The Doubtful Conscience

220. Notion. Doubtful conscience is that by which the mind suspends judgment concerning the honesty of an action, or indeed forms it, but with fear of erring.

a. Doubt accepted in general is a state of the mind concerning some proposition, by which the mind lacks certitude: for one is called doubtful who is not certain, whether he suspends judgment, or inclines to one side, or assents to one side with fear concerning the opposite. Therefore doubt accepted in this sense is opposed to certitude alone.

b. A twofold doubt must be distinguished, strict and broad: for the mind which does not possess a firm judgment concerning the honesty of an action can have itself in two ways; for either it assents to neither side, neither for liceity nor against liceity, but suspends assent (strict doubt), or it assents to one side rather than the other, but with fear of erring (broad doubt).

c. Doubt properly and strictly so called, since it is suspension of judgment or suspension of assent concerning some proposition, is opposed to all states of the mind by which the mind in some way assents to a proposition: suspicion, opinion, and certitude. For in suspicion the mind inclines to one side without nevertheless assenting to it; in opinion the mind assents to one side, but with fear; finally, in certitude it assents without fear.

d. Doubt properly and strictly taken can happen from a twofold reason: either because on each side there are either no reasons or only slight reasons, or because on each side equal or almost equal reasons militate. Therefore in doubt strictly accepted the mind is as the tongue of a balance which, placed in equilibrium, bends neither to one side nor to the other. But where on each side probable reasons are present, the will can move the mind to assent to one or the other.

221. Division. 1. By reason of the motive, doubt is called negative if either no reasons or only slight reasons of assenting occur; and it is called positive if a grave reason of assenting is present, which nevertheless does not exclude prudent fear of erring.

Positive doubt can happen in two ways: for either on each side there is a grave reason of assenting, or on one side only, while on the other no reason of assenting appears. The same must be said of negative doubt: for either on each side a reason of assenting is lacking, or on one side only, while on the other a reason of more or less firmly assenting is present, as if a priest doubts whether he consecrated duly, because reflexively he does not remember the consecration having been made.

2. By reason of the object, one doubt is speculative, which is concerned with the truth of a matter or proposition, e.g. whether painting is a servile work, or with the liceity of an action in general, e.g. whether it is lawful to paint on a feast day; another is practical, which is concerned with the liceity of an action now to be placed, e.g. whether it is lawful for me to paint today.

Therefore that doubt which is concerned with the liceity of an action in general is not customarily called practical doubt, but that which is concerned with the liceity of an action to be placed here and now.

3. Speculative doubt is either doubt of fact, which is concerned with a particular matter, e.g. whether I recited the hours, whether the child has been baptized, whether this food is meat; or doubt of law, which is immediately concerned with the law, or with a faculty of doing something, or with the value of an act, e.g. whether it is prohibited to hunt on a feast day, whether a parish priest can dispense from fasting, whether such a baptism is valid.

Practical doubt always supposes speculative doubt, whether of law or of fact, and arises from speculative doubt: for I would not doubt whether it is lawful for me to paint today unless I doubted whether painting is a servile work, nor would I doubt that I can baptize this child unless I doubted whether he has already been baptized. It is clear that it can happen that, while speculative doubt remains, a practically certain conscience can be had, namely indirectly.

222. Principles. 1. It is never lawful to operate with a practically doubtful conscience: for he who operates in this way, willing the action even if it were evil, consents to evil and therefore sins: for everything which is not from faith, i.e. from certain persuasion of liceity, is sin.¹

a. The sin which one acting with practical doubt commits is of the same species and gravity as a sin committed with certain conscience. Therefore he who doubts whether that which he is about to do is a grave sin and nevertheless acts, sins gravely; and he who in doubt whether today one must abstain from meat nevertheless eats, sins against the precept of abstinence. Wherefore in confession it suffices to say: on a prohibited day I ate meat.

b. Nevertheless they are foolish who after the fact begin to be distressed and to inquire in books or from a confessor whether they have sinned; likewise those who act in doubt and afterward, knowing that the action placed was not evil, are no longer distressed: for the whole morality of the action depends upon the dictate of conscience antecedent to and concomitant with the action itself; subsequent doubt or knowledge cannot change the morality of the action placed.

2. He who doubts concerning the liceity of an action to be placed, before he acts, must lay aside the doubt and form for himself a practically certain conscience. But there exists a twofold way and method of laying aside doubt and forming for oneself a practically certain conscience, direct and indirect.

a. He attempts to lay aside practical doubt directly who inquires into the truth of the matter or the liceity of the action concerning which speculative doubt is concerned, by investigating internal reasons, consulting books or doctors, etc. Practical doubt is laid aside indirectly or reflexively by means of some reflex principle: for by means of these one can arrive at a practically certain conclusion that this or that is licit, while speculative doubt remains (n. 218).

b. If the doubt is concerned with a law or precept which obliges here and now, the direct mode of laying aside a doubtful conscience must be employed in the first place, namely by inquiring with moral diligence into the truth of the matter or the liceity of the action: for every law first obliges to knowledge of itself. Wherefore he who from negligence in the inquiry of truth exposes himself to the danger of transgressing the law, by this very fact sins. But in this investigation of truth the highest diligence must not be employed, namely by using all means which can be employed: for this would be an intolerable burden; rather, it suffices that moral diligence be employed, which alone is accommodated to human nature (n. 49). He who, after employing moral diligence, cannot arrive at knowledge of the matter is situated in invincible ignorance of that matter (n. 209).

3. But if a doubtful conscience can be laid aside neither directly nor indirectly, the action must be deferred, or, if the necessity of acting urges, the safer part must be chosen: for unless in this case the safer part were chosen, the action would be made with a practically doubtful conscience, which is always sin; but he who embraces the safer part certainly observes the law, even if perhaps he would not be bound.

The safer part is that which stands for the observation of the law and which therefore excludes every danger of sinning by one's action. Therefore in doubt whether it is lawful to place an action which can licitly be omitted, the action must be omitted; in doubt whether it is lawful to omit an action which can licitly be placed, the action must be placed.

¹ Rom. 14, 23.

WHEN we have some knowledge of a matter which does not amount to a certainty, various states of mind may be distinguished with respect to the mind’s inclination to form a judgement about the matter in question. If no reasons are known for either affirming or denying a proposition, or if there are as weighty reasons for one as for the other, the mind suspends judgement, and is said to be in doubt. Doubt, then, is the suspending of judgement about a matter apprehended by the mind. A doubtful conscience, therefore, will be a suspension of judgement about the lawfulness of some action.

If some slight reason draws the mind in one direction, we have then a suspicion about the matter. If there be a good solid reason or reasons for forming a judgement in a particular sense though there is not sufficient ground for certainty, and it is felt that the opposite may be true, the mind then forms an opinion on the matter.¹

Theologians distinguish a negative from a positive doubt. There is negative doubt when the mind suspends judgement for want of reasons on one side or on the other; if there is an apparent equality of reasons on either side, the doubt is positive. In this chapter we confine our attention to negative doubt, the sense in which the term doubt is usually understood in theology. A speculative doubt has reference to some question in the abstract apart from present action, as when I doubt whether it is allowed to fish on Sundays, though I have no intention of actually fishing: a practical doubt has reference to the lawfulness of an action which there is question of performing here and now.

A doubt about law has reference to the law’s existence or its interpretation; a doubt about fact has reference to fact.

¹ St Thomas, 2-2, q. 2, a. 1.

It is not lawful to perform an action with a practically doubtful conscience as to whether the action is right or wrong. The reason is obvious; for, as we saw in the last chapter, we must have a certain conscience that the action is right before performing it, otherwise sin is committed, and one who has a doubtful conscience has not a certain conscience.

The sin which is committed by one who acts with a practically doubtful conscience as to whether the action is right takes its species and gravity from the doubtful conscience. If I eat meat with a practical doubt as to whether it is not forbidden on that day by the Church, I commit a sin of the same kind and malice as if I ate meat knowingly on a day of abstinence. The reason is obvious from what was said about a certain conscience. The species of a sin and its malice depend upon the mind and will of the agent, and when one acts with a doubtful conscience the will is prepared to commit a sin of the kind apprehended, and by that very act it commits the sin.

As long as the conscience is in a state of practical doubt, one may abstain from action altogether, or do what in any case would be licit. There is no danger of sin if, while doubting whether it is allowed to eat meat, one abstains from food altogether, or eats only what is allowed on days of abstinence. The axiom—In dubio pars tutior est sequenda—is to be taken in this sense. An effort may also be made to resolve the doubt by making inquiries of those who know, by consulting authorities, or by making use of certain principles of conduct which are approved by law and right reason. In this manner a certain conscience may frequently be formed.

There are various principles or axioms suitable for the purpose of forming one’s conscience when in doubt. They are for the most part taken from canon law, but they are also used in questions belonging to the forum of conscience.

In dubio melior est conditio possidentis—Possession is properly a physical fact, and consists in the corporal detention of a thing. In a wider sense rights are objects of possession, as a right of way, or the right to one’s liberty; so that if one’s liberty has hitherto been unrestricted, it is said to be in possession. The very fact of possession gives a right to continue in possession unless there is an adverse and stronger claim. There is also in the possessor a presumption of title to possess, for all men are jealous of their rights, and usually do not allow their property or rights to be held by others as owners. If, then, I am in possession of some object or right, and a doubt supervenes as to whether I am entitled to possession in the case or not, the question may be solved in the forum of conscience as it would be in a court of law, by applying the maxim —In dubio melior est conditio possidentis.¹

If, then, a doubt arises as to whether I have said my breviary, I must say it, for the law is in possession; if on the contrary a doubt comes into my mind as to whether I have taken food after midnight, I may go to Holy Communion, because my right to receive is in possession.

¹ Cf. Irish Eccles. Record, Sept. 1899.

In dubio standum est pro eo pro quo stat praesumptio. (In doubt one must stand by that for which the presumption stands.) A presumption is a probable conjecture about an uncertain event. The conjecture is such as would be formed in the circumstances by a man of ordinarily sound judgement and prudence. This is called a praesumptio hominis to distinguish it from a praesumptio juris, which the law itself sanctions in certain circumstances. Thus, according to the old canon law, if the parents of a boy and girl promised them in marriage and they did not express dissent, there was a praesumptio juris that they gave their consent, and they were reputed betrothed to each other. This praesumptio juris admits, indeed, of proof to the contrary; in cases where proof to the contrary is not admitted, there is praesumptio juris et de jure, as it is called.

When in doubt, I can frequently form my conscience by the aid of this axiom. If, for example, I am in the habit of saying my little hours after breakfast, and some evening a doubt occurs to me whether I said them on that day, I need not say them then, the presumption being that I said them in the morning as usual, and—In dubio standum est pro eo pro quo stat praesumptio.

¹ Cap. un., de despon. impub. in’ Sexto.

In dubio factum non praesumitur sed probari debet. Similarly, Nemo praesumitur malus donec probetur. (In doubt a fact is not presumed but must be proved. Similarly, No one is presumed wicked until he is proved so.) These axioms are understood of some principal fact, the fact of baptism, for example, or the commission of a crime, which obviously should not be presumed. If on the contrary the principal fact is certain, and a doubt arises as to some accessory circumstance, then other axioms should be used to guide the conduct: as, In dubio omne factum praesumitur recte factum; or, In dubio praesumitur factum quod de jure faciendum erat; or, In dubio standum est pro valore actus. (as, In doubt every act is presumed to have been rightly done; or, In doubt that is presumed to have been done which by law ought to have been done; or, In doubt one must stand by the validity of the act.) So that if I am certain that I baptized a child, but begin to doubt whether I anointed the head with chrism, according to the ritual, I am not bound to supply the ceremony afterwards.

We speak about him who lacks the conscience required for acting licitly, that is, about him who is not certain of the honesty of the action to be placed. Moreover:

I. One who is not certain of the honesty of some action, unless he wishes to abstain from it, is held before all else to inquire into the truth, that is, to investigate what the morality of the action is; in other words, what the ordinance of the eternal law concerning it is. And indeed one who neglects the aforesaid inquiry holds the divine ordinance itself cheap, since he rashly exposes himself to the danger of violating it. Hence St. Thomas: "But in doubtful and uncertain matters, reason does not give judgment without a preceding inquiry; and therefore inquiry of reason before judgment about things to be chosen is necessary; and this inquiry is called counsel" (I-II, q. 14, a. 1). And St. Alphonsus: "For acting licitly in doubtful matters we must inquire into the truth" (I, 54).

II. Concerning the manner of inquiring into the truth, hold these things:

1. The arguments, intrinsic and extrinsic, or authorities, of each opinion mutually opposed to the other, must be investigated and compared. For in doubts one part must be chosen before the other. But "choice imports a certain preceding comparison" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 13, a. 1).

2. The inquiry must be made with moral diligence proportionate both to the person inquiring and to the gravity of the matter of which there is question, and to the time that can be spent on the inquiry. The less learned should try to reach the truth by consulting the more learned, for example a pastor or confessor; the more learned, by their own inquiry. "It will be enough," says Benedict XIV in the encyclical De Praeparatione ad Annum Universalis Iubilaei (26 Jun. 1749), "to have admonished confessors that in a doubtful matter they not rely on their own opinion; but before they decide the cause, they should consult very many books, especially those whose doctrine is more solid; and then they should descend to that opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms. Nor indeed did we teach anything else in our encyclical on usuries." Besides this, greater diligence is needed if there is question of a matter of great importance, say of notable restitution, than if the discussion concerns a small matter.

If someone, after the truth has been inquired into, continues to doubt, or is not certain of the honesty of the action, it is disputed to what extent one who thus doubts theoretically can come to practical certainty and place the action. Moreover, the diverse responses to this question constitute the diverse moral systems, about which we must now speak. But it is clear that this controversy is of the greatest importance: since a moral system governs the whole of moral doctrine and opens the way for solving for practice the innumerable doubts that occur in it. About to speak of this very grave matter, we shall set forth first the notion of a moral system, the state of the controversial question, and the diverse systems; then the proof of the system which seems true to us. Finally we shall add some points concerning certain sayings akin to the moral system, concerning the importance of the controversy between equiprobabilists and probabilists, and concerning the use of the moral system.

Results of Conscience.—The results of following an erroneous conscience are as follows:

(a) He who follows an erroneous conscience, commanding or forbidding or permitting, is not guilty of sin if his ignorance is invincible. Example: A child who thinks he is obliged to lie because he has been told to do this, is excused from sin on account of his ignorance.

(b) He who follows an erroneous conscience, commanding or permitting evil, is guilty if his ignorance is vincible. Example: A grown person who has persuaded himself that deception is lawful, obligatory or advisable, or that truthfulness is forbidden, but who ought to know better, is not excused by the conscience he has formed (see above, 97 sqq.).

The results of disobeying an erroneous conscience are as follows:

(a) He who disobeys an invincibly erroneous conscience, is guilty. Example: The child who refuses to tell a lie when he thinks he ought to do so because it has been commanded, is guilty of disobedience.

(b) He who disobeys a vincibly erroneous conscience, is also guilty. Example: Caius promises to tell a lie to help another party. The doubt occurs whether or not this is lawful, and he takes no pains to settle it correctly, but decides offhand that a promise must be kept. When the time comes, Caius becomes alarmed and does not keep his promise, lest he get into trouble. He is guilty.

If a conscience which was vincibly erroneous in its origin is here and now invincibly erroneous, the acts that result from following such a conscience are to be judged as follows:

(a) They are materially evil in themselves and formally evil in their cause. Example: Titus, who intends to take a position in which he will have to advise others, foresees that later on he may make mistakes costly to others, as a result of his present lack of sufficient study. He secures the position, and tries to make up for former neglect of study, but on one occasion injures a patron by wrong advice which he would not have given, had he worked more faithfully as a younger student. The wrong advice is objectively sinful in itself, as being an injury; it is subjectively sinful in its cause, as being the result of negligence which foresaw what might happen.

(b) The acts in question are not formally evil in themselves. Example: Titus was formally guilty of injury to others at the time he foresaw what would happen on account of his negligence; he was not formally guilty at the time he did the injury, because he had tried meanwhile to repair his negligence and was not conscious of his ignorance.

The kinds of sin committed in consequence of an erroneous conscience are as follows:

(a) Sin committed by following a vincibly erroneous conscience is of the same gravity and species as the act for which the conscience is responsible, but the ignorance is an extenuating circumstance. Example: He who blinds his conscience so that it decides in favor of grave calumny, is guilty of mortal sin against justice; but he is less guilty than if he had sinned without any permission from conscience.

(b) Sin committed by disobeying an invincibly erroneous conscience is of the gravity and species apprehended by the conscience. Example: A person who tells a small lie, thinking it a mortal sin against charity, is guilty of the malice he understands to be in his act.

(c) Sin committed by disobeying a vincibly erroneous conscience is of the species that was perceived. Example: Caius who did not live up to his promise of telling a lie, after he had decided that to keep his word was the right thing to do, was guilty of a breach of promise. As to the gravity of sin against a vincibly erroneous conscience, it is always the same as that apprehended by the conscience, unless what is seriously wrong is culpably mistaken for what is only slightly wrong. Examples: If Caius, just referred to, thought that his desertion of his friend inflicted a grave injury, he was guilty of grave sin. A person who persuades himself by vain reasonings that complete intoxication does not differ in gravity from incipient intoxication, is nevertheless guilty of the greater malice, if he puts himself in the former state; for his wrong opinion cannot change the fact, and his culpable ignorance cannot excuse him.

An erroneous conscience may apprehend something not wrong as wrong, but in an indeterminate manner.

(a) If the species of evil is not determinate before the conscience, but an indifferent act is thought to be sinful without any definite species of sin being thought of, he who acts against such a conscience seems to commit a sin of disobedience. Example: A person who thinks that smoking is a sin, of what kind he does not know, must have at least vaguely the opinion that it is forbidden by the divine law; and hence, if he smokes, he is guilty of disobedience.

(b) If the gravity of the putative sin is not determinate before the conscience, but an act is thought to be sinful without the degree of sinfulness being at all known or thought of, he who acts against such a conscience commits a mortal or a venial sin according to his own disposition with respect to sin. If he is so attached to the sin he apprehends that he intends to commit it, whether it be great or small, he is guilty of mortal sin, at least in so far as he exposes himself to it. But if he is habitually resolved not to commit grave sin, it can be presumed that he would not do that which he apprehends as sinful, if he thought it was a grave offense, Example: If a person erroneously thinks that it is a sin to read a certain book, and then reads it without adverting at all to the gravity of the sin he apprehends, his greater or less guilt will have to be judged by his character. If he is so conscientious that he would stop reading at once if he feared the book was seriously harmful, he sins only venially; but if he knows that he is lax and is yet resolved to read the book at all costs, it seems that he is guilty of grave sin.

An Uncertain Conscience.—Uncertainty of conscience can be understood in two senses.

(a) Conscience is uncertain in a more strict sense, if the verdict of the moral judgment on a question of lawfulness or unlawfulness is that no decision can be given either way, either because there are no reasons of importance on either side (negative doubt), or because the opposing reasons balance so perfectly that it is impossible to choose between them (positive doubt). Examples: Titus, wishing to do some drawing on Sundays, asks himself whether drawing is servile work. Not knowing the definition of “servile,” he can only reply to his doubt that he has no reasons either for affirmation or for negation. Caius reads moral authors on the same question, and the pros and cons seem to him so equally strong that he cannot pronounce for either side.

(b) Conscience is uncertain in a less strict sense, if the verdict of the moral judgment on a question of lawfulness or unlawfulness is that the mind inclines to one side more than the other, but cannot decide in its favor (suspicion), or that it decides for one side, while perceiving that the arguments for the contrary are not to be despised (opinion). Example: Titus decides to spend a good part of Sunday taking photographs. Caius argues that this is unlawful; Sempronius, that it is lawful. Titus thinks the arguments of both are strong, but is better pleased with those of Sempronius. If he feels he cannot act on either opinion, his state of mind is what we called suspicion; if he feels that the opinion of Sempronius has prevailed, his state of mind is one of opinion.

From what was said above concerning the certitude requisite for conscience (see 641 sqq.), it follows that: (a) when the state of mind is positive or negative doubt, one is not allowed to act; for a person who is ignorant of what he should do, or who is fluctuating between opposites, runs the risk of sin and its consequences, if he acts blindly; (b) when the state of mind is suspicion, one is not allowed to act, for conscience must be more than conjecture or inclination; (e) when the state of mind is opinion, one is or is not allowed to act, according as the opinion has or has not the qualities required for certitude that is moral and practical (as explained above in 643 sqq.).

Doubt and Suspicion.—The following are the duties of a person whose state of mind about his obligation is one of doubt or suspicion:

(a) If he has no time to resolve his hesitation but must decide at once, he should follow the rules given for a perplexed conscience (see above, 611 sqq.). Example; Sempronius is ordered by his father to go on an errand; by his mother, to remain at home. He does not know whom he should obey, but argues that there can be no harm in performing the errand, since he feels that he is forced anyway. Sempronius’ impromptu decision proceeds from a sense of moral responsibility; it is good, and as certain as he is able to make it.

(b) If a person has time to resolve his hesitation, he should not trust to common sense, but should consult moral theology, if he is competent to understand and apply it, or should have recourse to his confessor, if he is not a theologian. The attention given to his problem should be proportionate to the gravity of the duty in question, its importance for third parties, etc. (see below, 667 Sqq.). Example: If a layman is uncertain whether a practice he follows in his business is dishonest, he should consult a priest; if the priest is uncertain, he should refer to his theology and study the matter until he is able to give a well-founded, morally certain judgment.

Reflex principles by the aid of which a negative doubt may be solved, when the question is about the existence or non-existence of some fact connected with obligation, are the following:

(a) If the fact at issue is one about which presumption may be had from general or personal experience, the doubt may be settled by the principle: “In uncertainty decide according to what usually happens.” Examples: Titus is uncertain whether his boy of seven years has the use of reason and is bound to go to Mass. As a rule, children attain discretion at the age of seven; and hence Titus should take his boy to Mass. Fr. Caius is uncertain whether he has said Terce. His experience is that such uncertainties on his part have always been baseless in the past; hence, he may consider that he has said Terce as usual.

(b) If the fact at issue is one about which no presumption is afforded, either from general or personal experience, recourse may be had to the principle: “A fact should not be taken for granted, but must be proved.” Examples: Sempronia doubts whether her practice of saying the Rosary daily was the result of a vow; but, as there is no proof or circumstantial evidence of a vow, it may be held that her practice originated in a resolution. Caius, a stranger, claims that Titus owes him for an unpaid debt of his father. Titus knows nothing of the alleged debt, and the only substantiation for its existence is the word of the stranger. Titus is not obliged to pay.

Presumption of a fact is of three kinds according to Weight:

(a) Violent presumption is based on indications so significant or numerous that it leaves only slight room for evasion. This kind of presumption suffices, but is not essential in solving doubts. Example: Caius has no direct proof or disproof that he paid Titus in a certain business transaction, because all the papers have been lost. But he remembers distinctly that he drew the money and went personally to the office of Titus on the day payment was to be made, and that the latter, up to the time of his death several months later, always acted as if full settlement had been made.

(b) Strong presumption is based on circumstances or signs so moving that they permit one to infer a fact as being their natural or usual accompaniment or result. This kind of presumption suffices in solving the doubts we are considering. Example: If Caius, spoken of above, has no individual recollection of any circumstances bearing on the payment of his debt to Titus, but knows that it was his invariable custom to pay all his debts promptly, the presumption that he paid this debt is strong.

(c) Light presumption occurs when the reasons are so slight, that they hardly ever suffice to permit us to infer a given fact from them. Example: If we suppose that Caius was dilatory in paying debts, and that he has no better indication of payment having been made than the fact that Titus gave him a cigar about the time of their business transaction, there is little presumption that the debt was paid.

Reflex principles that may be used to settle negative doubts about the quality of an act performed are the following:

(a) If there is an individual presumption, the quality of the act may be inferred from what usually happens. Example: Sempronius cannot remember whether a certain good work he undertook was prompted by zeal or ambition. But, as he usually tried to keep his motives pure, it may be concluded that the work in question proceeded from a right intention.

(b) If there is no individual presumption, the quality of an act may be settled from general presumptions or principles. When the act was according to law, and the doubt concerns its validity or sufficiency, one may take it that all was rightly done; for it usually happens that he who complies with the substance, also complies with what is accessory. Moreover, the welfare of the public and of individuals require that an act done outwardly according to law should be deemed as rightly performed unless the contrary can be proved. Hence the rules: “In doubt decide for the validity of what was done”; “What has been done is presumed to have been rightly done.” Examples: Caia cannot remember whether she really consented when she married Titus. Sempronius cannot remember whether he had sufficient attention in hearing Mass on Sunday. The presumptions are that Caia married validly and that Sempronius heard Mass properly, if they acted in good faith.

Reflex principles that may be used to settle negative and invincible doubts concerning law or obligation are the following:

(a) If no serious reasons can be found to prove or disprove the existence of a law, or its gravity or application to a present case, use may be made of the principle: “Invincible ignorance of the law excuses from sin.” Example: Titus on an ember day consults all the sources of information he has to discover whether it is a fast day; but all he can learn is that some vigils are fast days, others are not.

