The Circumstances

By the circumstances of an action we understand certain accidental conditions, which, as it were, surround (circumstant) and complete the substance of the action. enumerated in the doggerel line— There are seven Who, what, where, when, by what means, why, and how.

The circumstance indicated by who does not signify the agent merely as the author of the action; the action must necessarily be done by someone; but it signifies some special quality in him or condition which affects the morality of the action. Thus if a son strike his father, the circumstance of the parental relation changes the morality of the act, and makes it a sin not only against justice, but also against the fourth commandment or the virtue of piety. If a thief steals a consecrated chalice, the sacredness of the object makes the sin a sacrilegious theft, a circumstance indicated by what. And so of the rest.

It is obvious that circumstances of this kind are sources of morality, for they make the action conformable or not to the norm of morality. It is against right reason to strike anyone unjustly, but it is still more inordinate to strike a parent. At the proper time it is a good action to play in the proper place and with good playmates; if any of these circumstances be wanting, the action becomes so far bad.

Some circumstances affecting the intensity, or quantity, or duration of an action add to or lessen its malice, but they do not change its moral species; such circumstances are called aggravating circumstances. Although they do not change the moral species of the act, they sometimes make a venial sin mortal, or vice versa, as the quantity in theft; they are then said to change the theological species of the action. If the circumstances add to the action a special and distinct malice of their own, they change its moral species, as the sacred object or place in a sacrilegious theft. Such a theft is not only against justice, but also against the virtue of religion.

In order that an action may be altogether and simply good, the object, the end, and the circumstances must all be good; for good indicates completeness and perfection; there is evil in any defect. If all the sources of morality are evil, the action may have a triple malice; as when a thief steals Church plate in order to be able to indulge his vicious propensities. If only one source or circumstance of an action be mortally sinful, the perpetration of it turns the evil-doer away from God and makes the action wholly bad. An accidental and secondary circumstance, when only venially sinful, does not corrupt the whole action; it only lessens its merit. Thus it is a grievous sacrilege to receive Holy Communion in a state of mortal sin; a state of venial sin only makes the Communion less fruitful.

A full, entire, and specific confession of all the mortal sins which have been committed after Baptism is prescribed by divine law. According to the Council of Trent,¹ “ If anyone saith that in the sacrament of Penance it is not necessary by divine law for the remission of sins to confess all and singular the mortal sins which after due and diligent previous meditation are remembered, even those mortal sins which are secret, and those which are opposed to the two last commandments of the Decalogue, as also the circumstances which change the species of a sin ... let him be anathema.”

Theologians distinguish between the material and the formal integrity of confession. The material integrity consists in making known each and all the mortal sins which have been committed and which have not yet been confessed; the formal integrity consists in confessing all the mortal sins which occur to the mind after a diligent examination of conscience, or at least of all the sins which the penitent is bound under the circumstances to confess to the priest. It is formal integrity which is prescribed by divine law, and to procure it the penitent is bound before confession to make a diligent examination of his conscience. He should not be too anxious in making this examination; it will be sufficient if he employ that diligence which prudent men employ in worldly matters of importance. No general rule can be given to measure the length of time which the examination should occupy. Much depends upon the character of the individual, the length of time which has elapsed since the last confession, whether the penitent is accustomed to commit grave sins or not, and on similar circumstances. If the penitent cannot recollect the number of times that he has fallen into serious sin, he should mention the number as nearly as he can, and if he has fallen very frequently and almost continuously over a long period of time, it will be sufficient to mention the approximate number of times that he has fallen in the day or week, together with the length of time during which the habit has lasted.

¹ Sess. xiv, c. 7.

I. Notion. Circumstance is an accident which stands around a human act already constituted in some moral species, and is subject to the rules of morals (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 3; St. Alphonsus, V, XXXIX). Therefore two things are required: 1. that the act already have morality independently of the circumstance; 2. that the circumstance be subject to the rules of morals, or that it morally affect the act.

II. Enumeration of circumstances. "A circumstance is so called as existing, as it were, outside the substance of the act, yet so that in some way it touches the act itself. Now this can happen in three ways. In one way, insofar as it touches the act itself; in another way, insofar as it touches the cause of the act; in a third way, insofar as it touches the effect. It touches the act itself either by way of measure, as time and place; or by way of quality of the act, as the mode of acting. From the part of the effect, it is when what someone has done is considered. From the part of the cause of the act, as regards the final cause, there is taken on account of what; from the part of the material cause or object, there is taken about what; from the part of the principal agent cause, there is taken who has acted; and from the part of the instrumental agent cause, there is taken by what aids" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 7, a. 3; St. Alphonsus, V, XXXIX).

III. Morality from circumstance. That an act takes some morality from circumstance is clear from the fact that circumstance, as we posited, is subject to the rules of morals. Take these things especially:

1. Some circumstances increase or diminish morality within the same species. They are called aggravating or diminishing when they simply increase or diminish morality, for example the circumstance that someone steals a greater, but not yet grave, matter. When circumstances so increase or diminish morality that they make a mortal sin out of a venial one, or a venial sin out of a mortal one, they are called changing the theological species, for example the circumstance that someone steals grave matter, or consents semi-fully to a temptation.

2. Others cause the act to receive a new moral species, a new specific goodness or malice. Thus, for example, theft of a sacred thing involves a twofold diverse malice (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 10; St. Alphonsus, l.c.).¹

3. An evil circumstance influences an act good from its object in this way:

a) A lightly evil circumstance causes the act to be partly good, partly evil; good insofar as the honesty of the object is intended. For nothing prevents the one who does not repudiate a lightly evil circumstance of the object from sincerely seeking the honesty which inheres in the object. Added to this is that, if this opinion is rejected, even devout persons would perform a good work with greater difficulty, because a lightly evil circumstance or end is so easily mixed into the act. Hence, if someone, by praying, were to neglect only a light obligation of helping a sick person, he would contract the goodness which the act of praying has from its object (St. Alphonsus, V, XXXIX).

b) A gravely evil circumstance certainly prevents the act from being meritorious. But it does not seem to prevent the act from being partly good, partly evil; partly good, I say, because the agent, as it seems, can also in that case sincerely will the honesty which inheres in the object. Yet most authors hold an act of this sort as simply evil. According to the former opinion, one who, while neglecting a grave obligation of helping a sick person, assists at Mass contracts the goodness which inheres in the object of the act.

¹ According to some, other circumstances cause the act, rather than receiving a twofold malice, to receive a malice distinct from that which inheres in the act and the circumstance considered in themselves, and which, as it were, coalesces from a twofold malice. Thus, for example, the circumstance that a married person has intercourse with a third party, according to those authors, causes the act to have one specific malice, distinct from fornication and injustice, from which it, as it were, coalesces.

II. Sins to be confessed must be declared according to: 1. the lowest moral species, at least known confusedly; 2. number; 3. certain circumstances; 4. the external act; 5. the effect, as will be explained.

1. The lowest moral species, at least known confusedly. This follows from the Council of Trent,¹ which declares that sins must be declared "in species," which words in their obvious sense signify the lowest moral species. The reason is clear from what has been said about the necessity of integrity (n. 317). It is said:

a) Moral species; since it is not necessary to declare the physical species, so that one who has stolen, for example, 100 florins and a cow satisfies by confessing that he committed two grave thefts.

b) Lowest species, so that it does not suffice to confess, for example, the proximate genus of the sin, for instance by declaring: "I committed a sin of lust" or "of lust against nature."

c) At least known confusedly; for a species wholly unknown is not contracted.

Question. What must one confess who knows that he has sinned gravely but does not remember the lowest species?

Response. He is bound to confess the sin according to its generic aspect; for one who cannot integrally satisfy the precept is bound to satisfy it insofar as he can do that, unless the reason of the precept is not found in the defective fulfillment (St. Alphonsus, VI, 480).

2. Number. For the Council of Trent² declares that sins must be confessed "individually." For the rest, this is elicited also from the fact that all mortal sins must be confessed (n. 319; canon 901), which does not take place if the number is not assigned. Moreover:

a) If the true number is established, this must be declared.

b) If the true number is not established, but some number is established, for example, if someone certainly sinned eight times but doubts whether he sinned more often, say twelve times, let him either confess only the certain number or declare a truly approximate number, adding "about" or "more or less," saying, for example, in the case alleged, "about ten times I committed this or that sin." Now by an approximate number a moderate excess is comprehended, but not a notable one. And the greater the number expressed, the greater the excess comprehended. Thus, for example, by saying "three times more or less," up to 4 can be understood; by saying "ten times more or less," up to 12; by saying "thirty times more or less," up to 33; by saying "a hundred times more or less," up to 105 (St. Alphonsus, VI, 466).

c) If not even an approximate number can be assigned, let the habit of sinning be declared, the time through which it persevered, and, as far as possible, the frequency of falls in a day, week, or month (St. Alphonsus, VI, 466). But if not even that can be done at all, or not without great danger of erring, it suffices, after the time of the habit has been declared, to add that he sinned "as often as the occasion was given" or "as often as that desire occurred" (St. Alphonsus, VI, 466). Hence a prostitute commonly satisfies by declaring that she was given over to prostitution for such a time, and that as often as there was occasion she afforded the use of her body both to married and unmarried men. Nevertheless, she should determine more exactly the number of less usual species, if they occurred, for instance sins committed with clerics. Indeed, if she can, she must manifest the number more accurately. One who is accustomed to desire any women he meets satisfies by declaring that habit and the time through which he persists in it; let him add whether often married women, whether sometimes relatives, or sacred persons. One who is accustomed on any occasion to speak about shameful matters likewise satisfies by manifesting the time of a habit of this kind.

Corollary. One who has confessed an approximate number, adding "more or less" or "about," is not bound to supplement if afterward he certainly learns of a moderate excess above the number expressed. The reason is that the sacrament of Penance was instituted after the manner of a judgment to be exercised in a human way. But, considering the human manner of proceeding, in the case posited the case to be judged seems to have been so declared and judged that, if the penitent proceeded in good faith, the obligation of supplementing seems to be denied (St. Alphonsus, VI, 466). For the same reason the same seems to be said of one who, having confessed more generally and confusedly, afterward remembers the number more distinctly, unless afterward so great a multitude of sins comes to mind that they were not comprehended in the general and confused confession. Finally, it is clear that one who in good faith manifested too great a number is not bound to confess again, since the true number was included in the greater.

Question. Whether one who by one physical act committed several sins numerically, for instance by killing three men by one act, can confess thus: "I killed three men."

Response. It seems this must be affirmed, because he truly confesses the number of sins.

Objection. In the case posited the confessor is led into error as regards the number of acts; which is opposed to integrity.

Response. The confessor is led into error as regards the number of physical acts, let that pass; as regards the number of sins or malices, I deny it; namely, that act, physically one, is morally threefold. But an error induced as regards the number of physical acts is not opposed to integrity.

3. Circumstances of sin. The following must be declared:

a) A circumstance changing the theological species, as it is called, that is, one which makes a venial sin mortal or conversely; at least insofar as this is required lest the confessor take as light what was grave, or as grave what was light. Hence, for example, the circumstance of grave matter in theft must be declared, and the circumstance of half-full consent in an act gravely evil, if the penitent - to which in the case he is not bound - wishes to confess the consent.

b) A circumstance adding a new species of grave sin, or, to use the terminology of the Council of Trent³ and of the Code (canon 901), changing the species of sin, as if someone were to kill a sacred person. Thus the Council of Trent at the cited place and the cited canon of the Code; and it follows from what has been said about the obligation of confessing sins according to the lowest species.

Question. Whether one who by one physical act committed several sins in species, for instance if one bound by a vow of chastity pollutes himself, can confess thus: "I gravely transgressed a vow and perpetrated pollution."

Response. It seems this must be affirmed, provided he truly declares the lowest species, as in the example alleged; for nothing seems lacking to integrity. But if it is objected that the circumstance of the sin must be declared which changes its species or which adds a new species to it, whereas in the case the sin against the vow is not declared as a circumstance of the sin of lust, I respond that by objecting in this way one insists too much, as it seems, on the letter of the law.

c) Circumstances about which the confessor asks, so that he may judge better concerning the disposition and obligations of the penitent, and which especially regard habit, relapse, and proximate occasions. Hence Innocent XI condemned proposition 58: "We are not bound, when the confessor asks, to confess the habit of some sin."⁴

d) Accidentally, the circumstances must be declared on which a censure or reservation of sin depends.

Question. Whether a circumstance which notably aggravates a grave sin in the same species must be declared. I said notably, because no one teaches that a lightly aggravating circumstance must be manifested.

Response. Some affirm simply; others affirm as regards the circumstance "what," or of the object, or which regards the quantity of the thing, as in excessive theft, in incest in a very near degree. Others deny absolutely; with St. Alphonsus (VI, 468) we hold this opinion as sufficiently probable. For: 1. the Council of Trent,⁵ as also canon 901, speaks only of circumstances changing the species, so that a further obligation seems at least practically to be excluded; 2. a further obligation would impose a nearly intolerable burden and would be a source of scruples and difficulties. St. Antoninus,⁶ St. Bonaventure,⁷ St. Thomas, as it seems (4, distinction 16, question 3, article 2, solution 5; opusculum 12 to the reader of Besancon), and all more recent authors also adhere to the more benign opinion.

Corollary. Let the confessor generally not inquire into aggravating circumstances, but let him permit the faithful, for the tranquility of conscience, to manifest them. I said generally; for: 1. as regards sins against chastity, not only should he not inquire into circumstances not to be exposed, but generally he should also advise penitents not to expose anything besides that which must be exposed; 2. as regards sins of injustice, he should for the most part inquire into the gravity of the thing taken or of the damage inflicted, both because the faithful often do not know what matter is grave, and so that he can judge about the obligation of restoring and can teach the faithful about it.

