Article II. On Doubtful Conscience

40. • DEFINITION. Doubtful conscience is that which remains suspended concerning the honesty of an action. For doubt is the suspension of assent between opposites ¹.

¹ Carefully observe the distinction between doubt, suspicion, and opinion; which St. Thomas explains briefly thus (II-II, q. 2, art. 1): Certain acts of the intellect have unformed thought without firm assent, whether they incline to neither part, as happens to one doubting; or incline more to one part, but are tempted by some slight sign, as happens to one suspecting; or adhere to one part, yet with fear of the other, which happens to one opining.

DIVISION. A manifold doubt is distinguished, namely:

1. Positive, or negative, according as grave reasons for doubting are present, or only slight ones, or even none: or doubt is positive when the mind suspends assent on account of the apparent equality of reasons; but negative when the mind suspends assent from defect of reasons ².

² Concerning these things St. Thomas says (On Truth, q. 14, art. 1): Our intellect... sometimes is not inclined more to one than to another, either because of the defect of things moving it, as in those problems concerning which we do not have reasons, or because of the apparent equality of those things which move to each part: and this is the disposition of one doubting, who fluctuates between the two parts of contradiction. But sometimes the intellect is inclined more to one than to the other; nevertheless that which inclines it does not move the intellect sufficiently for this, that it determine it totally to one part; whence it indeed accepts one part, yet always doubts about the opposite: and this is the disposition of one opining. These are the words of the holy Doctor; from them gather that certain more recent authors do not accurately confuse positive doubt with the state of one opining for either part. For doubt excludes assent; but opinion has some assent.

2. Of law, or of fact, according as it is concerned with the existence of a law, or its obligation, or with some particular fact.

3. Speculative, or practical, according as it is concerned with abstract cognition of truth and in common, or with truth which here and now is ordered to a work.

But speculative doubt can also be divided into speculative simply, when one doubts about a thing not pertaining to morals; and into speculative-practical, when one doubts about a general principle of morals, or about the goodness of an action taken in itself, and nevertheless the inquiry is not ordered to the work actually to be carried out; but if it is concerned with an action to be posited here and now, it is called by some practical-practical doubt.

41. Principles. - I. It is never licit to operate with a practically doubtful conscience, but the safer part is to be followed. The reason is clear from what has just been said concerning certain conscience, principle 1. - But sometimes it is licit to operate with a speculatively doubtful conscience, namely when, the practical doubt having been laid aside from a practically certain dictate, or from certain reflex principles, conscience is formed, as we shall soon say in treating probabilism.

II. Merely negative doubt must be held as nothing; because it is founded on a reason utterly none, or very slight: therefore even if it remains, nevertheless the obligation urges, or liberty stands ³, according as it existed before; nor can it effect that the moral certitude of the opposite be overturned. But if a prudent suspicion of error arises for you, you are held to inquire. Therefore when hereafter cases of negative doubt occur, once this rule has been established, you will easily dissolve them, and for that reason we shall attend only to positive doubt. - St. Lig., no. 24.

³ Negative doubt is suspension of assent on account of defect of reasons for each part of the contradiction. Therefore, since here on the other side a certain law or liberty is supposed, doubt is taken in a certain broad sense for an empty suspicion.

42. You Will Resolve. - 1. As often as someone doubts whether the act which he is here and now about to posit is licit or not, he is held to apply diligence suitable for investigating the truth, according to the gravity of the matter and the condition of the person and place; let him consult upright and skilled men, investigate their practice, and weigh the reasons with the sole study of truth: for otherwise he exposes himself to the danger of violating the law from negligence in inquiry, and by that very fact sins.

2. If he cannot inquire, nor by himself is able to weigh the reasons of each part, nor in another way, for example through reflex principles, free himself from doubt, let him embrace the safer part; because otherwise he would act in practical-practical doubt, that is, with a truly doubtful conscience, and without any certain judgment concerning the honesty of the action.

3. He who, with diligent and sufficient inquiry having been performed, still doubts whether there is present a law commanding or prohibiting, is not held to obey it; because he can form conscience for himself from a reflex principle, namely, that a law which cannot be found cannot oblige, as will be said below, where probabilism is treated.

4. They act ineptly who, after an act already committed or omitted, inquire among the Doctors or from a Confessor whether they have sinned; for past sin does not depend on the following judgment of a Doctor or Confessor, but on the practical dictate which someone had in acting. - Nevertheless he acts prudently who asks so that he may know the truth, namely, in what way in the future in a similar case he can or ought to conduct himself.

43. Questions. - YOU WILL ASK 1. Whether one operating with practical doubt about the gravity of sin sins gravely?

I answer. Yes. For he who acts with a practically doubtful conscience, according to common principles sins with that species of sin, both moral and theological, about which practically, while he acts, he doubts. The reason is that he violates an obligation surely grave of taking precautions lest through voluntary ignorance or inadvertence he fall into transgressions of the law which can be grave.

YOU WILL ASK 2. Whether he sins gravely who knows that his action is evil, but does not advert to its gravity?

I answer. Some judge that this man sins gravely or lightly according as the object of sin is in itself grave or light; but others always gravely ⁴; finally others only venially, provided that he does not apprehend grave malice, at least in confusion; which nevertheless cannot be supposed where the matter treated is notably grave ⁵. - St. Lig., no. 23.

⁴ These namely suppose this man so disposed in mind that he wishes to act even if the fault is grave.

⁵ Nevertheless these opinions can scarcely be called opposed, because they treat not of the same hypothesis, but of a diverse one; wherefore they can easily be reconciled.

YOU WILL ASK 3. What must be done in the case of a perplexed conscience, when namely someone, placed between two precepts, remains doubtful which of the two he ought to follow?

I answer. Hold the following rules in perplexity:

1. Consult, if you can, a Confessor or other prudent men; because in that case ignorance is vincible.

2. If you cannot consult, and there is a necessity of acting, because the action cannot be suspended without grave harm, choose what seems to you the lesser evil, yet not so that you do evil, but so that you recede more from evil. But know that the law of an inferior order ought to yield to the law of a superior order.

3. If each precept seems equally grave to you, choose anything, and you will not sin; for there is not given a necessity of sinning. - St. Lig., no. 10. - See Cases, no. 43.