(b) If no serious reasons can be found to prove or disprove that a law bears a certain meaning, recourse may be had to such principles as the following: “A law obliges only in so far as it is knowable”; “The interpretation may be made against the legislator who could have spoken more clearly”; “Things burdensome to the subjects of the law should be construed narrowly; things favorable, broadly.” Example: Caius, who supervises workingmen, has no notion regarding the meaning of the word “workingman” as used in an indult on fasting—viz., whether it applies to supervisors of work or exclusively to laborers.

(c) If no serious reasons can be found to prove or directly disprove that a certain law has ceased or been abrogated, the principle to be followed is: “In doubt decide for that which has the presumption.” In this case the presumption is for the continuance of the law, since it was certainly made, and there is no probability for its non-continuance. Example: Sempronius learns that certain mitigations have been made in the law of fasting, and wonders whether the same is true as regards the law of abstinence; but he has no reason to think that any change has been made on this latter point.

In the above cases negative doubt was solved generally in favor of non-obligation as against obligation. But there are two cases in which negative doubt must be settled in favor of obligation, according to the rule: “In doubt follow that which is safer.” The two cases are:

(a) Negative doubt must be settled in favor of obligation, when the doubt is about a matter of such importance that it does not permit the taking of risks in its performance, as when there is question of laws that safeguard the supreme rights of man, or of laws that prescribe the essentials to be used in the administration of the Sacraments. Example: Sempronius adopts a newly-born infant abandoned at his door. As there is nothing to indicate whether the baby has been baptized or not, Sempronius takes the safer course and has it baptized.

(b) Negative doubt must be settled in favor of obligation when it persists because no reflex principle is found, or none that seems to be suitable for the case. Example: Titus wavers between uncertainties about the existence of a law; he can discover no reasons pro or con, and he knows no principle or presumption to guide himself by in his difficulty. He does not know or even think that he may act as if the law were non-existent, and hence he must inquire further, or else act as if the law did exist.

"11. It is not necessary to reflect upon doubts which occur, whether one is proceeding rightly or not." Proposition of Michael de Molinos condemned by Innocent XI.

What is doubtful conscience? - Doubt is a suspension of assent concerning an apprehended object; not only as regards the specification of the act, but also as regards the very exercise of the act, namely because a sufficient reason is not had for either part. Therefore doubtful conscience is that which remains suspended concerning the honorableness of an action, inclining to neither part. This conscience, since it does not involve judgment, is not conscience properly, but rather a defect of conscience; for conscience is judgment, not suspension of judgment. Nevertheless this suspension of judgment is called conscience, insofar as with this suspension of judgment we often in fact act. Doubt of this kind can be joined with a reflex judgment about the insufficiency of the motive or reason for assenting, and then a judgment of this kind is more properly called doubtful conscience. - L. 1. 1. n. 20; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5.

How manyfold is doubtful conscience? - "Doubt is divided into negative and positive. Negative doubt is when probable reasons occur on neither side. Positive is when for each side, or at least for one, there is present a grave motive sufficient for forming a probable conscience, although with fear concerning the opposite; therefore positive doubt almost always coincides with probable opinion." L. 1. 1. n. 20. Likewise one doubt is strict, another broad. Strict doubt is had when the mind does not determinately embrace one part by its assent, but adheres waveringly to each; broad is when the mind adheres to one part, yet does not furnish it an altogether firm assent.

In the former sense is to be understood what S. Alph. has apud Aertnys n. 70 at the end: "Where two equally probable opinions concur, neither remains probable, but only doubtful." Certainly the mind can remain doubtful, that is, suspend assent; but it can also well adhere determinately to one before the other, and even to each, if the motives are not contradictory but disparate, with an assent indeed not certain and firm, but probable, not without fear of the opposite. Therefore strict doubt can arise from the fact that on each side the reasons are equal or almost equal; or also from the fact that for neither side are there reasons, or only slight reasons are present for each. And just as when reasons are present on each side, although equal, reason can be moved by them to assent, so when no reasons or only slight reasons are present, then the doubt is to be scorned, and consequently does not impede opposite probability or certainty. In the present we are not treating of conscience positively and broadly doubtful, or probable, about which we have already spoken; but our discussion will be only about conscience negatively and strictly doubtful.

Moreover, doubt is divided into speculative and practical. Speculative doubt is that by which someone doubts about the truth of a thing or about the liceity of a thing in general, or universally, for example, whether baptism with distilled water is valid, whether painting on a feast day is servile work. Practical doubt is that by which someone doubts about the liceity or honorableness of an action in particular, to be exercised here and now, for example, whether on this feast day in these circumstances it is licit for me to paint, whether it is licit to baptize this child with distilled water. To be exercised here and now: for otherwise, although the action is considered as circumscribed by several circumstances, speculative doubt can still be had concerning it, if the question does not concern an action to be exercised and directed by conscience in the present. Practical doubt always arises from another speculative doubt, either of law concerning the law, or of fact concerning some particular thing. Hence conscience speculatively doubtful, and practically doubtful. L. 1. 1. n. 21; S. Th. 1. p. q. 79. a. 13.

What is the directive force of doubtful conscience? - The response is clear from the following propositions. - With a practically doubtful conscience, whether the action is licit or illicit, it is illicit to act. For only a certain conscience is the rule of morals. Cf. 102. Hence that saying: In doubts the safer part is to be chosen. The safer, namely that which stands for the observance of the law. C. Inquisitioni 44 de Sent. exc.; L. 1. 1. n. 22. 79, l. 7. n. 347; S. Th. Quodl. 8. a. 13; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5; De Censur. d. 40. s. 6. n. 3. 9; E. M.

With a speculatively doubtful conscience it is licit to operate, provided a practically certain conscience can be formed. For as is clear from what has been said n. 102, certain conscience, however finally it has been formed, if it at least rests on moral certainty, is a sufficient rule of morals, indeed the sole rule of morals. It is licit to operate: namely where the question concerns only the licit or illicit. For where the question concerns the truth of the thing and an effect necessarily to be obtained, if it is illicit to act with probability, it is consequently illicit to act with doubt. Cf. 116; L. 1. 1. n. 25; Suarez d. 12. s. 5.

The means by which from a speculatively doubtful conscience someone may make the step to a practically certain conscience are: 1. To weigh the doubt itself with a certain moral diligence. For if, as S. Alph. says l. 1. n. 24, "all things having been weighed, he notices that the doubt is empty, here he can well put aside his doubt without another reflection, and thus execute the action." 2. To inquire into the practice of good men operating without scruple. 3. The counsel of a learned and prudent man. 4. Some probable reason, a fortiori a demonstrative reason of the matter, which perhaps can be found by inquiring into the truth. - 5. Some general reason, or some general reflex principle, so called because it leads and bends us by means of reasoning to defining rightly the question, not concerning the intrinsic and objective truth of the thing, which cannot be resolved through itself and in its immediate principle, but concerning the subjective liceity of our action from some general extrinsic principle. Thus a judge is doubtful whether Titius is guilty, from intrinsic and direct reasons of law or fact. But from the general and reflex principle, In doubt favor is to be given to the accused, he unhesitatingly absolves Titius. - L. ib.

There are indeed certain general reasons, or certain general sayings and principles, which can always be at hand, so that someone may make the step from negative doubt to moral certainty immediately, or at least to probability, from which then by means of the principles of probabilism he can form for himself a certain conscience. Now rules and principles of this kind are the following. Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5. n. 7; Lugo De Iust. et Iur. d. 23. n. 110.

In doubt the condition of the possessor is better. C. 6 de Praescript. This axiom in the external forum, both ecclesiastical and civil, has been received as a certain rule of judgments. For it is to be presumed that he who possesses a thing possesses it by right, unless the contrary is clear. The same certainly has force in the internal forum of conscience. For certain and legitimate possession produces moral certainty concerning the dominion of the thing, L. 1. 1. n. 35, l. 4. 210, l. 6. n. 905. 927; and the reason is that, given human customs, no one is, morally speaking, negligent; indeed on the contrary all are diligent and very diligent in guarding their own things. Moreover, where one does not proceed from a false supposition, the right of the external and internal forum is the same; for each forum is founded on the principles of natural justice and equity. Hence theologians commonly admit the aforesaid rule for the forum of conscience. L. 1. 1. n. 26. Now some say that this axiom has force only in the matter of justice. "Yet I," says S. Alph. l. c., "do not know how it can be denied in all matters." And this certainly is by far the more common and truer opinion. The reason for this extension also to other matters, with due proportion, is the same as in the matter of justice. For no one can justly be despoiled without sufficient reason of a good which is his own. But man naturally, and therefore certainly and altogether legitimately, possesses his liberty, which certainly is some good and right of his own. Therefore this good also pertains to justice, and he who unjustly either takes it away or weakens it violates justice. Without injustice a free man cannot be subjected to servitude. But there can be no doubt that in doubtful laws liberty is always in prior possession of itself. For upon whom is law imposed except a free man? Whence it is that what is licit is not whatever the law permits, but what the law does not prohibit, L. 28. § 2 Ex quib. caus. maior., and therefore this prohibition must be manifestly proved, C. 23 de Verb. signif. - Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5. n. 8; Lugo De Iust. et Iur. d. 17. n. 87, d. 23. n. 110. In doubt: that is, in negative doubt, and the reason of the axiom is then clear, because possession stands for the possessor, and therefore moral certainty; for the petitioner no prudent reason is had. Cf. Lugo De Iust. et Iur. 23. n. 110. But in positive doubt, or probability, if probability is present on each side, so that on one side possession and probability of right stand, and on the other only equal or almost equal contrary probability of right, the condition of the possessor is again better, as is clear of itself. But if on one side indeed possession stands, but on the other contrary probability of right; or on one side possession and at the same time probability of right, and on the other far greater contrary probability of right, then certainly the condition of the possessor is not better, but doubtful. Indeed the first opinion holds that the judge is bound to adjudge the thing to the plaintiff, because the right of possession prevails in an equal cause, but not in a less probable cause. For Rule 65 of the Law in the Sixth has it thus: "In equal fault, or cause, the condition of the possessor is stronger"; and in L. 128 ff. de div. Reg. Iuris it is said: "In an equal cause the possessor ought to be held stronger." But the second opinion holds that the condition of the possessor is still better, and that the judge cannot despoil him of possession. The reason is that "it is certain that legitimate possession gives to each a certain right of retaining the thing, until the right of another is not established, as they say most commonly... a certain right, which cannot be overcome except by the certain right of another through certain convincing reasons." For possession is defined: the right of insisting in a thing not prohibited to be possessed. L. 1. 1. n. 36; Ithur. Cas. 1. n. 2. Cf. L. 1. 3. n. 547. 562. 711, etc.

Therefore the possession about which the present saying speaks is certain and legitimate possession. It is called certain, that is, that the fact of possession is certain; legitimate, that is, begun and continued in good faith, and likewise begun and continued by a just title, at least apparent, or at least thought to exist, or presumed, such as, for example, donation, purchase, inheritance, and similar things, through which ownership of some thing is usually acquired. Therefore if possession is doubtful, or begun with doubtful faith, or by a doubtful title, it by itself does not exhibit to the possessor a special prerogative and presumption against which no contrary probability has force. L. 1. 1. n. 36. 47, l. 4. n. 210.

Probability of right, which can be only on one side or on each side, is the probability of a real just title, or of one actually existing, from which true and real dominion and ownership of the thing arise. For for legitimate possession, about which the axiom speaks, it suffices that the just title at least appears, because, for example, a donation or purchase intervened from him who was thought to be owner, although he was not; or at least was thought to exist, because the action signified by the title is thought to have intervened, although it did not intervene, as happens when someone thinks that the thing was given to him or bought by him, and nevertheless this was not done; or at least presumed, because, for example, because of length of time in peaceful possession or other circumstances, it is prudently thought that some title intervened, although the possessor cannot allege any determinate one. Therefore this probability of right, as is clear, is altogether outside possession itself, which only gives the right of insisting in the thing, or of holding it, although perhaps its dominion and ownership does not belong to you, since a just title was not really present. Now the probability of a real just title, or of one actually existing, can be in two ways: 1. Probability of the justice of the title for beginning or continuing possession and ownership of the thing, for example, a testament lacking legal formalities. 2. Probability of the reality or existence of a just title for the same effect, for example, of donation, when it is also probable that the thing was taken by theft. The former probability is called of right; the latter is called of fact. Where this latter is treated, "when the fact is not plainly proved, it is not probable that the accused can be condemned, since laws never permit the accused to be condemned unless the crime or debt is fully proved; but it is not proved fully and sufficiently for a sentence when, although two or three witnesses testify, nevertheless other witnesses testify the contrary; for through these the testimony of the former is destroyed or diminished, and therefore the sufficient proof required for full proof and condemnation does not remain." Lugo De Iust. et Iure d. 16. n. 100. Cf. also d. 23. n. 100, d. 16. n. 34. 96. 99.

You will resolve: From the aforesaid axiom several practical cases of negative doubt can be resolved, in which every true probability is lacking, namely whether the time of the obligation of a law has arrived or passed. "In doubt of beginning, for example, whether you have completed 21 years, you are not bound to fasting, because then possession is for liberty. Otherwise in doubt of passing, for example, whether on Saturday the hour of midnight has passed, you cannot eat meat, for then the law possesses. Thus also, if you doubt whether you have 16 years for profession, or 25 years for priesthood, you cannot profess or be ordained. Thus commonly." L. 1. 1. n. 99. 32.

In doubt one must stand for that for which presumption stands. For presumption, taken from things ordinarily happening, or from other circumstances of the person and the thing, produces moral certainty, or at least probability. "In obscure matters one is accustomed to look at what is more likely, or what usually happens." L. 114 de R. I.; R. I. 14 in 6. It is a certain anticipated proof of a thing from indications, before direct proofs. Therefore presumption exhibits a thing as true and stands for that side which is not bound by itself to prove the contrary fact, but transfers that burden of proving to the other side. For whenever something is known to preexist which by its nature perseveres until it is taken away by some contrary fact, that thing is thought to persevere as long as that contrary fact is not established, which consequently must be proved by the adverse side.

Hence, if you are accustomed at such a time diligently to recite the breviary, and you doubt whether you have recited some part, presumption favors you and exempts you from the obligation of reciting or repeating. If an insane person, but one who has lucid intervals, makes a vow and afterward doubts whether he made the vow while master of himself, he is not obligated so long as it does not appear that he was master of himself. L. 1. n. 26. Nevertheless in the forum of penance, in which, as S. Thomas says 4.

D. 17. a. 3. q. 3, one must stand by the word of the penitent for himself and against himself, presumption yields to the truth affirmed by the penitent. - Cf. 204; Lugo De Poenit. d. 20. n. 17. 19; L. 1. 3. n. 270, l. 6. n. 600 par. Limitant. Likewise in the case of doubt, the baptism of spouses is not presumed in relation to a marriage, if the non-Catholic party or parties had parents belonging to a sect which rejects baptism; on the contrary it is presumed if they had parents belonging to a sect which admits baptism, and they were zealous in that sect. S. O. Aug. 1, 1883; Collect. S. C. de P. F. n. 662; E. M. n. 1016.

Note: Where the question concerns obedience to be furnished to a superior in doubt, presumption stands, speaking per se, always for the superior. L. 1. 1. n. 93. 98. 99. Speaking per se always: for accidentally it can sometimes happen that presumption is not present for the superior, for example, in doubt about the liceity of the thing, even with the precept of the superior acceding, for example, when the superior "is accustomed rashly and imprudently to command at pleasure things which are not licit... also when, with the precept of the prelate acceding, the thing remains in doubt (as regards its intrinsic liceity); nor does the authority, doctrine, probity, or prudence of the prelate suffice for putting aside the doubt, which case is possible." Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 3. d. 19. n. 11; L. 1. 3. n. 617. Cf. here 157.

In doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be demonstrated. L. 10 C. de Non numer. pec. - For no reason must be given for non-being, but for being; because non-being does not have its cause, but being does. But understand this of the principal fact, if it is doubtful: because, if the principal fact is certainly established and there is doubt about an accessory fact, then other principles have force: In doubt every fact is presumed rightly done; In doubt the fact which by law had to be done is presumed; In doubt one must stand for the value of the act; always excluding unjust damage to oneself or another or the community. For every being naturally tends toward its perfection and good. Therefore if nothing is established as obstructing, nature continues to pursue its course. The fact of a completed Confession is established; you doubt concerning the right, whether you confessed rightly with sorrow, with purpose; you can acquiesce. These three latter principles have force both for liberty and against liberty.

For liberty, if a contrary and certain presumption or the common good does not obstruct; for no obligation is to be imposed unless it is certainly established. Against liberty, namely if a contrary and certain presumption or the public good obstructs; for the common good prevails over private good. L. 1. 1. n. 26. 27. 137. 182. 251, l. 3. n. 201, l. 6. n. 505; L. Quoties 12 de Reb. dub. ff.

You will resolve: In doubt whether you took some food or drink, and likewise in doubt whether you took food or drink after midnight, you can receive the Eucharist. For unless the fact is proved in each case, liberty possesses. L. 1. 1. n. 38. 39; Elbel 166. 167; Amort. Theol. t. 2. d. 5. 9. 4, who observes these things at the end: "Yet I say that he would sin at least venially who, for the pleasure of mere drinking, should thus traffic around the laws of the Church, exposing himself to the danger of at least material transgression; and if he does this from custom or from a resolve always to operate in this way, no other reasonable cause concurring, for example, thirst, infirmity, he will sin mortally, because such a resolve argues interpretative contempt and a defect of charity toward God and the Church, whose honor he stains."

Busemb. apud La Croix, l. 1. n. 470. VI. Indeed, although it is licit to use a probable opinion against a law, it is nevertheless not licit to act in fraud of the law, voluntarily procuring a state of doubt against the law, lest someone be bound to observe the law. Doubtful baptism, in order to a marriage already entered or to be entered, is held as valid; and therefore a marriage is pronounced valid or invalid according to various circumstances.

The marriage of one doubtfully baptized with one not baptized must be held invalid. On the contrary, the marriage of two doubtfully baptized persons, and of one doubtfully baptized with one baptized, must be held valid. S. O. Nov. 17, 1830; Sept. 9, 1868; Sept. 18, 1872; July 7, 1880; Sept. 18, 1890; Apr. 12, 1899; Collect. S. C. P. F. n. 1872; E. M. n. 1016. But a doubtful marriage, because of the common good, is commonly held as valid. But because of the most excellent good of religion, the doubtful marriage of polygamous infidels who are converted to the faith is declared invalid. Collect. S. C. de P. F. n. 1301. 1304. 1332. 2184.

In doubt no one is presumed evil, unless it is proved. - This axiom is a corollary of the preceding. For since facts and consequently crimes are not presumed, but must be demonstrated, neither ought anyone to be presumed evil, but he must be proved. Indeed no one is evil for nothing.

Hatreds should be restricted and favors should be broadened. R. I. 15 in 6 - For no one desires to be hated, but all desire to be pleasing. Therefore favors are to be preferred to hatreds. Favor is understood as whatever indulges liberty or grants grace. R. 122 de R. I. Hatred is whatever restricts liberty, establishes a punishment, or injures some right. But since it sometimes happens that what is a favor to one is hatred to another, the particular case must be considered, so that it may be determined whether favor is to be preferred to hatred, or hatred to favor. Hence there arises the general principle: In obscure matters the minimum is to be followed, R. I. 30 in 6, L. 9 de Reg. Iur., and therefore the interpretation of law is to be made less burdensome and more benign to liberty. Whence there is another general principle: Always in doubts the more benign things are to be preferred. L. 56 de R. I. And likewise another: Unless you have been certain of the mandate, you will not be compelled to execute what is commanded. C. Cum iure 31 de Off. et pot. iud. del. L. 1. 1. n. 97.

You will resolve: Therefore it is false that where generally the discussion concerns speculative doubt about the liceity or illicitness of an action, in doubts the safer part must be chosen. And certainly in this Rule of Canon Law the question does not concern speculative doubt, in which by means of a reflex principle someone can form for himself a certain conscience, and thus choose a part altogether safe; but the question concerns either practical doubt, namely a practically doubtful conscience, with which it is not licit to act, or else the question concerns those cases in which the end must necessarily be obtained. But the question is above all about the external forum, in which often there is a special reason for following the safer course, in order to remove scandals, abuses, and offenses of the faithful; or about honorableness and the greater degree of merit, not about the necessity of salvation. L. 1. 1. n. 68. 79, H. A. tr. 1. n. 39; Struggl tr. 1. q. 5. n. 17.

Of what species of sin is he guilty who acts with a practically doubtful conscience? - This person will be guilty of a sin of the same notion and species as the sin about which he doubts. The reason is that one doubting about that malice, and nevertheless acting, has an affection toward that malice. Hence if you doubt whether it is mortal, you sin mortally; if you doubt generally whether it is sin, not attending even confusedly to the grave malice which may be present, you sin venially. L. 1. 1. 22. 23; Elbel 140.

Note: He who sinned from an erroneous conscience is not bound in confession to explain that circumstance of erroneous conscience, because it does not change the species; since every sin is against conscience, and does not depend on the objective truth of the thing except insofar as that is judged through conscience and proposed to the will. Except the case of censure and reservation: since then the erroneous conscience must be explained so that the exemption from censure and reservation may be established. Except also the case in which otherwise the sin would not be understood, for example, if someone by omitting Mass on a weekday believes that he sins gravely.

What must someone do if, placed between two precepts, he remains doubtful which one he ought to choose, for example, if the precept of hearing Mass urges, and he ought to assist someone gravely sick? - This conscience is usually called perplexed. Someone, when such a case occurs, must sufficiently, as much as is in him, inquire into the truth so that he may put aside the doubt. When the truth has been sufficiently inquired into, and the doubt remains, he can and must choose that which seems to him the lesser evil; and, if each seems equally grave, he can choose either. This is true even if someone culpably cast himself into that perplexity, provided that he is sorry for the past fault. The reason is that there is no obligation to impossibilities, and therefore then the lesser obligation ceases; or, if they are or seem equal, or because of ignorance someone does not know how to discern which is lesser, either ceases; and even if someone thinks that by acting so he sins, he does not really sin from defect of liberty. - Suarez d. 12. s. 5; Lessius on q. 19. d. 19. a. 6. d. 9; L. 1. 1. n. 10; Elbel 141.

You will resolve: If the one acting chooses that which seems to him the greater evil, he sins according to the excess of the evil apprehended, since he freely chooses this excess.

If you doubt whether you have already satisfied some obligation, are you still bound to satisfy? - R. Affirmatively, if the doubt is merely negative. For in such a doubt no prudent reason of satisfaction is present, and therefore it is impossible by some reflex principle to form for oneself a conscience concerning non-satisfaction, since the law altogether certainly perseveres. Cf. Ithur. Cas. 44. n. 15.

But if the doubt is positive, it is controverted. The first opinion, which S. Alph. 1. 1. n. 26-29, 1. 3. n. 700 par. ult., 1. 6. n. 477, quaest. reform., recent retract. q. 1 and 18, etc., altogether holds and thinks must be held, and several others hold, affirms. The reason is 1. because a certain obligation is not satisfied by a doubtful fulfillment; 2. because since in doubt the condition of the possessor is better, and the law certainly existing possesses against liberty, it prevails over liberty, and will always have it obligated to itself until the law has certainly been fulfilled. Cf. besides L. 1. 1. n. 20. 39. 99, 1. 3. n. 112. 290.

The second opinion, which we judge most probable both intrinsically and extrinsically, denies that such an obligation is present. The reason is the very fundamental reason of probabilism, which the holy Doctor cited above explains most learnedly and most expertly, namely: a doubtful law does not oblige. For law does not oblige in the abstract and universal, but in the concrete and particular case, L. 1. 1. n. 78. But although the existence of the law according to itself is certain, nevertheless the same law as obliging in such a concrete and particular case is uncertain, and is altogether prudently pronounced uncertain, if it is truly probable that satisfaction has already been made to it. Therefore either it must be said that the obligation of satisfying the law again in the aforesaid case is null, or it must be said that the aforesaid principle, a doubtful law does not oblige, is not universally true but suffers an exception; which would not be fittingly said. For what is true is always true, and for every particular contained in the universal. But from this reason it appears that the obligation really is not certain, which is assumed in the first reason of the opposite opinion, if it is probable that the law has already been satisfied. For against certainty there cannot be probability. As regards the second reason, as is clear from what has already been said, possession prevails in merely negative doubt; but for it certainly to prevail even in positive doubt, it must be certain and certainly legitimate possession. Now when in a particular case it is truly probably established that the law has been fulfilled, the possession of the law for that concrete and particular case becomes prudently doubtful; for if you really satisfied it, liberty in fact possesses. Besides, it is certainly not legitimate, since probably the just title of obligation is lacking; for you can probably believe that you have already satisfied, and therefore the just title, at least presumed, probably is not present. Moreover, several and very grave theologians hold this opinion. Indeed the same S. Alph. 1. 1. n. 99 has these things: "What in doubt whether you have fulfilled the law? In negative doubt you are bound to fulfill; otherwise in positive." Cf. also 1. 4. n. 150. And thus indeed S. Alph. himself thought, 1. 1. n. 76, edition of the year 1757; and S. D. called this opinion common, and himself deduced it from the very principles of probabilism. Finally S. D. 1. 6. n. 505 says, "it must be carefully noted that penitents are not to be compelled to repeat confessions unless it is morally certain that they were invalid, as La-Croix, etc., rightly say." - D'Annib. ed. 4. p. 1. n. 169.

