Chapter II. On Circumstances

I. Notion. Circumstance is an accident which stands around a human act already constituted in some moral species, and is subject to the rules of morals (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 3; St. Alphonsus, V, XXXIX). Therefore two things are required: 1. that the act already have morality independently of the circumstance; 2. that the circumstance be subject to the rules of morals, or that it morally affect the act.

II. Enumeration of circumstances. "A circumstance is so called as existing, as it were, outside the substance of the act, yet so that in some way it touches the act itself. Now this can happen in three ways. In one way, insofar as it touches the act itself; in another way, insofar as it touches the cause of the act; in a third way, insofar as it touches the effect. It touches the act itself either by way of measure, as time and place; or by way of quality of the act, as the mode of acting. From the part of the effect, it is when what someone has done is considered. From the part of the cause of the act, as regards the final cause, there is taken on account of what; from the part of the material cause or object, there is taken about what; from the part of the principal agent cause, there is taken who has acted; and from the part of the instrumental agent cause, there is taken by what aids" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 7, a. 3; St. Alphonsus, V, XXXIX).

III. Morality from circumstance. That an act takes some morality from circumstance is clear from the fact that circumstance, as we posited, is subject to the rules of morals. Take these things especially:

1. Some circumstances increase or diminish morality within the same species. They are called aggravating or diminishing when they simply increase or diminish morality, for example the circumstance that someone steals a greater, but not yet grave, matter. When circumstances so increase or diminish morality that they make a mortal sin out of a venial one, or a venial sin out of a mortal one, they are called changing the theological species, for example the circumstance that someone steals grave matter, or consents semi-fully to a temptation.

2. Others cause the act to receive a new moral species, a new specific goodness or malice. Thus, for example, theft of a sacred thing involves a twofold diverse malice (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 10; St. Alphonsus, l.c.).¹

3. An evil circumstance influences an act good from its object in this way:

a) A lightly evil circumstance causes the act to be partly good, partly evil; good insofar as the honesty of the object is intended. For nothing prevents the one who does not repudiate a lightly evil circumstance of the object from sincerely seeking the honesty which inheres in the object. Added to this is that, if this opinion is rejected, even devout persons would perform a good work with greater difficulty, because a lightly evil circumstance or end is so easily mixed into the act. Hence, if someone, by praying, were to neglect only a light obligation of helping a sick person, he would contract the goodness which the act of praying has from its object (St. Alphonsus, V, XXXIX).

b) A gravely evil circumstance certainly prevents the act from being meritorious. But it does not seem to prevent the act from being partly good, partly evil; partly good, I say, because the agent, as it seems, can also in that case sincerely will the honesty which inheres in the object. Yet most authors hold an act of this sort as simply evil. According to the former opinion, one who, while neglecting a grave obligation of helping a sick person, assists at Mass contracts the goodness which inheres in the object of the act.

¹ According to some, other circumstances cause the act, rather than receiving a twofold malice, to receive a malice distinct from that which inheres in the act and the circumstance considered in themselves, and which, as it were, coalesces from a twofold malice. Thus, for example, the circumstance that a married person has intercourse with a third party, according to those authors, causes the act to have one specific malice, distinct from fornication and injustice, from which it, as it were, coalesces.