4. External act, whether committed, as fornication, or omitted, as omission of Mass. Moreover, an external act which completes the internal act in the character of sin must be declared; for it comes under the name of sin and in reality is contrary to the law. But of itself an external act which is merely the manifestation of a sin that is properly internal, for example of heresy, need not be declared. Except if it introduces a new species, for example of scandal, or if a censure or reservation of sin depends on it (St. Alphonsus, V, 42).

5. Effect. The discussion concerns grave effects which were foreseen in the cause and either intended or permitted without sufficient reason. Effects of this kind can be, for example, blasphemies uttered in drunkenness, pollution, the death of an enemy following from the giving of poison, etc. Now:

a) The effect must be declared: 1. if the confessor asks about it so that he may judge better concerning the obligation of the penitent; 2. accidentally, if a censure or reservation of sin depends on it. Otherwise:

b) The effect need not be declared if the evil will was sincerely retracted before the event; for when that has been retracted, there is no source from which true morality can accrue to the effect, so that it cannot come under the name of sin (tom. I, n. 10). If the evil will has not been retracted, it is disputed. Moreover, it seems it must be said thus: the effect must be declared which is the complement or consummation of the internal sin, or the external execution, as foreseen blasphemies uttered in drunkenness. The reason is that an effect of this kind, as an act infected by the malice of the will (t. I, n. 60), comes under the name of sin (St. Alphonsus, IV, 149; V, 10). Otherwise it must be said of an effect which cannot be called the consummation or external execution of the internal sin, as the death of an enemy following from the giving of poison.

Question 1. Whether one satisfies integrity who declares a sin not yet confessed as confessed.

Response. It seems this must be wholly denied, because by declaring necessary matter as free, he does not subject it to the judgment of the confessor, but only to repeated absolution, or at least deceives the confessor as regards the obligation of judging the sin; and that deception is grave. Namely, necessary matter must be subjected to the judgment of the confessor and judged by him, because judgment concerning it has not yet taken place; free matter is only subjected again to absolution, although it is licit to subject it to judgment again.

Question 2. Whether one satisfies integrity who, with the confessor aware, for example in a general confession, omits to distinguish between sins confessed and not confessed.

Response. Affirmatively, because it is licit to subject sins already confessed together with those not yet confessed again to the judgment of the confessor, and not only to absolution, as happens if the whole confession is made concerning free matter. In the case, however, the confessor must judge concerning each sin, and therefore also investigate the species and number of old sins, namely lest some sin which has not yet been judged be left unjudged.

Question 3. Whether one satisfies integrity who declares a confessed sin as not yet confessed.

Response. Affirmatively, because it is licit to submit free matter again to the judgment of the confessor. Nevertheless he would commit a lie and a light sacrilege, and so would sin venially (n. 324).

Question 4. Whether one satisfies integrity who falsely declares the time of the committed sin, for instance by declaring a sin recently committed as committed long ago.

Response. Some deny this, because an act recently posited is not an act posited long ago, so that in the case the act posited is not declared. But it seems this must be affirmed, provided he does not proceed for this reason, that he confesses a not-yet-confessed sin as confessed. The reason is that the act is declared primarily as posited, so that it is undeservedly said that the act posited is not declared. I said "provided he does not proceed for this reason, that he confesses a not-yet-confessed sin as confessed"; this he would do if he accused himself of a sin not yet confessed in this way: "Besides, I accuse myself of this or that sin of my past life." Besides, a penitent rightly questioned about the time is bound to open the truth.

Corollary. The penitent has satisfied the precept of integrity only when he has exposed his sins in such a way that he can prudently judge that the confessor sufficiently perceived the things to be exposed. Hence: 1. one who notices that certain grave matters were either not heard by the confessor or were wrongly understood is bound to supplement; 2. a fortiori he is bound to this, indeed he confesses sacrilegiously, who deliberately chooses a somewhat deaf confessor lest the things to be exposed be duly perceived. On the other hand, however, the penitent can presume that the confessor sufficiently perceived the things exposed, until the contrary is established.

¹ Session 14, on Penance, chapter 5.

² Session 14, chapter 5.

³ Session 14, chapter 5.

⁴ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1208.

⁵ Session 14, on Penance, chapter 5.

⁶ Summa Theologica, part 3, title 14, chapter 19, § 7.

⁷ 4, distinction 17, part 3, article, question 3.

What is understood by circumstances? - By the circumstances of a human act are understood all those aspects which are accessory to the willed object, and, as it were, accidental to the substance of the act, and which are willed only concomitantly or consequently. "The name of circumstance," says S. Th. 1. 2. q. 7. a. 1, "is transferred to human acts from those things which are in place. But in local matters something is said to stand around which is indeed extrinsic to the thing, yet touches it or approaches it according to place. And therefore whatever conditions are outside the substance of the act, and yet touch the human act in some way, are called circumstances. But what is outside the substance of a thing, yet pertains to the thing itself, is called its accident. Hence the circumstances of human acts must be called their accidents."

As with the object, so circumstances are not considered here insofar as they are certain accidents physically affecting the act, but insofar as they are accidents of the human act, morally affecting it in moral being, already constituted from the object. Morally affecting, that is, insofar as they pertain to morals. Indeed it makes no difference to the moral being of an act that someone, for example, struck another with the right hand or the left, or stole with the right hand or the left. But jurists and theologians consider circumstances differently. For the former consider them rather insofar as they disturb society; the latter insofar as they offend God more gravely. - S. Th. 1. 2. q. 7. a. 2; Suarez tr. 2. d. 5.

Do human acts also take their moral goodness and malice from circumstances? - R. Affirmatively. For since they tend not toward an abstract object, but toward a concrete one, or one determined by its individuating circumstances, just as they take specific moral goodness and malice from the object, so also they take accidental moral goodness and malice from circumstances; and they put on various accidental qualities from them, just as man has the notion of his species from the soul, but something accidental belongs to an individual man according to his individual accidents. And certainly, since good is convertible with being, just as being is said according to substance and according to accident, so also good is attributed to something both according to its substantial being and according to its accidental being, both in natural things and in moral actions. - S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 3. 9, 2. 2. q. 154. a. 1; Wirceburg. c. 3. a. 1.

You will resolve: 1. A human act can have a threefold moral goodness or malice, whether within the same species, or even of diverse species. Thus, for example, if someone were to steal a sacred thing in order to give it as a gift to a prostitute for obtaining fornication from her, such an act from the object would be theft; from the circumstance of the sacred thing, sacrilege; from the end, fornication; and therefore it would have a threefold malice diverse in species.

2. The intrinsic and essential moral goodness or malice of the act is taken from the object. For from the object the will is moved first and per se, or directly, to the act. Hence, although for a human act to be good simply it is required that it have no evil circumstance, nevertheless it is not required that it always have proper objective circumstances, from which it receives accidental goodness or an increase of goodness, as is clear in an act concerning an altogether simple object, such as love of God. Objective circumstances are mentioned, or those on the part of the object, for circumstances on the part of the act itself are always at least in some way found, which confer upon it some goodness or malice. And thus always, at least morally speaking, which is enough in the present matter, there is in an act some intensity, pertaining to the circumstance how, by reason of which the act has some goodness or malice, which can be called accidental, insofar as the species of the act could be preserved without it.

3. In order that circumstances confer their moral goodness or malice upon an act, they must be willed either after the manner of an object, or at least after the manner of an act; because an object does not confer moral goodness or malice upon a human act except insofar as it is intended and willed. Objective circumstances, that is, those which hold themselves on the part of the object, must be willed after the manner of an object, because circumstances of this kind affect the object itself and the act indivisibly attains the object, not as though naked, but as though clothed with its circumstances. But circumstances which hold themselves on the part of the act must be willed either after the manner of an object, if that circumstance is extrinsic to the act itself, as is, for example, the circumstance who, for the one acting can regard himself as the object of his own will, and will the dignity or condition of his person to be applied to the work; or after the manner of an act, if that circumstance is intrinsic to the act itself, as is, for example, the circumstance how or when. And thus, in order that the goodness or malice of the act of the will be increased from intensity or duration, it is enough that the intensity and duration be voluntary after the manner of an act, namely insofar as the intense, lasting, etc., act itself is voluntary. S. Th. C. G. l. 3. c. 138, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4. 6. 7; Suarez tr. 3. d. 4, d. 5, d. 6. s. 3.

Can a circumstance intrinsically change the nature of the exterior work? - R. Affirmatively. The reason is that a circumstance is intrinsic to the work itself, regarded in the concrete, and by no means extrinsic, as the end of the one acting is with respect to the exterior work. Therefore it can change the external work itself. It can change it. For not every circumstance always modifies the external work in such a way that it also intrinsically changes its nature. And thus, if a pastor recites the breviary at the time when he ought to minister the sacraments to a dying person, the intrinsic nature of the recitation of the breviary is not changed. Hence it is also enough to confess only the aforesaid omission of the administration of the sacraments. Nor indeed is that intrinsic change to be understood in such a way that an external work, indifferent, good, or evil from the proper intrinsic nature belonging to it, or in such a species by reason of its proper object, becomes by its nature determined as to malice or goodness, evil, good, or in another species. For a circumstance, since it is something accessory to the object, if the object by reason of itself is indifferent or good or evil and in such a species, remains indifferent and good and evil and in such a species under that respect, although it can also intrinsically become evil, be changed into evil, and assume another species by reason of a circumstance. Thus, for example, eating is of itself an indifferent action, but eating on a fast day after another meal has been taken is a grave sin, and therefore the action is evil not by reason of eating, but by reason of the fast day, and by this evil circumstance of time it becomes evil. To use marriage is an honorable action, but to use marriage after a vow of chastity is a gravely sinful action, not by reason of the use itself of marriage, but of the vow; and by this circumstance of the vow it is changed from good into evil. To steal is an evil action against justice, but to steal a sacred thing is an evil action also against religion from that circumstance of the sacred thing, whence to the malice of theft is added the malice of sacrilege.

How are the various circumstances distinguished? - Certain circumstances are those which change the nature of the work or act merely accidentally, namely within the same species, increasing or diminishing moral goodness or malice; and therefore they are called aggravating or diminishing, and these can be either simply such, or notably, or greatly aggravating or diminishing. Circumstances of this kind are all those which do not have goodness or malice according to themselves, but through order to another condition of the act, which has that goodness or malice according to itself. Hence they increase or diminish the aforesaid goodness or malice. And thus, for example, the intensity and remission of the act, the long or short delay of the act, does not according to itself have moral goodness or malice, but only through order to the good or evil act, of which consequently it constitutes only an accidental diversity. Thus also to take something in a greater or lesser quantity does not according to itself regard the order of reason in good or evil, but presupposes some other condition through which the act has malice or goodness, for example, this, that it belongs to another, which according to itself is opposed to reason. Hence to take another's property in a greater or lesser quantity does not diversify the species of sin. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 11.

But there are other circumstances which essentially change the nature of the work and act and are called species-changing. Circumstances of this kind are those which according to themselves regard a special order of reason. Thus, for example, to take another's property has its species from the notion of what belongs to another, for from this it is constituted in the species of theft. And if on top of this place or time is considered, these will have the nature of a circumstance. But because reason can also order concerning place or concerning time and other things of this sort, it happens that a condition of place concerning the object is taken as according to itself contrary to the order of reason; for example, because reason orders that injury is not to be done in a sacred place. Hence to take something belonging to another from a sacred place adds a special repugnance to the order of reason. And therefore place, which was previously considered as a simple circumstance, is now considered as a principal condition of the object repugnant to reason. Hence S. Th. q. 18. a. 10 ad 2: "a circumstance," he says, "remaining in the notion of a circumstance, since it has the notion of an accident, does not give species; but insofar as it is changed into a principal condition of the object, according to this it gives species."

Circumstances which change a sin only from venial into mortal, under one respect, are only aggravating; and they are called aggravating infinitely: namely if mere opposition to such a virtue is considered, as may be seen in light and grave theft; for both are opposed to the same virtue of justice. Under another respect, they are species-changing, namely if opposition and repugnance with the general rule of morals is considered, namely with the law and the end to be attained. Circumstances which confer a new species upon an act already constituted in some moral species are properly species-adding. Thus, if someone bound by a vow sins against chastity, to the malice of the sin against chastity is added another malice against religion. But if the malice of the new species is not grave but light, then that circumstance is either held as simply aggravating, or as indeed adding a species, but with the addition, lightly: for then the whole specific substance of the act still remains intact, nor, morally speaking, does any substantial change of the act accede. Thus as regards a merely internal sin against chastity committed in a church, if the malice of sacrilege is present in it, it is only light, and therefore it is not a circumstance strictly and properly adding a species, but aggravating. But circumstances which first render an act simply good or evil are properly species-conferring or species-changing, for example, if someone undertakes a journey from the end of exercising a work of charity, that journey, indifferent of itself, first passes into an act of virtue; if someone gives alms only from vainglory, that act, although good in itself, then becomes evil. S. Th. 2. D. 38. q. 1. a. 4.

Is an act good if the circumstance is evil? - R. Affirmatively, if the question concerns one and the same act in the genus of nature, and one which is multiple in the genus of morals. The reason is that then a bad circumstance of this kind is altogether extrinsic to the good act itself. And thus in the celebration of Mass, a priest consecrating in the state of grace places a good act; then, sinning gravely by adhering to a shameful thought, and taking a sacrilegious communion, he places an evil act. - R. Negatively, if the question concerns one and the same act of the will in the genus of morals. The reason is that the act of the will, which embraces all these things together, namely the object and the circumstances, is one most simple act, and therefore, if it is not good from every side, it will be evil.

