ARTICLE II: ON THE NATURE OF RIGHT

583. • Since it belongs to justice to render to each one his right, as is clear from the definition of justice handed down at n. 580, in this article what comes under the name of right must be explained.

Right is taken in various senses; for it signifies: 1) the very science of right or laws, those who cultivate which we call Jurists or Jurisconsults; 2) law or the rule of right, and thus divine right is spoken of, natural or positive, human, canonical or civil, of nations, etc.; 3) the very complex and system of laws, as when we say the Corpus Juris Canonici, Corpus Juris Civilis, Code of Law; 4) the sentence pronounced by a judge, although perhaps iniquitous, in which sense they say that a judge speaks right; 5) the very place or forum in which cases are conducted, in which sense the accused is said to be called into court.⁵

584. • Right, as it is taken here, is defined: "A legitimate moral faculty by which someone can do or have something in such a way that it is licit for no one to violate it without some injury."

1° It is a faculty. This, "according to the common use of speaking, signifies the power by which something is held at one's nod,"¹ or at one's own judgment.

2° It is a moral faculty, because it does not consist in physical force. Wherefore it cannot be diminished by the violence of anyone stronger. Cf. Syllabus p. XLV. n. 59, 60.

3° It is a faculty by which someone can do or have something, since the matter of right consists in actions, such as possessing, retaining, etc., and in things.

4° It is a faculty which it is licit for no one to violate without some injury; for otherwise that faculty would be vain and useless.

5° It is a legitimate faculty, because, when a just law is repugnant, nothing can be done or had by right. But law can be repugnant to a faculty in two ways, namely so that either it removes the faculty itself, for example of disposing of goods by testament, or renders the exercise of the faculty illicit, for example the prodigal squandering of one's own goods.

585. Title of right. - From what has been said it is understood what a title of right is: namely it is nothing other than the very reason why someone has a right or legitimate faculty of doing or having something, and why it is not licit for others to violate this faculty without some injury.

586. Division of right. - Right:

1° Is either objective, which others call passive, and is called the just thing, or that which is owed to another, or subjective, which others call active, and is the very faculty of doing or having something defined above.

2° It is either personal, or pertaining to a person considered in himself and immediately inhering in him, such as the right of preserving life; or real, or belonging to a person only on account of some thing which he possesses. Hence real rights can be transmitted from one person to another, according as this person succeeds that one in possession of the thing by force of which the rights exist, as, for example, the right by which a Bishop has power to make laws. - Real and personal right is also taken in another sense: namely the former for a right in a thing, the latter for a right to a thing, concerning which this number under 4° will treat.

3° One right is strictly so called, or strict without addition; another is broadly so called. The former, if it is taken objectively, is that "which is owed to another with equality of thing to thing, and which therefore cannot be violated without injury"; but the latter is that "which is indeed owed to another," but not with the said equality. Thus a seller "has a strict right in the price of the thing: therefore money is to be paid to him which equals the price of the thing; but parents indeed have a right to the obedience of children, but not a strict right; for what sort of obedience is owed to them cannot be defined by an adequate number."¹

Strict right by its nature is perfect. But perfect right is called a right which is joined with the right of coercing, namely of coercing him who would violate it, or lessen it, or disturb the use of it, so that he desist from violating it, etc.; and also of coercing him who has violated it, etc., so that he restore all things to their former state. Yet this right of coercion, if you except the right of repelling force by force, in a society rightly constituted passes into an action, i.e. into the right of reclaiming through a judge that which you think is owed to you. "In human society," says St. Thomas,² "no one has coercion except through public power." Yet it can happen that in fact no action is given from that right, for example because the proof which is required by law is lacking, or because the legislator denies an action to some special perfect right.³ Hence sometimes, as for example in hidden compensation, n. 709, 2° and n. 712, without imploring a judge, you licitly procure right for yourself.

4° Strict right is divided into right in a thing and right to a thing. A right in a thing is that which someone has in a thing already his own, or in a thing which is already bound to him in itself, and which therefore he will be able to vindicate from anyone into whose hands, against his will, it has come. A right to a thing is that by which we have not the thing itself, but the person obligated to us. Thus I have a right in a thing in my horse, and therefore I can vindicate it from any possessor into whose hands, against my will, it has come. But if I have bought a horse - where from law its handing over is required, so that it becomes mine - and the handing over has not yet been done, I can seek it only from the seller, but not from any other to whom the seller afterward sold and handed it over.

Corollary. - Since office or duty is said in order to right, duties can be divided in a manner corresponding to the division of rights. Wherefore some are personal, others real, this number under 2°; some perfect or legal, others imperfect or moral, this number under 3°.