You will resolve: Therefore that axiom, a doubtful law does not oblige, is to be understood of a law doubtful by positive doubt, or truly probably doubtful. Now law can be positively doubtful in many ways concerning its existence and concerning its cessation; concerning existence, whether it has been enacted, whether promulgated, whether the time of obligation has arrived, whether it extends to such a case; concerning cessation, whether it has been abrogated, whether its excuse or dispensation is present, whether it has already been fulfilled. And in all these cases we say that the aforesaid axiom has place, unless we wish to admit the truth of the general proposition and at the same time deny the truth of the proposition contained in the general.

Therefore law can be doubtful: 1. As regards its very existence and promulgation, concerning which S. Alph. says: "In order that law oblige, it must not only be promulgated, but also promulgated as certain. And this point must firmly be established here," 1. 1. n. 63 seq. and 97. And, to pass over others, these things are from the distinguished Doctor apud S. Alph. 1. 1. 66: "As long as there is a probable judgment that there is no law prohibiting the action, such a law is not sufficiently proposed to man; whence since the obligation of law is of itself burdensome, it does not urge until it is more certainly established." C. 31 de Off. iud. deleg.

2. As regards its understanding and obvious interpretation, and whether it is obscure or ambiguous. For since law must be sufficiently proposed in order to oblige, the legislator is not judged to wish to oblige beyond that which is clearly and determinately expressed in the law. R. I. 30. 57 in 6; L. 9 C. de Leg. et Const.; Suarez in 1. 2. tr. d. 12. s. 5. n. 7. Obscure: for example, whether regular prelates, since they too have their own sheep, ought to apply Mass for them on feast days. This question, twice proposed before the Holy See, has not yet been solved. Giraldi Expos. I. P. p. 2. s. 85. t. 3. Ambiguous: it is provided that a beneficed cleric not reciting the canonical hours after six months from obtaining the benefice does not make the fruits his own; nevertheless the fruits are to be understood not of the earlier and later time, but only of the later.

3. Whether it has an extensive or restrictive interpretation, concerning which S. Alph. 1. 3. n. 1036 says: "When it is doubted whether a law comprehends some case or subject, it is the same as if it is doubted whether a law exists for that case or subject, and therefore liberty possesses." Cf. also 1. 1. n. 27. 97; Lugo De Poenit. d. 16. n. 59, De Iust. et Iur. d. 23. n. 110.

4. Whether it has ceased, either immediately when it was enacted, because it was never received, or with the progress of time through desuetude; concerning which S. D. 1. 3. n. 112 says: "Nor is the first opinion an obstacle, which we followed 1. 1. n. 97, namely that in doubt whether a law has been received, the law rightly obliges; for here we are not involved in doubt, but in probable opinion.... For in doubt the presumption stands for the law, since a crime in not receiving a just law is not presumed. But when it is probable that the obligation of the law never began, or has been abolished, then the presumption for the law ceases and liberty possesses." The same S. D. has this, 1. 1. n. 107 par. An vero, 1. 4. n. 47. The same must consequently be said when it is probable that the end of the law has ceased adequately, L. 1. 1. n. 199, or that the law has been abrogated by custom, L. 1. 3. n. 290, or that in a particular case there is no need of dispensation, L. 1. 1. n. 192, 1. 3. n. 304. Certainly as soon as the obligation of the law is doubtful, its possession consequently becomes doubtful; and therefore in the case the argument taken from the Rule of possession has no force.

5. Whether the law is just or unjust; and here a threefold case can occur. The first is that the justice of the law is doubted because the legislator himself is doubted, whether he is a legitimate superior. Now in this case, if the doubt about the legitimacy of the superior is positive, about which we are treating, namely it is truly probable that he is not a legitimate superior, by that very fact the non-existence of the law becomes truly probable, and therefore it does not oblige. Cf. L. 1. 1. n. 98. 121. - But if the doubt is merely negative, the law must be obeyed, "whenever the superior is in peaceful possession of his power; for then his condition, as already possessing the right of commanding, is better." L. 1. 1. n. 98, 1. 4. n. 47. The other case is that the justice of the law is doubted because it is doubted whether the superior exceeds his power. In positive doubt, or true probability concerning excess of power, the same must be said as in the preceding case. For by the very fact that it is truly and manifestly probable that the superior exceeds his power, the non-existence of the law becomes truly probable, and therefore it does not oblige. Cf. L. 1. 3. n. 617. - But if the doubt is merely negative, presumption, speaking per se, always stands for the superior.

The third case is because the liceity of the thing commanded itself is doubted. In positive doubt or true probability, the law is not doubtful, and therefore obliges. For the superior then commands a thing probably licit, indeed certainly licit; for he commands that the subject embrace some probable opinion in practice, which is certainly licit. Therefore he commands licitly and by right. Therefore the subject is bound to obey. Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 3. d. 19; L. 90, l. 1. n. 93. 99. 124, l. 4. n. 47; Wirceburg. De Legib. c. 1. a. 1. "But the doctors commonly limit the aforesaid opinion, and say that the subject is not bound to obey, 1. if the thing is very difficult and troublesome.... They limit it 2. when by obeying the subject would expose himself or another to the danger of undergoing grave inconvenience in life, reputation, honor, or goods." L. 1. 4. n. 47, l. 3. n. 617, l. 1. n. 31. "The reason is that the subjection and obedience due to the superior does not take away your right and possession, or that of another, concerning the good of honor, reputation, body, or fortune. Therefore you are not bound to deprive yourself of this certain possession in a matter of such great moment; rather it seems consonant with equity that greater account be taken of your certain possession, and that this be preferred to the right or possession, in some way doubtful, of the superior." Elbel 173; Laymann c. 5. n. 12; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5. Moreover, because then in the case of a very difficult or harmful thing it can deservedly be doubted whether the superior exceeds the limits of his power, and therefore the existence of the law becomes doubtful; or legitimate epikeia can then also have place, according to the various circumstances of the particular case. But if the doubt is merely negative, presumption, as has already been said, Cf. 146, always stands for the superior. Cf. Suarez De Relig. t. 4. l. 4. c. 12 seq.; Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 3. d. 19. Besides, as regards practice more, "the opinion of all theologians, both recent and ancient, is common: they teach that in obscure matters the superior must be obeyed where sin is not certain; and thus all have taught who have treated this matter. Thus also all the masters of mystical theology with S. Ignatius of Loyola in the Letter on the Virtue of Obedience." L. 1. 1. n. 100. 194; Lugo l. c. n. 3; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5.

Ferdinandus, on a certain day, doubtful whether he had drunk after midnight, although he had certainly drunk that night, received Holy Communion. In doubt, he says, the condition of the possessor is better. When again on another day he was about to receive Communion, he inadvertently brought a small piece of sugar to his mouth, but, immediately adverting to the Communion to be received, as quickly as possible he spat out whatever was in his mouth. Nevertheless, doubtful whether he had swallowed anything of the sugar, he nonetheless approached the sacred table, saying again: in doubt, the condition of the possessor is better.

Q. 1. What is doubtful conscience, and can it be a rule of morals? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 137 seqq. To the second: if the matter happened involuntarily, Ferdinandus reasoned rightly, and he cannot be deprived of the right which he certainly possesses of approaching Holy Communion in each case. Cardinal Lugo, De Sacr. euch., d. 15, n. 43, distinguishes case from case. He concedes that in the latter case Communion can be received, but denies it in the former. His reason is that "he who admits eating must prove a new day after eating, in order that he may have a right to Communion; meanwhile he will be rejected on this title, that he ate, and he does not have the right until a new day begins after the eating. This reason does not proceed in the case when there is doubt about the eating itself; for nothing can be opposed to this man by which he has lost the right to communicate on the same day, since eating cannot be opposed to him, concerning which it is not established." But, if this man has a right to communicate because eating cannot be opposed to him, that man also has a right to communicate, because eating after midnight cannot be opposed to him. For he is deprived of the right to communicate not by eating, but by eating after midnight. But in order that he be deprived of this right, which he certainly and legitimately possesses, the fact of eating after midnight must be proved. Aptly St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 39: "Therefore, if, in order that they cannot communicate, the fact that they have taken something must be proved, the fact that they took it after midnight must also be proved." Thus also G. 67, 68; La-Croix l. 6, p. 1, n. 565-567, and many others. Cf. Gur.-Ball., Comp., t. 1, n. 79, q. 5.

If the matter is done voluntarily, Eusebius Amort rightly says, tom. 2, diss. 5, quaestiunc. in fin., § 4, q. 4, 5, that "he would sin at least venially who, for the sake of merely pleasurable drinking, would thus traffic around the laws of the Church, exposing himself to the danger of at least material transgression; and if he does this from custom, or from a purpose of always acting in this way, with no other reasonable cause concurring, for example thirst, infirmity, etc., he will also sin mortally. Because such a purpose argues an interpretative contempt of the laws, and a defect of charity toward God and the Church, whose comeliness he defiles." - Elbel 165 seqq.

139. Doubt is the suspension of assent concerning an apprehended object; not only as to the specification, but also as to the very exercise of the act, because, namely, there is not a sufficient reason for either side. Therefore doubtful conscience is that which remains suspended concerning the honesty of an action, inclining to neither side. This conscience, since it does not involve judgment, is not properly conscience, but rather a defect of conscience; for conscience is judgment, not suspension of judgment. Nevertheless this suspension of judgment is called conscience, inasmuch as with this suspension of judgment we often act in fact. Doubt of this kind can be joined with a reflex judgment concerning the insufficiency of the motive or reason for assenting, and then a judgment of this kind is more properly called doubtful conscience. - L. l. 1, n. 20; Suarez tr. 3, d. 12, s. 5.

140. "Doubt is divided into negative and positive. Negative is when probable reasons occur on neither side. Positive is when for each side, or at least for one side, there is present a grave motive sufficient for forming a probable conscience, although with fear concerning the opposite; therefore positive doubt almost always coincides with probable opinion." L. l. 1, n. 20. Likewise one doubt is strict, another broad. Strict doubt is had when the mind does not determinately embrace one side with its assent, but clings hesitatingly to both; broad doubt is when the mind adheres to one side, yet without giving it an altogether firm assent. - In the former sense is to be understood what St. Alphonsus has in Aertnys n. 70 at the end: "Where two opinions concur as equally probable, neither remains probable, but only doubtful." Certainly the mind can remain doubtful, that is, suspend assent; but it can also well adhere determinately to one rather than to the other, and even to both, if the motives are not contradictory but disparate, with an assent indeed not certain and firm, but probable, not without fear of the opposite. Strict doubt, therefore, can arise from the fact that on each side the reasons are equal or nearly equal; or also from the fact that on neither side are there reasons, or only light reasons are present on both sides. And just as, when reasons are present on both sides, although equal, reason can be moved by them to assent, so, when no reasons or only light reasons are present, the doubt is then to be disregarded, and consequently does not impede opposite probability or certainty. - In the present matter we are not treating of conscience positively and broadly doubtful, or probable, concerning which we have already spoken; but our discourse will be only of conscience negatively and strictly doubtful.

141. Doubt is further divided into speculative and practical. Speculative doubt is doubt concerning what is licit or illicit according to itself; practical doubt is doubt concerning what is licit or illicit, insofar as it is the rule of a work here and now. Speculative is that by which someone doubts concerning the truth of a thing, or concerning the liceity of a thing in general, or in the universal, for example, whether baptism with distilled water is valid, whether painting on a feast day is a servile work. Practical is that by which someone doubts concerning the liceity or honesty of an action in the particular, to be performed here and now, for example, whether on this feast day, in these circumstances, it is lawful for me to paint, whether it is lawful to baptize this boy with distilled water. To be performed here and now: for otherwise, although the action be considered as circumscribed by several circumstances, a speculative doubt can still be had concerning it, if there is not question of an action to be performed and to be directed by conscience in the present. Practical doubt always arises from another speculative doubt, either of law concerning the law, or of fact concerning some particular thing. - Hence conscience speculatively doubtful, and practically doubtful. - L. l. 1, n. 21; St. Thomas, 1 p., q. 79, a. 13.

142. The directive force of a doubtful conscience is clear from the following propositions. - With a practically doubtful conscience, whether an action is licit or illicit, it is illicit to act. - For only a certain conscience is the rule of morals. Cf. n. 13 seqq. Hence that saying: In doubts the safer part is to be chosen. The safer, namely that which stands for the observance of the law. C. Inquisitioni 44, de Sent. exc.; L. l. 1, n. 22; St. Thomas, Quodl. 8, a. 13; Suarez tr. 3, d. 12, s. 5.

Whether the action is licit or illicit. And thus in doubt whether you ought to kill someone wounded in war, lest the pains of his wounds be prolonged, a person sins whether he kills or does not kill. Likewise in doubt whether an action is prohibited under grave sin or only under light sin, if someone nevertheless acts with this doubt, he sins gravely. On the contrary, in doubt whether today is a day of abstinence of stricter law, a person does not sin if he abstains from meats and milk foods, although the day is one of no abstinence.

143. With a speculatively doubtful conscience it is lawful to act, provided that a practically certain conscience can be formed. - For as is clear from what has been said, n. 13 seqq., a certain conscience, however finally it has been formed, if at least it rests upon moral certainty, is a sufficient rule of morals, indeed the only rule of morals. - It is lawful to act: where, namely, there is question of the licit or illicit alone. For where there is question of the truth of a thing and of an effect necessarily to be obtained, if it is illicit to act with probability, it is consequently illicit to act with doubt. Cf. n. 47 seqq.; L. l. 1, n. 25; Suarez d. 12, s. 5.

144. The means by which someone may make the step from a speculatively doubtful conscience to a practically certain conscience are: 1. To weigh the doubt itself with a certain moral diligence. For if, as St. Alphonsus says, l. 1, n. 24, "after all things have been weighed, he should notice that the doubt is empty, here he can well lay aside his doubt without any other reflection, and thus perform the action." - 2. To inquire into the practice of good men who operate without scruple. - 3. The counsel of a learned and prudent man. - 4. Some probable reason, demonstrative of the matter a fortiori, which perhaps can be found by inquiring into the truth. - 5. Some general reason, or some general reflex principle, so called because it leads and bends us by means of reasoning to defining rightly the question, not concerning the intrinsic and objective truth of the thing, which cannot be resolved through itself and in its immediate principle; but concerning the subjective liceity of our action, which can well appear from some general extrinsic principle. Thus a judge is doubtful whether Titius is guilty, from the intrinsic and direct reasons of law or fact. But from the general and reflex principle, In doubt one must favor the accused, he at once absolves Titius. - L. ib.

145. There really are certain general reasons, or there are certain general sayings and principles, which can always be ready at hand, so that someone may make the step from a negative doubt immediately to moral certainty, or at least to probability, from which then, by means of the principles of probabilism, he can form for himself a certain conscience. Now rules and principles of this kind are the following. Suarez tr. 3, d. 12, s. 5, n. 7; Lugo de Iust. et Iur. d. 23, n. 110.

146. In doubt the condition of the possessor is better. C. 6. de Praescript. - That axiom has been received in the external forum, both ecclesiastical and civil, as a certain rule of judgments. For it must be presumed that he who possesses a thing possesses it by right, unless the contrary appears. The same certainly has force in the internal forum of conscience. For certain and legitimate possession gives rise to moral certainty concerning dominion over the thing, L. l. 1, n. 35, l. 4, 210, l. 6, n. 905, 927; and the reason is that, human morals being considered, no one, morally speaking, is negligent; indeed, on the contrary, all are diligent and very diligent in guarding their own things. Moreover, where one does not proceed from a false supposition, the right of the external and internal forum is the same; for each forum is founded on the principles of natural justice and equity. Hence theologians commonly admit the aforesaid rule for the forum of conscience. L. l. 1, n. 26.

Now some say that this axiom has force only in the matter of justice. "I, however," says St. Alphonsus, l. c., "do not know how it can be denied in all matters." And this certainly is by far the more common and truer sentence. The reason for this extension even to other matters is, with due proportion, the same as in the matter of justice. For no one can justly be despoiled without sufficient reason of a good which is his. But man naturally, and therefore altogether certainly and legitimately, possesses his own liberty, which surely is some good and right of his own. Therefore this good also pertains to justice, and whoever unjustly either takes it away or weakens it injures justice. Without injustice a free man cannot be subjected to servitude. - But there can be no doubt that in doubtful laws liberty is always in prior possession of itself. For upon whom is law imposed except one who is free? Hence it is that what is licit is not whatever the law permits, but what the law does not prohibit, L. 28, sect. 2, Ex quib. caus. maior., and therefore this prohibition must be manifestly proved, C. 23 de Verb. signif. - Suarez tr. 3, d. 12, s. 5, n. 8; Lugo de Iust. et Iur. d. 17, n. 87, d. 23, n. 110.

147. In doubt; that is, in negative doubt, and the reason of the axiom then is clear, because possession stands for the possessor, and therefore moral certainty; for the petitioner no prudent reason is had. This rule, as it has customarily been handed down by the Doctors and admitted in the schools, was never understood and received concerning the state of opinion, but only concerning the state of doubt taken strictly. For if there is question of opinion, then the rules are to be observed which are commonly given concerning probable conscience. Cf. Lugo de Iust. et Iur. d. 23, n. 110.

But in positive doubt, or probability, if probability is present on both sides, so that on this side there stands possession and probability of right, on the other side only an equal or nearly equal contrary probability of right, again the condition of the possessor is better, as is clear of itself. But if on one side indeed there stands possession, and on the other side contrary probability of right, or on one side possession and also probability of right, and on the other a far greater contrary probability of right, then certainly the condition of the possessor is not better, but doubtful. For the first sentence holds that the judge is bound to adjudge the thing to the plaintiff, because the right of possession prevails in an equal cause, but not in a less probable cause. For Rule 65 of Law in the Sixth is thus: "In equal delict, or cause, the condition of the possessor is stronger"; and in L. 128 ff. de div. Reg. Iuris it is said: "In an equal cause the possessor must be held stronger." But the second sentence holds that the condition of the possessor is still better, and that the judge cannot despoil him of possession. The reason is that "it is certain that legitimate possession gives to each one a certain right of retaining the thing, until the right of another is clear, as they most commonly say... a certain right, which cannot be overcome except by the certain right of another through convincing reasons." For possession is defined: the right of standing upon a thing not prohibited to be possessed, sect. 4, Retinendae de Interdictis Inst.; L. l. 1, n. 36; Ithur. Cas. 1, n. 2. Cf. L. l. 3, n. 547, 562, 711, etc.

Therefore possession, of which there is question in the present saying, is certain and legitimate possession. It is called certain, that is, that the fact of possession is certain; legitimate, that is, begun and continued in good faith; likewise begun and continued by a just title, at least apparent, or at least believed, or presumed, such as, for example, donation, purchase, inheritance, and the like, by which dominion of some thing is customarily acquired. If therefore possession is doubtful, or begun with doubtful faith, or by a doubtful title, it of itself does not exhibit to the possessor a special prerogative and presumption against which no contrary probability has force. L. n. 36, 47, l. 4, n. 219.

148. Probability of right, which can be on only one side, or on both, is probability of a real just title, or one really existing, from which true and real dominion and ownership of a thing arise. For for legitimate possession, of which there is question in the axiom, there suffices a just title at least apparent, because, for example, there intervened a donation or purchase from him who was thought to be owner, although he was not; or at least believed, because it is thought that there intervened an action signified by the title, although it did not intervene, as happens when someone thinks that a thing was given to him or bought by him, and yet this was not done; or at least presumed, because, for example, because of length of time in quiet possession, or other circumstances, it is prudently judged that some title intervened, although the possessor cannot allege any determinate one. Therefore that probability of right, as is clear, is wholly outside the possession itself, which only gives a right of standing upon the thing, or of detaining it, although perhaps dominion and ownership of it do not belong to you, since in reality there was no just title.

149. Now the probability of a real just title, or of one really existing, can be twofold: 1. Probability of the justice of the title for beginning or continuing possession and ownership of a thing, for example, a testament destitute of legal formalities. 2. Probability of the reality or existence of a just title for the same effect, for example, of a donation, when it is also probable that the thing was taken away by theft. The former probability is called of right, the latter is called of fact. Where there is question of the latter, "when the fact is not plainly proved, it is not probable that the accused can be condemned, since the laws never permit the accused to be condemned unless the delict or debt is fully proved; but it is not proved fully and sufficiently for a sentence, when, although two or three witnesses testify, other witnesses nevertheless testify to the contrary; for through these the testimony of the former is weakened or diminished, and therefore there does not remain the sufficient proof required for full proof and condemnation." Lugo de Iust. et Iure d. 16, n. 100. Cf. also d. 23, n. 100; d. 16, n. 34, 96, 99.

150. From the aforesaid axiom, therefore, several practical cases of negative doubt can be resolved, in which all true probability is lacking, namely whether the time of the obligation of the law has arrived or has passed. "In doubt of inception, for example, whether you have completed twenty-one years, you are not bound to fasting, because then possession is for liberty. Otherwise in doubt of passing, for example, whether on Saturday the hour of midnight has passed, you may not eat meats, for then the law possesses. So also, if you doubt whether you have sixteen years for profession, or twenty-five years for priesthood, you may not make profession or be ordained. Thus commonly." L. l. 1, n. 99, 32.

151. In doubt one must stand for that for which presumption stands. - For presumption, taken from things ordinarily happening, or from other circumstances of person and thing, produces moral certainty, or at least probability. "In obscure matters it is customary to consider what is more like the truth, or what is usually done." L. 114 de R. I.; R. I. 14 in 6. It is a certain anticipated proof of a thing from signs, before direct proofs. Therefore presumption exhibits the thing as true, and stands for that side which is not bound by itself to prove the contrary fact, but transfers that burden of proving to the other side. For as often as something is known to have preexisted which by its nature perseveres until it is taken away by some contrary fact, that thing is judged to persevere so long as the contrary fact is not clear, which consequently will have to be proved by the adverse side.

152. Hence, if you are accustomed at such a time diligently to recite the breviary, and you doubt whether you have recited some part, presumption favors you, and exempts you from the obligation of reciting or repeating. If an insane person, but one who has lucid intervals, vowed, and afterwards doubts whether he vowed while in possession of himself, he is not bound, so long as it does not appear that he was in possession of himself. L. l. 1, n. 26. Nevertheless in the forum of penance, in which, as St. Thomas says, 4 D. 17, a. 3, q. 3, one must stand by the saying of the penitent both for himself and against himself, presumption yields to the truth affirmed by the penitent. - Lugo de Poenit. d. 20, n. 17, 19; L. l. 3, n. 270, l. 6, n. 600, par. Limitant.

Likewise in a case of doubt, the baptism of spouses is not presumed, in relation to marriage, if the non-Catholic party or parties had parents belonging to a sect which rejects baptism; on the contrary, it is presumed if they had parents belonging to a sect which admits baptism, and in that sect were zealous. S. O., Aug. 1, 1883, Collect. S. C. de P. F. n. 662, ed. 1.

Where there is question of obedience to be rendered to a superior, in doubt the presumption stands, speaking per se, always for the superior. L. l. 1, n. 93, 98, 99. Speaking per se, always, for by accident it can sometimes happen that the presumption is not present for the superior, for instance in doubt concerning the liceity of the thing, even with the superior's precept added, for example, when the superior "is accustomed rashly and imprudently to command at his pleasure things which are not lawful... when even with the precept of the prelate added, the matter remains in doubt (as to its intrinsic liceity); nor does the authority, learning, probity, or prudence of the prelate suffice for laying aside the doubt, which is a possible case." Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 3, d. 19, n. 11; L. l. 3, n. 617.

153. In doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be demonstrated. L. 10 C. de Non numer. pec. - For no reason is to be given for non-being, but for being; because non-being does not have a cause of itself, but being does. Understand this, however, concerning the principal fact, if it is doubtful; because, if the principal fact is certainly clear, and there is doubt concerning an accessory fact, then other principles have force: In doubt every fact is presumed to have been rightly done; In doubt that fact is presumed which by right had to be done; In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act; always excluding unjust harm to one's own, or another's, or the community's good. For every being naturally tends to its own perfection and good. Therefore if nothing is clear as standing in the way, nature proceeds to pursue its own course. If consequently something had to be done, that thing is presumed to have been done. It is clear concerning the fact of Confession having been made; you doubt concerning right, whether you confessed rightly with sorrow and purpose; you can acquiesce. These three latter principles have force both for liberty and against liberty. For liberty, if contrary and certain presumption or the common good does not stand in the way; for an obligation is not to be imposed unless it is certainly clear. Against liberty, if namely a contrary and certain presumption or public good stands in the way; for the common good prevails over the private. - L. l. 1, n. 26, 27, 137, 182, 251, l. 3, n. 201, l. 6, n. 505; L. Quoties 12 de Reb. dub. ff.

154. Therefore in doubt whether you have taken any food or drink; and likewise in doubt whether you have taken food or drink after midnight, you can receive the Eucharist. For unless in each case the fact is proved, liberty possesses. L. l. 1, n. 38, 39; Elbel 166, 167; Amort. Theol. t. 2, d. 5, q. 4, who at the end notes these things: "I say, however, that he would sin at least venially who, for the pleasure of drinking alone, should thus trade around the laws of the Church, exposing himself to the danger of at least material transgression; and if he does this from custom or from a purpose always to operate in this way, with no other reasonable cause concurring, for example, thirst, infirmity, he will sin mortally, because such a purpose argues interpretative contempt and a defect of charity toward God and the Church, whose comeliness he defiles." - Busemb. apud La Croix, l. 1, n. 470, VI.

