to be proud, nor to trust in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God, who giveth us abundantly all things to enjoy, to do good, to be rich in good works, to give easily, to communicate to others, to lay up in store for themselves a good foundation against the time to come, that they may lay hold on the true life."³⁵

³⁵ 1 Tim. VI, 17-19; cfr. Matth. VI, 19-21.

The concentration of great fortunes in the hands of a few is becoming a serious danger, not only to the individual, since, as St. James says, the rich oppress the poor by might,³⁶ but also to society, because so many rich men now-a-days employ their wealth to establish monopolies, obtain excessive profits, defraud their fellowmen, purchase political power, etc. The fact that it is possible under present conditions, for the exceptionally able, the exceptionally cunning, and the exceptionally lucky, to accumulate enormous riches through the clever and unscrupulous utilization of special advantages, natural and otherwise, has given rise to a just demand for the legal limitation of fortunes. Various methods are suggested. The law might directly limit the amount of property to be held by any individual. One of our leading Catholic authorities on social and political science, Dr. John A. Ryan, thinks that if the limit were placed fairly high, say at one hundred thousand dollars, such a law "could scarcely be regarded as an infringement on the right of property. In the case of a family numbering ten members, this would mean one million dollars. All the essential objects of private ownership could be abundantly met out of a sum of one hundred thousand dollars for each person. Moreover, a restriction of this sort need not prevent a man from bestowing unlimited amounts upon charitable, religious, educational, or other benevolent causes."³⁷

³⁶ Jas. II, 6; cfr. Henry H. Klein, Dynastic America and Those Who Own It, New York, 1921; Andrew Carnegie, The Gospel of Wealth, New York 1900.

³⁷ J. A. Ryan, Distributive Justice, New York 1916, pp. 292 sq.; cfr. Hy. H. Klein, Dynastic America, N. Y., 1921, pp. 164 sqq.

On the other hand, "the dangers and obstacles confronting any legal restriction of fortunes are so real as to render the proposal socially inexpedient. It would easily lend itself to grave abuse. Once the community had habituated itself to a direct limitation of any sort, the temptation to lower it in the interest of better distribution and simpler living would become exceedingly powerful. Eventually the right of property might take such an attenuated and uncertain form in the public mind as to discourage labor and initiative, and thus seriously to endanger human welfare. In the second place, the manifold evasions to which the measure would lend itself would make it of very doubtful efficacy."³⁸

³⁸ Ibid., p. 293.

Another suggestion is that the amount of property capable of being received by heirs of any person be limited, say, to one million dollars.³⁹ This would be a restriction of the rights of bequest and succession, which are integral elements of the right of ownership. Is such restriction admissible? The answer to this question, according to the same authority, "depends upon the effects of the measure on human welfare.... A person needs private property not only to provide for his personal wants and those of his family during his life-time, but also to safeguard the welfare of his dependents and to assist other worthy purposes, after he has passed away.... All the necessary and rational ends of bequest and succession could be attained in a society in which no man's heirs could inherit more than one million dollars. Under such an arrangement very few of the children of millionaires would be prevented from getting at least one hundred thousand dollars. That much would be amply sufficient for the essential and reasonable needs of any human being. Indeed, we may go further, and lay down the proposition that the overwhelming majority of persons can lead a more virtuous and reasonable life on the basis of a fortune of one hundred thousand dollars than when burdened with any larger amount. The persons who have the desire and the ability to use a greater sum than this in a rational way are so few that a limitation law need not take them into account. Corporate persons, such as hospitals, churches, schools, and other helpful institutions, should not, as a rule, be restricted as to the amount that they might inherit; for many of them could make a good use of more than the amount that suffices for a natural person."⁴⁰

³⁹ Final Report of the Federal Commission on Industrial Relations, p. 32; H. E. Read, The Abolition of Inheritance, N. Y., 1919; A. Carnegie, The Gospel of Wealth, N. Y., 1901, pp. 11 sqq.

⁴⁰ Ryan, Distributive Justice, p. 294.

The limitation of inheritance would, of course, also be liable to abuse, and while its bad effects would probably not be as great as those following a similar abuse with regard to possessions, they are, in Dr. Ryan's opinion, "sufficiently grave and sufficiently probable to suggest that the legal restriction of bequest and succession should not be considered except as a last resort, and when the transmission of great fortunes had become a great and certain public peril."⁴¹

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 295.

An indirect way of limiting large fortunes would be through a progressive tax on incomes and inheritances. This is a more feasible method, though the maximum limit that justice would set to the rate of taxation is not easy to determine. Some years ago Andrew Carnegie⁴² recommended an inheritance tax of fifty per cent on estates amounting to more than one million dollars. While no country has yet reached this high level, the proposal cannot be stigmatized as unjust either to the testator or his heirs, nor can it be proved that it is in any other manner injurious to human welfare. In a general way, all that can be said with confidence concerning the just rates of inheritance taxation is that "the increments of the tax should correspond as closely as possible to the diminishing intensity of the wants which the tax deprives of satisfaction; in the case of each heir a certain fairly high minimum of property should be entirely exempt; on all the highest estates the rate should be uniform, and it should fall a long way short of confis- cation; and the tax should at no point be such as to discourage socially useful activity and enterprise."⁴³

⁴² The Gospel of Wealth, pp. 11 sqq.

⁴³ Ryan, Distributive Justice, p. 300.

It would be still better, perhaps, instead of clipping off wealth from the top, by limiting possession and transmission, to prevent these things by going to the root, i. e., by abolishing the wage system and admitting workingmen to a share in the possession of the means of production. This, too, could best be brought about, not by legal enactment, but by molding public opinion.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ See Social Reconstruction, brochure issued by the four bishops constituting the Administrative Committee of the American Catholic War Council, Washington, D. C., 1919; Cardinal Bourne's Lenten Pastoral for 1918, "The Nation's a Crisis," London, Catholic Social Guild, 1918.

e) We will close this chapter with a few remarks on the duty of distributing superfluous wealth. Here, also, we shall follow Professor Ryan.

It is the fundamental teaching of Christianity that ownership is stewardship and that he who possesses superfluous goods must regard himself as a trustee for the needy. St. Thomas clearly and concisely formulates this principle as follows: "As regards the power of acquiring and dispensing material goods, man may lawfully possess them as his own; as regards their use, however, a man ought not to look upon them as his own, but as common, so that he may readily minister to the needs of others."⁴⁵ This teach- ing is in perfect conformity with reason. Since the goods of the earth were intended by the Creator for the common benefit of all mankind, the possessor of a surplus is reasonably required to use it in such a way that this original purpose of all created goods will be fulfilled. To refuse to do so is to treat one's less fortunate neighbor as something different from and less than oneself, as a creature whose claim upon the common bounty of nature is something less than one's own.

⁴⁵ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 3.

Is this obligation one of charity or of justice? In the case of wealth unjustly acquired it is clearly one of justice. But how about wealth honestly acquired? St. Thomas says: "The goods which a man has in superfluity are due by the natural law to the sustenance of the poor."⁴⁶ This is the official teaching of the Church, for Pope Leo XIII says: "When one has provided sufficiently for one's necessities and the demands of one's state of life, there is a duty to give to the indigent out of what remains. It is a duty not of strict justice, save in case of extreme necessity, but of Christian charity."⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Ibid., art. 7.

⁴⁷ Encyclical "On the Condition of Labor," 15 May, 1891; The Pope and the People, p. 192.

There seems to be a contradiction between this teaching and that of certain Fathers, but the contradiction is apparent rather than real. "The truly important fact of the whole situation," says Dr. Ryan, "is that both the Fathers and the later authorities of the Church regard the task of distributing superfluous goods as one of strict moral obligation, which in serious cases is binding under pain of grievous sin. Whether it falls under the head of justice or under that of charity, is of no great practical importance."⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Distributive Justice, pp. 303 sq., 307 sq.

What portion of his superfluous wealth is a man obliged to distribute among the needy? Dr. Ryan, proceeding from the unanimous teaching of moral theologians that the entire mass of superfluous wealth is morally subject to the call of grave need, and from the principle of the moral law that the goods of the earth should be enjoyed by the inhabitants of the earth in proportion to their essential needs, attempts to answer this question from the standpoint of common welfare. He thinks that, in view of available statistics, the conclusion is inevitable "that the greater part of the superfluous income of the well-to-do and rich would be required to abolish all grave and ordinary need." He adds: "The proposition that men are under moral obligation to give away the greater portion of their superfluous goods or income is, indeed, a 'hard saying’.... No Catholic, however, who knows the traditional teaching of the Church on the right use of wealth, and who considers patiently and seriously the magnitude and the meaning of human distress, will be able to refute the proposition by reasoned arguments. Indeed, no man can logically deny it who admits that men are intrinsically sacred, and essentially equal by nature and in their claims to a reasonable livelihood from the common heritage of the earth. The wants that a man supplies out of his superfluous goods are not necessary for rational existence. For the most part they bring him merely irrational enjoyment, greater social prestige, or increased domination over his fellows. Judged by any reasonable standard, these are surely less important than those needs of the neighbor which are connected with humane living. If any considerable part of the community rejects these propositions, the explanation will be found not in a reasoned theory, but in the conventional assumption that a man may do what he likes with his own. This assumption is adopted without examination, without criticism, without any serious advertence to the great moral facts that ownership is stewardship, and that the Creator intended the earth for the reasonable support of all the children of men."⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 314.

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 1 sq. —Theodore Meyer, S.J., Institutiones Iuris Naturalis, Vol. II, pp. 126 sqq., Freiburg 1900. —V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, 4th ed., Freiburg 1904, Vol. II, pp. 285 sqq. —IDEM, Das Privateigentum und seine Gegner, 4th ed., Freiburg 1909. —A. Vermeersch, S.J., Quaestiones de Iustitia, 2nd ed., pp. 240 sqq.—Ch. Perin, De la Richesse dans les Societes Chretiennes, 3rd ed., 2 vols., Paris 1881. —F. Walter, Das Eigentum nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin und des Socialismus, pp. 266 sqq., Freiburg 1895. —H. Pesch, S.J., Lehrbuch der Nationalökonomie, Vol. I, Freiburg 1905, pp. 179 sqq.—Michael Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, Dublin 1917, pp. 113 sqq.—R. I. Holaind, S.J., Natural Law and Legal Practice, New York 1899, pp. 203 sqq. —Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy: Ethics, Deontology and Natural Law, 4th ed., London 1918, pp. 278 sqq. —J. A. Ryan, Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of Wealth, New York 1916, pp. 3 sqq., 291 sqq., 303 sqq. —J. Husslein, S.J., The World Problem: Capital, Labor, and the Church, New York 1918, pp. 232 sqq. —H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, 11th ed., Innsbruck 1914, pp. 387 sqq. —Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 344 sqq., 350 sqq., New York 1919. —A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, 11th ed., Freiburg 1910, pp. 499 sqq. —J. Kelleher, Private Ownership, Dublin 1911. —J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, pp. 271 sqq., New York 1919.—H. Belloc, The Catholic Church and the Principle of Private Property, London 1920. —J. A. Ryan, The Christian Doctrine of Property, New York 1923.

A particularly offensive sin against the precept here under consideration is involved in the grosser forms of slavery. It is true that the treatment of slaves is usually softened by natural compassion and kindliness on the part either of the master or of public opinion, or by the precepts of religion; that the law has in some instances granted the wretched slaves a certain measure of protection, and that it is not necessary to assume that every slaveholder is a cruel tyrant. Yet the status of a slave is by its very definition not that of a person, but rather that of a brute beast or an inanimate object that is bought and sold according to the whims of its owner. Dr. Devas is undoubtedly right when he says that “slavery by its very nature encourages immorality, hinders proper family life among the slaves, gives the master an arbitrary power with which no man can be trusted, fosters the scorn of manual labor, as a degradation for the freeman, and thus is always a social evil, any incidental advantages which it may give being attainable by serfdom.”¹⁷

¹⁷ Political Economy, 3rd ed., pp. 529 sq.—Cfr. Leo XIII, Epist. ad Episc. Brasil., 5 Maii 1888; P. Allard, Art. “Slavery,” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, pp. 36 sqq.; J. J. Fox, ibid., pp. 39 sqq.; A. Ebeling, Die Sklaverei von der ältesten Zeit bis auf die Gegenwart, Paderborn 1899; J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, N.Y. 1919, p. 328.

"In modern times," writes Archbishop Simar, "the working classes live under conditions similar to those of pagan antiquity. All too frequently the laborer is degraded to the level of a mere tool for money-making, and no regard is paid to his bodily health, his social and economic welfare, and his spiritual, religious, and moral development. The evils and dangers which threaten humanity in consequence of this social injustice have their fountain-head in un-Christian views and principles, and therefore cannot be successfully and permanently abolished unless Christianity is again allowed to govern all social relations. The fundamental postulate of reform is respect for the personal dignity of every man as a man and as a Christian, for in no other soil can true charity and its concomitant spirit of self-sacrifice thrive." ¹⁸ The keynote of the famous Labor Encyclical of Leo XIII, "Rerum Novarum," is the principle that conditions of labor shall be made more human and less servile, and that the worker be placed in a condition of greater economic freedom both as regards his security against want and the conditions of his labor. The worker is to be regarded as a human agent, not as a mere tool; and as one who has the right by means of his labor to achieve a wholesome human existence, since, as the Pope says, it is only by his labor that he can preserve and develop himself. His necessity gives him the right to such conditions of labor as will enable him to achieve a thoroughly human existence. Moreover, the same necessity demands that he should claim this right; since, as Leo XIII declares, "a man cannot give up his soul to servitude." Yet that is just what he is required to do under the system now largely prevalent in modern industry.

¹⁸ Simar, Moraltheologie, 3rd ed., p. 372.—Cfr. Th. Meyer, S. J., Die christlich-ethischen Sozialprinzipien und die Arbeiterfrage, 4th ed., Freiburg i. B. 1906; Reuter-Lehmkuhl, S. J., Neoconfessarius, pp. 214 sqq.; J. Biederlack, S. J., Die soziale Frage, 7th ed., pp. 206 sqq.

1. The right of ownership (dominium) is defined as “the permanent and exclusive right of retaining, controlling, and disposing of an object in one’s own interest and according to one’s own wishes.”¹ It is derived from nature itself and protected by the natural law.²

¹ Cfr. M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, p. 113.—J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 533: “Ownership is the legitimate faculty of disposing of some thing as one’s own. Ownership is chiefly divided into perfect and imperfect, according as there is a right to dispose both of the thing itself and of its utility, or only of one of the two. Imperfect ownership, however, is subdivided into direct and indirect, that is, useful, according as it regards solely the ownership of the thing or solely its utility. They also commonly distinguish high and low ownership. The former is ownership improperly so called and is termed the right which the supreme authority has, for the gravest cause and for the good of the community, sometimes to dispose of the goods of private persons with due compensation, insofar as this can be done. The latter is the ownership of private persons, to which the definition properly applies.” Cfr. Pruner, Lehre vom Recht, Vol. I, pp. 248 sqq.

² Leo XIII, Encycl. “Quod apostolici,” Dec. 28, 1878: “The right of property and ownership, proceeding from nature itself, is sanctioned by natural law.”—IDEM, Encycl. “Rerum novarum,” May 15, 1891: “The right to possess things privately as one’s own has been given to man by nature. . . . The right of ownership which we have shown to have been bestowed by nature upon individuals must be transferred to man insofar as he is the head of a family. . . . Therefore, when relief for the people is sought, this must be held above all as a fundamental principle: private possessions must be preserved inviolate.”—IDEM, Encycl. “Graves de communi,” Jan. 18, 1901: “Therefore let nothing be more sacred to it [Christian democracy] than justice; let it command that the right of acquiring and possessing be kept intact.”

All ownership is based on some ground, usually called title. A title is a factor or an event by which a particular owner comes to have a right to his property. There is a variety of such titles, partly original or primary, partly derivative or secondary. An original title of ownership is one by which objects that belong to no one are appropriated, or by which existing private property is increased or improved. A secondary title is one based upon donation or legitimate purchase from a previous owner.

2. The chief original titles of ownership are: occupancy, accretion, and labor.

a) Occupancy (occupatio), the first and most primitive title of private ownership, is defined as the actual appropriation of ownerless objects with the intention to keep them as one’s own. This title of ownership (ius primi occupantis) presupposes that the object in question is by nature fit to become private property (res capax dominii privati). Hence it must not belong either to State or Church, nor be of such a nature that it cannot be occupied, e. g., the sea or air. Secondly, it must be actually ownerless, that is to say, it must never have belonged to anybody (res nullius), or, if it did, have been relinquished by the former owner (res relicta); third, the occupant must have the intention of acquiring the object as his own and of exercising the right of ownership in future. Fourth, the act of occupancy must be such as to convey to others some intimation that proprietary possession has been taken.³ This is usually done by some external act, e. g., in the case of a movable object, keeping it and turning it into something else; in the case of soil or real estate, by the act of cultivating it, fencing it in, setting out plants on it, and so forth.

³ M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 139 sq.—Gury, op. cit., I, n. 558: “Occupancy is the actual taking possession of things which belong to no one. It is a legitimate mode of acquiring ownership, provided that the required conditions are present, namely: 1. That the thing be capable of private ownership and belong to no one; 2. That the occupant wish to make it his own and take possession of it; 3. That no law stand in the way of occupancy. The more frequent practical cases concerning this matter relate to the occupancy of animals.”

The principle that ownerless land in uncivilized countries may be occupied and thereby become private property is recognized by the law of nations.

The most common kinds of occupancy are: hunting (venatio), fishing (piscatio), and discovery (inventio). In civilized countries the right of hunting and fishing is regulated by positive laws and hence may not be exercised ad libitum, or if it is so exercised, entails the duty of making restitution for damage done. Hence the right of occupancy may be exercised:

Order of speaking. Since these offices look to this, that each one's own right be rendered to him, their explanation is contained and completed by the explanation of rights. The order of speaking will be this: that we treat successively of the rights which are to be distinguished; - of the subject of rights; - of the object of rights; - of the modes of acquiring rights, in general; - of original modes; - of derived modes of acquiring rights through contract, through an office entrusted or admitted; through inheritance and testament; through another's delict or quasi-delict.

Utility. From this title the theologian ought especially to gather this fruit, that he sufficiently know various juridical acts and titles, at least for understanding the cases which are proposed, I do not say for solving them without the assistance of an expert in law; and that at the same time, once a solution of the external forum has been obtained, he may know how far that solution is efficacious in conscience, and may be able rightly to estimate the connected moral obligations.

We divide this question into four chapters, namely 1. on the notion of right and its division; 2. on the object of right; 3. on the subject of right; 4. on the modes of acquiring right.

1. Notion. The name of right is taken in various ways; but among the various acceptions of right the following seem to be more notable for us:

1. The sentence or decree of the judge. Whence the judge says the right, when he pronounces a judicial sentence.

2. Law, or rather the complex of laws, by which it is determined what is just. In this sense we say: canon law, civil law, to study law, etc. Many authors call right accepted in this sense right taken objectively, and they attribute to it those things which pertain to laws.²

3. That which is just and which is owed to someone (δίκαιον). In this sense we say: to render to someone his right. This right is also called passive right, and it is the proper object of the virtue of justice, since justice is the constant and perpetual will of rendering to each one his right.

4. A moral faculty or power of doing, having, demanding, omitting something, etc.³ In this sense we say: someone uses his own right, the right of property. Concerning this last acception of right, which is also called active right or right taken subjectively, we shall chiefly treat in this chapter.

The given definition is explained. It is said, first: a moral faculty; therefore right is not a physical faculty, or a physical fact, as several non-Catholics have taught. Hence the following propositions were condemned in the Syllabus of Pius IX:⁴ Prop. 59: "Right consists in a material fact, ... and all human facts have the force of right." Prop. 61: "A fortunate injustice of fact brings no detriment to the sanctity of right." Therefore true right arises from natural law alone, or from that positive law which is conformable to natural or divine law; but it is false that civil government can concede some right contrary to natural or divine law. Therefore in the same Syllabus the proposition defended by the Positivists was deservedly condemned (39): "The status of the republic, as being the origin and source of all rights, is endowed with a certain right circumscribed by no limits."⁵

It is said, second: of doing something, etc.; from which words it follows that a right belonging to some man produces in others a strict debt or obligation not to violate that right. Right (Recht) and debt (Pflicht) are correlatives. But if nevertheless another wounds the right of another and despises his own debt, then he commits a true punishable injustice. Both, namely human right and debt, are ultimately derived from eternal law, since it is the source and principle of all other laws, rights, and duties. Hence it can be said briefly: there is no right without debt; there is no debt without God.