Hence, if there is a circumstance which is only lightly evil and extrinsic to the object, which the will embraces concomitantly, this lightly evil circumstance does not corrupt the good act, since it is altogether extrinsic and accidental to the substance of the act constituted in itself. And thus an affection toward venial sin in Communion does not corrupt Communion in its substance, although it renders it less fruitful. But if the lightly evil circumstance is intrinsic to the object itself, then the whole act is evil. Therefore the action of a religious giving alms against the vow of poverty or against the precept of a Superior, or from another's property, is evil, although the unlawfulness by reason of the vow or precept is only light. Suarez tr. 3. d. 8. s. 1; Wirceburg. c. 3. art. 1.

How many circumstances of human acts are numbered? - Seven, and they are: who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when. "The reason of this enumeration can be taken thus. For a circumstance is said as something existing outside the substance of the act, yet in such a way that it touches the act itself in some way. But this can happen in three ways. In one way insofar as it touches the act itself. In another way insofar as it touches the cause of the act. In a third way insofar as it touches the effect. But it touches the act itself either after the manner of measure, as time and place; or after the manner of quality of the act, as the manner of acting. On the part of the effect it is when what someone has done is considered. But on the part of the cause of the act, as to the final cause, why is taken; on the part of the material cause or object, about what is taken (which is comprehended under what); on the part of the principal agent, who acted is taken; but on the part of the instrumental agent cause, by what aids is taken." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 7. a. 3.

How are the aforesaid circumstances to be considered? - They are not to be taken insofar as the substance of the act depends on them, but insofar as they accidentally affect it. Otherwise they would no longer have the notion of circumstances. - Therefore:

1. Who does not signify the substance of the one acting, but his quality or condition, for example, that he is bound by a vow, joined in marriage, a public magistrate, etc. To this circumstance Lugo, De Poenit. d. 16. n. 200, brings back the habit of sin; for through it is explained how someone is disposed to sin more easily. The circumstance of person, generally speaking, does not transfer sin into another species, unless the sin is directly opposed to a union, office bringing a special obligation, vow, or state; as if a priest fornicates, it passes into sacrilege, but if he blasphemes, he is guilty only of blasphemy, just as another blaspheming. Malach. 2:1. 8; C. Trid. sess. 22. C. 1 de R.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 45. a. 4, q. 110. a. 4 ad 5; Lugo De Poenit. d. 16. s. 4.

2. What and about what likewise does not express the substance of the effect or object, but its quality or quantity, for example in theft it does not denote that the stolen thing belongs to another, for this pertains to the very substance of the act, but that it is sacred or profane, of great or small quantity, with damage thereby to a poor person, to wards, to girls to be married, with scandal of many, etc. The circumstance what and about what can easily be species-changing. But what, that is, the effect, when it is foreseen and willed, draws into its own species. To this circumstance can be brought back how often, or the multiplication of acts. Nevertheless S. Th. did not count it among the circumstances. And the reason is that circumstances are around the same act. But the number of operations does not stand around one and the same operation. For a second theft is not a circumstance of the first, or conversely; nor the third of the second, and so on. From this it follows that, because someone is no less bound to confess the second sin than the first, and no less the hundredth than any other, it is not enough to say that he stole many times, but he must explain how many times he stole, if he remembers the number; and if he does not remember, he must express how frequently, so that a probable number may be had. Lugo l. c. s. 4. § 7. s. 5. 6. 9.

3. Where does not signify bare place; for it is certain that every act of man happens somewhere; but the quality of the place, for example, that it is public, whence scandal arises; that it is sacred, whence sacrilege is had, etc. The circumstance of a sacred place, although it aggravates all sins accidentally, nevertheless draws only those into the species of grave sacrilege which are directly opposed to the sanctity of the place, or to the immunity annexed to it, such as effusions of blood or of human seed, which impede the divine worship to be exhibited there, for which the place is directly sanctified, and violent removals, which are contrary to immunity. Lugo l. c. s. 10.

4. By what aids signifies accidental instruments, or means, which the one acting used, for example, if someone used sacred vessels for poisoning, employed the aid of the devil, induced other men by command or counsel to the execution of sin. Although this circumstance sometimes seems to relate to sin merely materially, nevertheless sometimes it also changes the species. Lugo l. c. n. 475. 476.

5. Why denotes not the intrinsic end of the work, for this pertains to the substance of the act, but the extrinsic end, and that of the one acting, as if someone steals in order to get himself drunk. Why can manifestly give another species to an act. Lugo l. c. n. 477 seq.

6. How designates the accidental mode by which the interior act of the will is done, for example, intensely or remissly, from contempt, from levity, from ignorance, from fear, from passion. It also designates the mode of the exterior action, for example, that you killed by poison, by the sword, with cruelty and savagery, etc. How, although ordinarily aggravating or diminishing sin, can sometimes also give species. - Lugo l. c. n. 497 seq.; Laym. l. 3. de Iust. tr. 3. p. 3. c. 4. n. 1; Tambur. Meth. Confess. l. 2. c. 6. n. 2; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66. a. 3 ad 1, a. 4.

7. When signifies the quality or quantity of time, for example, on a feast day, of Communion, of Holy Week; for a long time, for a short time. The circumstance of sacred time aggravates sin, but does not add the grave species of sacrilege, unless it is done in contempt of the sacred time. Lugo l. c. n. 515 seq.; Lessius on q. 7; Cajetan on the same q.; L. 1. 6. n. 923; S. Th. 4. D. 32. q. 1. a. 5, q. 4. Sol. 2.

How many kinds of scandal are there? - Scandal is one kind direct, another indirect, according as the ruin of neighbor, or sin, either is intended, or, although it is not intended, nevertheless is foreseen, at least in confusion. And if the spiritual ruin of neighbor is intended, or the offense of God, it is called diabolical, against charity toward neighbor and God; but otherwise, if only the sin is intended, e.g., of fornication, but not as the spiritual ruin of another or as offense of God. - Likewise scandal is one kind active, another passive. Active is scandal given, and this is that to which the given definition belongs. Passive is scandal received, and is the spiritual ruin itself of the neighbor, which is improperly called scandal, since it should better be called the effect of scandal.

But scandal can be active, or given, without being passive or received, because an action apt per se for scandal can be posited without the effect following. And conversely it can be received without being given; but then scandal is not properly to be attributed to the action of neighbor, but rather to the ignorance, imagination, or even malice of him who suffers scandal, or admits it without foundation. But this is called scandal of the little ones if it flows from the infirmity or ignorance of neighbor; but it is called pharisaical if it comes from the mere malice of the subject. L. 43; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 1 ad 4; a. 3; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 127.

Must circumstances of mortal sins which notably aggravate them necessarily be confessed? - "There are three opinions, all very probable. - The first opinion affirms it. It is proved, 1. from the Roman Ritual, de Sacram. poenit., from the Roman Catechism, p. 2, c. 5, n. 47.

It is proved, 2. by reason, because the same reason which persuades that circumstances changing the species are to be confessed also urges for circumstances notably aggravating, since both notably change the judgment of the confessor. - The second opinion says that the circumstance what must necessarily be confessed, namely that which touches the substantial integrity of the sin in the individual, as is the quantity of theft. The reason is that otherwise the confessor will not be able to form a due judgment about the substance of the sin. - The third opinion, more probable to me, denies that there is an obligation of confessing aggravating circumstances. It is proved, 1. from St. Thomas, 4 d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, q. 5, who by his authority has indeed given great weight to this opinion. It is proved, 2. by reasons. The first reason: because from the words of Trent, sess. 14, C. 5, the Council seems not obscurely to exclude the obligation of confessing circumstances other than those changing the species, because it sufficiently suggests that these suffice for this: that the confessor form a right judgment about the gravity of crimes and about the punishment to be imposed. The second reason: because otherwise penitents would always fluctuate amid anxieties, since they could always doubt about the integrity of their Confessions in determining which circumstances are or are not notably aggravating. St. Thomas, l. c., q. 5, ad 2. Hence Lugo assigns a reason a priori for this opinion, saying that Christ prescribed nothing other than Confession of sins; but one who explains the circumstances changing the species of sin already truly confesses and explains the essence of the sin, since the quiddity or essence of sin is taken from its specific nature. The third reason: because if we were bound to manifest circumstances notably aggravating, we would also be bound to confess those notably diminishing, namely if someone sinned from anger, fear, more intense passion, from the inducement of others, and similar things, which obligation even the adversaries deny. The last and stronger reason: because no one is bound to observe a doubtful law; hence since the law of confessing aggravating circumstances is very doubtful, we are not bound to it. And therefore, Lugo rightly says, Trent did not explain this obligation of confessing them because the Council could not sufficiently gather it from the words of Christ and the institution of the sacrament." L. 468. - Except: "if the circumstance brings in a censure or reservation, or if the penitent is prudently questioned by the confessor for his necessary direction." L. 467. - Instr. pro parvul., etc., p. 4, at the end of the Roman Council, published by command of Benedict XIII; Lugo, d. 16, s. 3.

Does the circumstance of habit of sin change the species; and must it be manifested in Confession? - Resp. To the first: "It must be said that duration is not a circumstance drawing into another species; similarly neither frequency nor assiduity, unless perhaps by accident from something supervening. For something does not acquire a new species from the fact that it is multiplied or prolonged, unless perhaps in the prolonged or multiplied act something supervenes which varies the species, such as disobedience, or contempt, or something of this kind." St. Thomas, 1. 2, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1.

Resp. To the second: "It is necessary to distinguish a twofold habit: one which induces to perpetrating similar sins with one's freedom and advertence; the other which induces to perpetrating sins without freedom and advertence, and therefore in such a way that they are not a new sin, but the sin (in its cause) consists in this, that the habit was freely acquired, or in this, that due effort is not applied to obliterate it; as happens when someone from habit blasphemes or perjures himself without adverting here and now to the malice of blasphemy or perjury. This latter habit, freely induced or not uprooted, must be confessed as a special sin; for we are gravely obliged to lack it. For although one who perjures himself or blasphemes without advertence does not sin here and now, nevertheless he sins if he does not strive to uproot the habit of perjuring or blaspheming thus. But the former habit is then also to be subjected to the keys when someone adverts that through it he is placed in proximate danger of perpetrating new faults; for since exposing oneself to proximate danger of sinning is a sin, one who adverts that through the habit of sinning he is in that danger commits this special sin: that he subjects himself to this danger, or that he does not strive to turn himself away from it. But because men rarely advert to this, for this reason they rarely accuse themselves of this habit, and therefore rarely is there an obligation of manifesting it before the confessor questions about it. "It is indeed true that one who exposes himself to danger of sinning and immediately sins sufficiently explains both sins by confessing the sin committed, with which that other sin, by which he exposed himself to the danger of sinning, morally makes one. But when a notable delay intervenes between one sin and the other, sufficient for a moral interruption, or when someone only exposes himself to the proximate danger of committing some sin, yet does not commit it, then that by which one exposed himself to proximate danger of sinning must be explained separately; for in that very thing there is sin, according to that of Ecclesiasticus 3: 'He who loves danger will perish in it.'" Viva, on prop. 60 condemned by Innocent XI, last part. - Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 200 ff.; cf. here 704; E. M.

Must the penitent declare the diverse persons with whom he sinned? - Resp. In the negative, of itself. The reason is that it suffices that the number of sins and their species be declared; but sins do not change species for this reason, that they were committed with several persons. - Hence one who fornicated with three different persons, or three times with the same person, satisfies by saying that he fornicated three times; nor is he bound spontaneously to say whether the accomplice was one or several, whether they were prostitutes or others. Nevertheless, if the confessor asks about this, the penitent is bound to respond, because it is expedient that the confessor know whether perhaps there is a proximate occasion of sinning, as is likely if the sin was committed several times with the same person. But different satisfaction and different remedies will have to be prescribed by the confessor according to the multiplicity and diversity of the persons with whom one has sinned. - La-Croix 1040; Bonacina, de Integr., diss. 3, n. 14; Tamburini, in decal., l. 7, c. 7; Elbel, de Act. hum., 103.

Is one bound by a vow of chastity who sins with another similarly bound required to declare both circumstances? - Resp. In the affirmative. The reason is that there are two plainly distinct sins there, namely a sin against one's own vow, and a sin of cooperation with another toward violating that person's vow. - The very same must be said of a married man having relations with another's wife. "Different in species is the obligation by which he himself must not violate his own marriage, and that by which he must not bring it about that the other violate his own." Lugo, d. 16, n. 258. - La-Croix 1063; Salmant., c. 6, n. 63; L., l. 1, n. 46.

Must one who has committed incest explain the quality, namely: 1. with one related by blood, or with one related by affinity; 2. the degree of consanguinity or affinity; 3. the line in spiritual relationship; 4. the line and degree in legal relationship? - Resp. To the first: Lessius, l. 4, c. 3, n. 79, and others affirm. Lugo, d. 16, nn. 313-316, and others deny. This opinion is judged more probable by St. Alphonsus, 469, and is proved by authority and reason from St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 154, a. 9, ad 2. "A person related by affinity," he says, "is joined to someone on account of a person joined by blood; and therefore, because one is on account of the other, consanguinity and affinity make an unbecomingness of the same nature."