Indeed, although it is lawful to use a probable opinion against the law, nevertheless it is not lawful to act in fraud of the law by voluntarily procuring a state of doubt against the law, lest one be bound afterwards to observe the law.

Doubtful baptism, in order to a marriage already entered or to be entered, is held as valid; and therefore marriage is pronounced valid or invalid according to various circumstances. The marriage of one doubtfully baptized with one not baptized must be held invalid. On the contrary, the marriage of two doubtfully baptized persons, and of a doubtfully baptized person with a baptized person, must be held valid. S. O., Nov. 17, 1830; Sept. 9, 1868; Sept. 18, 1872; July 7, 1880; Sept. 18, 1890; Apr. 12, 1899; Collect. S. C. de P. F. n. 1872, ed. 1.

But a doubtful marriage, because of the common good, is commonly held as valid. But because of the preeminent good of religion, the doubtful marriage of infidel polygamists who are converted to the faith is declared invalid. Collect. S. C. de P. F. n. 1301, 1304, 1332, 2184, ed. 1.

155. In doubt no one is presumed evil, unless he is proved so. - This axiom is a corollary of the preceding one. For since facts, and consequently delicts, are not presumed, but must be demonstrated, neither must anyone be presumed evil, but he must be proved so. Indeed, no one is evil without reason.

156. Odious things should be restricted and favors should suitably be enlarged. R. I. 15 in 6. - For no one desires to be odious, but all desire to be pleasing. Therefore favors are to be preferred to odious things. By favor is understood whatever indulges liberty, or grants grace. R. 122 de R. I. By odious is understood whatever restricts liberty, establishes a penalty, or injures some right. But since it sometimes happens that what is a favor to one is odious to another, the particular case must be considered, so that it may be determined whether favor is to be preferred to odium, or odium to favor. Hence arises the general principle: In obscure matters the least is to be followed, R. I. 30 in 6, L. 9 de Reg. Iur., and therefore the interpretation of law is to be made less burdensome and more favorable to liberty. Hence another general principle is: Always in doubts the more benign things are to be preferred. L. 56 de R. I. And likewise another: Unless you have become certain concerning the mandate, you will not be compelled to execute what is commanded. C. Cum iure 31 de Off. et pot. iud. del. L. l. 1, n. 97.

157. Therefore it is false that where there is speech generally of speculative doubt concerning the liceity or illiceity of an action, in doubts the safer part is to be chosen. And certainly in this Rule of Canon Law there is not question of speculative doubt, in which by means of a reflex principle someone can form for himself a certain conscience, and thus choose the part altogether safe; but there is question either of practical doubt, namely of a practically doubtful conscience, with which it is not lawful to act, or there is also question of those cases in which the end must necessarily be obtained. But primarily there is question of the external forum, in which there is often a special reason for following the safer in order to remove scandals, abuses, and offenses of the faithful; or there is question of honesty and of greater merit, not of the necessity of salvation. L. l. 1, n. 68, 79; H. A. tr. 1, n. 39; Struggl tr. 1, q. 5, n. 17.

158. Of what species of sin is he guilty who acts with a practically doubtful conscience? - This guilty person will be guilty of a sin of the same account and species as the sin concerning which he doubts. The reason is that one doubting concerning that malice, and nevertheless acting, has an affection toward that malice. Hence, if you doubt whether it is mortal, you sin mortally; if you doubt generally whether it is a sin, not attending, not even confusedly, to the grave malice which may be present, you sin venially. L. l. 1, 22, 23; Elbel 140.

159. He who sinned from an erroneous conscience is not bound in confession to explain that circumstance of erroneous conscience, because it does not change the species; since every sin is against conscience, and does not depend upon the objective truth of the thing, except insofar as that truth is judged through conscience and proposed to the will. Except the case of censure and reservation: since then the erroneous conscience must be explained, so that exemption from censure and from reservation may be clear. Except also the case in which otherwise the sin would not be understood, for example, if someone by omitting Mass on a weekday believes that he sins gravely.

160. What ought someone to do, if, placed between two precepts, he remains doubtful which he ought to choose, for instance, if the precept of hearing Mass presses, and he ought to assist someone gravely sick? - This conscience is usually called perplexed. When such a case occurs, a person ought sufficiently, so far as lies in him, to inquire into the truth so that he may lay aside the doubt. - When the truth has been sufficiently inquired into, and the doubt remains, he can and ought to choose that which seems to him the lesser evil; and, if each seems equally grave, he can choose either. This is true even if someone had culpably cast himself into that perplexity, provided that he grieve for the past fault. The reason is that there is no obligation to impossibilities, and therefore then the lesser obligation ceases; or, if they are or seem equal, or because of ignorance someone does not know how to discern which is lesser, either ceases; and, even if someone thinks that by acting thus he sins, in reality he does not sin from defect of liberty. - Suarez d. 12, s. 5; Lessius in q. 19, d. 19, a. 6, d. 9; L. l. 1, n. 10; Elbel 141.

If the agent chooses that which seems to him the greater evil, he sins according to the excess of the apprehended evil, since he freely chooses this excess.

161. If you doubt whether you have already satisfied some obligation, are you still bound to satisfy it? - R. Affirmatively, if the doubt is merely negative. For with such a doubt no prudent reason of satisfaction is present, and therefore it is impossible by some reflex principle to form for oneself a conscience concerning non-satisfaction, since the certain law altogether perseveres. In such a doubt the axiom altogether has force: the condition of the possessor is better. Cf. Ithur. Cas. 44, n. 15.

But if the doubt is positive, there is controversy. The first sentence, which St. Alphonsus altogether holds and thinks must be held, l. 1, n. 26-29, l. 3, n. 700, par. ult., l. 6, n. 477, quaest. reform., recent. retract. q. 1 and 18, etc., and which several others hold, affirms. The reason is 1. because one does not satisfy a certain obligation through a doubtful fulfillment; 2. because, since in doubt the condition of the possessor is better, and the certainly existing law possesses against liberty, it prevails over liberty, and will always hold liberty obligated to itself until it is certain that the law has been fulfilled. Cf. besides L. l. 1, n. 20, 33, 99, l. 3, n. 112, 290. The second sentence, which is very probable both extrinsically and intrinsically, denies that such an obligation is present. The reason is the very fundamental reason of probabilism, which the Illustrious Holy Doctor expounds most eruditely and learnedly in the chapters cited above, namely, a doubtful law does not oblige. For law does not oblige in the abstract and universal, but in the concrete and particular case, L. l. 1, n. 78. But although the existence of the law is certain according to itself, nevertheless the same law, insofar as obliging in such a concrete and particular case, is uncertain, and is altogether prudently pronounced uncertain, if it has already truly probably been satisfied. Therefore either it must be said that the obligation of satisfying the law again in the aforesaid case is none; or it must be said that the aforesaid principle, a doubtful law does not oblige, is not universally true, but suffers an exception; which would not be fittingly said. For what is true is always true; and for every particular which is contained in the universal.

But from this reason it appears that the obligation in fact is not certain, which is assumed in the first reason of the opposite sentence, if it is probable that the law has already been satisfied. For against certainty there cannot be probability. As regards the second reason, as is clear from what has already been said, possession prevails in a merely negative doubt; but in order that it should certainly prevail also in a positive doubt, it is necessary that there be certain and certainly legitimate possession. Now when in a particular case it is truly probably clear that the law has been fulfilled, the possession of the law for that concrete and particular case becomes prudently doubtful; for if you in fact have satisfied, liberty in reality possesses. Moreover it is certainly not legitimate, since a just title of obligation is probably lacking; for you can probably believe that you have already satisfied, and therefore a just title, at least presumed, probably does not exist. This sentence besides is held by several and very grave theologians. St. Alphonsus himself, l. 1, n. 76, ed. year 1757, called this sentence common, and himself deduced it from the very principles of probabilism; and, l. 4, n. 150, he calls it most common. Hence D'Annibale leads it as safe, Summ. ed. 4, p. 1, n. 169.

162. Since this question is held by equiprobabilists as a certain capital question, it will not be beside the point to linger somewhat over the doctrine of St. Alphonsus concerning it. - When the question has been proposed: "If someone probably judges that he has already satisfied a vow, is he bound, notwithstanding this, to fulfill the vow?" St. Alphonsus responds, l. 1, n. 29, p. 14, ed. P. Gaude: "Several Authors deny it, namely Roncaglia, the Salmanticenses with Leander, Lugo and others; because, as they say, since the obligation of the law in that case is doubtful, so also is the possession of the law. - Formerly I thought this opinion probable, being led more by extrinsic probability than intrinsic; but after the matter was better weighed, now I by no means judge it probable. Hence I say that the opposite is to be held with Concina, Filliuccio, Leander and others. The reason is that... when the vow is certain, liberty remains bound by the obligation of the vow, until the vow certainly has not been fulfilled." Indeed in Elenchus 2 of Reformed Questions, q. 1, the Holy Doctor writes these things: "If someone probably judges that he has fulfilled a vow, the canonical hours, or penance, is he bound to satisfy it, if it is still probable or doubtful that he has not fulfilled it? Several Authors deny it... But the opposite is to be held, because the obligation already contracted possesses, until certainly it has not been fulfilled."

163. But the Holy Doctor seems in reality either to have revoked his retraction, or certainly afterwards to have been doubtful. For as regards the very general question proposed in our Question, behold what he has in the same edition of the Moral Theology, l. 1, n. 99, which is to be held as altogether definitive from Father Gaude: "What in doubt whether you have fulfilled the law? In negative doubt you are bound to fulfill it; otherwise, in positive doubt. Cardenas and Illsung with Croix." Rev. Father Gaude, so that he may free the Holy Doctor from a certain contradiction, or from a new retraction, or certainly from every doubt on his part concerning that question, appends this note 99 d): "What St. Alphonsus briefly writes here, namely that you are no longer bound to fulfill the law in positive doubt whether you have fulfilled it, needs explanation. The saying of the Holy Doctor has force for the case in which there is only one probability, namely that you have fulfilled the law; or in the case in which it is notably more probable, and therefore it is clear to you with a certain moral certainty, that the law has been fulfilled. But in the case in which probability is present on both sides, you are by no means released from the obligation of the law, according to the reformed doctrine of St. Alphonsus, as is clear from l. 1, n. 29 and Elenchus 2, Quaest. reformatar., q. 1."

164. But this note of Rev. Father Gaude has altogether no foundation except in a prejudged opinion about equiprobabilism. Neither in the text of the Moral Theology nor in the first reformed question is there found any trace of a single or double more probable opinion. Therefore the saying of the Holy Doctor is well clear of itself, and needs no explanation.

And this is confirmed from the very citation of La-Croix, l. 1, n. 599, 600, whom St. Alphonsus praises. For the Holy Doctor resumes in few words the very same doctrine of La-Croix, from whom he also took the citations Cardenas and Illsung. And La-Croix is most certainly not an equiprobabilist.

165. Moreover, if from the general question we make a step to particular questions, we shall certainly see that St. Alphonsus both constantly holds that it is safe in conscience to follow, as regards obligation, a probable opinion; and that possession prevails in doubt, not in probability. And thus l. 3, n. 290, p. 560, ed. P. Gaude: "In doubt concerning custom the precept possesses; hence a dispensation must be sought. Otherwise, if it is probable that the custom is present."

40. • DEFINITION. Doubtful conscience is that which remains suspended concerning the honesty of an action. For doubt is the suspension of assent between opposites ¹.

¹ Carefully observe the distinction between doubt, suspicion, and opinion; which St. Thomas explains briefly thus (II-II, q. 2, art. 1): Certain acts of the intellect have unformed thought without firm assent, whether they incline to neither part, as happens to one doubting; or incline more to one part, but are tempted by some slight sign, as happens to one suspecting; or adhere to one part, yet with fear of the other, which happens to one opining.

DIVISION. A manifold doubt is distinguished, namely:

1. Positive, or negative, according as grave reasons for doubting are present, or only slight ones, or even none: or doubt is positive when the mind suspends assent on account of the apparent equality of reasons; but negative when the mind suspends assent from defect of reasons ².

² Concerning these things St. Thomas says (On Truth, q. 14, art. 1): Our intellect... sometimes is not inclined more to one than to another, either because of the defect of things moving it, as in those problems concerning which we do not have reasons, or because of the apparent equality of those things which move to each part: and this is the disposition of one doubting, who fluctuates between the two parts of contradiction. But sometimes the intellect is inclined more to one than to the other; nevertheless that which inclines it does not move the intellect sufficiently for this, that it determine it totally to one part; whence it indeed accepts one part, yet always doubts about the opposite: and this is the disposition of one opining. These are the words of the holy Doctor; from them gather that certain more recent authors do not accurately confuse positive doubt with the state of one opining for either part. For doubt excludes assent; but opinion has some assent.

2. Of law, or of fact, according as it is concerned with the existence of a law, or its obligation, or with some particular fact.

3. Speculative, or practical, according as it is concerned with abstract cognition of truth and in common, or with truth which here and now is ordered to a work.

But speculative doubt can also be divided into speculative simply, when one doubts about a thing not pertaining to morals; and into speculative-practical, when one doubts about a general principle of morals, or about the goodness of an action taken in itself, and nevertheless the inquiry is not ordered to the work actually to be carried out; but if it is concerned with an action to be posited here and now, it is called by some practical-practical doubt.

41. Principles. - I. It is never licit to operate with a practically doubtful conscience, but the safer part is to be followed. The reason is clear from what has just been said concerning certain conscience, principle 1. - But sometimes it is licit to operate with a speculatively doubtful conscience, namely when, the practical doubt having been laid aside from a practically certain dictate, or from certain reflex principles, conscience is formed, as we shall soon say in treating probabilism.

II. Merely negative doubt must be held as nothing; because it is founded on a reason utterly none, or very slight: therefore even if it remains, nevertheless the obligation urges, or liberty stands ³, according as it existed before; nor can it effect that the moral certitude of the opposite be overturned. But if a prudent suspicion of error arises for you, you are held to inquire. Therefore when hereafter cases of negative doubt occur, once this rule has been established, you will easily dissolve them, and for that reason we shall attend only to positive doubt. - St. Lig., no. 24.

³ Negative doubt is suspension of assent on account of defect of reasons for each part of the contradiction. Therefore, since here on the other side a certain law or liberty is supposed, doubt is taken in a certain broad sense for an empty suspicion.

42. You Will Resolve. - 1. As often as someone doubts whether the act which he is here and now about to posit is licit or not, he is held to apply diligence suitable for investigating the truth, according to the gravity of the matter and the condition of the person and place; let him consult upright and skilled men, investigate their practice, and weigh the reasons with the sole study of truth: for otherwise he exposes himself to the danger of violating the law from negligence in inquiry, and by that very fact sins.

2. If he cannot inquire, nor by himself is able to weigh the reasons of each part, nor in another way, for example through reflex principles, free himself from doubt, let him embrace the safer part; because otherwise he would act in practical-practical doubt, that is, with a truly doubtful conscience, and without any certain judgment concerning the honesty of the action.

3. He who, with diligent and sufficient inquiry having been performed, still doubts whether there is present a law commanding or prohibiting, is not held to obey it; because he can form conscience for himself from a reflex principle, namely, that a law which cannot be found cannot oblige, as will be said below, where probabilism is treated.

4. They act ineptly who, after an act already committed or omitted, inquire among the Doctors or from a Confessor whether they have sinned; for past sin does not depend on the following judgment of a Doctor or Confessor, but on the practical dictate which someone had in acting. - Nevertheless he acts prudently who asks so that he may know the truth, namely, in what way in the future in a similar case he can or ought to conduct himself.

43. Questions. - YOU WILL ASK 1. Whether one operating with practical doubt about the gravity of sin sins gravely?

I answer. Yes. For he who acts with a practically doubtful conscience, according to common principles sins with that species of sin, both moral and theological, about which practically, while he acts, he doubts. The reason is that he violates an obligation surely grave of taking precautions lest through voluntary ignorance or inadvertence he fall into transgressions of the law which can be grave.

YOU WILL ASK 2. Whether he sins gravely who knows that his action is evil, but does not advert to its gravity?

I answer. Some judge that this man sins gravely or lightly according as the object of sin is in itself grave or light; but others always gravely ⁴; finally others only venially, provided that he does not apprehend grave malice, at least in confusion; which nevertheless cannot be supposed where the matter treated is notably grave ⁵. - St. Lig., no. 23.

⁴ These namely suppose this man so disposed in mind that he wishes to act even if the fault is grave.

⁵ Nevertheless these opinions can scarcely be called opposed, because they treat not of the same hypothesis, but of a diverse one; wherefore they can easily be reconciled.

YOU WILL ASK 3. What must be done in the case of a perplexed conscience, when namely someone, placed between two precepts, remains doubtful which of the two he ought to follow?

I answer. Hold the following rules in perplexity:

1. Consult, if you can, a Confessor or other prudent men; because in that case ignorance is vincible.

2. If you cannot consult, and there is a necessity of acting, because the action cannot be suspended without grave harm, choose what seems to you the lesser evil, yet not so that you do evil, but so that you recede more from evil. But know that the law of an inferior order ought to yield to the law of a superior order.

3. If each precept seems equally grave to you, choose anything, and you will not sin; for there is not given a necessity of sinning. - St. Lig., no. 10. - See Cases, no. 43.

75. • Besides the general principles by which the theory of probabilism was established in the preceding article, namely: An obligation is not to be imposed unless it is certain concerning it, or a doubtful law does not oblige, certain special rules also are enumerated, by which those principles are confirmed, or applied in particular cases. They are the following:

I. In doubt one must stand for that for which the presumption stands. The reason is that presumption for the most part effects moral certitude, at least broad. Hence if you are accustomed at such a time diligently to recite the Breviary, and you doubt whether you have recited some part, the presumption favors you, and exempts you from the obligation of reciting or repeating. Likewise if you doubt whether the Superior rightly commands or dispenses, the presumption stands for him; because he can be led by reasons unknown to you, or is considered to judge prudently concerning known reasons. Besides, right order and the common good require that in such a case deference be given to him. - Thus commonly theologians.

II. In doubt judgment must be made from things ordinarily happening. An axiom commonly received. - St. Lig. everywhere. This rule falls back almost into the preceding one, since in each presumption is the reason for judging thus. But the prior rule extends more broadly; since presumption can be drawn not only from things ordinarily happening, but also from particular circumstances. - St. Lig. ibid.

III. In doubt one must stand for the value of the act. It is a rule of civil law, commonly applied also to theological matters. This must be understood if the principal fact is certain, and there is doubt concerning some necessary circumstance or condition, or concerning the due manner: for example, if you doubt whether you confessed a sin with sufficient sorrow, you are not held to confess again. - St. Lig., book 1, no. 26, etc. This principle seems also to be understood 1. in favor of liberty, provided that a contrary presumption, or the common good of the Republic or of Religion, does not stand in the way; 2. against liberty in the external forum, or even in the internal forum, when there is question of the public good, for example of contracts, especially of matrimony. But the reason why that principle is not to be applied in every case against liberty is sought from another principle mentioned above, namely: An obligation is not to be imposed unless it is certain concerning it. Moreover the obligation is not certain, unless some evident reason of justice, of Religion, of the public good, or of another end necessarily to be obtained, urges. - St. Lig., book 1, no. 26, book 6, no. 505. - Voit, no. 38.

76. • IV. In doubt favors are to be enlarged, and odious things restricted (Rule of Canon Law 15 in VI); that is, in doubt the more benign things are to be preferred. Hence according to this principle, and the more common interpretation, these things seem to be established: 1. As often as odious things and favors can be separated, odious things are to be restricted, and favors enlarged, as much as can be done without violence being inflicted on the sense of the words. 2. If odious things and favors are indivisible, then judgment must be made concerning the intention of the legislator from his words, from the subject matter, or from the adjoining circumstances. 3. If the intention of the legislator cannot be clearly determined, attention must be given more to favor than to odium. - St. Lig., book 1, no. 99.

But by odious is here understood whatever tends to punishment, or harms the right of a third party, or is opposed to common right. But favor, or favorable, whatever indulges liberty, or grants grace, without detriment to private persons, or to the community, or to the right itself.

V. In obscure matters, what is least must be held (Rule of Canon Law 30 in VI). This rule is to be understood thus: Where the true sense of a law or statute is not clear, and after inquiry has been made it cannot be determined either from the nature of the thing, or from the context of the words, or from the custom of the place, or from another circumstance, the less burdensome interpretation or the one more benign to liberty is to be admitted. The reason is that the legislator is not considered to wish to oblige beyond that which is clearly expressed in the law. Hence in doubt concerning the quantity of penalty to be inflicted, the least is to be chosen. Likewise, if the delict is not certainly clear, the accused must be absolved.

VI. In doubt of fact the following axioms, or rules of civil law received among all, are valid, namely 1. In doubt, a fact is not presumed, but must be demonstrated. But this must be understood of doubt concerning a principal act, for example if there is doubt whether someone struck another, this fact must not be presumed, but he who affirms must positively prove it. - 2. In doubt, a fact is presumed, or that which by law had to be done is presumed to have been rightly done. This must be understood of doubt concerning an accessory act, the certitude of the principal act being supposed; for if something had to be done by law, or if it is ordinarily accustomed to be done, or is favorable to the one acting, it is presumed to have been done. - 3. In doubt no one is presumed evil, unless he is proved so. This is valid whenever there is question of doubt concerning some delict. For that must not be imputed unless it is certainly clear concerning it. The reason is that delicts are not presumed; nor is anyone presumed evil, but he must be proved so.

VII. In doubt the safer part must be followed (a rule of canon law). This rule must be restricted to cases of practical doubt, or to those in which the end is necessarily to be obtained, namely where probability would not remove the danger which the law commands altogether to be avoided, as for example in confecting the Sacraments, according to what was said above, no. 56, and is known from all the things thus far set forth ¹.

¹ Above (in the note to no. 70), with St. Alphonsus it was observed that, from the common sentence of the Doctors, this rule, or others of this kind, as to speculative doubts, is of counsel, not however of precept.

77. Resolves. - 1. It is not licit to follow an opinion only probably probable against the law, because that opinion is not properly and solidly probable ², and therefore cannot be had as a sufficient reason for rendering the law uncertain.

² If you apply the words probably probable for a merely nominal and arbitrary definition, so that you wish to signify an opinion for whose probability there militates no grave and solid reason which could move to prudent assent, let what the Author has stand. But if you use the words, as is proper, according to their proper sense, the matter stands otherwise. For to affirm something probably, by the consent of all, is the same as to assert something because of a grave, solid, and prudent reason. Therefore if you say something to be probably probable, with the proper sense of the words considered, it is necessary that you be led to affirm it by a prudent, grave, and solid reason. Therefore it is beside the matter that what you say is probable, being moved probably, that is, by a grave, prudent, and solid reason, you would deny this same thing to be properly and solidly probable. On this matter, to remove ambiguities, it is indeed useful to recall to memory what Suarez, after St. Thomas and very many Doctors of the Scholastics, admonishes (On Penance, disp. 22, sect. IX, no. 5), that in moral matters solid and prudent probability is equivalent to a certain moral certitude; precisely because in matters of this sort greater certitude cannot be had. And this indeed common practice also suggests. For is not someone believed, by common consent, to act prudently enough if he holds as probable that which he finds handed down as probable, for example, by St. Antoninus after St. Thomas, or by St. Alphonsus after Suarez, etc.? Yet what certitude at last do we have in this beyond that prudent probability which, as we have said, ought to seem sufficient in matters of this kind to each wise man?

2. It is not licit for you to follow a sentence probable to others, but actually altogether false to you ³. The reason is that if you actually judge something to be illicit, and you do it, in the present act you have a conscience of sin, and therefore you act against your conscience. Therefore that you may licitly follow the sentence of another, you must first make it your own, that is, judge it to be probably true ⁴, or its object to be probably licit. - Reuter, no. 105.

³ Thus if there is question, for example, of the sentence handed down as probable by St. Alphonsus, that there is no obligation of denouncing a Confessor who has merely consented to solicitation. For it will be altogether false to you, if you know that it was condemned by the Congregation of the Holy Office, as we shall see in its own place, and indeed that that decree of the Sacred Inquisition was confirmed by Benedict XIV (in the constitution Sacramentum Poenitentiae) by Apostolic authority.

⁴ That you may make the opinion of another your own, it is not necessary that his intrinsic reasons move you to assent; but it will suffice that the authority of another induce you into a prudent doubt concerning your own sentence.

3. It is not always licit to follow any opinion whatever that is speculatively probable; because sometimes a speculatively probable opinion is not practically probable; namely, there can be an action indeed licit in itself, which nevertheless in practice becomes illicit because of danger of scandal, irreverence, injustice, etc. ⁵.

⁵ Then especially the Doctors called an opinion only speculatively probable, not practically, when the licit use of the same opinion requires those conditions which in practice can scarcely, or not even scarcely, be hoped for.

4. It is not licit to follow a probable opinion when the opposite appears most probable; because a grave motive does not seem able to stand in conflict with a most grave motive; whence such an opinion must be held as doubtfully or slightly probable ⁶.

⁶ Perhaps it will never happen that, with intrinsic reasons considered, someone judges probable an opinion whose opposite he holds as most probable; but it is otherwise if only the judgments of Authors concerning the same matter are considered. For you will certainly find that some hand down as probable, indeed hold as more probable, an opinion whose opposite others defend as most probable, and even morally certain. See St. Alph., book 6, no. 443. But then the matter itself admonishes the prudent reader that inquiry must be made more diligently into the matter; and thence it will easily appear either that the one opinion is called most probable without cause, or certainly that some probability is vainly attributed to the other, as we shall see in its own place in the cited place of St. Alphonsus.

78. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Whether it is licit to use probability not only in the matter of positive law, but also of divine and natural law?

I answer affirmatively, because in any matter it can happen that the existence of the law is not certain, namely whenever a true and solid probability militates against it; and therefore concerning such a law there is truly invincible ignorance. Moreover God, the author of law and the principle of the natural order, is not considered to wish to oblige us when we invincibly are ignorant of the existence of the law. - Lacroix, etc.

QUESTION 2. Whether a Confessor can, or ought to, absolve a penitent who wishes to follow an opinion indeed probable, but opposite to the sentence which he himself holds?

I answer affirmatively, if the penitent adheres to a truly probable opinion with formed conscience. The reason is that the penitent has a right of following a truly probable opinion, nor does the Confessor have a right of imposing his own opinions on him, even if they seem more probable to him. For the Confessor is not the judge of opinions which the penitent is held to follow, but is only the judge of the disposition of his penitent, as is clear from Trent, session 14, ch. 5. - Thus St. Lig., book 6, no. 604, and others commonly ⁷.

⁷ Concerning this matter St. Alphonsus says (book 6, no. 604): But the Confessor, whenever his opinion is not evidently certain, cannot oblige the penitent to follow it; whence then he not only can, but even is held to absolve him.

QUESTION 3. Whether extrinsic probability constitutes an opinion truly probable?

I answer affirmatively, at least speaking generally; indeed in questions whose solution depends very greatly on the estimation of prudent men, greater authority constitutes greater probability. For it is difficult for something to be extrinsically probable without a truly grave reason being for it. But it must reasonably be presumed that such a reason is present when many and grave Authors hold some opinion to be probable, since they are rightly considered to have looked thoroughly into the truth of the matter, and to rest on solid motives. - Hence St. Thomas: Someone of little knowledge is made more certain about that which he hears from some scientific man than about that which seems to him according to his own reason, 2. 2, q. 4, art. 8.

378. 1. Preliminary remarks concerning doubt and probability. (A) When the mind cannot judge morally certainly concerning the liceity of some action, it can comport itself in a twofold way: either it adheres to neither part and suspends assent, or it assents to one part more than to another, yet with a prudent fear of erring; in the former case, doubt is called strict; in the latter, it is called broad, or opinion.² But opinion is distinguished from suspicion, which is a certain initial adherence, or propensity toward judging, but not a true assent.

² Here opinion is treated insofar as it is a subjective judgment of the mind; the same word often signifies the proposition itself to which the mind adheres with fear of erring, or opinion objectively taken.

379. (B) Sometimes opinion is taken objectively; then it can be more or less probable. Probable, according to the force of the name, is said of that which can be proved; but, from common usage, it signifies that which, although not manifestly true, bears before itself certain signs of truth which can move a prudent man to assent to it. But the degrees of probability depend on the greater or lesser verisimilitude which the opinion seems to have; thus that opinion is called more probable which rests on graver motives than the contrary opinion; on the contrary, the one which is supported by lighter arguments is called simply probable, or less probable; again, an opinion is notably more probable, or most probable, if the excess of probability is very notable: then the opposed opinion is slenderly or doubtfully probable.

(C) This probability indeed is called intrinsic or extrinsic: the former rests on reasons drawn from the very nature of the thing, the latter on the authority of learned or wise men. Often, however, each is joined, and the authority of doctors is worth the more, the greater is the weight of the reasons which they bring forward.

380. (D) Again probability is absolute or relative: absolute, which is supported by those reasons by which the mind of a prudent man is accustomed to be moved; relative, which does not bend all minds, but a certain one in particular, because of his special character, or the special circumstances in which he is placed. For in matters which are not evident of themselves, the will can command the assent of the intellect, because of extrinsic motives, whether legitimate or more or less dishonorable; thus in doubts, those who are right of heart adhere to the part which more favors the divine honor, the good of neighbor, or the peace of the community; on the contrary, those who are prone to laxity not rarely adhere to the part which favors pride or pleasure.

(E) Finally, doubt is speculative or practical: speculative, or remote, which concerns the law considered in itself, or its application in general - namely, whether such a law has been sufficiently promulgated, or has been abrogated by custom, - whether to paint on a feast day is a prohibited servile work, etc.; practical, or proximate, which concerns the liceity of such or such an action in particular, for example, whether it is licit for me to paint on this feast day.

381. 2. Concerning doubtful conscience itself. Merely speculative doubt does not directly affect conscience itself, but pertains to moral science, which weighs those questions; nevertheless often it indirectly affects conscience, by rendering it uncertain concerning the liceity of such or such an action in particular to be placed here and now by the agent; thus, for example, if it is doubted whether painting is a servile work, by that very fact a practical doubt will frequently arise whether Peter can here and now paint on this Sunday.

But here we treat only of practical doubt,¹ and therefore doubtful conscience is called that which either remains suspended concerning the honesty of some action in particular, or pronounces concerning the same not without a prudent fear of erring. - But this state of mind can be induced from the fact that on both sides reasons are present which are equally probable; or because on one side there is a more probable reason, which nevertheless does not remove the probability of the adverse opinion, or a reason only merely but solidly probable. - But for conscience of this kind merely negative doubt does not suffice, which rests on reasons so slight that they would not move a prudent man; for notwithstanding merely negative doubt, we judge concerning the liceity of the action without prudent fear of erring; - hence positive doubt is required, resting on grave arguments, which are accustomed to move a prudent man.

¹ For concerning speculative doubt we have already said something in the Treatise on Laws, and it is treated in the whole course of Moral Theology, by setting forth what opinions are more or less probable.

382. 3. Concerning the manner of solving practical doubt. (A) From what has been said above, n. 374, it is not licit to act with a practically doubtful conscience, but doubt must be shaken off by diligently investigating the matter.

For man ought to try, insofar as he can, to attain truth, and therefore, in a moral matter, to investigate the law and its genuine sense, and also attentively to consider all the circumstances, so that, in the best way that can be done, he may conform his actions to the law, which is nothing other than the manifestation of divine reason and will. Therefore he who, laboring under practical doubt, does not wish seriously to weigh the matter, acts rashly, and voluntarily and culpably exposes himself to the danger of sinning against the law. But, on the contrary, he who uses moral diligence to shake off doubt acts prudently, and the error into which perhaps he involuntarily falls is not imputed to him.

But that examination ought to be more or less diligent according to the gravity of the matter, and the quality or duties of the person; thus, if the question concerns a matter of slight moment, a prolonged investigation is by no means necessary. But this is required if the matter concerns a grave precept, especially concerning the strict rights of another person, or if from office an obligation lies upon some person to solve a doubt which concerns not only his own good, but also the common good.

383. (B) To perform rightly an examination of this kind, that natural prudence which is called right judgment (bon sens, common sense) is indeed required, but it does not suffice; rather, in those who are able to devote themselves to study, there is desired competent knowledge of the principles of moral theology, and in others recourse to prudent men, by whose counsels they may be able rightly to form their conscience. For when the question concerns not only positive right, but also many conclusions of natural right, some aspect often escapes the mind which, if it had been known, would have greatly helped conscience to form a right judgment. For although knowledge of principles pertains directly to synderesis, nevertheless it is especially useful for rightly forming the dictate of conscience: the better the sense of the law becomes known, the easier its application to a particular case becomes.

384. Confessors especially are held to devote themselves to study of this kind, as we have proved elsewhere.¹ Wherefore Benedict XIV admonishes them,² "that in a doubtful matter they should not rely on their own opinion, but, before they decide the cause, should consult very many books, especially those whose doctrine is more solid, and then should descend into that opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms." (a) Namely, they should not rely on their own opinion, which is often fallacious: for more wisdom is found in the judgment of many than in the judgment of one. (b) They should consult very many books, in order more easily to guard against the same inconvenience; for what could have escaped one author will not so easily escape many, especially if they do not belong to the same school, but to diverse schools: for experience shows how easily authors of the same school, without further examination, confidently repeat the opinions and arguments of their predecessors! (c) But they should choose those books whose doctrine is more solid, those namely which, by knowledge, prudence, and piety, have acquired a greater reputation for themselves, and have weighed the matter expressly, not incidentally: nor are the authors whose works are read to be so much counted as weighed. (d) Let them descend into that opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms. Hence, insofar as can be done, attention must be given both to intrinsic reasons and to extrinsic authorities: the arguments brought forward should be critically weighed, with attention given to the circumstances of times and places, and, generally speaking, the authority of theologians should not be estimated at more than the weight of the reasons which they bring forward. Nevertheless, if some conclusion is confirmed by the common doctrine of all schools, by that very fact it has great probability, even independently of the arguments brought forward; nor should one depart from it unless a new reason which up to this time was unknown is brought into the middle.

¹ Syn. Theol. Mor., De Paenit., n. 370-374.

² Benedict XIV, Apostolic Constitution Constit. concerning preparation for the Jubilee, year 1750, § 21.

385. (C) After all these things have been weighed, if conscience cannot bring a morally certain judgment, it remains that we have recourse to a reflex principle, by whose aid the practical doubt may be converted into moral certitude. Now, among reflex principles, some are universal, because they can be applied in any doubt concerning the liceity of an action for forming a practically certain conscience; such are: a doubtful law does not oblige, - in doubt the condition of the possessor is better, and others which we shall soon explain in the critical exposition of the systems; others, however, are particular, which can be applied only in certain matters, for example, in doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be proved, - in doubt one must stand for the validity of the act, - in doubt the presumption stands for the superior, etc.; these indeed are explained in the various Treatises. By their aid doubt is shaken off, and a morally and practically certain conscience is formed. If someone, for example, after mature investigation of the matter, has judged that the law of fasting in such a case is truly doubtful, because of grave reasons, and at the same time admits the truth of the principle "a doubtful law does not oblige," he can immediately conclude: a law of this kind does not oblige me in this case; and this judgment indeed is morally and practically certain. For, from one side, probabilists hold as morally certain the principle "a doubtful law does not oblige"; from another side, it is morally certain that in this case the law of fasting is doubtful; therefore it is morally certain that this law does not oblige me.

386. But the uneducated, who have not explicitly learned the use of a reflex principle, nevertheless form for themselves a practically certain conscience, because, rightly using moral sense, they judge that they act prudently, since such or such an action does not seem, all things considered, clearly and certainly prohibited;¹ but if doubt tortures them too much, they approach a prudent man, especially the pastor or confessor, and ask from him what must be done.

¹ Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XXII, 1900, p. 753-758.

— He who practically doubts concerning the honesty of his action, by acting sins with a sin of the gravity and species concerning which he had prudent suspicion. For he hypothetically consents to the violation of law, and consequently has an affection inclined toward the violation of the law obliging him: which is forbidden by divine natural law, which urges the fulfillment of individual laws. Therefore he acts against a certain conscience, although a confused one, by which even an unlearned man detects that an action of suspected honesty is not permitted to him ¹.

And although he doubts concerning a merely human law, he makes the action intrinsically dishonest: for he sins against the natural law.

¹ Insofar as he doubts, conscience does not judge concerning the matter. Wherefore a doubting conscience is not the rule of action.

— Obligation of one practically doubting. He who practically doubts concerning the honesty of his action must, if he can, embrace the safer parts or put away the doubt by sufficient inquiry, according to the rules to be handed down later.

Moreover that investigation will be sufficient which is accommodated to the moment of the matter and to the capacity of the agent. Thus the more learned man, in a grave matter, will not be able to trust a simple priest, but must examine the matter by himself, while the unlearned man will not be able to trust himself, but, v.g., will have to ask his priest or someone whom he judges fit. Yet the very narrowness of time will be able to dispense from a fuller investigation which otherwise would have to be made, when proportionate harm is to be feared from the delay itself. For since then there is not the moral opportunity of greater diligence, the ignorance which remains will be able to be held as invincible. Wherefore even an unlearned man will then be able prudently, according to his measure, to solve the case by himself.

— Sin of one neglecting. Does he who acts by neglecting a founded but confused suspicion of malice sin gravely or lightly?

The matter seems to be judged from the concrete circumstances. If the man has been of a timorous conscience, or the object of itself has appeared light, it can be presumed that there was no doubt concerning grave sin, except perhaps an empty fancy. On the contrary, you will pronounce more severely if the matter at first appearance spontaneously seems grave, and the agent does not seem alien from grave sin. The matter will often have to be committed to divine judgment. Cf. Laymann, l. I, tr. 2, c. 4, n. 7.

— On a perplexed case. A perplexed case is said to be one where sin is practically feared on every side, whether by acting or by not acting. Of itself, indeed, then the lesser evil must be chosen; wherefore a natural precept must of itself be preferred to a positive one, and a divine precept to a human one. But if the gravity has appeared morally the same on each side, the very supply of free option is not had. For which reason, however you bear yourself, you will not actually sin, even if the perplexity has arisen from culpable negligence. And they observe that there will be only a light sin of him who, since he does not discern a notable excess, has made the choice of the part which is feared to be worse.

— Practically doubtful conscience, as such, judges nothing, and consequently cannot be a rule. One practically doubting concerning the honesty of his action makes the matter intrinsically evil. Nevertheless a human duty of inquiring is imposed upon us; and, in a perplexed case, one does not sin by choosing for either part which seems to him to be of almost equal danger, or for the part which he estimates to be of lesser danger or moral evil.

— Statement of cases. This must be well held. Insofar as the doubt is negative, no reason is had, at least no serious reason, which would found a probable judgment and therefore could prudently direct the rational appetite. Wherefore, as we saw above, n. 362, a uniquely probable opinion approaches practically to one morally certain; and negative doubts of law, whether there is question of the first beginning or of the cessation of law or of its signification, are without moral use, or are contemned. Hence we said that he is safe who from his habitual diligence has a positive argument for confession having been made integrally, for the whole office having been recited, etc., which is attacked by a negative doubt alone.

— But not rarely it happens, when the doubt is of fact, not of law, that each part is negatively doubtful. Thus it is a doubt of law: whether such a law was revoked or not; and canon 23 wisely establishes: "in doubt, the revocation of an existing law is not presumed"; but, what must be accurately observed, we are found in a doubt of fact when it is asked: is today Friday, or not, on which the law of abstinence obliges?

But now, when no reason of affirming or denying is at hand, there are those who wish to solve cases of this sort from the principle of possession. Thus Sanchez ¹, several others, and also Noldin (2), who nevertheless admits that in a negative doubt of fact it is often difficult to understand what part possesses, so that other principles are rather employed. Wherefore, as they judge, if you negatively doubt whether a day of abstinence has begun or not, you will not be held by the law of abstinence; but you will be held if you doubt whether it has ceased or not, because in the former case liberty possesses, in the latter the law. Above, we showed that appeal to the principle of possession outside the matter of justice is vain. Some solve the proposed case in the same way, because, as they say, a fact is not presumed but must be proved. Therefore in doubt concerning the day begun the obligation of abstinence must be proved; on the contrary, the cessation of the obligation must be proved in doubt concerning the ended day of obligation. Thus Laymann, Theol. mor. l. 1, tr. 1, c. 5, n. 36; Noldin, Principia n. 249.

But the reason of the saying upon which they rely is lacking here. Why is a fact not presumed but must be proved? Because a fact of itself is accustomed to leave positive indications, so that if these are lacking, it now becomes like the truth that the fact has not arrived. But in the proposed case, while time passes in an equal manner, neither the beginning nor the end of the obligation leaves peculiar traces. But, even passing this over, if you consider the matter more accurately, the beginning and end of the obligation of abstinence are not so much facts as moral consequences which are connected with a certain hour. But the true doubt is this: is it the eleventh hour before midnight, or the first hour after midnight? But thus the fact appears uncertain on each side, so that the principle, a fact is not presumed, cannot truly be applied. Moreover, whether it is the night on which the day of abstinence begins or the night on which it ceases, the doubt is altogether the same; objectively the matters bear themselves in wholly the same way, so that common sense seems to repudiate two diverse solutions.

¹ De Matr. l. 2, d. 11, n. 32. - (2) Principia, n. 218.

— Solution from the mind of the legislator. More universally, therefore, we shall say what Laymann insinuates about the eucharistic fast alone, l. cit. n. 36: that cases or doubts of law to which doubts of fact, negative on each side, give occasion, must be solved according to the mind, prudently gathered, of the legislator. But from the mind of the legislator, we judge that this distinction must be employed.

1. Where there is question of a human law merely prohibiting, and no reason of justice or charity obliges one to forestall the danger of material error (v.g., concerning the law forbidding communion to one not fasting, or the eating of meat on such and such a day), the legislator can, without inconvenience, incline toward the more benign parts. And because rights are said to be more prompt for loosing than for binding, it can prudently be judged that he truly followed those parts. Wherefore:

a) In invincible doubt whether or not after midnight you ate or drank anything, you will judge yourself not prohibited from communion. This other reason accedes in the case of communion, that, especially today, this cause is most favorable. Cf. concerning this matter St. Alphonsus, l. 1, nn. 38.39; and l. 6, n. 282.

Nor is he to be condemned who, in that doubt, invited by thirst or hunger, eats or drinks. If he had the moral means of knowing the hour, he could not honestly neglect investigation unless communion were to be renounced. But after he has sincerely done this, i.e., has renounced communion, if then reason or a special devotion urges communion upon him, he does not seem to be prohibited from access to the sacred table;

b) We by no means praise, as is clear, him who intentionally or without reason chooses a time at which he negatively doubts concerning an ecclesiastical obligation, v.g., of abstinence, for example, to eat meat.

But he who, after he has investigated the matter according to the abundance of examination which is morally at hand, doubts whether or not the twelfth hour of the night has been heard, can reasonably choose for himself the more benign parts, whether there is question of abstinence, or of fasting, or of servile labor prohibited on feasts.

2. But where some precept must positively be fulfilled, or a positive condition is prescribed for a certain office or use, it is necessary that at least by probable reason the occasion of fulfilling the precept be had, or that satisfaction can be made to the required condition. This is demanded by the common good, to which the legislator adapts his mind. Wherefore:

a) The time which is defined by a commanding law as fit for fulfilling a positive office, v.g., for reciting the canonical hours, must be at least probably present. Therefore St. Alph., in order to defend his benign solution of doubts concerning the eucharistic fast preserved, argues from this, that there is question not so much of a positive law requiring the fast as of a prohibiting law, which forbids that you approach not fasting. Cf. l. 1, n. 38;

b) He who negatively doubts concerning his age, whether or not he has completed the years by which he can receive sacred order, obtain a benefice, or celebrate marriage, is forbidden either to receive sacred order, or obtain a benefice, or celebrate marriage. For the condition positively required for orders or for a benefice or for marriage must be demonstrated by at least probable reason. For the common good demands that only fit persons receive orders, obtain a benefice, contract marriage.

3. Finally, if the legislator has bound subjects by a law once a condition has been posited, as long as that condition has not been positively established, the subjects are not held by the law. For the common good also demands that a burden not be imposed unless certain. Wherefore he who doubts whether or not he was born twenty-one years ago will not have to fast.

— I. On notions. Properly, that is called morally certain which is established from the character and morals of men; and more strictly, if an exception in a particular case is excluded; less properly, concerning a thing which is so like the truth that only a positive reason for doubting is absent. Wherefore a uniquely probable positive opinion, which is impugned by no grave reason, is assimilated to what is morally certain. By a different use, moral certainty is called adhesion, even most firm, which is commanded by the will, as is the very adhesion of supernatural faith.

But the probable is that which rests upon such a motive by which, although it is fallible, a grave man is inclined to assent. The motive can be intrinsic to the thing, or extrinsic: the authority of doctors. This founds a presumption of an intrinsic motive, and can be the cause why a human legislator tempers his own law according to received opinions.

Positive doubt can be converted into opinion or assent with fear of the opposite. That assent is made at the command of the will, nor does it contain more perceived truth than the doubt itself.

According to the degree of probability, two opinions can be of morally equal probability; or one can be more probable than another. But the more probable can be false, and the true one less probable, so that to one following the more probable it cannot be said: you approach more to the truth.

Only experts in theology or in the science upon which the solution depends can judge concerning the intrinsic probability of an opinion; concerning the extrinsic, by reading approved authors, even the moderately learned can pronounce. Extrinsically probable is what several expert men, who have examined the matter, say is probable; indeed what one prudent man says, if he has investigated the matter more deeply and adds a reason not to be despised. But doubtful probability cannot found a prudent opinion.

The unlearned will usually obtain for themselves a probable judgment concerning the honesty of their action from another's authority; and no one ought to examine all things intrinsically by himself, but all can trust approved authors.

Safe is said of the part which one can embrace without formal sin; safer, or less safe, of an opinion according as it stands for obligation or for liberty.

II. Various systems. A moral system is said to be a proposed way of arriving from speculative doubt to a practically safe way of acting.

Because it necessarily happens that direct certainty concerning the honesty or malice of an action is inaccessible to us, and because there is not a threefold practical conclusion of the will as there is a threefold state of mind, which can affirm, deny, and doubt, therefore it is necessary to have recourse to certain principles (reflex) which offer the will a certain practical norm.

Rigorists condemned every action whose honesty was not demonstrated at least as most probable.

Probabiliorists (several Friars Preachers) deny that an action is honest unless its honesty is at least certainly more probable.

Equiprobabilists (Fathers of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer and several others), besides, permit that, when the probabilities are morally equal, answer be made for liberty when there is question of a new law or the beginning of an obligation.

Probabilists (Friars Minor, Fathers of the Society of Jesus, and very many others), when the question immediately turns upon the liceity of the action, always permit the use of a solidly probable opinion.

No one is theoretically a laxist: practically he was and can be one who is content with slender probability, or too easily pronounces an opinion to be solidly probable.

St. Alphonsus defended simple probabilism through the greater part of his life, which afterward he tempered by his sayings so that he might exclude every laxism more. By circumstances he was also compelled to open his opinion less clearly; and by his humility he was moved to abstain from professing absolutely an opinion then greatly attacked.

The system of compensation does not admit the use of a probable opinion except when a proportionate cause excuses the permission of material sin.

Today the controversy survives more theoretically than practically.

III. Refutation and proof. Rigorism, excluded by authority, sins by denying the principle concerning the conditions necessary that a law truly oblige.

Probabiliorism is also deceived by the error of the destruction of contrary probabilities.

Equiprobabilism besides wrongly applies the principle of possession.

The system of compensation sins because there is not always place for fearing material sin; and there is always a sufficient reason present for permitting the danger of material sin. And when compensation seems merely probable, it must necessarily use another system.

Simple probabilism rests upon these certain principles: that there is no law not promulgated; and that the application of law is not had without knowledge of the law, or cognition certain in a human way.

Logically one must be either a probabilist or a tutiorist.

IV. Use of probability. He who is truly persuaded of the error of a common opinion cannot follow it, with saving of the benign mind of the human legislator, which may permit the use of the interpretation of approved authors. Yet it is always permitted to a confessor to accommodate his answers according to an opinion which is held as probable. In acts at least formally diverse, nothing of itself hinders the simultaneous use of opposite probabilities, unless by the prior election the other is virtually demonstrated to be excluded.

But the law itself, for fulfilling various positive obligations, has introduced a time almost common to two days, which can be attributed to either day or part of a day.

Doubtful probability does not provide practical security.

V. On probability of fact. Probabilism cannot be applied immediately to probability of fact. On the contrary, here the principle holds: in morals, to do and to expose oneself to the danger of doing are equivalent. Hence we are obliged to embrace the safer parts. Except if the legislator, because of doubt of fact, relaxes his obligation, or if probability of fact can be converted into probability of law, either because there is no obligation of forestalling the danger of error, even material error, or because approved authors affirm the probability of the liceity of the action in these circumstances.

VI. Negative doubts of law or fact are of themselves to be contemned. When each part is negatively doubtful, the solution must be sought from the prudently estimated mind of the legislator. Wherefore a merely prohibiting law does not seem to have to be urged; but a positively required condition must be satisfied at least probably. If subjects are bound conditionally by some law, they are not held by the law until it is morally established that the condition has been fulfilled.

St. Thomas, de Verit., q. XIV; 2.2, q. 1, a. 4; q. 2, a. 1; q. 70, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, I, 20-39; ed. G., I, p. 11 ff.; Mazzotta, tr. I, disp. 1, q. 3, c. 1-5; Bardi, Discept. de consc., discept. 1, c. 9; disc. V and VI; Reuter, P. I, tr. 2, c. 2, n. 75; Panzuti, Theol. mor., I, tr. 1, 3 and 4; Vind. Alph. (ed. 2), n. 125; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 119.

We shall speak: 1. of the necessity of certain conscience for acting rightly; 2. of the manner in which doubtful conscience is laid aside.

41. Doubtful conscience, according to the diverse condition of things, is laid aside diversely. In the present matter a twofold condition must be considered: either the matter concerns only the honesty of the action, as if I doubt whether fasting is commanded today, in which case there intervenes only the danger of violating the law; or the matter concerns some end necessarily to be obtained, for example, the validity of a sacrament, as happens if someone doubts whether he can use uncertain matter in conferring Baptism, in which case a twofold danger is incurred: namely the danger of transgressing the law and of frustrating the sacrament.