Note. The assertion of several Positivist jurists cited above, that the republic is the origin and source of all rights, was deservedly proscribed by Pius IX; for this assertion is not only most false,⁶ but in reality heretical, because it denies that natural and divine rights precede the very existence of the republic; moreover, it is injurious toward the native dignity of man, because it hands the individual man over into the narrow servitude of the state. Hence St. Thomas⁷ says forcefully: "Written [human] law, just as it does not give force to natural right, so neither can it diminish or take away its force, because neither can the will of man change nature."

The three acceptions of right enumerated above under nn. 2, 3, 4 can be coordinated in the following schema:

Corollary. From what has been said it follows that rights do not belong to animals, because they are not endowed with moral faculties. Therefore no one ever commits injustice properly so called against an animal. For this reason theologians are accustomed to say briefly: animals are indeed an object, but not a subject of right.⁹

² Although those things which are predicated of this objective right can also ordinarily be predicated of law, nevertheless objective right and law are not altogether the same. Wherefore St. Thomas says: "Law is not right, properly speaking, but a certain account of right" (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 57, a. 1 ad 2; "The law is not the Right, but a norm of Right"). Hence not all laws can properly be called right, but only those which are concerned with passive right; for example, police laws are incongruously called police right; the law of loving oneself or one's neighbor is not right.

³ In German it is said: authorization (Befugnis) (cf. Gopfert, Moraltheol. II, § 74).

⁴ Denz. n. 1759, 1761.

⁵ Denz. n. 1739.

⁶ Cf. Cathrein, Moralphil. I, § 3, 1.

⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 60, a. 5 ad 1.

⁸ Ground of right, laws of right, norms of right.

⁹ Cf. Gopfert, l.c.

2. Divisions Of Right. Among the multiple divisions of subjective right, the following seem to be the more principal:

1. By reason of origin, right is divided into natural, positive-divine, and human. Natural right is the moral faculty, belonging to man from the very principles of human nature, of doing, demanding, etc., something;¹⁰ for example, the right of defending one's own life, the right of possessing goods, etc. Positive-divine right is that faculty which belongs to man by force of a special divine decree; for example, the right of receiving the sacraments, the right of hearing the Gospel. Human right, which again is divided into ecclesiastical and civil, is that which emanates either from ecclesiastical law or from civil law. Thus parishioners have a right that the pastor administer the sacraments to them; citizens of the state, however, have a right that they be protected as to life and goods by the civil government.

Natural rights are either innate¹¹ or adventitious,¹² according as they arise of themselves from birth itself or from some contingent fact. An innate right is, for example, the right of children to receive suitable support from parents. An adventitious right is, for example, the right which someone acquires by the purchase of some thing. Natural right, and the same holds for positive right, is also divided into abdicable right,¹³ for example, the right to some possession, and inabdicable right;¹⁴ for example, a husband cannot abdicate his right over his wife, so that another may licitly live with her maritally.

Finally, natural right is divided into natural right strictly so called and the right of nations, which comprises conclusions necessarily deduced from natural right and therefore observed among all nations. The right of nations, therefore, is as it were a middle between natural right and civil right. Moreover, the right of nations is not always taken in the same sense.¹⁵

2. By reason of effect, strict right and non-strict right are distinguished. Strict right is that which is so closely connected with man that it cannot be taken away from him without manifest injury. A right of this kind is, for example, the right of legitimate property. For when someone takes away my legitimate property from me, he wounds my strict right and is held to repair the wounded justice. Non-strict, or broad, or imperfect right is that whose wounding does not constitute injustice properly so called, but a certain inconvenience more or less grave. The common poor man has a non-strict right to alms; a man who has deserved well of the republic has a non-strict right to honors, etc. Sometimes strict right is also divided against equitable right, which is then taken as a certain correction of excessively hard positive right, and which attends rather to the mind of the legislator than to the letter of the law. Cf. what was said above, I, n. 231, concerning epikeia.

3. Strict right is subdivided into ius in re and ius ad rem. This division is very celebrated both in ecclesiastical law and in civil law. Ius in re, or real right,¹⁶ is that by which someone enjoys some thing already legitimately existing, at least in some way, in his disposition. But what conditions are necessary in order that some thing be legitimately in the disposition of someone is usually determined by positive laws.¹⁷ This right confers a real action, that is, an action which immediately reaches the thing itself, wherever finally this thing may be found, for example, if someone has a mortgage over some thing.

Ius ad rem,¹⁸ or personal right or acquired right, is that which someone has so that some thing not yet possessed may become his. This right gives a personal action,¹⁹ which immediately reaches the person detaining the thing and only mediately the thing itself. Hence if someone has only ius ad rem, he cannot occupy that thing, but must first, if this is possible, call into judgment the person who detains the thing and refuses to hand it over; for example, if Peter owes me 1000 francs, I cannot licitly take away an equal value from him, but I must first demand from him the return of the money owed. Thus at least ordinarily. Ius ad rem is therefore the way to ius in re.²⁰

¹⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 57, a. 2. Concerning other acceptions of natural right less customary today, see Suppl. q. 65, a. 1 ad 4. That natural right truly exists is denied by some modern jurists, but it was already admitted in the Code of Justinian and manifestly follows from the existence of natural law; cf. above I, 152.

¹¹ Innate right.

¹² Acquired right.

¹³ Alienable right.

¹⁴ Inalienable right.

¹⁵ Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. 1, 2, q. 95, a. 4; 2, 2, q. 57, a. 3; Cathrein, Moralphil. I, 8, 6, § 2.

¹⁶ Real right, right in a thing.

¹⁷ Cf., for example, Cod. civ. Germ. § 854 sqq.

¹⁸ Right of claim.

¹⁹ Personal right of action.

²⁰ Cf. especially Gopfert, Moraltheol. II, 51 b; or Tanquerey, De iustitia n. 18; or Muller, Theol. mor. II, § 93.

3. On dominion.²¹ Ius in re is also called dominion, which is commonly defined: the legitimate faculty of disposing of some thing as one's own.

It is said, first: legitimate faculty, that is, a faculty granted by right, whether natural or positive. Therefore a man having dominion over some thing can dispose of it only within the limits placed by law. Hence a rich man dissipating his own goods does not indeed sin against commutative justice nor against positive right, but he sins against natural right, committing the sin of prodigality, which indeed is against liberality, which is a potential part of justice.

It is said, second: of disposing of some thing as one's own. Therefore curators and dispensers of things belonging to another do not have dominion over those things, since they do not dispose of their own things but of another's. The exercise of this faculty of disposing is sometimes bound by civil law or statute; for example, children cannot dispose of their own goods.

Divisions Of Dominion. Dominion has received many divisions, of which the principal are the following:

a) Divine dominion and human dominion.

To God there belongs, by the title of creation and conservation, the most perfect dominion, according to that saying: "The earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof, the world and all who dwell therein."²² By delegation from God, dominion belongs to man, who therefore cannot use it according to his own will, but according to the will of God delegating. Man is the steward of God. Human dominion is subdivided into:

b) Full dominion and semi-full dominion.

The first is the perfect faculty of disposing both of the thing itself and of its fruits. The other is the faculty of disposing either of the thing or of its fruits. But this semi-full dominion is subdivided a) into radical, or direct, or naked dominion, if someone indeed retains the ownership of the thing, but does not have free disposition either of the thing itself or of its fruits;²³ and b) into indirect or useful dominion, which extends either to the proper use of the thing and its fruits, with the substance of the thing preserved, without the fruits of the thing being able to be alienated, and then it is called use (Gebrauch); or it extends to total dominion of the fruits, even with the faculty of alienating them, while nevertheless the substance of the thing itself is preserved, and then there is usufruct (Niessbrauch). These two modes of dominion especially have place in contracts of leasing, emphyteusis, etc. Use and usufruct legitimately obtained introduce certain rights and debts both for the owner of the thing and for him who has useful dominion. The civil laws of each region must be attended to.²⁴ Generally speaking, the usufructuary has full dominion of all fruits which in any way arise from the thing. Treasures perhaps found in that thing are excepted,²⁵ since they are not properly fruits of the thing. But the usufructuary is held to pay annual taxes, which are considered to be burdens of the fruits; he is held to preserve the thing in the state in which he received it, and therefore he must make small repairs. Greater repairs, however, must be made by the owner himself. Then he is held to administer the thing as a good father of a family.

c) High dominion and low dominion.

The first is that which the supreme legitimate power has of disposing, sometimes from grave cause, of the goods of private persons for the good of the community. The other is the dominion of private persons, to which the definition given above applies. High dominion²⁶ is not dominion properly so called, since the supreme legitimate power is not a mistress possessing the goods of all subjects, nor can it convert them to its own advantage. Such high dominion may not licitly be exercised unless a) the true necessity of the community demands it, b) equivalent compensation has been given, and one subject is not burdened more than another. High dominion is exercised not rarely in our days in so-called expropriations for the construction of railroads and other roads.

To low dominion, which sometimes is also called private dominion,²⁷ there is opposed community of goods. Since in our days Socialism proclaims with a loud voice that private dominion is nothing other than theft, and that community of goods must be established, it is necessary here to say a few things:

On The Origin And Licitness Of Property And Private Dominion

²¹ Right of ownership, right of disposal, droit de propriete.

²² Ps. 23:1.

²³ Dominion of this kind, radical dominion, is had, for example, by religious over their goods after simple profession, and generally by all to whom free disposition of their own goods is forbidden by law, as, for example, wards.

²⁴ Cf. Cod. civ. Germ. § 1030 sqq.; Cod. civ. Gall. art. 578 sqq.

²⁵ Cod. civ. Germ. § 1040; cf. below n. 46.

²⁶ Superior ownership right, haut domaine, right of expropriation.

²⁷ Private ownership right.

4. Authors do not agree whence private dominion first arose. Some (Hugo Grotius, Pufendorf) wish that it arose from a social pact, by which men agreed that goods previously common to all would thereafter be divided among individuals. Others (Hobbes, Montesquieu, Bentham, several moderns) teach that the division of goods was first made by civil law. Others, namely modern Socialists, teach that the division of goods was introduced by violent occupation, so that the stronger, having overcome the weaker, violently and unjustly occupied goods previously common. Others have devised still other theories.²⁸

These opinions being left aside, it is better and more correct to distinguish in this matter the question of right and the question of fact. Certainly, sometimes private dominion was made by first occupation, as when inhabitants arrived in a land up to that point uninhabited. Sometimes, however, private dominion is constituted by civil law, as when the civil government assigns lands to be cultivated to certain farmers. Finally, sometimes the division of properties was made from a social pact, as we read in Sacred Scripture concerning the division of lands between Abraham and Lot.²⁹ But as to the question of right, without doubt private dominion (circumscribed by just limits) follows as a conclusion from natural law itself, not indeed in the sense that community of goods is directly against natural law,³⁰ but that, all circumstances considered, for the most part it is not so conformable to natural law. This is explained in this way by the Angelic Doctor:³¹ a) Because each person is more solicitous in procuring something which belongs to himself alone than that which is common to all or to many. For care concerning things exacts fatiguing labor, and if one must labor for the common good, many shrink back from the fatigue. b) Because human affairs are treated in a more orderly way if to each person there is incumbent the proper care of procuring some thing; but there would be confusion if each one indiscriminately procured anything whatever. c) For the preservation of peace. Hence we see that many and frequent quarrels arise among those who possess one and the same thing in common.

Deservedly, therefore, Leo XIII said in the Encyclical Rerum novarum: "To possess things privately as one's own is a right given to man by nature." Pius X proposed the same doctrine in the Motu proprio of 18 Dec. 1903 (Prop. 5). But if St. Thomas (and with him several theologians) teaches that private dominion was introduced from the ius gentium, under the name of the ius gentium he does not understand the so-called international law of peoples, but a right derived from natural law itself.³² Behold his words: "In another way something is naturally commensurate with another, not according to the absolute account of itself, but according to something which follows from it, for example the property of possessions; for if this field be considered absolutely, it has nothing by which it should be this man's rather than that man's; but if it be considered in respect to the suitability of cultivating it and to the peaceful use of the field, according to this it has a certain commensuration to this, that it be of one man and not of another."³³ And the same Angelic Doctor says: "Those things belong to the ius gentium which are derived from the law of nature, as conclusions from principles."³⁴ From all these things it is manifestly drawn out that private dominion is something licit, but Communism preached by the Socialists must be rejected.

²⁸ Cathrein enumerates seven diverse theories (Moralphilos. II, 44).

²⁹ Gen. 13:8 sqq.

³⁰ Hence St. Thomas says: "The property of possessions is not against natural law, but is superadded to natural law through the devising of human reason" (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 66, a. 2 ad 1).

³¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 66, a. 2. Franc. Walter, Das Eigentum nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin und des Sozialismus (1895) 7 sqq., and Franc. Schaub, Die Eigentumslehre nach Thomas von Aquin und dem modernen Sozialismus (1898) 259 sqq., wrote more broadly concerning this matter.

³² Concerning the diverse acceptions of the ius gentium, cf. Cathrein, Moralphil. I, 8, 6, § 2.

³³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 57, a. 3.

³⁴ Ibid. 1, 2, q. 95, a. 4.

5. Scholion. On The Enemies Of Private Dominion. That private dominion is illicit and therefore to be abolished was taught by: a) the Apostolics (Apotacticae, Renuntiators), asserting that a man cannot be saved unless, after the example of the apostles, he lives free from any possession;³⁵ b) the Manichaeans, saying that to possess fields, houses, and money is illicit;³⁶ c) the Waldenses and Albigenses, teaching that at least perfect men must renounce every possession. But especially with all their strength there fight against private dominion: d) modern Socialists and Communists.

Modern Socialism is usually joined with Anarchism, with Indifferentism in matters touching religion, indeed almost always with a fight against every positive religion. In present times Socialism widely rages almost everywhere on earth and grows day by day. Although the Socialists are divided among themselves, nevertheless almost all agree in the principle stated by Karl Marx: Capital is pure and putrid theft, because it has been born from the retention of that money which was owed to workers for their labors. Likewise the following demands are proposed by all Socialists:

1. The right of choosing deputies completely general both for men and for women (from the twentieth year of age).

2. The right of choosing all superiors and officials of the state.

3. Religion is a private matter, that is, each person should exercise the religion which he prefers.

4. A lay school without religious instruction.

5. Separation of Church from State.

6. Abolition of all indirect taxes.³⁷

Things To Be Noted For Practice. Certainly it is not forbidden that workers and other men of lesser condition strive by any legitimate means both to have a better wage and favorably to raise their condition; nevertheless it is never licit to employ means forbidden by Catholic moral Theology in order to obtain that end. Several associations imbued with Christian principles already exist for improving the lot of workers. The priest must cautiously and prudently foster associations of this kind; but all workers must be deterred from socialist associations and especially communist ones, since these, as mournful experience bears witness, almost always ruin the religion and good morals of workers, and do not make their material lot better. Hence the priest with all his strength should teach workers that private dominion is licit, and that the possessions of the rich are not always theft; that one must labor in the sweat of his brow, as already after the fall of Adam was foretold by God to the whole human race; that true human happiness is not situated in great possessions, but in the good use of material things, and that it is better to need less than to have more, as St. Augustine says. Above all he should also promote the fervent exercise of religion both among the rich and among workers. For because charity has grown cold, thence hardness has arisen among the rich. But since faith has become tepid among all, thence workers no longer with all their strength long for eternal happiness, but through right and wrong seek earthly happiness and are carried away by monstrous passions.

Socialism does not everywhere have the same degree of perversity, whence the circumstances of individual regions must be considered. But generally speaking, all who freely and positively adhere to the sect of the Socialists (and a fortiori of the Communists) are not worthy of sacramental absolution unless they seriously promise to leave that sect as soon as they can. More mildly can those be treated who adhere to the Socialists not freely but compelled by grave fear, and not actively but merely passively. For if these seriously promise the confessor faithfully to observe the precepts of religion and to guard against scandal according to their powers, they can receive the sacraments. Nevertheless they must gradually, according to their powers, separate themselves from the socialist sect. Several authors, such as Heiner, D'Annibale, Ballerini-Palmieri, etc., teach that positive socialists fall into the excommunication laid upon those who plot against civil or ecclesiastical power. Whatever may be said of this opinion,³⁸ this is certain: socialists greatly harm the Catholic religion.

³⁵ Cf. St. Epiphanius, Adv. haer. 61; St. Augustine, De haer. 40; St. John Damascene, De haer. 61; see also Wetzer and Welte, Kirchenlex., s. v. "Apostoliker."

³⁶ Cf. St. Augustine, De mor. eccl. l. 1, c. 35, n. 78.

³⁷ The history and diverse forms of Socialism may be seen in Tanquerey, Theol. mor.: De virtute Iustit., n. 54 sqq.

³⁸ Cf. below in the treatise on censures, III 516.

583. • Since it belongs to justice to render to each one his right, as is clear from the definition of justice handed down at n. 580, in this article what comes under the name of right must be explained.

Right is taken in various senses; for it signifies: 1) the very science of right or laws, those who cultivate which we call Jurists or Jurisconsults; 2) law or the rule of right, and thus divine right is spoken of, natural or positive, human, canonical or civil, of nations, etc.; 3) the very complex and system of laws, as when we say the Corpus Juris Canonici, Corpus Juris Civilis, Code of Law; 4) the sentence pronounced by a judge, although perhaps iniquitous, in which sense they say that a judge speaks right; 5) the very place or forum in which cases are conducted, in which sense the accused is said to be called into court.⁵

584. • Right, as it is taken here, is defined: "A legitimate moral faculty by which someone can do or have something in such a way that it is licit for no one to violate it without some injury."

1° It is a faculty. This, "according to the common use of speaking, signifies the power by which something is held at one's nod,"¹ or at one's own judgment.

2° It is a moral faculty, because it does not consist in physical force. Wherefore it cannot be diminished by the violence of anyone stronger. Cf. Syllabus p. XLV. n. 59, 60.

3° It is a faculty by which someone can do or have something, since the matter of right consists in actions, such as possessing, retaining, etc., and in things.

4° It is a faculty which it is licit for no one to violate without some injury; for otherwise that faculty would be vain and useless.

5° It is a legitimate faculty, because, when a just law is repugnant, nothing can be done or had by right. But law can be repugnant to a faculty in two ways, namely so that either it removes the faculty itself, for example of disposing of goods by testament, or renders the exercise of the faculty illicit, for example the prodigal squandering of one's own goods.

585. Title of right. - From what has been said it is understood what a title of right is: namely it is nothing other than the very reason why someone has a right or legitimate faculty of doing or having something, and why it is not licit for others to violate this faculty without some injury.

586. Division of right. - Right:

1° Is either objective, which others call passive, and is called the just thing, or that which is owed to another, or subjective, which others call active, and is the very faculty of doing or having something defined above.

2° It is either personal, or pertaining to a person considered in himself and immediately inhering in him, such as the right of preserving life; or real, or belonging to a person only on account of some thing which he possesses. Hence real rights can be transmitted from one person to another, according as this person succeeds that one in possession of the thing by force of which the rights exist, as, for example, the right by which a Bishop has power to make laws. - Real and personal right is also taken in another sense: namely the former for a right in a thing, the latter for a right to a thing, concerning which this number under 4° will treat.

