§ 2. On Circumstances

114. Notion. A circumstance, of which we speak here, is a moral condition which accedes to the already constituted moral substance of an act and modifies it; or it is an accident of a human act morally affecting the act itself already constituted in moral being. Thus, for example, the moral circumstance of a sacred place can accede to the substance of an act of theft, which is thereby changed into sacrilegious theft. The Angelic Doctor⁴³ aptly explains the notion of a moral circumstance: "The name of circumstance is transferred to human acts from those things which are in place. But in local things something is said to stand around when it is indeed extrinsic to the thing, yet touches it or approaches it according to place. And therefore whatever conditions are outside the substance of the act, and yet in some way touch the human act, are called circumstances." - It is said notably in the given definition that a moral circumstance is a condition modifying the substance of the moral act; for if some circumstance in no way touches the morality of the act, it is a mere physical circumstance and not a moral one. Thus, for example, to steal a white or black garment is a physical circumstance, but not a moral one.

⁴³ S. theol. I-II, q. 7, a. 1.

115. Number. Already from the most ancient times seven circumstances were customarily enumerated,⁴⁴ which are expressed in this little verse:

"Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when."

Who denotes the special quality of the person acting. For example, the morality of fornication is modified if it was done by a free person or by a person joined in marriage.

What designates the quality or quantity of the object, insofar as they influence the morality of the act. For example, theft was committed in a small or in a great quantity, in lay or ecclesiastical goods.

Where denotes the quality of place influencing morality. For example, lust committed in a profane or sacred place, in a hidden or public place.

By what aids signifies the special means employed for completing the act, insofar as they modify morality. For example, someone, employing physical coercion, violated a virgin.

Why expresses the end extrinsic to the work, on account of which the act was perpetrated. For example, to steal in order to make oneself drunk. There will be special discussion of this moral circumstance in the following paragraph.

How signifies the special moral mode by which the work was committed. For example, with vehement passion, from full deliberation, without complete advertence, etc.

When denotes the quantity or quality of time. For example, whether the work was done for a long time or briefly, at a sacred or ordinary time, etc.

All these circumstances often influence the morality of the act only lightly; and then they are not necessarily to be declared in the confession of sins. Sometimes they influence the morality of the act in absolutely no way, for example, whether someone blasphemed in the morning or evening; whether someone struck another with the right or left hand; and then let the confessor not permit circumstances of this kind of a sinful act to be narrated in confession. For they are accustomed to be useless chatterings and to harm rather than help the integrity of confession.

⁴⁴ Ibid. q. 7, a. 3.

116. Principle 1. A human act also takes some morality from moral circumstances. Thus all.⁴⁵

Proof: a) The goodness and malice of human acts can be compared with the goodness or malice of some physical thing. But the value of some physical thing is not taken only from its substance, but also from its accidents. For example, the value of some horse is not taken only from the fact that it is in the equine species, but also from the fact that it is a horse of such size, strength, beauty, age, etc. Therefore, by parity, the moral value of some human act must not be taken only from its object, but also from its accidents or circumstances, which have a special conformity or difformity with the norm of morality. - b) Christ himself declared that the gift of the poor widow putting two mites into the treasury was of greater value than the gifts of the rich.⁴⁶ And yet from the object alone of the gift this difference could not have arisen, as is plain of itself. Therefore this had to happen from some circumstance, because, namely, the poor widow exercised greater love by giving from her want all that she had. - c) The Council of Trent⁴⁷ defined that in confession circumstances changing the species of sin must be declared. Therefore the Council supposes that certain circumstances so influence a human act that the moral species is changed.

Note. In order that circumstances truly influence the morality of a human act, it is required:

1. that they be moral circumstances, that is, having a special conformity or difformity with reason (cf. above);

2. that this conformity or difformity be in some way known by the agent;

3. that an objectively good circumstance not only be known, but also be intended under the aspect of the honorable;⁴⁸ but an objectively evil circumstance influences the morality of the act if it is known, although it is not intended or even is displeasing in itself. Hence he who gives money because of an imposed penance and in no way intends the relief of the poor exercises indeed an act of justice, but by no means an act of mercy; but he who publicly pronounces obscene words commits, besides a sin against chastity, also a sin of scandal, although he did not intend to pervert his neighbor.

Principle 2. Certain circumstances totally change the species of morality; but certain circumstances only change the grade of morality, that is, they increase or diminish goodness or malice within the same species.

⁴⁵ S. theol. I-II, q. 18, a. 3.

⁴⁶ Mark 12:41-44.

⁴⁷ Sess. 14, cap. 5 and can. 7, on the sacrament of penance (Denz. n. 899 and 917).