42. Rules to be observed. I. Whenever the matter concerns an end absolutely to be attained, or an evil not depending on conscience, but certainly to be avoided, in any doubt whatever the safer part is to be followed. The reason is that the necessity of the end does not allow it to be committed to the danger of frustration, since the attainment of the end does not depend on the persuasion of conscience, but on the means really applied.

II. Whenever, while an invincible speculative doubt stands, the matter concerns only the honesty of the action, a practically certain conscience can be formed from the following principles, which at one time urge the obligation of law, at another favor the liberty of man, according as possession favors either the law or liberty. The reason will be clear from the explanation itself of the principles.

And this is the sum of the Alphonsian system, which will be set forth more fully in the following chapter. But that we may proceed in order, first the reflex principles themselves, by which conscience is formed, must be set forth according to their genuine sense.

43. Distinction of reflex principles. Among reflex principles, some are more universal in extension or use: these immediately serve in every speculative doubt for forming practical judgment. Others are more special and, as it were, subsidiary: recourse is had to these in doubts of fact, in order to discern what is favored by that universal principle which is called the principle of possession.

44. I. THE CONDITION OF THE ONE POSSESSING IS BETTER. This principle is very well known in both canon and civil law.³ In canon law, indeed, there is the axiom: In equal fault or cause, the condition of the possessor is stronger; and in civil law: In an equal cause, the possessor ought to be held stronger.

It is of great importance that the principle of possession be rightly understood.

1. All know that it takes its origin from civil law, and there, in doubts, obtains juridical value. It draws its force from presumption. Presumption is defined: A persuasion concerning some thing as true and certain until the contrary is proved (Polman, 2.2, n. 681). Or, as others will it: An anticipated proof of a doubtful thing, drawn from valid arguments and indications. Therefore presumption takes something for true before direct proofs. From this it is concluded that, whenever something is known to have preexisted, it is judged to persevere in its condition until it is removed by sufficient proof of the adverse part. But in the matter of justice, the preexisting condition is nothing other than possession of some thing. Whence from the principle of presumption arose the principle of possession. Therefore in the matter of strict right, the aforesaid principle signifies this: In an equal cause, or in doubt, rights favor him who, besides a doubtful title common to himself and to his adversary, has besides the title of possession. For possession founds a certain presumption of true dominion, until the contrary is proved; for example, he who with a just title possesses an estate, which another claims for himself with doubtful right, remains in possession, nor ought he to be despoiled, until the competitor has legitimately proved that he enjoys a better right (cf. n. 850).

2. In the matter of legal justice and of the other virtues, the principle of possession is taken only analogically, insofar as whatever right precedes the doubt that has arisen, by evident analogy with the possession of a temporal thing, is to be protected in the same way as possession itself. Therefore in matter which wanders outside strict justice, the principle of possession (reason itself dictates this) has this sense: every thing which from its nature perseveres stably until it is removed by some supervening fact is judged to remain in its condition so long as the contrary is not established.

Considered thus, the principle of possession can favor either liberty or law. Equity demands that preexisting rights, whatever they may be, be protected. Lugo excellently says (de Just., disp. 23, n. 110): No better and more universal rule can be handed down than that which is drawn from the external forum. "It is fitting that each forum agree, insofar as it can be done," says D'Annibale (I, n. 264). So the doctors commonly.¹

To the matter thus St. Alphonsus (I, 26; Diss. 1757, n. 19): "But this principle, although some attempt to weaken it, saying that it is valid only for the forum, or only in the matter of justice; yet I do not know how it can be denied in all things. The question can only be whether in any moral doubt the law or liberty possesses. The Antiprobabilists say that the law always possesses; but we say that sometimes the law possesses, sometimes liberty, namely when the law has not yet been promulgated. This, I say, is the question; but no one can deny the principle, that the condition of the possessor is always better. Therefore in the case in which the law possesses, one must stand for it; but if liberty possesses, one must stand for liberty."

45. Therefore some assert gratuitously that the principle of possession has force only in negative doubt alone, or that with it the law always possesses, or that it is a mere fiction of law or equivocation.

Here, however, it is useful to notice that the principle of possession, in the matter of justice, is of stricter application than in the matter of the other virtues. The reason: 1. Because justice is more rigid than the other virtues (cf. n. 383). Whence it happens that lawsuits concerning justice demand stricter proofs; while the dispute which morally is moved between liberty and law is settled, as is fitting, by moral proof. 2. Because in the matter of justice, at least in goods of fortune, possession produces a presumption both for the possessor and against the plaintiff; for the possessor: for he, so long as the contrary is not certainly proved, is presumed to possess by force of his right; but against the plaintiff, because the plaintiff is presumed to be destitute of possession by right until the contrary is proved.

46. II. A DOUBTFUL LAW DOES NOT OBLIGE, or: A doubtful law cannot induce a certain obligation.² This principle is a universal principle, which is applied in every law, both divine and human, whenever there is question of a doubt of mere law, as we shall prove n. 91. But if the matter concerns probabilities or doubts of dangerous fact, some certain antecedent law forbids every use of doubt or probability, as is shown below (n. 80).

Now the aforesaid principle, according to St. Alphonsus, must be understood: 1. of a strictly doubtful law; 2. of an invincibly doubtful law, that is, of a law which, after diligent inquiry, certainly remains doubtful; 3. of a law simply doubtful, that is, of a law doubtfully existing. "For if the law is certainly established and certainly promulgated, and thence arises a doubt whether it has been abrogated or dispensed, it is to be observed, because then it possesses."³ Therefore in doubt concerning the cessation of a law or obligation, the principle is to be converted in such a way that it is said: "Doubtful liberation does not liberate."⁴ But that the axiom "A doubtful law, etc." was in this sense truly used by most theologians, Muzzarelli testifies, saying: "Similarly, if the matter concerns the cessation or abrogation of a law, doubt in that case must be said to favor liberty in nothing, but one must stand for the law, which is in possession against liberty. In this all doctors agree." So also D'Annibale, I, n. 266.

47. From the things just said it is clear that reflex principles can be recalled to one principle, namely to the principle of possession. But it does not always appear at first glance what possession favors, whether namely the law or liberty. The general rule is this: "To discern for which part possession stands in doubt, one must see for which part presumption stands. But presumption stands for that part which is not itself bound to prove the fact, but transfers the burden of proving it to the other" (I, 26). The reason is that rights (for example liberty or obligation), by their nature, are stable and are judged to persevere until a change is proved. Therefore it belongs to the one affirming the change to bring proof, by demonstrating namely the existence or force of a certain fact by which the preceding right is changed, or the possessor is overcome (cf. n. 97).

Here moreover certain very well-known principles of law have force, which regard either the substance of the fact or the conditions of the fact.⁵

48. I. In doubt the fact is not presumed, but is proved; that is, the fact concerning which doubt is involved is reputed not to exist, until sufficient proof is brought which persuades a prudent man. When this proof is lacking, all things are judged to remain in the same state in which they were found before the doubt arose.

But the fact concerning which inquiry is made can either found the law (for example, promulgation of the law, emission of a vow), or suppose the law (for example, abrogation of the law, fulfillment of a vow). In doubt of a fact founding the law, liberty possesses; in doubt of a fact supposing the law, the law possesses. Whence the aforesaid principle favors now liberty, now law (cf. n. 55).

Note. To the same principle are recalled those three sayings: 1. No one is presumed evil unless he is proved so: for everyone by his nature is good. 2. Crimes are not presumed: whence the judge ought to condemn no one unless he has been proved guilty. 3. In doubt of crime one must favor the accused. Reg. 11 in VI agrees.

49. II. In doubt the proof falls upon the plaintiff.⁶ Moral doubt generates, as we have said, a certain lawsuit between law and liberty. One part defends the former state, which the other part, on account of a fact alleged by itself, contends should be changed. This part is called the plaintiff, and the burden of proving the fact falls upon it.

From this principle it follows: 1. If the law requires certain qualities, or prescribes special conditions (for example knowledge, age) for this, that a benefice or office, a state or dignity, a privilege or exemption be obtained, etc., the petitioner assumes as it were the part of plaintiff, and is bound to prove the fact alleged by himself.

2. On the contrary, if the law, on account of some fact, prohibits me from a common right, it belongs to the law itself to prove the truth of the fact, so that it may be established that on that account I am despoiled of the common right. Thus, for example, in doubt whether I am fasting, whether after midnight I swallowed something, I can communicate. For the law is prohibitive, and forbids anyone to communicate after food has been taken. Whence the fact of the fast broken must be proved, so that someone may be prohibited from communion (I, 38; VI, 282; H. Ap., XV, 34).

50. III. In doubts judgment must be made from things ordinarily occurring. If direct proof of the fact cannot be had, indirect proof can often be had from legitimate presumption, which indeed furnishes moral but sufficient certitude. Therefore then the cited rule has force, or: From things commonly occurring a prudent presumption is made. These axioms are received by all and agree with the forty-fifth rule in VI: In obscure things we inspect what is more likely, or what for the most part is accustomed to happen.

Hence, in doubt whether a child has arrived at the use of reason and is bound by ecclesiastical laws, he is presumed to have arrived if he has completed the seventh year; otherwise not. In doubt whether you have recited part of the Hours, you prudently presume that you have recited it, if in recitation you are regularly accustomed to omit nothing. In doubt whether someone has consented to depraved thoughts, he is presumed to have consented if he is of lax conscience; otherwise, if he is of timorous conscience (III, 270, 1012; IV, 150; VI, 476).

51. I. In doubt one must stand for the value of the act, or: In doubt every fact is presumed to have been rightly done. These principles have force when the principal act indeed is established, and there is doubt only concerning an adjunct, for example, concerning a required condition, concerning the due mode. In these cases, so long as the opposite is not established, that is presumed to have been done which had to be done for the validity of the act, and which is accustomed to be done (III, 196, 201, q. 3; VI, 450, 505). The following sayings have the same sound: In doubt the fact is presumed which by law had to be done. A defect is not presumed, but must be demonstrated. What is regularly, what is ordinarily done, is judged to have been done.

From this rule (which rests on the preceding one) you will conclude: Given that they certainly have been placed, contracts, a vow, dispensation, the election of a superior, recitation of the breviary, Baptism, confession of sin, sacramental satisfaction, absolution, consecration, marriage, and like things are supposed valid. Except unless a positive reason to the contrary is had, or unless a law of this kind stands in the way, which demands certitude in every way.

52. II. In doubt presumption stands for the superior; that is: in doubt whether some command, imposed by a superior, is wise or just, regularly it must be obeyed.

We said, regularly it must be obeyed; for the case is excepted in which the law or precept certainly would be of excessive labor or difficulty, or would bring grave harm. But this exception is admitted by force of another certain principle, that is, by force of epikeia (cf. n. 173), or also by force of the following rule.

This principle is a certain particular application of the preceding principle. For since the principal fact, that is, the command, is established, the command is supposed to have been rightly made. The reason is that the superior is judged to be led by counsels unknown to the inferior, and to judge more prudently than the inferior concerning counsels known to him. Add that the power of commanding is a certain right, of which a legitimate superior cannot be despoiled in doubt (I, 31; IV, 47).

53. III. In doubt favors are to be enlarged, odious things restricted. By favor here is understood whatever indulges liberty, or grants grace, without detriment to right; but by odium, whatever imposes penalty, obligation, or burden. Cf. the treatise on Laws.

The following rules agree with the aforesaid principle: It is fitting that odious things be restricted and favors enlarged. In obscure things, what is least is to be held; understand: what burdens less. In penalties, the more benign interpretation is to be made. The reason for all these is the benevolence or prudence of the superior, which are legitimately presumed (Reg. 15, 30, 49 in VI; cf. Diss. 1757, n. 7).

54. It is asked: When must the rule be applied: IN DOUBT THE SAFER PART IS TO BE CHOSEN?

Resp. This rule of law is to be applied:

1. In practical doubts. Hence, if someone does not wish or cannot lay aside a practical doubt by some principle, whether direct or reflex, he is bound to choose the safer part (cf. n. 42).

2. In doubts of dangerous fact, namely when there remains a danger of bringing upon oneself or others a temporal or spiritual evil which must certainly be prevented, as will be explained below (n. 81). Apart from these cases, in which the law certainly possesses, the aforesaid rule of itself is of counsel, but by no means of precept (I, 77).

55. From the principles brought forward up to this point these general consequences flow (I, 97 ff.):

I. LIBERTY possesses, and therefore the law does not oblige:

1. In doubt whether a law has been established, or promulgated in the due manner; whether it imposes such a work; whether it has such a sense; whether it truly prescribes, or only persuades; whether it is extended to such a case, to that territory or subject; whether the superior (who is not yet in peaceful possession) enjoys legitimate authority.

2. In doubt whether a vow was emitted; whether it extends to this or to that; whether a pact or promise was made; whether some debt was contracted.

3. In doubt whether the obligation of the law has begun: for example, if on Thursday toward midnight you doubt whether the day of abstinence has already begun; likewise, if you doubt whether you have reached the age for undergoing the law of the Church.

In all these and similar cases, doubt is truly involved concerning the existence of the law or its beginning; and therefore the law is doubtful, and liberty remains whole (I, 27, 34, 195; VI, 468, 473 ff.).

II. But the LAW possesses, and therefore liberty remains bound:

1. If you doubt whether a law, certainly promulgated, was afterward abrogated, revoked, dispensed, or abolished by contrary custom. Likewise, if you doubt whether the law is just, or was received; whether the superior prescribed rightly and justly.

2. If you doubt whether the obligation of the law has ceased, for example, whether you are a sexagenarian and therefore released from the law of fasting; whether the day of abstinence or fasting has already entirely passed, for example on Saturday toward midnight.

3. If you doubt whether you have fulfilled the law, for example, whether you recited the Divine Office, whether you satisfied the precept of confession, sacramental penance, a vow, the obligation of a contract, the payment of a certain debt, etc.

In these and similar cases (unless the doubt is only concerning the value of the act fulfilling the law, as was said above), the principle of possession favors the law, and accordingly your liberty is bound, until it is morally certain that you have satisfied the law, or that the bond of the law is already dissolved (I, 26 ff.; VI, 475).

56. Note. The things which we have just said concerning the formation of a practically certain conscience by reflex principles are not equally approved by all. When the matter concerns a positive doubt, others follow other opinions. Hence that celebrated controversy CONCERNING PROBABILISM arose. Since this question is of the greatest moment, we judged it opportune to treat the great argument more accurately: not because new rules must be handed down, but because those already set forth must be weighed more diligently and confirmed by fitting reasons, since the whole MORAL SYSTEM of St. Alphonsus rests upon them.

⁶⁸

For the sake of clarity the present article is divided into two paragraphs: 1. concerning the notion and division of doubtful conscience or moral doubt; 2. concerning the means for solving practical doubt.

⁶⁸ Strictly and accurately speaking, doubtful conscience is a contradiction in the adjective, as was already said above in n. 304. For conscience is judgment or dictate; but doubt is suspension of judgment, as St. Thomas clearly teaches: "When a man has no reason toward the other part, either because he has none toward either part, which belongs to one not knowing, or because he has reason toward each part, but equal reason, which belongs to one doubting, then he assents in no way, since his judgment is in no way determined, but bears itself equally toward diverse things" (3, dist. 23, q. 2, a. 2, quaestiunc. 3, sol. 1). Hence the question would be placed more accurately in this way: How ought the dictate of conscience be formed if in the mind there exists doubt concerning the licitness of an act? - Nevertheless, since, St. Alphonsus leading the way, authors commonly employ the expression "doubtful conscience," and since conscience in the vernacular language not rarely signifies a state of mind, we also speak of doubtful conscience (cf. Beaudouin, Tract. de conscientia p. 47).

328. Notions. Billuart rightly observes:⁶⁹ "To doubt is not to judge, but to suspend every judgment or assent and to cling wavering between each part of a contradiction. To opine is to judge or assent to one part with fear of the opposite part." - Therefore doubt strictly and properly so called is the suspension of assent and judgment concerning some proposition; and so it is opposed not to certitude alone, but also to suspicion and opinion, in which true assent is had, although imperfect and with fear of erring. In doubt the mind is as it were the tongue of a balance, which, placed in equilibrium, inclines neither to one nor to the other part. Older authors with St. Thomas⁷⁰ distinguished three grades with reference to assent: 1. doubt, in which every assent is lacking; 2. opinion and suspicion, in which imperfect assent is present with fear of the opposite part;⁷¹ 3. science and even faith, in which there is firm assent without fear of erring. - Modern authors, however, are accustomed to distinguish only two grades of assent, namely certain assent without fear of erring or certitude, and uncertain assent with fear of erring or doubt broadly so called. - Since therefore the same terminology is not employed by ancient and modern authors, confusion must be carefully avoided.

⁶⁹ De consc. diss. 5, a. 6.

⁷⁰ Cf. De verit. q. 14, a. 1; S. theol. 2, 2, q. 2, a. 1.

⁷¹ There is indeed some difference between opinion and suspicion. Opinion is an assent of the mind with fear of erring, but suspicion is pure conjecture and is accustomed to turn on particular facts, for example, concerning evil perpetrated by another (cf. St. Thomas in 6 Ethic. lect. 3).

329. Divisions of doubt. 1. Doubt of right and doubt of fact, according as it is not certainly established either concerning the existence of some right (or law) or of some particular fact. Doubt of right is, for example, the controversy whether merely external attention suffices for the recitation of the Breviary. But doubt of fact is, for example, if the confessor hesitates whether the penitent made a true vow or a simple promise.

2. Positive and negative doubt. Positive doubt rests on grave reasons. But negative doubt is founded on a light and insufficient motive. The common adage says: "Negative doubt is to be despised." The reason is that doubt of this kind is irrational and cannot destroy contrary certitude. For example, some pious priest is accustomed always to say his Breviary with great diligence; but once in the evening he does not remember that he said the third nocturn. That doubt is negative and to be despised, and the priest is not bound to say again the nocturn concerning which he doubts.

3. Speculative and practical doubt. Speculative and practical doubt is subdivided by some authors⁷² into speculative, speculative-practical, practical, and practical-practical. Such subtleties seem to be superfluous and therefore are omitted here. Speculative doubt regards the objective morality of some human act, yet without direct relation to the act itself to be posited here and now. Such doubt exists concerning all controverted questions in which moralists dispute on either side, for example, whether civil law is a sufficient title for receiving interest, whether an informal testament is valid in conscience, etc. - Practical doubt (by others called practical-practical) turns on the morality of an act to be posited here and now, with attention to all the circumstances; for example, whether it is licit to retain such a legacy proceeding from an informal testament or not; whether it is licit to read such a dangerous book, etc.⁷³

⁷² Cf. Billuart, De consc. l. c.

⁷³ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 21.

330. Principle. It is never licit to act with a practically doubtful conscience (at least if positive doubt remains).

Thus almost all Catholic theologians,⁷⁴ and this is deduced as a corollary from the principle of the preceding article. For since certitude (broad) is required for acting licitly, it is not licit to act with positive doubt, because otherwise man would voluntarily expose himself to the proximate danger of formally sinning.⁷⁵ But the sin which one acting with positive practical doubt commits is of the same species and gravity as the same sin committed with certain conscience. Hence, for example, he who positively doubts whether the act here and now to be posited is a grave sin, and, notwithstanding such doubt, posits the act, truly sins gravely; he who positively doubts whether today the precept of abstinence obliges and nevertheless eats meat sins against the law of abstinence, even if perhaps in reality today is not a day of abstinence. - But I said: it is not licit to act with a practically doubtful conscience; for speculative doubt in the sense set forth above does not render an action illicit, provided that before action it is changed into broad certitude in the way which will be stated below. - Finally I said: positive doubt remaining; for negative doubt does not harm the morality of the action. Hence such doubts are to be despised, because otherwise life would become intolerable, since in our acts there almost never exists such moral certitude against which even light reasons of doubting do not fight.

⁷⁴ Even the pagans themselves taught thus, for example, Cicero, saying: "They rightly command who forbid doing anything concerning which they doubt whether it is equitable or inequitable" (De offic. 1, 9). Pliny warns: "What you doubt, do not do" (Ep. 1, 18).

⁷⁵ St. Thomas, Quodlib. VIII, a. 13.

48. Definition. - A doubtful conscience is a suspension of judgment concerning the goodness or malice of some act in particular. This happens, namely, when conscience suspends its assent for each part of the doubt, and remains uncertain and hesitating concerning the morality of its action. Moreover, since conscience is a practical judgment of reason, and here there is had only a suspension of judgment, it is clear that a doubtful conscience is not conscience in the true and proper sense of the name, but only improperly and in the usage accepted by the Schools.

Division. - Doubt is divided:

1. Into positive and negative. Positive doubt is either strict, and exists from equal or almost equal reasons for each part (which coincides with a probable opinion), or broad, when for one part alone there is present a grave motive, or a certainly graver one than for the other. Negative doubt is when reasons are supplied from neither part, or only very slight ones; and this also is deservedly called strict, for as a balance, so also the mind stands in equilibrium, whether there are no weights on either side, or equal ones.

2. Into doubt of law and doubt of fact. Doubt of law is when there is doubt either about the law, for example, whether fasting on such a day has really been prescribed in the law; or about its obligation, for example, whether the law of fasting obliges in such a case or not; or about the legitimate authority of the legislator, for example, whether he can prescribe fasting in such a case. Doubt of fact is when there is doubt about some fact, for example, whether the medicine which I am about to take is healthful or poisonous; whether he who lies hidden in the woods is a man or rather a beast.

3. Into speculative and practical doubt. Speculative doubt is when there is doubt concerning the goodness or malice of an action in itself, abstracting from the execution of the action itself: for example, whether to paint on a feast day is a servile work or not. Practical doubt is when there is doubt whether a singular action, with its circumstances and in order to the end of the agent, may lawfully be given over to execution; for example, whether it is licit for me, constituted in these circumstances, to do a servile work on a feast day; whether it is licit for me, a servant, to obey my master commanding me in this matter. Wherefore between each doubt there intervenes the same distinction (which indeed intervenes very widely) as between true and licit. For speculative doubt, although obliquely and secondarily, or consequently, it regards also the licit, nevertheless directly and principally regards the true. But practical doubt directly, immediately, and primarily regards the licit itself. According to this twofold species of doubt, even doubtful conscience itself can, indeed must, with St. Alphonsus, be divided in two ways, namely into a speculatively doubtful conscience and a practically doubtful conscience.

49. Principles. - I. A merely negative doubt is to be held as nothing, because it is founded upon absolutely no reason, or upon a very slight one: therefore, even if it remains, the obligation still urges, or liberty stands, according as it existed before; nor can it effect that the moral certainty of the opposite be overturned. But if a prudent suspicion of error arises for you, you are bound to inquire. And so, when hereafter cases of negative doubt occur, you will easily solve them, once this rule has been established; and therefore we shall attend only to positive doubt.

II. It is never lawful to operate with a practically doubtful conscience, but the safer part must be followed. The reason is clear from what has just been said concerning certain conscience, principle I, n. 47. - But sometimes it is lawful to operate with a speculatively doubtful conscience, namely when, the practical doubt having been laid aside from a practically certain dictate, or from certain reflex principles, conscience is formed, as we shall soon say when treating of Probabilism.

50. Resolutions. - 1° As often as someone doubts whether an act which he is going to perform here and now is licit or not, he is bound to employ diligence in seeking the truth, congruent with the gravity of the matter and the condition of the person and place; namely, to consult upright and expert men, to investigate their practice, and to weigh the reasons with the sole pursuit of truth: otherwise he exposes himself, by negligence of inquiry, to the danger of violating the law, and sins in that very thing.

2° If he cannot inquire, nor is able of himself to weigh the reasons of each part, nor in another way, for example, through reflex principles, to free himself from doubt, let him embrace the safer part; because otherwise he would act in practical doubt, that is, with a truly doubtful conscience, and without any certain judgment concerning the honesty of the action.

3° He who, after diligent and sufficient inquiry has been made, still doubts whether there is present a law commanding or prohibiting, is not bound to obey this law; because he can form for himself a conscience from a reflex principle, namely that a law which cannot be found cannot oblige, as will be said below, where Probabilism is treated.

51. Questions. - Quest. 1° Does one sin gravely when operating with practical doubt concerning the gravity of sin?

Resp. Affirmatively. For he who acts with a practically doubtful conscience, according to common principles, sins with that species of sin, both moral and theological, concerning which, practically, while he acts, he doubts. The reason is that he violates a certainly grave obligation of taking precautions lest through voluntary ignorance or inadvertence he fall into transgressions of law which can be grave.

Quest. 2° Does he sin gravely who knows that his action is evil, but does not attend to its gravity?

Resp. It is disputed; but for St. Alphonsus¹ the sentence of those who say that such a one, of himself, sins only venially is sufficiently probable. The reason is that for sinning mortally it is required that someone consent directly or indirectly to what is mortal; but he who in no way thinks of or suspects what is mortal can in no way be said to consent to what is mortal. Therefore. Yet I have said: of himself, that is, supposing a) that he does not apprehend, at least confusedly, the danger of sinning gravely, or the obligation of investigating the matter; b) that the object is not certainly of itself a grave sin, of which kind, for example, it is in external sins whose gravity is known of itself to all, such as homicides, adulteries, thefts in grave matter, concerning which no one prudently supposes that they can be committed without advertence to grave malice, or at least without doubt about it, or without notable remorse of conscience; c) that the agent is of a fearful conscience; for otherwise, at least indirectly, he must be judged to consent to what is mortal.