3° One right is strictly so called, or strict without addition; another is broadly so called. The former, if it is taken objectively, is that "which is owed to another with equality of thing to thing, and which therefore cannot be violated without injury"; but the latter is that "which is indeed owed to another," but not with the said equality. Thus a seller "has a strict right in the price of the thing: therefore money is to be paid to him which equals the price of the thing; but parents indeed have a right to the obedience of children, but not a strict right; for what sort of obedience is owed to them cannot be defined by an adequate number."¹

Strict right by its nature is perfect. But perfect right is called a right which is joined with the right of coercing, namely of coercing him who would violate it, or lessen it, or disturb the use of it, so that he desist from violating it, etc.; and also of coercing him who has violated it, etc., so that he restore all things to their former state. Yet this right of coercion, if you except the right of repelling force by force, in a society rightly constituted passes into an action, i.e. into the right of reclaiming through a judge that which you think is owed to you. "In human society," says St. Thomas,² "no one has coercion except through public power." Yet it can happen that in fact no action is given from that right, for example because the proof which is required by law is lacking, or because the legislator denies an action to some special perfect right.³ Hence sometimes, as for example in hidden compensation, n. 709, 2° and n. 712, without imploring a judge, you licitly procure right for yourself.

4° Strict right is divided into right in a thing and right to a thing. A right in a thing is that which someone has in a thing already his own, or in a thing which is already bound to him in itself, and which therefore he will be able to vindicate from anyone into whose hands, against his will, it has come. A right to a thing is that by which we have not the thing itself, but the person obligated to us. Thus I have a right in a thing in my horse, and therefore I can vindicate it from any possessor into whose hands, against my will, it has come. But if I have bought a horse - where from law its handing over is required, so that it becomes mine - and the handing over has not yet been done, I can seek it only from the seller, but not from any other to whom the seller afterward sold and handed it over.

Corollary. - Since office or duty is said in order to right, duties can be divided in a manner corresponding to the division of rights. Wherefore some are personal, others real, this number under 2°; some perfect or legal, others imperfect or moral, this number under 3°.

St. Th. II-II, q. 57, a. 1; I-II, q. 60, a. 2.

149. Various acceptations of right. - A. In the more received sense, right designates:

1st. Properly, and indeed in its primary signification, that which is just (the just thing itself), and thus it is the object of justice: that which is owed to another and to be rendered unto equality. In this sense one says: to give someone his right, a chacun son droit, wat recht is.¹ It is objective right, which is also called passive, since it must be given to each one.

¹ "In modern languages right is designated by a metaphorical word from geometry (straight line, droit, recht), because just as a straight line of itself and independently of our choice is the shorter line between two points, so right constitutes rectitude in the relations of men among themselves." Lehu, Phil. Mor., I, n. 353.

2nd. Secondarily, the foundation of the just, namely, the legitimate power or faculty of demanding something as owed; in which sense someone is said to use his right or to have the right of property or of election: it is the power of right² (pouvoir du droit, rechtsbevoegdheid, rechtsvermogen). This right is subjective, or also active, which each one can exercise.

² Thus more recent authors; the ancients are not accustomed to call this right, but faculty, power, or even dominion. Indeed it was said that in this sense the word ius never occurs in St. Thomas. But this is said too boldly, for it seems to be used somewhat in this sense, though very rarely, for example, I-II, q. 58, a. 2; II-II, q. 66, a. 5, ad 2; Suppl., q. 64, a. 1, ad 3; de Virt., q. 1, a. 4; in IV, d. 25, q. 3, a. 2, qc. 3, ad 2.

3rd. Finally, by a signification not proper but metaphorical, yet proximately derived, the cause of each, namely, law (and by extension: the complex of laws), which is the rule both of the faculty of demanding a debt of this kind and of the just thing itself, because it determines the rights of men: thus natural, divine, ecclesiastical, and civil right are spoken of. It is normative right.³ Law is not right essentially, but causatively, because it is the reason of right, namely, the reason by which there is in another the faculty of demanding something, and consequently this is owed to him and must be rendered: for these are correlatives which correspond to one another.

³ Modern authors more often call law objective right.

The aforesaid order is according to the signification of the name; but the real order is inverse.⁴ For the first, namely, right in the first signification, according to the thing depends upon the second, and the second upon the third: nothing is owed to another without the faculty of demanding it in the other, and that the other has this faculty is given to him by natural or positive law. Thus the faculty of demanding something (active right) mediates between the reason of right (law) and the just thing (objective or passive right), and although it is not the object of justice, nevertheless it is something on which the object of justice depends, and to which it has an intrinsic order as to something which it supposes.

⁴ Let it be noted that the matter is thus proposed independently of etymology, but in order to the doctrine on justice, conformably to St. Thomas. There is doubt about the etymology. Formerly several said that the word ius was derived from iustum, signified the same as just, and was so called by apocope, i.e., amputation. Today this is abandoned by many. Others said it is the same as iussum, which indicates law. Others hold the word as primitive: ios or ious, i.e., good, holy, that which pertains to divinity; or iu, iug, which signifies a bond, a tie which joins men or to which they are subjected. But whatever may be the case concerning the first signification or etymology of the word, in the doctrine on justice the primary signification is the just or objective right, because the others do not pertain to justice except insofar as they have relation to its object, which is the just or objective right. Terminology is not wholly fixed and determined. The ancients especially understand right in the objective sense; subjective right they are not accustomed to call so. Modern authors, on the contrary, rarely speak of objective or passive right, and especially take right in the sense of faculty, or even of law. One must attend to this in reading authors.

B. By a signification more remotely derived and wholly improper, right designates:

1. the science by which what is just is known (the science of right, a jurist, to study law), or the code in which laws are found; 2) further, the place in which right is rendered (to appear in court, to be called into court, to have recourse to court); 3) finally, the sentence of a judge, to whom it belongs to make justice, even if what he decrees is unjust (to render right).

150. Definition of right. - Right cannot strictly be defined, but is a simple and primary notion;⁵ nevertheless it can be described somewhat, so that it may be more fully understood.

⁵ Pottier, De Iure et Iustitia, diss. I, sect. I, n. 3.

A. Right considered objectively or passively is that which is rigorously owed to another unto equality, so that the other can demand it as due to himself and exclusively his own, even legally or judicially; in other words, it is a strict debt to be rendered unto equality. Whence formally it is a true relation, namely, of equality toward another. It is the adequation, the adjustment, of one to another; consequently it is a relation constituting an objective order between them, and thus a due ordering of one to another: a relation by which they are adjusted or made adequate to one another, or a relation of adequation between two or more whom it renders equal and by which they are equal.

This relation is not immediate between persons, but is made by means of the object which specifies the right: something must be given to one which is owed to him by another. The object of right is not always a thing; it can be an action to be furnished, such as honor and service, or the omission of that which would impede the action of another. But the subject of right is he to whom it is owed, to whom right is his to something.⁶

⁶ It can be asked whether the object of justice is the just operation itself, the rendering of the debt, or rather the object of the operation. Fr. de Victoria responds in this place: The rendering of the debt can be called the object of justice, or the equality which arises from the fact that the debt is rendered. The just operation is for the one owing one hundred to render those to the creditor. If he renders them, a just operation is done and equality is made. The object of justice is each in some way: that giving, and the equality resulting thence. Yet more properly the resulting effect, namely, the equality following the just operation, is called the object of justice; because the operation tends to that, and the object of justice and of the just operation must be the same, just as the object of the habit and of the operation is the same.

B. But right considered actively or subjectively imports a relation of a rational being to something as to his own; yet formally it is power, and is usually defined as a legitimate and inviolable moral faculty of having, doing, or demanding something, as exclusively one's own, for one's proper advantage. It is said:

1st, moral faculty, i.e., not a mere fact, but a power, not indeed merely physical, which can be opposed to right,⁷ but moral and legitimate, which is obtained by force of law and is conformed to right reason. Whence the subject of right is a rational being;

⁷ Cf. Syll. prop. 59 and 61.

2nd, inviolable, i.e., which cannot licitly be prohibited by others, for right in one brings with it in others the obligation of not impeding the exercise of this right. Whence of itself it also includes coercive power by force of warding off those who try to injure the right; yet this faculty must be exercised not arbitrarily but according to law;

3rd, of having, doing, or demanding something, by which the object of right is indicated, which is threefold: possession of external things, exercise of one's own faculties (under which name also comes non-exercise: not paying, not serving as a soldier), the furnishing to be made by another (or omitted), or the action of another;

4th, as exclusively one's own for one's proper advantage: namely, it is founded on the connection of the thing with the possessor of the right, considered independently of other men, by which it comes about that the thing must serve his utility exclusively. - And thus right properly and simply so called is distinguished from right accepted in a broader sense and according to something, or the power of jurisdiction which someone has for ruling others, not for his own advantage but for the utility of subjects.

151. What is essential to right.⁸ - Therefore in right, considered both subjectively and objectively, there is essentially imported a moral preference by which someone is preferred, all others being excluded, in the use of some thing on account of the peculiar connection which the thing has with him; whence it is owed to him. That connection is a moral bond: namely, it is a connection conformed to right reason, by which it comes about that the thing about which there is question must now be judged as exclusively destined to the utility and advantage of him who has obtained this connection. Therefore the essential or constitutive foundation of right is that connection, namely, the ordering of something to something as to an end; if this exists, right exists; but if it does not exist or if it is removed, right does not exist.

⁸ On the notion and foundation of right, cf. Meyer, Zigliara, Lehu, Beysens, De Pascal, De Bie in the cited work; likewise Weiss, Apologie des Christenthums; Nolens, De Leer van den H. Thomas over het Recht; De Baets, Les Bases de la Morale et du Droit; Kuhlmann, Der Gesetzesbegriff des H. Thomas von Aquin; De la Barre, La morale d'apres S. Thomas d'Aquin et les anciens scolastiques; Lachance, Le Concept de droit selon Aristote et S. Thomas.

This connection can arise by various titles from the nature of the thing or from positive law; for example, he who from his own material, by his own instruments, has made some manufactured thing, for this reason has a connection with the work which no one has with it; and, this being posited, right reason dictates that he be preferred to all others in the faculty of disposing of that thing for his own utility. And he who has received the thing from him is rightly judged to succeed in the connection of dominion, and therefore to be preferred to all.

152. The proximate foundation of right. - The aforesaid titles provide the foundation of this or that right in the concrete, but there must also be a foundation of right itself, as such, in the abstract, or of every right: this is the dignity and inviolability of the person himself. A person essentially is an intellectual being, incommunicable, existing for himself: on the one hand he is master of his acts on account of freedom; on the other hand, because, existing incommunicably for himself, he is of his own right, and of himself in being and acting; whence he does not exist merely or chiefly on account of the good of others, but on account of his own good and proper end. Therefore he cannot be considered by others as a means subordinated to them, but they must revere him as a being existing alongside them and of the same dignity, who cannot be deprived of his own order to his proper good. Therefore every person is inviolable insofar as he tends to his end (S. Th., c. Gent. III, 112).

This being posited, we argue thus: A person enjoys the inviolable faculty of ordering himself to his end. But he cannot efficaciously attain the end without several means, even external ones: exterior things - the use of faculties - a prestation made by others, such as honor, help, the rule of superiors, etc. Therefore he also has the inviolable power of effecting or obtaining that those means are truly ordered to his proper end. But this is the right of disposing exclusively of these things.

153. The ultimate foundation of right. - The inviolability of the created person is the proximate and secondary foundation; but the primary foundation or ultimate source of right is God Himself. For:

1st. He who imposes an end upon us and wills that we attain it, must also give us the means necessary for this and order that by an inviolable power we can tend to the end through them (against Kant).

2nd. Moreover, right in one and duty in another are correlatives;⁹ but every obligation and duty is ultimately derived from the eternal law of God, as was proved in the treatise on Laws, I, n. 241; therefore God is the ultimate source of every right.

⁹ Against this assertion some object at times that there is an obligation, for example, of almsgiving, in one, without right in another; or, if it is not without right, that by this very fact almsgiving is owed in justice. - Resp. 1st. There is an obligation in one without right in another, I concede; there is a duty or obligation of justice in one without right in another, I deny. Or 2nd. There is an obligation without right in him to whom the obligation procures an advantage, I concede; without right in another who obliges us, for example, in God, I deny.

154. Errors concerning the nature and foundation of right are various, just as concerning the nature and foundation of morality and moral obligation.

A. Materialism, such as natural monism, acknowledges nothing except the law of brute matter, or the dominion of the stronger force; whence right is natural force or physical power. Cf. Syll., prop. 59 and 61.

B. Juridical positivism, which is akin to moral positivism. It arose among the sophists. Callicles, Thrasymachus, and Aristippus admitted some right of nature (individual right), namely, the physical force of the stronger, whose measure is the necessity of nature and the utility of man; but since society is necessary at least for the weak, so that they may be able to exercise that right and live securely, it must be transferred and communicated to the community, so that they may have right collectively and so that it may be determined from common power and will. Thus right becomes collective and positive, and the distinction of just and unjust is from external human authority, so that the whole of right is positive and of human origin.

Spinoza (1632-1677) taught almost the same thing; likewise Hobbes (1588-1679), deriving right from the power of command and civil authority; thereafter J. J. Rousseau (1712-1778), explaining the origin from the social contract, or from an express or tacit pact with society through the abdication of individual rights. Bentham, Wundt, Lasson, Schopenhauer, v. Hartmann, v. Kirschmann, v. Ihering, and afterward, in some sense, the promoters of the historical school, approached more or less to this.

C. Transcendental rationalism. Thomasius (1653-1728) was the first of all adequately to distinguish right from morality, so that right is torn away from morality: morality regards internal peace, right external peace.¹⁰ What he rather insinuated for practical reasons, Kant (1724-1804) attempted to establish from philosophical principles. Just as the internal liberty of a rational being, which is an end in itself, is the foundation of moral obligation, so also external liberty is the foundation of right. Morality regards the internal obligation of conscience or of practical reason essentially autonomous (namely, from every external law); right regards external law or external coercion. Hence the juridical order is independent of the moral order. Yet external liberty is the necessary complement of internal liberty; and thus right is the condition, or complex of conditions, of individual liberty. For the liberty of one must be harmonized with the liberty of another; whence the liberty of each must be restrained in favor of the liberty of all. Some positive common recognition of this is required; and therefore it is postulated that civil society be constituted by a social pact, by which rights are determined.

¹⁰ Thus against Wicleff and Luther, who, namely, acknowledge internal right, but no positive right.

Fichte (1762-1814), in his subjective idealism, followed Kantian doctrine rather closely: according to him the liberty of each one is to be restricted insofar as the possibility of the same liberty of others demands it. This restriction is to be made by common consent; and therefore every juridical relation exists really and determinately insofar as it is founded on common recognition. Hence the necessity of society, and in it of a coercive power, by which alone the liberty of all can be obtained and preserved, and which determines the rights of individuals. Thus subjective individualism of right was born.

To this there succeeded, by reaction, an absolute objectivism of right in objective transcendental idealism and ideal pantheism, which Schelling (1785-1854), and especially Hegel (1770-1831), defended, and to whom Schleiermacher (1768-1834) in some measure approached.

In place of the pact-like union of wills there was substituted the absolute universal will, and an absolute moral organism with absolute morality, which does not descend from the eternal law of God, but is realized and expressed by the political State, which State is the supreme deity of human affairs. Hence there arises the omnipotence of the State, which leads to full socialism.

Thus the State is the source of all right, whose immediate foundation is the universal will.

In more recent times many remain imbued with Kantian principles and profess pure rationalism or formalism, such as Stammler, Loening, Kelsen, Merke.

D. The historical school. From a certain reaction against Kant and individualism, and at the same time against absolute transcendental objectivism, there arose the school of historical right, according to which in fact and in the concrete there exists no valid right except positive right, whose source is the history of laws and customs: thus for the absolute will there is now substituted the union of wills; nor is the State the origin of right, but rather the State has arisen from the evolution of right.

Thus de Maistre, de Bonald and the traditionalists, Burke, likewise Lud. de Haller and Adam Miller; afterward, more scientifically, the strictly historical school represented by v. Savigny, Hugo, Puchta, v. Stahl, Schwind; the strictly empirical school with v. Ihering¹¹ and Levy-Bruhl, to which the sociological school with Durkheim in some measure approaches.

¹¹ Yet he holds the State to be the source of right, which he says is an advantage that is juridically protected.

Right properly so called, which is to be distinguished from morality, is nothing except positive right, nor has it any other source except a historical one, namely, historical custom and the statutes of laws. The science of right is the evolution of written law and legal custom; the subject of right is the people, and all right is human.

Several things can be opposed to these systems. Generally:

a) It is false that right is adequately distinguished from morality: for it is an objective part of the moral order, or part of the natural law, since man by his nature is social.

And indeed: objective or passive right is the object of justice, which is a moral virtue; subjective or active right is a moral faculty; normative right or law is of the moral order, for it depends upon the natural moral law.

b) It is false that there is nothing except positive right. For 1) we have demonstrated that the natural law exists (I, n. 244) and that there is intrinsic morality (I, n. 122); but the precepts of justice pertain to it. - 2) Positive law is necessarily founded upon natural law (I, n. 270); thus positive right is necessarily founded upon natural right.

Since right taken in the second way, for the faculty of doing something, acquiring, etc., is the foundation of right or of the just, which is the object of justice, many necessary points concerning it occur to be examined, especially concerning dominion, which is its principal species.

Dominion is twofold: one of jurisdiction, which is the power of governing one's subjects; the other of property, which is the faculty of disposing of some thing as one's own for one's own advantage, and it is chiefly of this that we treat here.

Dominion of property again is twofold: one full and perfect, the other not full and imperfect.

Full dominion is the right to the property of a thing and its emoluments. Not full is the right to the property of a thing without the emoluments, and it is called direct dominion, such, e. g., as belongs to the prince with respect to a fief; or the right to the emoluments without the property, and it is called useful dominion, and such belongs to usufructuaries, feudatories, emphyteutae, etc.

Therefore

I say first: Full and perfect dominion of property, as it embraces direct and useful dominion, is rightly defined: "A right in a thing, or the legitimate faculty of disposing of a thing as one's own, for any use not prohibited by law, for one's own advantage." It is gathered from D. Thomas, here q. 66, a. 1, c.

It is said, "for any use not prohibited by law;" because, although dominion by its nature bestows power for any use whatever, this power can nevertheless be impeded by law so that it does not pass into act: as happens with a minor, who before the legitimate age cannot alienate his goods, although he is their true owner; hence, if he were to alienate them, he would not sin against justice.

But the same conditions are required for perfect dominion that are required for right in a thing, namely: the existence of the thing, a legitimate title, and delivery of the thing.

I say secondly: Usufruct is defined: "The right of using and enjoying the things of another, saving their substance." So in the law.

It is said, "of enjoying," that it may be distinguished from simple use.

For he who has simple use can only use the thing, e. g., a horse, a house, a garden, a field, a wood, etc., for his own daily necessity, so that he can neither let, sell, nor gratuitously cede to another either the superfluous fruits or the right he has; whereas he who has usufruct can do all these things, so L. 12, ff. de Usu.

But fruits are reckoned not only in immovables, as hay, crops, shoots, timber trees, bois taillis in an estate (for fruit-bearing trees are not reckoned fruits), but also in movables, as wool, milk, offspring, etc., in a flock. Where note that timber wood, even if cut out of season, is in fruit, just as an olive picked unripe, likewise hay cut unripe. L. 48, ff. de Usufructu. As to harvest and vintage, however, the usufructuary must wait for ripeness.

Note further that, if the usufructuary die before he has gathered the fruits, even if ripe, these are acquired by the owner of the property, and not by the heirs of the usufructuary. So in Instit. de Rerum divisione, § Is vero. The reason is, because as long as they adhere to the estate they are held to be one with it. Hence they belong to the owner of the estate until the usufructuary by gathering them has made them his own.

It is said, "the things of another;" because usufruct is a servitude, which can be constituted only over the things of another. "For no one's own thing serves him, but profits him by right of dominion," as is said in L. 26, ff. de servitute praedior. rustic.

It is said, "saving their substance;" because the usufructuary must reserve the thing intact for the proprietor. Hence usufruct cannot properly be constituted over things that are consumed by a single use, as wine, oil, etc.

I say thirdly: Use is defined by the jurists: "The right of only using the things of another, saving their substance."