⁴⁸ St. Thomas expresses this doctrine in these words: "For the will to be good, it is required that it be of good under the aspect of good, that is, that it will the good, and on account of the good" (S. theol. I-II, q. 19, a. 7 ad 3).

117. The first part is proved. All morality arises from conformity or difformity with right reason, as was said above. Therefore where there is special conformity or difformity, there also is special morality. But sometimes circumstances added to some act have an altogether special and specific conformity or difformity with reason. Therefore then those circumstances specifically change the morality of the act or add some new diverse morality.⁴⁹ The matter becomes clearer by an example. If someone steals another's thing, he commits an act which has one determinate species of morality, namely, he commits a sin against justice. But if someone steals a thing which is consecrated to God, for example, a consecrated chalice, then this circumstance of a sacred thing induces a special and specific morality, namely, the malice of sacrilege, because in that theft there is a special difformity with right reason. For not only the virtue of justice is injured, but also the virtue of religion.

The second part is proved. Sometimes circumstances do not have a special and proper conformity or difformity with right reason, but increase or diminish the morality of the act already arising from the object. For example, to take another's thing away when the owner is unwilling is an act which from the object has the morality of theft. But whether someone takes away 1000 or 100 francs does not essentially change the morality of theft. Each is and remains theft and nothing else. Nevertheless everyone immediately sees that to take away a greater sum of money is objectively a greater sin than to steal a lesser sum.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Ibid. q. 18, a. 10.

⁵⁰ Ibid. a. 11.

118. Corollary. From the two stated principles it follows that circumstances can influence the morality of a human act in a fourfold way.

1. An act indifferent from the object becomes good or evil because of an influencing circumstance. Thus, for example, the act of walking, indifferent from the object, becomes good if it is done from reasonable pursuit of health; but evil if it is done for the sake of sinning.

2. An act good from the object becomes evil. For example, to give alms is an act good from the object; to give alms solely because of vainglory or from another's goods is an evil act. A gravely evil circumstance destroys the goodness of the act to which it is joined; for example, the punishment of a delinquent subject is a good act, and if grave cruelty accedes to it, it becomes an act simply evil. But a lightly evil circumstance does not take away, but diminishes, the goodness of the act; for example, tepidity in prayer does not take away the whole goodness in prayer, but diminishes it.⁵¹

3. An act good or evil from the object becomes more good or evil. For example, to fast is a good act; to fast on bread and water is a better act. To make oneself drunk is an evil act; to make oneself drunk daily is a more evil act (at least if it happens from a habit not retracted).

4. An act good or evil from the object receives a new and specifically diverse goodness or malice. For example, to preserve chastity is a good act, namely, of the virtue of temperance; to preserve chastity because of a vow emitted is furthermore an act of the virtue of religion. To strike one's neighbor unjustly is a sin against justice; to strike one's parents unjustly is furthermore a sin against piety.

⁵¹ Cf. however below n. 122.

119. Note. In the first two cases, circumstances pass over into the condition of the moral object and therefore in reality give the first morality to the act; but in the following two cases circumstances retain the character of an accident, which either increases the already existing morality or adds to the already existing and remaining morality some new specific morality. Therefore in the last case one human act is in several species of morals, which is no inconvenience, as the Angelic Doctor says.⁵²

⁵² Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 1, a. 3 ad 3; q. 18, a. 7 ad 1; a. 10 ad 3.

120. Division of circumstances. 1. With respect to influence on the morality of the act, circumstances changing the species and circumstances not changing the species are distinguished. The former are those which in the Corollary brought forward above were described under nos. 1, 2, and 4; indeed, if we speak of the theological species, even the circumstances indicated under no. 3 can change the species. The latter, namely, circumstances not changing the species, are called those which increase or diminish the already existing morality of an act without effecting anything else, for example, to steal 100 or 150 francs.

2. Circumstances changing the species change either the moral or the theological species. They change the moral species if they add a new and diverse morality to the objective morality of the act, for example, the violation of a vow joined with the violation of chastity. But they change the theological species if from a light sin they make a mortal sin, or on the contrary from a mortal sin they render a venial sin; for example, the theft of one obol is a light sin; the same theft repeated a thousand times, finally at some time by constituting grave matter, causes grave sin. An obscene thought is a mortal sin, which, if it is admitted with only imperfect consent, is a light sin.

3. Circumstances not changing the species are subdivided into aggravating and diminishing, according as they increase or diminish the specific malice of some act. But circumstances aggravating malice are again subdivided into a) lightly aggravating, b) notably aggravating, c) aggravating infinitely. The first increase the malice of sin lightly, the second gravely, the third infinitely. But the malice of sin is said to be increased infinitely when from a light sin there is made a grave sin. For each sin is infinitely distant in malice from the other. Circumstances aggravating infinitely are at the same time circumstances changing the theological species.