On the Collision of Duties and Rights.

205*. Notions. To duties on one side correspond rights on the other side, and indeed in such a way that the right of one extends as broadly as the duty of the other.

1. Duties, according to the diversity of laws from which they arise, are:

a. affirmative duties, which arise from precepts, and negative duties, which arise from prohibitions;

b. absolute duties, which oblige simply and without exception, and hypothetical duties, which oblige only under certain suppositions;

c. natural duties, which are founded in the law of nature, and positive duties, which are founded in positive law, whether divine or human;

d. higher and lower duties, according as they refer to preserving greater or lesser goods, to averting greater or lesser evils;

e. duties of justice, from whose violation an obligation of restitution of itself arises, and duties of charity, from whose violation an obligation of restitution does not arise.

2. Since rights cohere with duties, they are distinguished in the same manner as duties; specifically these are to be noted:

a. connate rights, which are founded in the law of nature, and acquired rights, which are founded in positive law or in contracts.

b. inalienable rights, which can in no way be renounced, and alienable rights, which can be renounced: for what is necessary for man either for attaining the ultimate end or for fulfilling a moral obligation cannot be abdicated.

3. Collision of duties is the concurrence of several obligations which cannot be fulfilled at the same time.

Thus in the case of an unjust aggressor, two obligations collide: preserving one's own life and preserving the life of another. Since the obligation of preserving one's own life is more excellent, the other obligation loses its force.

a. So many and various are the relations of man, whether toward God or toward himself or toward other men, and consequently so manifold are the obligations which arise from them, that not rarely duties which are opposed to one another urge at the same time. But the collision of duties is only apparent, because of the colliding obligations only one in reality exists and requires that it be fulfilled; the rest lose their force or are suspended as long as the collision lasts: for their fulfillment is impossible; but no one is bound to the impossible. Certainly the supreme reason of all obligations is the will of God; but God, whose will is wisdom, cannot wish that at the same time we place actions of which one excludes the other.

b. Wherefore in a case in which duties collide, this is chiefly at issue: that the collision be solved, or that it be determined which obligation among the colliding ones, while the others cease, requires that it be fulfilled. Several rules are established for determining this.

205**. Rules for solving collision. The supreme principle in this matter is this: a higher obligation is to be preferred to a lower; but that obligation is judged higher which arises from a law which is of greater moment. Hence the following rules are inferred.

a. Precepts of the law of nature are to be preferred to precepts of positive divine law, these to precepts of positive human law; among these latter, precepts of ecclesiastical law prevail over precepts of civil law, which is drawn from the diverse end of these laws, one of which is nobler than the other.

The law which requires that we aid a needy neighbor is higher than the law of abstaining from servile works; the law of preserving health is to be preferred to the law of fasting or abstinence.

b. Negative precepts prevail over positive precepts; therefore in general the obligation of avoiding prohibited things is greater than that of doing prescribed things: for that which is prohibited is evil and pernicious in itself; but that which is prescribed is simply fitting and useful.

It is not lawful to lie nor to exercise a shameful business in order to aid one in need.

c. Precepts of justice in general prevail over precepts of charity.

If at the same time the obligation of paying a debt and of giving alms concur, the former, which is of justice, prevails over the latter obligation, which is of charity. Nevertheless, if someone must pay a debt by which, once paid, the debtor casts himself into grave necessity, he can defer payment, although it is an obligation of justice.

d. Precepts (negative and positive) which protect greater goods prevail over laws which protect lesser ones; therefore precepts which refer to spiritual goods, internal goods, common goods, are to be preferred to precepts which refer to bodily, external, private goods.

Thus a citizen is bound to serve as a soldier, even if his own life or his own family suffers damage. - A priest or physician is bound to help the sick, even if his own health or his own family is endangered. - It is not lawful to defect from the faith in order to preserve life; nor to deny the faith in order to avoid persecution. - A servant for whom service is an occasion of sin which can be removed by no means is bound to leave the service, even if the temporal damages would be most grave. - It is not lawful to expose life to danger on account of some slight temporal good.

e. But if in a case of colliding duties, after diligent examination, it cannot be determined which obligation prevails, and at the same time the necessity of acting urges, the choice can be made at will. An error which perhaps is committed in this case is involuntary and is not imputed to the agent.