83. Notions. - By reason of the subject, i.e., on the part of the act, assent, or adhesion to the object, conscience is certain if its judgment adheres firmly to something, doubtful if judgment is suspended, or opinative if it adheres to something not firmly but with fear of the opposite.

Thus certain conscience, as we have already said, is that which with firm assent and without fear of erring judges something in particular to be licit or illicit.

Opinative conscience is that which judges, not firmly but with grave fear of erring, that some action to be placed here and now is licit or illicit.

Doubtful conscience is that which remains suspended and does not give assent, and therefore judges nothing concerning the licitness of an action in particular to be placed here and now: this happens either on account of a defect of grave reasons, and then it is negatively doubtful; or on account of the equality of grave reasons, and then it is positively doubtful. Whence it is not properly conscience, because it is not a judgment, but rather is the absence of conscience; nevertheless it is called conscience reductively, just as privations are reduced to that of which they are privations: in that way omission is called a human act.1

Just as, on the part of the object, judgment is divided into speculative, speculatively practical, and practically practical (I, n. 200), so there is given:

1. Merely speculative doubt concerning the truth of a thing, for example whether Baptism is valid in rose-water.

2. Speculatively or remotely practical doubt concerning the objective and material honesty of an act in general and in the abstract, or concerning something pertaining to it, for example whether Baptism in rose-water is licit; and this is twofold:

a) Doubt of law, which is concerned with law as in the proposed example: whether concerning the existence of a law or obligation, such as rights, offices, and their conditions, causes, force, nature, object, extension, limits, etc.; or concerning the cessation of a law or obligation;

b) Doubt of fact, which is concerned with fact, not indeed in itself (for then it would be merely speculative doubt and in no way would pertain to practice), but insofar as it founds some right or some obligation and thus remotely pertains to law, for example whether someone has made a vow, whether there is no other water besides rose-water.

3. Practically or proximately practical doubt concerning the subjective and formal honesty of an act in particular to be placed here and now, for example whether it is licit here and now to baptize this child in rose-water: this alone is doubt of conscience.¹

¹ Several say that it is a judgment, expressed or at least tacit, concerning uncertainty, by which we reflexively affirm that our judgment, on account of the equality of reasons, must be suspended. This indeed can happen, while we reflect concerning the state of the intellect; but doubtful conscience does not necessarily include such a reflex judgment by which we affirm that we doubt. Besides, this judgment is not conscience, because it is not a judgment definitively applying science to a particular act or fact.

Only a certain conscience is the rule of acting prudently; hence it is asked how, by force of an indirect principle, a sufficiently certain conscience may be formed so that it may be a rule of acting prudently, and how conscience negatively doubtful - positively doubtful - and opinative may be laid aside and reformed.

1. Several authors, distinguishing speculatively doubtful conscience and practically doubtful conscience, say that with the former we act licitly, but not so with the latter. But the manner of speaking, although from the seventeenth century onward it is commonly employed, even by St. Alphonsus (Th. M., book I, nn. 20, 21, 22, 25), nevertheless is not to be approved. For conscience essentially is an act, namely, a practically practical judgment; but it is impossible that the same act or the same judgment be at once practical and speculative, certain and uncertain; whence there is not given conscience, i.e., an act of certain practical judgment, which is speculative or even doubtful. But it can happen that a man by a diverse act or judgment speculatively doubts, and is practically certain, i.e., is occupied in speculative doubt, and has a certain practical conscience. But that doubt, like the speculative judgment, is not a doubt or judgment of conscience, but precedes this.

84. Thesis. Negative doubt, as being empty and founded upon no reason or only a slight reason, does not impede prudential certitude, but is ineffective for inducing a new obligation or for extinguishing it, and consequently is not to be attended to, but is to be held as nothing and despised; which is expressed by the axiom: The condition of the possessor is better.

It is proved: He would act imprudently who, on account of slight or no reasons, would think himself held to placing or omitting an act. Whence one must act as if the doubt had not arisen, which can be expressed by the axiom: In doubt the condition of the possessor is better, whether of law or of liberty; namely, one must stand for that part which before the doubt was practically certain.

Law, namely, and liberty can be considered as two possessors of right: law possesses the force of obliging, liberty the faculty of acting according to one's pleasure and of disposing of oneself and of one's acts, which is true dominion. But that possesses which is prior. Whence when a law or obligation is doubtful, the same liberty remains which man previously possesses; on the contrary, if a law or obligation is certain, while liberation from this law or obligation is altogether doubtful, the same law remains. Possession, namely, is the antecedent certain right of liberty or of law.¹

¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Th. M., book I, nn. 26 and 27.

85. Formation of certain conscience in negative doubt. - Negatively doubtful conscience can be laid aside by force of a reflex principle by which an indirectly certain conscience is formed (at least implicitly), for example in this way:

"That which, all things having been diligently considered, certainly appears prescribed, certainly must be done; that which in no way appears prescribed, certainly need not be done.

"But this action in no way appears prescribed, for no serious reason indicates that it must be done; on the contrary, that one appears prescribed, because no serious reason indicates that the law by which it is prescribed has been taken away.

"Therefore this action here and now certainly can be omitted, that other one certainly must be placed."

86. The axiom: "The condition of the possessor is better" is a general principle, so that it is valid for solving all negative doubts, and therefore it is more determined and expressed by more particular formulas according as it is applied to various doubts of law or fact. These particular forms are called subsidiary principles by which possession is more discerned. Hence:

1. In negative doubt of law: a) If slight or no reason proves that a law has been passed by legitimate authority, or has been edited or promulgated, liberty remains.

b) Similarly, if slight or no reason proves that the law extends to this case or to such subjects, commands under mortal sin, is strictly preceptive rather than merely penal, or establishes penalties to be incurred in fact. This is enunciated under the more particular form: In doubt favors are to be amplified, and odious things restricted; or: In obscure matters, the minimum is to be held.

c) On the contrary, if slight or no reason proves that a law has been revoked or abrogated, - or has ceased, - or that dispensation has been given in it, or that someone has been excused from it, the law remains.²

² Cf. St. Alphonsus, Th. M., book I, n. 27.

2. In negative doubt of fact, since it is often difficult to understand which part possesses, the principle In doubt the condition of the possessor is better is enunciated under a more determined form:

a) In a general way: In doubt one must stand for that for which presumption stands; but presumption stands for the part which is not bound to prove the fact;³ - in other words: In doubt one must judge from things ordinarily occurring, for the exception must be proved. Thus a child of seven years is presumed to have the use of reason; a superior is presumed not to command illicit things, nor to exceed his power; a God-fearing man is presumed not to have consented to wicked delight.

³ Ibid., n. 26.

b) Under a more particular form the same principle is enunciated for the existence of an act or fact: A fact is not presumed, but must be proved. Hence in doubt of a fact founding an obligation, liberty remains, as if slight or no reason proves that I emitted a vow or oath or by it obligated myself to this, that I committed mortal sin, that harm was inflicted, that the time for an obligation to begin is present, for example that Friday has begun, that someone has reached the age of 7 or 21. On the contrary, in doubt of a fact supposing a law, and exempting from it, the law remains, as if slight or no reason proves that I recited the hours, was confessed, satisfied a vow or oath, paid a debt, that the time for the obligation to end is present, for example that Friday has passed, or that I have reached the age of 60.⁴

⁴ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Th. M., book I, n. 32.

c) Likewise for the condition or value of an act or fact: In doubt one must stand for the value of the act, or: What has been done is judged rightly done, for example, if slight or no reason proves that I did not have the intention and attention required in Mass or in the hours, that I possess this thing unjustly, that Baptism conferred was invalid, that the wine of the sacrifice is not genuine, that the confession was not integral, etc.⁵

⁵ Ibid., n. 26.

87. Observation. - Authors do not always agree for which side possession stands, for example, in doubt whether midnight has passed, whether liberty of eating before communion possesses, or the law prescribing the natural fast; - whether a debt must be paid if even the creditor doubts about payment; - whether a father can invalidate the vow of a son in doubt whether it was emitted before or after puberty or majority; etc.⁶ If their reasons are grave, the question is reduced to positive doubt, and is to be solved in the same way; of which we must now speak.

⁶ Ibid., nn. 38-39.

88. Most certain principles placed beyond all controversy. - Positive doubt, which, namely, is founded upon grave reasons morally equal, i.e., equal or almost equal on both sides, is serious and therefore impedes direct practical certitude, and consequently is not to be neglected but attended to. But conscience ought to be certain (n. 78). Therefore it is never licit, but always illicit, to act with a positive practical doubt concerning the honesty of the action to be placed here and now, or with a positively doubtful conscience. This, namely, is not a rule of acting prudently.

But from positive speculatively practical doubt there follows per se and ordinarily practically practical doubt or doubtful conscience: for he who doubts concerning the honesty of an action in general, per se and ordinarily doubts concerning the honesty of the same action in particular. Hence there follows the obligation of laying aside the said doubt, and

1. of acquiring certitude concerning the honesty of the action, and indeed direct certitude if this is possible: for he who is held to observing laws is held to knowing and inquiring into them; otherwise he would be in ignorance that is vincible and culpable;

2. but if he cannot have direct certitude, he is held, before he acts, to acquire indirect certitude and to form conscience by force of an indirect or reflex principle;¹

¹ According to one of the systems of probability: Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, Probabilism, as we shall see later.

3. but if he also cannot have indirect certitude, he is held to act more safely, namely, to abstain from the action which is doubtfully honest; and if he must altogether act, he must do what is safer and what removes more from the danger of sinning even materially. Here the principle is valid: In practical doubts the safer way must be chosen.

Certain conscience is that by which someone firmly and without fear of erring judges something to be good or bad.

Although certainty is distinguished in three ways among philosophers, that which is called moral is chiefly considered by moralists. This certainty, which rests upon the laws by which men are ruled in their acts, is subdivided into perfect and imperfect. The former is that which is so founded upon moral laws that the proposition is clearly perceived to be unable to be false. This is reduced indirectly to metaphysical certainty. The latter is that which belongs to those propositions in which it is not absolutely repugnant that there be error, although this can happen most rarely. This admits various degrees.

Doubtful conscience is that which remains suspended concerning the honesty of an action; for doubt is the suspension of assent between opposites.

Multiple doubt is distinguished, namely: 1st, positive or negative; the first is had when the intellect suspends assent on account of grave reasons for doubting, or at least reasons apparently such; but the other when assent is suspended on account of a defect of motives; 2nd, of law or of fact, according as it is concerned with the existence of a law, or its obligation, or with some particular fact; 3rd, speculative or practical, according as it is concerned with the abstract cognition of truth and in common, or with truth which here and now is ordered to work.

Only certain conscience is the right rule of morals, and therefore it is never licit to operate with a practically doubtful conscience. The reason is both because, according to the Apostle, Rom. xiv, 23: "all that is not from faith is sin"; and because the agent with a conscience not certain voluntarily admits the danger of transgressing a precept, and therefore, by virtually consenting to its violation, formally sins. But morally certain conscience, even imperfect, suffices; because only that certainty is required which alone for the most part can be had; otherwise the rule of acting, to which man is proximately subject, would be very little accommodated to the human condition. Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 41.

You Will Resolve. 1st. As often as someone doubts whether the act which he is about to place here and now is licit or not, he is bound to apply diligence congruent to the gravity of the matter and the condition of person and place for the inquiry of truth; let him consult upright and skilled men, investigate their practice, and weigh the reasons with the sole zeal for truth; otherwise he exposes himself to the danger of violating the law from negligence in inquiry, and by that very fact sins.

2nd. If he cannot inquire, nor by himself is able to weigh the reasons of each side, nor in another way, for example through reflex principles, free himself from doubt, let him embrace the safer part; because otherwise he would act in practical doubt, that is, with a conscience truly doubtful and without any certain judgment concerning the honesty of the action.

3rd. He who, after diligent and sufficient inquiry has been completed, still doubts whether there is a law commanding or prohibiting, is not bound to obey this law, if nevertheless he can form for himself a conscience from a reflex principle, namely that a law which cannot be found cannot oblige, as will be said below, where probabilism is treated.

4th. Merely negative doubt is to be held as nothing, because it is founded upon no reason at all, or upon a very light one. Therefore, even if it remains, because it cannot bring it about that the opposite moral certainty is overthrown, nevertheless the obligation presses, or liberty stands, according as it existed before. But if a prudent suspicion of error, resting upon a grave motive, arises for you, the doubt ceases to be merely negative, and you are bound to inquire. And so, when hereafter cases of negative doubt occur, you will easily dissolve them, this rule having once been established, and therefore we shall attend only to positive doubt. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 24.

Question 1. Does he who operates with practical doubt concerning the gravity of sin sin gravely?

Response. Affirmatively. For he who acts with a practically doubtful conscience, according to the common principles, sins in that species of sin, both moral and theological, concerning which practically, while he acts, he doubts. The reason is that he surely violates the grave obligation of taking care lest through voluntary ignorance or inadvertence he fall into transgressions of the law which could be grave.

Question 2. What is to be done in the case of a perplexed conscience, namely when someone, placed between two precepts, remains doubtful which of the two he ought to follow?

Response. 1st. Consult, if you can, a confessor or other prudent men, because in that case ignorance is vincible. 2nd. If you cannot consult and there is a necessity of acting, because the action cannot be suspended without grave harm, choose what seems to you the lesser evil, yet not so that you do evil, but so that you recede more from evil. Know, moreover, that the law of an inferior order ought to yield to the law of a superior order. 3rd. If each precept seems to you equally grave, choose anything, and you will not sin; for there is not given a necessity of sinning. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 10.

Note 1°. Doubt is distinguished threefold: speculative, speculative-practical and practically-practical. Merely speculative is that which turns upon the nature, substance, value, quality and condition of things, whether speculative or moral: as if you doubt whether the angelic nature is universal, whether baptism conferred in rose water is valid. Speculative-practical is that which turns upon the goodness or malice, licitness or illicitness of an act in itself and in common, which goodness or malice is called objective and material: as if you doubt whether it is licit to baptize in rose water, to journey on a feast day, etc. Practically-practical is that which turns upon the goodness or malice, licitness or illicitness of an act to be done here and now, with all the circumstances attended to, which is called formal goodness or malice: as if you doubt whether it is licit for you here and now to baptize in rose water a dying infant.

What I said of doubt must be said of judgment, namely that it is threefold: merely speculative, concerning the nature or quality of things; speculative-practical, concerning the objective goodness or malice of actions; and practically-practical, concerning the formal goodness or malice of actions.

That the doubt or judgment which we call speculative-practical may be such, it must regard action in itself indeed, but as to be exercised, or in order to practice, and to influence it, inasmuch as from it the doubt or judgment practically-practical is formed: otherwise it will be purely speculative. But in the doubt or judgment alone practically-practical is situated the doubtful or probable conscience.

Note 2° doubt is again distinguished into negative and positive. Negative is, when there are no reasons or only very light ones for or against; and, as I already noted, it is improperly called doubt, and better named nescience or ignorance. Whence they err who recognize this doubt alone as doubt properly so called. Positive doubt is, when because of contrary reasons, on either side equally or nearly equally probable, the mind fluctuates suspended between both parts, assenting to neither.

Note 3°. Certitude, which is opposed to doubt, can be distinguished threefold: metaphysical, physical and moral. Metaphysical certitude is the adherence of the mind to truth which cannot be otherwise even by God, as: The whole is greater than its part; anything either is or is not. Physical certitude is the assent to truth which cannot be otherwise according to ordinary laws, although it could be otherwise through miracle, as a faggot thrown into fire to burn. Moral certitude is the assent to some truth founded and reasonable without fear of the opposite, although the opposite could absolutely and without miracle be, such as is that which is had in law through two witnesses worthy of faith, or that which is had about the baptism of anyone from the baptismal register; because, although it could happen that two witnesses held worthy of faith depose falsely, and that the pastor wrote falsely, yet that rarely happens, and it is a remote danger, which ought not prudently to be feared: otherwise there would be no end of doubts. These observations run through various parts of Theology; whence, set down once for all, they are to be firmly retained in memory.

I say: It is never licit to act with a doubtful conscience, probable or more probable properly so called ¹] ¹ This is to be understood with the supposition that, the conscience not yet formed at least by reflex principles, the practically-practical doubt persists; for it is always true that it is not licit to act except with certitude. It is asked what is to be done in the case of the morally permanent conscience concerning the goodness of the act, and this certitude alone confers formal honesty upon the act, whatever be the goodness of this act objectively or materially taken.

instead of a probable or more probable practically-practical doubt or judgment concerning the formal goodness or malice of the action; but only a morally certain conscience is the rule of our actions. It is certain and common, even among probabilists.

It is proved. 1° Conscience is the immediate rule of our actions. But a rule ought to be certain and infallible, at least morally: otherwise it would not be proposed as a rule, but would be regulable. Therefore.

2° He who acts with a doubtful conscience, probable or only more probable, does not act prudently. Therefore he sins. — The antecedent is proved. That anyone may act prudently, he ought to have no reasonable and founded fear of the formal dishonesty of his act; for the act of prudence is always practically true and morally certain. But he who acts with a doubtful conscience, or one only probable and more probable, concerning the formal honesty of his act, has a reasonable and founded fear of the formal dishonesty of his act, because those consciences do not go beyond the bounds of probability or opinion, whose account it is that it is with reasonable and founded fear of the opposite; and otherwise, if there were not reasonable and founded fear, it would already be moral certitude. — It is confirmed. He who takes a drink of which he doubts whether it is poisoned, or which he believes only probably and more probably not to be poisoned, while he has another not poisoned, acts imprudently. Therefore similarly.

3° He who does what he reasonably suspects offends God, by this very fact offends him, and contemns his friendship; just as he who would do what he reasonably suspects offends a friend, by this very fact would offend him and contemn his friendship. But he who acts with a doubtful conscience, probable or only more probable, does what he reasonably suspects offends God. Therefore.

[Perplexed, that is, when someone, placed between two precepts, one of which cannot be fulfilled without the other being omitted, remains in doubt which of the two he ought to prefer, and believes he will sin by omitting either one.

I answer. 1ª If the perplexed person can suspend the action, he is bound to defer it until he has consulted his confessor or another man expert and prudent, by whose judgment his conscience be formed.

2° If he cannot consult and there is present necessity of acting, because the action cannot be suspended without grave damage, then he is bound to choose the lesser evil, avoiding rather the transgression of the natural law than of the divine or human positive law; for the law of the lower order must always yield to the law of the higher order. It is supposed however that, in departing from the precept of lesser weight, he does not intend evil, but rather so acts as to avoid evil.

3° If both precepts seem equally grave to him, or he does not discern what the lesser evil is, let him choose whichever part, he will not sin, because in this case the liberty required for sinning formally is lacking, and from elsewhere necessity of sinning is never given. — So St. Alph., lib. I, tract. 1, n. 10, and Gury, n. 43.]

We resolved in the preceding dissertation, from the common opinion, that it is not licit to act with a doubtful conscience, probable or more probable, but that only a morally certain conscience is the rule of our actions. Now we ask whether upon an opinion or speculative-practical judgment, probable or more probable, concerning the objective and material honesty of an action, there can be founded mediately, namely through reflex principles intervening, a morally certain conscience concerning the formal and subjective honesty of the action; consequently whether it is licit

I. Conscience is called doubting, not because the dictate or judgment is in itself doubtful — for doubt is a suspension of judgment — but the conscience is called doubting objectively, or terminatively, inasmuch as concerning the doubtful matter itself a man has various practical judgments on either side, which suspend his sentence upon that same matter.

II. Many divide doubt into positive and negative. They call the doubt positive when equal reasons for doubting present themselves on both sides; negative, when no reason for doubting offers itself. This division is chimerical. When no reason for doubting occurs, it is not doubt, but nescience and ignorance, and is so called. For I do not doubt whether the stars be even or odd in number; I simply do not know. Vain likewise is the division of others, by which they say that negative doubt turns upon light reasons, positive doubt upon grave ones. Light reasons induce not a doubt, but a scruple, or a suspicion; and they are to be spurned. No prudent man is moved to doubt by light indications, but despises them.

III. Positive doubt, therefore, which is true doubt, and of which we now dispute, exists when on both sides equal, or nearly equal, weights of reasons present themselves to the intellect. For then the mind, pressed by equal weights, hangs suspended and undecided, and withholds its judgment. Doubt properly so called, therefore, includes a suspension of assent toward both sides, on account of the equality of the reasons.

IV. Question I. Of how many kinds is doubt? Answer. Twofold: of law, and of fact. There is a doubt of law when someone doubts about a law, about a precept, about a vow, or about any obligation whatsoever — for an obligation, in respect of that thing to which it obliges, has the nature of a Law. There is a doubt of fact when it is doubted whether something has been done: for instance, whether you fasted yesterday, whether you heard Mass, whether you recited the Breviary. The same thing can be the matter of a doubt of law and of fact under a diverse aspect. Doubt is further divided into speculative and practical: the former regards the honesty of the action absolutely; the latter, the exercise of the work. You doubt whether it be licit to paint on a feast day, or whether this garment be yours. These are speculative doubts. These persisting, you doubt whether here and now it is licit for you to paint on this feast day, and to retain the garment which you possess. These are practical doubts. You doubt whether you have incurred a censure, or an irregularity. This doubt is speculative. This doubt persisting, you doubt whether it is now licit for you to celebrate. This doubt is practical.

V. Question II. Is it a sin to act with a conscience in doubt about sin? Answer. All affirm that you sin. You doubt whether that contract be licit; and, the doubt remaining, you celebrate the contract: it is certain that in this case you sin. For so long as you do not lay aside the doubt about the justice or injustice of the contract, the intellect remains undecided; and if the will undertakes the work, it is so disposed that it wills to execute it, whether it be, or be not, against the Law of God. For he who acts while doubting exposes himself to the proximate danger of sinning mortally, since the sin is as probable as the absence of sin.

VI. Question III. What is to be said of the distinction which some establish between a doubt of fact and a doubt of law? Answer. Fr. Cardenas, in his Crisis, treatise 1, disputation 6, chapter 6, article 1, teaches that in a question of fact equal weights of witnesses leave the matter undecided, so that the judge cannot pronounce sentence for either side; but he contends that the opposite happens in a question of law. The first part he proves by invincible weight of reasons, and in confirmation adduces many testimonies of both canon and civil law. But these very arguments prove that the same must be said in a question of Law, as I have proved at length in Tome II of the Apparatus, Dissertation I, chapter 6, sole paragraph.

I. "Safe" is taken, first, by comparison with the opposite safe part. The religious state is safer than the lay and the matrimonial; yet each state, the lay and the matrimonial, is safe. Secondly, adversatively to the part that is not safe but doubtful: in which sense only the safer part in doubts is safe; and therefore it is commanded that the safer part be chosen. The safer part is so called by withdrawal from sin; the more probable part, by conformity to the Law and to truth. The safer part in a positive doubt is always to be chosen, as will be demonstrated below.

II. The other rule is: In doubt the condition of the possessor is the better. This rule the Probabilists abuse. This rule has its place in the matter of justice. In good faith you possess a field; an adversary, having brought suit, calls into controversy the title of possession and of ownership. After diligent examination the rights appear altogether equal. Then possession removes the equality, and the field is adjudged to the possessor. This second rule, therefore, is best reconciled with the first — In doubts the safer part is to be chosen — since that part which, over and above the equality of right, brings possession also, comes out the safer. On this ground that other rule is also true: In doubts it is safer to favor the accused. For while the doubt lies between the accused and the plaintiff, it is safer to absolve a doubtful defendant than to condemn him. For of two necessary evils it is safer to choose the lesser; and it is a lesser evil to absolve a guilty man than to condemn an innocent one. The aforesaid rule has no place outside the confines of justice, as we shall demonstrate below against the Probabilists, who are not ashamed to boast the possession of liberty against God himself, that is, against his eternal Law.

III. All affirm that diligence must be applied in the investigation of the truth necessary for laying aside a doubt. But what degree of diligence is necessary, it is difficult to prescribe; the following rules, however, I submit to the judgment of the prudent.

IV. Rule I. Both the gravity of the matter, and the consequences that flow from it, must be regarded. The condition of the person doubting must be kept before the eyes. If that person is distressed by scruples, if he is of a well-ordered conscience, this serves not a little for forming a judgment about the laying aside of the doubt. Not all are bound to the same degree of diligence. A learned man should consult either those more learned than himself, or his equals. He is not bound to go to all, but to those whom he would consult in a grave affair. Rule II. For an unlearned Christian it will suffice to consult his Parish priest or his Confessor, when no solid reason occurs for doubting of his probity and doctrine. Rule III. The circumstance of time must be regarded. For sometimes the affair does not suffer delay; and then, the divine aid having been implored, what prudence suggests must be decided upon. Rule IV. There is required sincerity of soul, and the desire and zeal of inquiring after and acquiring the truth. Now this sincerity, and this zeal for acquiring the truth, is presumed to be present when things are not sought for one's own advantage and utility, with a mind bent on indulging one's own appetites, but all things are ordered to the glory of God and the salvation of one's Neighbor. On the contrary, those do not sincerely inquire after the truth who hunt for opinions favoring their own liberty and advantage, and study to consult those Doctors whom they know to be smooth-spoken and indulgent. Rule V. Fervent and humble prayers must be poured out to God, who enlighteneth every man that cometh into this World. Cry, cease not: Enlighten my darkness. Give me understanding, and I shall live. He who approaches the Father of lights with a sincere and humble heart will obtain the light: because, just as he does not permit us to be tempted beyond our strength, so neither does he suffer our mind to be blinded, when we fervently seek and beg his light.