It is said the right of only using, and not of enjoying; because, as I have already said, the simple user can only take the fruits of a thing, as vegetables, apples, hay, for his own daily necessity, but he cannot sell or give them away, nor let the thing itself; which the usufructuary can do.

It is said, "saving their substance," because in use, as in usufruct, the thing must be preserved intact for the owner.

From this you have that this definition of use does not belong to things consumable by a single act, as wine, oil, bread, etc.; because by such use the substance of the thing does not remain safe. Hence, if use be taken more generally, as it befits both things consumable by a single act and non-consumable things, it is "the right of using a thing of another."

Concerning this use of things consumable by a single act there was once great controversy, not only among theologians, but also among Pontiffs: whether it should be distinguished from dominion? For whose resolution let there be

Use is distinguished in two ways: one independent and irrevocable at the nod of the grantor, as in a loan; the other dependent and revocable at the nod of the grantor, such as guests have at a banquet laid out, or individual religious at food or drink granted to them by the superior; for these things, whether the banquet, or the food and drink, can be taken away by the owner or superior without injustice as long as they exist.

Irrevocable use is called by Nicholas III, cap. Exiit, de verborum signific. in 6°, and by some theologians "use of right," because it is an absolute and solid right. Revocable use is called use of fact; because the right it imports or supposes is very weak, being dependent on the will of another.

I say: Revocable use in things consumable by one act is distinguished from dominion.

Proof. First. Separation is a manifest proof of real distinction. But revocable use, as in the conclusion, is separable from dominion. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. He who grants to another the faculty of using his thing, while retaining the power of revoking this faculty at his nod and of disposing of his thing to whatever use he wishes, grants the use and retains dominion. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. That he grants the use is evident in itself. That he retains dominion is proved. He is truly lord who can recall his thing to himself at his pleasure, no contract intervening, and dispose of it for any use whatever. Therefore.

Proof. Second. Individual religious have the use of those things that are granted to them for sustenance, revocable by the superior. But they do not have dominion over them, since by vow of poverty they have abdicated the dominion and property of all things²⁴¹ . Therefore. ²⁴¹ This is understood of religious orders that are perfect, in which solemn vows are pronounced.

It is confirmed by the example Nicholas III uses. A father of a family giving a banquet to guests gives them the use of foods revocable at his nod. Yet he does not transfer dominion to them. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. Guests are not lords of what is set on the table, nor can they use it for any use whatever, but only for eating, and that so dependently on the will of the father of the family that he would commit no injustice if he took away what he had set out. Therefore.

So with us think Nicholas III, Clement V, and before them Alexander III and Gregory IX, Soto, Navarrus, Sylvius, Lessius, and many others together with the entire school of the Scotists.

You will object: John XXII, Extravag. Ad conditorem, asserts the contrary of our opinion, and says that to say that in such things use can be constituted separately from dominion repugns to right and runs counter to reason. Therefore either he, or the Pontiffs praised above, erred.

I answer. First: suppose we admit that John XXII erred in this part, nothing absurd follows, since it is not a matter of faith or morals, but partly natural, partly civil; and besides he said this not defining as Pontiff, but reasoning as a particular doctor.

It can be answered secondly that John XXII did not err even in this; because he does not take dominion strictly and properly, but broadly and improperly for right however tenuous, or rather for the license of using a thing by consuming it, which since in things consumable by the use itself it is equivalent as to effect to dominion (for the Friars Minor consume food as freely as if they were owners), therefore the Pontiff called this right, though most tenuous and revocable, dominion, namely equivalently and analogically. This solution is intimated by the gloss in Clement., Exivi de Paradiso, § Proinde.

: To every and only intellectual nature, namely God, angel, and man, dominion belongs ²⁴² ; because to every and only intellectual nature belongs the foundation of dominion, namely intellect and will, by which it has the power of disposing of its own acts, and by acts over external things. Hence Genesis, I, 26, God said: Let us make man to our image and likeness, that he may rule over the fishes of the sea and the beasts of the earth: where he attributes to man dominion over beasts and fishes because he is the image of God. Now he is the image of God through intellect and will. ²⁴² Here q. 66, a. 1.

I say secondly: All sublunary things can fall under the dominion of man, inasmuch as he can acquire them for himself and dispose of what is acquired at his nod; but of those things of which he has legitimate title he is de facto lord.

He is also absolutely lord of operations freely exercised through intellect and will, through the external senses and through the locomotive power ²⁴³ ; because such are subject to his free choice. Not so perfectly is he lord of actions naturally exercised through the interior senses and the sensitive appetite; because these sometimes depend on the disposition of a bodily organ, which is not in man's power. But of the actions of the vegetative faculty he is in no way lord, because they are in no wise subject to the command of reason. ²⁴³ Iª 2ae, q. 17, a. 5-9.

I say thirdly: Man is not absolutely and directly lord of his own life and members, but only custodian and user ²⁴⁴ ; God alone is Lord. So doctors everywhere. ²⁴⁴ Here q. 64, a. 5, ad 3.

It is proved. First from Scripture. Deut., XXXII, 39, God says: See ye that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me. I will kill, and I will make to live. And Wisdom, XVI, 13: Thou, Lord, hast power of life and death; that is, thou alone.

Proof by reason. First. Life and body are presupposed to dominion as its foundations. Therefore they are not subject to dominion. — If you say that liberty also is a foundation of dominion, and yet man is its lord, seeing that he can sell it into servitude; I answer that what is sold into servitude is not liberty itself or the power of free choice, which is the foundation of dominion, but only the use; just as man can also sell the use of his own body. — Secondly. By the precept Thou shalt not kill, killing is prohibited, not only of another, but also of oneself, and likewise mutilation. Therefore man cannot dispose at pleasure of life or members, and consequently has no dominion over them. — Thirdly. Dominion is only over those things which we can acquire by our industry; for just as we can acquire them, so we can relinquish them. But we cannot acquire life or members by our own industry. Therefore. — Fourthly. Dominion is only over distinct things. But life and members are not a thing distinct from us. Therefore.

I say thirdly: Neither princes nor the commonwealth have direct dominion over the life and members of citizens, as if they could kill or mutilate citizens at pleasure, but only indirect, inasmuch as the life of certain men is harmful to the public good.

It is evident both from the praised precept: Thou shalt not kill; and because every private person stands to the commonwealth as a member to the body; no one however is lord of his own members, as was said. Therefore.

I say fourthly: Man is lord of his own reputation and honor ²⁴⁵ . It is common against Cajetan, q. 73, a. 2. This dominion however is at times bound up. ²⁴⁵ Here q. 73, a. 4, ad 1.

Proof of the first part. Man acquires reputation by his own labor, or at least the right to it; having once acquired it, by the faculty of choice he governs it, preserves it, or loses it without wrong to anyone, as Augustine did by making his falls manifest. Therefore he is its lord. — The corollary is evident; because all these acts are the principal acts of dominion.

I. God alone is truly and absolutely Lord of all things. The reason is that, since he alone is the supreme creator and conserver of all things, all things have absolute dependence upon him alone. - Hence it follows 1st. that no created being can possess with respect to God, that is, use some thing as absolutely his own; and 2nd. that the right of property cannot be in a created being unless God wills it.

II. A man can be proprietor with respect to another man. The reason is that this is repugnant under no aspect: not on the part of men, because, since these are equal by nature, they do not depend in this matter one upon another; not on the part of the things themselves, because these rather have an aptitude to be possessed and brought into use, although not by diverse persons at the same time on account of their finitude; nor finally on the part of God, because God wills that we use created goods as means for conserving life, as is clear from the nature of those goods and from the exigency of man.

III. If any man has legitimately made certain goods his own, he has acquired in them a right inviolable of itself. The reason is that, this condition having been posited, God, who gave both aptitude and exigencies to man for the use of things, immediately communicates a right in them; but that right cannot be violated by another man without disorder. - Hence it follows 1st. that there is a natural precept promulgated and sanctioned by God himself, forbidding that the right of another be injured, and prescribing that if at any time it has been injured, it be restored whole; 2nd. that he who unjustly usurps another's thing becomes guilty both toward neighbor and toward God: toward neighbor indeed, because he injures his natural independence; toward God, by violating the divine right communicated to the neighbor, and at the same time the natural precept commanding that the aforesaid right be observed.

IV. Commutative justice obliges under grave sin and with the burden of restitution. The reason of the first is taken both from the fact that in the Scriptures eternal punishment is decreed not only once against those who violate commutative justice, and because the violation of another's right, since it is essentially harmful, by its own nature introduces great disorder into the mutual fellowship of men, and is repugnant to charity, which moves one to will another's good. But the reason of the second is that commutative justice regards equality of thing to thing, which can be brought about only through full restitution, once it has been violated.

V. The other species of justice of themselves also oblige under grave sin, but not with the burden of restitution. The first is clear from this, that, their definitions being inspected, grave harm to the whole society would follow if they could be violated either with impunity or under light sin only. But the other is gathered from this, that there cannot be the burden of restitution where either equality or relation to another is lacking, namely where restitution itself is not possible. - Nevertheless, commutative justice is often joined to the others, and thus the burden of restitution is introduced. Wherefore a magistrate or judge is held to restore if, on account of grave negligence in punishing, he is the cause why private persons or the community suffer grave damage, not by virtue of legal justice having been neglected, but of a violated contract by which, in assuming the office, he implicitly obligated himself to prevent the damages of subjects.

Dominion, taken in general and in a broad sense, signifies any power whatever: sometimes it is used to express especially the power of jurisdiction, and sometimes even the possessed thing itself. But here it is taken in the strict sense for the right of property, and it is usually defined as "the faculty of disposing of some thing as one's own for every use not prohibited by law or agreement." - Cf. Molina, disp. 3, tract. 2. - Lugo, disp. 2, nn. 2 and 3. - Carrière, n. 16.

Dominion is chiefly divided into perfect and imperfect, according as it is the right of disposing both of the thing itself and of its utility, or only of one or the other. - This latter, namely imperfect dominion, is again divided into direct and indirect, which is also called useful, according as it regards only the property of the thing or only its utility.

Here also mention must be made of dominion which they call eminent. This dominion consists in the right which the supreme authority in society has of disposing, sometimes for a most grave cause, of the goods of private persons for the good of the community, e.g., of the field of some citizen for constructing a road. But then just compensation must be given; and concerning this, among us, special provision is made in the Constitution itself; for, Amend. art. 5, at the end, it is said: "Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." - Hence, since eminent dominion does not confer the right of disposing, but rather the right of buying some thing for the common good, it must be reduced to the power of jurisdiction rather than to the right of property.

I say. Every man, and only man, is capable of dominion. The reason is that, according to St. Thomas, the foundation of dominion is rational nature. And indeed, every man, and only man, can know the utility of things, will to apply them to himself if they belong to no one, and dispose of them thus applied to himself for his own end and his own advantage. Besides, he alone is capable of right or dominion who is capable of injury; but he alone suffers injury who suffers it against his will: however, he must be unwilling not indeed through the will by which he wills his own thing, but through the will by which he wills to retain the right to the thing itself, or to oblige others not to take it away. But brute animals cannot have such a will, since they can know neither moral obligation nor turpitude. Therefore.

Hence neither little children nor the insane themselves are incapable of dominion, as is clear from the practice of all peoples and from the reason just given; for, as was said, dominion is founded in the rational nature of men and its powers, but not in the actual exercise of those powers. Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 66, art. 1. - Lugo, disp. 3, n. 1.

Children of the family here are properly called those who, born from legitimate marriage or legitimated, of whatever sex they may be, are still subject to paternal power. - I said 1st. born from legitimate marriage or legitimated, because concerning the dominion of those who are spurious, judgment must be made only according to the equity of the right of nature, but not according to the special dispositions of the law. - I said 2nd. still subject to paternal power, because since only children not yet emancipated are reputed by law as infants, limitations are given only concerning their dominion, and therefore the question can be raised concerning them alone.

But emancipation can take place either by general law or by privilege and special declaration, and at a diverse age of children of the family, according to the diversity of regions. - Among us, with two or three States excepted, emancipation takes place in the twenty-first year both for males and for females. Cf. Wells, Every Man His Own Lawyer, p. 240.

You Will Ask. What can be the diverse goods of children of the family, and what dominion can they exercise?

Response 1st. From Roman Law the goods of children are: 1st. castrensia, that is, acquired on occasion of military service; 2nd. quasi-castrensia, or acquired from some public office, e.g., of judge, physician, etc.; 3rd. adventitia, which come from inheritance or donation, yet not made by the father or with a view to the father; 4th. profectitia, which the son gains from paternal goods, e.g., by carrying on business with the father's money, or which are given to him with a view to the father. - Moreover, of castrensia or quasi-castrensia goods the son has both dominion of property and usufruct; he also has administration if he has attained puberty. But the property of adventitia belongs to the son, but usufruct and administration to the father; finally profectitia in all respects belong to the father. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 488.

Response 2nd. Since, as Kenrick says, "these distinctions are not in force in the law which we use," the proposed question must be answered by distinguishing between the case in which the child of the family receives goods by title of donation or inheritance, and the case in which he acquires them by virtue of labor or industry. - In the first case, administration belongs to the father, but dominion of property and usufruct to the son. In the other, there is need of a new distinction; for either 1st. the son labors outside the paternal house and is not fed by the father, and then he will be able to make the goods which he gains his own, because he has been dismissed or is reputed dismissed; or 2nd. the son labors in the paternal house or outside it and is fed by the father, and then all things which he gains belong to the father.

But in that last case a threefold exception must be made in favor of the son, namely: 1st. if the father remits from his right, and he is considered to remit if he permits the son to contract marriage; 2nd. if the son by reason of his condition is not held to labor; 3rd. if he has evidently and undoubtedly labored more than the others of the family. - Although this last opinion can sometimes be held in practice, at least after the fact, nevertheless it is not to be taught publicly everywhere on account of the inconveniences which would follow through abuse. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 488 and 544. - Lessius, lib. 2, cap. 12, n. 81. - Kenrick, tract. 10, part. 1, n. 41. - Kent, Comment., vol. 2, nn. 191 and seq.

See Bouvier, Law Dictionary, 8th Edit., Parent and Child. Cf. Right to earnings of the child.

From Roman Law the goods of a wife are of three kinds, namely:

1st. Dotal goods, or goods which the wife already possessed, or which her father conceded to her for contracting marriage: the administration and usufruct of these are in the possession of the husband, but direct dominion is in the possession of the wife.

2nd. Paraphernal goods, or goods which the wife reserved to herself besides the dowry: these belong to her by full right.

3rd. Common goods, or goods which, by agreement had between the spouses or by determination of law, are brought into a certain partnership: of these, both direct and useful dominion belong to both spouses. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 489. - Elbel, n. 69.

But in this region the three aforesaid names are taken otherwise, and the dominion of wives is different in it. For:

1st. "The dotal goods of a wife, according to our customs," says Kenrick, "are the third part of the immovable goods which the husband has possessed during marriage, which therefore he cannot alienate to the prejudice of the wife, unless she herself, questioned separately by a magistrate, has freely consented, and by her signature has renounced her right. If the husband by testament has left certain goods to the wife, that her dowry be excluded, it is in her power to reject them so that she may enjoy her right. Moreover, only during her life does her right remain, and when she has died, it passes to the heirs of the husband." Cf. Kenrick, n. 45. - Bouvier, Law Dictionary, under the word Dower.

2nd. Paraphernal goods among us mean all goods which pertain to the clothing or ornament of a woman, according to her condition, and which she used during marriage: these after the death of the husband belong altogether to the wife. - Cf. Kenrick, n. 42. - Bouvier, Law Dictionary, under the word Paraphernalia. - Wells, Every Man, etc., p. 82.

3rd. Common goods are those which are acquired by husband and wife together by title of purchase or of donation had during marriage. Each spouse possesses these goods as if the two spouses were one person, so that neither can sell them without the consent of the other. Cf. Kenrick, n. 44. - Kent, Comment., vol. 4, part 6, lect. 55. - Bouvier, Law Dictionary, §§ Dower, Husband and Wife.

Question 1. Can a wife give alms from common goods?

Response. Affirmatively, even if otherwise she has her own goods, provided that it is done according to the custom of other women of the same condition. The reason is that a wife is not a servant but a partner; therefore she must have a certain administration in the house of the husband. Besides, the husband is deservedly presumed to consent to those things which are done by the wife according to the respectable custom of condition and region; and if he shows himself unwilling, such dissent is considered irrational, because the husband cannot deprive the wife of a right conceded to her by legitimate custom. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 540. - Kenrick, n. 46.

Question 2. Does a wife sin by giving something from common goods for relieving the necessity of parents or children whom she has had from a prior marriage?

Response. Negatively, if she does not have her own goods, and through this necessary things are not lacking to the husband and his family. The reason is that by the right of nature the wife is held to relieve the aforesaid blood relatives, and therefore the husband is reasonably presumed to consent to this. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 542. - Kenrick, n. 46.

Question 3. Is the wife held to restore goods given in this manner when, the husband having died, she comes into the inheritance of dotal goods, or before his death she has acquired paraphernal goods?

Response. Negatively, if the goods given are of small moment, because then they are held as common alms, which, if they are made moderately, do not carry with themselves the burden of restitution. Indeed, the response must also be negative, at least probably, if the goods withdrawn are of greater moment; because all burdens which, while marriage stands, naturally befall one of the spouses are considered common to the other, and therefore the husband cannot be reasonably unwilling.

The goods of clerics are distinguished into four kinds, namely: 1st. Patrimonial goods, which come from paternal inheritance or from any other profane cause, for instance from donation, succession, etc.; 2nd. Quasi-patrimonial goods, which are also called quasi-ecclesiastical or casual, and these are those which are acquired on occasion and in view of functions, e.g., by celebrating Mass, preaching, etc.; 3rd. Ecclesiastical goods, which are received from benefices of the Church, e.g., from revenues of benefices, etc.; 4th. Parcimonial goods, which a cleric sets aside by living sparingly from the fruits of a benefice, and which he could consume by living honorably.

I say. Clerics have perfect dominion in patrimonial, quasi-patrimonial, and parcimonial goods, so that they can dispose of them at will. The reason is both that that dominion is nowhere found restricted, and that in this all theologians, even the stricter ones, agree.

Although a benefice-holder may have other non-beneficial goods, he can freely use and enjoy benefice fruits which are necessary for his honorable support; but he is held by the obligation of expending superfluous fruits for the poor or for pious causes, with the prescription of can. 239, § 1, n. 19 being saved (Can. 1473).

§ 1. Unless the contrary is proved, those things which are donated to rectors of churches, even of religious, are to be presumed to have been donated to the church.

§ 2. A donation made to the church cannot be repudiated by its rector or Superior without the license of the Ordinary.

§ 3. If a donation has been illegitimately repudiated, on account of the damages which have arisen thence an action is given for restitution in full or for indemnity.

§ 4. A donation made to a church and legitimately accepted by the same cannot be revoked on account of the ungrateful disposition of the Prelate or rector (Can. 1536).

Question 1. Are clerics badly expending the surplus of ecclesiastical goods held to restitution?

Response. Certain strict theologians, such as Collet and Antoine, respond affirmatively, because they say: clerics are only administrators and stewards of ecclesiastical goods. But the opinion denying is probable, because although it is established concerning the precept of giving these superfluous goods, nevertheless it is not established concerning the origin of this obligation, namely whether it proceeds from justice. This opinion is also called probable by St. Alphonsus in his reformed propositions, especially on account of the authority of St. Thomas. Observe moreover that for the gravity of fault in the violation of this ecclesiastical precept there is required a quantity much greater than in theft, namely, according to the truer opinion, about a twentieth part of the superfluous goods. - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 185, art. 7. - St. Alphonsus, n. 491; and QQ. Reform., n. 10.

Question 2. Whether the annual pension which is given to our Missionaries from the renting of pews is to be assimilated to ecclesiastical goods?

Response. According to the Constitution Romanos Pontifices, this annual pension is to be held as ecclesiastical goods.

§ 1. Temporal goods, whether corporeal, both immovable and movable, or incorporeal, which belong either to the universal Church and to the Apostolic See or to another moral person in the Church, are ecclesiastical goods (Can. 1497).