Resp. To the second: Suarez, d. 22, s. 3, n. 12, Diana, t. 1, tr. 7, r. 107, and others, from St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 154, a. 9, and Cajetan there, think that all incests are of the same nature, and that as concerns degree, from this there is had only an aggravating circumstance because of the same virtue of piety and the reverence due to relatives, which is harmed; but greater or lesser connection does not change the species. Ballerinius apud Gur., 486, seems to approve this opinion. - Navarrus, Man., c. 7, n. 4, and others hold that the species of incest is changed from the various degree of connection, because between degree and degree there is special reverence. St. Alphonsus, 470, says this opinion is less probable. - Salmant., de 6 Dec. praec., c. 5, nn. 28, 36, and others, relying also on the authority of the Angelic Doctor, hold that incest differs in species only in the first degree, both of the direct line and of the transverse line, because the reverence due to relatives in that first degree is of a different nature. St. Alphonsus in the cited place says this opinion seems equally probable as the following. - Tamburini, Meth. Confess., l. 2, c. 5, § 2, n. 6, and others judge that all incests among blood relatives, except only the first degree in the direct line, are of the same species. The reason is that only in the said first degree is there present a special nature of connection and of reverence due. "And for this opinion," says St. Alphonsus in the cited place, "St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 154, a. 9, seems undoubtedly to stand," and he says that it seems altogether to be held, and he adds: "indeed Lugo, d. 16, n. 314, etc., rightly teach that one must explain whether a father sinned with a daughter, or a son with his mother, whose fault has a diverse malice by reason of the special reverence due to the mother." Indeed the first degree of the direct line invalidates marriage by natural law. - But Tamburini, ibid., c. 7, n. 48, states that any incest, whether on account of consanguinity or on account of affinity, whatever the degree may be, does not differ in species. And by reason of parity he affirms that the same is to be said not improbably also about other injuries inflicted as regards parents, brothers, and wife, concerning which he had treated properly, c. 5, § 2, n. 6.

The Angelic Doctor, l. c., ad 3, says: "In the mingling of related persons, there is something which is unbecoming in itself and repugnant to natural reason, such as when mingling is made between parents and children, whose kinship is of itself and immediate.... But other persons, who are not joined according to themselves, but through order to parents, do not have unbecomingness in this way from themselves, but fittingness or unfittingness varies about this according to custom and human or divine law, because the use of venereal things, which is ordered to the common good, is subject to law." But it must be noted that by reason of superiority and the obligation arising from it, the sin is truly different if a father seduces a daughter, stepdaughter, or daughter-in-law, from that which a son commits when seducing his mother, stepmother, or mother-in-law.

Resp. To the third: The line in spiritual relationship does not change the species, whether one sins with her whom he held in baptism, or with her mother. L., l. 3, n. 450.

Resp. To the fourth: As for consanguinity and affinity, so consequently and much more for legal relationship the matter is disputed. - Cf. vol. 1, n. 798.

Must the nearness of persons be declared in sins of hatred or injury? - Resp. To the first: As to hatred, in the affirmative, if it is a question of nearer relationship on account of the strict bond of the virtue of piety. Hence grave hatred toward parents, children, grandparents, grandchildren, a spouse, brothers, sisters, and relatives by affinity in the first degree must be declared. - But in the negative, more probably, if it is a question of more remote relationship, namely among other blood relatives or relatives by affinity. For when the connection is more remote, there is had only an aggravating circumstance, and not also one changing the species and necessarily to be expressed in Confession. - Lugo, d. 16, n. 303 ff.

Resp. To the second: Lugo has these things, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 299 ff.: "I think that one universal rule cannot be given on this point; for sometimes the circumstance of the related person against whom one sins will have to be explained; sometimes it will not. This indeed depends on the quality of the offense and on the degree of connection. Hence if parents are struck by a child, if they are killed, if they are affected with insults, if they are defamed, those sins without doubt have a special circumstance against piety, love, and reverence due to parents, which are gravely harmed by sins of this kind. From this, however, it does not follow that every grave injury which is against a father has that other specific malice against piety and must be explained in Confession. For if a son steals from his father that which suffices for a mortal sin of theft against justice, he does not always sin gravely against piety or is bound to explain that circumstance... because... it is not... gravely opposed to that which piety and reverence toward a father demands."

Must the circumstance of dignity and office of the person necessarily be accused, e.g., if the sinner is a superior, magistrate, priest, etc.; if he is a confessor? - Resp. To the first: In the negative, more probably, of itself, i.e., the reason of scandal or office or particular obligation being excluded. The reason is that the circumstance of the dignity of the person sinning does not of itself change the species of sin, but at most aggravates the sin. - But the crime of injured majesty is equated with parricide, e.g., if someone kills the Pope, Emperor, King, or Prince, on account of the same virtue of observance and piety to which it is opposed. - Lugo, d. 16, nn. 309-311.

Resp. To the second: Resp. In the negative, more probably, provided it has no relation to Confession. The reason is that the confessor from his office is bound only to right direction in the tribunal of penance; from this direction no spiritual relationship arises. Moreover no injury is done to the sacrament through this sin, since it has no respect to Confession. Nevertheless it is easily evident that both a penitent of this kind must be entirely deterred from confessing further to that priest, and a confessor of this kind from admitting that penitent further to Confession. - Lugo, d. 16, n. 351 ff.; L., l. 3, n. 451.

Therefore a distinction must be made between the excellence and dignity of the person and his office. The circumstance of excellence and dignity of the person is of itself only aggravating, because from this no special virtue is gravely harmed. But the circumstance of office changes the species if the office induces a peculiar obligation of procuring the spiritual good of another. "For a Bishop, e.g., or a parish priest, from his own office, is pastor and physician of his subjects, and therefore is specially bound to impede their sins and to procure their salvation. Therefore they sin against the duty of their office if they positively attempt to stain those souls for whom they ought specially to watch. This sin not only pertains to the species of scandal, but is also specially against the duty of satisfying the proper office of Bishop or pastor, etc.... On the contrary, this malice is not found in any confessor whatever. For although in the very act of Confession he is pastor and physician, and has a peculiar obligation of governing and caring for the penitent, afterward, however, one who from office does not have that duty does not retain some peculiar obligation by this alone, that he once heard that person's Confession.... This could more easily be conceded in one who, although he is not parish priest or prelate, has nevertheless been specially chosen and assumed by the penitent himself as spiritual father by whom he is governed, which duty he has habitually accepted and retains, and therefore from the habitual duty itself seems to be obliged at least to moderate diligence concerning the salvation of his client, and much more to not positively bring upon him so grave a danger of eternal damnation." Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, nn. 356-358, 179-181; L., l. 1, n. 451; Elbel, de Act. hum., n. 97.

Must the circumstance of sacred time necessarily be accused? - Resp. In the negative. This is evident from the universal practice both of confessors and of penitents; since it is established that neither are the former solicitous about questioning concerning such a circumstance, nor are the latter accustomed to declare it.

Therefore the circumstance of sacred time does not seem to have to be explained, unless certain things are specially prohibited on account of reverence for the time, e.g., lest someone on Good Friday exhibit public games, comedies, or theatrical spectacles. - Lugo, d. 16, n. 520; L., l. 3, n. 273.

Does one satisfy the integrity of Confession who accuses a recent sin as if committed formerly? - "Resp. 1. In the affirmative, of itself, because the circumstance of time by no means pertains to Confession. Hence a penitent satisfies the obligation of Confession who mixes new sins with old ones, or who, making a general Confession, does not distinguish from the others mortal sins committed since the last Confession, even if he does this intentionally to cover the time at which he committed the sins. - 2. But if the penitent lies about the time, e.g., if he denies that he sinned today and declares the sin as if committed at another determined and remote time, the doctors more commonly think that he does not satisfy his obligation. The reason is that the act which the penitent placed today is not an act placed in the preceding year. Hence he lies in two ways, namely by concealing the sin committed today and by accusing a sin committed at another time. Thus Tamburini, l. c. - Nevertheless there are not lacking theologians who think this lie light." Thus Fr. Gury, 488. - The reason which is adduced for the second case does not exceed mere probability. And indeed it seems to prove too much; for then a lie about any accidental circumstance whatever would render Confession void. Moreover Gury himself in the first case says: "The circumstance of time by no means pertains to Confession." And rightly indeed: for the intrinsic substance of sin, which pertains to Confession, is one thing; the extrinsic accident of sin, which of itself is irrelevant to Confession, is another. Hence the aforesaid reason, insofar as it is urged for denying the sufficiency of that Confession, Lugo himself, d. 16, n. 53, calls merely probable. - Baller., ibid.; D'Annibale, ed. 3, p. 3, n. 309; Lugo, d. 16, s. 2, § 1.

Busembaum apud St. Alphonsus, 425, also affirms it as probable, "unless some circumstance, e.g., changing the species, or reservation of the case, or proximate occasion of sinning, requires otherwise, and sufficient penance is imposed." And St. Alphonsus himself implicitly affirms the same, H. A., tr. 16, n. 4.

1. Henricus confesses thus: 1. I committed carnal sins. 2. I performed gravely immodest acts. 3. I had evil thoughts. 4. I injured the reputation of my neighbor. 5. Besides homicide, I committed all other sins.

2. Paschalis, a priest, confesses thus: I am a priest and once sinned with a woman; omitting that he has care of souls, and that he had previously solicited his own parishioner in confession.

Q. 1. Is the morality of human acts derived from circumstances? 2. Do Henricus and Paschalis confess rightly?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 88. To the second: Henricus by no means confesses rightly. For first, besides the number, he ought to declare the various species of carnal sins, for example whether he sinned by himself alone, or with another person; and if with this person, whether unmarried, or bound in marriage, etc. But, speaking in itself, it is not necessary that he say whether he committed fornication twice, three times, etc., with the same person or with different persons. - Elbel 103; La-Croix l. c. p. 2, n. 1040; I. M. V. 2, n. 708.

In the second case, acts even gravely immodest, unless they are acts consummated, must be declared by their proper number and proper species. For acts of this sort also differ in species, as for example if someone mixes in filthy conversations, or looks upon himself; or touches a woman or himself shamefully, etc. I. M. 307, 310, 783.

In the third case it is also necessary to declare, besides the number of internal acts, the objects of desires or of delights, varying in species. For desires and morose delights take their species from their objects, Elbel 80, 102; and those evil thoughts, voluntary and deliberate, appear from the context of the case. For Henricus does not seem to be a man who is accustomed to resist temptations of this sort.

In the fourth case he ought to explain whether he gravely injured the reputation of his neighbor; and, if gravely, how many times he injured the reputation of his neighbor, and whether any other damage followed thence for the neighbor. But, speaking in itself, he is not held to declare whether he injured the reputation of his neighbor by simple detraction or by calumny. I. M. 1486.

Finally, in the fifth case it is clear that the confession of Henricus is very imperfect; and so he must be directly questioned by the confessor concerning other special sins against the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church, and against the obligations of his proper state, which Henricus could probably have committed. Cf. Elbel 96.

Nor has Paschalis confessed rightly. For he ought to have explained the circumstance of solicitation in confession, which adds the malice of real sacrilege, and the circumstance of the care of souls, which made the sin specially repugnant to the virtue of justice. Elbel 97, 98. - G. 31, 32.

1. By circumstances of a human act are understood all those accounts which are accessory to the willed object, and are as accidents of the substance of the act, and are willed only concomitantly or consequently. “The name of circumstance,” says St. Thomas, q. 7. a. 1, “is derived to human acts from those things which are in place to human acts. But in local things something is said to stand around which is indeed extrinsic to the thing, yet touches it itself or approaches it according to place. And therefore whatever conditions are outside the substance of the act, and nevertheless touch the human act in some way, are called circumstances. But what is outside the substance of a thing, while pertaining to the thing itself, is called its accident. Whence the circumstances of human acts must be called their accidents.” As with the object, so circumstances are not considered here insofar as they are certain accidents physically affecting the act, but insofar as they are accidents of a human act, morally affecting it in its moral being, already constituted from the object. In its moral being, already constituted from the object, because if it gave the first and essential moral species, it would no longer be a circumstance, but would pass over into the condition of object and essential difference. Morally affecting, that is, insofar as they pertain to morals. For indeed it makes no difference to the moral being of the act that someone, for example, gave a slap to another or stole with the right hand or the left. But jurists and theologians consider circumstances differently. For the former consider them rather insofar as they disturb society; the latter, insofar as they offend God more gravely. Cf. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 5.

2. Human acts also take their moral goodness and malice from circumstances. For since they tend not to an abstract but to a concrete object, or to an object determined by its individuating circumstances, as they take specific moral goodness and malice from the object, so also they take accidental moral goodness and malice from circumstances; and from them they put on various accidental qualities: just as man has the account of his species from the soul, but something accidental belongs to an individual man according to his individual accidents. And indeed, since good is convertible with being, just as being is said according to substance and according to accident, so also good is attributed to something both according to its substantial being and according to its accidental being, both in natural things and in moral actions. Therefore, just as “in natural things there is not found the whole fullness of perfection which is due to them from substantial form, which gives species, but much is superadded from supervening accidents, as in man from figure, from color, and so concerning others, and if any of these is lacking for a decent relation, evil follows; so also it is in action. For the fullness of its goodness does not consist wholly in its species, but something is added from those things which come upon it as certain accidents. And things of this sort are due circumstances. Whence, if something is lacking which is required for due circumstances, the action will be evil.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 3, 9.

3. For indeed a human act takes goodness or malice from the object for this reason, that the object states a relation of fittingness or unfittingness to right reason. But circumstances also can import a relation of fittingness or unfittingness to right reason; thus, for example, it is not only unfitting to reason to steal, but also to steal in a sacred place. Billuart, De Act. hum., Diss. 4, art. 2, § 2.

4. “Thus, therefore, in a human action goodness can be considered in four ways. One indeed according to genus, namely insofar as it is an action, because as much as it has of action and entity, so much it has of goodness. Another according to species, which is taken according to a fitting object. The third according to circumstances, as according to certain accidents. But the fourth according to the end, as according to relation to the cause of goodness.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4. “Nothing prevents an action having one of the aforesaid goodnesses from lacking another, and according to this it happens that an action which is good according to its species, or according to circumstances, is ordered to an evil end, or conversely. Nevertheless an action is not good simply unless all the goodnesses concur, because any singular defect causes evil; but good is caused from an integral cause.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4, body and ad 3.