I. Several difficulties requiring examination are contained in the proposed question. For the doubt regarding the matter of a vow can be manifold. First, you can doubt whether you made the vow, or not. Second, when you are certain that you made it, you can doubt whether you have fulfilled it; you can also doubt about the quantity of the thing promised by the vow. The more celebrated controversy among authors is whether, when the doubt concerns the very making of the vow, the one vowing is bound. And the resolution of this question depends on that never-sufficiently-lamented invention of Probabilism. Much would therefore need to be said here pertaining to that treatise, which, God granting, we shall handle according to its importance, yet within the limits of our own slight ability.

II. Before I approach the matter, I must first set forth the distinction between doubt and light suspicion, or scruple, that is, imprudent doubt. Our discussion here, then, does not concern doubt resting on no probable foundation, which is not a true doubt, but an imprudent suspicion of an anxious mind, or a scruple; and that this is to be rejected, all teach. Castropalao, Leander, the theologians of Salamanca, and other Probabilists soon to be cited, omit this distinction here, and speak absolutely of "doubt," in the sense of the true opinion; whereby a not inconsiderable disservice is done — since, when many inept and irrational doubts occupy the mind, and torment the conscience of certain scrupulous people, the less experienced reader easily persuades himself that the one vowing, doubtful about the making of the vow, is absolutely not bound.

III. Now, then, we speak not of empty doubts, not of scruples and suspicions, but of true doubt, which, on account of probable conjectures on either side, leaves the intellect so suspended and undecided that it cannot form a judgment on either side: it is concerning this true doubt, I say, that there is controversy among authors. Some teach that no one is bound to fulfill a vow whose very making the one vowing doubts. Sánchez (Bk. II, on Marriage, disp. 40, sect. 6, n. 14), López (Part I, Instructions, ch. 25), Henríquez (Bk. XI, ch. 11, n. 9), Egidio de Coninck (Bk. IV, ch. 1, n. 16), Suárez (Vol. V, disp. 34, dub. 10, n. 26), Malder (in III, I-II, q. 19, art. 7, disp. 87), Layman (Bk. II, tract. 1, ch. 5, §4, n. 31), Filliucci (tract. 21, ch. 4, n. 165), Del Bene (tract. 3, on conscience, dub. 3), Martínez de Prado (ch. 31, q. 5, §1), Medina (Bk. I, ch. 14, §7), Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 3, art. 2), Tamburini (Bk. II, ch. 3, §7, near the end, n. 2), Cardinal Diana (Vol. VIII, tract. 12, resol. 18), Sporer (tract. 1, preamble, ch. 1, §1, n. 145), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 1, n. 84), and Probabilists commonly, resting on the principle: "The condition of the possessor is the better one" — the one vowing is in possession of some liberty against the vow, since it is certain that a man is free, but doubtful whether he has bound himself by a vow.

IV. The contrary opinion is upheld by almost all the ancient theologians, and by all those, among more recent ones too, who have declared a righteous and just war on Probabilism. First, I will produce the testimonies of some holy Doctors. St. Thomas, in express words, teaches that in a doubtful vow the safer part is to be chosen (Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1, qc. 2, ad 3): "If, however, he doubts how he behaved in vowing, he ought to take the safer way, lest he commit a wrong." St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, §5, before §6): "If, however, they doubt whether they intended to bind themselves, it must be said that, since one is in doubt whether one can, or cannot, fulfill it, it is safer to do so, lest that day be prolonged, or transferred to some other good thing." Likewise §10, near the end: "In the third case, however, when there is doubt, since one who exists in doubt whether he transgresses the vow, and consequently sins mortally, is bound to place himself in a safe position — namely, that he not transgress the vow." The reason for this is drawn by these Doctors from the sacred canons; for Pope Eugene I, in a certain decree (Bk. IV, tit. 1, on betrothal and marriage): "In matters that are doubtful, what we consider more certain, we ought to hold." And Innocent III (ch. Illud, on excommunicated Clerics): "In doubtful matters, the safer path is to be chosen." And Clement III (ch. Ad audientiam, on voluntary or accidental homicides), says: "In doubtful matters we ought to choose the safer opinion." Nearly all the more ancient theologians agree with these Fathers — the Summae of Rosella, Trovamala, Pisanella, Sylvestrina, Armilla, whose texts, when we treat of doubt, we shall give in their own express words, for all of them may be read at the source. I will now indicate some among the more recent ones. Vázquez (I-II, q. 1, art. 6, disp. 65, ch. 3, and disp. 66, ch. 1), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 15, q. 4), Salas (unique treatise, sect. 17), Turrianus (q. 49, q. 2), Natalis Alexander (Bk. IV, art. 21, and disp. 66, ch. 2, q. 21, tract. 8, n. 162), Sayr (in Clavis Regia, Bk. I, ch. 12, n. 9 and 36), Luiz (Vol. II, disp. 25, q. 21, n. 6), Basile de Marriage (Bk. X, ch. 15, n. 3), Pérez (in Laurea Salmanticensis, cert. 10, dub. 1), Montefinos (I-II, disp. 29, q. 4, §3, n. 121), Pedro Cornejo (in St. Thomas, tract. 8, q. 19, disp. 4, ch. 1), Pontas (s.v. Votum, dub. 3, n. 6), Gonet (tract. 11, on the first precept of the Decalogue, q. 8, dub. 2, n. 1), Antoine (tract. on the virtue of religion, ch. 3, q. 5), and all the other rigorous Probabilorists.

V. The reason for this opinion rests entirely on the sacred canons, which prescribe that in doubtful matters the safer opinion is to be chosen. What of the fact that the very light of rational nature prescribes, in all matters of every kind — whether pertaining to obtaining bodily health or avoiding temporal loss, or acquiring goods — that the safer course be embraced in doubtful matters?

VI. The theologians of Salamanca, and Probabilists commonly, respond that the sacred canons, St. Thomas, and other Doctors, must be understood of practical doubt, but not of speculative doubt. A charming, and quite empty, response indeed! What, I ask you, is this "speculative doubt"? The canons, and the aforesaid Doctors, speak of a doubt of fact — namely, whether the vow was made or not. What speculation is there here? They speak of a doubtful conscience, which has probable reasons for asserting the making of the vow, and equal reasons for denying it — and it is therefore called doubtful because the mind cannot form a judgment on either side, since it hesitates because of equal reasons on either part. If you call this "speculative," all doubts will be speculative. They perhaps understand a "practical doubt" as that which occurs while one must act: for then the agent doubts practically, whenever, while acting, he doubts. But this speculation is vain, and quite ridiculous: for it is necessary that the agent always doubt whenever, while acting, the intellect, on account of equal reasons on either side, remains suspended.

VII. You are mistaken, they say. For there are given principles by which the doubt is laid aside, and a judgment is formed which is called "practically practical." By this judgment, which is also called the "reflex," the clouds of any doubt whatsoever are dispelled. What, I ask you, are such principles, which, the doubt having been dispelled, induce moral certainty? They are, they say, hidden in the depths of human liberty, which cannot be dislodged from its possession except by certainty — since the condition of the possessor is the better one. But this rule holds only in matters of justice, to avoid disputes and confusion in civil society, as jurists themselves, and the Doctors, explain. In other doubtful matters, however, that rule by no means holds — especially in the matter of eternal salvation, which must be preferred to human life, let alone liberty. But more on this invention in its proper place. For now let it suffice to have stated the true opinion concerning the doubtful vow alone.

VIII. I will only point out this: that the theologians of Salamanca (loc. cit., n. 144), following Diana, Trullench, Palao, and the other Probabilists, have descended into such laxity as to teach that the one vowing is free from the vow, even if, being in doubt, he leans more toward favoring the vow — since he has stronger reasons on this side — because, they say, although stronger reasons press in favor of the vow, if these are nonetheless not so efficacious as to generate a certain assent for that part, but still leave the matter doubtful, then the certain possession of the other side must outweigh that inequality, and a prudent judgment must pronounce in its favor.

IX. Two things here I would have you weigh carefully. The first is that, by the adversaries' own admission, our discussion concerns a doubt not light, empty, founded on scruples and inept conjectures, but resting on grave reasons on either side. The second is that, in the aforesaid doctrine, the whole deadly poison of Probabilism lies hidden. Even when stronger reasons press in favor of the vow's having been made, the one in doubt will still be free of the vow! Without doubt. Why? Because the certain possession of liberty can be dislodged from its place not by stronger, and weightier, reasons, but only by the most evident, and most invincible ones. But tell me, first of all: do these stronger reasons render the doubt merely speculative, and not practical? They incline the intellect, at least, more strongly in favor of the vow. The doubt, then, will be direct and practical, not merely reflex. Nothing could be clearer, or more significant, for the integrity of evangelical morals. Then, on what foundation do you assert that human liberty, in a doubtful contest, takes precedence over natural or divine right? For natural and divine right are, in fact, prior to the liberty of the one vowing; indeed, the liberty of the one vowing is born subject to natural and divine right, from which the vow shines forth in the obligation of payment. It is so, you say, when this divine right is really given. But when I doubt whether the vow was made, I doubt whether this divine right exists or not; and, on the other hand, I am certain that I was free from this right before making the vow. This is precisely what we are asking. Why do they wish, when contending at the tribunal of reason between divine right against liberty, and liberty against divine right, that the judgment ought to be given in favor of liberty, even when stronger reasons press in favor of divine right? Human laws, indeed, have established a rule to remove quarrels, lawsuits, and countless other evils — that, in the possession of estates, the condition of the possessor be the better one. But what book of the sacred Scriptures, what Council, what ecclesiastical decree has issued any canon establishing that, in matters pertaining to the business of eternal salvation, the condition of human liberty in possession takes precedence over divine right, when doubts, or disputes, occur on either side — indeed, even when stronger reasons press in favor of the vow, or of divine right? Let them produce a single Scripture, or a single Council, or some Father, or some Doctor of eminent name and authority, who, before the fifteenth century, taught that, in doubts where mortal sin is at issue, the condition of human liberty in possession is the better one. We, on the contrary, establish from Scripture, the canons, and the Fathers, that in doubtful ways the safer is to be chosen, and uncertainties abandoned, when certainties present themselves. But, to drive our adversaries to the wall, let me reduce that rule — "the condition of the possessor is the better one" — to our own case, so that it may be seen to be true even here: natural, or divine, law is itself the will of God, or God himself. God is the first possessor. The will, or liberty, [of man] is born subject to God. Whenever, then, there is doubt about possession, possession stands for God. Better, then, is the condition of him who possesses God, through his own law. See our History of Probabilism and Rigorism, Vol. II, diss. 3, where we have explained this argument at length. But more on this in its proper place.

X. Question I. Is one who is certain of the vow, but doubtful of its execution, bound to its execution? Response: The Probabilists themselves, whom we cited above in n. 3, answer affirmatively — since, they say, in that case the possession of the vow made is certain, but its execution is doubtful: therefore possession stands for the vow. So teach, as I said, Sánchez, Filliucci, Diana, Castropalao, Leander, the theologians of Salamanca, and almost all others. We add our own reason, drawn from the Fathers: that in doubtful matters the safer part is to be chosen.

XI. Question II. Is one who doubts the quantity of the thing promised — say, whether he vowed a hundred or fifty — bound to render a hundred? Response: Probabilists commonly deny this. For they say: if you doubt whether you vowed a hundred, or fifty, you are bound only to fifty; if you doubt whether the vow is perpetual, or for a year, you are bound only for a year; if you know that you promised entrance into religious life, and doubt whether you promised the laxer, or the stricter kind, you are bound only to the laxer — since the obligation is odious, and must be interpreted toward the more lenient side, so that it obliges less.

XII. The contrary opinion, which we embrace, is upheld by the theologians cited above (n. 4), and further by Navarrus (Bk. III, Consilia, on vows, consil. 20, act 18), resting on the most firm principle: that in doubtful matters the safer part is to be chosen. The reason, indeed, that the obligation is odious, and that laws are to be interpreted in the more lenient sense, is less consonant with the evangelical law, in the Probabilists' sense. For laws are to be interpreted, especially natural and divine ones, in the more lenient sense with respect to the soul, not to the flesh, and human appetites. With respect to the soul, however, the more lenient interpretation is that which places it in a place of safety, and leads it by the safer road to the port of eternal salvation — not that interpretation which, by loosening the reins further, and rendering it freer from the sweetest yoke of the evangelical law, exposes it to the dangers of eternal ruin. The one vowing, then, in the case proposed, is bound either to render a hundred, or to preserve perpetual chastity, so as to embrace the safer path; and the same, for the same reason, must be said of other similar cases in which the quantity, quality, or perpetuity of the vow is doubted. I will, however, propose some cases, so that you may attain a clearer understanding.

XIII. Question III. One who vowed to give the Church a chalice, and truly doubts of what material — silver, or gold — he had promised the chalice, is he bound to give a gold chalice, or a silver one? Response: Leander teaches, as a probable opinion (tract. 1, disp. 2, q. 3), that it would suffice in such a case to render a chalice of gilded bronze, or copper — since such a chalice too is suited to any divine use. This author, as usual, always adheres to the laxer opinions. The most common opinion, however, maintains that a golden, or at least a silver, chalice must be rendered, bronze or copper being excluded. This is the only difference among these authors: that some, such as Diana, Del Bene, Trullench, assert that it suffices for the cup to be silver, the rest being of bronze or copper. In this interpretation, however, the custom of that Church to which the chalice is promised to be offered must be considered. For if commonly the chalices of that Church are gold, or silver, the chalice must be gold, or silver, bronze or copper being excluded. So teach Azor (Bk. II, ch. 20, q. 10), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 6, n. 28), Villalobos (Vol. V, tract. 34, n. 54). And this is the more probable opinion.

XIV. Question IV. One who vowed not to approach a woman, but truly doubts whether this concerns fornicatory or conjugal approach — is he bound only to abstain from fornicatory intercourse? Response: Leander teaches (loc. cit., q. 11) — citing Sánchez, Del Bene, and others — that abstinence from fornicatory intercourse alone would suffice, and he judges this more probable on the basis of that principle: "possession stands for liberty." But this abuses the principle even by the Probabilists' own standards. For the one vowing is certain of the vow. Therefore, by these same Probabilists' own standards, it must be presumed that the vow was made according to the nature of its own act. Now the nature, or essential notion, of a vow is that it concerns matters which fall under counsels, or free matter — although, as we have explained above from St. Thomas, it can also concern necessary matter. Now abstinence from conjugal intercourse is a matter of counsel; from fornicatory intercourse, however, it is a matter of precept. The aforesaid vow, then, excludes both conjugal and fornicatory intercourse. This is also gathered from the chapter "Since it was pleasing" on gifts.

XV. Question V. Is one who doubts whether he made the vow before the age of seven, or before the perfect use of reason, bound to keep the vow? Response: Sotus denies this (Bk. VII, q. 3, art. 1), where he treats this doubt in passing, and to whom Palao, Del Bene, and Leander subscribe — who nonetheless says that the contrary opinion is most probable. It is surprising that he did not pronounce it less probable. We say, then, to this matter: he is bound. For it is established that the vow was made, and the excuse is doubtful. It should be added, moreover, that very few people make vows before the age of seven, or before the use of reason: therefore, if a vow was made, it must be presumed to have been made once the use of reason was complete. The more common opinion is defended by Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 1, n. 14), Luiz (opusc. 10, ch. 6), Suárez (Bk. IV, ch. 2, n. 10), Faustus (tract. on Religion, Bk. I, q. 26), Turrianus (in disp. 1, dub. 1), Malder (tract. 10, ch. 1, dub. 4), and several others.

XVI. Question VI. Is one who is certain of the promise made to someone, but doubtful of his intention to bind himself, bound to fulfill the vow? Response: Although Angles denies this (s.v. Ius, 5, n. 10), yet the common opinion, even among the Probabilists themselves, holds that the vow is made valid — since words uttered externally are certain and sure signs of intention; nor is anyone presumed to say what he does not feel; for, once a fact is proven, all things that naturally accompany it are presumed to have occurred. Hence, once profession is proven, the one professing is presumed to have had the legitimate age; and the burden of proof falls on the one who denies it.

XVII. Question VII. Is one who made a vow extorted by fear to be presumed, in doubtful cases, not to have had the intention of binding himself? Response: Sánchez affirms this (Bk. I, on Marriage, disp. 9, n. 11). But the most common opinion holds that the one vowing had the intention of binding himself — since to presume simulation in one vowing, or swearing, is a presumption of a crime; but no one is to be presumed guilty of a crime unless it is proven. Wherefore you favor the one vowing more, if you presume him bound by the vow, than if you absolve him from it — since you cannot absolve him from the vow unless you indicate that he sinned. So teach Sánchez, Suárez, Palao, Del Bene, Fagundez, Bonacina, Trullench, Leander, the theologians of Salamanca, and others commonly.

XVIII. Question VIII. If you doubt, in the aforesaid case, whether you used ambiguous, or restricted, words, are you bound by the vow, or oath? Response: That the vow does not bind in this case is affirmed by Suárez (Bk. II, ch. 33, n. 6), to whom Palao, Leander, Fagundez, Del Bene subscribe. For, they say, in this manner it is not presumed that a crime was committed, but rather it is presumed that there was a sufficient cause for prudent dissimulation. They add, however, that it is necessary for the one vowing to know the modes of equivocation and ambiguity, so that he can, with some foundation, doubt that he used such a locution. But, this opinion aside, we say that the one vowing is bound even in this case: both because in doubtful matters the safer part is to be chosen, and because no one is presumed to have spoken ambiguously, unless reasons occur by which this is proven.

XIX. Question IX. Is one who doubts whether he made a vow while asleep, drunk, or in a state of frenzy, to be presumed to have made his vow in a sound state of mind? Response: Leander teaches (tract. 1, disp. 13, q. 19) that the one vowing who truly doubts whether he vowed in the aforesaid circumstances is free from the vow — since then, he says, it is truly doubted whether there is a vow, or oath, or promise at all, since it is doubted concerning something essentially required for the nature of a vow; and in doubt, favor must be shown to liberty. This opinion is false, and lax beyond measure. Therefore, in fact, with the common opinion, it must be said that the aforesaid one vowing is bound by the vow — since presumption must be gathered from what commonly occurs. Now it very rarely happens that men make vows while drunk, asleep, or in a frenzy. Besides which, in doubtful matters the safer part is to be preferred. What if someone is certain that he made the vow while asleep, or drunk, but doubts whether the sleep, or drunkenness, or frenzy was full — that is, of such a degree as would remove the freedom necessary for a valid vow? Leander answers (loc. cit., q. 20) that the one vowing is absolutely not bound by the vow. But a distinction must be drawn. Absolutely speaking, the presumption favors the one vowing, since he is certain about the sleep, drunkenness, or frenzy: therefore the doubt, as inept, and resting on no valid foundation, is to be dismissed — just as is said of nocturnal pollution, which is not commonly presumed to have occurred with the full consent necessary for mortal sin. When, however, such reasons occur as would not allow the doubt to be prudently dismissed, then the rule presses: in doubtful matters, the safer part is to be chosen.

XX. Question X. Is one who, angry or disturbed, made a vow, and afterward doubts whether he had the necessary use of reason, bound by the vow — especially if, once his anger has subsided, he repents of the vow he made? Response: St. Antoninus discusses this question concerning vows made by angry persons (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, before §1): "Vows, however, which are made by women in childbirth, or in illness, or by men in whatever straits of their own, or of their family, or in disturbance — if they had this intention of binding themselves to God, thinking also of the cause which moved them to vow — namely, illness, or danger — and of the end — namely, the escape from danger, to avoid which they vowed — are to be held binding." The same is taught by St. Thomas. "If, however, they doubt whether they intended to bind themselves, it is safer that they fulfill it, according to Thomas. Note also that one who, angry at his father, or teacher, or drunk, vows, or swears, to enter religious life, is not bound — for what is done in the heat of anger ought to be reckoned as not done; which is true, if it happens so suddenly that he would not have done it after deliberation, and the judgment of reason, which does not require a great delay of time. But when, knowing what he swears, or vows, he does this, he is bound, unless he is excused by reason of a less than full deliberation — just as one who, inflamed by the heat of concupiscence, or having drunk well, though not drunk, swears to take a wife, is compelled to take her, unless he was altogether drunk." This assertion is confirmed by the following reason: just as deliberation is required for a vow, so too for a mortal sin; and although an angry, or drunk, person who kills a man is excused from the fullness of the sin, but not from its entirety, since it is still mortal, because he was not so beside himself as not to know what he was doing — even though he later repents of having done it — for to repent immediately of a sin argues well that it was not done from habit, but does not argue that it was not done from choice, although the judgment of reason was disturbed by passion. That deliberation of time, or age, then, which would suffice to bind oneself to the devil through mortal sin, suffices to bind oneself to God through a vow. It rarely happens, then, that anger, or some other disturbance, so clouds reason as to remove the liberty necessary and sufficient for sinning, and consequently for a valid vow. In doubt, then, of sufficient deliberation, it must be presumed that the necessary liberty was present. But if the doubt cannot be dismissed, then the rule must be observed: in doubt, the safer part is to be chosen. As for the second part of the question, authors commonly teach that repentance following the making of a vow is not an argument of insufficient deliberation — since it is not uncommon for men to repent even of things they did with great deliberation. Only from anger, then, or accompanying disturbance, from subsequent repentance, and other conjectures, can it sometimes be gathered that the one vowing was not perfectly master of himself, as authors commonly establish.

XXI. Question XI. When someone doubts whether the matter of the vow is dishonorable, or evil, is he bound to keep the vow? Authors commonly deny this. The theologians of Salamanca give the reason (n. 147): that the vow is not yet possessed, since there is doubt about what is necessary for its very essence. But this reasoning of "possession" is here futile. One who doubts the wickedness, or dishonorableness, of the matter is not bound to keep the vow, because he would sin by keeping it. For whoever undertakes a work about which he doubts whether it is good or evil, sins.

XXII. Question XII. When someone doubts about the condition of a vow, is he bound to fulfill the vow? Response: The theologians of Salamanca deny this (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 1, §1, n. 145), on account of that so often rejected fallacious rule: that the vow is not possessed until the condition has been fulfilled. Now, when the condition is doubted, the vow itself is doubted. But a doubtful vow does not oblige. We, on the contrary, say that in doubtful matters the safer part is to be chosen; and consequently that the aforesaid one in doubt is bound by the vow in the same way that one who doubts the vow itself is bound by it.

98. Conscience is said to be doubtful, when the motive for believing that a particular law does not exist, or that it is not applicable to the case in hand is based on an opinion more or less probable — i. e., more or less well founded. 1. An opinion is slightly or barely probable when it rests on very weak motives. 2. It is probable, or plausible, when supported by solid reasons, though stronger reasons may uphold the contradictory opinion. 3. It is equally probable with the contradictory opinion when both are supported by equally plausible reasons. 4. It is more probable, when the reasons favoring the opinion are stronger than those opposed to it. 5. It is most probable, when the arguments on which it rests are very strong, while those for the contradictory opinion are very weak.

99. Doubt, as affecting conscience is either speculative or practical. It is a practical doubt, if it regards the formal liceity of a particular act which is about to be performed. Hence, if I act with a practical doubt, I do not know whether or not I am doing wrong and displeasing God; for example: everything considered, I am in doubt whether I shall do wrong by reading a certain book which, I have reason to think, is dangerous to Faith.

Doubt is speculative when it concerns the premises of a syllogism, the conclusion of which is a dictate of conscience: that is, if I doubt either that a certain law exists, or, granting its existence, that it is applicable to this particular case. I doubt, for example, whether by a law of the Church a certain Saturday of the year is a fast day, or, knowing that such a law exists, whether to-day is that particular Saturday; or, again, whether I am excused from fasting to-day by present illness.

100. Thesis XIV. It is never right to act with a practical doubt of conscience.

Proof. To act with a practical doubt of conscience is equivalent to saying: "I may break God's law, and so displease Him by doing this act, yet I will do it any way." But this is never right, because it is a manifest proof of an evil disposition to do the act, even if it were known to be prohibited, and hence shows contempt for God's law.

101. What then must we do, in order to avoid acting with a practical doubt of conscience? We may abstain from acting, if the matter so permits; or we may choose the safer side, that, namely, by which we fulfill the obligation in question; or we may remove the practical doubt. This removal we can sometimes effect by a more careful examination into the principles or facts involved, or by inquiring from competent authorities whether such a law exists, or whether it is applicable to this particular case. This would be to solve the speculative doubt, and is the direct method of getting rid of the practical doubt. But, if we are indeed so circumstanced that it is impossible to make use of the direct method, we may, nevertheless, get rid of the practical doubt, and act in the matter with safety, by applying to the difficulty the reflex principle of moral conduct: "A doubtful law has no binding force."

102. A course of conduct is called safe, if it excludes all danger of formal wrong. Yet one course may be safer than another, for we can make assurance doubly sure by avoiding the possibility of even material wrong. The less safe course, however, must so guard me from formal wrong that I cannot be justly blamed for adopting it. Still, the fact that one opinion is safer than another, does not by itself make it the more probable of the two. Thus, if a neighbor has a less probable claim to a house in my possession, the safer course for me to follow, that I may avoid all possibility of doing him an injustice, would be to give up my claim in his favor; and yet, in point of genuineness, my neighbor's title is supposed to be less probable than mine.