I say. Any man from natural right has a right in the fruit of his own ingenuity or industry. For if a thing bears fruit for its owner, a fortiori this must be true concerning internal faculties, since nothing can be more proper to a man. Wherefore the inventor of some art has a strict right that his secret not be stolen and, against his will, divulged to the public; but if this is done, the one causing damage will be held to restitution according to the measure of the injury inflicted. - Cf. Wells, Every Man, etc.; qq. 243 and seq.

Question 1. Does he violate another's right who publishes in type a manuscript work without the consent of the author?

Response. Affirmatively; and the reason is that it is established among all that a manuscript work is not in the public domain, but lies under the dominion of the author. The same must be said of one who would publish in type the public lectures of some professor or the sermon of an orator; for to teach publicly or to preach is not to hand over one's work to another for publishing and selling. - Yet except the case if someone delivers again from the pulpit a sermon already heard as if composed by himself, both because through this he does not properly claim the thing of another for himself, and because he does not necessarily and of itself harm the prior orator. - Cf. Carrière, n. 61.

Question 2. Does he who has published a book in type have the right of preventing anyone from committing it to the press and selling it with damage to the author or to the bookseller to whom the author has transmitted his right?

Response. Affirmatively, by positive right prevailing in most places, just as in these States, provided nevertheless that the conditions or formalities required by law have been fulfilled. But if there is question of natural right, it is controverted, and to some the denying opinion seems probable, because the author has a right in his work as long as it remains his own, namely is not handed over to the community, and thus as it were becomes of common right. Wherefore according to these, if someone in this region committed to type a book published in Europe without the permission of the author, strictly speaking and looking only to the right of nature, he does not seem to be accused of the temporal pecuniary damage which the author would suffer thence. I said 1st. strictly speaking, because by such a manner of acting, if not a right properly so called, public uprightness and natural decency seem to be injured. - I said 2nd. looking only to the right of nature, because if the contrary has been provided through international stipulation, the violator certainly would be held to paying the fine and congruous compensation. I said 3rd. concerning temporal pecuniary damage, for if the same or almost the same book were published under another name, then the true author would be damaged in the goods of reputation, which can never be lawful, and a sin of this kind is designated by a special name among all nations. - Cf. Carrière, ibid. - Kenrick, tract. 10, part. 1, nn. 13 and 14. - Bouvier, Law Dictionary, Ed. 8th. Cf. Copyright, De lege lata among us (March 4, 1909).

ALL Theologians, Jurists, and Philosophers hold that Ius is the object of the Virtue of Justice: but one must diligently see which Ius is established as the object of this virtue; and which Virtue Justice is understood to be by us; for each can be taken in many ways.

FOR JUSTICE is taken chiefly in three ways. First, for the habit by which we are made suited to all things equitable, both in order to ourselves, and in order to God and others: thus it is taken by all Philosophers, but more by Theologians, who understand in this sense what is delivered universally in the Scriptures, when someone is named just, namely endowed with all the virtues, which is everywhere met with, where they name Just men heroes, as Genes. 6. Noë a just man Genes. 6. Iob. 1. Eccles. 40. et seq. as the Saintly Doctor observes everywhere. The Doctor interprets it at ad 3. Luca:¹ Make straight your paths, according to 16. Isa. The path of the just is right. Prouerb. 4. I led thee by the paths of equity. So Prouerb. 8. I walk in the ways of justice. So Gregory of Nyssa, lib. de beat. oratione 4. understands it Matth. 5. Blessed who hunger and thirst after justice, in which sense it is taken also by St. Augustine at that place, cited by St. Bonaventure 3. p. Centiloquii, sect. 44. and lib. 2. Pharet. cap. 42. ¹ Editor's note: the print reads 'Ided ad 3. Luca interpretatur id'; 'Ided' is unintelligible and is rendered 'Ideo' (therefore), as a new clause begins.

IN like manner Justice is taken for the habit infused with sanctifying grace, by which one is constituted just, and holy, endowed with all the virtues. So Rom. 3. But the justice of God, by the faith of Jesus Christ, unto all who believe in him. Which is called the justice of God, not formally, but efficiently from God, or the gift of God, as St. Augustine teaches lib. de Spiritu, et litt. cap. 9. and the Holy Council of Trent often inculcates, and gravely defines, as I showed Tract. de Gratia, disp. 2.

THEREFORE we do not take justice in so general a sense, but as it is a particular virtue among the four Cardinal ones, whose proper praise and office is to constitute the due equality between men, as the Saintly Doctor notes in 3. dist. 33. dub. 1. et in quaestionibus passim, et in 4. dist. 15. passim et 3. p. Cencil. sect. 44. et 5. p. Breuil. cap. 4. et lib. 2. Phar. cap. 42. et in Diata, tit. 5. cap. 8.

WISDOM takes it thus, c. 8. where it is said, to teach Soberness, and Wisdom, Justice and Virtue; where it calls Soberness Temperance; for Wisdom it understands Prudence; for Virtue, Fortitude; but it takes Justice for the Virtue of Justice, which is the second Cardinal virtue among those, as Gregory of Valencia notes disp. 5. quaest. 1. puncto 1. after St. Bonaventure in the Commentary on that place.

THIRDLY, in another mode the Saintly Doctor takes it in 3. § dist. 33. dub. 1. litt. et in Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 31. for the judicial, coercing with punishments; But this is a species of the Cardinal, as I shall say; nevertheless all commonly call it this, when it is said: Justice inquired into Peter, punishes; or: Peter is afflicted in Justice.

¶ Further, Ius also can be taken in many ways.

¶ First, whatever in any mode is equitable, or good, as the Jurist Paulus says l. Ius, ff. de Iustitia, et Iure.

¶ Second, it signifies whatever is conformable to law, as the Philosopher says 5. Eth. cap. 1. In which way St. Isidore said lib. 5. Ethymol. cap. 3. that Law is a kind of species (that is, norm, or idea) of Ius, according to the doctrine of St. Thom. art. 1. ad 2.

¶ Third, it signifies the lawful faculty, or power of doing, or acquiring, or possessing, or alienating something, as the Jurists distinguish between Ius ad rem, which is owed to someone; and Ius in re, which someone also possesses.

¶ Fourth, it is taken for the Sentence of a judge, as the Jurist Paulus has it loco citato.

¶ Fifth, it signifies the same as Lex, that is, the dictamen of prudence, whether natural, or in habit, or the authority for making laws, in which way Ius is divided into the Natural of nations, and Civil, by Ulpian in l. Iuri, et often by St. Bonaventure in 4. dist. 36. quaest. 1. et 3. p. Centil. cap. 44. et other places, cited in the tract. de Legibus.

¶ In none of the said modes, or the others enumerated by Valencia, is Ius taken here, but it is taken for the same as Iustum, through equality with another. Hence Scotus lib. 3. de Iustitia, et Iure, quaest. 1. art. 1. says that Ius, by APOCOPE, is said as it were iustum: Whence also in Greek Ius and Iustum are expressed by the same word δίκαιον. The ethymology of which word Ius properly sounds, to be just through the equality of thing with thing. For, as the Philosopher says 5. Eth. cap. 4. on that account it is called ius δίκαιον, because it is δίχα, that is, divided in two, as if to say bipartite; and what is divided in two is divided into equal parts according to the ratio of discrete quantity, inasmuch as it is divided into one and one. Whence, and Iudex, as Aristotle says in the same place, because he determines the just through the equality of thing with thing, is called Bipartitor. And by this reason Justice is called Equity. Thus Proverb. 8. Mine is Equity, mine is Prudence, mine is Fortitude, as the Saintly Doctor observes ad cap. 8. Sapientiae.

¶ Aristotle also used Ius in this sense cap. 4. when he said: Ius, which is in exchanges, is a certain constant equality according to Arithmetic proportion; but that ius, which is in distributions, he had said cap. 3. according to Geometric proportion.

¶ Moderns labor in this ius, which is the object of Justice, in making it clear; and as I see, Mastrius observes the matter Tom. 2. disp. 7. num. 163. saying, that it is That which constitutes dominion, which is twofold, of Jurisdiction, and of Property. This dominion however is defined by the Jurists: The faculty of using a thing at pleasure, without injury to another. In which definition, says Hurtado disp. 12. de Incarn. sect. 3. a circle is committed; for also in defining injury, they say it is the use of a thing against the right and will of the Lord. Thus Ius is defined through Injury, and this through Ius, which is to run in a circle against Aristotle 5. Metaph. cap. 15. Hence Cardinal Lugo disp. 1. de Iustitia, et disp. 3. de Incarn. sect. 2. num. 42. teaches, that this ius, which is the object of Justice, is nothing else than a certain moral prelation, by which this man is morally preferred to others in the use of this thing, by reason of a peculiar connexion, which the thing has with him. Which explanation Bellutus also embraces disp. 7. de Incarn. quaest 6. art. 1. and Mastrius num. 164. He adds, however, that this prelation must be explained, from what head it arises, namely from the disposition of laws, or the nature of the thing. Thus it is explained a priori.

¶ I indeed, weighing this new invention, find that all of these relapse into the same circle; for the Praelation in the use of a thing is an effect of ius. For each one is preferred in the use of a thing, namely a house, a garment, etc. because he has right to it before others, and so Ius is the fountain and cause of that prelation, and therefore ius is not expressed a priori. Again therefore if you seek the origin of that prelation, it must be taken a priori from ius; and so they walk in a circle.

¶ Tanner therefore disp. 4. quaest. 1. dub. 2. n. 8. says, that Ius in re, in the mode of dominion, can scarcely be explicated by any common concept, since it is an analogon of proportionality to its inferiors, such as the dominion of Jurisdiction, and of Property, of which I shall treat in the Disputationes de Furto, et Rapina.

¶ These things pre-stated, it is now established that the object of the Justice of which we treat is Ius, that is, as he says, the Iustum through a certain equality.

¶ It is proved first from the definition of Justice; which is defined through such Ius, as through its proper object. So Aristotle 5. Eth. cap. 1. We see, that this kind of habit is wont to be called Justice; from which men are made suited to doing just things. And cap 5. Justice is that by which the just man is called the doer of the just from election. Where he takes iustum for the equal.

¶ The Jurists also with the words of Ulpian l. Iustitia, ff. de Iustitia, et Iure, define Justice thus: Justice is a constant, and perpetual will of rendering to each his ius. Which definition St. Thom. also sets forth quaest. 58. art 1. and St. Bonaventure 3. p. Centil. sect. 44. where he asserts it to be of the Masters.

¶ So also St. Ambrose lib. 1. de offic. cap. 24. says: Justice renders to each his own ius, does not claim another's, neglects his own utility, and keeps the common equity. And St. Augustine lib. 19. de civit. cap. 21. There is not (he says) ius, where there is no justice: Justice moreover is that virtue which distributes to each his own,² So also St. Bonaventure reports loco citato. ² Editor's note: the print reads 'quae sua nique distribuit'; 'nique' is corrupt (apparently for 'unicuique'); rendered 'sua unicuique distribuit' (distributes to each his own).

¶ It is proved secondly by St. Bonaventure in Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 8. That is the object of Justice, which constitutes the virtue, standing in the mean, not declining to the vicious extremes through excess, and defect: Such is ius, or iustum: Therefore. The Major is Aristotle's 2. Eth. cap. 6. The Minor is proved; For then is one sinning against justice, when more or less is given than is owed. But the mean is the equitable, as Aristotle shows 5. Eth. cap. 3. et 4. cited by St. Bonaventure loc. cit. He says. Thus cap. 4. he says: Whence when men contend, they flee to the judge, etc. and they seek a judge in the mean, and some call him mediator, as if, should they have attained the mean, they should also attain the ius itself. Ius therefore is a certain mean, if indeed the judge also is in the mean; But the judge reduces to equality; and as, if a line be divided into two unequal parts, that by which the greater part exceeds the half, he takes from it, and joins to the lesser.

¶ The Saintly Doctor expounds it with an elegant Astronomical example: For as he says the Polar star, near the pole, is borne with a small gyre in the diurnal motion around the Pole; yet so, that it does not recede from the middle, that is, from the pole of the world; so also created Justice gyrates closely around the immovable Justice of God: And as, not declining, it keeps the straightness of the diurnal motion; so that as the line of the Equator in the middle of its circulation describes the Highest circle, on that account it does not allow the gyrating stars to decline to the right, or to the left, that is, toward the South, nor toward the North; although it is borne through the immense space of 1017. Millions of miles; so also Justice, keeping the equatorial line of equity, does not allow the various things snatched by the first mobile to decline from East to West, either to the right of excess, or to the left of defect, giving more to one; and taking from the other.

From these the Saintly Doctor draws, in 3. dist. 33. dub. 1. and 5. p. Brevil. cap. 4. with St. Thomas as cited by Cajetan art. 1. and Valencia p. 1. at the end. And Soto lib. 3. de Iustitia, quaest. 1. art. 1. the difference between justice and the other moral virtues; for Justice according to its proper reason makes right in order to another; but the others only in order to oneself. On this account St. Ambrose lib. 1. offic. cap. 28. says, that Justice is born rather for others than for itself. So also Cicero lib. 2. de Republica, and Seneca epist. 77. as the Saintly Doctor teaches in Pharetra, lib. 1. cap. 42.

It is GATHERED also, that the mean of Justice is the mean of the thing, even without comparison to the very agent; but of the other virtues, which turn about their own passions, and not about another, in no way does it consist in a mean without comparison to the very agent. But that equality is that very ius, which is called equitable between too much and too little, as Aristotle says 5. Eth. cap. 4.

This shines still more in that example of the Seraphic Doctor: For as without any thinking there is the pole, upon which the heaven moves, and the polar star; which, its small diurnal circle having been described around the pole, they keep the motion of both Hemispheres by the line of the Equator, the substance of the heaven being kept on both sides for each Hemisphere Mathematically; so also Justice, before every thought, and before all its operation, has that object alone, and only to be kept, which is not found in the other moral virtues.

HENCE also it is, that in the Disputation on Justice there is first treated of its object; then of the Virtue, because the object is presupposed before the virtue; not so in the other moral virtues. See Valencia at the end of the punctus.

IT MUST however be observed, that Ius, which is the object of Justice, includes two things; First, that it be owed: Second, that it be equal.

INASMUCH as it is owed, it can be either owed Legally by the force of some Law, or singular, arising from some pact, or convention of certain persons, such as is between buyer and seller.

SECONDLY Ius, inasmuch as it is owed, is divided into natural Ius and human Ius. The owed thing of the first kind arises from the law of nature, namely, that if you give a measure of wheat as a loan; that he render that measure to you. This however is distinguished threefold by St. Bonaventure in 4. dist. 33. quaest. 1. The first is called that which is contained in the Law, and the Gospel, and this is called natural Ius commonly. The second is proper, and is defined at the beginning of the Decretals: Natural ius is that which is common to all nations; and this ius is that which reason dictates. The third, most proper, which nature taught all animals.

The owed thing from human law is, what has been established by some human law, as that between certain things vendible, and that price which is fixed by human law, it be the only price.

From the other head, however, inasmuch as it is something just, and equal; It is divided first by Aristotle lib. 5. Eth. cap. 3. et 4. into Ius, or the equal Geometric; and Arithmetic. The Geometric equal, which is according to proportion, is observed in the distribution of common goods among those who are members of the community, so that by as much as one surpasses another in merits, by the same proportion he may receive more of the goods of the community. But Aristotle says that Ius is exercised through Arithmetic equality, both in exchanges, which are done voluntarily between men, as in buying, selling, exchange, etc. and in compensating, or making amends for the dealings of men involuntary, and those without clandestine acts, as theft, adultery, poisoning, pandering, the seduction of servants, deceitful homicide, false witness, etc. or manifestly violent, as flogging, captivity, slaughter, rapine, mutilation, reviling, contumely, etc. which examples the Philosopher brings in that cap. 2. and through this are distinguished two species of Justice properly so called, namely Distributive, and Commutative, which I exposed at length p. 1. Tract. 1. disput. 19. quaest. 1. et 2.

SECONDLY Ius, inasmuch as it is equal, is divided into Ius, or the iustum simply, and Ius secundum quid. Ius simply is, what is altogether equal, or by which those are made equal between whom it is; and because equality is between distinct ones, therefore this equal is between those, of whom one is not a part of the other, as between two citizens, and it is called Political Ius. Ius secundum quid equal, is between those, of whom one is a part of the other, as between Father, and son, who is a part of the Father, since from his seed, as Aristotle teaches 8. Eth. cap. 12. So between Lord, and servant, who is something of the Lord, namely his instrument, and a part in goods, as Aristotle teaches 1. Polit. cap. 3. Such is also that between Husband, and Wife, as Aristotle says, because whichever spouse is of the other, as is gathered from the Philosopher 6. Eth. cap. 5. and more from Matth. 19. Ephes. 5. For they are one flesh, and on that account that ius is called by St. Thomas here, art. 4. Oeconomicum, and some dominion intervenes in bodies, and some other things, as St. Bonaventure teaches in 4. dist. 41. quaest. ult. Such improper ius seems to be also between citizen, and community, of which he is a part.

THEY DISPUTE: Whether this improper ius is also on the part of the father toward the son, since the father is not a part of the son. They respond affirmatively, Cajetan art. 4. Valencia punct. 2. for whatever pertains to the whole, pertains also to the part. Hence it comes about, that what the son renders to the father, he renders also to himself.

THEY ALSO DOUBT: Whether the son, even when emancipated, ought to be included under this improper ius. It is answered, that he is included by the reason made above, because to be a part of the Father came to him from generation, which always keeps sons, that they may be as it were other Fathers, as Aristotle says 8. Eth. cap. 11.

Julius, who applies himself to the study of moral theology, recently read in a certain newspaper an article which seems to defend the lawfulness of the action called “boycotting,” in order to prevent another from renting lands from which a previous tenant had been expelled by the landlord. For those who apply a “boycott” in the case do nothing violent; each indeed, as a result of a conspiracy, abstains from all association, except in a case of extreme necessity, with those who rent the lands, in which manner of acting nothing is discovered which is not conceded to physicians and others who do not associate with brethren who do not observe the rules of the profession. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a right, and how are rights divided?

2. What is the foundation of a right, or whence do human beings possess rights?

3. Is the saying true—It is lawful for several persons as a result of a conspiracy to do what is lawful for individuals?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is a right and how are rights divided?

A right is a moral power of having, doing, or exacting something. Rights may be divided in a great many ways, but for the purposes of this case it will be sufficient to mention natural rights, such as the right to live and to hold property, rights due to positive law, such as the right of prescription, and rights arising out of contract.

2. What is the foundation of right, or whence do men get their rights?

The foundation of natural rights is man’s rational nature, which is ordered by God his Creator to eternal blessedness with God. The duty is imposed upon man by his Creator of working toward the attainment of the end for which he was created; he has consequently the right to fulfil his destiny unhindered by any one else. This is the ultimate foundation for all man’s natural rights. Positive law is the foundation of rights derived from that source; and voluntary agreement that of rights arising from contract.

3. Is the saying true: Whatever individuals are allowed to do may be done by many in conspiracy with one another?

In general it is, but sometimes it becomes unlawful because the very fact of numbers acting together in conspiracy causes hardship to others, or interferes with their rights. Thus individuals have a right to walk through a crowded thoroughfare, but it does not follow that a large number of people may form themselves into a compact body and march, so as to interfere with the traffic.

4. The case. Those who boycott another abstain from all intercourse with him and prevent others from having any intercourse with him with a view to compelling him to leave a place or occupation to which he has a legal right. Thus they violate his natural right of liberty to settle and employ himself as he chooses, provided that he does not violate just laws nor the rights of others. They also violate the right that he had acquired by contract with the owner of the property which he hired. Boycotting is also against charity on account of the hardship which it causes and the practical exclusion of the boycotted party from human society. It also interferes seriously with public order and peace. Doctors, lawyers, and others belonging to like voluntary associations have a right to make rules for their mutual protection, and any one who enters such profession may be required to conform to the established rules. If they will not do so, they may be professionally ostracized. Such ostracism, however, is only partial; it is applied for good reason to compel uniformity for the common good; it is very different from the ordinary boycott, which takes away rights, the enjoyment of which is necessary for human life.