5. Therefore a human act can have a threefold moral goodness or malice, either within the same species or even of a diverse species. Thus, for example, if someone were to steal a sacred thing so that he might give it as a gift to a prostitute for obtaining fornication from her, such an act from the object would be theft, from the circumstance of the sacred thing sacrilege, from the end fornication; and therefore it would have a threefold malice diverse in species. But the intrinsic and essential moral goodness or malice of the act is taken from the object. For from the object the will is first and of itself, or directly, moved to the act. Hence although, in order that a human act be good simply, it is required that it have no evil circumstance, nevertheless it is not required that it always have proper objective circumstances from which it receives accidental goodness or an increase of goodness, as is clear in an act concerning an altogether simple object, such as the love of God. Objective circumstances are meant, or circumstances on the part of the object, for at least some circumstances on the part of the act itself are always found which confer on it some goodness or malice. And thus always, at least morally speaking, which is enough in the present matter, there is in the act some intensity, pertaining to the circumstance how, by reason of which the act has some goodness or malice which can be called accidental, insofar as the species of the act could be preserved without it. But in order that circumstances confer their moral goodness or malice on the act, they must be willed either after the manner of an object, or at least after the manner of an act, because an object does not confer moral goodness or malice on a human act except insofar as it is intended and willed. Objective circumstances, that is, those which hold themselves on the part of the object, must be willed after the manner of an object, because circumstances of this sort affect the object itself, and the act indivisibly attains the object, not as if naked, but as if clothed with its own circumstances. But circumstances which hold themselves on the part of the act must be willed either after the manner of an object, if that circumstance is extrinsic to the act itself, as, for example, is the circumstance who; for the one operating can regard himself as the object of his will and will to apply the dignity or condition of his person to the work; or after the manner of an act, if that circumstance is intrinsic to the act itself, as, for example, is the circumstance how or when. And thus, in order that the goodness or malice of the act of the will be increased from intensity or duration, it is enough that the intensity and duration be voluntary after the manner of an act, namely insofar as the intense, lasting act itself is voluntary, etc. Cf. St. Thomas, C. G. l. 3, c. 138; 1. 2, cited places; Suarez, D. 4, D. 5, D. 6, S. 3.

6. Whether a circumstance can intrinsically change the nature of the exterior work and of the interior act? — R. In the affirmative. The reason is that a circumstance is intrinsic to the work itself or to the act itself, but by no means extrinsic, as is the end of the one operating with respect to the exterior work. Therefore it can modify the external work itself and the internal act. For not every circumstance always modifies the external work in such a way that it also intrinsically changes its nature. And thus, if a pastor recites the breviary at a time when he ought to minister the sacraments to a dying person, the intrinsic nature of the recitation of the breviary is not changed. Whence it is enough also to confess only the aforesaid omission of the administration of the sacraments. Nor indeed is that intrinsic modification to be understood in such a way that an external work, indifferent, good, or evil from its own intrinsic nature and in such a species by reason namely of the object properly, becomes from indifferent, by its nature, good or evil, from evil good, from good evil, or in another species. For since a circumstance is something accessory to the object, if the object, by reason of itself, is indifferent or good or evil and in such a species, it remains indifferent, good, evil, and in such a species under that respect, although intrinsically it can also become evil, be changed into evil, and assume another species of evil by reason of the circumstance. Thus, for example, the action of eating of itself is indifferent; but to eat on a fast day after another meal has been taken is a grave sin, and therefore the action is evil not by reason of eating, but by reason of the fast day, and by this circumstance of time it becomes evil. To use marriage is an honorable action; but to use marriage after a vow of chastity is a gravely sinful action, not by reason of the use itself of marriage, but of the vow; and by this circumstance of the vow it is changed from good into evil. To steal is an evil action against justice; but to steal a sacred thing is an action evil also against religion from that circumstance of the sacred thing, whence to the malice of theft is added the malice of sacrilege.

7. Now there are certain circumstances which change the nature of the work or act merely accidentally, namely within the same species, they increase or diminish moral goodness or malice; and therefore they are called aggravating or diminishing. Circumstances of this sort are all those which do not have goodness or malice according to themselves, but through order to another condition of the act which has that goodness or malice according to itself. Whence they increase or lessen the aforesaid goodness or malice. And thus, for example, the intensity and remission of an act, the long or short delay of an act, do not have moral goodness or malice according to themselves, but only through order to a good or evil act, of which consequently they constitute only an accidental diversity. Thus also to take something in a greater or lesser quantity does not of itself regard the order of reason in good or evil, but presupposes some other condition through which the act has malice or goodness, for example this, that it is another’s, which according to itself is repugnant to reason. Whence to take another’s property in a greater or lesser quantity does not diversify the species of sin. Circumstances which, by aggravating a sin, render it mortal from venial are called aggravating infinitely.

8. Of aggravating circumstances, some aggravate notably, others lightly. A circumstance is judged to aggravate notably in quantitative matter, or matter which consists in number, weight, and measure, when, taken separately and separated from the act, it would suffice for mortal sin; as one who, beyond five or six lire constituting in the case a mortal sin, should steal another five or six, namely ten or twelve. But in other matters it would be judged to aggravate notably when it notably exceeds the ordinary manner of sinning in matters of this sort, as if someone should spend the whole night in impurities with a woman, if someone should persevere for months and years in fraternal hatred, if someone should kill an enemy by cutting him limb by limb, etc. If neither of these occurs, it is judged to aggravate lightly, as that a thief steals seven or eight lire in the same case of grave matter of five or six lire, or that after a quarrel someone, being angry, remains for a little while in hatred. Billuart, De Act. hum., Diss. 4, art. 2, § 2.

9. But there are other circumstances which essentially change the nature of the work and act and are called those changing the species. Circumstances of this sort are those which according to themselves regard a special order of reason. Thus, for example, to take another’s property has species from the character of what is another’s; for from this it is constituted in the species of theft. And if beyond this the character of place or time is considered, it will have itself in the character of a circumstance. But because reason can also order concerning place or time and other things of this sort, it happens that the condition of place concerning the object is taken as according to itself contrary to the order of reason; for example, that reason orders that injury is not to be done to a sacred place. Whence to take something belonging to another from a sacred place adds a special repugnance as regards the order of reason. And therefore the place which previously was considered as a simple circumstance is now considered as a principal condition of the object repugnant to reason.

10. Nor indeed is it repugnant that a moral act be found constituted in multiple species. For a natural being cannot be except in only one species, because its being is physically determined; nor can there be physically a process of nature into infinity, whence it is necessary to stop at some ultimate form from which the specific difference is taken, after which there cannot be another specific difference. And hence it is that in natural things that which is an accident of some thing cannot be taken as a difference constituting species, since it comes upon a thing already constituted in its species. But a moral being can be constituted in multiple species, for the species of moral acts are constituted from forms according as they are apprehended by reason. But the process of reason is not determined to one thing; rather, when anything whatever has been given, it can proceed further. And therefore what in one act is taken as a circumstance superadded to the object which determines the species of the act can again be taken by ordering reason as a principal condition of the object determining the species of the act. And thus in theft, if the mere account of place is considered, it has itself as a circumstance; but if that account of a sacred place, for example, is considered as contrary to ordering reason, because reason orders the reverence due to a sacred place and that no injury be done to it, then that account is no longer considered as a mere circumstance, but as a certain principal condition of the object; whence, as from the object, so also from it the act receives species, as though from a certain specific difference of it.

11. Hence St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 10 ad 2, says: “a circumstance, remaining in the character of circumstance, since it has the character of an accident, does not give species; but insofar as it is changed into a principal condition of the object, according to this it gives species.” For indeed since an act, as the whole that it is, tends to the object, it is indeed specified by the object. But since it tends to a concrete object, it also attains its circumstances, and from them itself puts on various accidental qualities. But when those circumstances import some consonance or dissonance with reason, and are changed into a certain principal condition of the object, then the act, which attains the object as it is, namely according to that condition which it really has, and is specified by the object, also takes species from that condition of the object. Namely that circumstance, constituting the principal condition of the object, itself also becomes the object of the act, so that there is, as it were, a twofold act, or one act virtually twofold: one concerning the object of the act, the other concerning the object of the circumstance, as appears in theft in a sacred place; namely the taking of another’s thing, the object of the act of theft, and the injury inflicted on the sacred place, the object of the circumstance of theft. And thus the principle still stands: that an act is specified by the object; for in truth there is a twofold object which is attained by the act: since the object here is not simply this or that thing, but according as it bears relation to the order of reason; moreover both the object of the act properly such, and the circumstance of that object, will be able to be consonant with or discordant from the order of reason.

12. Cajetan aptly says on q. 18. a. 10 and 11: “Notice and consider diligently that just as in natural things certain accidents are forms according to themselves, such as whiteness and sweetness, but certain others are only conditions of presupposed forms, as more, less, greater, strongly, quickly, and other things of this sort; so in morals circumstances are twofold: some are goodnesses or malices according to themselves, as are all acts of virtues and vices; some are only conditions of supposed virtues or malices, as greater and less, more and less, and the like. The difference between these circumstances is manifest, because the latter never make an act good or evil, although they increase or diminish goodness or malice. But the former make an act good or evil; and the reason is ready at hand, because the former of themselves add goodness or malice, the latter do not. Again, the difference between them is that the former according to themselves are certain species of morals having their own objects, fitting or unfitting to reason, as is clear concerning theft done in a sacred place. For to the act of theft is joined injury of a sacred place, which has its proper species from the sacred place, as an object for reason, as suffering injury: for this object is according to itself discordant from reason. But the latter are not according to themselves species of morals, nor do they have their own objects; and from this it follows that the former give species to the act which they circumstantiate, since the act is concerned with that object of the circumstance.”

13. The matter can still be explained otherwise. “It must be said that according to its substance something cannot be in two species, of which one is not ordered under the other. But according to those things which come to a thing, something can be contained under diverse species. As this apple according to color is contained under this species, namely of white, and according to odor under the species of sweet-smelling. And similarly an act which according to its substance is in one species of nature can, according to supervening moral conditions, be referred to two species.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 8 ad 1.

14. What, generally, are circumstances changing the species? — “A circumstance is sometimes taken as an essential difference of the object, according as it is compared to reason; and then it can give species to a moral act. — And this must be whenever a circumstance changes an act from goodness into malice; for a circumstance would not make an act evil except through this, that it is repugnant to reason.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 6 ad 4. This same thing must be whenever a circumstance changes an act from indifferent into good or evil, by giving namely the first and essential species of goodness or malice. — Thus, for example, if someone after a vow of chastity should use marriage, from that circumstance of the vow the act is changed from goodness into malice; if someone for the sake of recreation wished to ride in a church, or to hold a wedding banquet in a church, or to eat a small quantity on a fast day after several other small meals; from the circumstance of place and fast the act becomes evil from indifferent, and is constituted in a determinate species of malice. — For indeed, from the fact that a circumstance according to itself is repugnant to or fits reason, it imports malice or goodness according to itself, and bears before itself an object repugnant to or fitting to reason; and through this it places in its proper species the act which it changes into evil from good, or changes into good or into evil from indifferent. For the constitution of an act in the being of evil or good is from the object. But it is clear that the changing of an act from good into evil, from indifferent into evil or good, is a constitution in the being of evil or good.

15. From what has been said it is clear, 1.º that circumstances changing the species can be threefold: because they give to the act a new species of goodness or malice beyond the preceding species from the object; because they change the act from good into evil; because they give to the act its first moral goodness or malice. 2.º There are two general rules concerning circumstances giving species to moral acts. The first is that whenever a circumstance makes an act evil from good, or good or evil from indifferent, it gives species to the act. The second is that whenever a circumstance regards a special, of itself proper order of reason, it again gives species to the act. But it regards a special proper order of reason when it of itself exhibits something congruent with or discordant from reason. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 72. a. 8, 9; q. 73. a. 7; q. 88. a. 5; De Malo, q. 2. a. 6 ad 2, a. 8.

16. Whether an act is good if the circumstance is evil? R. 1.º In the affirmative, if the question concerns one and the same act in the genus of nature, and one which is multiple in the genus of morals; for example, someone chants the canonical hours in choir, or sings the conventual Mass, and at some time during the singing consents to vain glory concerning his beautiful voice, etc. The reason is that then an evil circumstance of this sort is altogether extrinsic to the good act itself, for example to the celebration of the divine offices, etc. And thus in the celebration of Mass, a priest consecrating in the state of grace places a good act; then, gravely sinning by adhering to a base thought and sacrilegiously receiving Communion, he places an evil act. — 2.º In the negative, if the question concerns one and the same act of the will in the genus of morals. The reason is that the act of the will which embraces all these things together, namely the object and circumstances, is one most simple act, and therefore, if it is not good on every side, it will be evil. “And therefore,” says St. Thomas, 2 D. 36. q. un. a. 5, “it happens that an act has goodness from matter and yet be done badly because of undue circumstances.” And in 1. 2. q. 18. a. 1, an act of this sort is called by the Holy Doctor good in a certain respect and evil in a certain respect; and generally, insofar as it falls short of goodness, so it is called evil: “for example, if there be lacking to it either a determinate quantity according to reason, or a due place, or something of this sort.” And q. 19. a. 2 ad 2, he says: “it must be said that, supposing that the will is of the good, no circumstance can make it evil. Therefore what is said, that someone wills some good when he ought not, can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that this circumstance is referred to the thing willed. And thus the will is not of good, because to will to do something when it ought not be done is not to will good. In another way, so that it is referred to the act of willing. And thus it is impossible that someone will good when he ought not, because man ought always to will good, except perhaps accidentally, insofar as someone by willing this good is prevented from then willing some due good. And then evil enters not from the fact that someone wills that good, but from the fact that someone does not will another good. And similarly it must be said concerning other circumstances.” — Hence, if the circumstance is only lightly evil and extrinsic to the object, and the will embraces it concomitantly, this lightly evil circumstance does not corrupt the good act, since it is altogether accidental to the substance of the act constituted in itself. This indeed happens in natural things; the same ought much more to be in moral things. Suarez, D. 8, S. 1, n. VII ff. “And thus an affection for mortal sin in Communion corrupts it substantially and renders it sacrilegious; an affection for venial sin in Communion does not corrupt it in its substance, although it renders it less fruitful.” But if a circumstance, even lightly evil, is intrinsic to the object itself, then the whole act is evil, because that circumstance is the ultimate determination of the moral object. And thus the whole action of a Religious giving alms against the vow of poverty or against the precept of a Superior is evil, although the prohibition by reason of the vow, or by reason of the precept of the Superior, is only light.