1. A right is that in virtue of which a person calls anything his own. More elaborately, a right is a moral power residing in a person, in virtue whereof he refers to himself as well his own actions as also other things, which stand referred to him in preference to other persons. A right is a moral power, as distinguished from physical force or ability. It resides in a person, a being whom we call autocentric, as distinguished from a thing, which is heterocentric. (c. ii., s. i., n. 2, p. 203.) A person is his own, a thing is another's. Every intellectual nature is a person except the Humanity of Christ, an exception which does not concern us here. To the Creator all created personalities are as things, but that again is not our concern in this place, where we treat of the relations between man and man. It will have to be noted hereafter with great emphasis, that the individual man is a person, not a thing and chattel, in relation to the State, and consequently has rights against the State.

2. Every intellectual being has the attribute of reflex consciousness. It may turn its regard in upon itself, and call itself me, and its powers and activities mine. It certainly has the physical ability of acting for self, and using its powers consciously for its own ends. Does this physical ability represent also a moral power? Is the agent justified in exercising it? and are his fellows under a moral obligation of justice to leave him free to exercise it? (Ethics, c. vi., s. i., nn. 5, 6, p. 111.) We have seen that morality consists in acting up to one's own intellectual or rational nature. Since then the calling oneself me, and one's power mine, and the using those powers for purposes which one's reason approves, is the distinguishing feature of an intellectual, or rational, and personal being, that being is morally warranted so to act. He calls himself his own, and his powers his own, and they are his own by the very fact of his calling them so by a natural act. And, as justice is to give to another his own, others are bound in justice to leave him free to dispose of himself and his powers, at least within certain limits. But this would be for man a barren freedom, were he not empowered to lay hold of and make his own some things, nay many things, outside of himself, for man is not self-sufficient, but has many natural necessities, and many psychical cravings to boot. Therefore man's right of preference extends, not only to his own actions, but also to external things, which he may make his own to act upon.

3. Rights are either connatural or acquired. Connatural rights spring from the very being of a man, as he is a person. Such are the rights to life, to honour, to personal liberty—that is, freedom to go where you will—to civil liberty—that is, not being a slave—also the rights to marry and to acquire property. Acquired rights spring from some deed of man, annexing something to his personality. Such are the rights to property, duly entered upon, to reputation, to the political franchise, and all rights that come by contract. Acquired rights may descend to heirs.

4. Rights again are alienable and inalienable, which division does not coincide with the preceding. Those rights are inalienable, shorn of which a man cannot work out his last end. Some rights are thus permanently and universally inalienable, as the right to life: others are so occasionally and for particular persons.

5. The correlative of right is duty: so that, wherever one man has a right, his neighbours have a duty in justice to leave him free to exercise the same. But the converse is not true, that wherever one man has a duty towards another, that other has a right to its performance, for there are duties of charity, which do not impart a corresponding right, but only a claim. Duties that correspond to rights are called by English moralists perfect duties. Duties answering to claims only they call imperfect.

6. Of duties, some are positive, which bind always, not for always, as the duty of adoring God. We are always bound to adore, we are not bound to be always adoring. Other duties are negative, and bind always, for always, as the duties of sobriety and chastity. The former class of duties we may more easily be excused from, because they can be deferred, and it is at times morally impossible to take them up. But negative duty, as Mr. Gladstone has finely said, "rises with us in the morning, and goes to rest with us at night: it is the shadow that follows us wheresoever we go, and only leaves us when we leave the light of life."

7. Only a person has rights, as appears by the definition of a right. Again, only persons have duties, for they only have free will. No one has duties without rights, and no man has rights without duties. Infants and idiots, in whom the use of reason is impeded, having notwithstanding rights, are said to have duties also radically. Hence it is wrong to make an idiot commit what is in him a material breach of some negative duty, as of temperance. Positive duties he is excused from.

8. Some have taught that all human rights are consequences of duties; a man having first a duty to perform, and then a right to the means necessary to its performance. But this doctrine appears more pious than probable. For, first, the type and example of sovereign right, God, has no duties. (Ethics, c. vi., s. ii., n. 4, p. 130.) Then again, a man may have a right conjoined with a duty—not of justice, of course, but of some other virtue, as of religion—not to use that right. But if rights were consequent upon duties, the right would cease in such a case; and to pretend to exercise it would be a sin against justice, which it is not.

1. Brute beasts, not having understanding and therefore not being persons, cannot have any rights. The conclusion is clear. They are not autocentric. They are of the number of things, which are another's: they are chattels, or cattle. We have no duties to them,—not of justice, as is shown; not of religion, unless we are to worship them, like the Egyptians of old; not of fidelity, for they are incapable of accepting a promise. The only question can be of charity. Have we duties of charity to the lower animals? Charity is an extension of the love of ourselves to beings like ourselves, in view of our common nature and our common destiny to happiness in God. (c. iv., nn. 1, 2, p. 239.) It is not for the present treatise to prove, but to assume, that our nature is not common to brute beasts but immeasurably above theirs, higher indeed above them than we are below the angels. Man alone speaks, man alone hopes to contemplate for ever, if not—in the natural order—the Face of his Father in Heaven, at least the reflected brightness of that Divine Face. (Ethics, c. ii., s. iv., nn. 3, 4.) We have then no duties of charity, nor duties of any kind, to the lower animals, as neither to stocks and stones.

2. Still we have duties about stones, not to fling them through our neighbour's windows; and we have duties about brute beasts. We must not harm them, when they are our neighbour's property. We must not break out into paroxysms of rage and impatience in dealing with them. It is a miserable way of showing off human pre-eminence, to torture poor brutes in malevolent glee at their pain and helplessness. Such wanton cruelty is especially deplorable, because it disposes the perpetrators to be cruel also to men. As St. Thomas says (1a 2æ, q. 102, art. 6, ad 8):

"Because the passion of pity arises from the afflictions of others, and it happens even to brute animals to feel pain, the affection of pity may arise in man even about the afflictions of animals. Obviously, whoever is practised in the affection of pity towards animals, is thereby more disposed to the affection of pity towards men: whence it is said in Proverbs xii. 10: 'The just regardeth the lives of his beasts, but the bowels of the wicked are cruel.' And therefore the Lord, seeing the Jewish people to be cruel, that He might reclaim them to pity, wished to train them to pity even towards brute beasts, forbidding certain things to be done to animals which seem to touch upon cruelty. And therefore He forbade them to seethe the kid in the mother's milk (Deut. xiv. 21), or to muzzle the treading ox (Deut. xxv. 4), or to kill the old bird with the young." (Deut. xxii. 6, 7.)

3. It is wanton cruelty to vex and annoy a brute beast for sport. This is unworthy of man, and disposes him to inhumanity towards his own species. Yet the converse is not to be relied on: there have been cruel men who have made pets of the brute creation. But there is no shadow of evil resting on the practice of causing pain to brutes in sport, where the pain is not the sport itself, but an incidental concomitant of it. Much more in all that conduces to the sustenance of man may we give pain to brutes, as also in the pursuit of science. Nor are we bound to any anxious care to make this pain as little as may be. Brutes are as things in our regard: so far as they are useful to us, they exist for us, not for themselves; and we do right in using them unsparingly for our need and convenience, though not for our wantonness. If then any special case of pain to a brute creature be a fact of considerable value for observation in biological science or the medical art, no reasoned considerations of morality can stand in the way of man making the experiment, yet so that even in the quest of science he be mindful of mercy.

4. Altogether it will be found that a sedulous observance of the rights and claims of other men, a mastery over one's own passions, and a reverence for the Creator, give the best assurance of a wise and humane treatment of the lower animals. But to preach kindness to brutes as a primary obligation, and capital point of amendment in the conversion of a sinner, is to treat the symptom and leave unchecked the inward malady.

Reading.—St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 25, art. 3.

1. Honour is the attestation of another's excellence. Reputation is the opinion of many touching another's life and conduct. Honour is paid to a man to his face, whereas his reputation is bruited behind his back. Honour is taken away by insult, reputation by detraction. If the detraction involve a falsehood, it is called calumny or slander. The name backbiting, given to detraction, points to the absence of the person spoken of. But no one meets with an insult except where he is present, either in person or by his representative.

2. Both honour and reputation are goods that a man can call his own, and has a right to, but on different titles. Honour, some honour at least, appertains to a man simply for his being a man: reputation is won by deeds. Honour is primarily a connatural right: reputation is acquired. An entire stranger has no reputation, but a certain honour is his due to start with.

3. As there is a right to honour and a right to reputation, so insult and detraction are sins, not against charity, but against commutative justice, calling for restitution. (Ethics, c. v., s. ix., n. 6, p. 106.) We must tender an apology for an insult, and labour to restore the good name that our detracting tongue has taken away.

4. Calumny is a double sin, one sin against truth, and another sin, the heavier of the two, against justice. If the blackening tale be true, the first sin is absent, but the second is there. The truth of the story is no justification for our publishing it. Though it is wrong to lie, it is not always right to blurt out the truth, especially when we are not asked for it. There are unprofitable disclosures, unseasonable, harmful, and wrongful. But, it will be said, does not a man forego his right to reputation by doing the evil that belies his fair fame? No, his right remains, unless the evil that he does, either of its own proper working or by the scandal that it gives, be subversive of social order. If he has committed a crime against society, he is to be denounced to the authorities who have charge of society: they will judge him, and, finding him guilty, they will punish him and brand him with infamy. If, again, he does evil, though not immediately against society, yet in the face of society and before the sun; he shocks the public conscience and rends his own reputation. But the evil private and proper to himself that any man works in secret, is not society's care, nor affects his social standing, nor brings any rightful diminution to his good name. If all our secret and personal offences are liable to be made public by any observer, which of us shall abide it? Our character is our public character; and that is not forfeit except for some manner of public sin.

5. Suppose a veteran, long retired, has made a name for military prowess by boasting of battles wherein he never came into danger, is the one old comrade who remembers him for a skulker and a runaway, justified in showing him up? No, for that reputation, however mendaciously got together, is still truly a good possession: it is not a fruit of injustice, therefore it is no matter of restitution: nor is it any instrument of injustice, which the holder is bound to drop: thus, as he is not bound to forego it, now that he has got it, so his neighbour may not rightfully take it from him.

Reading.—St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 73, art. 1.

1. A contract is a bargain productive of an obligation of commutative justice in each of the contracting parties. A bargain is a consent of two wills to the same object. Thus a promise, before it is accepted, is not a bargain. But even after acceptance a promise is not a contract, for the promiser may not choose to bind himself in justice, but only in good faith, while the promisee is under no obligation whatever.

2. There are such things as implicit contracts, attached to the bearing of certain offices, whereby a man becomes his brother's keeper. The liability contracted is limited by the nature of the office: thus a physician is officially bound in justice as to his patient's pulse, but not officially as to his purse. Where there is no explicit contract, the duties which the subjects of a person's official care have towards him are not duties of commutative justice. Thus these implicit contracts are not strictly contracts, as failing to carry a full reciprocity.

3. Contracts are either consensual or real, according as they are either complete by the mere consent of the parties, or further require that something should change hands and pass from one to the other. What contracts are consensual, and what real, depends chiefly on positive law. No natural law can tell whether buying and selling, for instance, be a consensual or a real contract. The interest of this particular case is when the goods are lost in transmission: then whichever of the two parties at the time be determined to be the owner, apart from culpable negligence or contrary agreement of the sender, he bears the loss, on the principle, res perit domino.

4. Contracts are otherwise divided as onerous and gratuitous. In an onerous contract either party renders some advantage in return for the advantage that he receives, as when Titius hires the horse of Caius. In a gratuitous contract all the advantage is on one side, as when Titius does not hire but borrows a horse. The Roman lawyers further distinguish contracts, somewhat humorously, into contracts with names and contracts without names, or nominate and innominate, as anatomists name a certain bone the innominate bone, and a certain artery the innominate artery. Innominate contracts are reckoned four: I give on the terms of your giving, otherwise than as buying and selling,—to some forms of this there are English names, as exchange and barter: I do on the terms of your doing: I do on the terms of your giving: I give on the terms of your doing.

Readings.—De Lugo, De Just. et Jure, 22, nn. 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 16, 17. For buying and selling and the frauds incident thereto, Paley, Moral Philosophy, bk. iii., p. 1, c. vii.

1. We must distinguish use value and market value. The use value of an article of property is the esteem which the owner has of it from every other point of view except as a thing to sell. Thus a man values his overcoat on a journey as a protection from cold and rain. A book is valued that was held in the dying hand of a parent. This is use value. The market value of an article is the estimate of society, fixing the rate of exchange between that and other articles, so much of one for so much of another, e.g., between mahogany and cedar wood, considered as things to sell.

2. Answering to this twofold value is a twofold exchange, private exchange, which regards use value; and commercial exchange, which is founded on market value. If I part with my watch to a sailor for carrying me across an arm of the sea where there is no public ferry, that is private exchange. If I pay the ordinary fare where there is a public ferry, that is commercial exchange.

3. Private exchange begins in the need of at least one of the contracting parties. It is an act of charity in the other party to accommodate him by offering the thing needed. If the offer is made otherwise than as a gift, and is accepted, he who avails himself of it is bound in justice to see that the afforder of the accommodation is compensated for the loss that he suffers in affording it. Thus far the recipient is bound in justice, and no further in that virtue. However wholesome or profitable the thing be to him that gets it, the supplier cannot charge for that but only for the loss that he himself suffers, or the gain that he foregoes, in handing the thing over, or the pains that he takes, or the hardship that he endures, or the risk that he runs, in rendering the service desired. If all the labour to be undergone, or damage incurred, or risk encountered, by the sailor who goes about by private bargain to be my ferryman, is fairly met by the remuneration of a thirty-shilling watch, he has no right to stipulate for any more, not though the passage that he gives me sets me on the way to a throne. The peculiar advantage that I have in prospect does not come out of him, but out of myself. He must not pretend to sell what is not his, what attaches, not to him, but to me. He can only sell his own loss, risk, pains and labour. At the same time, if I have any gentlemanly or generous feeling in me, I shall be forward to bestow extra remuneration on one who has rendered me so timely a service: but this is matter of my gratitude, not of his right and claim in justice. Gratitude must not be put into the bill. And this much of private exchange.

4. Commercial exchange is conducted according to market value. Apart from dire necessity—and one in dire necessity is not fit to enter into commercial exchanges—the rule is, that a seller may always ask the market value of his article, however much that may be above what the thing cost him, or the use value which it bears to him. Thus, if one finds in his garden a rare Roman coin—so far as his tastes go, a paltry bit of metal—he may sell it for whatever price numismatists will offer: whereas, if there were no market for coins, but only one individual who doted on such things, the finder could make no profit out of that individual, the coin having neither market value with the community, nor use value in the eyes of the finder.

5. As there is a twofold value, and a twofold exchange, so a twofold character is impressed on the great instrument of exchange, money. Money, in one character, is an instrument of private exchange: in its other character, to mercantile men more familiar, it is an instrument of commercial exchange. In the one, it represents use value to the particular owner, more or less to him than it would be to some other owner: in the other, it represents market value, the same to all at the same time.

6. Leo X. in the Fifth Council of Lateran, 1515, ruled that—"usury is properly interpreted to be the attempt to draw profit and increment, without labour, without cost, and without risk, out of the use of a thing that does not fructify." In 1745 Benedict XIV. wrote in the same sense to the Bishops of Italy: "That kind of sin which is called usury, and which has its proper seat and place in the contract of mutuum, consists in turning that contract, which of its own nature requires the amount returned exactly to balance the amount received, into a ground for demanding a return in excess of the amount received." Mutuum, be it observed, is a loan for a definite period, of some article, the use of which lies in its consumption, as matches, fuel, food, and, in one respect, money. We shall prove this to be properly a gratuitous contract. (s. iv., n. 4, p. 254.)

7. Usury then is no mere taking of exorbitant interest. There is no question of more or less, but it is usury to take any interest at all upon the loan of a piece of property, which

(a) is of no use except to be used up, spent, consumed:

(b) is not wanted for the lender's own consumption within the period of the loan:

(c) is lent upon security that obviates risk:

(d) is so lent that the lender foregoes no occasion of lawful gain by lending it.

8. When all these four conditions are fulfilled, and yet interest is exacted upon a loan, such interest is usurious and unjust. And why? Simply by reason of the principle that we laid down before, speaking of private exchange (n. 3), a principle that is thus stated by St. Thomas:

"If one party is much benefited by the commodity which he receives of the other, while the other, the seller, is not a loser by going without the article, no extra price must be put on. The reason is, because the benefit that accrues to one party is not from the seller, but from the condition of the buyer. Now no one ought to sell to another that which is not his, though he may sell the loss that he suffers. He, however, who is much benefited by the commodity he receives of another, may spontaneously bestow some extra recompense on the seller: that is the part of one who has the feelings of a gentleman." (2a. 2æ, q. 77, art. 1, in corp.)

9. St. Thomas speaks of sales, but the principle applies equally to loans. It is upon loans of money that interest is commonly taken, and of money-loans we speak. Clearly, according to the doctrine stated, the lender can claim the compensation of interest, if he has to pinch himself in order to lend, or lends at a notable risk. He is selling his own loss,—or risk, which is loss once removed. But supposing he has other monies in hand, and the security is good, and he has enough still left for all domestic needs, and for all luxuries that he cares to indulge in,—moreover he has nothing absolutely to do with his money, in the event of his not lending it, but to hoard it up in his strong box, and wait long months till he has occasion to use it: in that case, if he lends it he will be no worse off on the day that he gets it back, no worse off in the time while it is away, than if it had never left his coffers. Such is the contract of mutuum, shorn of all accidental attendant circumstances, a contract, which "of its own nature," as Benedict XIV. says, that is, apart from circumstances, "requires the amount returned exactly to balance the amount received." Not though the borrower has profited of the loan to gain kingdoms, is any further return in strict justice to be exacted of him on that precise account.

10. But now an altered case. Suppose land is purchaseable, and it is proposed to stock a farm with cattle, and rear them, and convey them to a large town where there is a brisk demand for meat—the supposition is not always verified, nor any supposition like it, but suppose it verified in some one case—then, though the lender has other monies in hand for the needs of his household, and the security is good, yet the money is not so lent as that he foregoes no occasion of lawful gain by lending it. He foregoes the purchase of land and farm stock, or at least delays it, and delay is loss where profit is perennial. On that score of gain forfeited he may exact interest on the money that he lends, which interest will be no usury. The title of interest here given is recognized by divines as lucrum cessans, "interruption of profit." The interest is taken, so far as it goes upon a lawful title, not upon the fact of the borrower's profit—that is irrelevant—but upon the profit that the lender might have made, had he kept the money in hand.

11. This latter case (n. 10) represents that putting of money out to interest, which is an essential feature of modern commerce. The former case (n. 9) is the aspect that money-lending commonly bore in the Middle Ages. In those days land was hard to buy, agriculture backward, roads bad, seas unnavigable, carrying-trade precarious, messages slow, raids and marauders frequent, population sparse, commerce confined to a few centres, mines unworked, manufactures mostly domestic, capital yet unformed. Men kept their money in their cellars, or deposited it for safety in religious houses: whence the stories of treasure-trove belonging to those days. They took out the coin as they wanted it to spend on housekeeping, or on war, or feasting. It was very hard, next to impossible, to lay out money so as to make more money by it. Money was in those days really barren—a resource for housekeeping, not for trade—a medium of private, not of commercial exchange—a representative of use value, not of market value. Apart from risk of non-repayment, to take interest for money that you had no use for but to hoard, was getting "a breed of barren metal:" it was taking up what you laid not down: it was making profit out of your neighbour's need, or your neighbour's gain, where there was no corresponding need unsatisfied, or gain forfeited, on your part: it was that "attempt to draw profit and increment, without labour, without cost, and without risk, out of the use of a thing that does not fructify," which the Fifth Lateran Council defines to be usury.

12. In our time, thanks to steam and electricity, the increase of population, and continued peace, the whole world has become one trading community, representing now more, now less abundant opportunities for the investment of money, and the conversion of it into other lucrative commodities. Money consequently with us is not a mere medium of private exchange for the purposes of housekeeping: it is a medium of commercial exchange. It represents, not use value, but market value. To be a thousand pounds out of pocket for a year means an opportunity of gain irretrievably lost, gain that could have been made otherwise than by money-lending. Where this is so, and so far as it is so, the lender may without violation of justice point to lucrum cessans, gain lost, and arrange beforehand with the borrower for being reimbursed with interest.

13. The transition from mediaeval housekeeping, with its use values and private exchange, to the mercantile society of modern times, was not made in a day, nor went on everywhere at the same rate. It was a growth of ages. In great cities commerce rapidly ripened, and was well on towards maturity five centuries ago. Then the conditions that render interest lawful, and mark it off from usury, readily came to obtain. But those centres were isolated. Like the centres of ossification, which appear here and there in cartilage when it is being converted into bone, they were separated one from another by large tracts remaining in the primitive condition. Here you might have a great city, Hamburg or Genoa, an early type of commercial enterprise, and, fifty miles inland, society was in its infancy, and the great city was as part of another world. Hence the same transaction, as described by the letter of the law, might mean lawful interest in the city, and usury out in the country—the two were so disconnected. In such a situation the legislator has to choose between forbidding interest here and allowing usury there; between restraining speculation and licensing oppression. The mediaeval legislator chose the former alternative. Church and State together enacted a number of laws to restrain the taking of interest, laws that, like the clothes of infancy, are not to be scorned as absurd restrictions, merely because they are inapplicable now, and would not fit the modern growth of nations. At this day the State has repealed those laws, and the Church has officially signified that she no longer insists on them. Still she maintains dogmatically that there is such a sin as usury, and what it is, as defined in the Fifth Council of Lateran.

Readings.—St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 77, art. 1; Ar., Pol., I., ix.; St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 77, art. 4; The Month for September, 1886; _The Nineteenth Century _for September, 1877, pp. 181, seq.

To Our Venerable Brethren, All Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, and Bishops of the Catholic World, in Peace and Communion With the Apostolic See.

Venerable Brethren, Health and Apostolic Benediction.

IT is not surprising that the spirit of revolutionary change, which has so long been predominant in the nations of the world, should have passed beyond politics, and made its influence felt in the cognate field of practical economy. The elements of a conflict are unmistakable: the growth of industry, and the surprising discoveries of science; the changed relations of masters and workmen; the enormous fortunes of individuals, and the poverty of the masses; the increased self-reliance and the closer mutual combination of the working population ; and, finally, a general moral deterioration. The momentous seriousness of the present state of things just now fills every mind with painful apprehension ; wise men discuss it; practical men propose schemes ; popular meetings, legislatures, and sovereign princes,—all are occupied with it, and there is nothing which has a deeper hold on public attention.

Therefore, Venerable Brethren, as on former occasions, when it seemed opportune to refute false teaching, We have addressed you in the interest of the Church and of the common weal, and have issued Letters on Political Power, on Human Liberty, on the Christian Constitution of the State, and on similar subjects, so now We have thought it useful to speak on the CONDITION OF LABOR. It is a matter on which We have touched once or twice already. But in this Letter the responsibility of the Apostolic office urges Us to treat the question expressly and at length, in order that there may be no mistake as to the principles which truth and justice dictate for its settlement. The discussion is not easy, nor is it free from danger. It is not easy to define the relative rights and the mutual duties of the wealthy and of the poor, of capital and of labor. And the danger lies in this, that crafty agitators constantly make use of these disputes to pervert men’s judgments and to stir up the people to sedition.

But all agree, and there can be no question whatever, that some remedy must be found, and quickly found, for the misery and wretchedness which press so heavily at this moment on the large majority of the very poor. The ancient workmen’s Guilds were destroyed in the last century, and no other organization took their place. Public institutions and the laws have repudiated the ancient religion. Hence by degrees it has come to pass that Working Men have been given over, isolated and defenceless, to the callousness of employers and the greed of unrestrained competition. The evil has been increased by rapacious Usury, which, although more than once condemned by the Church, is, nevertheless, under a different form, but with the same guilt, still practised by avaricious and grasping men. And to this must be added the custom of working by contract, and the concentration of so many branches of trade in the hands of a few individuals, so that a small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the masses of the poor a yoke little better than slavery itself.

To remedy these evils the Socialists, working on the poor man’s envy of the rich, endeavor to destroy private property, and maintain that individual possessions should become the common property of all, to be administered by the State or by municipal bodies. They hold that, by thus transferring property from private persons to the community, the present evil state of things will be set to rights, because each citizen will then have his equal share of whatever there is to enjoy. But their proposals are so clearly futile for all practical purposes, that if they were carried out the working man himself would be among the first to suffer. Moreover they are emphatically unjust, because they would rob the lawful possessor, bring the State into a sphere that is not its own, and cause complete confusion in the community.

It is surely undeniable that, when a man engages in remunerative labor, the very reason and motive of his work is to obtain property, and to hold it as his own private possession. If one man hires out to another his strength or his industry, he does this for the purpose of receiving in return what is necessary for food and living; he thereby expressly proposes to acquire a full and real right, not only to the remuneration, but also to the disposal of that remuneration as he pleases. Thus, if he lives sparingly, saves money, and invests his savings, for greater security, in land, the land in such a case is only his wages in another form; and, consequently, a working man’s little estate thus purchased should be as completely at his own disposal as the wages he receives for his labor. But it is precisely in this power of disposal that ownership consists, whether the property be land or movable goods. The Socialists, therefore, in endeavoring to transfer the possessions of individuals to the community, strike at the interests of every wage-earner, for they deprive him of the liberty of disposing of his wages, and thus of all hope and possibility of increasing his stock and of bettering his condition in life.

What is of still greater importance, however, is that the remedy they propose is manifestly against justice. For every man has by nature the right to possess property as his own. This is one of the chief points of distinction between man and the animal creation. For the brute has no power of selfdirection, but is governed by two chief instincts, which keep his powers alert, move him to use his strength, and determine him to action without the power of choice. These instincts are self-preservation and the propagation of the species. Both can attain their purpose by means of things which are close at hand ; beyond their surroundings the brute creation cannot go, for they are moved to action by sensibility alone, and by the things which sense perceives. But with man it is different indeed. He possesses, on the one hand, the full perfection of animal nature, and therefore he enjoys, at least as much as the rest of the animal race, the fruition of the things of the body. But animality, however perfect, is far from being the whole of humanity, and is, indeed, humanity’s humble handmaid, made to serve and obey. It is the mind, or the reason, which is the chief thing in us who are human beings ; it is this which makes a human being human, and distinguishes him essentially and completely from the brute. And on this account—viz., that man alone among animals possesses reason—it must be within his right to have things not merely for temporary and momentary use, as other living beings have them, but in stable and permanent possession; he must have not only things which perish in the using, but also those which, though used, remain for use in the future.

This becomes still more clearly evident if we consider man’s nature a little more deeply. For man, comprehending by the power of his reason things innumerable, and joining the future with the present—being, moreover, the master of his own acts—governs himself by the foresight of his counsel, under the eternal law and the power of God whose Providence governs all things. Wherefore it is in his power to exercise his choice, not only on things which regard his present welfare, but also on those which will be for his advantage in time to come. Hence man not only can possess the fruits of the earth, but also the earth itself; for of the products of the earth he can make provision for the future. Man's needs do not die out, but recur; satisfied to-day, they demand new supplies to-morrow. Nature, therefore, owes to man a storehouse that shall never fail, the daily supply of his daily wants. And this he finds only in the inexhaustible fertility of the earth.

Nor must we, at this stage, have recourse to the State. Man is older than the State ; and he holds the right of providing for the life of his body prior to the formation of any State. And to say that God has given the earth to the use and enjoyment of the universal human race is not to deny that there can be private property. For God has granted the earth to mankind in general; not in the sense that all without distinction can deal with it as they please, but rather that no part of it has been assigned to any one in particular, and that the limits of private possession have been left to be fixed by man’s own industry and the laws of individual peoples. Moreover, the earth, though divided among private owners, ceases not thereby to minister to the needs of all; for there is no one who does not live on what the land brings forth. Those who do not possess the soil, contribute their labor ; so that it may be truly said that all human subsistence is derived either from labor on one’s own land, or from some laborious industry which is paid for either in the produce of the land itself or in that which is exchanged for what the land brings forth.

Here, again, we have another proof that private ownership is according to nature's law. For that which is required for the preservation of life, and for life’s well-being, is produced in great abundance by the earth, but not until man has brought it into cultivation and lavished upon it his care and skill. Now, when man thus spends the industry of his mind and the strength of his body in procuring the fruits of nature, by that act he makes his own that portion of nature's field which he cultivates—that portion on which he leaves, as it were, the impress of his own personality ; and it cannot but be just that he should possess that portion as his own, and should have a right to keep it without molestation.

These arguments are so strong and convincing that it seems surprising that certain obsolete opinions should now be revived in opposition to what is here laid down. We are told that it is right for private persons to have the use the soil and the fruits of their land, but that it is unjust for any one to possess as owner either the land on which he has built or the estate which he has cultivated. But those who assert this do not perceive that they are robbing man of what his own labor has produced. For the soil which is tilled and cultivated with toil and skill utterly changes its condition; it was wild before, it is now fruitful, it was barren, and now it brings forth in abundance. That which has thus altered and improved it becomes so truly part of itself as to be in great measure indistinguishable and inseparable from it. Is it just that the fruit of a man’s sweat and labor should be enjoyed by another? As effects follow their cause, so it is just and right that the results of labor should belong to him who has labored.

With reason, therefore, the common opinion of mankind, little affected by the few dissentients who have maintained the opposite view, has found in the study of nature, and in the law of Nature herself, the foundations of the division of property, and has consecrated by the practice of all ages the principle of private ownership, as being preëminently in conformity with human nature, and as conducing, in the most unmistakable manner, to the peace and tranquillity of human life. The same principle is confirmed and enforced by the civil laws,—laws which, as long as they are just, derive their binding force from the law of nature. The authority of the Divine Law adds its sanction, forbidding us, in the gravest terms, even to covet that which is another’s: Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife ; nor his house, nor his field, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything which is his.^*

^* Deuteronomy v. 21.

The rights here spoken of, belonging to each individual man, are seen in a much stronger light if they are considered in relation to man’s social and domestic obligations.

In choosing a state of life, it is indisputable that all are at full liberty either to follow the counsel of Jesus Christ as to virginity, or to enter into the bonds of marriage. No human law can abolish the natural and primitive right of marriage, or in any way limit the chief and principal purpose of marriage, ordained by God's authority from the beginning. Increase and multiply.^† Thus we have the Family; the “society” of a man’s own household; a society limited, indeed, in numbers, but a true “ society,” anterior to every kind of State or nation, with rights and duties of its own, totally independent of the commonwealth.

^† Genesis i. 28.

That right of property, therefore, which has been proved to belong naturally to individual persons, must also belong to a man in his capacity of head of a family; nay, such a person must possess this right so much the more clearly in proportion as his position multiplies his duties. For it is a most sacred law of nature that a father must provide food and all necessaries for those whom he has begotten; and, similarly, nature dictates that a man’s children, who carry on, as it were, and continue his own personality, should be provided by him with all that is needful to enable them honorably to keep themselves from want and misery in the uncertainties of this mortal life. Now, in no other way can a father effect this except by the ownership of profitable property, which he can transmit to his children by inheritance. A family, no less than a State, is, as We have said, a true society, governed by a power within itself, that is to say, by the father. Wherefore, provided the limits be not transgressed which are prescribed by the very purposes for which it exists, the Family has, at least, equal rights with the State in the choice and pursuit of those things which are needful to its preservation and its just liberty.

We say, at least, equal rights; for since the domestic household is anterior both in idea and in fact to the gathering of men into a commonwealth, the former must necessarily have rights and duties which are prior to those of the latter, and which rest more immediately on nature. If the citizens of a State—that is to say, the Families—on entering into association and fellowship, experienced at the hands of the State hindrance instead of help, and found their rights attacked instead of being protected, such association were rather to be repudiated than sought after.

The idea, then, that the civil government should, at its own discretion, penetrate and pervade the family and the household, is a great and pernicious mistake. True, if a family finds itself in great difficulty, utterly friendless, and without prospect of help, it is right that extreme necessity be met by public aid; for each family is a part of the commonwealth. In like manner, if within the walls of the household there occur grave disturbance of mutual rights, the public power must interfere to force each party to give the other what is due; for this is not to rob citizens of their rights, but justly and properly to safeguard and strengthen them. But the rulers of the State must go no further: nature bids them stop here. Paternal authority can neither be abolished by the State, nor absorbed; for it has the same source as human life itself. “The child belongs to the father,” and is, as it were, the continuation of the father’s personality; and, to speak with strictness, the child takes its place in civil society not in its own right, but in its quality as a member of the family in which it is begotten. And it is for the very reason that “the child belongs to the father,” that, as St. Thomas of Aquin says, “ before it attains the use of free will, it is in the power and care of its parents.”^* The Socialists, therefore, in setting aside the parent and introducing the providence of the State, act against natural justice, and threaten the very existence of family life.

^* St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2æ Q. x. Art. 12.

And such interference is not only unjust, but is quite certain to harass and disturb all classes of citizens, and to subject them to odious and intolerable slavery. It would open the door to envy, to evil-speaking, and to quarrelling ; the sources of wealth would themselves run dry, for no one would have any interest in exerting his talents or his industry; and that ideal equality of which so much is said would, in reality, be the levelling down of all to the same condition of misery and dishonor.

Thus it is clear that the main tenet of Socialism, the community of goods, must be utterly rejected; for it would injure those whom it is intended to benefit, it would be contrary to the natural rights of mankind, and it would introduce confusion and disorder into the commonwealth. Our first and most fundamental principle, therefore, when we undertake to alleviate the condition of the masses, must be the inviolability of private property. This laid down, We go on to show where we must find the remedy that we seek.

We approach the subject with confidence, and in the exercise of the rights which belong to Us. For no practical solution of this question will ever be found without the assistance of Religion and of the Church. It is We who are the chief guardian of Religion, and the chief dispenser of what belongs to the Church, and We must not by silence neglect the duty which lies upon Us. Doubtless this most serious question demands the attention and the efforts of others besides Ourselves—of the rulers of States, of employers of labor, of the wealthy, and of the working population themselves for whom We plead. But We affirm without hesitation, that all the striving of men will be vain if they leave out the Church. It is the Church that proclaims from the Gospel those teachings by which the conflict can be put an end to, or at the least made far less bitter; the Church uses its efforts not only to enlighten the mind, but to direct by its precepts the life and conduct of men; the Church improves and ameliorates the condition of the working man by numerous useful organizations; does its best to enlist the services of all ranks in discussing and endeavoring to meet, in the most practical way, the claims of the working classes; and acts on the decided view that for these purposes recourse should be had, in due measure and degree, to the help of the law and of State authority.

Let it be laid down, in the first place, that humanity must remain as it is. It is impossible to reduce human society to a level. The Socialists may do their utmost, but all striving against nature is vain. There naturally exist among mankind innumerable differences of the most important kind; people differ in capability, in diligence, in health, and in strength; an unequal fortune is a necessary result of inequality in condition. Such inequality is far from being disadvantageous either to individuals or to the community; social and public life can only go on by the help of various kinds of capacity and the playing of many parts; and each man, as a rule, chooses the part which peculiarly suits his case. As regards bodily labor, even had man never fallen from the state of innocence, he would not have been wholly unoccupied ; but that which would then have been his free choice and his delight, became afterwards compulsory, and the painful expiation of his sin. Cursed be the earth in thy work; in thy labor thou shalt eat of it all the days of thy life.^* In like manner, the other pains and hardships of life will have no end or cessation on this earth; for the consequences of sin are bitter and hard to bear, and they must be with man as long as life lasts. To suffer and to endure, therefore, is the lot of humanity; let men try as they may, no strength and no artifice will ever succeed in banishing from human life the ills and troubles which beset it. If any there are who pretend differently—who hold out to a hardpressed people freedom from pain and trouble, undisturbed repose, and constant enjoyment—they cheat the people and impose upon them, and their lying promises will only make the evil worse than before. There is nothing more useful than to look at the world as it really is—and at the same time to look elsewhere for a remedy to its troubles.

^* Genesis iii. 17.

The great mistake that is made in the matter now under consideration, is to possess oneself of the idea that class is naturally hostile to class; that rich and poor are intended by nature to live at war with one another. So irrational and so false is this view, that the exact contrary is the truth. Just as the symmetry of the human body is the result of the disposition of the members of the body, so in a State it is ordained by nature that these two classes should exist in harmony and agreement, and should, as it were, fit into one another, so as to maintain the equilibrium of the body politic. Each requires the other; capital cannot do without labor, nor labor without capital. Mutual agreement results in pleasantness and good order; perpetual conflict necessarily produces confusion and outrage. Now, in preventing such strife as this, and in making it impossible, the efficacy of Christianity is marvellous and manifold. First of all, there is nothing more powerful than Religion (of which the Church is the interpreter and guardian) in drawing rich and poor together, by reminding each class of its duties to the other, and especially of the duties of justice. Thus Religion teaches the laboring man and the workman to carry out honestly and well all equitable agreements freely made; never to injure capital, or to outrage the person of an employer; never to employ violence in representing his own cause, or to engage in riot or disorder; and to have nothing to do with men of evil principles, who work upon the people with artful promises, and raise foolish hopes which usually end in disaster and in repentance when too late. Religion teaches the rich man and the employer that their work-people are not their slaves; that they must respect in every man his dignity as a man and as a Christian; that labor is nothing to be ashamed of, if we listen to right reason, and to Christian philosophy, but is an honorable employment, enabling a man to sustain his life in an upright and creditable way ; and that it is shameful and inhuman to treat men like chattels to make money by, or to look upon them merely as so much muscle or physical power. Thus, again, Religion teaches that, as among the workman’s concerns are Religion herself and things spiritual and mental, the employer is bound to see that he has time for the duties of piety; that he be not exposed to corrupting influences and dangerous occasions; and that he be not led away to neglect his home and family or to squander his wages. Then, again, the employer must never tax his work-people beyond their strength, nor employ them in work unsuited to their sex or age. His great and principal obligation is to give to every one that which is just. Doubtless before we can decide whether wages are adequate, many things have to be considered; but rich men and masters should remember this—that to exercise pressure for the sake of gain, upon the indigent and the destitute, and to make one’s profit out of the need of another, is condemned by all laws, human and divine. To defraud any one of wages that are his due is a crime which cries to the avenging anger of heaven. Behold the hire of the laborers . . . which by fraud hath been kept back by you, crieth; and the cry of them hath entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth.^* Finally, the rich must religiously refrain from cutting down the workman’s earnings, either by force, by fraud, or by usurious dealing ; and with the more reason because the poor man is weak and unprotected, and because his slender means should be sacred in proportion to their scantiness.

^* St. James v. 4.

Were these precepts carefully obeyed and followed, would not strife die out and cease ?

But the Church, with Jesus Christ for its Master and Guide, aims higher still. It lays down precepts yet more perfect, and tries to bind class to class in friendliness and good understanding. The things of this earth cannot be understood or valued rightly without taking into consideration the life to come, the life that will last forever. Exclude the idea of futurity, and the very notion of what is good and right would perish; nay, the whole system of the universe would become a dark and unfathomable mystery. The great truth which we learn from Nature herself is also the grand Christian dogma on which Religion rests as on its base—that when we have done with this present life, then we shall really begin to live. God has not created us for the perishable and transitory things of earth, but for things heavenly and everlasting; He has given us this world as a place of exile, and not as our true country. Money, and the other things which men call good and desirable—we may have them in abundance, or we may want them altogether ; as far as eternal happiness is concerned, it is no matter; the only thing that is important is to use them aright. Jesus Christ, when He redeemed us with plentiful redemption, took not away the pains and sorrows which in such large proportion make up the texture of our mortal life; He transformed them into motives of virtue and occasions of merit: and no man can hope for eternal reward unless he follow in the blood-stained footprints of his Saviour. If we suffer with Him, we shall also reign with Him.^* His labors and His sufferings, accepted by His own free will, have marvellously sweetened all suffering and all labor. And not only by His example, but by His grace and by the hope of everlasting recompense, He has made pain and grief more easy to endure ; for that which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation, worketh for us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory.^†

^* II. Timothy ii. 12.