17. How many circumstances of human acts are numbered? — R. Seven, and they are these: who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when. “The reason of this enumeration can be taken thus. For a circumstance is said as though existing outside the substance of the act, yet in such a way that it touches the act itself in some way; but this happens to be done in three ways. In one way, insofar as it touches the act itself. In another way, insofar as it touches the cause of the act. In a third way, insofar as it touches the effect. But it touches the act itself either after the manner of measure, as time and place, or after the manner of the quality of the act, as the mode of acting. On the part of the effect, as when what someone did is considered. But on the part of the cause of the act, as to the final cause, why is taken; but on the part of the material cause or object, there is taken about what (which is comprehended under what); but on the part of the principal agent, who acted is taken; but on the part of the instrumental acting cause, by what aids is taken.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 7. a. 3.

18. How are the aforesaid circumstances to be considered? — R. They are not to be taken insofar as the substance of the act depends on them, but insofar as they affect it accidentally. Otherwise they would no longer have the character of circumstances. Therefore: 1.º Who does not signify the substance of the one operating, but his quality or condition, for example that he is bound by a vow, joined in marriage, a public magistrate, etc. Lugo, de Poen. D. 16. n. 200, refers the custom of sin to this circumstance; for by it is explained how someone is disposed to sinning more easily. The circumstance of person, generally speaking, does not transfer a sin into another species, unless the sin is directly opposed to a conjunction, an office bringing a special obligation, his vow, or his state; as if a priest commits fornication, it passes into sacrilege, but if he blasphemes, he is guilty of blasphemy alone, just as another blasphemer. St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 65. a. 4; q. 110. a. 4 ad 5. 2.º What and about what likewise does not express the substance of the effect or object, but its quality or quantity; for example, in theft it does not denote that the stolen thing is another’s, for this pertains to the very substance of the act, but that it is sacred or profane, of great or small quantity, with resulting damage of a poor man, of wards, of marriageable girls, with scandal of many, etc. The circumstance what and about what can easily be one changing the species. But what, i.e. the effect, when it is foreseen and willed, draws into its own species; as if a woman, going to church, knows that she is to be loved there, and wills this, although she does not go on account of this but on account of hearing Mass, that act draws species from that evil effect. To this circumstance can be referred how many times, or the multiplication of acts. Yet St. Thomas did not count it among the circumstances. And the reason is that circumstances are about the same act. But the number of operations does not circumstantiate one and the same operation. For the second theft is not a circumstance of the first, or conversely, nor the third of the second, and so thereafter. From which it follows that, because someone is no less bound to confess the second sin than the first, and no less the hundredth than any other, it is not enough to say that he stole several times, but it is necessary to explain how many times he stole, if he remembers the number; and if he does not remember, he ought to express how frequently, so that a probable number may be had. 3.º Where does not signify bare place; for it is certain that any act of man is done somewhere; but the quality of the place, for example that it is public, whence scandal arises; that it is sacred, whence sacrilege is had, etc. The circumstance of sacred place, although it aggravates all sins accidentally, nevertheless draws only that sin to the species of sacrilege which is directly opposed to the sanctity of the place or to the immunity annexed to it, as outpourings of blood or of human seed, and other actions which by law impede divine worship from being offered there, for which the place is directly sanctified, and violent removals of the guilty from it. 4.º By what aids signifies accidental instruments or means which the one operating has used, for example if someone has used sacred vessels for poisoning, has employed the help of a demon, has induced other men by command or counsel to the execution of sin. Although this circumstance sometimes seems to have itself merely materially toward sin, nevertheless sometimes it also changes the species. 5.º Why denotes not the intrinsic end of the work, for this does not differ from the object and pertains to the substance of the act, but the extrinsic end and that of the one operating, as if someone steals in order to become drunk. But the extrinsic end of the one operating can coincide with the intrinsic end of the work. Why can manifestly give another species to the act. 6.º How designates the accidental mode by which the interior act of the will is done, for example intensely or remissly, from contempt, from levity, from ignorance, from fear, from passion. It also designates the mode of the exterior action, that you killed by poison, by sword, with cruelty and savagery, etc. How, although it is ordinarily aggravating or diminishing of sin, sometimes can also give species. 7.º When signifies the quality or quantity of time, for example on a feast day, of Communion, of Holy Week; for a long time, for a short time. The circumstance of sacred time is aggravating of sin, yet not adding the species of sacrilege unless it is done in contempt of sacred time. Lessius on q. 7; Cajetan on the same q.; St. Alphonsus, l. 6. n. 923; St. Thomas, 4 Dist. 32. q. 1. a. 5, q. 4, solution 2.ª

27. • Circumstances are accidental determinations of an act, without which it could exist as to substance, and which nevertheless in some way touch upon its morality. Hence circumstances are not the object of the act, because they are touched upon by the will only secondarily.

Seven classes of circumstances are numbered, expressed in this little verse:

Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when?

Namely: Who, or what sort is the agent, married, cleric, etc.? - what, or what is the accidental quality or quantity of the object? - where, or in what place, whether sacred or profane? etc. - by what aids, that is, what means, instruments, etc., did the agent use? - why, or from what end, namely extrinsic? - how, namely whether maliciously, or in good faith, whether in an intense or remiss manner, whether advertently or not? - when, that is, at what or how much time?

I say: A human act takes true morality from circumstances. The reason is that circumstances determine the act as moral, namely as having a relation of agreement or disagreement with reason and right order; indeed sometimes circumstances alone introduce agreement or disagreement of this kind into an act, as happens in acts indifferent from the object.

Hence 1. some circumstances are those which pertain to the morality of the act; - 2. others are those which contribute nothing to it, and therefore must be held wholly indifferent; - 3. others are those which leave the object in the same moral species, and others which change the species itself, or add a new species. Of the former, some aggravate the malice, but others lessen it, and do this gravely or lightly ¹.

¹ If circumstances so lessen or aggravate sin that from mortal it becomes venial, or vice versa, then they are said to transfer the act into another theological species.

YOU WILL ASK: Whether a lightly evil circumstance always corrupts the whole good act?

I answer. No. For the substance of the good act can remain unharmed notwithstanding a circumstance of this kind; whence that act is infected only in part. Thus, for example, the agent does not lose the whole merit of a good work, nor its principal part, although he may have given consent to some incident temptation of vainglory. - Billuart, diss. 4, art. 4. - See what is to be said below concerning the end, no. 30.

29. You Will Resolve. - 1. Every election of an evil means is evil, but not conversely is every election of a good means good. Thus no one is praised because he abstains from drink out of avarice; but he must be held guilty who steals money in order to give alms.

2. He who chooses an honest means for an honest end posits an act of twofold honesty ⁴, if each honesty is intended. Likewise he is guilty of twofold malice who chooses an evil means for an evil end, for instance if someone steals money in order to make himself drunk.

⁴ ** St. Alphonsus (On Human Acts, no. XXXVIII), after Collet (On Human Acts, ch. 6, art. 2, sect. 2, conclusion 3), writes that this doctrine is common among theologians, with Vasquez alone excepted. But this exception of Vasquez is a mere hallucination of Collet, who here did not have accurately before his eyes the distinctions and conclusions of the schools. Namely, so that in the case there be a twofold goodness of the act, it is necessary that the means be loved not only because it is useful for the end, but also because it is good in itself. To this pertain those words of Becanus (On Human Acts, ch. 4, q. 3, no. 6): When the object of election, which is good per se, is not loved in any way on account of itself, but only on account of the end, then the goodness of the object does nothing to the matter. But when it is loved both on account of itself, insofar as it is good per se, and on account of the end, insofar as it is useful for obtaining that end, then the goodness of the object remains with the goodness of the end. For this reason the Author adds that phrase: If each honesty is intended. And to this Vasquez pertains (On I-II, disp. 51, ch. 3, no. 13; which place Collet alleges), where he says: When someone choosing a work of one virtue from the intention of the end of another virtue is then not allured by the goodness of the virtue of which that matter is, and chooses that work only as useful for the end, it is effected that that election has only the goodness of the end.

But to avoid Collet's hallucinations, even where a twofold honesty or goodness in reality comes to the act, the doctrine of the school must be inspected, which Suarez expresses thus (On I-II, treatise 3, disp. 6, sect. 2, no. 2): It can happen that an honest object is not indeed willed on account of its own honesty, yet its honesty is willed in itself and per se on account of another end.....; for one good can be useful for another not only by reason of its matter, but also by reason of its honesty; and then indeed the honesty of one object or act can be loved in itself, although it is not loved precisely on account of itself, but on account of another end. And soon the same Suarez says (ibid., no. 3): Concerning an act of this kind almost all also agree that it has essential and first goodness from the end, but not from the material object nor from its honesty. Thus St. Thomas can be taken (3 Against the Gentiles, ch. 138), where he signifies that abstinence done from vow has, besides the goodness of temperance, also the goodness of religion: indeed that it is more praiseworthy from the vow than from abstinence.

From these things someone could conclude with Collet that according to Suarez a twofold goodness is denied in an act of temperance. But theologians do not so speak, although they call one goodness essential, the other accidental. Thus also Vasquez (cited disp. 51, ch. 2): If however the means has from itself proper goodness... even if the election had proper goodness from the means, nevertheless it would take also the species of another goodness from the end, so that that goodness would be primary and substantial, insofar as it is election, but that which it would have from the means according to itself would be secondary to it and as it were accidental.

3. He who employs an evil means for a good end contracts only the malice of the means, for example, if someone lies to free his neighbor from danger. Likewise conversely, he who employs an honest means for an evil end contracts only the malice of the end.

4. He who employs an indifferent means for a good or evil end contracts only the goodness or malice of the end. Thus, for example, if you undertake a journey in order to show the way to a pilgrim, you have only the merit of the end; likewise if you sing in order to cause annoyance to another, you have only the guilt of the end. But in confession it is not necessary to declare the circumstance of means of this kind, as is clear.

30. Questions. - YOU WILL ASK 1. Whether any evil end corrupts the whole goodness of the act?

I answer 1. A gravely evil end always entirely infects the act, however good the object may be in itself. For that act can be good in no part, since the agent, by sinning mortally, totally recedes from God.

I answer 2. A lightly evil end also corrupts the whole act, if it is the total end, or at least the primary end, of the agent. For if it is total, it encompasses the whole object, and therefore infects the whole, because the agent, by an evil end, wills the good under the aspect of evil, and therefore, as it is willed by him, it is evil. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, art. 7. - This is also clear from the words of Christ, Matt. 6. 23: If thy eye is wicked, thy whole body will be dark. Hence the gifts of Cain, although good in themselves, displeased God as proceeding from an evil end.

But if a twofold end is had, and the evil one is primary, it must be resolved in the same way, because that act is still chosen so that it may be an instrument for evil, and therefore it is vitiated substantially.

I answer 3. But if a lightly evil end is merely secondary, more probably it does not corrupt the whole act, which will be partly good, partly evil. The reason is that that act retains its goodness from the object; but the evil end holds itself only concomitantly, and does not influence the very substance of the action. If it were otherwise, fewer good acts would be found. - Billuart, diss. 4, art. 4. - Gerdil, On Human Acts, and others commonly.

Notions. 1. Circumstances are as it were accidents of human acts; for they are any conditions whatsoever which, while situated outside the substance of the act, touch it in some way.

2. Already seven in number were indicated by Cicero ¹, which are contained in this little verse:

Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when.

In this verse, who designates a special quality of the agent: he is a cleric, a child, married.

What designates a special quality either of the object or of the effect. (There are those who call the circumstance of the object "about what," reserving the circumstance "what" for effects.) The quality of the object will be had, for example, in the love of an enemy; in an injury done to a sacred person, a relative; in theft of such or such a quantity. But the quality of the effect will accede if there has been a special good or evil force of example; if the action has given place to blasphemies.

Where notes a special quality of place, for example, in a church.

By what aids is referred to the means employed, to instrumental causes, to accomplices: I pursued the end by mortifications, lies, frauds; a sacred or married person cooperated.

Why recalls the end: of this we have already treated.

How names the manner of action: for example, cautiously, imprudently, with great intensity.

When asks about the time at which the thing was completed, and also about the space of time through which the action lasted, for example, an office was omitted during a time prefixed for censure or reservation.

Cf. on these circumstances St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 7, art. 1.

4. According to the varied intention or ordering of reason, the same thing can be an object or a circumstance. Thus one person will commit a sacrilegious theft, another a thievish sacrilege, by the removal of the same chalice. Cf. 1, 2, q. 18, art. 10.

¹ De inventione, l. I and II; and Topica.

Effect of circumstances. Circumstances:

a) Sometimes increase or diminish goodness or malice within the same species: five thousand or one hundred thousand francs have been taken by theft;

b) Sometimes transfer malice to another theological species, that is, sin from grave becomes light, or conversely: an injury done to the Pontiff or to the King will be grave which would be light if done to an equal;

c) Sometimes add a new moral species, for example, a vow of chastity in the matter of purity;

d) Sometimes give the first moral species: the eating of flesh on a day of abstinence. (A circumstance which adds or constitutes a species is now not properly a circumstance, says St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 88, art. 5.)