^† II. Corinthians iv. 17.

Therefore those whom fortune favors are warned that freedom from sorrow, and abundance of earthly riches, are no guarantee of the beatitude that shall never end, but rather the contrary ;^* that the rich should tremble at the threatenings of Jesus Christ—threatenings so strange in the mouth of Our Lord ;^† and that a most strict account must be given to the Supreme Judge for all that we possess. The chiefest and most excellent rule for the right use of money is one which the heathen philosophers indicated, but which the Church has traced out clearly, and has not only made known to men’s minds but has impressed upon their lives. It rests on the principle that it is one thing to have a right to the possession of money, and another to have a right to use money as one pleases. Private ownership, as we have seen, is the natural right of man; and to exercise that right, especially as members of society, is not only lawful, but absolutely necessary. It is lawful, says St. Thomas of Aquin, for a man to hold private property ; and it is also necessary for the carrying on of human life.^‡ But if the question be asked, How must one’s possessions be used? the Church replies without hesitation in the words of the same holy Doctor: Man should not consider his outward possessions as his own, but as common to all, so as to share them without difficulty when others are in need. Whence the Apostle saith, Command the rich of this world... to give with ease, to communicate.§ True, no one is commanded to distribute to others that which is required for his own necessities and those of his household; nor even to give away what is reasonably required to keep up becomingly his condition in life; for no one ought to live unbecomingly.|| But when necessity has been supplied, and one’s position fairly considered, it is a duty to give to the indigent out of that which is over. That which remaineth, give alms.¶ It is a duty, not of justice (except in extreme cases), but of Christian charity —a duty which is not enforced by human law. But the laws and judgments of men must give place to the laws and judgments of Christ the true God, Who in many ways urges on His followers the practice of almsgiving—It is more blessed to give than to receive ;^* and Who will count a kindness done or refused to the poor as done or refused to Himself—as long as you did it to one of My least brethren, you did it to Me.^† Thus to sum up what has been said: Whoever has received from the Divine bounty a large share of blessings, whether they be external and corporeal or gifts of the mind, has received them for the purpose of using them for the perfecting of his own nature, and, at the same time, that he may employ them, as the minister of God’s providence, for the benefit of others. He that hath a talent, says St. Gregory the Great, let him see that he hide it not; he that hath abundance, let him arouse himself to mercy and generosity; he that hath art and skill, let him do his best to share the use and the utility thereof with his neighbor.^‡

^* St. Matthew xix. 23, 24.

^† St. Luke vi. 24, 25.

^‡ 2a 2æ Q. lxvi. Art. 2. § Ibid. Q. lxv. Art. 2. || Ibid. Q. xxxii. Art. 6. ¶ St. Luke xi. 41.

^* Acts xx. 35.

^† St. Matthew xxv. 40.

^‡ St. Gregory the Great. Hom. ix. in Evangel. n. 7.

§ II. Corinthians viii. 9. || St. Mark vi. 3.

¶ St. Matthew v. 3: “Blessed are the poor in spirit.” ** Ibid. xi. 28. “Come to Me, all you that labor and are burdened, and I will refresh you.”

As for those who do not possess the gifts of fortune, they are taught by the Church that in God's sight poverty is no disgrace, and that there is nothing to be ashamed of in seeking one’s bread by labor. This is strengthened by what we see in Christ Himself, Who whereas He was rich, for our sakes became poor ;§ and Who, being the Son of God, and God Himself, chose to seem and to be considered the son of a carpenter—nay, did not disdain to spend a great part of His life as a carpenter Himself. Is not this the carpenter, the Son of Mary?|| From the contemplation of this Divine example it is easy to understand that the true dignity and excellence of man lies in his moral qualities, that is, in virtue; that virtue is the common inheritance of all, equally within the reach of high and low, rich and poor; and that virtue, and virtue alone, wherever found, will be followed by the rewards of everlasting happiness. Nay, God Himself seems to incline more to those who suffer evil; for Jesus Christ calls the poor blessed;¶ He lovingly invites those in labor and grief to come to Him for solace;** and He displays the tenderest charity to the lowly and the oppressed. These reflections cannot fail to keep down the pride of those who are well off, and to cheer the spirit of the afflicted ; to incline the former to generosity and the latter to tranquil resignation. Thus the separation which pride would make tends to disappear, nor will it be difficult to make rich and poor join hands in friendly concord.

But if Christian precepts prevail, the two classes will not only be united in the bonds of friendship, but also in those of brotherly love. For they will understand and feel that all men are the children of the common Father, that is, of God; that all have the same last end, which is God Himself, Who alone can make either men or angels absolutely and perfectly happy; that all and each are redeemed by Jesus Christ and raised to the dignity of children of God, and are thus united in brotherly ties both with each other and with Jesus Christ, the first-born among many brethren; that the blessings of nature and the gifts of grace belong in common to the whole human race, and that to all, except to those who are unworthy, is promised the inheritance of the kingdom of heaven. If sons, heirs also, heirs indeed of God, and co-heirs of Christ.^*

^* Romans viii. 17.

Such is the scheme of duties and of rights which is put forth to the world by the Gospel. Would it not seem that strife must quickly cease were society penetrated with ideas like these ?

But the Church, not content with pointing out the remedy, also applies it. For the Church does its utmost to teach and to train men, and to educate them; and by means of its Bishops and clergy it diffuses its salutary teachings far and wide. It strives to influence the mind and heart so that all may willingly yield themselves to be formed and guided by the commandments of God. It is precisely in this fundamental and principal matter, on which everything depends, that the Church has a power peculiar to itself. The agencies which it employs are given it for the very purpose of reaching the hearts of men, by Jesus Christ Himself, and derive their efficiency from God. They alone can touch the innermost heart and conscience, and bring men to act from a motive of duty, to resist their passions and appetites, to love God and their fellow-men with a love that is unique and supreme, and courageously to break down every barrier which stands in the way of a virtuous life.

On this subject We need only recall, for one moment, the examples written down in history. Of these things there cannot be the shadow of doubt; for instance, that civil society was renovated in every part by the teachings of Christianity ; that in the strength of that renewal the human race was lifted up to better things,—nay, that it was brought back from death to life, and to so excellent a life that nothing more perfect had been known before, or will come to pass in the ages that have yet to be. Of this beneficent transformation, Jesus Christ was at once the first cause and the final purpose; as from Him all came, so to Him all was to be referred. For when, by the light of the Gospel message, the human race came to know the grand mystery of the Incarnation of the Word and the redemption of man, the life of Jesus Christ, God and Man, penetrated every race and nation, and impregnated them with His faith, His precepts, and His laws. And if Society is to be cured now, in no other way can it be cured but by a return to the Christian life and Christian institutions. When a Society is perishing, the true advice to give to those who would restore it is to recall it to the principles from which it sprung; for the purpose and perfection of an association is to aim at and to attain that for which it was formed; and its operation should be put in motion and inspired by the end and object which originally gave it its being. So that to fall away from its primal constitution is disease; to go back to it is recovery. And this may be asserted with the utmost truth both of the State in general and of that body of its citizens—by far the greater number— who sustain life by labor.

Neither must it be supposed that the solicitude of the Church is so occupied with the spiritual concerns of its children as to neglect their interests temporal and earthly. Its desire is that the poor, for example, should rise above poverty and wretchedness, and should better their condition in life; and for this it strives. By the very fact that it calls men to virtue and forms them to its practice, it promotes this in no slight degree. Christian morality, when it is adequately and completely practised, conduces of itself to temporal prosperity, for it merits the blessing of that God Who is the source of all blessings; it powerfully restrains the lust of possession and the lust of pleasure—twin plagues, which too often make a man without self-restraint miserable in the midst of abundance ;^* it makes men supply by economy for the want of means, teaching them to be content with frugal living, and keeping them out of the reach of those vices which eat up not merely small incomes, but large fortunes, and dissipate many a goodly inheritance.

^* “The root of all evils is cupidity.”—I. Tim. vi. 10.

Moreover, the Church intervenes directly in the interest of the poor, by setting on foot and keeping up many things which it sees to be efficacious in the relief of poverty. Here, again, it has always succeeded so well that it has even extorted the praise of its enemies. Such was the ardor of brotherly love among the earliest Christians that numbers of those who were better off deprived themselves of their possessions in order to relieve their brethren; whence neither was there any one needy among them.^† To the order of Deacons, instituted for that very purpose, was committed by the Apostles the charge of the daily distributions; and the Apostle Paul, though burdened with the solicitude of all the churches, hesitated not to undertake laborious journeys in order to carry the alms of the Faithful to the poorer Christians. Tertullian calls these contributions, given voluntarily by Christians in their assemblies, deposits of piety ; because, to cite his words, they were employed in feeding the needy, in burying them, in the support of boys and girls destitute of means and deprived of their parents, in the care of the aged, and in relief of the shipwrecked.^‡

^† Acts iv. 34.

^‡ Apologia Secunda, xxxix.

Thus by degrees came into existence the patrimony which the Church has guarded with religious care as the inheritance of the poor. Nay, to spare them the shame of begging, the common Mother of rich and poor has exerted herself to gather together funds for the support of the needy. The Church has stirred up everywhere the heroism of charity, and has established Congregations of Religious and many other useful institutions for help and mercy, so that there might be hardly any kind of suffering which was not visited and relieved. At the present day there are many who, like the heathen of old, blame and condemn the Church for this beautiful charity. They would substitute in its place a system of State-organized relief. But no human methods will ever supply for the devotion and self-sacrifice of Christian charity. Charity, as a virtue, belongs to the Church; for it is no virtue unless it is drawn from the Sacred Heart of Jesus Christ; and he who turns his back on the Church cannot be near to Christ.

It cannot, however, be doubted that to attain the purpose of which We treat, not only the Church but all human means must conspire. All who are concerned in the matter must be of one mind and must act together. It is in this as in the Providence which governs the world: results do not happen save where all the causes co-operate.

Let us now, therefore, inquire what part the State should play in the work of remedy and relief.

By the State We here understand, not the particular form of government which prevails in this or that nation, but the State, as rightly understood ; that is to say, any government conformable in its institutions to right reason and natural law, and to those dictates of the Divine wisdom which We have expounded in the Encyclical on the Christian Constitution of the State. The first duty, therefore, of the rulers of the State should be to make sure that the laws and institutions, the general character and administration of the commonwealth, shall be such as to produce of themselves public well-being and private prosperity. This is the proper office of wise statesmanship and the work of the heads of the State. Now a State chiefly prospers and flourishes by morality, by well-regulated family life, by respect for religion and justice, by the moderation and equal distribution of public burdens, by the progress of the arts and of trade, by the abundant yield of the land—by everything which makes the citizens better and happier. Here, then, it is in the power of a ruler to benefit every order of the State, and amongst the rest to promote in the highest degree the interests of the poor, and this by virtue of his office, and without being exposed to any suspicion of undue interference; for it is the province of the commonwealth to consult for the common good. And the more that is done for the working population by the general laws of the country, the less need will there be to seek for particular means to relieve them.

There is another and a deeper consideration which must not be lost sight of. To the State the interests of all are equal, whether high or low. The poor are members of the national community equally with the rich; they are real component parts, living parts, which make up, through the family, the living body; and it need hardly be said that they are by far the majority. It would be irrational to neglect one portion of the citizens and to favor another; and therefore the public administration must duly and solicitously provide for the welfare and the comfort of the working people, or else that law of justice will be violated which ordains that each shall have his due. To cite the wise words of St. Thomas of Aquin: As the part and the whole are in a certain sense identical, the part may in some sense claim what belongs to the whole.** Among the many and grave duties of rulers who would do their best for the people, the first and chief is to act with strict justice—with that justice which is called in the school distributive—towards each and every class.

But although all citizens, without exception, can and ought to contribute to that common good in which individuals share so profitably to themselves, yet it is not to be supposed that all can contribute in the same way and to the same extent. No matter what changes may be made in forms of government, there will always be differences and inequalities of condition in the State: Society cannot exist or be conceived without them. Some there must be who dedicate themselves to the work of the commonwealth, who

• 2a 2æ Q. lxi. Art. 1 ad 2. make the laws, who administer justice, whose advice and authority govern the nation in times of peace, and defend it in war. Such men clearly occupy the foremost place in the State, and should be held in the foremost estimation, for their work touches most nearly and effectively the general interests of the community. Those who labor at a trade or calling do not promote the general welfare in such a fashion as this; but they do in the most important way benefit the nation, though less directly. We have insisted that, since it is the end of Society to make men better, the chief good that Society can be possessed of is Virtue. Nevertheless, in all well-constituted States it is a by no means unimportant matter to provide those bodily and external commodities the use of which is necessary to virtuous action.^* And in the provision of material well-being, the labor of the poor— the exercise of their skill, and the employment of their strength in the culture of the land and the workshops of trade—is most efficacious and altogether indispensable. Indeed, their co-operation in this respect is so important that it may be truly said that it is only by the labor of the working man that States grow rich. Justice, therefore, demands that the interests of the poorer population be carefully watched over by the Administration, so that they who contribute so largely to the advantage of the community may themselves share in the benefits they create—that being housed, clothed, and enabled to support life, they may find their existence less hard and more endurable. It follows that whatever shall appear to be conducive to the well-being of those who work should receive favorable consideration. Let it not be feared that solicitude of this kind will injure any interest; on the contrary, it will be to the advantage of all; for it cannot but be good for the commonwealth to secure from misery those on whom it so largely depends. We have said that the State must not absorb the individual or the family; both should be allowed free and untrammelled action as far as is consistent with the common good and the interests of others. Nevertheless, rulers should anxiously safeguard the community and all its parts; the community, because the conservation of the community is so emphatically the business of the supreme power, that the safety of the commonwealth is not only the first law, but it is a Government’s whole reason of existence; and the parts, because both philosophy and the Gospel agree in laying down that the object of the administration of the State should be, not the advantage of the ruler, but the benefit of those over whom he rules. The gift of authority is from God, and is, as it were, a participation of the highest of all sovereignties; and it should be exercised as the power of God is exercised— with a fatherly solicitude which not only guides the whole, but reaches to details as well.

^* St. Thomas of Aquin. De Regimine Principum, I. cap. 15.

114. To say that a man has a right to a thing, means that he has a certain power over it. Evidently, however, physical power does not of itself constitute a right. The highwayman's power over the traveler's money gives him no right thereto. A right, then, belongs to the moral order. It is an inviolable moral power belonging to one man, which, therefore, all other men are bound to respect.

115. In every right four things are to be taken into account: (a) the subject, i. e., the person possessing the right; (b) the term, including all those who are bound to respect the right; (c) the title, or reason on which the right is founded; (d) the matter, or that to which the subject has a right. The matter may be my own act or the act of another person; that is, I may have the right to perform a certain act or to require the performance or the omission of an act on the part of another. Thus in N.'s right to the house which he owns, N. himself is the subject, all other persons constitute the term, his payment of the purchase money agreed upon is the title, and the ownership of the house is the matter. He has a right to occupy the house, to prevent others from dwelling in it, or to require the party who leases it to pay the stipulated rent.

116. A right possessed by one person involves, on the part of another or of others, the obligation to respect that right. This obligation is called a duty. We may therefore define duty in the abstract as a moral bond or obligation of doing or omitting certain acts in favor of another person. The act itself that ought to be done or omitted is the concrete duty. Every duty then supposes a corresponding right, and every right a duty: right and duty are correlative and inseparable. Hence brute animals can have no rights, for they have no duties or moral obligations, since by their irrational nature they are incapable of voluntary acts. We are under obligation to abstain from cruelty to animals, not because they have rights, but because such conduct is unworthy of our rational nature. Insane persons and infants have rights radically, which all are bound to respect; yet by reason of their mental helplessness they are exempt from performing duties.

117. Every duty or obligation supposes that some one who has power to bind the consciences of men has imposed the obligation. Now, moral acts, we know from the preceding book, are such as are in conformity with the moral law, which has God for its author. As every moral obligation is necessarily associated with a moral act, it depends, immediately or remotely, for its binding force upon the moral law and the Divine Author of the law. Therefore, the true rights and duties of man come from God; and they cannot be correctly understood if considered apart from their dependence upon God.

118. Rights and duties are inseparable; yet it may be asked, which is prior? Do the duties which rest upon us precede in the order of nature and of supposition the corresponding rights, or is the converse true? 1. Absolutely, or in the formal concept of right and duty, right is prior to duty. Right is a moral power existing in one person, which gives rise to an obligation in another. Consequently, the right is the cause of the obligation, and every cause is prior, in the order of nature and of supposition, to its effect. 2. Since God cannot be bound or limited, He has no duties towards His creatures, although He possesses sovereign rights over all creation. 3. Hence, man has no rights with regard to God; he has duties only. These duties, which God has imposed, confer upon him a right to the means required to attain the end of his existence. Thus man's dependence upon God is a duty prior to all his rights, and, at the same time, it is the source of all his rights. Once God has deigned to bestow upon us the right of existence, He owes it to His own infinite attributes to perfect His gift by endowing us with all the rights necessary for our existence as men. 4. A man's God-given rights impose obligations or duties on other men to respect his rights. Hence, in the relations of men with one another, right is prior to duty.

119. Rights are variously divided into connatural and acquired, alienable and inalienable, perfect and imperfect. 1. Connatural rights are those which are inseparable from the nature of man as a person. Such are the rights to life and limb, to personal integrity, to liberty of action within just limits, to specific equality as a member of the human family. Acquired rights come to a man in virtue of his own exertions, or of acts done by others in his favor; for example, rights to property, to franchise, to office, are acquired rights. 2. Inalienable rights are those which a man cannot renounce or transfer to another, because they are necessary to the attainment of his last end. All other rights are called alienable. "We hold these truths to be self-evident," says our Declaration of Independence, "that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among them are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." 3. Perfect or strict rights are of such a kind that the corresponding duties are matters of commutative justice. Imperfect rights are not so definite; they are founded not on justice but on claims of gratitude or of honor, or on some similar title.

120. Rights in conflict. Rights cannot strictly be said to conflict. We may meet with conflicting claims to the same thing, or apparent rights in conflict, but of these only one can be a real right. For, by the nature of a right, its existence in one person imposes an obligation upon all others to respect that right. Consequently, conflicting rights is a contradiction in terms, because "I am bound to respect something" and "I am not so bound" are evidently contradictory propositions. When two claims conflict, the right disputed must be decided to belong to the claimant that has the true title, or at least the better title. Such a decision is not always easy, especially as men are naturally prepossessed in favor of their own interests, and on this account they are often forced to make use of arbitration and law courts.

121. The following principles regarding conflicting claims are obvious: of two claims otherwise equal that should prevail --

1. Which is more necessary for the attainment of man's last end: thus, the right to life takes precedence of that to property. Hence, if a man who is suffering extreme poverty has instant need of food, he possesses the right to supply his need from the provisions of others who are not in equal or greater need.

2. Which concerns the good of the greater number. For this reason, the common good takes precedence of private good, as when a citizen has to expose his life in defense of the State.

3. Which is more probably genuine: thus, a man possessing an object which he acquired in good faith can continue to hold it till a better claim be proved.

122. Various classes of duties correspond to the various classes of rights: to the natural rights of one person correspond the natural duties of others; to acquired rights, adventitious duties; to imperfect rights, imperfect duties. Positive duties, which are based on positive or affirmative precepts of the law, oblige us to perform certain acts; while negative duties, which are based on negative precepts, oblige us to abstain from certain acts. Positive duties do not require us to act at every moment, but only at certain times; negative duties, however, oblige us to abstain at all times from the forbidden acts.

We have duties to God, to ourselves, and to our neighbor. These three classes of duties we shall examine severally in the three following chapters.