114. Notion. A circumstance, of which we speak here, is a moral condition which accedes to the already constituted moral substance of an act and modifies it; or it is an accident of a human act morally affecting the act itself already constituted in moral being. Thus, for example, the moral circumstance of a sacred place can accede to the substance of an act of theft, which is thereby changed into sacrilegious theft. The Angelic Doctor⁴³ aptly explains the notion of a moral circumstance: "The name of circumstance is transferred to human acts from those things which are in place. But in local things something is said to stand around when it is indeed extrinsic to the thing, yet touches it or approaches it according to place. And therefore whatever conditions are outside the substance of the act, and yet in some way touch the human act, are called circumstances." - It is said notably in the given definition that a moral circumstance is a condition modifying the substance of the moral act; for if some circumstance in no way touches the morality of the act, it is a mere physical circumstance and not a moral one. Thus, for example, to steal a white or black garment is a physical circumstance, but not a moral one.

⁴³ S. theol. I-II, q. 7, a. 1.

115. Number. Already from the most ancient times seven circumstances were customarily enumerated,⁴⁴ which are expressed in this little verse:

"Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when."

Who denotes the special quality of the person acting. For example, the morality of fornication is modified if it was done by a free person or by a person joined in marriage.

What designates the quality or quantity of the object, insofar as they influence the morality of the act. For example, theft was committed in a small or in a great quantity, in lay or ecclesiastical goods.

Where denotes the quality of place influencing morality. For example, lust committed in a profane or sacred place, in a hidden or public place.

By what aids signifies the special means employed for completing the act, insofar as they modify morality. For example, someone, employing physical coercion, violated a virgin.

Why expresses the end extrinsic to the work, on account of which the act was perpetrated. For example, to steal in order to make oneself drunk. There will be special discussion of this moral circumstance in the following paragraph.

How signifies the special moral mode by which the work was committed. For example, with vehement passion, from full deliberation, without complete advertence, etc.

When denotes the quantity or quality of time. For example, whether the work was done for a long time or briefly, at a sacred or ordinary time, etc.

All these circumstances often influence the morality of the act only lightly; and then they are not necessarily to be declared in the confession of sins. Sometimes they influence the morality of the act in absolutely no way, for example, whether someone blasphemed in the morning or evening; whether someone struck another with the right or left hand; and then let the confessor not permit circumstances of this kind of a sinful act to be narrated in confession. For they are accustomed to be useless chatterings and to harm rather than help the integrity of confession.

⁴⁴ Ibid. q. 7, a. 3.

116. Principle 1. A human act also takes some morality from moral circumstances. Thus all.⁴⁵

Proof: a) The goodness and malice of human acts can be compared with the goodness or malice of some physical thing. But the value of some physical thing is not taken only from its substance, but also from its accidents. For example, the value of some horse is not taken only from the fact that it is in the equine species, but also from the fact that it is a horse of such size, strength, beauty, age, etc. Therefore, by parity, the moral value of some human act must not be taken only from its object, but also from its accidents or circumstances, which have a special conformity or difformity with the norm of morality. - b) Christ himself declared that the gift of the poor widow putting two mites into the treasury was of greater value than the gifts of the rich.⁴⁶ And yet from the object alone of the gift this difference could not have arisen, as is plain of itself. Therefore this had to happen from some circumstance, because, namely, the poor widow exercised greater love by giving from her want all that she had. - c) The Council of Trent⁴⁷ defined that in confession circumstances changing the species of sin must be declared. Therefore the Council supposes that certain circumstances so influence a human act that the moral species is changed.

Note. In order that circumstances truly influence the morality of a human act, it is required:

1. that they be moral circumstances, that is, having a special conformity or difformity with reason (cf. above);

2. that this conformity or difformity be in some way known by the agent;

3. that an objectively good circumstance not only be known, but also be intended under the aspect of the honorable;⁴⁸ but an objectively evil circumstance influences the morality of the act if it is known, although it is not intended or even is displeasing in itself. Hence he who gives money because of an imposed penance and in no way intends the relief of the poor exercises indeed an act of justice, but by no means an act of mercy; but he who publicly pronounces obscene words commits, besides a sin against chastity, also a sin of scandal, although he did not intend to pervert his neighbor.

Principle 2. Certain circumstances totally change the species of morality; but certain circumstances only change the grade of morality, that is, they increase or diminish goodness or malice within the same species.

⁴⁵ S. theol. I-II, q. 18, a. 3.

⁴⁶ Mark 12:41-44.

⁴⁷ Sess. 14, cap. 5 and can. 7, on the sacrament of penance (Denz. n. 899 and 917).

⁴⁸ St. Thomas expresses this doctrine in these words: "For the will to be good, it is required that it be of good under the aspect of good, that is, that it will the good, and on account of the good" (S. theol. I-II, q. 19, a. 7 ad 3).

117. The first part is proved. All morality arises from conformity or difformity with right reason, as was said above. Therefore where there is special conformity or difformity, there also is special morality. But sometimes circumstances added to some act have an altogether special and specific conformity or difformity with reason. Therefore then those circumstances specifically change the morality of the act or add some new diverse morality.⁴⁹ The matter becomes clearer by an example. If someone steals another's thing, he commits an act which has one determinate species of morality, namely, he commits a sin against justice. But if someone steals a thing which is consecrated to God, for example, a consecrated chalice, then this circumstance of a sacred thing induces a special and specific morality, namely, the malice of sacrilege, because in that theft there is a special difformity with right reason. For not only the virtue of justice is injured, but also the virtue of religion.

The second part is proved. Sometimes circumstances do not have a special and proper conformity or difformity with right reason, but increase or diminish the morality of the act already arising from the object. For example, to take another's thing away when the owner is unwilling is an act which from the object has the morality of theft. But whether someone takes away 1000 or 100 francs does not essentially change the morality of theft. Each is and remains theft and nothing else. Nevertheless everyone immediately sees that to take away a greater sum of money is objectively a greater sin than to steal a lesser sum.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Ibid. q. 18, a. 10.

⁵⁰ Ibid. a. 11.

118. Corollary. From the two stated principles it follows that circumstances can influence the morality of a human act in a fourfold way.

1. An act indifferent from the object becomes good or evil because of an influencing circumstance. Thus, for example, the act of walking, indifferent from the object, becomes good if it is done from reasonable pursuit of health; but evil if it is done for the sake of sinning.

2. An act good from the object becomes evil. For example, to give alms is an act good from the object; to give alms solely because of vainglory or from another's goods is an evil act. A gravely evil circumstance destroys the goodness of the act to which it is joined; for example, the punishment of a delinquent subject is a good act, and if grave cruelty accedes to it, it becomes an act simply evil. But a lightly evil circumstance does not take away, but diminishes, the goodness of the act; for example, tepidity in prayer does not take away the whole goodness in prayer, but diminishes it.⁵¹

3. An act good or evil from the object becomes more good or evil. For example, to fast is a good act; to fast on bread and water is a better act. To make oneself drunk is an evil act; to make oneself drunk daily is a more evil act (at least if it happens from a habit not retracted).

4. An act good or evil from the object receives a new and specifically diverse goodness or malice. For example, to preserve chastity is a good act, namely, of the virtue of temperance; to preserve chastity because of a vow emitted is furthermore an act of the virtue of religion. To strike one's neighbor unjustly is a sin against justice; to strike one's parents unjustly is furthermore a sin against piety.

⁵¹ Cf. however below n. 122.

119. Note. In the first two cases, circumstances pass over into the condition of the moral object and therefore in reality give the first morality to the act; but in the following two cases circumstances retain the character of an accident, which either increases the already existing morality or adds to the already existing and remaining morality some new specific morality. Therefore in the last case one human act is in several species of morals, which is no inconvenience, as the Angelic Doctor says.⁵²

⁵² Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 1, a. 3 ad 3; q. 18, a. 7 ad 1; a. 10 ad 3.

120. Division of circumstances. 1. With respect to influence on the morality of the act, circumstances changing the species and circumstances not changing the species are distinguished. The former are those which in the Corollary brought forward above were described under nos. 1, 2, and 4; indeed, if we speak of the theological species, even the circumstances indicated under no. 3 can change the species. The latter, namely, circumstances not changing the species, are called those which increase or diminish the already existing morality of an act without effecting anything else, for example, to steal 100 or 150 francs.

2. Circumstances changing the species change either the moral or the theological species. They change the moral species if they add a new and diverse morality to the objective morality of the act, for example, the violation of a vow joined with the violation of chastity. But they change the theological species if from a light sin they make a mortal sin, or on the contrary from a mortal sin they render a venial sin; for example, the theft of one obol is a light sin; the same theft repeated a thousand times, finally at some time by constituting grave matter, causes grave sin. An obscene thought is a mortal sin, which, if it is admitted with only imperfect consent, is a light sin.

3. Circumstances not changing the species are subdivided into aggravating and diminishing, according as they increase or diminish the specific malice of some act. But circumstances aggravating malice are again subdivided into a) lightly aggravating, b) notably aggravating, c) aggravating infinitely. The first increase the malice of sin lightly, the second gravely, the third infinitely. But the malice of sin is said to be increased infinitely when from a light sin there is made a grave sin. For each sin is infinitely distant in malice from the other. Circumstances aggravating infinitely are at the same time circumstances changing the theological species.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 7.

102. Circumstance, by force of the word, signifies that which stands around something; hence it designates something extrinsic to a thing, which nevertheless touches it or approaches it according to place. Hence that which is outside the substance of an act and yet in some way touches it, as an accident of it, is called a circumstance of the act, and is therefore defined: an accident of a human act affecting it as already constituted in being.

Of the substance of theft are the man taking, the property of another, and the appropriation of it against the owner's will; but that the man be a priest or a layman, rich or poor, that he steal a sacred or profane thing, a precious or cheap thing, where he steals, in a church or in a street, are circumstances.

103. Seven circumstances are customarily enumerated: who, what, where, by what helps, why, how, when; to which Aristotle adds: about what, which by others is comprehended under what.

For circumstances can touch either the human act itself, or its cause, or its effect. The act itself is affected both by the two measures, namely place or where and time or when, and by the quality or mode of acting: how; on the part of the final cause there is the circumstance why or on account of what; on the part of the principal agent: who; on the part of the instrument: by what helps; finally, on the part of the material cause: about what, and on the part of the effect: what.

It should be noted that circumstances designate not essential but accidental conditions of place, time, mode, effect, agent, etc., likewise an accidental end.

104. Observations.

1. Circumstances must be considered by the theologian. For he considers acts 1) in order to the ultimate end, 2) according as goodness or malice, and indeed greater or lesser goodness or malice, is found in them, 3) according as they are meritorious and demeritorious. But a) human acts are proportioned to the end according as they are done with due circumstances; b) according to these they are good or evil, better and worse; indeed c) meritorious and demeritorious: for acts are voluntary, and therefore meritorious, or involuntary according to knowledge or ignorance of circumstances. Therefore.

These things will be clearer from what is to be said below.

2. The most principal of all circumstances is "on account of what," or the end, because it is the motive and object of the will; there follows the circumstance "what," which indicates the effect of the act and at the same time the quantity and quality of the object, and thus touches the very substance of the act.

3. There is not given a circumstance "how often," because it does not affect the same act but multiplies acts.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 10 and 11; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6-8.

151. A moral circumstance is an accident of a human act morally affecting it once it has already been constituted in its moral being.

For this a threefold condition is required:

1. that the act already be constituted in moral being, that is, have morality from the object independently of circumstances: for an accident supposes a substance. Thus, with respect to theft, it is not a circumstance that the thing belongs to another, but that it is notable; similarly, an act indifferent from the object has its first specific morality from a circumstance first and principally intended, which therefore becomes the object because it is intended first and per se under the notion of good or evil;

2. that the circumstance be outside the substance of the act and affect it, and therefore that it not destroy or essentially change the substantial moral being which the act has from the object, as if someone does a good act solely for an evil end: for then it would not be an accident, but would pass over into the substance and object;

3. that the circumstance attain the act according to moral being, by increasing or diminishing goodness or malice: thus that someone steals with the right hand or the left hand is a physical and indifferent circumstance; but that the thing be precious or cheap is a moral circumstance.

Now by reason of influence upon morality, some circumstances change the species, others only aggravate or diminish within the same species.

1. Several authors teach that circumstances truly and properly diminishing moral good or evil are not given; but in this there is only a different mode of speaking.

152. Principles. I. Moral circumstances changing the species are those which add to the act a goodness or malice diverse in species from that which the act has from the object, because according to themselves, separately and independently from the morality which proceeds from the object, they imply some agreement or repugnance with right reason, or a special and distinct conformity or difformity with the rules of morals: thus when someone gives alms in order to satisfy for sin, or steals a sacred thing, the circumstance of end expresses a special conformity with reason and the circumstance of the sacred expresses a special difformity. These circumstances do not remain in the notion of circumstance, but rather are considered as the principal condition of the object (or as a partial object), and become as it were the specific difference of this object: the genus is to take another's property or to give alms; the species is to take a sacred thing, to give satisfactory alms.

II. Moral circumstances only aggravating or diminishing within the same species are those which do not imply something per se agreeing with or repugnant to reason, and according to themselves express no order to the rules of morals, but only by reason of a prior circumstance or condition of the object have the morality which they suppose and only modify it, such as more and less, much and little, intensely and remissly. Thus to take much or little of itself does not express goodness or malice, but to take much or little of another's property does.

Among these some are:

1. Notably aggravating or diminishing. Such are:

a) in quantitative matter, which consists in number, weight, measure, those which, taken separately and separated from the act, suffice for mortal sin, for example, if someone beyond 100 gold coins steals another 100, or steals a gilt watch which he thinks is gold, it will be a circumstance notably aggravating the theft; on the contrary, if he steals a gold watch which he thinks is silver, it is a circumstance notably diminishing;

b) in other matters (duration, intensity, execution), those which notably exceed the ordinary mode of acting well or badly in these matters, for example, if someone perseveres in hatred for a year, or the whole night with a woman in shameless acts; or only for some instant consents to her. Sometimes they so notably increase or diminish that they render a sin from venial mortal, or from mortal venial, and thus are said to aggravate or diminish infinitely, for example, the circumstance of grave harm for one's neighbor from a slight theft, or the circumstance of half-full deliberation in blasphemy, imprecation, shameful delight.

2. Others are slightly aggravating or diminishing, such as:

a) in quantitative matter, those which, taken separately, do not suffice for mortal sin, as if someone instead of 100 francs steals either 101 or 99;

b) in other matters, those which do not much exceed the ordinary mode of acting, as if someone, angry after a quarrel, remains somewhat in hatred.

153. Practical rules follow from the aforesaid:

1. An act indifferent from the object can become good or evil from circumstances: thus to eat temperately to restore one's strength is good; to do this with excess is evil; then the circumstance passes over into the notion of object because it is first and per se intended under the notion of good or evil.

2. An act good from the object is rendered evil by circumstances, gravely or lightly, according to the degree of malice which is in them, for example, commerce in a sacred place, servile labor on the Lord's Day, marriage with a person bound by a vow of chastity. Then the circumstance becomes the principal condition or part of the object.

3. An act good or evil from the object can receive a new species of goodness or malice from circumstances, for example, one who keeps chastity from a vow contracts the goodness of chastity and of religion; one who steals a sacred thing contracts the malice of theft and sacrilege. This circumstance also becomes a condition of the object.

4. An act good or evil from the object can acquire or lose from circumstances some greater degree of goodness or malice, for example, a poor man giving alms, a man outstanding in learning who places himself after others; a priest sinning, a rich man giving alms as though compelled, a poor man committing theft. Such remain mere circumstances.

154. Observation.

From circumstances properly so called, which affect the act, there differ internal or external actions which sometimes are done during the principal action and only accompany it, without influence upon it. These are truly distinct acts, which can be evil, but do not affect the goodness of the principal action. Thus if care of the sick, communion, or hearing Mass is done also on account of sensible affection for the sick person, vainglory, curiosity, it will be an evil circumstance; on the contrary, if they are done with a movement of impatience, affection toward venial sin, distractions, these will only be evils which accompany them.

Concerning the more principal circumstance "why" enough has been said where the end was treated; likewise concerning the circumstance "what," where the goodness and malice of the effect was treated. Moreover, the things we noted about the passions already regard the circumstance "how" (as to part of it). Therefore it remains to speak of the remaining circumstances not explained, and indeed in order to the interior act and exterior act together, because all can modify the latter and several the former.

181. The circumstance who does not denote the very person of the one acting according to himself (for thus he pertains to the substance of the human act), but his accidental condition or quality, by reason of which in the moral estimation the act or omission is of greater or lesser moral value, for example, that the agent is religious, a priest or a layman, married or free, superior or subject, rich or poor, a child or an old man, etc.

Often it indicates an office or special obligation (of justice, piety, fidelity), and then it brings to the good or evil act a new species of goodness or malice, as if one bound by vow preserves chastity or a married person fornicates; otherwise it is only aggravating: thus, other things being equal and the same deliberation or negligence being supposed, a religious acts better or sins more gravely than a secular, the learned man than the unlearned, because he operates more perfectly or sin disgraces him more.

182. The circumstance about what does not signify the object itself or the matter (for that pertains to the substance of the act), but an accident joined to it, for example, quantity or quality, such as that the thing is sacred or profane, of one's father or of a stranger, much or little, grave or light, etc.

Often quality changes the species, namely, if it brings a distinct goodness or malice, as alms given to a poor church, or the theft of a sacred thing, the praise or striking of a father or cleric. Thus in acts concerning another, in the matter of chastity by reason of the accomplice, in the matter of religion toward sacred things. When, namely, a quality on the part of the agent changes the species, the same quality on the part of the object or matter also does this; hence it is understood that there is a double malice in adultery or carnal sacrilege if each person is married or sacred, because a double circumstance changes the species. Sometimes quality only aggravates, as to love an enemy or do good to orphans and widows, to harm one who is plainly innocent.

Circumstances are accidental determinations of an act, without which the act could exist as to substance, and which nevertheless in some way touch its morality. Seven classes of circumstances are numbered, expressed in this little verse:

Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when?

Namely: Who, or what sort the agent is, married, cleric, etc.? What, or what is the accidental quality or quantity of the object? Where, or in what place, whether sacred or profane, etc.? By what aids, that is, what means, instruments, etc., the agent has used? Why, or from what end, namely extrinsic? How, namely whether maliciously or in good faith, whether in an intense or remiss manner, whether advertently, or not? When, that is, at what sort of time or for how much time? Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 7, arts. 3 and 4.

I say. A human act takes true morality from circumstances. The reason is that circumstances, which cannot together with the object not be intended directly or indirectly, by that very fact affect the act insofar as it is a human act and lies under the rules of morals; but often they have a relation of agreement or disagreement with reason and right order. Therefore they affect the act in the being of morals, or as to morality; indeed sometimes the circumstances alone introduce agreement or disagreement of this kind into the act, as happens in acts indifferent from the object.

Hence, 1st, some circumstances are those which pertain to the morality of an act, others which contribute nothing to it, and which therefore are to be held wholly indifferent. 2nd. Some leave the object in the same moral species, and others change the species itself, or add a new species. 3rd. Of the former, some aggravate malice, but others diminish it, and they do this gravely or lightly. If they so aggravate that they render a sin mortal from venial, or so diminish that they render it venial from mortal, the act, remaining in the same moral species, is said to be changed as to its theological species.

Ordinarily a circumstance is said notably to aggravate malice either when to this malice, grave in itself, it adds an excess which alone would itself be a lethal sin, which in quantitative things is obvious to anyone, as if someone steals ten horses; or when one sinning notably exceeds the mode of delinquency in things not quantitative, as if a murderer cuts an enemy limb by limb.

Whether and how human act takes goodness or malice from circumstances and from end ?

TO BE NOTED BEFOREHAND

1° Circumstance is « an accident of human act, morally affecting it already constituted in moral being ¹ ». ¹ Here q. 7, a. 1, c.

It is explained ². It is called accident, because circumstance is said metaphorically from place. Therefore as in local things that is said to stand around something which is indeed extrinsic to it, yet attains it or approaches it; so in morals circumstance is said to be that which is outside substance of act, yet attaining it somehow. But what is outside substance of thing, as being such that without it the thing can be and be conceived, pertains nevertheless to itself, is called its accident. So is, e.g., circumstance of sacred place respecting theft. ² Ibid.

It is said, « affecting human act already constituted in moral being, » because, if it gave first and essential moral species, it would no longer be circumstance, but would pass into condition of object and essential difference.

It is said, « morally affecting it, » that is, modifying it in ordine to rules of morals; because, if it affect physically, it will indeed be circumstance of act qua physical, not qua moral, as that one give alms in gold or silver, morning or evening, with right or left hand; of which there is not question here.

2° Seven circumstances of human acts are commonly assigned, comprehended in this verse: Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando¹. For in acts must be considered, who did it, with what aids or instruments he did it, what he did, where he did it, why he did it, how he did it, and when he did it. ¹ Ibid., a. 3, c. — These circumstances were enumerated by Aristotle in III Ethic., c. 2 vel 3, and by Cicero in his Rhetorica.

Note, these things which we recounted, in order that they be circumstances, are not to be taken insofar as substance of act depends upon them, but insofar as they affect it accidentally. Whence

Quis, signifies not substance of agent, but its quality, e.g., that he be priest, religious or layman, unmarried or married, rich or poor, superior or subject.

Quid, denotes likewise not substance of effect, but some accident joined to it, suppose quality or quantity : e.g., in theft, it denotes not that stolen thing be alien, for that pertains to substance of theft, but that it be sacred or profane, that it be of great or small quantity; in homicide, that slain one be parent or cleric; in lust, that partner be kinswoman or wedded one, etc.

Ubi, signifies not bare place, certain it is that act done somewhere is done somewhere, but quality of place: as that it be public, sacred, etc.; for if fornication take place in public place, scandal arises, if in sacred place, it is sacrilege.

Quibus auxiliis, signifies accidental instruments or means which the agent used; as if he used help of devil or witchcraft, if he killed by poison or sword, etc.

Cur, denotes end, not intrinsic and of work, for that pertains to substance of act, but extrinsic and of working : as if someone steal to get himself drunk.

Quomodo, signifies accidental mode whereby act is done, e.g., intensely or remissly, from contempt or levity, from ignorance or fear, from malice or passion.

Quando, signifies accidental condition of time, namely either quality, as if work be done on feast day, or day of communion; or quantity, as if act endure long or little.

Question is resolved.

I say 1° : Human act draws some goodness or malice from circumstances¹. ¹ Here q. 18, a. 3, c.

It is proved 1°. Concerning goodness or malice of human acts judgment must be made in same mode, at least analogically, as concerning goodness and malice of natural things. But in natural things whole goodness and perfection is not taken from sole form giving species, but also from accidents: thus, e.g., whole goodness and perfection of man is not taken from his sole substantial form, but from various accidents, as from color, figure, due proportion of members, etc. Therefore whole goodness of human act is not taken from sole object giving species, but also from circumstances which are its accidents.

2° Therefore human act draws goodness or malice from object, because it says habit of convenience or disconvenience toward right reason. But circumstances also can import habit of convenience or disconvenience toward right reason: thus, e.g., not only is it disconvenient to reason to steal, but also to steal in sacred place.

I say 2° : Human act sometimes draws from circumstances species of good or evil, sometimes only aggravation or diminution of goodness or malice within same species ; or, as commonly is said : Certain circumstances are changing species, certain only aggravating within same species¹. ¹ Here q. 18, a. 10 et 11, c.

Changing-species circumstance is that which of itself adds onto human act special and distinct goodness or malice; only aggravating, that which increases only presupposed goodness or malice and modifies it within same species.

Among aggravating circumstances, some aggravate notably, others lightly. It is held notably aggravating in quantitative matter, or which consists in number, weight and measure, when separately taken and separated from act it would suffice unto mortal sin : as he who stole beyond twenty-five aurei would sin mortally: as he who beyond twenty-five asses, which I suppose suffice unto mortal sin, stole another twenty-five. In other matters however it is held notably aggravating, when it notably exceeds ordinary measure of sinning in suchlike matters: as if anyone spend whole night in impurities with woman, if anyone persevere through months and years in fraternal hatred, if anyone killed enemy cutting him limb from limb, etc.

If neither of these occur, it is held lightly aggravating : suppose thief filched thirty asses; that after quarrel someone angry remained in hatred for some small time.

Species-changing circumstances certainly must be accused in confession. That notably aggravating circumstances also must be accused holds the more common and safer opinion², of which in treatise on Penance. ² The contrary is now common, because it seems more probable. This question will be resolved in its place.

7. The means taken and the circumstances of those means enter into the morality of the act, formally as they are seen by the intellect, materially as they are in themselves. (See what is said of ignorance, c. iii., s. i., nn. 3-5, p. 27.) This explains the difference between formal and material sin. A material sin would be formal also, did the agent know what he was doing. No sin is culpable that is not formal. But, as has been said, there may be a culpable perversion of the intellect, so that the man is the author of his own obliquity or defect of vision. When Saul persecuted the Christians, he probably sinned materially, not formally. When Caiphas spoke the truth without knowing it, he said well materially, but ill formally.

8. In looking at the means taken and the circumstances that accompany those means, it is important to have a ready rule for pronouncing what particular belongs to the means and what to the circumstances. Thus Clytemnestra deals her husband Agamemnon a deadly stroke with an axe, partly for revenge, partly that she may take to herself another consort; is the deadliness of the blow part of the means taken or only an accompanying circumstance? It is part of the means taken. The means taken include every particular that is willed and chosen as making for the end in view. The fatal character of the blow does make to that end; if Agamemnon does not die, the revenge will not be complete, and life with Aegisthus will be impossible. On the other hand, the fact that Clytemnestra is the wife of the man whom she murders, is not a point that her will rests upon as furthering her purpose at all; it is an accompanying circumstance. This method of distinguishing means from circumstance is of great value in casuistry.

9. It is clear that not every attendant circumstance affects the morality of the means taken. Thus the blow under which Agamemnon sank was neither more nor less guiltily struck because it was dealt with an axe, because it was under pretence of giving him a bath, or because his feet were entangled in a long robe. These circumstances are all irrelevant. Those only are relevant which attach some special reasonableness or unreasonableness to the thing done Thus the provocation that Clytemnestra had from her husband's introduction of Cassandra into her house made her act of vengeance less unreasonable: on the other hand it was rendered more unreasonable by the circumstance of the dear and holy tie that binds wife to husband. The provocation and the relationship were two relevant circumstances in that case.

10. But it happens sometimes that a circumstance only affects the reasonableness of an action on the supposition of some previous circumstance so affecting it. Thus to carry off a thing in large or small quantities does not affect the reasonableness of the carrying, unless there be already some other circumstance attached that renders the act good or evil; as for instance, if the goods that are being removed are stolen property. Circumstances of this sort are called aggravating—or, as the case may be, extenuating—circumstances. Circumstances that of themselves, and apart from any previous supposition, make the thing done peculiarly reasonable or unreasonable, are called specifying circumstances. They are so called, because they place the action in some species of virtue or vice; whereas aggravating or extenuating circumstances add to, or take off from, the good or evil of the action in that species of virtue or vice to which it already belongs.

11. A variety of specifying circumstances may place one and the same action in many various species of virtue or vice. Thus a religious robbing his parents would sin at once against justice, piety, and religion. A nun preferring death to dishonour practises three virtues, chastity, fortitude, and religion.